An Ignorant Person's Recognition

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 27a) had stated: If an agent (who was bringing a get) lost the get and found it immediately, it is still valid. However, if he found it after some time, it cannot be used (for we are concerned that it fell from someone else and it is not the get which he lost). If he found the get in a chafisah or in a deluskema (types of containers), or if he recognizes the get, it is valid.

Rashi explains that if the agent himself found the get (not in a container) and he recognizes it, the get is valid.

Other Rishonim understand the Mishna to mean that the get is valid if he recognizes the container.

The Rashba writes that the get will be valid if the agent found it and claims that he recognizes it. This is true even if the agent is an ignorant person. That which the Gemora says below that an ignorant person cannot be trusted that he recognizes the get is only true when someone else found it and the agent is trying to claim it from him. There, we suspect that he is lying. However, if he himself found the get, he is trusted that he recognizes it, for he has a migu (believe me what I am saying, for if I would want to lie, I could have said a better lie); he could have said that he never lost it in the first place. (The Ritva seems to say that the ignorant person is believed even without the migu.)

The Ramban writes that it is only with respect to a lost article that we do not trust an ignorant person when he claims that he recognizes it. However, with regards to a get, which is a prohibitory matter, he is trusted. (The Magid Mishnah explains that this is because one witness is believed with respect to prohibitory matters.)

There are two glaring questions on the Ramban. Firstly, the Gemora below states explicitly that to return it to someone who claims that he recognizes it by sight, it is only to a Talmudic scholar who would be trusted, but not any ordinary person!? Secondly, a get should be regarded as a davar she’b’ervah, a matter with respect to relations, and two witnesses are required for testimony involving such matters!?

The Toras Gittin answers the first question as follows: When the Gemora states that an ordinary person will not be trusted that he recognizes the get, that is only with respect to the monetary issues of the get; however, with respect to the prohibitions stemming from the get, he will be trusted.

The Maharam Schick answers the second question: The halacha is if a father said, “I accepted a kiddushin for my daughter, but I do not know from whom,” and a fellow comes to us and says that it was him, he is believed and she is married to him. The Ran explains that although ordinarily, a davar she’b’ervah requires two witnesses, here it doesn’t, for his testimony is not in contrast with any preexisting status quo; it is merely a clarification as to whom the father accepted the kiddushin from. One person is sufficient for this. So too, here, the one witness is not testifying on the divorce; rather, he is clarifying for us as to who this get belongs to.

The Oneg Yom Tov answers this question by saying that the concern for two Yosef ben Shimon’s in the same city is only a Rabbinical one, and therefore, although it is a davar she’b’ervah, only one witness is required.

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Carrying a Siddur on Shabbos - Yevamos 114 - Daf Yomi

The following is a discussion from Meorot HaDaf HaYomi: In places without a kosher eiruv, it is forbidden to carry outside on Shabbos. Today, most shuls are well stocked with siddurim. However, in generations gone by, people had to bring their own siddurim from home. It was then a common question how to daven in shul on Shabbos, if one could not carry his siddur from home. R’ Akiva Eiger was once asked if a child could be given a siddur to carry to shul for his parents. For their own benefit: As we learn in our sugya, children may not be fed forbidden foods. Similarly, they may not be encouraged to transgress other prohibitions. However, the Rashba rules that this applies only to Torah prohibitions. Children may be encouraged to transgress a Rabbinic prohibition. As a proof, the Rashba cites the Gemara (Shabbos 139a), that forbids encouraging a child to sow kilayim (mixed seeds) even outside of Israel, where the prohibition is only Rabbinic. The Gemara explains that he might get accustomed to this habit, and continue even after he grows up. From here it seems that only because of this fear, do we forbid encouraging a young child to sow Rabbinically forbidden kilayim. The general prohibition against encouraging children to sin, seems not to apply. The Rashba adds that the fear of him getting accustomed to sin applies only when we ask him to sin for our sake. When we ask him to do something for his own benefit, this does not apply. (For this reason, we encourage children to eat on Yom Kippur). Our streets are not reshus harabim: Accordingly, R’ Akiva Eiger rules that although many Poskim hold that our streets are generally not reshus harabim by Torah standards (since they are not regularly traveled by 600,000 people), it is still forbidden to ask a child to carry a siddur for an adult to use. We may only ask him to carry a siddur for himself, and then look along inside with him (Teshuvos R’ Akiva Eiger 15, cited in Biur Halacha 343). It will not lead to a Torah prohibition: In his public lectures, the Maharam Shick warned against asking children to carry outside where there is no eiruv. However, in his writings he finds some room to be lenient. He explains, based on the Rashba, that the general prohibition against encouraging children to sin does not apply to Rabbinic prohibitions. Furthermore, the concern that he might get accustomed to sin applies only to Rabbinic sins whose Torah counterparts are common. For example, kilayim is forbidden by Rabbinic law in the Diaspora, and forbidden by Torah law in Eretz Yisroel.

However, the Torah prohibition of carrying was almost inapplicable in the Maharam Shick’s time, since there were no roads commonly traveled by 600,000 people. Therefore, perhaps small children may be asked to carry for their parents (Teshuvos Maharam Shik, 173).

The Shulchan Aruch’s ruling: This question is relevant only according to the Rashba, who rules that there is no general prohibition against encouraging young children to transgress Rabbinic prohibitions. However, the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 343) follows the opinion that even this is forbidden. Therefore, there is certainly no room to permit asking a child to carry for an adult, even in a Rabbinically forbidden area.

Chinuch: Furthermore, this discussion concerns only children who are too young to be educated in mitzva observance. Nevertheless, our sugya forbids feeding them Torah prohibited foods. Here, the Rashba rules that Rabbinically prohibited foods may be fed to them. However, the Rashba certainly agrees that once a child has reached the age to be educated in mitzva observance, his father must teach him to observe all the mitzvos – both Torah and Rabbinic. Therefore, he may not carry a siddur even for himself (see Mishna Berura 343 s.k. 3). R’ Akiva Eiger seems to apply that the obligation of chinuch in mitzva observance begins at age nine. The Maharam Shick suggests that perhaps asking a child to carry a siddur to shul is also considered good chinuch, even if there is no eiruv, since one is educating him to daven.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 22 - GROWING HAIR FOR THREE MONTHS

The Gemora states: If one is mourning for a parent, he should not take a haircut until his friends criticize him on account of his long hair.

The Rama (O”C 390:4) cites that there is a dispute among the poskim as to how long a mourner should wait until he takes a haircut. The custom is to wait three months.

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe Y”D 3:156) explains: Even though it would seem from the Gemora that the mourner must wait until his friends criticize him on the account of his long hair, this is just an indicator as to how long he should let his hair grow.

If his friends criticize him before three months, he may take a haircut then. (The Mishna Berura and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch agree to this ruling of Reb Moshe. There are those that argue.)

Maharam Schick (371) writes: The three months do not commence at the time of death, rather, it begins from his last haircut. He explains: The three months of growing his hair is not a measurement of mourning, rather it is an indicator to the length of his hair.

He concludes that the poskim do not specifically say this and therefore he cannot rule leniently in this matter unless there are other reasons to combine with this one.

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