Accepting Charity from an Idolater

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The Gemora states: An act of kindness or charity performed by an idolater is regarded as a sin. This is because they are only performing these good deeds to live longer, or that their reign should continue, or in order to glorify themselves, or to rebuke the Jews.

The Gemora in Sotah (47a) states: When there increased the number of Jews who accepted charity from idolaters, the idolaters were on top and Israel was on bottom.

Our Gemora says that when idolaters give tzedakah it serves as an atonement for them. Because it serves as an atonement, Rav Ami refused to accept tzedakah from Ifra Hurmiz. Even Rava only accepted it for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government, but otherwise, he would not have accepted it. This is based upon a verse which teaches us that the idolaters will become weak and broken once their charitable deeds have dried up, and therefore, we don’t give them opportunities for more merits. However, the Gemora says that if we were to use the funds to support non-Jewish causes (which Rashi explains that we support anyway for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government), it would not give them any special merit. It is only if we use the funds to support Jews that it is considered a merit for them.

Tosfos (8a d.h. yasiv) points out that the Gemora in Eruchin (6b) implies that we would accept donations to synagogues that come from idolaters. Why? Tosfos explains that donations to synagogues are considered like korbanos and we do accept korbanos from idolaters.

The Gemora (Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (here) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

What does the Haga’os Ashri mean that vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings are not meant for the purpose of atonement? What is accomplished for the idolaters aside from atonement? Furthermore, the Gemora says in Sukkah (55b) that the idolaters destroyed the Holy Temple, not realizing what they will be losing. When we had the Temple, the Altar served as an atonement for them, but now they have nothing to atone for them. The Gemora in Sukkah clearly implies that the purpose for their korbanos were to be an atonement, which contradicts the Haga’os Ashri?

The distinction of the Haga’os Ashri is found in the Shach and Taz (Y.D. 254:4) to explain the Rama who says that we do accept donations to synagogues from idolaters, but don’t accept tzedakah from them (unless the money was air-marked for tzedakah and must be accepted for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government).

Reb Avi Lebowitz suggests the following: Perhaps the Gemora in Sukkah is not referring to the vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings that the idolaters bring, rather the Holy Temple, in general, served as an atonement for the entire world, including the idolaters. But the vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings, and donations to synagogues that we accept from idolaters is because it allows them to have a share in our prayers, but it will not serve as an atonement to prevent them from being destroyed for sins that they have committed. Tzedakah to the poor which would serve as an atonement for sins that they have committed, we refuse to accept from them unless we have no choice (such as for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government).

The Chochmas Adam (146:3) explains this idea a bit further: Tzedakah to the poor is tantamount to a korban chatas which we do not accept from idolaters because we don’t give them opportunity for atonement, but freewill-offerings, we do accept from them, so we can also accept gifts to synagogues.

It would seem that this prohibition, which forbids accepting tzedakah from them, only applies to tzedakah to the poor, but donations to Yeshivos and donations for kindness activities which do not go to the poor, would be like vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings that we can accept from them. But perhaps when it comes to the studying of Torah, where the donation buys them a share in the Torah, we should not provide them with that opportunity either.

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Counseling an Idolater to Avoid Divine Retribution

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The Gemora asks: How could Bava ben Buta give advice to Hurdus, seeing that Rav Yehudah has said in the name of Rav, or alternatively, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that Daniel was punished only because he gave advice to Nevuchadnezzar, as it is written: Nevertheless, O king, let my counsel be acceptable to you; redeem your sins through charity and your iniquities by showing mercy to the poor; if there may be a lengthening of your tranquility etc. And later on it is written: All this came upon the King Nevuchadnezzar, and afterwards it is written: At the end of twelve months etc.?

The Gemora answers: Either you can say that this does not apply to a slave, who is under obligation to keep the Torah’s commandments, or you can say that an exception had to be made in the case of the Temple which could not have been built without the assistance of Royalty.

The Gemora asks: How do we know that Daniel was punished? Shall I say that it is from the verse: And Esther called to Hasach, who, as Rav has told us, was the same as Daniel? This is a sufficient answer if we accept the view of those who say that he was called Hasach because he was “cut down” (chatach) from his greatness. But according to the view of those who say that he was called Hasach because all affairs of state were “decided” according to his counsel, what answer can we give?

The Gemora answers that he was thrown into the den of lions.

The Meiri writes that one who constantly sins, his iniquities are so great that the ability to repent is removed from him. This is why one should not divulge to them the appropriate ways of penance, for these people are not supposed to escape the Divine punishment. This is why Daniel was punished, for without solicitation, he proffered advice to Nevuchadnezzar, as to how to escape Hashem’s anger.

The Yad Ramah adds that this prohibition applies only to an idolater who is oppressing a Jew – one is forbidden from counseling him to perform mitzvos or dispense charity to the poor in order to evade retribution for their sins. It emerges that it would be permitted to offer such advice to an ordinary idolater.

However, it is evident from the Rambam that he maintains that it is forbidden to give any positive counsel to an idolater, as long as he remains steadfast in his evil ways.

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Saving the Whales

by: Reb Avi Lebovitz

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The Gemora suggests a kal vachomer that would result in their being a mitzvah of preserving the life of animals. Although one may have a mitzvah to feed his own animals, the Gemora concludes that there is surely no mitzvah to support the animal (when it is no longer profitable), and certainly one is not obligated to support animals that are not his.

The Tosfos HaRosh asks in the name of Rabbeinu Meir: Why would we have thought differently? There should be an obvious challenge to this kal vachomer from the fact that one is not allowed to slaughter people, but may slaughter animals - this obviously shows that there isn’t any mitzvah to preserve the life of animals!?

The Tosfos HaRosh responds to this question by saying that we would have thought that this mitzvah would apply to animals that one is not allowed to slaughter, such as a bechor that is intermingled with an ox that is destined to be stoned (shor haniskal).

Aside from the actual question of the Tosfos HaRosh, the entire thought that one would be obligated to support animals and help them survive seems a little strange. Especially since in the end, the mitzvah of preserving a life only applies to a Jew and not to an idolater!?

The Biur Halachah (330:2) writes that one is obligated to help a ger toshav woman give birth because on a ger toshav, there is a mitzvah to preserve their life. He entertains the possibility that the Jew can even violate a Rabbinic prohibition to help the ger toshav give birth because when there is a mitzvah to preserve a life, the Rabbis did not issue their decrees. Based on this application of the mitzvah to preserve a life, the mitzvah goes beyond tzedakah; it compels one to actually take care of others and help them through physically challenging circumstances.

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Converts

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Converts are like Sapachas

Rabbi Chelbo said (Kiddushin 70) : Converts are as harmful to the Jewish people as sapachas (a type of tzara’as).

Rashi explains that this is because converts are not so meticulous in the performance of mitzvos, and those Jews who observe this behavior will become influenced by them.

Tosfos writes that each and every Jew is a guarantor for his fellow, and if converts do not perform mitzvos meticulously, they will be punished on account of them.

Tosfos rejects this explanation, for he proves that when the Jewish people accepted to be guarantors for each other, they did not accept to be guarantors for the converts as well.

Tosfos brings another explanation: They are harmful to the Jews, for it is impossible that someone will not bother them, and the punishment for this will be severe, for the Torah in twenty-four places warn the Jewish people not to bother the converts.

Tosfos brings another explanation: It is because of the converts that we are still in exile, for the Gemora says that Klal Yisroel are scattered all over the world much more so than other nations in order for there to be additional converts.

Rabbeinu Avraham the convert explains differently: It is because the converts are meticulous in their performance of the mitzvos. This shows the shortcomings of ordinary Jews.

TEACHING TORAH TO A GENTILE PLANNING ON CONVERTING
The Rambam (Issurei Bi’ah 14:2) writes that we inform the prospective convert the essentials of the faith, which is the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and they go on at great length about these matters.

The Machaneh Chaim (Y”D II, 45) asks: Why isn’t this forbidden on account of a gentile studying Torah? The Gemora in Sanhedrin (59a) states explicitly that a non-Jew who studies Torah is liable for death.

He answers by citing a Medrash Tanchuma in Parshas Vayelech: The numerical value of Torah is six hundred and eleven. The remaining two mitzvos which complete the six hundred and thirteen are the two mitzvos which were given by Hashem directly at Har Sinai. This is the explanation of the verse: The Torah that Moshe commanded us to observe. Moshe instructed us regarding six hundred and eleven mitzvos; the other two were from Hashem.

The prohibition against teaching an idolater Torah is only applicable to the six hundred and eleven mitzvos that Moshe taught us. The other two, I am Hashem your God and the Unity of God; one would be permitted to teach to them. This is where the Rambam derived his ruling from; we can go on with great length discussing the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry.

The Maharsha (Shabbos 31a) writes that it is permitted to teach Torah to an idolater who wishes to convert. He proves this from the incident with Hillel and the convert.

Reb Akiva Eiger (41) disagrees and maintains that it is forbidden to teach Torah to an idolater even if he is planning on converting. Hillel taught the convert Torah only after he converted.

NOT BELIEVING A SCHOLAR
At that time, the plaintiff spoke up and said to Rav Yehudah, “Is it me that you call a slave, when, in fact, I descend from the Chasmonai family!” Rav Yehudah responded, “Shmuel has said that whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave (for Herod had killed them all out).

Rav Nachman said to Rav Yehudah, “Do you not hold of that which Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna, who said in the name of Rav: Wherever a scholar issues a halachic ruling (that was previously unknown) and such a point comes up for a practical decision, he is obeyed if he made the statement before the incident occurred, but if the statement was made only after the incident occurred, he is not obeyed (and therefore, we do not have to accept this ruling which you stated in the name of Shmuel)!?

Rav Yehudah replied, “But there is Rav Masnah who holds like me as well?” Rav Masnah was not seen in Nehardea for thirteen years, but just that day, he came before them. Rav Yehudah asked him, “Does the master remember that which Shmuel said while he had one foot on the bank of the river and the other foot was on a boat?” Rav Masnah replied, “Shmuel said, ‘whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave, for no one remained from their family except for one maiden who went up on the roof and called out with a loud voice, “whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave.” She then threw herself off the roof and died.’”

Rav Nachman declared that the man was indeed a slave. That day, they ripped up many kesuvos in Nehardea (all the married woman from that man’s family lost their kesuvos).

From Rashi’s commentary (Yevamos 77a), it would seem that the reason we do not accept the scholar’s statement is because we are concerned that he might deliberately falsify the halachah.

The Ritva forcefully disputes this. Heaven forbid that a Torah scholar would deliberately falsify the ruling. Rather, the reason why we don’t believe him in these situations is because he might make a mistake; in the excitement of the moment, it would appear to him that he remembers the tradition in one manner, when in fact, it is really the opposite.

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Stealing from an Idolater

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 63) proves that Rabbi Meir holds a man may sell something that is not yet in existence from the following braisa: If a man said to a woman, “You shall be betrothed to me after I convert,” or “After you shall convert,” or “After I shall have been set free from slavery,” or “After you have been set free,” or “After your husband dies,” or “After your sister (my wife) dies,” or “After your yavam has submitted to chalitzah from you,” she, Rabbi Meir ruled, is legally betrothed! [The kiddushin is effective when the respective conditions are fulfilled, though at the time of the betrothal they were still unfulfilled; this indicates that an act that involves something that is not yet in existence is nevertheless, valid.]

The Acharonim ask: The Gemora in Bava Kamma (70b) explains that the acquisition using money (kinyan kesef) functions in the following way: When the seller receives the money, he becomes obligated to give the item being exchanged with the money. Now according to those that hold that it is permitted to steal from a gentile, how can the idolater betroth this woman with money after he converts? The woman is not obligated to return the money, and if she will lose the money, she would not be required to compensate him! If so, where is the kinyan?

Reb Shimon Shkop answers based upon the opinion of the Yereim, who says that even according to those that hold that it is permitted to steal from a gentile, one cannot fulfill his mitzvah with an esrog that he stole from a gentile. This is because it is not regarded as “his,” for the Torah did not render their money ownerless that anyone has the right to possess their money. “Stealing from an idolater is permitted” means that there is no prohibition against keeping that which was stolen from them. However, since it does not belong to the Jew, he still has an obligation to return it to its rightful owner, and he would be liable to compensate the gentile if he would lose it. Accordingly, the kinyan of money would still apply to an idolater.

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Healing an Idolater

(Gittin 70) For a skin disease (moist outside and dry inside), he should take seven plump wheat stalks and roast them over a new hoe and smear himself with the oil that exudes from them. Rav Shimi bar Ashi used this remedy for a certain idolater for “something else” (leprosy), and it cured him.

Tosfos asks from the Gemora in Avodah Zarah (26b) which states that it is forbidden to heal an idolater. The Gemora rules that one may not assist an idolater woman giving birth, even for payment, for she will raise the child to serve idols!?

Tosfos answers that Rav Shimi was permitted to heal the idolater, for this would help him perfect his medical skills, and thus enable him to heal other Jews.

Tosfos in Avodah Zarah adds that Rav Shimi was not an expert practitioner at all, and he was training when he cured the idolater.

Furthermore, in cases where the idolater knows that the Jew has the ability to cure him, it would be permitted to heal him, for otherwise, it would propagate hatred from them to us.

Alternatively, there may be a distinction between a child being born, who will serve idols, and one who already worships idols.

The Geresh Yerachim asks: How was Elisha permitted to heal Naaman from his leprosy?

He answers that Elisha knew that Naaman would not serve idols any longer, and therefore, it was permitted.

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Ransoming for more than their Value

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The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b) had stated: We do not redeem captives for more than their true value for “the benefit of the world.”

The Gemora inquires: Does “the benefit of the world” (with respect to redeeming the captives for more than their worth) relate to the burden which may be imposed on the community (they will all become impoverished), or to the possibility that the bandits will take more captives? [The difference would be in a case where a private individual, such as a relative, wishes to redeem him.]

Come and hear: Levi ben Darga ransomed his daughter for thirteen thousand golden dinars.

Abaye asked: But are you sure that he acted with the consent of the Sages? Perhaps he acted against their will!

Rashi explains that “more than their true value” is referring to the amount that they would fetch if they would be sold in the slave market.

The Meiri writes that their value is based upon their individual wealth and prominence.

The Radvaz rules that we may ransom any captive with the amount of money that is usual to redeem other captives during that time period.

He adds: It has become the custom to redeem captive for more than their worth in the market, for an elderly person or a minor are not worth more than ten dinars, and nevertheless, they are ransomed for more than one hundred dinars. His explanation why there is no concern that the bandits will take more captives is because the captives are not being ransomed for any more that their gentile counterparts. He concludes that nothing should be told to Klal Yisroel about this, for they are a charitable nation, and it is better for them to remain that way.

Tosfos and the Ramban disagree regarding the halachah if the captive himself is allowed to ransom himself for more money than he is actually worth.

The Gemora in Kesuvos (52b) states: If one’s wife was captured and the kidnappers sought ten times her fair value for redemption, the first time the husband must redeem her. Afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that we do not redeem captives for more than they are worth for “the establishment of the world” (that captors should not thereby be encouraged to demand exorbitant prices for the ransom of their captive).

This issue had an extraordinary public application about 700 years ago. The leader of Ashkenazic Jewry at the time was Rabbi Meir ben Boruch of Rottenberg. He was imprisoned by a German ruler, Rudolph, whose voracity knew no bounds. Rabbi Meir (known as Maharam Mi’Rottenberg) was imprisoned until his death, and his body was not released. The community did not ransom him, as he himself had ruled. Seven years after his death, a private member of the community paid almost all of his own money to release the body, with the stipulation that he be buried next to him.

There is a question whether according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel a man would be permitted to ransom his wife if the ransom exceeds her worth. The Ritva holds that he may do so, and the Chelkas Mechokeik disagrees.

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Kiddushin with a Slavewoman

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (Daf Yomi: Gittin 40b) explains the braisa to be dealing with the following case: The master told her, “Become free with this deed (of betrothal) and be betrothed to me with this.” [In this case, she was obviously not freed from beforehand.] Rabbi Meir holds that this expression (be betrothed) includes emancipation (for she cannot become betrothed to him unless he frees her first), and the Chachamim maintain that it does not include emancipation.

Tosfos in Yevamos (47b) asks: How can the kiddushin be effective if the slave did not immerse herself in a mikvah beforehand? The halachah is that after a slave becomes free, he is immersed in a mikvah to become a complete Jew. If so, this woman is still a slave, and kiddushin is not effective with a slave!?

Tosfos answers that we are dealing with a case where she immersed herself prior to the kiddushin.

The Nimukei Yosef states that the requirement for this immersion is only Rabbinical, and therefore, the kiddushin will be Biblically effective even if she did not immerse beforehand.

Reb Chaim Brisker asks that both of these answers will not resolve the issue according to the Rambam. He proves that the Rambam holds that this immersion is a Biblical requirement. This is because the Rambam maintains that this immersion is a completion of her conversion process. If so, asks Reb Chaim, it is obviously a Biblical requirement and it also cannot be done before she becomes free, for it is part of her conversion process and that can only be accomplished after she becomes free! How would the Rambam understand our Gemora? How can the kiddushin be effective with a slavewoman?

He answers as follows: A freed slave requires immersion in order to accept upon himself those halachos that he was lacking while he was still a slave, for at that time, he was not a complete Jew. This, however, has no bearing on the fact that kiddushin is not effective with a slave or a slavewoman. That, the Gemora in Kiddushin (68a) explains is because a slave does not have any lineage (yuchasin). A slave, in this respect, is inferior to an idolater, for an idolater does have lineage. As soon as the slave is freed and he is no longer a slave, he does have lineage, even though his conversion was not completed, for even an idolater has lineage. It is for this reason that kiddushin can be effective in this case even though she did not immerse in the mikvah yet. For in order for the kiddushin to be effective, it is not necessary for her to have a completed conversion; as long as she is not a slave is sufficient, and since at the moment she becomes free, she is no longer a slave, kiddushin may take effect.

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An Idolatrous Name

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel (Daf Yomi: Gittin 34b): The Jews from abroad sent to Rabban Gamliel the following inquiry: If a man comes here from Eretz Yisroel whose true name is Yosef, but who is known here as Yochanan, or whose name is Yochanan, but who is known here as Yosef, how can he divorce his wife? Rabban Gamliel thereupon stood up and decreed that they should write in the get, “This man So-and-so or by whatever names he is known,” “This woman So-and-so or by whatever names she is known,” in order to benefit the public.

They asked Rabbeinu Tam regarding a Jew who worships idols and he divorced his wife with a get which had only his Jewish name written on it, and not his idolatrous name. What is the status of such a get?

He answered: Heaven forbid to even mention an idolatrous name on a get which is written according to the law of Moshe and all of Israel!

The Ra”dach in his response explains that his idolatrous name is not regarded as his name at all, and if that would be the only name written on the get, it would be as if the get would be written without the name of the divorcing husband.

However, Reb Yosef Engel notes that from the language of Rabbeinu Tam, it would seem that there is a different explanation. It is on account of the sanctity of the get that his idolatrous name cannot be written.

And the Rad”vaz in his response writes like that as well. He says that any holy scroll, such as a Sefer Torah, Tefillin, or Mezuzah, where there lies an obligation that it should be written lishmah, and also a get has sanctity, for it is also has a requirement to be written lishmah.

He concludes that the matzah which is being baked to be eaten on Pesach night also possesses sanctity, for it is required to be baked lishmah.

It is possible that this could explain the custom of many righteous people to kiss the matzah before they eat it on the night of the seder.

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Idolater Judges

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin Daf 11a) asks: What are names that are clearly those of non-Jews?
Rav Papa answers: Names such as Hurmiz, Abudina, Bar Shibsai, Bar Kidri, Bati, and Nakim Una. Rashi explains that these are all names of idolater judges.

The Maharam Shif asks: The judges are not the ones who are signing! Rather, it is the witnesses who are signing in the presence of the judges.

He answers that Rashi is only stating as to why these names are obviously idolaters, and not Jewish. There were well known idolater judges with those names, and that is why when someone signs with such a name, we are certain that he is an idolater and not a Jew.

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Accepting Charity from an Idolater

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 47b) states: When there increased the number of Jews who accepted charity from idolaters, the idolaters were on top and Israel was on bottom.

The Gemora (Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (in Bava Basra) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

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An Idolater is Stricter than a Jew

The Rishonim ask: It is evident from our Gemora that according to the one that holds that an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, can only Rabbinically pronounce a vow, but Biblically, it will not be effective; nevertheless, with respect to an idolater, an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, may pronounce a vow and it will be Biblically binding. Why would this be? How can an idolater be more stringent that a Jew?

The Mefaresh explains that there are other examples where we find that the law is stricter with an idolater than it is with respect of a Jew. The Mishna in Bava Kamma teaches us that if the ox of idolater gores an animal belonging to a Jew, the idolater is liable to pay full damages, even if the ox gored for the first time. A Jew, however, whose ox gores for the first time, will only be liable to pay half-damages.

Tosfos suggests the following: A Jewish adult is subject to the prohibition against desecrating his word. Accordingly, we expound that any Jew who is not included in this prohibition cannot pronounce a vow. A minor, who is not subject to this commandment, cannot therefore utter a vow, which would be Biblically valid. An idolater, however, who is not included in this prohibition, cannot be excluded from pronouncing a vow based on this, and therefore, even a minor’s vow would be Biblically binding.

It is evident from Tosfos that the prohibition against desecrating his word is not applicable to an idolater. The Mishna L’melech cites proofs that an idolater is obligated to keep his word based upon the prohibition against desecrating his word.

The Ohr Sameach answers this question by citing the Chasam Sofer, who says that any idolater, even a minor is obligated to observe their commandments. This explains why with respect to idolaters, an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, can pronounce a vow and it will be Biblically valid, whereas a Jewish minor cannot. By an idolater, there is no distinction whatsoever between a minor and an adult. Proof to this is from the Rosh, who states that the guidelines for a minor to reach adulthood are learned from an oral tradition that was transmitted to Moshe at Sinai with respect to all measurements. These laws were given to the Jewish people; not for the idolaters.

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Accepting Charity from an Idolater

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (in Bava Basra) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

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The Novelty of the Midianite Utensils

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 37b) had concluded regarding the emissions of utensils used by idolaters that have been used within twenty-four hours, it is impossible that the absorption is not deemed slightly bad, and although with respect to all prohibitions, such a taste would be permitted, nevertheless, the Torah states that one is prohibited from using such a pot unless it is first scalded.

The Ramban asks: If in regards to those utensils used by idolaters, the flavor is regarded like the substance, how is it possible to say that with respect to other prohibitions, the flavor is not forbidden like the substance? Are the emissions from the idolaters’ utensils a distinct class of prohibition, different from any other prohibitions? The Midianite utensils were forbidden out of the concern that there were non-kosher foods cooked inside of it!

He answers that the Torah elevated its prohibition with respect of utensils that a utensil that absorbed flavor from a forbidden food is forbidden. And although the flavor that will be emitted from this pot will be slightly spoiled, and is not equivalent to the substance, nevertheless the Torah decreed that the flavor is not nullified and is forbidden. This is similar to the halacha that one must immerse in water a utensil purchased from an idolater even though it has not been used. There, if one would use it without immersion, the food would not be forbidden; here, it would be.

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