Showing posts with label Rama. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rama. Show all posts

Sunday, January 31, 2010

Get Mekushar Bizman Hazeh

The Mishna states: A plain document - its witnesses are inside it (on the bottom). And a tied one - its witnesses are on the reverse (between one fold and the next). [They began by wring a single line or a number of lines of the essence of the document, and they folded the written part upon the part below and sewed them together. Another line or lines were written, and again the parchment was sewn down, and the procedure was repeated until the last fold. Each such fold was known as a kesher, and that is why it is called a get mekushar. The Gemora explains that the tied document type was ordained by the Rabbis primarily for gittin. They instituted it for the hot-tempered Kohen who might in a fit of anger decide to divorce his wife. Unlike any other Jew, a Kohen may not marry a divorcee, including his own ex-wife. They therefore instituted the tied deed which cannot easily be written quickly in order to allow time for the Kohen’s temper to cool. As this document type was ordained for divorce, the Rabbis also instituted it for other documents, for bills of indebtedness as well as for bills of sale so that one may choose the tied document, so as not to differentiate between bills of divorce and other documents.] A plain one whose witnesses signed on its reverse and a tied one whose witnesses signed inside it - both are invalid. Rabbi Chanania ben Gamliel says: A tied one whose witnesses signed inside it is valid, because he can make it a plain one (by not sewing the knots; and even though there are spaces between one line and the next, one need not be concerned about that, as there are many unskilled scribes who leave considerable space between one line and another). Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: All is in accordance with the custom of the place. A plain document requires two witnesses, while a tied document requires three witnesses. If a plain document contained one witness or a tied document contained two witnesses, they are both invalid.

According to the Ramban, the Tannaim of the Mishna disqualified even a shtar where the witnesses signed on both sides – underneath the body of the shtar as in a plain document, and on the opposite side, in the manner which is done in a tied document. The reason for this is because the “ba’al hashtar” – the owner of the document – is particular as to how the shtar should be written. If he instructed them to write it as a plain document, the signatures of the witnesses on the back side of the shtar will ruin its “openness”; and if his instructions were to make it a tied document, their signatures on the front side remove the document from being called a tied document.

The Nimukei Yosef infers that according to the Ramban, there could be room to validate a tied document nowadays. This is because it is not the custom at all to make a tied document, and it does not enter the mind of the ba’al hashtar to instruct them to make it opened and not tied.

However, he says, according to other Rishonim’s explanation of the Mishna, it would still be invalid. They explain that the reason that a plain document is invalid when the witnesses sign their names on the back is because it was not done in the manner that the Chachamim instituted; it has nothing to do with the ba’al hashtar’s instructions. Accordingly, nowadays, a document where the witnesses signed on the back will be invalid, for it is not being done according to the established practice of the Chachamim.

The Rem”a (42:1) cites both opinions regarding this.

The Shac”h understood that the Rem”a, at least in one opinion, is validating a shtar that was completely made like a tied document – meaning, the witnesses signed only on its back side. The Shac”h disagrees and holds that this would be disqualified according to everyone, for it was not done according to the established practice of the Chachamim.

The Tumim writes that this was never the intention of the Rem”a. He was only referring to a case where the witnesses signed on both sides – underneath the body of the shtar as in a plain document, and on the opposite side, in the manner which is done in a tied document.

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Monday, June 29, 2009

Increasing the Dowry

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The Mishna stated: If someone is renting out a courtyard and he says, “If you give me the money now, I will give it to you for ten sela a year. If you give me the money every month, it will cost you one sela a month (totaling twelve sela per year),” this is permitted.

The Rem”a rules: It is permitted to increase the dowry of one’s son-in-law. He explains the case: A father vowed to give a certain amount to his daughter as a dowry. He then stipulated with his son-in-law that for every year that he allows the dowry to stay by him (and not collect it), he will give an extra amount. This is permitted, for it is as if he is merely increasing the dowry amount. However, this is only if the condition was made before the marriage. Otherwise, it would be forbidden, because the father-in-law is rewarding the son-in-law for waiting to collect the debt.

THE FORBIDDEN SALE AND THE PERMITTED LOAN

By: Rabbi Yaakov Montrose

The Mishna here discusses two cases. In the first case, a landowner sells a field to a buyer who makes a down payment. The seller says, “Whenever you want, you may bring the money and take your field.” The Mishna states that this arrangement is forbidden. RASHI (DH Machar Lo) explains that the field retroactively becomes the buyer's when he pays the rest of the money. Accordingly, if the seller ate the fruit of the field in the interim time, the seller effectively has taken Ribbis for letting the buyer delay payment. If, on the other hand, the buyer eats the fruit of the field during this time, there is a possibility that the buyer will be taking Ribbis: in the event that the buyer defaults on the sale and does not deliver the rest of the money by the given time, the down payment that he gave will retroactively be considered a loan to the seller, and the buyer (lender) will have eaten the fruit of the field of the seller (borrower), effectively taking Ribbis for his “loan” to the seller.

In the Mishna’s second case, a borrower gives his field as collateral to a lender, and they stipulate that if the borrower does not pay back the loan within three years, the field retroactively becomes payment for the loan. The fruit of the field is sold and the money held by a third party until the three years pass. If the borrower pays back the money on time, the profit from the fruit goes to the borrower and the field stays in his possession. If he does not pay back, the ownership of the field is considered to have been transferred to the lender three years ago, and the profit of the fruit goes to the lender.

The TOSFOS YOM TOV asks the following question. The Mishna’s point seems to be that when there is a possibility that the ownership of a field will be transferred retroactively when a certain time arrives, neither party may eat the fruit in the interim because of Ribbis. Why does the Mishna express this point in the case of a sale which is forbidden and in a case of a loan which is permitted? The point seems to be the same in both cases.

(a) The TOSFOS YOM TOV answers that the Mishna teaches its point in the first case with regard to a sale because it wants to show that even though the Halachah is often lenient in cases of sales (as Rebbi Yehudah indeed is lenient in this case because he rules that “Tzad Echad b'Ribbis” is permitted), in this case the Halachah is not lenient and such a transaction is forbidden. On the other hand, the Rabanan were generally stringent in cases of Ribbis of loans. The Mishna therefore teaches a second case to show that such a transaction is permitted even in the case of a loan.

(b) Alternatively, the Tosfos Yom Tov explains that the case of a permitted loan is necessary only because of the testimony which the Mishna quotes afterwards. The Mishna relates that Baysos used to manage his loans this way according to the Chachamim. To maintain consistency with the case of Baysos, the Mishna teaches the second case, in which the law is lenient.

The CHIDUSHEI MAHARI'ACH has difficulty with the question of the Tosfos Yom Tov. The Mishna teaches the first case involving a sale because it needs to teach the potential problem of Ribbis involved in selling a field. A deal in which the fruit is given to a third party until the ownership of the field becomes clarified is not problematic at all. The Mishna therefore needs to teach a case in which the deal is forbidden. The second case of the Mishna is also necessary: since the borrower is offering his field as security for a loan which is due only three years from now, it is possible that this type of transaction should be forbidden because presumably the borrower offers a field of greater value as collateral in order to receive a loan for three years. This means that a default on the loan will provide the lender with a field worth more than the loan -- which is Ribbis. The Mishna teaches that the Halachah in the case of such a loan is lenient and such a deal is permitted.

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Sunday, February 22, 2009

Laws of Heaven

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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The Gemora (Bava Kamma 56) cites a Mishna: If one sends out a fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor (and it consequently burned someone’s haystack), he is not liable to pay according to the laws of man, but he is liable according to the laws of Heaven. If, however, he sent out the fire in the hands of a competent person, the competent person is liable to pay for the damages.

It would seem that in the case where the sender sent the fire with a competent person, the sender is not liable at all, even under the laws of Heaven!

The Ram”a (C”M: 32:2) rules that if one sends out false witnesses to testify against someone, and they cause that fellow a loss, the sender is not liable at all, even under the laws of Heaven. This is because we say that there cannot be a shliach to commit a transgression.

The Sha”ch disagrees and maintains that the sender will be liable to pay under the laws of Heaven. He explains the distinction between the two cases. The sender will always be liable under the laws of Heaven. The only reason that the sender is not required to pay at all in the case of the fire is because once the competent person is liable to pay, there is no place for the sender to be liable as well!

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Thursday, January 22, 2009

Laws of Heaven

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The Gemora (Bava Kamma 22b) cites a Mishna: If one sends out a fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor (and it consequently burned someone’s haystack), he is not liable to pay according to the laws of man, but he is liable according to the laws of Heaven. If, however, he sent out the fire in the hands of a competent person, the competent person is liable to pay for the damages.

It would seem that in the case where the sender sent the fire with a competent person, the sender is not liable at all, even under the laws of Heaven!

The Ram”a (C”M: 32:2) rules that if one sends out false witnesses to testify against someone, and they cause that fellow a loss, the sender is not liable at all, even under the laws of Heaven. This is because we say that there cannot be a shliach to commit a transgression.

The Sha”ch disagrees and maintains that the sender will be liable to pay under the laws of Heaven. He explains the distinction between the two cases. The sender will always be liable under the laws of Heaven. The only reason that the sender is not required to pay at all in the case of the fire is because once the competent person is liable to pay, there is no place for the sender to be liable as well!

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Wednesday, November 19, 2008

Laws of Heaven

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 41b) cites a Mishna: If one sends out a fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor (and it consequently burned someone’s haystack), he is not liable to pay according to the laws of man, but he is liable according to the laws of Heaven. If, however, he sent out the fire in the hands of a competent person, the competent person is liable to pay for the damages.

It would seem that in the case where the sender sent the fire with a competent person, the sender is not liable at all, even under the laws of Heaven!

The Ram”a (C”M: 32:2) rules that if one sends out false witnesses to testify against someone, and they cause that fellow a loss, the sender is not liable at all, even under the laws of Heaven. This is because we say that there cannot be a shliach to commit a transgression.

The Sha”ch disagrees and maintains that the sender will be liable to pay under the laws of Heaven. He explains the distinction between the two cases. The sender will always be liable under the laws of Heaven. The only reason that the sender is not required to pay at all in the case of the fire is because once the competent person is liable to pay, there is no place for the sender to be liable as well!

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Monday, October 20, 2008

Kiddushin Daf 12

MONEY; NOT DIRT

Shmuel Daf yomi Kiddushin 12a said: If someone betroths a woman with a date, even if a kur of dates is only worth a dinar, we say that she is betrothed, as a single date might be worth a perutah in (the country of) Media (where dates are not so common).

The Ra”n explains that this is because she can say that to her, the date is worth a perutah.

This explanation is challenged by the Acharonim, for if so, the kiddushin should be valid even if it is not worth a perutah in Media (similar to the incident involving Rav Kahana and the kerchief cited above)?

The Pardes Yosef answers: In order for someone to say, “It is worth a perutah to me,” it has to be regarded as “money,” and not mere earth. It is considered “money” if it valued as a perutah somewhere in the world. If the date is worth a perutah in Media, the woman can say here, “It is worth a perutah to me.”

PERUTAH

Today, the custom, based upon the Ram”a is as follows: Under the chupah, prior to the man giving the ring to the woman, the Rabbi asks the witnesses in the presence of the bride whether, in their opinion, the ring is worth a perutah, the minimum amount necessary for the marriage to be effective. This is done in order that the woman should know that her husband is only marrying her with one perutah of the value of the ring, and the remaining value is a present. It follows, therefore, that if the ring were to be found fake, it should not affect the marriage. As long as the ring was worth a perutah, she cannot claim that she consented to the marriage under an erroneous assumption. Although she thought that her present (the ring) was worth more than it actually did, it cannot affect the marriage.

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Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Permitted Rulings

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 41b) had stated, applying the classic principle that it is preferable to render a permissible ruling. Rashi in Beitzah (2b) explains that this means that something that is permitted indicates that the Tanna is relying on his knowledge of the subject matter, and is not afraid to rule leniently. One can be strict even if he is in doubt and it does not necessarily indicate the conclusiveness of the ruling.

Rashbam in Pesachim (102a) writes that if there is no compelling logic to rule stringently, then ruling leniently is not regarded as a more preferred option. Rather, it is the only option. The Rema in his responsa (§ 54) rules that one is not allowed to be stringent regarding an issue where there is no uncertainty.

Pischei Teshuvah (Yoreh Deah 116:10) cites a dispute amongst the Acharonim if one is permitted to be stringent for himself regarding a matter that has been permitted by the Torah, such as a prohibited matter that was nullified.

Bnei Yissachar writes that it is a mitzvah not to be stringent in such a situation.

The Tzlach writes that it is preferable to record the permitted ruling regarding a situation that may be subject to a Biblical prohibition, because if there would be uncertainty, we would be compelled to rule stringently. The Tanna would not be introducing a novel ruling if the ruling was that the matter is prohibited. Regarding a matter that may be subject to a Rabbinic prohibition, however, the reverse would be true. It is preferable to record the stringent ruling because if there would be uncertainty, we would rule leniently.

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Tuesday, July 01, 2008

Raising his Hands Higher than the Tzitz

The Mishna in Yoma states that the Kohen Gadol wears eight vestments and the ordinary Kohen dons four. The Yerushalmi comments that each one of the Kohen’s clothing served as an atonement for a specific sin. The shirt is a forgiveness for the transgression of wearing shatnez (wool and linen together).

The commentators on Medrash explain the connection between the shirt and shatnez because the shirt itself was shatnez. This is extremely bewildering for it is explicit that the shirt of the Kohen was made solely from linen and there was no wool in it!?

There is a famous answer given based on a ruling of the Rama. He rules that one is forbidden to wear shoes of linen and socks from wool, even though they are two different articles. The reason for this is because it is considered like one, since the socks cannot be removed without first taking off the shoes. The same can be said regarding the Kohen’s shirt. The Kohen Gadol wore the robe on top of the shirt and the robe was made from wool. Since the shirt could not be removed without first taking off the robe, this can be considered shatnez.

There are those that say that this can be the reason why the Kohen Gadol puts the headplate (tzitz) on last. In truth, he can lift his hands in the air and wiggle out of the shirt without removing the robe. However, there is a halacha (Daf Yomi: Sotah 38a) that he cannot raise his hands higher than the tzitz because it has Hashem’s name inscribed on it. It emerges that the wearing of the tzitz is what creates the shatnez of the shirt and the robe; hence, we delay the placing of the tzitz until the end.

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Wednesday, August 16, 2006

Daf Yomi - Yoma 71 - Kesones was Shatnez?

It is stated in the Mishna that the kohen gadol wears eight begodim and the kohen hedyot dons four. The Yerushalmi comments that each one of the kohen's clothing served as an atonement for a specific aveira. The shirt is a forgiveness for the transgression of wearing shatnez (wool and linen together). The commentators on Midrash explain the connection between the shirt and shatnez because the shirt itself was shatnez. This is extremely bewildering for it is explicit that the shirt of the kohen was made solely from linen and there was no wool in it?

There is a famous answer given based on a riling of the Rama. He rules that one is forbidden to wear shoes of linen and socks from wool, even though they are two different articles. The reason for this is because it is considered like one since the socks cannot be removed without first taking off the shoes. The same can be said regarding the kohen's shirt. The kohen gadol wore the robe on top of the shirt and the robe was made from wool. Since the shirt could not be removed without first taking off the robe, this can be considered shatnez.

There are those that say that this can be the reason why the kohen gadol puts the headplate (tzitz) on last. In truth, he can lift his hands in the air and wiggle out of the shirt without removing the robe. However, there is a halacha that he cannot lift his hands higher than the tzitz because it has Hashem's name inscribed on it. It comes out that the wearing of the tzitz is what creates the shatnez of the shirt and the robe, hence we delay the placing of the tzitz until the end.

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