Daf Yomi - Beitzah 8- Lekavod Shabbos

The Gemara states that if one digs a hole on Shabbos and only needs its earth but he does not require the hole itself, he is exempt from biblical punishment for the act that he has performed. Perhaps we can interpret this statement homiletically to mean that one can escape the clutches of the Evil Inclination by hiding in a hole on Shabbos, i.e. by rejoicing in the Shabbos, and in this way he will be patur, i.e. he will have gotten rid of his Evil Inclination.

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Daf Yomi - Beitzah 8- Performing a positive and negative commandment simultaneously

The Gemara states that a positive commandment will override a negative commandment when both commandments are performed simultaneously. It is noteworthy that the Gemara in Sota states that a mitzvah cannot extinguish an aveira, a sin, yet an aveira can extinguish a mitzvah. Apparently, the principle that a positive commandment can override a negative commandment is not a contradiction to this Gemara. Perhaps the idea is that when one performs an aveira intentionally, he has rebelled against HaShem, and it is not possible for one to appease HaShem with a mitzvah when he has just committed an act of rebellion. When one is simultaneously overriding the negative commandment by performing a positive commandment, however, he is demonstrating that he is fully aware that he is performing a negative commandment, yet he is permitted by the Torah to override the negative commandment. This principle allows him to perform the positive commandment and be rewarded for its performance.

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Daf Yomi - Beitzah 8 - A blessing for a completed mitzvah by Reb Jay

One cannot slaughter on Yom Tov a koy, which is a specie that the Chachamim were uncertain whether it is categorized as a beheimah, a domestic animal, or a chaya, a wild animal. If one slaughtered a koy, since it may be a beheimah, one cannot cover its blood. There is a concern that one who observes someone else covering the blood of a koy on Yom Tov will assume that a koy is a chaya, as we would not permit one to exert himself on Yom Tov for an uncertain specie and one would then permit the cheilev of a koy to be eaten, when in fact, because of its uncertain status, one is prohibited form eating the cheilev of a koy.

The Rambam writes that one who covers the blood of a beheimah that is kelayim, an animal that was bred from a chaya and a beheimah, one does not recite the blessing that is normally recited for the mitzvah of covering the blood. Rav Chaim Brisker wonders why one does not recite a blessing in such a case as there is reason to say that the animal that was slaughtered was a chaya which requires that its blood be covered. Rav Chaim answers that although there is reason to require that its blood be covered, the converse is also true, as there is reason to exempt one from covering the blood of this animal. The mitzvah is thus lacking a full requirement and for this reason one does not recite a blessing when covering the blood. Rav Chaim likens this ruling to a different ruling of the Rambam. The Rambam writes that when a child is born circumcised, or if a convert to Judaism was already circumcised prior to his conversion, we draw some blood, known as hatafas dam bris, but one does not recite a blessing on this procedure, although this is not a case of uncertainty. The reason for this ruling is because the mitzvah cannot be performed completely so one does not recite a blessing when performing such a mitzvah.

Rav Soloveitchek in Harerei Kedem likens this case to sitting in the Sukkah on Shemini Atzeres, as there is a requirement to sit in the Sukkah on Shemini Atzeres, yet there is also reason to exempt one from sitting in the Sukkah on Shemini Atzeres. Given the fact that one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of sitting in the Sukkah completely, he will not recite a blessing for sitting in the Sukkah.

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New Daf Yomi Site!!!!!!!!! Please Visit

There is a new site that began in the beginning of Meseches Beitza. They are posting small heoros on the Daf from Palo Alto, California. It looks very interesting and informative. Please make sure to visit them. L'hagdil Torah U'lhadira.

http://Heoros al HaDaf/

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Daf Yomi in the Parsha by Oizer

Compiled by Oizer Alport

ויוצא אתו החוצה ויאמר הבט נא השמימה וספר הכוכבים

אם תוכל לספר אתם ויאמר לו כה יהיה זרעך (15:5)

After Avrohom Avinu miraculously defeated the armies of the four kings and rescued the captured people and possessions, he feared that the miracles Hashem performed on his behalf had detracted from the reward awaiting him in the World to Come. Hashem reassured him and promised that his reward would indeed be very great. Avrohom then expressed his worry that he had no children to inherit him, to which Hashem replied by promising that he would indeed merit to have children.

Hashem then took Avrohom outside and instructed him to gaze toward the Heavens. Hashem challenged him to attempt to count the number of stars and cryptically added, “so shall your offspring be.” Why did Hashem present Avrohom with such an impossible task, and what did He mean with His blessing, “so will your offspring be?”

Rav Meir Shapiro beautifully explains that although finite, the number of stars is clearly so great as to be beyond human comprehension and certainly uncountable with the naked eye. An intelligent person who is challenged to do so will likely decline the impossible task. Knowing that he will be unable to successfully finish the project, he will choose not to even begin. Avrohom Avinu was also aware of this reality. Nevertheless, when Hashem suggested that he attempt to count the stars, he quickly went outside, looked up in the sky, and began counting, “One, two, three.”

Avrohom was undaunted by apparent restrictions and natural limitations, recognizing that the power of one’s will and commitment to a project can allow him to succeed where others foresaw only failure. Upon recognizing Avrohom’s contagious enthusiasm and willingness to disregard naysayers, Hashem quickly blessed him that so should his offspring be a nation known for their dedication and perseverance against all odds.

Not surprisingly, Rav Meir Shapiro – whose yahrtzeit (7 Cheshvan) traditionally falls in the week of Parshas Lech Lecha – lived by his own teachings. More than any other single figure in the 20th century, he singlehandedly revolutionized Torah study as we know it today through his development of the concept of Daf Yomi – learning one page of Gemora daily. The odds of his program spreading and taking off were clearly stacked against him. The potential for any of a number of obstacles to derail his plan before it got off the ground was great. Yet like his forefather Avrohom before him, he ignored the probability of not succeeding, realizing that with the aid of the fire which burned within him, he would be able to reach the stars, and beyond!

© 2006 by Oizer Alport. Permission is granted to reproduce and distribute as long as credit is given. To receive weekly via email or to send comments or suggestions, write to parshapotpourri@optonline.net

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Daf Yomi - Beitzah 5 - More on clapping on Shabbos

Reb Dave wrote:
These Poskim write that if the reason is not longer valid, the decree is no longer valid. In fact, that is one of the reasons we are allowed to dance and clap our hands on shabbos, even though it was originally outlawed for fear one might come to fashion an instrument - it is becasue we are not skilled enough. I beleive the Rama states this, but he is challenged by the Magen Avraham.Question: The reason we are prohibited from swimming on Shabbos is b/c we are concerned one may come to make a flotation device. ( Contrary to the popular idea that it has to do with squezzing hair). But how many peopel today can do this? Should we then be permitted to swim on Shabbos

Rabbi Doniel Neustadt responds:

Firstly making a floating device is a lot less complicated than making a musical instrument. Any geshikete fellow can make a makeshift floating deviceSecondly, the Rama's shita is very difficult to understand even by music, and we dare not stretch it any moreThirdly, and most important, the real reason why nowadays we do not swim is because of the old minghag Yisrael not to dip one's entire body on Shabbos even in cold water because of the concern that it may lead to sechitah or carrying; see Mishnah Berurah 326:21.

Rabbi Ephraim Nissenbaum adds:

I only saw the piece of the posting that was e-mailed to me, but the comparison to clapping on Shabbos is a little different. Although the Rema says that we don't know how to fix instruments today, the Biur Halacha says from Elya Rabba that the Rema is not permitting every type of clapping or dancing. He's not clear what he does permit )I didn't see the Elya Rabba) but it sounds like he's saying that Chazal only prohibited certain types of clapping and dancing, and we're not going to prohibit any more since we don't know how to fix the instruments anyway. The Aruch Hashulchan says this clearly, that our clapping and dancing is a different type than they used to do....

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Daf Yomi - Beitzah 7 - Desire on a rope

The Gemara states that a rooster once crossed a river on a rope bridge to reach a hen and fertilize its eggs. It is said regarding the Torah, it is not hidden from you and it is not far away. It is not in heaven that you must say, “Who can go up to heaven and take it for us, so that we can listen to it and perform it.” Rashi quotes the Gemara that states that if the Torah were in heaven, one would have to ascend to heaven to study it. Although it seems like the Torah is asking the impossible from us, the truth is that if we understood the greatness and beauty that is found in the Torah, we would be like the rooster that would make every possible endeavor to cross the rope bridge, i.e. to sacrifice ones life for the sake of Torah study.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 7 - Drinking Included in Eating

Rashi cites the Gemara in Chullin that states that if one melts forbidden fats into a liquid and drinks it, he will be liable. This is derived from an extra word in a verse. Tosfos wonders why an extra word is necessary, if we can use the principle that drinking is included in eating. Tosfos answers that this principle is only said regarding something that is normal to drink. Regarding something that is actually a food item and has now been transformed into a liquid, however, we do not apply the principle that drinking is included in eating and for this reason we need to use the extra word.The Gemara in Yoma states that one is required to afflict himself in five different manners on Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks that there are actually six afflictions, to which the Gemara answers that drinking is included in eating.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger questions this principle from a Gemara in Shavuos and we can pose a similar question on the Gemara. Why does the Gemara state that there are only five afflictions, when there are actually six afflictions? Drinking a liquid on Yom Kippur that was initially a solid is not be included in eating and thus would be deemed a sixth affliction?

Perhaps we can answer that the distinction posited by Tosfos only applies to something that is an issur cheftza, a prohibition in the item itself. Cheilev, forbidden fats, is intrinsically forbidden, so we can say that when the fats are transformed into a liquid, it is not included in the conventional prohibition of eating. Regarding Yom Kippur, however, which is an issur gavra, a prohibition on the person not to consume food, the food is not intrinsically forbidden. Rather, the person is prohibited from eating, so there is no distinction between a conventional liquid and a food that was transformed into a liquid. All liquids are included in the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 7 - Hide n' Seek Egg by Reb Dave

7a – The Gemara says we assume the egg came out a little, then reentered the body, and then came out again. Rashi comments that although this is not likely, since we know chickens do not hatch at night, the egg must have come and gone in this fashion. This Rashi reminds me of Sherlock Holmes’s famous dictum, (a dictum that should be kept uppermost in mind at all times) – “When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 6 - Displaying Joy on Rosh HaShanah

The Gemara relates an incident where Ravina was sitting in front of Rav Ashi on the first day of Rosh HaShanah and Ravina noticed that Rav Ashi was dejected. Ravina wondered why Rav Ashi was sad and Rav Ashi informed Ravina that he had forgotten to make an eruvei tavshilin. Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha asks that perhaps Rav Ashi was dejected because it was Rosh HaShanah and he was fearful of the Day of Judgment? He answers that it is said explicitly in the Book of Nechemiah (8:9) that the leaders exhorted the Jewish People not to be sad on Rosh HaShanah as it is a holy day.

The Gemara in Rosh HaShanah (26b) states that it is preferred that one subjugate his heart and his mind on Rosh HaShanah. The explanation for this ruling is that one should pray with a broken heart, but he should still be filled with joy. Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Orach Chaim 582:10) rules that one should not recite the words moadim lesimcha on Rosh HaShanah and Yom Kippur as these are Days of Awe and not days of joy. (this matter is also discussed in Sefer HaPardes L’Rashi 176). Yet, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav himself writes further on (Ibid 597:1) that one is obligated to be in a state of joy on Rosh HaShanah. (See further in Shearim Hametzuyanim B’Halacha to Taanis 30b.) The Zohar (Emor 95b) states that chedvesa, joy, is not found on Rosh HaShanah and Yom Kippur.

The Maharil in his responsa (128) writes that someone that wrote to him that one is required to be more in joyful on Shabbos than on Rosh HaShanah. The Maharil disagrees and he cites several proofs that support the idea that one is required to be joyful on Rosh HaShanah similar to the other Yomim Tovim.

The Shagaas Aryeh (102) infers from the Rambam in Hilchos Yom Tov (6:17) that there is no obligation for one to be joyful on Rosh HaShanah. The Ohr Sameach disagrees with the inference of the Shagaas Aryeh.

The Rosh at the end of Rosh HaShanah quotes Rav Natrinoai Gaon who rules that one is permitted to fast on the second day of Rosh HaShanah. Rav Hai Gaon and others disagree and they maintain that one is prohibited to fast on both days of Rosh HaShanah. There are two sources for the requirement that one should be joyful on Rosh HaShanah. In the Book of Nechemiah (8:10) it is said that one should eat and drink on any holy day. This verse implies that there is a requirement to be joyful on all the Yom Tovim, including Rosh HaShanah. The Rosh cites a Yerushalmi as another source. Rav Simon states that the Jewish People are not like the other nations of the world. Prior to our day of judgment, we wear respectable white clothing, we trim our beards, we cut our fingernails and we eat, drink and we are joyful. We engage in all these activities because we know that Hashem will perform miracles on our behalf and we are confident that he will judge us favorably.

The Maharshal notes that the requirement to be joyful on Rosh HaShanah is based on the words of the Yerushalmi that maintains that we are supposed to demonstrate our confidence in being granted a favorable verdict. This, nonetheless, would not be akin to the joy that one is required to exhibit on an ordinary Yom Tov. Based on this reasoning, the Maharshal maintains that one is permitted to fast after midday on Rosh HaShanah, whereas on other Yomim Tovim one is prohibited to fast even after midday. One can fast on Rosh HaShanah after midday because it is sufficient that one demonstrates his confidence in his anticipated positive verdict by eating and drinking in the latter part of the day.

The Maaglei Tzedek writes that the reasoning offered by the Maharshal can support the dispute whether one is permitted to pray on Rosh HaShanah after midday. If the requirement that one should be joyful on Rosh HaShanah is derived from the same source as the requirement to be joyful on other Yomim Tovim, then we will say that just like one cannot pray after midday on an ordinary Yom Tov, so too one should not pray after midday on Rosh HaShanah. If, however, we are joyful on Rosh HaShanah to demonstrate our confidence in an anticipated positive verdict, then one would be permitted to pray even after midday and we can be joyful following our prayers.

Rav Ezriel Cziment, Shlita, the Rosh Kollel in Telz Chicago, in a pamphlet entitled Zmanei Sasson, writes that the Magen Avrohom rules that if one forgot to recite yaaleh veyavo in Bircas HaMazon on Rosh HaShanah, he is not required to repeat Bircas HaMazon because there are opinions that maintain that one is permitted to fast on Rosh HaShanah. This ruling, however, appears to contradict the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch who writes that one is forbidden to fast on Rosh HaShanah.

Rav Ezriel answers that one can maintain that it is forbidden to fast on Rosh HaShanah, yet one can also maintain that there is no requirement to eat a meal. This can only be understood according to the Yerushalmi that states that the source for being joyful on Rosh HaShanah is because we anticipate a positive verdict in our judgment. This requirement to be joyful would necessitate that we eat and drink and be joyful, but we would not necessarily be required to eat an entire meal. The halacha that mandates that one repeat yaaleh veyavo, however, is contingent on the requirement that one eat a meal, and for this reason the Magen Avrohom rules that one who forgot to recite yaaleh veyavo would not have to repeat Bircas HaMazon.

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Daf Yomi - Beitzah 6 - Closed eyes

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov maintains that one cannot eat a chick even during the week because its eyes have not yet opened. Perhaps this ruling can be interpreted allegorically to mean that one should not assume that he understands how HaShem conducts the world, because essentially we are blind in this world. It is said, HaShem did not give you a heart to know, eyes to see, and ears to hear until this day. The Gemara interprets this verse to mean that one cannot fathom the wisdom of his teacher until forty years have elapsed. If this can be said regarding the teachings of a human being, how much more so does it apply to the Creator of the world? One should contemplate this idea and feel truly humbled in the Presence of HaShem.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 5 - Two Days of Rosh Hashana

This is a clear explanation as to the establishment of two days for Rosh Hashana - it should be beneficial for many in the understanding of today's daf.

The New Year and New Fruit
By Rabbi Chaim Binyomin Kaye

It is well known that in Eretz Yisrael, Yom Tov is observed for one day only, whereas in the Diaspora, two days are observed. This second day of Yom Tov is known as Yom Tov Sheni Shel Golias. Rosh Hashana is the one exception to the rule, and is celebrated as a two-day Yom Tov throughout the world, including Eretz Yisrael.

In order to understand this distinction, we must first understand why two days are observed for the other Yomim Tovim outside of Eretz Yisrael. We will endeavour to explain why Rosh Hashana is different. We will also explore any further halachic differences between Rosh Hashana and the other Yomim Tovim. Finally, we will address the custom of eating a new fruit and the laws pertaining to the bracha "she'hechiyanu" that is recited on the second night of Rosh Hashana.

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We celebrate two days of Yom Tov because, initially, Rosh Chodesh - the onset of a new month - was not pre-determined, as is the case today. It used to be sanctified by the Beis Din in Eretz Yisrael, based on the testimony of two witnesses who saw the new moon. In any given month, Rosh Chodesh would fall on either the thirtieth or the thirty-first day. Once the day had been sanctified, Jewish settlements everywhere would be notified which of the two days was Rosh Chodesh, and thus they would observe the Yom Tov or Yomim Tovim of that month accordingly.

In those days, e-mails and telephones did not exist even in dreams, so the Beis Din had to dispatch messengers to notify all the Jews when Rosh Chodesh would be. Those who lived too far away, or could not be reached for other reasons, could not be sure when Rosh Chodesh would fall (and therefore when Yom Tov should be observed). Thus, they had to observe two days of Yom Tov.

The Gemara adds that although this doubt is no longer relevant, since our Rosh Chodesh is pre-determined, we are still Rabbinically bound to observe a second day, in case a doubtful situation would rise again(1).

Since observing the second day is a Rabbinic decree, rather than a Torah decree, there are certain leniencies. For example, even though Jews may not perform a funeral on Yom Tov (due to the various melachos that are involved), it is permissible to do so on the second day of a Yom Tov(2). Also, the prohibition of taking medication on Shabbos or Yom Tov does not apply on the second day of Yom Tov(3).

However, the Poskim rule that these leniencies do not apply on the second day of Rosh Hashana. The reason is that the second day of Rosh Hashana has another reason for being observed. Rosh Hashana is the only Yom Tov that falls on Rosh Chodesh itself. Therefore, not only in the Diaspora, but even in Yerushalayim itself, there was a doubt on the thirtieth of Elul whether it was actually the thirtieth of Elul or the first of Tishrei, which is Rosh Hashana.

Therefore, they observed the night of the thirtieth as Rosh Hashana. The following day, if witnesses would testify that the moon had been seen the previous night, the thirtieth was proclaimed as Yom Tov. If no witnesses arrived, it was obvious that it had not been Rosh Chodesh, and the following day was sanctified and observed as Rosh Hashana.

This was the practice for many years, until a halachic mishap occurred. It was the thirtieth of Elul and the Leviim, who sang praises in the Beis HaMikdash twice a day, were not sure whether to sing the Yom Tov or the weekday songs. Was it Yom Tov or was it a weekday? Therefore, they did not sing any shira (some opinions state that they sang the wrong shira). To ensure that this would not happen again, Chazal decreed that witnesses would not be accepted on the thirtieth day after midday. Therefore, if they arrived in the morning, only the thirtieth would be observed as Rosh Hashana. If they came in the afternoon, their testimony would not be accepted, and the Beis Din would sanctify the following day as Rosh Hashana (Beis Din has the right to push off Rosh Chodesh one day).

Even when witnesses came in the afternoon, the thirtieth was observed as Yom Tov until night. This was to prevent people from not observing the thirtieth day as Yom Tov the following year, rationalizing that it had not been Yom Tov on the thirtieth the previous year. Therefore, in the case where witnesses came in the afternoon, two days of Yom Tov were observed because of Chazal's decree, rather than out of doubt(4). Therefore, the second day of Rosh Hashana is more stringent than that of the second day of other Yomim Tovim, and the usual leniencies do not apply.

This distinction between Rosh Hashana and other Yomim Tovim has another interesting halachic ramification. As a rule, the bracha of Shehechiyanu is said on Yom Tov to thank Hashem for bringing us to that happy and holy day. It is said on both the first and the second night, as they are both considered Yom Tov. However, concerning Rosh Hashana, there are those who say that a Shehechiyanu should only be said on the first night. Since the second day of other Yomim Tovim is observed due to the original doubt of which night to observe, Shehechiyanu is said on both nights as if each is the first night. On Rosh Hashana this is not the case. The second day was kept even when only one day was really Yom Tov. Therefore, the two days are considered as one long Kedusha and one day of Yom Tov. Only one Shehechiyanu is then required.

Rashi has a conflicting opinion that two Shehechiyanu's should be said. His rationale is that even though the two days are not kept individually, they are two separate days of Yom Tov. He adds that on the second day, a Shehechiyanu should definitely be said - the reason for observing two days is because of the case where witnesses arrived after noon, and then the second day was the real day of Yom Tov, and of course Shehechiyanu was said.

The Shulchan Aruch rules that since reciting Shehechiyanu on the second night is debatable, one should try to have a new fruit or wear a new garment during Kiddush on the second night of Rosh Hashana. Thus, the bracha will definitely not be in vain. If the second night does not require a Shehechiyanu, the bracha will refer to the new fruit or garment only. If a Shehechiyanu is required, it will cover both the fruit and the Yom Tov.

If a person does not have a new fruit on the second night, Shehechiyanu should nevertheless be recited, since the halacha follows Rashi's view, that the Yom Tov itself requires a blessing(5).

A few halachos to bear in mind concerning the new fruit:

1) Only the one reciting Kiddush must eat from the new fruit. The rest of those assembled fulfill their obligation by listening to his Shehechiyanu. However, the minhag is that everyone partakes of the new fruit(6)

2) The fruit should be eaten straight after Kiddush, before washing for bread(7). No unnecessary interruptions should be made before eating the fruit(8).

3) Women who recite the Shehechiyanu during candle lighting should light candles shortly before the meal. They should not make any unnecessary interruption between their Shehechiyanu and eating the fruit. The fruit should be on the table when they light the candles, and they should have the new fruit in mind when reciting their Shehechiyanu(9).

4) If a kezayis of the fruit was eaten, a bracha achrona must be recited(10), unless a person had intention that his bracha of "Boreh Pri Ha'etz" should exempt the fruit he will eat for dessert at the end of the meal as well. In such a case, the bentching will cover the first fruit too(11).

5) It is important to remember that the Shehechiyanu refers to both the new fruit and the Yom Tov(12).

6) If the one reciting Kiddush has already eaten the new fruit placed in front of him that season, and there is no other fruit for him to say Shehechiyanu on, the Shehechiyanu should be said by someone who has not yet eaten from that fruit. The one reciting Kiddush should listen and answer 'Amen' with intention of fulfilling his obligation with that Shehechiyanu(13).

Footnotes

1. Beitza 4b. 2. Shulchan Aruch 526:4. 3. Shulchan Aruch 496:2. 4. Rosh hashana 31a. 5. Shulchan Aruch 600:2 6. Mateh Ephraim 7. Ibid 8. Kitzur Hilchos Moadim 9. Mishna Berura 599:4 10. Mateh Ephraim 11. Shmiras Shabbos K'hilchasa ch.47 note 222 12. Minchas Shlomo Siman 20 13. Maharil Diskin

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 5 - Decrees where the reason does not apply any longer

Rabbah maintained that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai rescinded the prohibition against accepting witnesses after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, and subsequently an egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah was permitted to be eaten on the second day. Rav Yosef challenged Rabbah’s ruling because if the Chachamim assembled to render a ruling, they would need to reassemble to revoke their ruling. Rav Yosef added that one could not say that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai convened with his colleagues to permit one to eat the egg, because their decision was only to accept the testimony after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, but they never took a vote on permitting the egg to be eaten.

Tosfos rules that a matter that was only prohibited for a specific amount of time will be permitted once that time period elapses. Tosfos on Daf 6 writes that a matter that was only prohibited because of a specific concern will be permitted when the concern no longer exists. This principle justifies why we do not have to be concerned for water that was exposed at night and one is allowed to drink from it because in modern times snakes are not frequent in our homes.

Tosfos HaRosh in Avodah Zara (2a) rules that one is permitted to conduct business with gentiles during their holiday season as initially this was prohibited because gentiles in the past worshipped idols and now that gentiles do not worship idols, the decree is irrelevant.

Tosfos in Brachos (53b) writes that people are not scrupulous regarding mayim acharonim , washing the hands at the end of a meal, because we no longer have melach sedomis, salt from Sodom. Tosfos notes that although the practice of washing mayim achronmim was instituted by an assembly of a Bais Din, this institution was not unanimously accepted and thus this institution is not categorized as a ruling that is irrevocable unless a Bais Din reassembles and rescinds the ruling.

Reb Shlomo Kluger in Elef Lecho Shlomo (116) rules that one is permitted to learn by candlelight on Shabbos and we are not concerned that he may come to move the wick which will cause the fire to burn brighter, thus violating a biblical prohibition, because one does not need to move the wick of our present-day candles.

Teshuvos HaRosh (klal 2:8) rules that one is permitted to tie strings of linen on a four-cornered garment that is made from linen to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzis and we are not concerned that one might tie strings of wool to the garment. The reason for this ruling is because all know that techeiles, a blue-dyed wool used for tzitzis, is not prevalent, thus there is no permit to tie strings of wool to a linen garment.

Teshuvos HaRosh writes that if is common knowledge why a decree was instituted and the rationale no longer applies, then the decree is considered irrelevant. Teshuvos HaRosh draws a contrast of this supposition to the case in our Gemara regarding the egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah, because some people are not aware whey the egg was initially prohibited, nor do they understand why the reason to prohibit no longer applies.

Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha rules that if necessary, one is permitted to take medicine on Shabbos. Taking medicine on Shabbos was initially forbidden as there was a concern that one would violate the prohibition of grinding. Now that medicine is prepared by the manufacturer and most people are not even aware of the process involved in manufacturing the medicine, there is no longer a concern that one who wishes to take medicine will violate the Shabbos prohibition of grinding herbs or spices.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 5 - Mandatory Customs

The Gemora states that nowadays we have two days of Yom Tov even though we have a fixed calendar and Rosh Chodesh is clearly established. This is because there was a message sent from Eretz Yisroel to Bavel to be careful to continue with the customs of their fathers for perhaps one day there might be a decree issued by the government forbidding the studying of Torah thereby causing people to forget the calculations needed for the establishment of the calendar.

The Ritva in Rosh Hashana (18) writes that this custom is different than the custom of taking the arovos on Hoshana Rabbah. One is obligated to recite all the blessings on the second day of Yom Tov. The custom is to enact the second day as if we would be living in the times that they did not know when Rosh Chodesh truly was.

Reb Yaakov Emden in Sheilas Yaavetz (168) warns people that heaven forbid should they think that the custom of having a second day of Yom Tov is similar to other customs that come from people wants and desires. Rather this is a custom that even if Eliyohu Hanovi would come and instruct us to abolish this custom, we would not listen to him until Moshiach would come and the Beis Hamikdosh would be rebuilt. It is evident from some of the halachos of the second days of Yom Tov how significant this custom is. Tefillin is not worn on the second day of Yom Tov. Brochos on matza, shofar and kiddush are recited and we are not concerned that these brochos are being recited in vain.

It is similarly written in Teshuvos Maharil (1) regarding the brocha of Yiru Eineinu during the week and Meyein Sheva on Friday night. These brochos were instituted because their Shuls were in the fields and nonetheless we recite them now and it is not regarded as an unnecessary brocha. The repitition of Shmone Esrei by the chazan is still recited even though everyone nowadays can read the shmone esrei from a siddur. This is because we are concerned that things will go back to the way they were before.

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Daf Yomi - Beitzah 5 - Return to your state of physicality

The Gemara states that once the Chachamim assemble to render a ruling, they are required to gather again to rescind the ruling. This is derived from the verse that states that HaShem told Moshe to inform the Jewish People to return to their tents, as it is said go say to them, return to your tents. The Rambam in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah writes that this verse means that HaShem told Moshe to instruct the Jewish People to return to their bodies. When HaShem revealed Himself at Sinai and uttered the Ten Commandments, the souls of the Jewish People left their bodies. Hashem was thus instructing Moshe to tell the Jewish People that they should now return to their bodies. Hashem then told Moshe, but as for you, stand here with Me, which means that HaShem was telling Moshe to distance himself from physical pursuits and that he would be transformed into an angelic like figure, devoid of physical desire. One must wonder why the Jewish People were required to return to their state of physicality. Would it not have been preferable to retain their exalted status of a soul unconfined to the physical? It is said people of holiness shall you be to Me. The Kotzker Rebbe was known to have said, be holy, but retain your human state. Thus, the goal of most Jews must be to strive for great heights in spirituality but to remain a mortal, as this is the will of HaShem.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 4 - Fundamental Explanation in the Decrees of the Chachamim

The Gemora drew a comparison between the halacha of an object that will eventually become permitted to a case where there is a uncertainty regarding the status of the egg. When an egg was laid on Yom Tov and became mixed with permissible eggs, we would not nullify the egg in question as the egg will be permitted after Yom Tov. Similarly, in our case where there is a doubt if the egg is rabbinically forbidden, we will not rule leniently as after Yom Tov the egg will nonetheless be permitted.

The Ran in Nedarim (52) offers what seems to be a different reason why an item that will eventually be permitted cannot be nullified. Normally if a forbidden food becomes intermingled with food that is permitted, the entire mixture will be permitted to eat, as long as the permitted food will comprise a majority of the mixture. There are certain exceptions to this rule. One exception is that if the two foods are similar to the point that they are indistinguishable from each other, the permitted foods cannot nullify the forbidden food. The Ran explains that a prohibited item which will eventually be permitted is not discernable from the permitted items and therefore it cannot be nullified.

Rav Elchonon Wasserman in Kovetiz Shiurim questions the words of the Ran from our Gemora. Here we equated the halacha of a case where there is an uncertainty if the egg is rabbinically forbidden to the case where the item will eventually be permitted and we ruled that the forbidden item is not nullified because it will nonetheless be permitted after Yom Tov. According to the Ran, however, there is no comparison. In the cases where the item will eventually be permitted, there is no nullification as the two items are indistinguishable from each other and that is why we cannot be lenient. In our case there is an egg which we have an uncertainty regarding to when the egg was laid, thus creating a Rabbinic doubt, so why should we not be lenient?

Rav Elchonon asks further on the essence of the Ran’s explanation. Why is an item which will eventually be permitted deemed to be indistinguishable from the other permitted items, if at present the item is forbidden. It is evident that they are distinguished from each other because the item is biblically permitted due to the nullification of the majority of items. What, then, compelled the Chachamim to rule stringently and state that an item that will eventually be permitted cannot be nullified?

The most obvious answer to the latter question is that logic dictates that one should not eat something until it is completely permitted, rather than nullifying it in its present state. The Ran, however, maintains that this reason alone would be insufficient for such a stringency. Rav Elchonon writes that there are two fundamental ideas that are required for every rabbinic injunction. First, there must be a legitimate reason for the decree and furthermore, there must be a biblical source that justifies the decree, as the Chachamim need to have a source in the Torah that will reinforce their decree.

The Chachamim saw fit to decree that a forbidden item that will eventually be permitted cannot be eaten now. The reason for this is because one can wait until the item will become permitted and then he can eat it. The justification for the Chachamim issuing this decree was based on the biblical law that a forbidden item which is indistinguishable from the permitted items cannot be nullified.

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Daf Yomi - Heoros by Reb Dave

3a The Gemara says an egg is food, and fruits are food, as opposed to drinks or liquids. Rashi comments, when Chazal made their decree concerning dripping liquids, eggs were not included because it is not considered a liquid. It seems to me a proof can be brought from Sanhedrin 5b, where the Gemara states that “egg liquid cannot render something impure” ( mei beitzim ainam machshirim). Thus, another source for the idea that egg liquid is not considered liquid.

Interestingly, the Tiferres Yisrael states that the episode in Sanhedrin is the reason we pronounce the name of this Masechta as “Beiah”, rather than “ Beitzah”. Because the Gemara there asserts that the inhabitants of a certain town confused the law of egg liquid – “mei beitzim” with a completely different substance called - “mei betzaim”. He therefore says, in the introduction to Mishnayos Beiah, that in order not to make the same mistake we call this Masechta, “Beiah”. ( See also Tosfos in Sanhedrin, who elaborates a little further).



3b – “ Shehoyo Reb Meir Omar” – Scores of times throughout Shas, the Gemara introduces a comment from Reb Meir with this unusual formulation, “ Reb Meir was wont to say”. For no other individual do we find this _expression used so widely and frequently. My speculation is that it has something to do with the incident recorded at the end of Horayos, where Rav Meir disobeyed the will of the sages in a particular incident. The Gemara there states separately that two individuals also disobeyed the sages, and those sages are therefore referred to as “yesh omrim” and “acherim omrim”. My belief is that Chazal altered the way in which Rav Meir is quoted for the same reason. I have no support for this idea, but then, I have not found anyone who noted this phenomena with Reb Meir. ( There is a sefer called Ir Benyamin who notes it with regard to one particular passage in Megillah, but does not discuss the trend all over Shas)

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Daf Yomi - Beitzah 4 - Wine: settling and unsettling

The Gemara states that Rav would not place an amora, an expounder, by his side from the onset of Yom Tov until the next day because he was concerned about intoxication. Rav would not lecture after eating his Yom Tov meal, because had he drunk wine, he would have been forbidden to issue halachic rulings, and one who is intoxicated is prohibited from deciding on halachic matters. It is noteworthy that the Gemara in Megillah states that when Achashveirosh requested that the Jewish sages render a judgment regarding Vashti’s infraction of not appearing before the king, the Jewish sages responded that they were not fit to judge because they were in exile. The Chachamim recommended to Achashveirosh that he consult with the wise men of Moav who were like wine that had settled, as Moav had not been exiled. Thus, we see that wine can unsettle a person to the point that he is prohibited from issuing halachic rulings, yet one can be in a state that is akin to wine that has settled and this state is conducive to render judgment.

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Daf Yomi - Beitzah 3 - Preparation and Shabbos

The Gemara discuses hachanah deRabbah, Rabbah’s law of preparation, which dictates that food for a holy day must be prepared prior to the holy day on a weekday. It is noteworthy that the verse where this principle is derived from states and it will be on the sixth day that they shall prepare the manna which they bring. The Medrash states that Yosef observed Shabbos in Egypt, as it is said have meat slaughtered and prepare it. Perhaps the understanding of this statement is that Yosef represents the attribute of yesod, foundation, which means that he observed the covenant of circumcision. The word for prepared is hachen, which has its root in the word kan, which means base or foundation. Thus, Yosef, being the tzaddik yesod olam, the righteous person who is the foundation of the world, corresponds to Shabbos, and the Ohr HaChaim (Vayikra 19:3) writes that regarding Shabbos and regarding Bris Milah, circumcision, the Torah writes the word os, a sign, demonstrating that one who observes one of these signs is a catalyst for observing the other sign.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 3 - Eating and Handling the Egg

The Gemara cites a Baraisa that rules that when there is a doubt, one is not permitted to eat the egg. The Gemara assumes that the doubt is where the egg was laid on Yom Tov or prior to Yom Tov. According to Rabbah, who maintains that an egg that is laid on Yom Tov is prohibited because of the principle of hachanah, i.e. preparation, then we can understand why the Baraisa rules that in a case of doubt the egg is prohibited. This is because the principle of hachanah is biblical in nature and we always rule stringently regarding biblical uncertainties.

The Rashba in Avodas HaKodesh rules that one is forbidden to eat an egg that was laid on Yom Tov, thus rendering the egg muktzeh, and one is prohibited from handling the egg on Yom Tov. The Eimek Bracha asks on the Rashba from our Gemara because it would appear from the Baraisa that in the case when there is a doubt if the egg was laid on Yom Tov and the Baraisa rules that it is forbidden, one is also prohibited from handling the egg. The Gemara can ask on Rabbah that Rabbah rules that one is biblically prohibited from eating an egg which was laid on Yom Tov and therefore in a case of doubt, it will also be forbidden. Regarding handling the egg, however, which in a case of certainty is only rabbinically forbidden, it should not be forbidden to handle the egg. The Emek Bracha wants to prove from this Gemara that the reason of hachanah will biblically prohibit one from eating the egg and from handling it and that is why in a case of doubt, it will be forbidden to eat and to handle the egg.

Bais HaLevi, cited in sefer Matikei Shemuah, writes that when the Baraisa rules that the egg is forbidden in a case of doubt, that only refers to the prohibition of eating the egg, as it is biblically prohibited to eat an egg which was not prepared prior to Yom Tov. It is permitted to handle the egg, however, as handling the egg is only a rabbinical decree and we are not stringent in a case of doubt.

Reb Dovid Newman in his sefer Avodas Yom Tov offers two answers to the question on the Rashba.

The Shach (Yoreh Deah 110) rules that when there is a case of doubt and there are two halachic ramifications, we must either rule stringently or leniently regarding both applications. We cannot rule stringently regarding one halacha and leniently regarding another. For this reason, since the ruling in our case is that the egg is forbidden to eat, it must follow that the egg cannot be handled even though it is only a rabbinical prohibition.

Another answer is that once it is decided that the egg cannot be eaten because it might not have been prepared prior to Yom Tov, the egg automatically becomes muktzeh. We are not ruling that it cannot be handled because of the uncertainty. Rather, once it has been decided that the egg cannot be eaten, the egg is rendered muktzeh for certain and subsequently the egg cannot be handled.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 3 - Picking Fruit on Yom Tov

Rav Yosef maintains that the reason Bais Hillel posits that an egg that was laid on Yom Tov may not be eaten is because the egg is similar to a case of fruit that fell off a tree on Yom Tov. If we would permit the egg to be eaten, people would think that it is permitted to eat the fruit that fell off a tree on Yom Tov The reason one cannot eat the fruit that fell from the tree on Yom Tov is because if the fruits that fell form the tree would be permitted, one might climb the tree and pick the fruit, which is a violation of the act of reaping, a biblically prohibited melacha. Rav Yitzchak disagrees with Rav Yosef’s comparison of the egg to the fruit because an egg is contained within the hen whereas a fruit is in the open, so an egg is not included in the decree of fruit that falls on Yom Tov.

Rashi writes that picking the fruits from the tree would be biblically prohibited under the category of reaping which is an av melacha, a primary prohibited act of labor. This is difficult to understand as our case pertains to Yom Tov and this should be permitted on Yom Tov as picking the fruit is performed in preparation for the food.

The Rashba in Shabbos (95a) proves from this Gemara that it is biblically prohibited to cut something that is still connected to the ground even if the act is in preparation for the food. The Rashba cites Tosfos, however, who maintains that it would be permitted to cut something that is still connected to the ground since it is for the preparation of food. The Rashba explains that according to Tosfos our Gemara would refer to a case where one picks the fruit at the end of Yom Tov and it cannot possibly be used anymore in preparation for food for this Yom Tov. In such a case it would be biblically forbidden to pick the fruit.

Pnei Yehoshua (end of 2b) cites Rashi who writes that one is prohibited from eating an egg that was laid on Yom Tov on account of the decree of fruits falling from a tree on Shabbos. The Pnei Yehoshua wonders why Rashi mentions Shabbos when our Gemara is discussing Yom Tov. The Pnei Yehoshua quotes his grandfather, the Maginei Shlomo, who writes that Rashi is of the opinion that tolesh, the act of reaping fruit, is rabbinically forbidden on Yom Tov because it could have been performed prior to Yom Tov. The primary reason for the decree was because of Shabbos and not because of Yom Tov. This is not considered a gezeirah ligzeira, a decree on account of another decree, as Shabbos and Yom Tov are considered one.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 3 - Highlights

1. Rav Yosef maintains that the reason Bais Hillel posits that an egg that was laid on Yom Tov may not be eaten is because the egg is similar to a case of fruit that fell off a tree on Yom Tov. If we would permit the egg to be eaten, people would think that it is permitted to eat the fruit that fell off a tree on Yom Tov The reason one cannot eat the fruit that fell from the tree on Yom Tov is because if the fruits that fell from the tree would be permitted, one might climb the tree and pick the fruit, which is a violation of the act of reaping, a biblically prohibited melacha. Rav Yitzchak disagrees with Rav Yosef’s comparison of the egg to the fruit because an egg is contained within the hen whereas a fruit is in the open, so an egg is not included in the decree of fruit that falls on Yom Tov.
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2. Rav Yitzchak explains the reasoning of Bais Hillel to mean that Bais Hillel does not permit one to eat the egg that was laid on Yom Tov because it resembles juices that flow from a fruit on Yom Tov. If one were allowed to eat the egg, he would come to drink the juice that flowed from the fruit, and this is prohibited lest one come to squeeze the fruit. Rav Yosef disagrees with the opinion of Rav Yitzchak who maintains that Bais Hillel prohibits one to eat an egg that was laid on Yom Tov because of the concern that otherwise one will permit juices that flowed on Yom Tov. There is no similarity as eggs and fruits are food whereas juice is not a food but a liquid.
3. There is a contradiction between two rulings of Rabi Yehudah. The Mishnah in Shabbos states that the Chachamim maintain that one cannot squeeze fruits on Shabbos with the intention of using the juice and even if the juice flowed out by itself one would not be allowed to use the juice. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that if one intended to eat the fruit, then the juice is permitted as he does not want the juice and therefore there is no concern that he will come to squeeze the fruit. If the fruit was intended to be used for the juice, however, then one is prohibited from drinking the juice that flowed from them. This ruling of Rabbi Yehudah indicates that anything that is extracted from food is deemed to be food and is not included in the decree on account of juice that flows from the fruit. Yet, Rabbi Yehudah himself opines elsewhere that an egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah can be eaten on the second day of Rosh HaShanah, and this ruling implies that according to Rabbi Yehudah, the egg can only be eaten on the second day of Rosh HaShanah and not the first. This ruling contradicts the previous ruling of Rabbi Yehudah, as this ruling implies that any item that flows from its place of growth on Yom Tov, even if the item is a food, it is forbidden on account of the decree of juices that flow from a fruit. Rabbi Yochanan answers that the opinions in the Mishna of Shabbos should be reversed, with the stringent opinion being attributed to Rabbi Yehudah, and Rabbi Yehudah always follows the principle of issuing a decree on account of juice flowing from the fruit. Ravina answers that in the second Mishnah, Rabbi Yehudah was merely stating that his opinion is that the egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah should be permitted on the first day also, but according to the Chachamim who prohibit one from eating the egg even on the second day of Rosh HaSshanah, they should at least admit that the egg is permitted to be eaten on the second day The reason Rabbi Yehudah felt that the Chachamim disagree with him regarding the second day is because Rabbi Yehudah posits that both days of Rosh HaShanah are holy because of an uncertainty, whereas the Chachamim maintain that the egg is prohibited on the second day also because both days are one continuous day of holiness. Ravina the son of Rav Ulla answers that the Mishna that discuses the egg that was laid on Rosh HaShanah refers to a hen which was designated to produce eggs and Rabbi Yehudah maintains that there is a prohibition of muktzeh, thus resulting in the prohibition of eating the egg on the first day of Rosh HaShanah.
4. The Gemara cites a Baraisa that rules that when there is a doubt, one is not permitted to eat the egg. The Gemara assumes that the doubt is where the egg was laid on Yom Tov or prior to Yom Tov. According to Rabbah, who maintains that an egg that is laid on Yom Tov is prohibited because of the principle of hachanah, i.e. preparation, then we can understand why the Baraisa rules that in a case of doubt the egg is prohibited. This is because the principle of hachanah is biblical in nature and we always rule stringently regarding biblical uncertainties. According to Rav Yosef and Rav Yitzchak, however, who maintain that one is prohibited from eating the egg because of a rabbinical decree, we rule leniently regarding uncertainty pertaining to a rabbinical decree, so the egg should be permitted in a case of uncertainty. The Gemara answers that the Baraisa refers to a doubt whether the hen was a treifa, which is a physical injury on an animal or on a bird that renders the animal biblically forbidden, and for this reason the egg is prohibited.
5. The Baraisa continues by stating that if the egg in doubt became mixed up with other eggs, all the eggs are prohibited. The Gemara asks that it is understandable why all the eggs are prohibited if the doubt was whether the egg had been laid on Yom Tov or during the week, because since the egg will be permitted after Yom Tov, there is a principle that any item that will eventually become permitted is not nullified even when intermingled with a thousand items of its like. If, however, the uncertainty is whether the egg that was laid came from a treifa hen, then the egg will never be permitted and the egg should be nullified in the mixture by the majority of eggs that are permitted. The Gemara attempts to answer that the Baraisa is in accordance with the opinion that maintains that any item which is counted and thus sold individually is deemed to be significant and cannot be nullified.

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