Closer and Majority

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Rabbi Chanina maintains that when the principles of rov, the majority, and karov, close in proximity, conflict with each other, then we follow the principle of majority. And although both principles are of scriptural origin, the principle of majority is superior.

Reb Shmuel Rozovsky is uncertain as to why we would follow that which is “closer.” Is it because that this is a method which clarifies the doubt, for it is more probable that it came from the “closer”? Or perhaps, the probability of coming from the “closer” is just as likely as if it was coming from the “further,” except that there is a halachah that we follow that which is “closer.”

This can be proven from that which Rabbi Chanina said that when there is a conflict between the “majority” and that which is “closer,” we follow the “closer.” If “majority” and “closer” are both logics that clarify to us that which was uncertain, Rabbi Chanina’s halachah would be understandable, for he would be informing us that the clarifier from the fact that it is closer is superior then the clarifier emerging from the majority.

However, the Tosfos HaRosh in Bava Metzia (66b) writes that when we follow a majority that is before us (such as a piece of meat, where we are uncertain if it came from one of the nine stores selling kosher meat, or the one store selling non-kosher meat), that is not because the majority verifies for us that the meat in question came from the kosher shop; rather ,it is the Torah’s law that we follow the majority. Accordingly, if we would say that the logic of following the “closer” is on account of clarification, it would certainly be stronger than a mere “majority.” This proves that following the “closer” is also a Torah law and not based on logic.

If so, the question begs to be asked: How does Rabbi Chanina know that we follow the “closer” and not the “majority”? If they are both halachos without any logic, why is one superior that the other?

He answers that even though they are both halachos and not verifiers, they are distinct from each other. When we follow the majority, the majority resolves the uncertainty. Although the doubt rests before us, the majority is a decider. However, when we follow the ”closer,” it doesn’t resolve the uncertainty at all; it merely tells us that we should not search any longer for where this doubtful item comes from - since we can attribute it to that which is closer. However, when that which is closer conflicts with a majority, it is impossible to assert that the object did not come from that which is further (for the majority tells us that it did); it therefore reverts back to an ordinary case of uncertainty, where we would rule according to the majority.

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Desecrating his Words - Yevamos 34 - Daf Yomi

The Mishna in Makkos states that a person can commit one action of plowing and be liable for eight transgressions.

The Gemora asks: Couldn’t the Mishna list a ninth; if he took an oath not to plow on Yom Tov?

The Gemora answers: He has already been sworn from Har Sinai not to violate Yom Tov and therefore the oath does not take affect.

The Ran explains the principle: An oath must be regarding something voluntary; anything that a person is obligated to do regardless of his oath is not binding. However, this is only relevant to the bringing of a korban chatas if he would violate the oath, but in respect of transgressing the oath intentionally, he would incur the thirty-nine lashes.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks on the Ran from the Gemora in Makkos: The Gemora was discussing the amount of lashes one could possibly receive for committing one action that entails many different transgressions. The Gemora states that an oath cannot be included for a person is sworn from Har Sinai prior to uttering the oath against plowing on Yom Tov. According to the Ran, it should still be included because it is another prohibition that incurs the penalty of lashes?

Reb Akiva Eiger understands the Gemora that the oath does not have any validity whatsoever because of the principle that one prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition.

Reb Shmuel Rozovksy asks: Why don’t both prohibitions take effect simultaneoulsy; the oath does not take effect until the beginning of Yom Tov and that is precisely the same moment that the prohibition against engaging in labor on Yom Tov commences?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman states: The principle that one prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition is not applicable to an oath. He cites a Tosfos as proof to this: Tosfos states that the principle of one prohibition not taking effect on an existing prohibition would not apply to a case where one eats on Yom Kippur and simultaneously carries the food in his mouth from one domain to another. Although, the swallowing of the food causes both transgressions it is regarded as two different actions; swallowing and carrying.

Reb Elchonon explains regarding one who violates an oath by eating something he swore not to eat or by plowing a field when he swore that he wouldn’t; the transgression is not the eating or plowing, but rather the desecration of his words the oath. It is therefore not considered the same action which causes the other prohibition, and the principle of one prohibition not taking effect on an existing one would not be applicable.

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