Daily Mashal - Zevachim 90

This is the Law of an Olah

It is noteworthy that after the Torah discusses the korban that a rich woman who has given birth brings, it says [Vayikra 12:7]: This is the law of a woman who gives birth to a male or to a female. The question is asked: Immediately following this verse, the Torah teaches us the korbanos that a poor woman who has given birth brings. Why would the Torah say regarding the rich woman’s korbanos that “this is law of a woman who gives birth”? It would seem from the verse that only the rich woman’s korbanos are the law, and not the korbanos from the poor woman.

The Kli Chemdah (Parshas Tazria) cites a Gemora in Menochos (110a): It is written: This is the law of an olah. The Gemora expounds: Anyone that studies the laws of an olah is considered as if he brought a korban olah. What would be if a poor person would recite the portion dealing with the rich person’s korbanos? Would it be regarded as if he brought the korban? The answer may be gleaned from the fact that the Torah concluded the portion dealing with the rich woman’s korbanos with the following verse: This is the law of a woman who gives birth. The Torah is informing us that the recital of this portion is sufficient for anyone, even for a poor woman.

[The Gemora states that Hashem told Avraham Avinu that whenever Klal Yisroel will read the Torah portions pertaining to the korbanos, it will be regarded as if they brought korbanos and their sins will be forgiven.

The commentators discuss if this concept applies by other mitzvos as well. Perhaps it can be said that the studying of any mitzvah that cannot be performed nowadays will be regarded as if one fulfilled the mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemora in Bava Metzia (114b) that the Amoraim were fluent in Seder Kodoshim in the same manner as Seder Moed, Nashim and Nezikin. This is because Kodoshim was relevant to them since the learning about the korbanos was regarded as if they actually brought a korban. Implicit in his words that for some reason this was only true regarding Seder Kodoshim and not to Seder Zeroim or Taharos which also has many halachos that do not apply outside of Eretz Yisroel and after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Taz in his sefer Divrei Dovid maintains that the concept applies to all mitzvos and one who studies the laws of Zeraim, it will be regarded as if he gave terumos and ma’asros to the kohanim and levi’im and it will be considered as if he gave all the presents to the poor people. This is the explanation in Yaakov’s words to Esav "Im Lavan garti," which Chazal understand to mean that Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos in Lavan’s house. There were many mitzvos that he was not able to fulfill at that time; it is evident that the studying of these mitzvos are regarded as if he fulfilled them all.

The Ben Ish Cahi explains the verse in Nitzavim: "Ki Korov eilecha hadavar meod b’ficha u’vilvov’cha la’asoso." It is possible to fulfill all the mitzvos with your mouth (by studying them) even those mitzvos that you cannot actually perform.]

The Order of Serving Hashem

Our Gemora explains that a chatas should be sacrificed before an „olah but that the Torah put the verses of the „olah before those of the chatas because “for its reading, the Torah gave precedence to it”. Rashi (s.v. Lemikraah) comments: “that it should be read in the subject (of offerings) first” and Tosfos wonder (s.v. Lemikraah): “What kind of chidush is this?” HaGaon Rav Eliyahu Dessler zt”l writes that we can explain Rashi thus: In the order of sacrifices – i.e., in the practical phases of serving Hashem, the chatas – the rectification of sins – precedes the „olah – achieving high levels. But “for its reading” – i.e., to know and perceive high levels – “the Torah gave precedence to it” as even before the sinner finishes rectifying his sins, he should be familiar with all the levels. One cannot serve Hashem from a narrow viewpoint but one must be aware of all the stages of serving Hashem and the high levels that one must strive to achieve (Michtav MeEliyahu, III 174).

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Eighty Replies to One Question

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
and Many of our Subscribers

Our Gemora states: Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi said, I have heard that the owner causes piggul. In his opinion, not only a Kohen can disqualify a sacrifice with a thought of piggul (that it will be eaten not in its proper time or place) but the owner of a sacrifice can disqualify it in the same way.

A question that originated in the beis midrash of Rabbi Chayim Berlin zt”l, the Netziv’s son, was discussed in all centers of learning everywhere. In his Sedei Chemed, HaGaon Rav Chizkiyah Medini zt”l collected the replies to this question from outstanding talmidei chachamim in Teveria, Vilna, Germany, etc. The question even graced the world of Torah with the work Gevuros Shemonim which, according to its author HaGaon Rav Yosef Engel zt”l (author of Beis HaOtzar, Asvan D’oraisa, etc.), “discusses one question and answers it in 80 ways”. His pupils related that he had many more answers but he sufficed with publishing 80 of them to give his book its unique name.

The question: If the owner causes piggul, we cannot test a sotah (a woman suspected of adultery) in the Temple, as before she drinks the cursing water, the Kohen has to offer the minchah (Sotah 23a, s.v. Kol) that she must bring. The sotah, who surely wants to be saved from the curse, will cause the minchah to be piggul and without offering the minchah, the water does not test her (Sotah 20b)! Rav Berlin continues that this question is only according to Rambam, that piggul can be caused also by thought but according to Rashi, that piggul is caused only by speech, the sotah can be prevented from saying anything.

She can be taken out of the ‘Azarah: The fifth of the 80 answers is based on Tosfos (above, 29a, s.v. Lamakom), who assert that a thought of piggul disqualifies a sacrifice only in the ‘Azarah. If so, the sotah can be taken out of the ‘Azarah while the minchah is offered. To force her to say the opposite: In the 37th answer, Rav Engel advises that the woman be forced to say explicitly that the minchah will be eaten in its proper time and place. From then on, even if she thinks frantically that it should be piggul, she cannot disqualify anything (according to Pesachim 63a).

The Kohen dispels her thought: In the 18th answer we find an idea based on a fine proof from Rashi on our sugya (s.v. Shama’ti), that the owner causes piggul only if the Kohen remains silent. But if the Kohen announces his pure intentions, the owner cannot cause piggul.

Piggul applies only to shelamim and todos: Rav Zeev Yitzchak HaLevi Dünner of Germany offered the answer that the owner can cause piggul only concerning shelamim and todos, whose meat they eat, but not regarding an asham, chatas orminchah, of which they do not partake (and see ibid, answer 4).

It would appear that the concept of the owner causing piggul is not relevant to the sotah’s minchah. The Gemora (36a; see Rashi ad loc. s.v. Hachi Garsinan Lishna Acharina) says that piggul, which entails intending to eat or burn the korban at the wrong time, only applies if the one causing the piggul can actually do it at the wrong time. But if he himself cannot, intending that others will do it at the wrong time is meaningless. Accordingly, the halachah that the owner can cause piggul would only apply to shelamim and the like, where the owner will indeed be eating the meat, so it is up to him to intend to eat it at the wrong time. But when it comes to the minchah, the woman will not be burning the minchah, nor will she be eating it. All she can do is intend that the Kohen burn or eat it at the wrong time, and that is meaningless.

Let’s remember that the woman is not the sole owner, as the husband is the one "sponsoring" the korban for her, which has many halachic ramifications. Accordingly, it is quite likely that the husband is the one who would have the jurisdiction over the piggul, just as we see in Bava Kama Daf 13a-b that when one person sponsors a korban for another, the sponsor is entitled to the meat.

Rashi writes that the owner can render it piggul if the Kohen had no intent, implying that if the Kohen explicitly intended the proper thought, the owner’s thought would not count. This makes sense, considering that the source for the owner’s power to cause piggul is that he too is called a makriv, but as a makriv, he is definitely secondary to the Kohen. Accordingly, in the case of the sotah, the solution is to ensure that the Kohen specifically intends the right thought.

The most obvious answer seems to be that she cannot overpower the intention of the Kohen doing the avodah. You will note that Rashi says that the owner can cause piggul if he has piggul intention and the Kohen kept quiet. From here it seems that if the Kohen has an active intention the owner’s intention cannot take effect.

Perhaps, since it’s not b’yadah to eat it chutz l’zmano or to be makriv it chutz l’mkomo, she cannot make it piggul.

The Torah says that the husband shall bring her to the Kohen, and therefore it’s his korban not hers.

Perhaps because she would benefit personally from piggul, therefore she does not have believability.

Only an innocent woman will actually drink the waters, so as to prove her innocence. Accordingly, she wouldn’t cause it to become piggul.

The Torah says (Bamidbor 5,15) "Veheivi", which means that the husband brings the minchah, so what makes the wife the owner? And even if the waving (of the minchah) is done by the wife, so what? The Kohen had to do the waving with her as well so he is the owner as well?

In Sotah 19, the Chachamim say (and so is the halachah) that first she drinks and then they start with the minchah. There was no chance to cause piggul before drinking, and R’ Shimon says the minchah was first, but who says that he agrees with Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi?

It would seem to me that if she deliberately has machsheves piggul, she would not be believed to say so since ain odom maysim atzmo rasha. (I assume it is forbidden to deliberately invalidate a korban, and especially to prevent them from fulfilling dinei sotah). The only possible case is if the person says he accidentally had machsheves piggul.

Who said the woman is the owner of the korban. Perhaps it’s being brought for her, not by her, and she can’t cause the piggul.

If we’re concerned that she’ll try to get out of drinking she could do it in an easier way by admitting she was guilty. This would forbid her to her husband, but no death penalty.

Who said the wife is the owner of the minchah? Doesn’t the husband pay for it and have to "bring her"? Isn’t he the owner?

The first though that occurs to me is whether in fact the korban minchah prevents the sotah from drinking, or is it considered a separate and distinct aspect of the overall process, so that even if it invalidated it, she could still drink?

There is a halachah that if the accused sotah declares that she will not drink, then the korban minchah must be burned. Therefore, even according to the opinion of the Rambam, if she is completely silent, we need not be concerned with the possibility of her having a piggul thought, since she did not verbally refuse to drink. Obviously, she feels that she is innocent, and is willing to do ahead with the entire process - including both a proper hakravah of the korban and the drinking.

Rashi there says ‘if the Kohen is quiet while being mekabel…’ – this sounds like the only then does the owner capable of rendering it piggul. Therefore here where there is a concern we’ll just have the Kohen speak out the correct time and day… and therefore even the Rambam will agree that her intention cannot override or have any impact to the Kohen’s expression.

Do we see anywhere that we suspect someone to deliberately render something piggul – is it not kares?

If there is this concern then R’ Chaim Berlin should ask more – how can the Kohen continue to do the different avodah’s on an animal which is suspect to be piggul?

Saying Eizehu Mekoman before Prayer

For very many years it has been the custom to say the Mishna of our chapter, Eizehu mekoman, before shacharis. The Tur (O.C. 50) bases the custom on the halachah that every day one should learn Torah (Written), Mishna and Talmud (Kiddushin 30a). Therefore we say the parashah of the tamid and the verses dealing with the sacrifices for the portion of Torah, Eizehu mekoman for Mishna and Rabbi Yishmael’s braisa for the portion of Talmud. Our chapter was chosen from the 524 chapters of Mishna because the Gemora in Menachos 110a praises those who learn about sacrifices (see Perishah, ibid, S.K. 2 and 4).

Beis Yosef (ibid) cites another reason in the name of the Raah: “because there is no disagreement in the whole chapter and it is a clear Mishna handed down from Moshe from Mount Sinai”. In other words, this chapter does not contain even one difference of opinions and therefore we assume that it has been handed down from Moshe in its present form (Peninim Mishulchan HaGra, end of Shemos, and the Noda’ BiYeudah wrote likewise in Doresh LeTziyon, derush 11). Some also prove thus from the phrasing of the Mishna in this chapter, which evidences its antiquity, as we are told: “…and they are eaten within the curtains (kla’im)”. Curtains were not in the Temple but in the Sanctuary (mishkan). Therefore, the Tanaim did not formulate this Mishna but it originates from the generation of the desert (see Otzar HaTefilos, p. 81 in the remark, and Tiferes Yisrael on our chapter, os 22). ‘Ateres Zekeinim on Shulchan ‘Aruch (ibid) states that the words of this chapter amount to 344 and when we add 1 for reading, we arrive at the numerical equivalent for Moshe – a hint that this chapter was given to Moshe at Mount Sinai in its present phrasing.

Is it really true, many wondered, that there is no difference of opinions in the chapter? Our Gemora explains that the Mishna’s statement, that the pesach is eaten only till midnight, is only according to Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah and not according to Rabbi Akiva (see Pri Megadim, ibid, in Eishel Avraham, and see Yeshu’as Ya’akov, S.K. 1). Indeed, the Ritva, the great pupil of the Raah, indicates (Avodah Zarah 19b) that Raah did not mean that this chapter was given to Moshe in its present form but “since the whole chapter is learnt with no difference of opinions mentioned at all, it should be learnt more than other chapters”.

HaGaon Rav Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, who expands on the topic (Responsa Tzitz Eli’ezer, IX, 5), cites the reason of Orchos Chayim (Dinei Meah Berachos, os 16), that this chapter includes the secret of all the sacrifices. Yesod Veshoresh Ha’Avodah says: “A person scrutinizing the writings of the Ari z”l will realize its great import, that every Mishna of this chapter is a rectification (tikun) in itself in the high worlds” (see Tzitz Eli’ezer, ibid).

To conclude, we should mention the statement of Rabbi Shneiur Zalman of Lyadi zt”l (Responsa HaGraz, 1:9), that as saying Eizehu mekoman before prayer was mainly instituted so that a person should learn something each day, a person “who can learn and understand does not have to say the parashah of the sacrifices each day but to say it sometimes suffices”.

DAILY MASHAL

How Could You Write a Book on Eizehu Mekoman?

A person who wrote a commentary on Eizehu mekoman came with his book to Rebbe Baruch of Mezhbuzh for an approbation. The Rebbe replied, “I wonder how you could write such a commentary. When I come to this chapter, I begin to imagine bringing sacrifices to the Temple and the service of the kohanim. My stomach turns over and I’m full of tribulations and suffering” (Ma’yanah shel Mishna).

What Is a Sacrifice?

Our Mishna says “What is the place of the sacrifices?” – i.e., all the sacrifices. Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra writes in his commentary on the Torah (Shemos 20:20): “I saw an apostate…who challenged the chachamim because they said „What is the place of the sacrifices (zevachim)‟. He said that in all the Torah he found zevichah referring only to shelamim, such as „‘olah uzevachim as an ‘olah is a thing for itself and the zevachim are shelamim, as in „…and they offered ‘olos and slaughtered zevachim shelamim” (Shemos 24:5) and thus we find everywhere. I showed him that he wasn’t speaking correctly as we are told: „…and you will slaughter (vezavachta) on it your ‘olos and shelamim.” He then admitted to his sin…that he had disputed men greater than all following generations”

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Atonement of an Olah

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Rabbi Yosi HaGelili (Yoma 36) states that a korban olah is brought for the sin of not giving the poor people from your grain, which one is obligated to do. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and holds that a korban olah is brought to atone for transgressing a positive commandment. Chazal say that an olah is a doron - a present to Hashem. The Seforim say that an olah shows a tremendous amount of love between the person and Hashem. The Ramban writes that when one brings a chatas or an asham, he should feel as if he is bringing himself as a sacrifice, for in truth, that is what he deserves. By an olah, it is as if he is giving himself to Hashem out of love.

How do we reconcile an olah being a present and a sign of love with the fact that Chazal say it is brought for transgressing certain sins?

The Aruch L'neir (Makkos 17b) explains the Ritva. The Gemora contrasts a chatas and asham that is coming for atonement and an olah is not. The Ritva asks from the Gemora in Yoma and Zevachim that it does provide forgiveness for some sins, and he answers that when one brings an olah as a donation, it atones for those sins.

Reb Chaim HaQoton elaborates: Rashi, quoting the Midrash, explains that an olah sacrifice is an atonement for one who violates a positive commandment or for one who violates a negative commandment and fails to perform the positive commandment that is supposed to rectify the negative commandment. Rashi explains, in a point further explained by Nachmanides and Rabbi Yaakov Ettlinger, that one is never obligated to bring a olah as an atonement, rather, if one does, he attains his atonement.

Tosfos write that after bringing an olah one’s atonement is “floating. Rabbi Meir Lublin explains that the Tosafists mean that an olah offering only atones for lenient sins, not for the more strict and severe sins.

Rabbi Shlomo Luria explains that the atonement is “floating” inasmuch as the atonement does not occur automatically when one offers an olah sacrifice, rather one must first perform teshuvah (repentance) and return to God before the offering of the sacrifice will complete its powers of atonement.

His words echo that of Rabbi Yaakov ben Asher who explains that the olah only serves as atonement for failing to perform a positive commandment or violating a negative commandment which is to be repaired by a positive commandment, if one repents from one’s sin.

Other Tosafists write that the olah offers an atonement for one who sinned and never knew of his sin. According to this explanation, obviously one cannot be obligate to being an olah for such a sin, because if he never knew about his sin, how can he be obliged to offer a sacrifice to atone for it? Rather, if one brought an olah offering, then it atones for sins unbeknown to him, but if he did not bring one, he is not required to do so. Another Midrash says that an olah is an atonement for one who thinks about sinning and thus has sinned with his intellect, not for one who violates a positive commandment.

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Forced Get

Rav Huna holds that if one is coerced to sell property, the sale is never the less binding. [The reason for this is that a person will feel that he has no choice, and he might as well give up the property and take the money.] The Gemora says that all sales are done under duress and nevertheless, they are binding. [People only sell when they need money but they really have no desire to sell.

The Gemora asks on this logic. There might be a difference when the coercion is not internal, but coming from someone else.

Perhaps it is from the following braisa: It is written regarding a sacrifice: He shall bring it. This teaches us that we force him to fulfill his obligation. Perhaps, you might think that he brings the korban even against his will. The Torah writes: Of his will. This teaches us that we compel him to bring the sacrifice until he says that he is willing to bring it. [This shows that one can be forced by others to do something willingly, and is therefore a source for the law that a forced sale is a sale.]

The Gemora rejects this proof: Perhaps there it is different, for everyone wishes to receive atonement (and he is really willing to bring the korban).

Rather, it may be proven from the latter part of that braisa, which states: And the same is true regarding a letter of divorce and the emancipation of slaves. We compel him to give the get (in cases where he is required to do so) until he says that he is willing to give it. Evidently, the divorce and emancipation is valid even though, in his heart, he is not truly willing. This proves that words that are only in the heart are not regarded as words.

The Gemora rejects this proof: Perhaps there it is different, for he has a mitzvah to listen to the Chachamim (to issue a divorce or to free his slave).

Similarly, the Rambam discusses a case when a person is obligated to divorce his wife due to the ruling of Beis Din. When he refuses, he is beaten until he says that he is willing.

The Rambam asks: How can a get that is given by force be ruled to be valid? A coerced get is not valid at all!?

He explains that it is only considered “forced,” if a Jew is compelled to do something that the Torah does not obligate him to do. However, if he is compelled to do something that the Torah instructs him to do, this is not considered “forced.” The explanation is as follows: A Jew wants to perform all the mitzvos and distance himself from all sins, but his evil inclination convinces him to do otherwise. When he is beaten, his evil inclination is broken and when he says that he is willing, it is his actual intent and the get is valid.

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Accepting Charity from an Idolater

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The Gemora states: An act of kindness or charity performed by an idolater is regarded as a sin. This is because they are only performing these good deeds to live longer, or that their reign should continue, or in order to glorify themselves, or to rebuke the Jews.

The Gemora in Sotah (47a) states: When there increased the number of Jews who accepted charity from idolaters, the idolaters were on top and Israel was on bottom.

Our Gemora says that when idolaters give tzedakah it serves as an atonement for them. Because it serves as an atonement, Rav Ami refused to accept tzedakah from Ifra Hurmiz. Even Rava only accepted it for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government, but otherwise, he would not have accepted it. This is based upon a verse which teaches us that the idolaters will become weak and broken once their charitable deeds have dried up, and therefore, we don’t give them opportunities for more merits. However, the Gemora says that if we were to use the funds to support non-Jewish causes (which Rashi explains that we support anyway for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government), it would not give them any special merit. It is only if we use the funds to support Jews that it is considered a merit for them.

Tosfos (8a d.h. yasiv) points out that the Gemora in Eruchin (6b) implies that we would accept donations to synagogues that come from idolaters. Why? Tosfos explains that donations to synagogues are considered like korbanos and we do accept korbanos from idolaters.

The Gemora (Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (here) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

What does the Haga’os Ashri mean that vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings are not meant for the purpose of atonement? What is accomplished for the idolaters aside from atonement? Furthermore, the Gemora says in Sukkah (55b) that the idolaters destroyed the Holy Temple, not realizing what they will be losing. When we had the Temple, the Altar served as an atonement for them, but now they have nothing to atone for them. The Gemora in Sukkah clearly implies that the purpose for their korbanos were to be an atonement, which contradicts the Haga’os Ashri?

The distinction of the Haga’os Ashri is found in the Shach and Taz (Y.D. 254:4) to explain the Rama who says that we do accept donations to synagogues from idolaters, but don’t accept tzedakah from them (unless the money was air-marked for tzedakah and must be accepted for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government).

Reb Avi Lebowitz suggests the following: Perhaps the Gemora in Sukkah is not referring to the vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings that the idolaters bring, rather the Holy Temple, in general, served as an atonement for the entire world, including the idolaters. But the vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings, and donations to synagogues that we accept from idolaters is because it allows them to have a share in our prayers, but it will not serve as an atonement to prevent them from being destroyed for sins that they have committed. Tzedakah to the poor which would serve as an atonement for sins that they have committed, we refuse to accept from them unless we have no choice (such as for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government).

The Chochmas Adam (146:3) explains this idea a bit further: Tzedakah to the poor is tantamount to a korban chatas which we do not accept from idolaters because we don’t give them opportunity for atonement, but freewill-offerings, we do accept from them, so we can also accept gifts to synagogues.

It would seem that this prohibition, which forbids accepting tzedakah from them, only applies to tzedakah to the poor, but donations to Yeshivos and donations for kindness activities which do not go to the poor, would be like vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings that we can accept from them. But perhaps when it comes to the studying of Torah, where the donation buys them a share in the Torah, we should not provide them with that opportunity either.

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A Woman's Sacrifices and Recital

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Rabbi Yehudah used to expound common terms. For it has been taught in a braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: A rich person is obligated to bring a rich person’s korban for his wife, and likewise, he is obligated to provide her with the animals for any of her korbanos that she must bring, for the following is what he wrote for her in the kesuvah: My properties are pledged for every claim you may have against me from before up to now.

Rashi explains that it is the husband’s obligation to provide for the sacrifice of his wife, and Rabbi Yehudah rules that when the husband is doing so, he must bring a sacrifice according to his financial status. He cannot claim and say, “My wife has no possessions of her own and she is therefore poor, and I should therefore only be obligated to bring a poor man’s sacrifice for her.”

The Gemora in Nedarim (35b) cites a verse which teaches us that a man is required to bring a korban for his wife, whether she is normal or insane. This, however, is only true regarding sacrifices that are offered for someone who lacks atonement, for these korbanos are different in the following respect: Korbanos are only brought with the owner’s consent; however, a korban, which is brought for one who lacks atonement, can be brought even without the owner’s consent. Therefore, all other korbanos, the woman would be required to bring them; her consent is a necessity.

Rabbi Yaakov Emden in Mor U’Ketziah (47) writes that women, in general, have no connection to korbanos, except for those that are her personal obligations, e.g. the birds of a zavah or for a woman who gave birth.

The Peri Megadim disagrees and writes that they are included in the general sacrifices, and certainly with the recital of the korbanos, which we do nowadays, as a replacement for the actual offering of the sacrifices.

The sefer Toras Hayoledes brings that a woman who gave birth, on the forty-first day if she had a son, and on the eighty-first day if she had a daughter, should recite the verses in Parshas Tazria dealing with the korbanos she would have been required to bring if there was a Beis HaMikdash in existence. And she should conclude with the following prayer, “Master of the Universe, it should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that this recital which I said should be significant and accepted before You as if I actually brought my prescribed sacrifices. And it should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that You should build the Beis HaMikdash speedily in our days.”

The Pischei Zuta discusses if she would be required to recite the passages that deal with the sacrifices that she would bring if she was poor and could afford the animals. For perhaps that dispensation was only in the times of the Beis HaMikdash, when korbanos were being brought; however, now, that we are merely reciting the verses, every woman should say the same thing.

In the siddur Keser Nehura, it is written that on the day following a woman’s immersion in a mikvah for her menstrual impurity, she should recite the passages from Parshas Metzora that deal with those halachos. And she should conclude by saying, “It should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that this recital which I said should be significant and accepted before You as if I actually brought my prescribed sacrifices.”

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Insights on Bava Kamma - 76

Too late to redeem?

Tosfos (76a shechitah) asks why we consider the slaughtering of a sacrifice outside of the Temple to be unusable. Rabbi Shimon holds that an animal with a blemish can be redeemed as long as it is moving, even after slaughtering. Once the animal is slaughtered, the slit throat is a definite blemish, and should be grounds for redemption.

Tosfos answers that only blemishes that were present before an animal died are grounds for redemption, but that redemption can occur as long as the animal is still moving.

Tahi bah

The Rishonim discuss the exact meaning of this word, used to describe Rabbi Elozar’s objection to the cases offered by Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish.

Rashi explains that the word is a borrowed term from wine inspection. The Gemora in Bava Basra refers to someone who smelled wine, and uses the same verb tahi . Similarly, Rashi explains that Rabbi Elozar was inspecting the statements, and delving into them, to understand them better.

The Shitah Mekubetzes, on the other hand, quotes an opinion that explains this word as a form of the more common matma - he was amazed.

Sacrificial slaughtering

Rashi states that Rabbi Elozar was challenging both Rish Lakish, who offered the case of a sacrifice with a blemish, as well as Ravin, who offered the case of a sacrifice that was successfully brought (including splashing of the blood), but not for the sake of its owner. Rashi understands Rabbi Elozar’s objection to apply even to Ravin, because even in a case where the sacrifice turned out to be valid and edible, the fact remains that as of the time of the slaughtering, it was not yet edible, since the splashing was not done.

Tosfos (76b v’halo zrika) states that Rabbi Elozar was challenging Rish Lakish, but only Rav Dimi’s version of Rabbi Yochanan’s answer – the case of the sacrifice whose blood was spilled before being splashed. Tosfos explains that their understanding of the Gemora in Chulin 80b is that the need for splashing blood can invalidate a slaughtering only if it was not ultimately done. Splashing of blood which was ultimately done will definitely make the slaughtering an edible one, retroactively.

Rashi, on the other hand, has a different text in the Gemora in Chulin, and therefore holds that even slaughtering a sacrifice which was successfully completed, including splashing the blood, does not render the slaughtering re’uyah since at the time of slaughtering, the animal was not edible.

See Pnei Yehoshua for a discussion of whether Rashi holds that Rabbi Elozar was also challenging Rav Dimi.

Just as if...

The Gemora stated that Rabbi Shimon holds a general rule of kol ha’omed - anything destined for a specific action is considered as if the action were already done. Tosfos (76b v’halo zrika) narrows the scope of Rabbi Shimon’s rule to cases where the subsequent action is mandated – a mitzvah. In that case, since the action not just may be performed, but is supposed to be performed, we can act as if it’s already done.

The halachah rules like the Chachamim. The Aruch Hashulchan infers from this topic a number of halachic conclusions. One of them is in the halachos of a shofar. The Gemora states that a shofar that is cracked is unfit. There is debate in the Rishonim on what extent of a crack invalidates a shofar, both for vertical and horizontal cracks. The Rosh (R”H 3:6) cites an opinion that any sized vertical crack (i.e., along the pathway of the air flow), no matter how small, invalidates the shofar, since the more it is blown, the larger the crack will become. The Aruch Hashulchan (O”H 586:15) states that this opinion does not invalidate it from the Torah, since we rule like the Chachamim. Rabbi Shimon can hold that a shofar that will become fully cracked is considered currently cracked, as part of his general opinion of kol ha’omed. The Chachamim, however, do not agree with this rule, and therefore would not consider the shofar already cracked. Since we do not rule like Rabbi Shimon, the invalidation must be on a Rabbinic level, lest we use a fully cracked shofar. [According to Tosfos’s limitation of Rabbi Shimon, it is debatable if Rabbi Shimon would apply kol ha’omed to a cracked shofar. There is no mitzvah of cracking the shofar, per se, but there is a mitzvah to blow in it, which would crack it further.]

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Eating the Size of a Bean

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 53) states: The righteous Kohanim would withdraw their hands from the lechem hapanim (for eating a portion the size of a bean would not be regarded as a mitzvah), but the gluttons would divide their shares (seemingly this means that they would leave a large amount for one Kohen, and they would take his share a different time)

Rashi cites the Gemora in Yoma 39a which states that in the times of Shimon Hatzadik, there was a blessing in the lechem hapanim and a Kohen who would eat a k’zayis would be satisfied, but afterwards, they would only receive a portion the size of a bean, and still not be satiated.

Tosfos Yeshonim comments that if they would have become satiated from a portion the size of a bean, they would have fulfilled their mitzvah.

Chasam Sofer notes that there exists a novelty in the mitzvah of eating kodoshim. If one person eats from the korban the size of a k’zayis and the rest of the Kohanim all have less than a k’zayis, that is sufficient in respect to the korban. The first Kohen is the only one that fulfilled his mitzvah. This is why the righteous ones held back from eating when it was only the size of a bean.

The Beis Halevi explains the Tosfos Yeshonim that there is a distinction between the korban pesach and other korbanos. By the korban pesach, there is an obligation on the individual and he is required to eat a k’zayis. By the other korbanos, the mitzvah is that the korban should be eaten, and if accumulatively, the korban was eaten, even though there was no Kohen who had a k’zayis, that is sufficient.

According to the Beis Halevi, we do not understand why the righteous ones held back from eating when it was only the size of a bean; as long as everyone ate the entire lechem hapanim, the mitzvah would be fulfilled!?

(Shemuas Chaim attempts to answer this, however, it is not clear to me)

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L'chatchilah and B'dieved

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 25) explains that while it is true that Rebbe holds that the water is not required to enter the person’s mouth, it must, however, be a place which is fit for the water to enter (and since a bone was lodged between her teeth, the water could not touch her entire mouth; this invalidated her immersion).

This logic follows the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, who says in regards to a korban minchah: A flour-offering that is fit for mixing (of the flour and the oil of the offering; with one log of oil for sixty esronim of flour, and a maximum of sixty esronim in one pan, perfect mixing is possible), the mixing is not critical to it (and the offering will be valid even without mixing); whereas, a flour-offering that is not fit for mixing (where, the proportions of the mixture were less than a log for sixty esronim or where more than sixty esronim were placed in one pan), the mixing is critical (and the offering will not be valid).

Tosfos asks: If the Torah repeated the halachah of “mixing,” it should be critical to the minchah, and if it did not, why is it necessary for it to be “fit for mixing”?

Tosfos answers: Although it is written many times in the Torah, it is not mandatory for it to be mixed, since it is not written in the language of a commandment. We may only derive that the flour and oil should be fit for mixing.

Tosfos in Niddah writes that none of those verses are extra, for they are all necessary to teach various halachos. If so, they ask: Why is it necessary for it to be “fit for mixing”?

Tosfos answers: Since the Torah was particular that a mixing should be done, it is only logical that it should be fit for mixing, for otherwise, the mitzvah would be negated completely.

The Rishonim similarly ask with regards to immersion: Why is it required that his mouth (or other areas) should be a place where water is fit to enter?

Tosfos answers: It is because it is written: And he shall immerse all his flesh in the water. This would seemingly include even all the hidden areas. However, since we expound the verse “his flesh” to be referring only to the exposed parts of the body, the term “all his flesh” teaches us that all parts must be fit for the water to enter.

Evidently, Tosfos holds that this halachah is a Biblical requirement. Other Rishonim hold that it is only a Rabbinical obligation.

Tosfos in Niddah asks: Why isn’t there a requirement at least l’chatchilah that the water should enter even the hidden areas (the same way there is a halachah that the minchah should l’chatchilah be mixed)?

Tosfos answers: With respect to immersion, there is no logic to mandate that the water should enter even the hidden areas of his body, for the Torah is only interested in the person becoming tahor; since b’dieved he will be tahor anyway (even if the water does not come into contact with these areas), what sense is there to require it in the first place? However, with respect to mixing the minchah, which is a mitzvah, it is understandable that the Torah desires that the minchah should be mixed, even though it will be valid even if it isn’t.

My Rosh Yeshivah, Rabbi Avrohom Chaim Levin Shlit”a explains this Tosfos in the following manner: When the discussion pertains to a chalos (something taking effect), it is either valid, or it is not. It is not logical to state that in order for something to be effective, the Torah wants it done in this specific manner. However, even if that is done, it is effective anyway. [L’chatchilah and b’dieved cannot be said regarding a Torahdike chalos.] However, when we are discussing a mitzvah, it is possible to say that there are different levels with respect to the fulfillment of the mitzvah. One will fulfill the mitzvah regardless, but it is still preferable to do it in a certain specific manner.

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Kohanim as Agents

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Rabbah inquired: Can a Canaanite slave make a messenger to accept his Get for him from his master? Do we say that being that we derive his laws from a woman (who can make a messenger), he too can make a messenger? Or do we say that a woman who can accept her Get can make a messenger, but he, who cannot accept a Get cannot make a messenger? After Rabbah asked the question, he resolved that he can make a messenger, based upon the above gezeirah shavah.

The Gemora asks: Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua says that Kohanim are Hashem’s messengers. If we would say that they are our messengers, is it possible that there is something that a person themselves cannot do, yet they have the power to create a messenger to do it for them?
However, based on what we just said, this logic seems flawed. After all, a slave cannot accept his own Get, yet, he can make a messenger who will accept it for him!?

The Gemora answers: This question is incorrect. A regular Jew cannot have anything to do with bringing a korban. A slave, however, has a connection with emancipation documents. This is as the braisa states: It appears that a slave can act as a messenger to accept his friend’s Get from his friend’s master. However, he cannot accept a Get from his own master.

The Gemora in Nedarim (35b) poses the identical inquiry and states that a practical difference between the two perspectives is with regard to someone who declared that he would not derive benefit from a certain Kohen. If the Kohen is our agent, he will not be permitted to perform the service for the one who vowed against him. However, if the Kohen is an agent of Heaven, he would be permitted to perform the service for him.

The Rishonim ask: Why didn’t the Gemora there resolve this inquiry from that which Rav Huna said here that if we would say that they are our messengers, is it possible that there is something that a person themselves cannot do, yet they have the power to create a messenger to do it for them?

1) Tosfos answers that the Gemora wished to resolve the inquiry from a Mishna or a braisa, not from an Amoraic statement.

2) Furthermore, Tosfos notes that we can only prove from Rav Huna that the Kohanim are also agents of Heaven, and not only our agents, for if they would only be our agents, how can they perform the service when the Yisroel, who sent them, cannot perform it! However, it can still very well be that they are the agents of both.

3) The Ritva answers that we can prove from Rav Huna that the Kohanim are agents of Heaven only when they are offering the korbanos of a Yisroel; however, there would still be a matter of doubt with respect to a case when they are sacrificing the korbanos for another Kohen. Here, Rav Huna’s logic would not be applicable, for the sender is able to perform the service himself!

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Terifah on the Mizbe'ach

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 48a) asks: Who are the “strikers?” Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: They would cut a calf between its eyes in order that blood should fall into its eyes (and it would become easier to slaughter). He stopped this, because it looked like they were making a blemish on the animal (which would render it invalid to be brought as a sacrifice).

The braisa taught: They would hit it with sticks, just as is done with sacrifices brought before idols. He asked them: Until when are you going to bring animals that are not killed via slaughtering (neveilah) as sacrifices on the altar?

The Gemora asks: How could he say this? They slaughtered the animals! The Gemora answers: Rather, he said that they were bringing animals that are too sick to be kosher, as he suspected that they were causing a puncture in the covering of the brain (rendering the animal unkosher as a “tereifah” even if it would be slaughtered properly). He therefore instituted that they should have rings on the ground (of the courtyard of the Beis HaMikdash that would hold the animal in place during slaughtering).

The Maharsham in Daas Torah asks: Since they knew where the animal was hit, why couldn’t they check to see if the animal was a tereifah or not?

The Minchas Keneos answers: It is forbidden to slaughter an animal which is a tereifah in the Beis HaMikdash because the Rabbis placed a tumah on a kodoshim animal which is a tereifah (and therefore it would help finding out afterwards that it was indeed a tereifah).

Furthermore, he states that we are concerned that when they hit the korban with a stick, it is regarded as if they were destroying kodoshim with their hands (if it becomes a tereifah), and therefore they instituted that it shouldn’t be hit at all.

Dayan Weiss, in Minchas Yitzchak answers that since this procedure was constantly done, it was impossible to institute that the animal should always be checked afterwards to see if it became a tereifah. There is a grave concern that sometimes, they will forget.

The Avnei Neizer writes that in the Beis HaMikdash, they never examined the animal to see if it was a tereifah, for anytime an uncertainty arose in the Beis HaMikdash regarding the kashrus of a korban, they would not offer it as a korban. This is based upon the passuk: Hakrivehu na l’phechasecha.

According to this answer, we could explain why the Gemora states that the concern was that a tereifah will be brought on the mizbe’ach. Shouldn’t we be concerned that they will be eating from an animal which is a tereifah? The answer could be that for that, they could have checked, but for what is going to be brought on the mizbe’ach, they were not allowed to check, and that was the primary concern.

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Accepting Charity from an Idolater

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 47b) states: When there increased the number of Jews who accepted charity from idolaters, the idolaters were on top and Israel was on bottom.

The Gemora (Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (in Bava Basra) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

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Sinner should not Gain

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 15a) cites a braisa: Rabbi Shimon said: In truth, the sinner’s minchah should require oil and levonah, for we do not want the sinner to gain. Why then does it not require them? It is because we do not want his minchah to be elegant.

The Gemora (Yoma 86b) states that repentance is so great that willful transgressions can be regarded as merits, providing that one is motivated to repent by love.

The question is asked: How can that be? Isn’t the sinner gaining?

The Maharsha answers: The Gemora does not mean that the sin itself converts into a merit; but rather, through his repentance out of love, he will merit performing other mitzvos and good deeds.

Reb Tzadok Hakohen answers: The sin does convert into a merit. This is because once a person has tasted the pleasure of a sin, it becomes more difficult for him to control himself and not sin again. If, after sinning, one can nevertheless restrain himself from transgressing again, he will merit that his sins are converted into merits.

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Accepting Charity from an Idolater

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (in Bava Basra) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

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Post # 1,500!!! Reciting Korbanos in the Morning and the Reason for the Nazir's Chatas

Shulchan Aruch (O”C 1:5) rules that it is beneficial to recite every morning the portions in the Torah dealing with the korban olah, mincha, shelamim, chatas and asham.

The Magen Avraham asks: Shouldn’t the chatas be mentioned before the olah, since the chatas always takes precedence?

The Chidah offers the following answer: The Gemora in Menachos (110a) states that whoever recites the portion in the Torah discussing the korban chatas is recognized as if he offered a chatas on the Altar. This, he explains, is only applicable to the portions of the korban which are burned on the Altar; however, with respect to the portion that is given to the Kohanim, and that which they eat which provides atonement for the owner, the recital of the relevant verses does not help for this. Therefore, he says, that which our Gemora said that a chatas takes precedence over an olah, that is only with respect to the sacrifice; however, with respect to the recital of the korbanos, it is preferable to recite the olah portion prior to the portion dealing with the chatas. When one recites the verses of the chatas, he only receives credit for the portion that was to be brought on the Altar, but he does not receive credit for the portion of the korban which was to be eaten by the Kohanim; however, with the recital of the olah verses, it is regarded as if he offered the entire korban, for an olah is completely burned on the Altar. This is the reason that the olah is recited before the chatas.

The Nazir’s Chatas

The nazir brings three animals; a chatas, olah and a shelamim.

It is not explained why a nazir brings a korban chatas. The Ramban writes that it is for the following reason: A nazir separates himself to serve Hashem in a manner of extreme sanctity. It is only fitting, that after he has reached such a high level, he should strive to remain on that level for the remainder of his life. Since he concluded his nezirus and he reverted back to the desires of this world, he is required to offer a korban chatas to atone for this reversal.

The Meshech Chochmah writes that the accepting of nezirus upon oneself results in the forfeiture of many mitzvos, such as involving himself with the burial of his close relatives, reciting kiddush over wine and making havdalah. Although, a nazir accomplishes much in his abstainment and he is considered praiseworthy for this, he nevertheless is required to bring a korban chatas to atone for the mitzvos that he has lost.

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Bull Refuses to Budge

The Medrash (Vayikra Rabbah 3:5) cites the following incident: There was an animal that was being brought to the Beis Hamikdosh to be brought up on the Altar as a korban. As they got near the final destination, the animal refused to budge. A pauper came by and fed the animal a bundle of truksima (a certain type of grass that is known to cause animals to sneeze). As the animal sneezed, a needle discharged from inside its throat. The animal then allowed itself to be pulled towards the Altar and be brought as a korban (if the needle would have stayed inside, it would have punctured one of the animal’s vital organs rendering it a treifa, which would invalidate it from being used as a korban). The poor person appeared to the animal’s owner in a dream and said, “The offering of a pauper (my bundle of vegetables) is regarded as being more significant than your bull.

The Drush Shmuel explains the following verse accordingly [Vayikra 1:3]: An unblemished male you shall offer it according to his will. Only if the animal is going willingly should it be brought as a korban; otherwise (if it refuses to budge), do not offer it as a sacrifice, for it might be because it has a blemish (that the owner is not aware of).

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Ruling Leniently by a Nazir; Even Nowadays

The braisa states (Nazir 8a): If someone said that he will be a nazir on condition that in this silo there are one hundred kur (type of measurement), and it was found out that some of the grain was stolen or lost and there is therefore no way of knowing for sure how much grain was there, Rabbi Shimon says he must be a nazir as a doubt of nezirus is resolved stringently.

Rabbi Yehudah said: He does not have to be a nazir, as a doubt of nezirus is resolved leniently.

The Mefaresh explains that we do not rule that he should be a nazir based upon our uncertainty, since we do not want that he should offer unconsecrated sacrifices (if he is actually not a nazir) into the Beis Hamikdosh upon conclusion of his nezirus.

It should emerge, according to this logic, that nowadays, when there are no korbanos, and the aforementioned concern is not applicable, Rabbi Yehudah should agree that we should rule stringently that he is a nazir.

However, the Maharam Mipadava (71) writes that we find many places that the ruling does not change because perhaps the Beis Hamikdosh will be built the following day. So too, here, we say that the Beis Hamikdosh might be built the following day, and he will be bringing unconsecrated offerings into the Beis Hamikdosh. Therefore, the ruling remains that he is not regarded as a nazir.

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Oath to Fulfill a Mitzvah

The Ran and Rosh (Nedarim 8a) argue whether an oath to fulfill a mitzvah is binding in the sense that one would be in violation of “desecrating his word” for not keeping his promise. Ran understands that an oath on a mitzvah is not binding for the purpose of being liable for a korban, but is binding, and if he transgresses the mitzvah, he has violated the prohibition against desecrating his word. The Rosh seems to understand that it is not binding at all. This is also the opinion of the Ramban brought by Reb Akiva Eiger.

Reb Avi Lebowitz points out that based on this understanding, they also argue as to what the novelty of Rav Gidal’s teaching is. The Ran understands that the oath is binding and therefore obviously not an oath taken in vain, so the novelty is that one is encouraged to make these types of oaths (even those who generally refrain from taking oaths), for it will inspire him to fulfill the mitzvah. But, according to the Rosh that the oath is not really binding, the novelty is simply that by making such an “oath,” it is not an automatic violation of an oath taken in vain, since it at least accomplishes a function of encouraging the person to fulfill the mitzvah.

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Drinking Wine by Kiddush

The Gemora (Nedarim 4a)explains that the novelty of a chatas nazir is that it cannot be pledged to be brought as a vow. When we asked earlier that this is a trademark of all chatas offerings, it is possible to answer that all other chatas offerings are obviously not brought because they are pledged, as they are obligated to be brought to atone for a sin. However, why is a korban chatas of a nazir brought? [One might therefore have thought the prohibition of delaying vows does not apply to it, which is why the hekeish is needed.]

The Gemora asks: The korban chatas of a woman who gives birth is also not brought for a sin that she committed, but nonetheless we know the prohibition for delaying vows does apply to her korban chatas. [Why should a korban chatas of a nazir be different?]

The Gemora answers: Her korban chatas is still different than that of a nazir, as it enables her to eat kodoshim (korbanos, which she was unable to eat beforehand and is a mitzvah).

The Meiri asks: Doesn’t the chatas offering of a nazir help him that he is now permitted to drink wine?

Tosfos and the Ran answer that drinking wine is a voluntary act, and it is not a mitzvah like the eating of kodoshim.

However, we can ask: What about the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush and havdalah? The Gemora Pesachim (106a) derives from the verse Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it that there is an obligation to recite kiddush over a cup of wine. Accordingly, we should say that a nazir’s bringing of the korbanos is similar to that of a woman who gave birth; he is bringing the korban in order to be permitted to partake in the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush?

The Meiri answers: The mitzvah of drinking the wine for kiddush is only a Rabbinical one, and the korban is not coming for that.

Tosfos explains that although there is a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush with wine, the obligation that the one who recites the blessing should drink the wine is only Rabbinical.

Reb Koby Shapiro in the Hebrew Midrashiya states that there may be a practical difference in halacha whether the mitzvah of drinking the wine is a Biblical one or merely Rabbinical.

It is ruled upon in Shulchan Aruch that a woman is Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush on Shabbos. Accordingly, she would be allowed to discharge a man of his obligation by reciting the kiddush for him.

The Acharonim raise the following question: When a man comes home from Shul Friday night, he has already fulfilled his Biblical obligation of kiddush in the Shemoneh Esrei of ma’ariv. He still has a Rabbinical obligation to recite the kiddush over a cup of wine. His wife, on the other hand, who did not daven ma’ariv, still has a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush. How can the man, who only has a Rabbinical obligation discharge his wife of her Biblical obligation?

Some answer that she should recite vayechulu prior to kiddush.

Reb Akiva Eiger answers that there is no concern here because of the principle that one who has fulfilled the mitzvah can nevertheless discharge an obligation for someone who did not yet fulfill the mitzvah. This works because every Jew is a guarantor for another. Some Acharonim are not satisfied with this answer because they say that a woman is not included in this guarantee for each other.

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is as if the husband had intention not to fulfill the Biblical obligation of kiddush when he is davening ma’ariv. This way, they are both Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush.

This entire discussion is based upon the Meiri’s opinion that the mitzvah of drinking the wine is merely a Rabbinical mitzvah. However, if we would hold that there is a Biblical mitzvah to drink the wine of kiddush, then, there would be no discussion, for the husband still has not discharged his own obligation by davening ma’ariv; he still has a Biblical obligation to drink the wine.

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SHABBOS IN THE DAF - Yevamos 100 - Daf Yomi

By Reb Ben

The Gemara discusses a case where limbs of a chatas offering, which are meant to be eaten, became mixed up with limbs of an olah offering, which are meant to be burned on the mizbeiach. The Gemara states that for a satisfying aroma, i.e. with sacrificial intent, one cannot offer on the mizbeiach something that is supposed to be eaten, but one can offer it for the sake of firewood. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar who maintains that we can view the limbs of the chatas as fuel for the fire of the mizbeiach. In his opinion, one is only prohibited to place the edible part of an offering on the mizbeiach if it was placed there with sacrificial intent. We see from the Gemara the importance of intent regarding a sacrifice. We do not currently have the Bais HaMikdash and thus we are not able to offer sacrifices. Yet, in lieu of the Bais HaMikdash and sacrifices, we have Shabbos, which serves as an atonement for the Jewish People. In the Shabbos Mussaf prayers, we offer the following supplication: vies Mussaf yom HaShabbos hazeh naaseh vinakriv lefeonecho beahavah kimitzvas ritzonecho, and the Mussaf of this Shabbos day we will perform and offer to You with love according to the commandment of Your will. Besides the fact that we will be offering the sacrifices in the future, we will also be offering them with love. According to an explanation of the Tiferes Shlomo (Bereishis 2:31) we can interpret this to mean that through the infusion of holiness that we have now on Shabbos in the exile, we will merit the holiness of Shabbos in the World to Come. Thus, our intent in observing the Shabbos now predicates the reward of Shabbos that we will receive in the future.

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