Half Slave and Half Free

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The braisa states: If someone is half slave and half free-man (he was jointly owned by two men, and one of them set him free), he serves his master for one day and then is free for one day (and so on). Beis Shammai says: You have fixed the problem for his master, but you have not solved his own problem. He cannot marry a Canaanite slavewoman (as his free side is a freeman, who is forbidden to marry a slavewoman) and he cannot marry a regular Jewish girl (who cannot be with his slave half)! Should he simply not marry? The world was created to be populated, as the verse says: The world was not created by G-d to be empty; it was created to be populated! Rather, we force his master to free his other half as well, and we have the slave write for the master a document stating that he owes the master the rest of his value. Beis Hillel retracted their opinion, and agreed with Beis Shammai.

The Sfas Emes discusses the verdict regarding a half-slave and half free person that he must go free, and the slave writes a document to the remaining partner for half of his value. This is because the slave has no money. Essentially, by the first partner’s freeing his half, the second partner lost his slave as well, as the law is that he must set him free. Can the second partner demand that the first partner should take the bond from the slave, while the first partner should pay him the monetary equivalent?

The Sfas Emes concludes that being that the damage is not direct, as it is only a consequence of the first person’s action, Beis Din will not force the first owner to pay the second owner. [However, it should be noted that usually indirect damage makes a person liable to pay according to “Heavenly law (meaning what is viewed as right and wrong by Hashem),” despite the fact that Beis Din will not make him pay. Accordingly, if the person freed his half of the slave knowing full well that this would indirectly damage the second owner, he should compensate him to ensure Heaven (Hashem) will not hold it against him.] (13a – 13b)

Half Slave and Half Free

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

Tosfos (d.h. shene’emar) asks: Why does the Gemora choose to cite the verse of “The world was not created by G-d to be empty; it was created to be populated” to justify the importance for the half-slave half-freeman to be able to procreate, rather than the more well known verse in the Torah of P’ru U’rvu (Be fruitful and multiply)?

My understanding of Tosfos answer in the name of the R"I is that the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu is really a ma’aseh mitzvah like any other, where we have exemptions for o’nes (a case where he has no choice). Therefore, citing the verse of P’ru U’rvu wouldn’t justify forcing the master to free the slave, since at the present time, the half-free side of the slave is exempt as an o’nes because he is incapable of performing the mitzvah. But by citing the verse of “The world was not created by G-d to be empty; it was created to be populated,” the Gemora is pointing to the root and purpose of the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu. This verse illustrates that the purpose of P’ru U’rvu is to occupy the world and therefore we don’t follow the regular system that we do by other mitzvos, because even if he is exempt due to o’nes, the world will still remain empty. Although the Gemora means to use the verse in the torah as P’ru U’rvu as the source, it chooses to quote an alternate verse that would justify why P’ru U’rvu should apply even in a circumstance where he is an o’nes.

This approach is very meduyak in the language of Tosfos where the entire focus is on the verse chosen by the Gemora, rather than using language that indicates that P’ru U’rvu isn’t at all applicable since he is an o’nes. Tosfos language implies that P’ru U’rvu is truly the source that compels us to force the master to free the slave, but we cite the verse that explains why P’ru U’rvu should apply even to a circumstance of o’nes.

Furthermore, this approach would compliment, rather than contradict the Turei Even in Rosh Hashanah (29a), who asks that since one who does a mitzvah when they are exempt doesn’t fulfill their obligation, how can the Gemora in Yevamos say that if one had children as an idolater, and then he converts his whole family, he automatically fulfills the mitzvah? The mitzvah was done when he was exempt, so he should have to do it again!?

Turei Even answers that since the purpose of P’ru U’rvu is to populate the world, we disregard when the act of the mitzvah was done, so long as the world is being populated as a result of his actions.

If we were to understand Tosfos simply that only the mitzvah of “sheves” (populating the world) applies, but not P’ru U’rvu, then Tosfos would be holding that P’ru U’rvu is a standard mitzvah like any other, where o’nes is exempt and the ma’aseh mitzvah should have to be done when he is obligated in the mitzvah. But since we are explaining that according to Tosfos, the entire mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu is for the purpose of populating the world, Tosfos is essentially a support for the Turei Even’s novel understanding that the time of the ma’aseh mitzvah is not relevant.

This also explains how in the very next Tosfos, they are able to ask that the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu should override the prohibition of marrying a kadeish (harlot). How can Tosfos cite the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu moments after saying that it doesn’t apply here since he is o’nes? Clearly, Tosfos never meant to say that it doesn’t apply here; rather, the meaning is that we wouldn’t have realized that it does apply here, if not for the fact that we quoted the verse of “sheves.”

As a side note, there is a famous discussion whether an o’nes is exempt, or actually obligated but unable to perform. Tosfos here seems to support the former. Tosfos explains that since the half freeman is an o’nes in his obligation of P’ru U’rvu, we wouldn’t force the master to free him. Tosfos supports this claim from the fact that we don’t force masters to free all regular slaves to enable them to keep mitzvos. Now, if o’nes is actually obligated but unable to perform, how can Tosfos prove their case from a standard slave who isn’t even obligated at all in the mitzvos? Perhaps we don’t free regular slaves because they aren’t obligated, but we would free this half slave since his free side is obligated, just that he is an o’nes. Clearly, Tosfos holds that o’nes and not being obligated is exactly the same and can prove o’nes from the case of a regular slave.

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Adam - Unity

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Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said: The graves of idolaters do not transmit tumah through the roof (if the tumah source and a person or object is under the same roof). He cites a Scriptural source to prove this point. It is written [Yechezkel 34:31]: Now you my sheep, the sheep of my pasture; you are adam. You, Israel, are referred to as “Adam,” man, but an idolater is not regarded as “Adam.” (The word “Adam” is the term used in the Torah regarding the laws of tumah by way of a roof; thus we see that the grave of an idolater does not transmit this tumah.)

The Ol’los Efraim says that there are four names for man; Adam, Gever, Enosh and Ish. Each of them can be written in a singlular form as well as in a plural form. However, the term “Adam” can only be written in a singular form. He explains this with our Gemora. Only a Jew is referred to as Adam, not an idolater. Klal Yisroel has the quality of achdus, uniting as one; therefore only we can be called Adam.

Using this principle, we can answer a famous question. It is written [Koheles 12:13]: The end of the matter, all having been heard: fear God, and keep His commandments; for this is the whole man. The Shalah comments that the verse fear God is referring to the negative prohibitions; the verse and keep His commandments is referring to the positive commandments; and the verse for this is the whole man is the essence of man, the two hundred and forty eight limbs and the three hundred and sixty five veins, which are corresponding to the two hundred and forty eight positive commandments and the three hundred and sixty five negative prohibitions.

There are those that ask: If so, it is impossible for any single individual to be complete; it is impossible to fulfill all six hundred and thirteen mitzvos. Some mitzvos are only applicable to a Kohen; some are unique to a Levi; others are only to a Yisroel; men have mitzvos that are only relevant to them, and women have their special mitzvos. How can a person be considered complete?

Perhaps the answer is because Klal Yisroel is Adam. We are all united. One person’s performance of a mitzvah effects everyone else. If everyone does their particular mitzvah, Klal Yisroel can be regarded as being complete.

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The Famous Taz

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Estate Money and Interest

The Gemora allowed an administrator of an estate to invest the orphan’s money in an investment with favorable terms for them, although this is generally Rabbinically prohibited.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 160:18), based on the Rambam and Rosh, applies this license to all Rabbinically prohibited interest, and extends this to money of charity, money donated to Torah scholars, and money donated for use in a synagogue.

What did the Torah Permit?

The Gemora quotes a statement of Rav Huna that prohibits charging interest from a non Jew. The Gemora debates why this is prohibited, and how to reconcile this statement with the verse and Mishna that seem to permit such a loan.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) asks why the Gemora was concerned with reconciling this Rabbinic law with the verse and Mishna, and answers that the Gemora assumed that the Sages would not prohibit something the Torah permitted.

The Taz states in numerous places that although the Sages have leeway to enact their own new prohibitions, they may not prohibit something explicitly permitted by the Torah.

The Taz in YD 117:1 applies this to the Rabbinic prohibition on commerce in forbidden foods. Since the Torah explicitly allows one to sell neveilah meat to a non Jew, the Rabbinic prohibition had to allow for such commerce when one chanced upon the forbidden food, so as to not fully prohibit an act the Torah explicitly allows.

The Taz in OC 588:5 discusses a question raised by earlier poskim. We find the Sages prohibited the performance of numerous mitzvos on Shabbos (e.g., Shofar, Lulav), due to a concern of one accidentally carrying to perform the mitzvah. Why did the Sages not apply this to bris milah, prohibiting a bris milah which falls on a Shabbos.

The Taz says that since the Torah explicitly said that one must perform a bris milah on the eighth day, even if it is a Shabbos, the Sages could not prohibit it.

The Chavos Yair 142 challenges this Taz from our Gemora, among others. Our Gemora is an instance where the Sages prohibited an action explicitly permitted by the Torah – i.e., charging a non Jew interest on a loan. Therefore, the Chavos Yair rejects the Taz’s thesis.

Later poskim dispute the Chavos Yair’s disproof. The Shla, quoted by the Chasam Sofer (YD 106), says that the Sages did not prohibit charging a non Jew interest, since that is indeed explicitly permitted by the Torah. Instead, the Sages prohibited a Jew from lending to a non Jew at all, and only thereby precluded the Jew from receiving interest from him.

The Chasam Sofer (YD 106, 109) says that Tosfos themselves (70b Tashich, 64b v’Lo) seem to support the Taz, and actually explain the Gemora based on his principle. According to Tosfos, when the Gemora challenged Rav Nachman from the verse, the Gemora was stating that since the Torah explicitly allowed a Jew to charge a non Jew interest, the Sages cannot prohibit it. The Chasam Sofer says that the reason the Sages were allowed to do so is due to the exclusions built in to their prohibitions (for livelihood, or for a Torah scholar). Just as the Sages allowed commerce in forbidden food when the Jew chanced upon it in order to avoid explicitly prohibiting an act allowed by the Torah, so too, the Sages allowed charging a non Jew interest in some cases, to avoid explicitly such a prohibition.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 1:134) says that the Gemora’s answer that we read the verse only as tashich – explicitly allowing a Jew only to pay interest, means that the Torah never did explicitly allow a Jew to charge interest, giving the Sages the leeway to prohibit it. See Rabbi Akiva Eiger YD 117 on the Taz for more details.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) says that nowadays we lend money to non Jews with interest. Tosfos advances three reasons for this behavior:
1. The economic situation and lack of other professions available to Jews makes the interest necessary for the creditor’s basic needs, in which case it is permitted.
2. Ravina’s answer understood that the prohibition was to limit our interactions with non Jews. Since we are forced into such interactions due to economic circumstances, there is no added interaction that will be prevented by refraining from charging interest.
3. The second version of Rav Huna’s statement does not prohibit interest from a non Jew at all, but only prioritized an interest free loan to a Jew above it.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 159:1) rules that charging interest from a non Jew is prohibited by the Sages, unless the creditor needs the interest for his basic needs, or is a Torah scholar. However, the Shulchan Aruch says that it is permitted nowadays, based on the first two reasons of Tosfos (see Shach 2).

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Converts

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Converts are like Sapachas

Rabbi Chelbo said (Kiddushin 70) : Converts are as harmful to the Jewish people as sapachas (a type of tzara’as).

Rashi explains that this is because converts are not so meticulous in the performance of mitzvos, and those Jews who observe this behavior will become influenced by them.

Tosfos writes that each and every Jew is a guarantor for his fellow, and if converts do not perform mitzvos meticulously, they will be punished on account of them.

Tosfos rejects this explanation, for he proves that when the Jewish people accepted to be guarantors for each other, they did not accept to be guarantors for the converts as well.

Tosfos brings another explanation: They are harmful to the Jews, for it is impossible that someone will not bother them, and the punishment for this will be severe, for the Torah in twenty-four places warn the Jewish people not to bother the converts.

Tosfos brings another explanation: It is because of the converts that we are still in exile, for the Gemora says that Klal Yisroel are scattered all over the world much more so than other nations in order for there to be additional converts.

Rabbeinu Avraham the convert explains differently: It is because the converts are meticulous in their performance of the mitzvos. This shows the shortcomings of ordinary Jews.

TEACHING TORAH TO A GENTILE PLANNING ON CONVERTING
The Rambam (Issurei Bi’ah 14:2) writes that we inform the prospective convert the essentials of the faith, which is the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and they go on at great length about these matters.

The Machaneh Chaim (Y”D II, 45) asks: Why isn’t this forbidden on account of a gentile studying Torah? The Gemora in Sanhedrin (59a) states explicitly that a non-Jew who studies Torah is liable for death.

He answers by citing a Medrash Tanchuma in Parshas Vayelech: The numerical value of Torah is six hundred and eleven. The remaining two mitzvos which complete the six hundred and thirteen are the two mitzvos which were given by Hashem directly at Har Sinai. This is the explanation of the verse: The Torah that Moshe commanded us to observe. Moshe instructed us regarding six hundred and eleven mitzvos; the other two were from Hashem.

The prohibition against teaching an idolater Torah is only applicable to the six hundred and eleven mitzvos that Moshe taught us. The other two, I am Hashem your God and the Unity of God; one would be permitted to teach to them. This is where the Rambam derived his ruling from; we can go on with great length discussing the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry.

The Maharsha (Shabbos 31a) writes that it is permitted to teach Torah to an idolater who wishes to convert. He proves this from the incident with Hillel and the convert.

Reb Akiva Eiger (41) disagrees and maintains that it is forbidden to teach Torah to an idolater even if he is planning on converting. Hillel taught the convert Torah only after he converted.

NOT BELIEVING A SCHOLAR
At that time, the plaintiff spoke up and said to Rav Yehudah, “Is it me that you call a slave, when, in fact, I descend from the Chasmonai family!” Rav Yehudah responded, “Shmuel has said that whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave (for Herod had killed them all out).

Rav Nachman said to Rav Yehudah, “Do you not hold of that which Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna, who said in the name of Rav: Wherever a scholar issues a halachic ruling (that was previously unknown) and such a point comes up for a practical decision, he is obeyed if he made the statement before the incident occurred, but if the statement was made only after the incident occurred, he is not obeyed (and therefore, we do not have to accept this ruling which you stated in the name of Shmuel)!?

Rav Yehudah replied, “But there is Rav Masnah who holds like me as well?” Rav Masnah was not seen in Nehardea for thirteen years, but just that day, he came before them. Rav Yehudah asked him, “Does the master remember that which Shmuel said while he had one foot on the bank of the river and the other foot was on a boat?” Rav Masnah replied, “Shmuel said, ‘whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave, for no one remained from their family except for one maiden who went up on the roof and called out with a loud voice, “whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave.” She then threw herself off the roof and died.’”

Rav Nachman declared that the man was indeed a slave. That day, they ripped up many kesuvos in Nehardea (all the married woman from that man’s family lost their kesuvos).

From Rashi’s commentary (Yevamos 77a), it would seem that the reason we do not accept the scholar’s statement is because we are concerned that he might deliberately falsify the halachah.

The Ritva forcefully disputes this. Heaven forbid that a Torah scholar would deliberately falsify the ruling. Rather, the reason why we don’t believe him in these situations is because he might make a mistake; in the excitement of the moment, it would appear to him that he remembers the tradition in one manner, when in fact, it is really the opposite.

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Craftsmen Standing for Torah Scholars

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Rabbi Yochanan states (Kiddushin 33a) : They stood before those bringing the bikkurim, but not before Torah scholars.

Rabbi Yosi bar Avin explains: Come and see how precious a mitzvah is in its proper time, for the craftsmen would rise before those bringing the bikkurim, but not before Torah scholars.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps they would only rise before those bringing bikkurim (but not for an ordinary mitzvah) because if not, they will not bring the bikkurim in the future (for they will think that the people living in Yerushalayim have no respect for them).

The Pnei Yehoshua writes that although it is obvious that the studying of Torah is greater than the performance of mitzvos, and even a mitzvah which has a set time, nevertheless, here, those that are performing a mitzvah are greater than Torah scholars. This is because it is quite possible that the Torah scholar is not engrossed in learning as he is walking.

The Chasam Sofer asks: And is a Torah scholar not occupied in performing mitzvos as he is walking? The Gemora Brochos states that a Torah scholar does not walk even four amos without thinking in Torah!? Why shouldn’t they stand before him?

He answers that according to halachah, thinking in learning is not equivalent to studying out loud, and therefore it is not in the same category as one who is performing a mitzvah while he is walking.

The Noda BeYehudah answers that a mitzvah which does not apply every day is more significant than the mitzvah of studying Torah, which applies every day.

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Forced to Drink

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Sotah 20a) had stated: If she had any merit, it would suspend her punishment. Certain merits suspend it for one year; others can suspend it for two years; and others suspend it for three years.

Ben Yehoyadah explains: There are certain mitzvos that can only be fulfilled during the day. If the woman performed such a mitzvah, the merit can delay her punishment for one year, i.e. twelve months, which corresponds to the twelve hours of the day. There are some mitzvos, such as the reading of the Megillah, which apply by day and by night. Performance of such a mitzvah can postpone her punishment for two years, twenty-four months, corresponding to the twenty-four hours of the day and night. There are mitzvos that are applicable for a day, night and a day, such as the mitzvah of fasting on Yom Kippur. The Gemora tells us that one who eats on the ninth day is regarded as if he fasted on the ninth and the tenth (of Tishrei). According to many poskim, the mitzvah of eating on Erev Yom Kippur can only be fulfilled during the day; not the night before. The mitzvah of Shabbos is also a mitzvah which comprises thirty-six hours, since there is a mitzvah to prepare for Shabbos on Friday. If the woman performed these mitzvos, the merits can hold back her punishment for thirty-six months, three years.

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Two for One

Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said (Daf Yomi: Nazir 60b): The shaving of a nazir, whether he is tahor or tamei cannot count for the shaving of a metzora. This, he explains, is because each of the shavings are different than the other (either because one is to remove hair and one is to grow hair, or because one is before the korbanos and one is afterwards, or because one is after immersion in a mikvah and the other is before immersion).

Shulchan Aruch rules that on Purim, one must cease from learning Torah in order to go and hear the Megillah.

The Beis Efraim asked the son of the Noda B’Yehuda as to why this would be considered bitul Torah. Isn’t the reading of the Megillah also considered learning?

The Chachmas Shlomo answers according to our Gemora, which states that one action cannot count for two different things. If he will be intending to fulfill the mitzvah of studying Torah, it cannot count for the mitzvah of reading the Megillah. And if he intends to discharge his obligation for reading the Megillah, it cannot count for learning Torah. This is why it is regarded as bitul Torah. (This, he says, is according to those that rule that one needs intent in order to discharge his obligation; it is impossible to have in mind for two mitzvos when he is only performing one action.)

This answer is perplexing in light of the halacha that one who recites kerias shema is also fulfilling his mitzvah of studying Torah! We see that one action can accomplish two things.

The Beis Efraim maintains that one who reads the Megillah or listens to it will not be fulfilling a mitzva of studying Torah. The Avnei Neizer (O”C 517) disagrees with him vehemently to such an extent that he writes: “I do not believe that those words came out of the mouth from such a righteous person as the Beis Efraim.”

Reb Chaim Voloziner talks at great length that there is a concept of neglecting to study Torah in depth and not only time. According to this, the Gemora can be explained to mean that even though reading the Megillah is considered learning, nonetheless it would be regarded as bitul Torah since he is not delving into the depths of Torah; if not for the special halacha that one is obligated to close the Gemora and hear the Megillah.

The Beis Efraim himself speculates that perhaps one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of learning Torah through the reading of the Megillah because it is part of Tefillah. This is based on the viewpoint of the Beis Yosef, who rules regarding one who had forgotten to recite birchas hatorah in the morning. The blessing of Ahava Rabbah can be utilized as a birchas hatorah, providing that he learns immediately after Shemoneh Esrei. The recital of kerias shema will not be sufficient because that is part of Tefillah. Perhaps, the same logic can be used for the reading of the Megillah.

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Six Hundred and Thirteen Mitzvos

It is evident from the Gemora (Nedarim 25a) that accepting an oath to fulfill the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos is exactly the same as accepting an oath to keep the entire Torah. Reb Avi Lebowitz hearos wonders if this is really true. Firstly, the Ramban at the beginning of sefer hamitzvos discusses the possibility that the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos is not an actual count and it is not necessarily accepted by all sources. Even if we are to assume that our Gemora holds of the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos idea (as the Gemora in Makkos seems to indicate) as do all the Rishonim who list the mitzvos, aren't there still other "mitzvos" in the Torah that are not counted in the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos? There are many mitzvah concepts that would qualify as "ratzon ha'torah", even if not an absolute obligation, and by only accepting the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos, we would seemingly not be accepting all the thousands of other points that the Torah wants us to accept! How can the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos be the same as an oath on the entire Torah?

Reb Yossie Schonkopf suggests that the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos is the root for all mitzvos and as such encompass all of Torah.

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