A SHORT CONCEPTION

The Gemora (Kesuvos 39a) stated that perhaps one can say that a girl became pregnant while she was a na’arah and gave birth while still a na’arah; this cannot be the case, for Shmuel said: There are only six months between the time a girl becomes a na’arah until she becomes a bogeres.

The Acharonim ask from this Gemora on a teshuva written by the R”I Mintz, which is quoted in the Rama (E”H; 4; 14). He states: A woman who became pregnant from her husband towards the end of the month of Sivan, and she gave birth in the beginning of Kislev, even though there are only five months in between (Tammuz, Av, Elul, Tishrei and Cheshvan), we are not suspicious that she became pregnant beforehand because there are a total of seven months from conception to the birth and that is sufficient; the child is regarded as a seven-month baby.

If so, it should be possible for a na’arah to conceive and give birth before she becomes a bogeres? She can give birth in five months and two days!

The Chelkas Mechokeik answers that according to the R”I Mintz, a girl is not considered a na’arah for a complete six months, but rather, she would become a bogeres after four months and two days; as long as she became a na’arah at the end of one month – four months and two days later, she becomes a bogeres.

Read more!

INVERTING HERSELF AFTER RELATIONS WITH HER DERANGED HUSBAND - Yevamos 69 - Daf Yomi

Rabbah bar Rav Huna states: We are only concerned for pregnancy in cases of cohabitation during marriage; however, in cases that involve promiscuity, we are not concerned for pregnancy (because women who engage in illicit relations invert themselves after cohabitation in order to avoid becoming pregnant).

Tosfos writes: A Kohen’s daughter who is married to a deranged man is permitted to eat terumah. Although she assumes that her marriage is valid, she is concerned that she will not be able to tolerate him, and eventually will leave him. She therefore inverts herself after relations with her husband in order that she will not conceive and bear his children.

The Noda B’Yehudah (II Y”D:202) brings a question from Reb Zaruch Eidelwitz from Prague: The Tur (Y”D 331) rules that a Kohen’s daughter who is married to a deranged man is disqualified from eating terumah. How can that be if the kiddushin does not take effect even Rabbnically?

The Noda B’Yehudah’s son answers: The Tur disagrees with Tosfos, and maintains that a woman who is married to a deranged man is under the impression that her marriage is valid, and therefore she does not invert herself after relations. The Tur rules that she is disqualified from eating terumah because we are concerned that she might be pregnant.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 36 - Highlights

The Gemora asks on Rabbi Yochanan (who maintains that one who performed chalitzah or yibum with his pregnant yevamah and subsequently she miscarries, she is not required to have a chalitzah from the brothers) from a braisa: One who performed a yibum with his yevamah, and it was found that she was pregnant; the yevamah’s co-wife may not marry because the child might be viable.

The Gemora emends the braisa to say as follows: One who performed a yibum with his yevamah, and it was found that she was pregnant; the yevamah’s co-wife may not marry because the child might not be viable.

According to Rabbi Yochanan that the yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is considered valid, why don’t we allow the co-wife to marry?

Abaye answers: Rabbi Yochanan never meant to dispute that a yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is considered valid (since this is a forbidden action, it is deemed to be invalid); he only argued regarding a chalitzah performed with a pregnant yevamah.

Rava objects to Abaye’s answer: If the yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is not considered valid, the chalitzah cannot be valid either; for we have learned that whoever is subject to yibum is subject to chalitzah and whoever is not subject to yibum is not subject to chalitzah?

Rava answers Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion differently: This is what the braisa means: One who performed a yibum with his yevamah, and it was found that she was pregnant; the yevamah’s co-wife may not marry because the child might be viable, and a yibum or chalitzah with one’s yevamah who is pregnant with a viable child is certainly not valid, and the child does not release the co-wife until he enters into the world.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rava’s position. (35b – 36a)

Rish Lakish explains the braisa as follows: A yibum or chalitzah performed with a pregnant yevamah is not considered valid, but perhaps the co-wife can be released because the majority of women give birth to viable children; the braisa teaches us that a child does not release the yevamah from her attachment to the yavam until the child enters into the world. (36a)

Rabbi Elozar attempts to cite support to Rish Lakish from a Mishna. The Mishna (119a) states: If a woman’s husband and her co-wife went overseas and they informed her that her husband has died (based on the report, she would be free to remarry, however, it is uncertain if she falls for yibum), she should not marry or be taken in yibum until she determines if her co-wife is pregnant or not. Rish Lakish asks: It is understandable why we do not permit her to be taken in yibum for perhaps the co-wife will have a viable child and the yavam will have transgressed the Biblical prohibition of taking his brother’s wife (when there is no mitzvah of yibum); however, why can’t she perform chalitzah with the yavam during the nine months of her husband’s death and get married afterwards? (By the fact that this option is not permitted, it would indicate that a chalitzah with a pregnant yevamah (or the co-wife) has no legitimacy.)

The Gemora rejects this proof: Even according to Rish Lakish, why don’t we permit her to perform a chalitzah after the nine months, which certainly would be valid?

Abaye bar Abba and Rav Chin’na bar Abaye both say that chalitzah is not an option, for if the child is viable, we will require an announcement that she is permitted to marry a Kohen (since the chalitzah was invalid).

The Gemora asks: So, why don’t we make the announcement?

The Gemora answers: Perhaps someone will be present by the chalitzah and will not hear of the announcement; he will be under the false impression that a chalutzah is permitted to a Kohen.

The Gemora cites a braisa: One who performed chalitzah with his pregnant yevamah and subsequently she miscarries; she would require chalitzah from the brothers. This is a proof to Rish Lakish. (36a)

The Mishna had stated: One who performs yibum with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant and later gave birth; if the child is not viable, he may keep her as a wife.

Rabbi Eliezer is cited in a braisa: He is required to divorce her. (Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Tanna of the Mishna and maintains that he must divorce her as a penalty for taking a risk of violating the prohibition against taking one’s brother’s wife when yibum would not apply.) (36b)

Rava says: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer said the same thing. Rabbi Eliezer; we mentioned above. Rabbi Meir; it was taught in a braisa: (The Rabbis decreed that one should wait twenty-four months for otherwise she might become pregnant from her new husband and will be compelled to wean her previous child.) One should not marry a pregnant or nursing woman, and if he did marry her, he must divorce her and he is prohibited from marrying her again; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim say: He must divorce her, but he may remarry her at the appropriate time (after the twenty-four months). (It emerges that both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer hold that one who marries a woman prematurely is required to divorce her forever.)

Abaye asked Rava: Why do you say that the two rulings are similar? Perhaps, Rabbi Eliezer ruled accordingly only because the yavam was risking violating a Biblical prohibition of marrying his brother’s wife, but in the other case, where he is only violating a Rabbinical decree, he would agree to the Chachamim (he may remarry her). Alternatively, perhaps Rabbi Meir issued his ruling only in a case where the man violated a Rabbinical decree, and the Rabbis were stricter and strengthened their enactments more than for those of the Torah.; however, here, when a Biblical prohibition is involved, the Chachamim did not find it necessary to penalize the yavam because people generally distance themselves from Biblical prohibitions. (36b)

[END]

Read more!