Mevarchin Hachodesh

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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In the sefer Yereim (259) it is written: That which Jews all over the world have the custom to announce the new month on Shabbos before Rosh Chodesh (birchas ha’chodesh), this is not the sanctification of the new month, for we do not have the Rosh Beis Din amongst us and he is an integral and essential part of this mitzvah. The Rishonim established this custom merely as a way of notifying the people when Rosh Chodesh will be.

The Magen Avraham (O:C, 417) writes that it is, nevertheless, the custom to stand by birchas ha’chodesh - specifically when we are saying that “Rosh Chodesh will be on Such-and-such a day,” similar to when Beis Din sanctified the new month, which was done while standing.

Reb Akiva Eiger (ibid) asks: Where is it found that the sanctifying of the month was done standing? On the contrary! It would seem from the beginning of the third perek of Rosh Hashanah that it was done while sitting!?

Reb Moshe Feinstein zt”l (O:C I; 142) answers this question based upon a Gemora in Rosh Hashanah (24a) which states that first the Rosh Beis Din would say, “Mekudash” – “It is sanctified,” and then the entire congregation would say in unison, “Mekudash, mekudash.” And certainly, the entire congregation, who were there at the Beis Din, were not all sitting; they were standing! We find like this by the mitzvah of chalitzah as well, where the Gemora in Yevamos (106a) states that there is a mitzvah for all the people standing there to say “chalutz hana’al.”

Reb Moshe understands that the Rosh Beis Din’s saying “Mekudash” was the p’sak din – the witnesses were fully cross-examined and the Beis Din came to a conclusion with respect of the new month. The Rosh Beis Din announced this ruling. Then, there was a mitzvah on the congregation to sanctify the new month. This, they accomplished, by saying, “Mekudash, mekudash.” He derives this from a Scriptural verse, and it can be inferred from the language of the Rambam, as well.

That which we recite birchas ha’chodesh is based upon the congregation’s saying of “Mekudash, mekudash.” It is not on account of the Rosh Beis Din’s announcement of the judgment, for this was already done by Hillel’s Beis Din (when he arranged the calendar for the future). This is why the custom is to stand. The inference of the Gemora in Rosh Hashanah that they were sitting is only in reference to the Beis Din, not to the people standing there. It also stands to reason that the “Mekudash, mekudash” should be said standing, for this was the mitzvah of sanctifying the new month, and mitzvos (as a general rule) are performed while standing.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Palginan Dibura

The Gemora teaches us that if Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon cohabited with his wife, and with Reuven there is another witness, we can consider them two witnesses and Shimon gets killed. The Gemora explains that it would work only because of palginan dibura (we split his words). Rashi explains that we accept his testimony in regard to Shimon but not in regard to his wife, since she is related to him and he is not a valid witness.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:26) has several cases where palginan dibura applies:

1) A loveh (borrower) may testify that the malveh (lender) lent money to him with interest, and although he cannot testify on himself, we enact palginan dibura and we split his sentence. Instead of hearing the entire testimony that the malveh lent money to him with interest, we only listen to part of it; i.e., the malveh lent with interest (S’ma). Therefore, if there would be another witness, Beis Din will disqualify the malveh from being believed when giving testimony in the future (an oveir aveira is disqualify as a witness).

2) Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon sodomized him, we invoke palginan dibura, and if there would be another witness testifying, Beis Din will disqualify him.

3) Similarly, if Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon cohabited with his wife, and there is another witness, Beis Din will disqualify Shimon (the Shulchan Aruch doesn’t state that he gets put to death, because the Shulchan Aruch is talking to our generation, where there isn’t any court-imposed death penalty).

The Rashba distinguishes between the case where he says, “Shimon cohabited with my wife,” and where he said, “I cohabited with Shimon’s wife.” In the latter case, we don’t say palginan dibura.

4) Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon sodomized Reuven’s animal, if there will be another witness, Beis Din will disqualify Shimon. The S’ma points out that this case is different than the above cases, since there is no such concept that Reuven is related to his animal, and therefore, in the times of the Sanhedrin, we would kill the animal as well.

Not in all cases do we say palginan dibura. The Mordechai (Yevamos) and Tosfos in Kesuvos (18b) rule that cases which are not common, or if you have to add a reason to his sentence, then we don’t say palginan dibura.

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Dancing at a distant Wedding

DISTANT CELEBRATION OF
REB AKIVA EIGER’S WEDDING

Reb Wolf Eiger, the uncle of Reb Akiva Eiger was unable to attend his nephew’s wedding. He made a simultaneous banquet of his own to celebrate the occasion. Reb Shaya Pik and other Rabbanim attended the festivities. He wrote to his nephew about the halachic issues (if one can fulfill the mitzvah of counting the omer by way of writing) which were discussed at the banquet.

What was the point of such a celebration? They weren’t dancing before the groom or the bride; they weren’t praising the groom in front of the bride. What caused these Rabbonim to celebrate in such a manner?

In the West (Eretz Yisroel) they would say: (A man who does not have a wife lives) without Torah.

Why is not having a wife like living without Torah; if anything, there exists more time for Torah study, not less?

Our Gemora refers to Ben Azzai as the “Talmid chaver” of Rabbi Akiva. Ben Azzai was considered somewhat of a disciple of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbeinu Gershom comments: Since Ben Azzai was a “bochur,” he was unable to comprehend halachic logic as well as Rabbi Akiva.

What is the connection between being a “bochur,” and not comprehending to the fullest extent?

I once heard from my Rosh Yeshiva, HaRav Chaim Schmelczer zt”l that Rabbeinu Gershom means that Ben Azzai was a bachelor, and one who is not married does not have the same level of contentment as one who is married. Torah study requires one to be at ease; one must have a menuchas hanefesh in order to comprehend the depths of the Torah. This is what Ben Azzai was lacking.

This is the explanation of the Gemora. One who is not married is akin to living without Torah. He may have more time for Torah study, but he is lacking the inner contentment which is a prerequisite for Torah.

Perhaps this can explain what caused Reb Wolf Eiger to celebrate the wedding of his nephew Reb Akiva Eiger even though the bride and the groom were not present; in fact, they were miles away. Reb Wolf understood that the marriage of Reb Akiva Eiger will result in his becoming the Reb Akiva Eiger that we know now. The wedding was not only a private joy for the families of the bride and groom, but rather, it was a simchas hatorah; a celebration in the honor of Torah. Reb Akiva Eiger’s Torah would spread throughout the world. This could be celebrated anywhere, even without the choson and kallah.

HALACHOS OF THE DAF


A Husband and Wife Die in a Building

The Shulchan Aruch (Even Ha’ezer 90:6) rules in accordance with Beis Hillel. In the case where both the husband and wife die due to a building collapsing and it’s not clear who died first, the halachah is that the kesuvah goes to the inheritors of the husband; the nichsei melog to the inheritors of the wife, and the nichsei tzon barzel they split evenly. Obviously this only applies if they didn’t have children together, for if they did, it wouldn’t make a difference who died first, since the children would inherit everything.

Although a woman normally needs to take an oath (that she never collected it yet) in order to collect nichsei tzon barzel (ibid 96:1), in this case, we allow her, and now that she died - her inheritors collect it. Since the reason why a woman needs to take an oath is because we are suspicious that she might have taken some items before he died, in our case, where he died suddenly, we don’t assume that she took anything (Celkas Michokek).

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Mentioning a Father's Name

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The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Yosi said: When my father, Chalafta, went to Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri to study Torah, or, as others recorded: When Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri went to study Torah by my father, Chalafta, he said to him: Suppose a man occupied a piece of land for one year as testified by two witnesses, for a second year as testified by two other witnesses, and for a third year as testified by still two other witnesses (totaling three years, constituting a chazakah), what is the halachah? He replied: This is a proper chazakah. He said to him: I also say like that, but Rabbi Akiva disagrees, for Rabbi Akiva used to say: When the Torah said (regarding witnesses testimony), “a matter,” it means that they must testify regarding a complete matter, and not about half a matter.

Rashi in Shabbos (115a) explains that Chalafta was the name of Rabbi Yosi’s father. Reb Akiva Eiger asks: If so, how was Rabbi Yosi permitted to mention the name of his father? It is explicitly ruled in Shulchan Aruch (Y”D 240:2) that one is forbidden from mentioning his father’s name, during his lifetime and after his death as well!?

He quotes an answer from his son, Reb Shlomo: It emerges from Rashi in Sanhedrin (100a) that if a title of honor precedes the mentioning of one’s father’s name, it is permitted. Since “Abba” is a title of honor, Rabbi Yosi was permitted to say “Abba Chalafta.”

The following is the explanation of the proof: Rabbi Yochanan said: Geichazi was punished for calling Elisha, his Rebbe, by his name. Rashi writes: He did not say, “My teacher, my master, So-and-So.” Evidently, one is permitted to mention his Rebbe’s name if he says, “My teacher, my master” first. Accordingly, Reb Shlomo derived from here that the same would be true regarding one’s father. A son would be permitted to mention his father’s name if he mentions a title of honor before the name. Reb Akiva Eiger agreed to this logic.

Reb Shlomo, in his teshuvos, adds that the honor that one must give to his teacher is greater than the honor he must provide to his father, for his teacher leads him to the World to Come. So if it is permitted to call one’s teacher by his name when it is preceded by a title of honor, it is most certainly permitted to call one’s father by his name if it is preceded by a title of honor.

He also rules that although Rashi said that Geichazi did not say, “My teacher, my master,” it is not necessary to say both, “teacher and master.” One of them would be sufficient.

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Benefit from Receiving

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora in Kiddushin (6a) says that if a woman would give a gift to someone who is an important person and doesn’t accepts presents from just anybody, she would be receiving enough pleasure from the fact that he receives her gift so that he can betroth her with that benefit that she receives.

The Taz (y.d. 160:8) explains that the reason that he must be an important person is because if he is just a regular person, then the benefit she receives, doesn’t have any cash value to it and therefore cannot create a kiddushin.

The Taz continues to apply this concept to the prohibition against lending with interest as well. If a lender tells a borrower, “I will lend you the money you need on condition that you receive this gift from me” - it depends. If the borrower is an important person, then the lender would be receiving real benefit from the borrower willing to receive his gift, which would create a ribbis (lending with interest) problem. But if the borrower is not an important person, there wouldn’t be any ribbis problem. The Taz clearly understands that if the receiver of the gift is not an important person, we consider the value of the pleasure that the giver has to be worth zero, and therefore it is not a ribbis problem.

However, R’ Akiva Eiger (y.d. 160 on Taz) cites a Ran in Kiddushin who asks based on Levi in our Gemora who holds that chalifin is done with the vessel of the seller, because the benefit that the seller receives by the buyer willing to accept his gift, provides enough benefit to the seller with which to sell the item. Clearly, we see that the seller receives benefit by the buyer receiving his gift even if the buyer is not an important person. This seems to contradict the Gemora in Kiddushin!?

The Ran answers that even if the receiver of the gift isn’t an important person, the giver has pleasure that the receiver was willing to accept, but the pleasure isn’t valued at a perutah. Therefore, in the context of kiddushin where her pleasure must equal a perutah, it only works when he is an important person. But, by chalifin, where the benefit received by the seller need not be worth a perutah, even if the buyer is not an important person, it will work.

R’ Akiva Eiger explains that Rav doesn’t disagree with Levi about this. Therefore, in the context of ribbis, where even a slight benefit that the lender receives from the borrower is a prohibition (although not a Biblical one), even if the borrower isn’t an important person, there would be a problem of ribbis. Based on this, the lender cannot say to the borrower, “I will lend you money on the condition that you receive this gift from me,” even if the borrower isn’t an important person, because the lender will be receiving some minor benefit which is forbidden.

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Converts

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Converts are like Sapachas

Rabbi Chelbo said (Kiddushin 70) : Converts are as harmful to the Jewish people as sapachas (a type of tzara’as).

Rashi explains that this is because converts are not so meticulous in the performance of mitzvos, and those Jews who observe this behavior will become influenced by them.

Tosfos writes that each and every Jew is a guarantor for his fellow, and if converts do not perform mitzvos meticulously, they will be punished on account of them.

Tosfos rejects this explanation, for he proves that when the Jewish people accepted to be guarantors for each other, they did not accept to be guarantors for the converts as well.

Tosfos brings another explanation: They are harmful to the Jews, for it is impossible that someone will not bother them, and the punishment for this will be severe, for the Torah in twenty-four places warn the Jewish people not to bother the converts.

Tosfos brings another explanation: It is because of the converts that we are still in exile, for the Gemora says that Klal Yisroel are scattered all over the world much more so than other nations in order for there to be additional converts.

Rabbeinu Avraham the convert explains differently: It is because the converts are meticulous in their performance of the mitzvos. This shows the shortcomings of ordinary Jews.

TEACHING TORAH TO A GENTILE PLANNING ON CONVERTING
The Rambam (Issurei Bi’ah 14:2) writes that we inform the prospective convert the essentials of the faith, which is the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and they go on at great length about these matters.

The Machaneh Chaim (Y”D II, 45) asks: Why isn’t this forbidden on account of a gentile studying Torah? The Gemora in Sanhedrin (59a) states explicitly that a non-Jew who studies Torah is liable for death.

He answers by citing a Medrash Tanchuma in Parshas Vayelech: The numerical value of Torah is six hundred and eleven. The remaining two mitzvos which complete the six hundred and thirteen are the two mitzvos which were given by Hashem directly at Har Sinai. This is the explanation of the verse: The Torah that Moshe commanded us to observe. Moshe instructed us regarding six hundred and eleven mitzvos; the other two were from Hashem.

The prohibition against teaching an idolater Torah is only applicable to the six hundred and eleven mitzvos that Moshe taught us. The other two, I am Hashem your God and the Unity of God; one would be permitted to teach to them. This is where the Rambam derived his ruling from; we can go on with great length discussing the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry.

The Maharsha (Shabbos 31a) writes that it is permitted to teach Torah to an idolater who wishes to convert. He proves this from the incident with Hillel and the convert.

Reb Akiva Eiger (41) disagrees and maintains that it is forbidden to teach Torah to an idolater even if he is planning on converting. Hillel taught the convert Torah only after he converted.

NOT BELIEVING A SCHOLAR
At that time, the plaintiff spoke up and said to Rav Yehudah, “Is it me that you call a slave, when, in fact, I descend from the Chasmonai family!” Rav Yehudah responded, “Shmuel has said that whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave (for Herod had killed them all out).

Rav Nachman said to Rav Yehudah, “Do you not hold of that which Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna, who said in the name of Rav: Wherever a scholar issues a halachic ruling (that was previously unknown) and such a point comes up for a practical decision, he is obeyed if he made the statement before the incident occurred, but if the statement was made only after the incident occurred, he is not obeyed (and therefore, we do not have to accept this ruling which you stated in the name of Shmuel)!?

Rav Yehudah replied, “But there is Rav Masnah who holds like me as well?” Rav Masnah was not seen in Nehardea for thirteen years, but just that day, he came before them. Rav Yehudah asked him, “Does the master remember that which Shmuel said while he had one foot on the bank of the river and the other foot was on a boat?” Rav Masnah replied, “Shmuel said, ‘whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave, for no one remained from their family except for one maiden who went up on the roof and called out with a loud voice, “whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave.” She then threw herself off the roof and died.’”

Rav Nachman declared that the man was indeed a slave. That day, they ripped up many kesuvos in Nehardea (all the married woman from that man’s family lost their kesuvos).

From Rashi’s commentary (Yevamos 77a), it would seem that the reason we do not accept the scholar’s statement is because we are concerned that he might deliberately falsify the halachah.

The Ritva forcefully disputes this. Heaven forbid that a Torah scholar would deliberately falsify the ruling. Rather, the reason why we don’t believe him in these situations is because he might make a mistake; in the excitement of the moment, it would appear to him that he remembers the tradition in one manner, when in fact, it is really the opposite.

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Teaching Torah to an Idolater who Plans on Converting - Kiddushin 62

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The Rambam (Issurei Bi’ah 14:2) writes that we inform the prospective convert the essentials of the faith, which is the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and they go on at great length about these matters.

The Machaneh Chaim (Y”D II, 45) asks: Why isn’t this forbidden on account of a gentile studying Torah? The Gemora in Sanhedrin (59a) states explicitly that a non-Jew who studies Torah is liable for death.

He answers by citing a Medrash Tanchuma in Parshas Vayelech: The numerical value of Torah is six hundred and eleven. The remaining two mitzvos which complete the six hundred and thirteen are the two mitzvos which were given by Hashem directly at Har Sinai. This is the explanation of the verse: The Torah that Moshe commanded us to observe. Moshe instructed us regarding six hundred and eleven mitzvos; the other two were from Hashem.

The prohibition against teaching an idolater Torah is only applicable to the six hundred and eleven mitzvos that Moshe taught us. The other two, I am Hashem your God and the Unity of God; one would be permitted to teach to them. This is where the Rambam derived his ruling from; we can go on with great length discussing the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry.

The Maharsha (Shabbos 31a) writes that it is permitted to teach Torah to an idolater who wishes to convert. He proves this from the incident with Hillel and the convert.

Reb Akiva Eiger (41) disagrees and maintains that it is forbidden to teach Torah to an idolater even if he is planning on converting. Hillel taught the convert Torah only after he converted.

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From their Mouth's and not from their Writings

The Gemora (Gittin 71) states that testimony is valid only from the mouths of the witnesses, not on the basis of any documents. It is evident that writing is not the same as talking.

The Gemora Chagigah (10b) cites Shmuel who states that one who resolves to make a vow must express the vow with his lips; otherwise, it is meaningless.

The Noda b’Yehudah (Y”D I: 66) inquires if an oath that was written down but not expressed would be valid as an oath. His underlying question is: Do we regard his written word as an expression of his lips?

This should be dependent on a dispute between the Rambam and Rabbeinu Tam regarding the validity of testimony from a written document. The Rambam maintains that testimony must be from the mouth of the witnesses and a document will not be Biblically acceptable for testimony. Rabbeinu Tam disagrees and holds that one who is physically capable of testifying may testify through the means of a document.

He concludes, however, that even the Rambam would agree that writing is considered testimony and yet, a written document cannot be accepted by Beis Din. The logic for this is as follows: An act of writing can constitute speech, but only during the time that it is being written. Beis Din will only accept an oral testimony when they hear it directly; hearsay is disqualified. Witnesses who signed a document are testifying, but Beis Din is not present at that time. If they would sign in front of Beis Din, that would be considered valid testimony.

With this principle, you can answer what would seemingly be a contradiction in the Rambam. He rules in Hilchos Eidus (3:7) that testimony must be from the mouth of the witnesses and a document will not be Biblically acceptable for testimony; yet later in Perek 9:11, he writes that one is required to testify with his mouth or at least that he is fitting to testify with his mouth. This would imply that if he is fitting to testify with his mouth, he would be permitted to testify through the means of a document. According to the Noda b’Yehudah’s explanation, it can be said that the Rambam allows witnesses to testify through the means of a document, but only if they sign the document when Beis Din is present. Accordingly, we can say that an oath taken through writing will be binding.

Reb Akiva Eiger discusses some other practical applications for this principle.

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Between Eighty and One Hundred

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 28a) had stated: If an agent was bringing a get and he left the husband old or sick, he may give the get under the assumption that the husband is still alive (for we assume, based upon the principle of chazakah, that nothing changed from the status quo). [If we would be certain that the husband died before the agent delivered the get to the wife, he may not give it any longer.]

The Chasam Sofer says: By the fact that the Mishna did not say ‘an old and sick person,” we may infer that if in fact the husband was old and sick, the agent would not be allowed to deliver the get, for then we can no longer assume that he is still alive.

The Chasam Sofer adds that this would apply for anyone over sixty years old.

The Maharshal in Yam shel Shlomo disagrees and says that even if the husband is old and sick, we nevertheless, assume that he is still alive, and we deliver the get. He adds that this is only if he is younger than eighty years old. However, if he is over eighty, it would depend upon his strength.

Reb Akiva Eiger in Shulchan Aruch writes that he is uncertain as to what the halacha would be if the husband was old and sick.

The Shiltei Giborim writes that when the Mishna rules that if the husband is sick, we still assume that he is alive, that is only if he is the sickness befell him from the hand of Heaven, such as a sickness which was caused by exposure to the cold or the heat. However, if he was knifed in the stomach or his skull was crushed, we do not assume that he is still alive, and we would not deliver the get.

The Yam shel Shlomo rules as follows: If the husband is over the age of one hundred, the agent may deliver the get even if he is sick as well. However, if he is over eighty years old, but not yet one hundred, the agent should not deliver the get if the husband is sick. The distinction between them is as follows: The Gemora refers to someone alive over eighty as a “ben gevuros,” a man of strength. This is true if he is healthy. However, if he took ill, then he is not at full strength, and therefore we cannot assume that he is still alive. Contrast this to someone who is over one hundred years old. Someone so old is always frail and weak, and there should not be any assumption that he will remain alive. However, the Gemora applies the logic that once he has reached such an age (over one hundred), he is regarded as an exceptional person (due to his longevity), and we may therefore assume that he is still alive, even if he is sick.

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Second One Takes Effect

The Gemora (Nedarim 18a) states: Although the Mishna had stated that if someone makes two consecutive oaths that he will not eat something and he eats it, he has transgressed one prohibition (for the second one does not take effect), if the person asked for the first oath to be permitted (and it was), the second oath is now valid.

There is a discussion if the second oath (before the first one was annulled) is regarded as an oath taken in vain (similar to an oath to nullify a mitzvah).

The Ritva writes: If he has the first one annulled, the second one is not regarded as an oath taken in vain, for now, it takes effect. He, therefore, would not incur lashes for the second oath.

The Nimukei Yosef maintains that even while the first oath is intact, the second oath is not regarded as an oath taken in vain. This is because it has potential for being a valid oath, i.e. if the first one is annulled. Others say that it is not considered in vain for the second oath is essentially an oath in order to uphold a mitzvah (fulfilling the first one), and we learned above that this is an admirable thing to do.

Rashi in Shavuos explains the reason why the second oath takes effect after the first one is annulled. He says it is because a sage has the power to retroactively revoke the oath in a manner as if the oath was never uttered. Accordingly, the second one is valid, for there is no first one any longer.

The Shach writes that according to this, the second one will only take effect if a sage annulled the oath. However, if the husband annulled the oath of his wife, her second oath would not take effect. This is because a husband does not retroactively revoke her oath; it is only considered void from this moment and on. The first oath is not regarded as if it never existed and therefore, the second one does not take effect.

Reb Akiva Eiger disagrees. He states: The reason why the second oath does not take effect initially is because one prohibition cannot take effect upon another. The second prohibition exists, but it is in a pending state. As soon as the first prohibition is removed, the second one “wakes up” and takes effect. This would be true when the husband annuls the oath of his wife as well.

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His possessions, but not himself - Nedarim Daf 5

Reb Akiva Eiger writes that it would seem from the language of the Ran that when one declares, “I am vowed to you,” he is only prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from his fellow’s possessions, but he would be permitted to derive benefit from the fellow himself. Reb Akiva Eiger wonders as to why this should be the case. Shouldn’t everything be included? (Sefer Beis Arazim says that the Ran could be understood to mean that all benefits are forbidden. As a matter of fact, the Ran in Kesuvos states explicitly that all pleasures are forbidden, even if it does not involve the fellow’s possessions.)

Shalmei Nedarim answers that the expression, “to you” connotes “from something that belongs to you.” The possessions of a person belong to him; his body does not. This is why the vower would be permitted to derive benefit from the fellow, provided that he is not benefiting from his possessions.

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Drinking Wine by Kiddush

The Gemora (Nedarim 4a)explains that the novelty of a chatas nazir is that it cannot be pledged to be brought as a vow. When we asked earlier that this is a trademark of all chatas offerings, it is possible to answer that all other chatas offerings are obviously not brought because they are pledged, as they are obligated to be brought to atone for a sin. However, why is a korban chatas of a nazir brought? [One might therefore have thought the prohibition of delaying vows does not apply to it, which is why the hekeish is needed.]

The Gemora asks: The korban chatas of a woman who gives birth is also not brought for a sin that she committed, but nonetheless we know the prohibition for delaying vows does apply to her korban chatas. [Why should a korban chatas of a nazir be different?]

The Gemora answers: Her korban chatas is still different than that of a nazir, as it enables her to eat kodoshim (korbanos, which she was unable to eat beforehand and is a mitzvah).

The Meiri asks: Doesn’t the chatas offering of a nazir help him that he is now permitted to drink wine?

Tosfos and the Ran answer that drinking wine is a voluntary act, and it is not a mitzvah like the eating of kodoshim.

However, we can ask: What about the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush and havdalah? The Gemora Pesachim (106a) derives from the verse Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it that there is an obligation to recite kiddush over a cup of wine. Accordingly, we should say that a nazir’s bringing of the korbanos is similar to that of a woman who gave birth; he is bringing the korban in order to be permitted to partake in the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush?

The Meiri answers: The mitzvah of drinking the wine for kiddush is only a Rabbinical one, and the korban is not coming for that.

Tosfos explains that although there is a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush with wine, the obligation that the one who recites the blessing should drink the wine is only Rabbinical.

Reb Koby Shapiro in the Hebrew Midrashiya states that there may be a practical difference in halacha whether the mitzvah of drinking the wine is a Biblical one or merely Rabbinical.

It is ruled upon in Shulchan Aruch that a woman is Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush on Shabbos. Accordingly, she would be allowed to discharge a man of his obligation by reciting the kiddush for him.

The Acharonim raise the following question: When a man comes home from Shul Friday night, he has already fulfilled his Biblical obligation of kiddush in the Shemoneh Esrei of ma’ariv. He still has a Rabbinical obligation to recite the kiddush over a cup of wine. His wife, on the other hand, who did not daven ma’ariv, still has a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush. How can the man, who only has a Rabbinical obligation discharge his wife of her Biblical obligation?

Some answer that she should recite vayechulu prior to kiddush.

Reb Akiva Eiger answers that there is no concern here because of the principle that one who has fulfilled the mitzvah can nevertheless discharge an obligation for someone who did not yet fulfill the mitzvah. This works because every Jew is a guarantor for another. Some Acharonim are not satisfied with this answer because they say that a woman is not included in this guarantee for each other.

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is as if the husband had intention not to fulfill the Biblical obligation of kiddush when he is davening ma’ariv. This way, they are both Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush.

This entire discussion is based upon the Meiri’s opinion that the mitzvah of drinking the wine is merely a Rabbinical mitzvah. However, if we would hold that there is a Biblical mitzvah to drink the wine of kiddush, then, there would be no discussion, for the husband still has not discharged his own obligation by davening ma’ariv; he still has a Biblical obligation to drink the wine.

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A Vow to Eat & Concern for Death

A Vow to Eat

The Gemora (Nedarim 3b) states: It is understandable how one can violate the prohibition of Not to desecrate his word; if one would invoke a vow that this bread he will eat, and he does not eat it, he has desecrated his word.

How can this be a valid vow; did we not learn previously (2b) that a vow is when one prohibits the object upon himself; a vow to perform an action should have no validity?

Reb Akiva Eiger adds: The Ran cited the opinion of the Ramban who maintains that if one pronounces a vow using the language of an oath (I make a vow not to eat this bread) or he takes an oath using the language of a vow (This bread is forbidden to me by an oath), even though it is not regarded as a basic type of vow, it does take effect on account of being “a handle of a vow.” It is a partial declaration and he will be prohibited from eating the bread. However, that is only if his intention is to prohibit the object upon himself, but it cannot be regarded as a partial declaration of a vow if he is saying that he vows to eat this bread?

He concludes: May Hashem enlighten my eyes.

The Chasam Sofer explains the case as follows: He said, “This bread should be forbidden to me if I do not eat this other bread.” He went ahead and ate the first loaf of bread. The halacha would be that he is obligated to eat the second bread, for if he does not eat it by the conclusion of the day, he would have retroactively desecrated his word by eating from the first one.

Concern for Death

In Shulchan Aruch (O”C 568:3) it is ruled that if one vows to fast a certain amount of fasts, he is permitted to wait until the winter when the days will be shorter.

The Magen Avraham asks: Shouldn’t the halacha be that he is required to fast immediately, for perhaps he might die? He proves that we are concerned for death in respect to a vow from our Gemora.

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Master of All

The Ran (Nedarim 2a) maintains if one states that he will not do something and includes the Name of Hashem, that itself is regarded as an oath. He proves this from a Gemora below (22b) which says that if one says, “By the Master of all, I will not eat it,” he is prohibited from eating it, although he did not say that he was invoking an oath.

It is evident from this Ran that the words “Master of all” is regarded as saying the Name of Hashem. If so, Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach asks: How would one be permitted to mention this expression (Adon Olam) in his daily speech; it should be regarded as pronouncing the Name of Hashem in vain?

The Chasam Sofer writes that this is indeed the halacha. Just as saying “The Compassionate One” in Hebrew is considered an oath, so too, if he says “Rachmana” in Aramaic, it is regarded as an oath. And just as these expressions are included in the prohibition of swearing with the Name of Hashem in vain, so too, if one uses this expression in vain, he has violated this prohibition, for both of these transgression (swearing falsely and saying Hashem’s Name in vain) are derived from the same verse. Reb Shlomo Zalman is deeply troubled by this ruling, for if so, it would be forbidden to say “Ribbono shel Olam,” or “Adon Olam,” and this is not found in the poskim.

The Netziv cites a different ruling of the Chasam Sofer: If one finds himself in a situation where he is uncertain if he should recite a certain blessing or not, he may say the following: Brich Rachmana Mara D’alma (Blessed is the Compassionate One, Master of all). This would seemingly be a contradiction to the other ruling of the Chasam Sofer. If “Master of all” is considered the Name of Hashem in regards to an oath and in respect to uttering the Name of Hashem in vain, what remedy is there by reciting this other version of the blessing; he is anyway saying the Name of Hashem? Reb Akiva Eiger rules that one is prohibited from using this other version because of this concern.

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Spit Out all of the Saliva

Rav Anan bar Tachlifa related (Kesuvos 61a): I was once standing in the presence of Shmuel when they brought him a dish of mushrooms, and, had he not given me to eat from it, I would have been exposed to danger.

Rav Ashi said: I was once standing before Rav Kahana when they brought him slices of turnip heads in vinegar, and, had he not given me to eat from it, I would have been exposed to danger.

Rav Papa said: Even a fragrant date may expose one to danger.

This is the general rule: Any food that has a strong aroma or an sharp taste will expose a man to danger if he is not allowed to eat from it.

The Gemora records a related incident: A Roman once said to a woman, “Will you marry me?” “No,” she replied. Thereupon, he brought some pomegranates, split them open and ate them in her presence. She kept on swallowing all the saliva that irritated her, but he did not give her any of the fruit until her body became swollen. Eventually, he said to her, “If I cure you, will you marry me?” “Yes,” she replied. He went and brought more pomegranates, split them open and ate them in her presence. He said to her, “All the saliva that irritates you, spit out at once, and again and again.” She continued doing so until something issued forth from her body in the shape of a green palm-leaf, and she recovered.

Reb Akiva Eiger (Y”D 336) writes in the name of the Maharil: The Mahari Segal told us that it is forbidden to test any of the remedies and cures mentioned in the Talmud, for we do not fully comprehend all the intricate details, and if we attempt to duplicate them and it fails to heal the sick, it will result in the mocking of our Sages. (He cites one exception that is mentioned in Meseches Shabbos.)

The Mishna Berura (617:8) cites our Gemora as a cure for one who smells the aroma of a certain food and he is unable to eat from it. He should be careful to spit out all the saliva accumulated in his mouth and he should not swallow any of it. His ruling indicates that this is not a magical remedy; but rather, it is a natural phenomenon, and it is applicable nowadays.

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Chupah on Shabbos and Yom Tov

The Mishna had stated: The father is entitled to the earnings of his daughter.

The Gemora (Kesuvos 47a) asks: What is the source for this?

The Gemora answers: It is learned from that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: How is it known that a daughter’s earnings belong to her father? It is because it is written [Shmos 21:7]: When a father shall sell his daughter as a maidservant. The Torah juxtaposes the words “daughter” and “maidservant” to teach the following: Just as the earnings of a maidservant belong to her master, so too, the earnings of a daughter belong to her father.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps, the Torah is only referring to a minor, whom a father may sell as a maidservant; however, in respect to a na’arah, whom the father may not sell, her earnings belong to her?

The Gemora answers: It can be derived through the following logical argument: If it would be imagined that her earnings does not belong to him, how would the father have the right to deliver his daughter to the chupah (bridal chamber)? How could he consign her when he thereby prevents her from doing her work (during her preparations for chupah and its ceremony)?

Rav Achai objects to this line of reasoning and asks: Perhaps the father pays her compensation for her loss of work during the time of the chupah? Alternatively, he may deliver her to the chupah at night (when she is not working anyway)! Alternatively, he may deliver her to the chupah on Shabbos and Yom Tov (in which time, it is forbidden to perform any labor)!

Tosfos asks: How can we be discussing a case where he married her on Shabbos or Yom Tov? The Gemora in Moed Katan (8b) states that one may not get married even during Chol Hamoed, for one is not permitted to intermingle one source of joy with another. It is evident from a Gemora in Chagigah (8b) that this is a Biblical halacha. Certainly, it should be forbidden to marry on Yom Tov!?

Tosfos answers that we are referring to a case where he married her an hour before Yom Tov; in respect to performing labor, it is regarded as Yom Tov, for one is Biblically obligated to add time before Yom Tov and to treat it as if the Yom Tov began; however, it is not considered Yom Tov for the obligation of simcha yet, and therefore, one is permitted to marry during that time. It is at this time, where she anyways may not perform any labor, the father would deliver her to the chupah, and he would not be causing her any loss whatsoever.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks: Not all labor is forbidden to do on Shabbos and Yom Tov; isn’t the father still preventing her from performing that type of work? The fact that it is forbidden to receive compensation for work performed on Shabbos will not be a sufficient explanation in our Gemora, for that is only a Rabbinical prohibition, and we are discussing a Biblical one!

Reshash answers that our Gemora does not mean that it is forbidden to perform labor on Shabbos, for there are many types of permitted labor that one may perform on Shabbos. Our Gemora means that it is not common for one to be working and receiving compensation for labor on Shabbos and Yom Tov. This is why it is not considered that the father is causing her to lose by marrying her off; she probably would not have been working anyway!

This could be proven from the Gemora’s alternative answer that the father delivered her to the chupah at night. It is not forbidden to perform labor at night; however, it is uncommon. The father is not causing her to lose by delivering her to the chupah at night.

It would seem from Tosfos, however, that we are searching for a time where performing labor would be forbidden, and that is why Tosfos explained the case to be referring to the additional time added before Yom Tov, when it is Biblically forbidden to perform labor at that time.

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Uncertain Warning

The Gemora states: If witnesses appeared when she was betrothed that she had been unfaithful during the betrothal, she is stoned at the doorway of the city gates. If she had been unfaithful while betrothed but then became a bogeres (older than twelve and a half), she is killed with strangulation.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks: Rabbi Yehudah in Sanhedrin (8b) maintains that in order for a person to be subject to a death penalty, they must be warned and informed precisely death they will be receiving if they transgress the prohibition. If so, Reb Akiva Eiger asks: How can the bogeres be executed through strangulation; when she was warned, the witnesses informed her that she would die by stoning since she was a na’arah at the time?

We are compelled to say that our Gemora is following the opinion that holds that one who is warned for a stricter punishment is automatically regarded as being warned for a more lenient punishment. Since she was warned that she will be stoned if she commits adultery, Beis Din may execute her through strangulation if she becomes a bogeres because stoning is stricter than strangulation.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks on any na’arah; how can we execute her by way of stoning? We cannot inform her that she will certainly be stoned, for perhaps, her judgment will not be complete until she becomes a bogeres, and then her death penalty is strangulation, not stoning!?

We are forced to say that Rabbi Yehudah is in accordance with his own opinion, for he holds that an uncertain warning is a valid one. Accordingly, we warn her that she might get stoned or strangled; it all depends on what her status is at the time of Beis Din’s verdict.

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‘KIM LEIH B’DIRABAH MINEIH’ IN A CASE OF UNCERTAINTY

Reb Akiva Eiger rules that if one seduces an idolater, he is exempt from paying a fine because of the principle of ‘kim leih b’dirabah mineih,’ one incurs the more severe penalty of death and he is not liable for the monetary payments. Since the halacha is: Zealots have a right to kill one who cohabits with an idolater, he will not be required to pay the fine. If, however, it is uncertain if the girl is a Jew or an idolater, he will be liable for the fine because in this situation, the zealots cannot kill him.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Shiurim (84) learns from here that whenever it is uncertain if the principle of ‘kim leih b’dirabah mineih’ applies, he would still be liable for the payment.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein comments that if not for Reb Elchonon, a distinction could have been made between a court-imposed death penalty and a case where one incurs death by the hands of the zealots. In a case of an uncertainty regarding a court-imposed death penalty, such as one who desecrated Shabbos in a time where it is uncertain if Shabbos has started or not (bein hashemoshos), and at the same time he burned the stalks of his fellow, he would be exempt from paying for the damages. The reason is as follows: Even though, Beis Din cannot administer the death penalty, he would be exempt from paying because he might be liable for death. However, in a case where one does not incur a death penalty; it is a transgression where zealots have a right to kill him. In a case of uncertainty, where he may not be killed, he should certainly be responsible for the monetary payments involved.

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RETROACTIVELY NOT MARRIED AND THE CONSEQUENCES - Yevamos 90 - Daf Yomi

Rav Chisda attempts to bring a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: If a husband annulled his letter of divorce (that was sent to his wife in the hands of an agent), it is annulled (even though he nullified it in front of a Beis Din in the absence of his wife or the agent); these are the words of Rebbe. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel said: He may neither annul it nor add a single condition to it, since, otherwise, of what avail is the authority of the Beis Din (since Rabban Gamliel the Elder ordained that such an annulment must not be made, since the woman in her ignorance of it might marry again and thus unconsciously give birth to illegitimate children). Now, even though, the letter of divorce may be annulled in accordance with Biblical law, we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world.

Rabbah rejects this proof and states: Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.)

As I was saying the Daf, I was asked the following question: If the Rabbis revoked the marriage retroactively, would she be permitted to marry a Kohen?

Since we are presently located in Marshall, Indiana, we do not have all the necessary seforim to discuss this in depth, but here is a brief synopsis of the topic matter.

Tosfos in Gittin (33b) goes to such an extent as to say that she was not considered a married woman, and if someone had cohabited with her during the time that she was "married," he would not be liable for cohabiting with a married woman, since the Rabbis revoked her marriage retroactively.

The Ramban in Kesuvos (3b) writes that there would be a Rabbinical prohibition retroactively, and she would be regarded as a divorcee, and hence, she would be forbidden to a Kohen.

Some say that she is forbidden to a Kohen because it "smells" like a get.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger discusses the following case: If she was a daughter of a Yisroel who married a Kohen, and therefore ate terumah during her "marriage," would it be regarded retroactively as if she ate terumah as a zar?

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DISTANT CELEBRATION OF REB AKIVA EIGER’S WEDDING - Yevamos 63 - Daf Yomi

Reb Wolf Eiger, the uncle of Reb Akiva Eiger was unable to attend his nephew's wedding. He made a simultaneous banquet of his own to celebrate the occasion. Reb Shaya Pik and other Rabbanim attended the festivities. He wrote to his nephew about the halachic issues (if one can fulfill the mitzvah of counting the omer by way of writing) which were discussed at the banquet.

What was the point of such a celebration? They weren’t dancing before the groom or the bride; they weren’t praising the groom in front of the bride. What caused these Rabbonim to celebrate in such a manner?

In the West (Eretz Yisroel) they would say: (A man who does not have a wife lives) without Torah.

Why is not having a wife like living without Torah; if anything, there exists more time for Torah study, not less?

The Gemora states: It was taught in a braisa: Rabbi Eliezer said: Whoever does not occupy himself with the mitzvah of procreation is considered like a murderer.

Rabbi Yaakov said: It is as if he diminished the Divine Image.

Ben Azzai said: It is considered like a murderer and as if he diminished the Divine Image.

They asked Ben Azzai: “there are those that teach well, and perform well; there are others who perform well, but do not teach well. You, however, teach well, but do not perform well (for Ben Azzai died as a bachelor and childless).” Ben Azzai replied to them: “What should I do? My soul desires the Torah. The world can survive through other people.”

The Gemora in Bava Basra (158a) refers to Ben Azzai as the “Talmid chaver” of Rabbi Akiva. Ben Azzai was considered somewhat of a disciple of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbeinu Gershom comments: Since Ben Azzai was a “bochur,” he was unable to comprehend halachic logic as well as Rabbi Akiva.

What is the connection between being a “bochur,” and not comprehending to the fullest extent?

I once heard from my Rosh Yeshiva, HaRav Chaim Schmelczer zt”l that Rabbeinu Gershom means that Ben Azzai was a bachelor, and one who is not married does not have the same level of contentment as one who is married. Torah study requires one to be at ease; one must have a menuchas hanefesh in order to comprehend the depths of the Torah. This is what Ben Azzai was lacking.

This is the explanation of our Gemora. One who is not married is akin to living without Torah. He may have more time for Torah study, but he is lacking the inner contentment which is a prerequisite for Torah.

Perhaps this can explain what caused Reb Wolf Eiger to celebrate the wedding of his nephew Reb Akiva Eiger even though the bride and the groom were not present; in fact, they were miles away. Reb Wolf understood that the marriage of Reb Akiva Eiger will result in his becoming the Reb Akiva Eiger that we know now. The wedding was not only a private joy for the families of the bride and groom, but rather, it was a simchas hatorah; a celebration in the honor of Torah. Reb Akiva Eiger’s Torah would spread throughout the world. This could be celebrated anywhere, even without the choson and kallah.

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COHABITATION OF A YAVAM WITHOUT ACQUIRING HER - Yevamos 58 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora is seeking to find a case of a yavam who cohabits with a woman awaiting yibum, but she still remains a woman awaiting yibum. In truth, there are some cases, but for various reasons they don't meet the Gemora’s conditions. For example, Tosfos says that when the yavam does not intend for cohabitation at all, he does not acquire her, yet it does not fulfill the Gemora’s requirement that we only administer the waters when the husband’s cohabitation with her has preceded the adulterer’s cohabitation with her, but otherwise, we do not give her to drink. since the pesukim by sotah imply that the husband had intent for cohabitation before she committed adultery.

How many cases are there of a yavam cohabitating with the yevamah, and not acquiring her?

Reb Avi Lebovitz lists some of them:

1. Any time he does not intend for cohabitation at all, as we see in the Gemora 54a. This includes intent to press against the wall, and falling from a roof, and when he is sleeping (according to Tosfos).

2. Cohabitation with a limp member: Tosfos 53b says that even according to the opinion that you are liable by arayos, you cannot acquire a yevamah (the Gemora couldn't use this case on 58b - see aruch l'ner).

3. When he is sleeping, he does not acquire her because he is not an intelligent being at that time (according to Rashi).

4. There is a discussion between Reb Akiva Eiger and his son regarding one who cohabited with specific intention not to acquire his yevamah.

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