Paying for Terumah

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The Gemora cites a braisa: If someone steals terumah but did not eat it, he pays keifel (double) the value of the terumah. If he ate it (accidentally after he stole it), he pays twice the principle plus one fifth. The value of one principle plus one fifth is from chulin produce, and one principle is paid with money according to the value of terumah.

The gemora in Pesachim (32a) is uncertain what the halachah is if one steals terumah from a Kohen and he eats it. Does he pay according to the measure – that is, he pays with unconsecrated produce in the amount of terumah produce that he stole – even if the produce went up in value? Or perhaps he pays according to the value which he stole, and therefore, if the produce price went up in value, he can give less produce which equals the value in which he stole. The Gemora does not resolve this.

The Mishnah Lamelech wonders how it would be evaluated according to value. Do we evaluated how much the stolen terumah itself is worth (which would be less than chulin), or do we view it as if it would have been chulin produce? He cites an opinion of the Ra”sh that it is evaluated as if it would have been chulin produce.

The Tosfos Yom Tov derives from Rashi in our sugya that he pays according to the value of terumah.

The Minchas Chinuch makes the following distinction: If a non-Kohen eats terumah that belongs to him (it was inherited from his mother’s father), he can pay according to the value of terumah, for the payment is not on account of stealing; rather, it is to receive atonement for his sin. However, a non-Kohen who steals terumah and eats it, he must pay according to its value as if it would be chulin produce. This is because of the following: If he would pay a lesser amount of chulin produce, immediately after he designates the produce for payment, which serves as his atonement, the produce becomes terumah. This would cause the price to drop, and it would emerge that he is paying less than the value of terumah in which he stole.

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A Single Grain is Sufficient

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Rabbi Chiya bar Avin inquired of Rav Huna (Kiddushin 58) : Is the “benefit of gratitude” regarded as money or not?

The Gemora comments: Let us say that this is a matter of a Tannaic dispute, for we learned in a braisa: If one steals the tevel (untithed produce) of his fellow, he is obligated to pay him for the value of the entire tevel (including the terumah and ma’aser that is mixed in, according to its value to him based upon his ability to choose who he wants to give them to). Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah says: He is only obligated to pay him for the value of the chulin. It must be that Rebbe holds that the ability to choose who to give something to has a monetary value, while Rabbi Yosi holds it does not.

The Gemora rejects this, and gives an alternate explanation to their argument. Everyone holds that the matanos (gift portions for the Kohen) that were not yet separated are considered as if they were separated, and the “benefit of gratitude” is not regarded as money, and the dispute is regarding Shmuel’s ruling, for Shmuel said: One grain of wheat can exempt an entire pile (and there would be no need to separate any more terumah). Rebbe holds of Shmuel’s ruling (and the thief would be required to pay the full value, for the owner could have exempted himself with one grain of wheat), and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah does not.

The Acharonim ask that Shmuel is only discussing the Biblical requirement, but the Chachamim instituted that one must give at least one sixtieth of his produce to the Kohen as terumah! If so, the thief should be exempt from paying the value of terumah that he is Rabbinically required to give!?

The Oneg Yom Tov answers based on the Tosfos Ri”d, who says that even Rabbinically speaking, one grain of wheat can exempt an entire pile from the prohibition of tevel. The Chachamim instituted that there is a mitzvah of giving to the Kohen. This, however, the owner could claim that he would not have given, and the thief would therefore be required to pay the entire amount.

The Mishnah Lamelech disagrees and holds that if one does not give at least one-sixtieth to the Kohen, it is Rabbinically regarded as tevel. Accordingly, the thief should not be required to pay the entire amount!?

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Holy Thoughts

The Gemora states (Daf Yomi: Gittin 30b - 31a) that one can separate both terumah gedolah and terumas ma’aser with a thought and one does not need to physically or orally designate the terumah.

There are certain mitzvos which require one to contemplate the mitzvah, such as loving HaShem, fearing HaShem and other such mitzvos. There is even a situation where if one sought to perform a mitzvah and he could not complete it because of extenuating circumstances, it is considered as if he performed the mitzvah. Thus, thoughts play an important part in serving HaShem.

Rav Chaim Volozhiner writes in Nefesh HaChaim that one who entertains immoral thoughts is worse than the Roman general Titus, who defiled the Holy of Holies, because a gentile does not have the capability of reaching high spiritual levels, whereas a Jew has the ability to reach very high spiritual levels, and improper thoughts defile the spiritual Holy of Holies. This idea should teach us that not only do we have to be pure in our actions but we must also keep our thoughts pure and holy.

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Cutheans

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 25a) cites a braisa: If someone buys wine from amongst the Cutheans (converts to Judaism after an outbreak of wild animals in Eretz Yisroel and their conversion was debated as to its validity; they observed some commandments, but not others), he should say the following: “The two lugin (a measurement) that I will eventually separate (from the one hundred lugin in total) are terumah (tithe for the kohen), ten are ma’aser rishon (tithe for the Levite), nine are for ma’aser sheini (to be eaten in Yerushalyim),” and after redeeming the ma’aser sheini (with coins), he can drink right away. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Shimon forbid this leniency.

Tosfos explains that although the Cutheans observed the mitzvos that are expressly written in the Torah, and therefore, it would be safe to assume that they already separated terumah and ma’aser, nevertheless, they are only trusted with respect to the food which they eat. However, the produce which they sell to others, they are not trusted, for the Cutheans were not particular about the transgression of lifnei iver (placing a stumbling block in front of a blind man). Tosfos in Sukkah (23b) explains further that understood that verse only in its literal sense. They maintained that it is forbidden to place a stumbling block in front of a blind man, but there is no prohibition against causing someone else to sin.

However, Tosfos asks: Would selling the produce without separating terumah and ma’aser not be regarded as stealing from the Kohanim? Stealing is a prohibition that they seemingly did observe!

Tosfos answers that since terumah and ma’aser is considered money that has no claimants (for which Kohen is regarded as its owner), it was not considered stealing in their eyes.

Other Rishonim add that, in truth, it is not regarded as stealing. Stealing is only when one takes something away from an owner who can make a claim to it. Since the Kohanim cannot forcibly take the produce from him, it is not considered stealing.

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The Ra”n Elucidated - Daf 3

Delaying his Nezirus - The Gemora asks (Nedarim 3b): How does one violate the prohibition of Not to delay by nezirus? If one says, “I am a nazir,” he is automatically a nazir! If he eats grapes or drinks wine, he has violated the prohibition of a nazir, but he has not delayed!?

Rava answers: It is applicable in the following case: If one says, “I will not leave this world without becoming a nazir first,” he has an obligation from that moment on to become a nazir. (Since he might die at any moment, he is required to become a nazir immediately; otherwise, he is delaying.)

Rava cites proof to this concept from the following halacha: If a Kohen says to his wife: “Here is your get on the condition that it should take effect one moment before my death,” she is forbidden from eating terumah immediately because we are concerned that he will die the next moment. This same logic applies in this case of nezirus as well. We are concerned that he will die at any moment; therefore, he is obligated to become a nazir immediately.

The Ran explains that there is a distinction between the two cases. If she would eat terumah and her husband wouldn’t die, she has not violated any prohibition. However, he is obligated to become a nazir immediately, and if he does not, he has violated the prohibition against delaying (even though he didn’t die yet). This is because it is as if he said, “It is upon me to become a nazir in a manner that there is no concern that I will not be able to fulfill this vow of nezirus before I die.”

He asks: When an individual makes a vow to bring an offering, he is not regarded as delaying the fulfillment of his vow, unless three festivals have passed. Shouldn’t we allow the person to become a nazir within three festivals; why is he immediately regarded as procrastinating?

He answers: If one vows that he will bring an offering immediately, he is required to bring it immediately. If he procrastinates at all, he is regarded as delaying and he has violated the prohibition against delaying. He is only allowed to wait three festivals if he vowed to bring an offering without imposing any deadline. Here, we interpret his nezirus vow to mean that he wants to become a nazir immediately; any delay will be regarded as violating the terms of his vow.

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Terumah More than a Sixth

The Gemora (Kesuvos 100a) asks: Why is this case (an agent undercharging for the property of an orphan) any different than that which we learned in the following Mishna: If one tells an agent, “Separate terumah for me (without specifying an amount), he should separate according to what the agent perceives is the mindset of the owner (either one-fortieth, one-fiftieth or one-sixtieth). If he cannot ascertain what the owner would want, he should separate one-fiftieth. If the agent has separated one in forty or one in sixty as terumah, the terumah is nevertheless is valid. (It is evident that although the agent has made a mistake, his actions are nevertheless valid?)

The Gemora answers: By the terumah, the agent has a valid excuse; he can say that he figured that the owner would separate terumah in a stingy manner or generously; however, in this case (where the agent charged too little for the property), the owner may tell the agent, “You should not have made a mistake.”

The Beis Yaakov asks: Isn’t the case of terumah a case where the agent erred in an amount which is more than a sixth; everyone would agree that the sale is invalid?

He answers: Since it is extremely common to err in this regard when separating terumah; even more than a sixth is regarded as having the same halacha as precisely a sixth.

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The Apple doesn't Fall Far Away

The Mishna (Kesuvos 57a) had stated regarding the amount of terumah a husband may provide his wife: Rabbi Tarfon says: They give her everything (all her food) of terumah. Rabbi Akiva says: Half of her food must be chulin (for the days in which she is tamei and therefore prohibited from eating terumah) and the other half may be terumah.

Abaye said (58a): This argument only applies to a daughter of a Kohen who is betrothed to a Kohen; however, regarding a daughter of a Yisroel who is betrothed to a Kohen, everyone agrees that half of her food must be chulin and the other half may be terumah (the chulin is needed for the days that she is tamei; a daughter of a Kohen is familiar with the halachos of terumah (from her father’s house), and she knows that the terumah must be sold when she is tamei and exchanged for other food).

Rabbi Braun, in his sefer She’orim Mitzuyanim B’halacha notes that this is the custom of the world; that which the daughter observes in her parent’s house is the manner in which she acts after she is married.

This can be seen from the Gemora above (23a) records an incident where the daughters of Shmuel were taken captive. They were taken to Eretz Yisroel from Bavel and leaving their captors outside, they entered the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Chanina and proclaimed, “We were captured but we are pure.” Rabbi Chanina permitted them to marry Kohanim (based on the principle of happeh she’assar; for the very mouth that would have rendered them forbidden to Kohanim is the mouth that has permitted them). Immediately afterwards, their captors entered the Beis Medrash. Rabbi Chanina said: It is evident that these women are the children of a halachic master (for they had known to speak to the Beis Din before their captors entered; our knowledge of them being taken captive came through their mouth and not from their captors).

Unfortunately, this can be the case in a negative manner as well. The Gemora in Sukkah states that if a child talks in a crude manner in the market, it is obvious that he heard this type of language from his parents in the house.

It is incumbent upon all parents to be constantly aware of their own behavior and manner of speech, especially, when their children are present.

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Food for Thought - Kesuvos 58

*** There are several different opinions as to the amount of terumah a groom should provide to his bride prior to the nisuin.

Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira said: We give her two thirds terumah and one third chulin (unconsecrated produce).

Maharshal comments: An average time for a woman to menstruate (consequently, she is tamei and forbidden from eating terumah) is once every thirty days. The normal flow of blood is for three days. In addition, she must observe seven days of cleanliness prior to becoming tahor and only then will she be permitted to eat terumah again.

Rav Elyashiv Shlita asks: Where did the Maharshal find that an ordinary woman menstruates for three days? It is our custom to wait five days!?

*** The Mishna had stated: The yavam does not entitle his yevamah to eat terumah.

The Gemora explains the reason for this: It is written [Vayikra 22:11]: The acquisition of his money, he may eat of it. Only a Kohen’s own acquisition may eat terumah; however, a yevamah is the acquisition of his brother, not his own.

Rashi maintains that even if the yevamah began eating terumah while her husband was alive, she will be required to cease eating terumah once he dies.

Rabbeinu Tam disagrees and holds that Biblically, once a yevamah obtained the right to eat terumah, she preserves that right even after the husband dies. It is merely a Rabbinical prohibition; the verse cited in the Gemora is only an asmachta (used as support for the Rabbi’s decree).

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Shiurim (183) asks: Why does Rabbeinu Tam hold that the yevamah is Biblically permitted to eat terumah even after her husband died? She is not the wife of a Kohen any longer; she doesn’t have any offspring from the Kohen (which would have allowed her to continue eating terumah) and she is not yet the acquisition of the yavam!?

[Perhaps, this challenge can be answered by examining the concept of the zikah-attachment between the yavam and the yevamah.]

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INFALLIBILITY

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Elozar bar Tzadok said: I testified once in my life regarding the genealogical status of a person, and through that testimony, I elevated a slave to the genealogically qualified.

The Gemora asks: Do you think that he actually elevated a slave to the genealogically qualified? Hashem does not even allow the animal of a righteous person to transgress (referring to the animal of Rabbi Pinchas of Yair, who would not eat untithed produce); certainly Hashem would not bring a stumbling block to the righteous person himself!

The Gemora answers: Rather, Rabbi Elozar bar Tzadok wanted to elevate a slave to the genealogically qualified, but he realized at the end that he was in fact a slave. The Gemora explains the incident: Rabbi Elozar was in the city of Rabbi Yosi when he observed them giving terumah to a slave in the granary. He went and testified regarding his lineage in the city of Rabbi Yehudah. (He then realized that he could not testify regarding his genealogy, for even though, in Rabbi Yehudah’s locale, they would elevate one’s status on the evidence of having received a share of terumah, that was only because they didn’t give a slave terumah when he wasn’t in the presence of the master, whereas, in Rabbi Yosi’s locale, they did give terumah to a slave in absence of the master, but they didn’t testify regarding his genealogy based on that evidence.)

Tosfos s.v. salka da’atach states that the text of our Gemora should not have the challenge from the fact that Hashem does not even allow the animal of a righteous person to transgress; certainly Hashem would not bring a stumbling block to the righteous person himself. This principle is applicable only to the inadvertent consumption of forbidden foods. (The reason for this is because it is degrading for the righteous to eat forbidden foods.) Here, the scholar did not violate any prohibition by elevating the status of the slave; this would not be included in the protection that Hashem provides for the scholars.

Reb Dov Zupnik from Kollel Iyun Hadaf discusses this Tosfos at length.
THE DAFYOMI DISCUSSION LIST
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Yerushalayim
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld

Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu asked:

I understand that a chacham can decide if the Bet Din has erred. If he knows it erred but nevertheless goes by its decision to allow something forbidden, he is guilty. But in the Torah we are commanded that we must follow decisions, even if we are told "left is right and right is left". In Horayot, the chacham is deciding whether to follow the bet din or not, thereby putting himself above the bet din. Please clarify.
Shvua tov--Tzvi

Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, Bet Yatir Israel

Shmuel K. asked:

Our Mishna states that if the individual knew the the Psak of Bet Din was wrong, and yet follows their Psak, he is liable. Yet we see many cases in Shas that individuals are forced to follow the majority, Rov, and do things that they feel is Asur. In these cases the individual knew the Bet Din was wrong, and yet we see it is a Mitzvah to follow them. I.e.. 1 - Bava Metziah 59B, R. Eliezer Ben Horkanis, and the oven 2 - Rosh Hashana 25B, and the debate as to which day is Yom Kippur. Are we to say that our Mishna is referring to a case, where the individual did not share his information with the Bet Din. But had he shared his information, and they don't accept it. Then he is obligated to follow the Bet Din, even though it is against his beliefs?

Thank You,
Shmuel Katz

Aurel Littmann asked:

How could beis din err? Did they not have daas torah that would have prevented them from erring? The donkey of a rabbi would not eat food that was not tithed...certainly these rabbis? Many stories are said of R.Moshe how he did not err in permitting agunos....where it was easy to err as people got separated during the war...but he had siyato d'shmayo.

What is the halacha of lo sosuru min... where if the rabbis tell you something that you may not fully understand, still follow them...in the first mishnah in horeyos ... if one suspects that the beis din paskened wrong he should not follow them!? Does the first mishnah show that we don't have a concept of papal infalibility? But, again...when is one to follow daas torah?

The Kollel replies:

(a) Let us first refer to the words of the RAMBAN in Sefer ha'mitzvos la'Rambam, Shoresh ha'Rishon (p. 24 in Frankel edition):

"And one who transgresses the words of the Sanhedrin of his generation, and relies on his own opinion, has transgressed this Lo Saa'seh (of Lo Sasur) and this Aseh. Even if Beis Din is divided on the issue, we follow the majority as it is said in Sanhedrin 88.... And one who transgresses and relies on his own opinion is a Zaken Mamrei... and this is what is said in the verse regarding one who acts 'b'Zadon' not to heed the Kohen. For the Written Torah which was given to us by Moshe Rabeinu A'H clearly will not be understood in the same way by each person, and therefore Hashem decreed that we follow the Sanhedrin in whatever they say, whether they have received the interpretation through transmission or whether they interpret the Torah as they understand it, for the Torah was given according to the understanding of the Sanhedrin.

"And this is what is written in the Sifri: 'Even if they tell you regarding right that it is left.' For that is the Mitzvah of the Giver of the Torah -- that a dissenter should not say, 'I shall permit this to myself for I know clearly that they are mistaken,' for we will reply to him, 'It is this that you are commanded (i.e. to follow the Torah according to the Sanhedrin's interpretation), as Rebbi Yehoshua conducted himself with Raban Gamliel on the Yom Kipur of the latter's calculation, as related in the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah.

"However, there is a contingency, as can be seen in the Gemara in Horayos 2, which is that if there was in the time of the Sanhedrin a scholar who had reached the level of Hora'ah and the Sanhedrin ruled to allow an Isur, and this scholar thinks that they have made a mistake, he may not listen to them and be lenient with himself, but rather he should observe the stringency with regard to his own conduct, and surely if he was actually a member of the Sanhedrin... he must come before them and voice his objections, and if they all agreed to dismiss his objection and his reasoning, he must then follow their ruling."

(b) We do not believe in infallibility, nor do we believe in the pope. Tosfos throughout Shas (Shabbos 12b, Gitin 7a, Yevamos 99b, etc.) says in the name of Rabeinu Tam that "Ein ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu Mevi Takalah Al Yedeihem" applies only to where the Chacham eats something Asur, but not with regard to a ruling that a Chacham makes for someone else or with regard to a transgression that does not involve eating. (Everywhere the Gemara seems to cite this principle with regard to another type of mistake, Rabeinu Tam changes the Girsa.)

(c) As for the rulings regarding Agunos, although in general there is Siyata d'Shemaya in any Pesak Halachah and mistakes are rare, the Agunah situation is something else entirely. If the husband were to arrive, it would not be because the Rav erred in his understanding of the Torah's laws; he may have ruled correctly, in accordance with the Torah, and decided that the evidence that was presented sufficed to permit the woman to get married. However, the husband may actually be alive (because the Torah does not require 100% certain evidence to remarry; a near certainty will suffice). Rav Moshe says about such situations that a Rav has Siyata d'Shemaya that since his Pesak was correct according to the parameters of the Torah, nothing wrong will come about because of his correct Pesak (and the husband will not be alive).

Here, in contrast, we are talking about a mistaken Pesak, where the judges erred in their interpretation of the Torah's laws. Such a mistake may have come about because the Sanhedrin were not on the impeccable level that Hashem expected of them, or because the people of the generation were not fit.

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RETROACTIVELY NOT MARRIED AND THE CONSEQUENCES - Yevamos 90 - Daf Yomi

Rav Chisda attempts to bring a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: If a husband annulled his letter of divorce (that was sent to his wife in the hands of an agent), it is annulled (even though he nullified it in front of a Beis Din in the absence of his wife or the agent); these are the words of Rebbe. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel said: He may neither annul it nor add a single condition to it, since, otherwise, of what avail is the authority of the Beis Din (since Rabban Gamliel the Elder ordained that such an annulment must not be made, since the woman in her ignorance of it might marry again and thus unconsciously give birth to illegitimate children). Now, even though, the letter of divorce may be annulled in accordance with Biblical law, we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world.

Rabbah rejects this proof and states: Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.)

As I was saying the Daf, I was asked the following question: If the Rabbis revoked the marriage retroactively, would she be permitted to marry a Kohen?

Since we are presently located in Marshall, Indiana, we do not have all the necessary seforim to discuss this in depth, but here is a brief synopsis of the topic matter.

Tosfos in Gittin (33b) goes to such an extent as to say that she was not considered a married woman, and if someone had cohabited with her during the time that she was "married," he would not be liable for cohabiting with a married woman, since the Rabbis revoked her marriage retroactively.

The Ramban in Kesuvos (3b) writes that there would be a Rabbinical prohibition retroactively, and she would be regarded as a divorcee, and hence, she would be forbidden to a Kohen.

Some say that she is forbidden to a Kohen because it "smells" like a get.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger discusses the following case: If she was a daughter of a Yisroel who married a Kohen, and therefore ate terumah during her "marriage," would it be regarded retroactively as if she ate terumah as a zar?

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TERUMAH FACTS - Yevamos 81 - Daf Yomi

Rashi and many other Rishonim maintain that the requirement to separate terumah from figs and other fruits from a tree is only Rabbinical even in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh. The Biblical obligation of terumah only applies to grain, olives and grapes. The Gemora, that mentions Rabbinical terumah in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh can be referring to figs.

The Rambam (Terumos 2:1) holds that there is a Biblical obligation to separate terumah from all fruits on a tree. The Gemora, that mentions Rabbinical terumah in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh can be referring to vegetables or terumah from any land outside of Eretz Yisroel.

It emerges from our Gemora that there is an argument between Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish if there is a Biblical requirement to separate terumah nowadays. The Rambam (ibid. 26) rules in accordance with Rish Lakish that there is only a Rabbinical obligation to separate terumah nowadays. The Ra’avad disagrees, and states that the halacha follows Rabbi Yochanan.

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IS A CHALALAH AN ORDINARY BAS YISROEL? - Yevamos 74 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora asks: Terumah is also not eaten by all the offspring of Aaron because a chalalah (a female offspring of a Kohen and a woman who is forbidden to him because he is a Kohen) is not permitted in terumah.

The Gemora answers: A chalalah is not classified as an offspring of Aaron.

It emerges from the Gemora that a chalalah may not eat terumah because she is not considered a Kohenes.

The Keren Orah inquires: Can a chalalah that marries a Kohen eat terumah? Can we say that just as a daughter of a Yisroel, who marries a Kohen may eat terumah, so too, the chalalah, who is married to a Kohen can also eat terumah?

Tosfos (57a) states: A chalalah who marries a Kohen is forbidden from eating terumah even if he married her in a permissible manner.

The Steipler Gaon says that a chalalah is regarded as being on an inferior level than an ordinary daughter of a Yisroel. A chalalah is considered a non-Kohenes forever. A daughter of a Yisroel, who marries a Kohen can be classified as a Kohenes, whereas a chalalah is removed from that status forever.

Furthermore, he states that a chalalah has an inherent disqualification from Kehunah besides being classified as a non-Kohenes.

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WIFE OF A KOHEN - Yevamos 57 - Daf Yomi

Reb Elchonon Wasserman states a distinction between the wife of a Kohen eating terumah and the Kohen’s Canaanite slaves and slavewomen. Although their entitlement to eat terumah is derived from the same verse, “An acquisition of his money,” there is a basic distinction between the two of them.

A Canaanite slave and slavewomen do not have any elevated status by the fact that they now belong to the Kohen. The Kohen is permitted to feed his animals terumah, and so too, he can feed his slaves terumah. This is why there is no halacha regarding a slavewoman of a Kohen committing adultery and thereby disqualifying herself from eating terumah. She does not have an inherent right to eat terumah; the Kohen can feed her terumah if he so desires.

The wife of a Kohen is different. By virtue of the fact that she is married to a Kohen, she assumes an elevated status. She has a privilege of eating terumah; it is not necessary for the husband to feed her terumah. She possesses a higher degree of sanctity, but she can lose that as well. If she becomes a zonah or chalalah, she becomes disqualified, and cannot eat terumah any longer.

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