Showing posts with label Sfas Emes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sfas Emes. Show all posts

Friday, September 04, 2009

Half Slave and Half Free

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The braisa states: If someone is half slave and half free-man (he was jointly owned by two men, and one of them set him free), he serves his master for one day and then is free for one day (and so on). Beis Shammai says: You have fixed the problem for his master, but you have not solved his own problem. He cannot marry a Canaanite slavewoman (as his free side is a freeman, who is forbidden to marry a slavewoman) and he cannot marry a regular Jewish girl (who cannot be with his slave half)! Should he simply not marry? The world was created to be populated, as the verse says: The world was not created by G-d to be empty; it was created to be populated! Rather, we force his master to free his other half as well, and we have the slave write for the master a document stating that he owes the master the rest of his value. Beis Hillel retracted their opinion, and agreed with Beis Shammai.

The Sfas Emes discusses the verdict regarding a half-slave and half free person that he must go free, and the slave writes a document to the remaining partner for half of his value. This is because the slave has no money. Essentially, by the first partner’s freeing his half, the second partner lost his slave as well, as the law is that he must set him free. Can the second partner demand that the first partner should take the bond from the slave, while the first partner should pay him the monetary equivalent?

The Sfas Emes concludes that being that the damage is not direct, as it is only a consequence of the first person’s action, Beis Din will not force the first owner to pay the second owner. [However, it should be noted that usually indirect damage makes a person liable to pay according to “Heavenly law (meaning what is viewed as right and wrong by Hashem),” despite the fact that Beis Din will not make him pay. Accordingly, if the person freed his half of the slave knowing full well that this would indirectly damage the second owner, he should compensate him to ensure Heaven (Hashem) will not hold it against him.] (13a – 13b)

Half Slave and Half Free

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

Tosfos (d.h. shene’emar) asks: Why does the Gemora choose to cite the verse of “The world was not created by G-d to be empty; it was created to be populated” to justify the importance for the half-slave half-freeman to be able to procreate, rather than the more well known verse in the Torah of P’ru U’rvu (Be fruitful and multiply)?

My understanding of Tosfos answer in the name of the R"I is that the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu is really a ma’aseh mitzvah like any other, where we have exemptions for o’nes (a case where he has no choice). Therefore, citing the verse of P’ru U’rvu wouldn’t justify forcing the master to free the slave, since at the present time, the half-free side of the slave is exempt as an o’nes because he is incapable of performing the mitzvah. But by citing the verse of “The world was not created by G-d to be empty; it was created to be populated,” the Gemora is pointing to the root and purpose of the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu. This verse illustrates that the purpose of P’ru U’rvu is to occupy the world and therefore we don’t follow the regular system that we do by other mitzvos, because even if he is exempt due to o’nes, the world will still remain empty. Although the Gemora means to use the verse in the torah as P’ru U’rvu as the source, it chooses to quote an alternate verse that would justify why P’ru U’rvu should apply even in a circumstance where he is an o’nes.

This approach is very meduyak in the language of Tosfos where the entire focus is on the verse chosen by the Gemora, rather than using language that indicates that P’ru U’rvu isn’t at all applicable since he is an o’nes. Tosfos language implies that P’ru U’rvu is truly the source that compels us to force the master to free the slave, but we cite the verse that explains why P’ru U’rvu should apply even to a circumstance of o’nes.

Furthermore, this approach would compliment, rather than contradict the Turei Even in Rosh Hashanah (29a), who asks that since one who does a mitzvah when they are exempt doesn’t fulfill their obligation, how can the Gemora in Yevamos say that if one had children as an idolater, and then he converts his whole family, he automatically fulfills the mitzvah? The mitzvah was done when he was exempt, so he should have to do it again!?

Turei Even answers that since the purpose of P’ru U’rvu is to populate the world, we disregard when the act of the mitzvah was done, so long as the world is being populated as a result of his actions.

If we were to understand Tosfos simply that only the mitzvah of “sheves” (populating the world) applies, but not P’ru U’rvu, then Tosfos would be holding that P’ru U’rvu is a standard mitzvah like any other, where o’nes is exempt and the ma’aseh mitzvah should have to be done when he is obligated in the mitzvah. But since we are explaining that according to Tosfos, the entire mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu is for the purpose of populating the world, Tosfos is essentially a support for the Turei Even’s novel understanding that the time of the ma’aseh mitzvah is not relevant.

This also explains how in the very next Tosfos, they are able to ask that the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu should override the prohibition of marrying a kadeish (harlot). How can Tosfos cite the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu moments after saying that it doesn’t apply here since he is o’nes? Clearly, Tosfos never meant to say that it doesn’t apply here; rather, the meaning is that we wouldn’t have realized that it does apply here, if not for the fact that we quoted the verse of “sheves.”

As a side note, there is a famous discussion whether an o’nes is exempt, or actually obligated but unable to perform. Tosfos here seems to support the former. Tosfos explains that since the half freeman is an o’nes in his obligation of P’ru U’rvu, we wouldn’t force the master to free him. Tosfos supports this claim from the fact that we don’t force masters to free all regular slaves to enable them to keep mitzvos. Now, if o’nes is actually obligated but unable to perform, how can Tosfos prove their case from a standard slave who isn’t even obligated at all in the mitzvos? Perhaps we don’t free regular slaves because they aren’t obligated, but we would free this half slave since his free side is obligated, just that he is an o’nes. Clearly, Tosfos holds that o’nes and not being obligated is exactly the same and can prove o’nes from the case of a regular slave.

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Monday, August 25, 2008

Neder like a Bamah

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The Sefas Emes and Noam Elimelech teach us that the word neder, vow is related to the word dira, dwelling. What does an oath have to do with a dwelling?

Reb Chaim from Divrei Chaim cites the Shem m’Shmuel who questions the entire essence of nedarim: How is it that a person has the power through his verbal declaration to create prohibitions (in the case of nidrei bituei) and create a status of hekdesh (nidrei hekdesh)? This power goes so far that the Gemora is uncertain whether the object of a neder is subject to the laws of me’ilah for violating a neder!

He suggests the following: In essence no new kedushah is being created. The concept of neder is a recognition that beyond what meets the eye, there is a level of kedushah already inherent in the reality around us - the Shechinah already dwells immanently in the world.

Sefas Emes notes that the first person in the Torah to take a neder is Yaakov Avinu. While the other Avos revealed Hashem’s presence as similar to a mountain or a field, Chazal tell us that Yaakov revealed Hashem’s presence as the bayis, a dwelling. Chazal tell us that taking a neder is like building a bamah, an altar used outside the Mikdash. Hashem metaphorically “dwells” in the Bais haMikdash – to create a sanctified space for him - outside those confines is a task fraught with challenge.

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Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Pauper Acting Rich

The braisa (Daf Yomi: Nazir 25b - 26a) states: Other people who are obligated to bring bird offerings by the Torah (because they cannot afford to buy animal offerings) who already designated the money to buy the birds (and then became rich), if they now want to bring a chatas or olah offering instead, they may do so.

The Mefaresh understands this Gemora to be referring to a rich woman who has given birth, where her chatas is a bird.

It is noteworthy that after the Torah discusses the korban that a rich woman who has given birth brings, it says [Vayikra 12:7]: This is the law of a woman who gives birth to a male or to a female. The question is asked: Immediately following this verse, the Torah teaches us the korbanos that a poor woman who has given birth brings. Why would the Torah say regarding the rich woman’s korbanos that “this is law of a woman who gives birth”? It would seem from the verse that only the rich woman’s korbanos are the law, and not the korbanos from the poor woman.

The Kli Chemdah (Parshas Tazria) cites a Gemora in Menochos (110a): It is written: This is the law of an olah. The Gemora expounds: Anyone that studies the laws of an olah is considered as if he brought a korban olah. What would be if a poor person would recite the portion dealing with the rich person’s korbanos? Would it be regarded as if he brought the korban? The answer may be gleaned from the fact that the Torah concluded the portion dealing with the rich woman’s korbanos with the following verse: This is the law of a woman who gives birth. The Torah is informing us that the recital of this portion is sufficient for anyone, even for a poor woman.

[The Gemora states that Hashem told Avraham Avinu that whenever Klal Yisroel will read the Torah portions pertaining to the korbanos, it will be regarded as if they brought korbanos and their sins will be forgiven.

The commentators discuss if this concept applies by other mitzvos as well. Perhaps it can be said that the studying of any mitzvah that cannot be performed nowadays will be regarded as if one fulfilled the mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemora in Bava Metzia (114b) that the Amoraim were fluent in Seder Kodoshim in the same manner as Seder Moed, Nashim and Nezikin. This is because Kodoshim was relevant to them since the learning about the korbanos was regarded as if they actually brought a korban. Implicit in his words that for some reason this was only true regarding Seder Kodoshim and not to Seder Zeroim or Taharos which also has many halachos that do not apply outside of Eretz Yisroel and after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Taz in his sefer Divrei Dovid maintains that the concept applies to all mitzvos and one who studies the laws of Zeraim, it will be regarded as if he gave terumos and ma’asros to the kohanim and levi’im and it will be considered as if he gave all the presents to the poor people. This is the explanation in Yaakov’s words to Esav "Im Lavan garti," which Chazal understand to mean that Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos in Lavan’s house. There were many mitzvos that he was not able to fulfill at that time; it is evident that the studying of these mitzvos are regarded as if he fulfilled them all.

The Ben Ish Cahi explains the verse in Nitzavim: "Ki Korov eilecha hadavar meod b’ficha u’vilvov’cha la’asoso." It is possible to fulfill all the mitzvos with your mouth (by studying them) even those mitzvos that you cannot actually perform.]

We can add that the Mishna in Negaim compliments this explanation. For the Mishna says that if a poor person who is a metzora brings the korban that a rich person is supposed to bring, he fulfills his obligation. The Chinuch (123) states by a korban olah v’yoreid - (certain sins which require a korban chatos, he either brings an animal, bird or flour offering depending on his status - this is called a fluctuating korban) if a poor person brings the korban of a rich person, he does not fulfill his obligation. The Chinuch explains the reason: the Torah had compassion on the poor person, it is not proper for him to compel himself to bring a korban which he cannot afford. How can the Chinuch hold against the Mishna, which explicitly states that he does fulfill his obligation?

The Chasam Sofer answers based on the following Gemora in Shabbos: Hashem punishes each person according to what he can afford. A rich person who sins will lose his cow. A poor person, on the other hand, will lose his chicken or some eggs. Therefore, there is a distinction between the korban of a metzora or a woman who gave birth and the korban olah v’yoreid. A metzora is not required to bring a korban because he sinned, it is to purify him and allow him to eat kodoshim. If a poor metzora decides to bring the rich man’s korban, he will have discharged his obligation. Conversely, a sinner who does that will not have discharged his obligation, for here the Torah prescribed for him the korban which will give him atonement according to his status. The korban is in place of the punishment. It is not decided by the pauper what his punishment should be, and therefore when he brings the korban of a rich person, he does not fulfill his obligation.

The Sfas Emes (here and quoted in Moadim U’zmanim as a story which occurred by a Kenesiya Gedola) answers that there is a basic distinction. A metzora disregarding if he is rich or poor, is required to bring a chatas and an olah. The rich man brings animals and the pauper brings birds. If a poor person brings the korban of a rich person, he fulfills his obligation, for he brought the prescribed amount. A korban olah v’yoreid is different. A rich person brings an animal for a korban chatas and a poor person brings two birds, one for a chatas and one for an olah. If a poor person will force himself to bring the korban of a rich person, he will not fulfill his obligation because he cheated the Altar out of one korban - namely the olah.

There are two questions on this explanation (look in Shemuas Chaim and in Mitzvas Hamelech from Harav Ezriel Cziment). Firstly, the Chinuch says a different reason for his not fulfilling his obligation. He says because the Torah doesn’t want a poor person to overburden himself. He does not say the reason of the Sfas Emes that he missed a korban? Secondly, one must ask, why is it that a poor person is required to bring two korbanos and a rich person only brings one? The Ibn Ezra explains the reason for this: A chatas bird is completely eaten and an olah bird is completely burned on the Altar. These two birds together replace a regular korban which entails a human consumption and the Altar’s consumption. They are actually one korban. Therefore, one can say that a poor person is not missing a korban by bringing one animal instead of two birds?

It would seem, however, that this question can be answered. Even according to the Ibn Ezra, the two birds are not one korban. They are two korbanos complimenting one another. The rationale behind bringing the two korbanos could be because the Torah wants human consumption and the Altar’s consumption; nevertheless, it is still two korbanos and a poor person is missing one korban when he brings the korban of a rich person.

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Thursday, July 05, 2007

FOOD FOR THOUGHT REGARDING TEFILLOS - Yevamos 64 - Daf Yomi

Our Gemora tells us that Hashem desires the prayers of the righteous. The Matriarchs were barren only so that they should pray to Hashem for children. Their desire for progeny caused the Matriarchs and the Patriarchs to pray to Hashem at a level that under normal circumstances they would not have done.

Rabbi Yitzchak said: Why are the prayers of the righteous likened to a pitchfork, as just like a pitchfork turns over the grain on the threshing floor from one place to another, so too the prayers of the righteous transform the manner in which HaShem conducts Himself from the Attribute of Cruel Judgment to the Attribute of Mercy.


*** Why did Hashem have to make them infertile; is there no other reason to pray to Him? If they would have had children, would they not have prayed for their health, sustenance and spiritual growth?


*** Divrei Yoel cites a Zohar and explains: It is on account of the prayers of the righteous that all future salvations will be effected. The Divrei Yoel explains with a parable: A king was traveling in a desert and he became very thirsty. The king's servants sought to bring the king water from a distant land. The king said, "I have the capabilities to bring sufficient water from afar for ourselves, but how will anyone else who passes through this area survive?" The king then commanded his servants to dig in the sand until they would find water, and by discovering a well, all future travelers would be able to survive in the desert. Similarly, explains the Divrei Yoel, people in future generations will be in need of a salvation, but they may not be deserving of it. It is through the tefillos of our forefathers that the gateways for these salvations will be effected.


*** The Sfas Emes writes that Yitzchak was answered through Tefillas Mincha. The Gemora states that one should be extremely careful in Mincha because this was the tefillah that Eliyahu was answered with.


*** The Imrei Emes comments that although the essence of Yitzchak was judgment, in the depths of judgment lies chesed, kindness; it was through this that he had the ability to transform the manner in which HaShem conducts Himself, from the Attribute of Cruel Judgment to the Attribute of Mercy.


*** Imrei Shefer writes that part of the tefillah that Yitzchak prayed at that time was the tefillah of “b’fi yeshorim tisromam etc.” which contains Yitzchak and Rivkah’s name in it.

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Monday, June 11, 2007

WHICH MITZVAH TAKES PRECEDENCE? - Yevamos 39 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that although it might be preferable for the older brother to perform a yibum, we do not wait for him. This is based on the principle that we do not delay the performance of a mitzvah in expectation of some future, better performance.

The Terumas Hadeshen (35) comments that the only time you do delay the performance of the mitzvah is we are concerned that by delaying, the mitzvah will not be fulfilled.

Similarly, the Gr”a (O”C 426) rules that this halacha is only applicable if the brother is overseas, but otherwise, we would be required to wait for him.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha brings a proof from here to the Rama’s ruling regarding Kiddush Levanah. One should wait to recite the blessing for the moon for Motzei Shabbos if it will occur prior to the tenth of the month, but if it is afterwards, one should not wait for Motzei Shabbos, and he should recite the blessing in middle of the week. This is because there might be a few consecutive cloudy days and he will have missed the opportunity for the mitzvah this month.

There is an argument between the Radvaz (187) and the Chacham Tzvi (106) regarding a person who was in jail and he did not have the ability to perform any mitzvos and his captors gave him one day that he can choose to be released and perform the mitzvos of that day, which day should he choose. The Radvaz says he should choose the first opportunity that he has and the Chacham Tzvi disagrees and holds that one should wait until there is a mitzva of great prominence.

The Gemora in Yoma (34a) discusses the obligation of nesachim - the wine libations by the two temidin which were brought every day. There is an argument there if we derive the morning tamid from the afternoon or vice-versa. Tosfos comments that there would be a difference l'halacha if they would have only enough nesachim for one korban; which tamid should have the nesachim. Is the primary tamid the morning or the afternoon? Rabeinu Chananel says that there is no difference l'halacha; it's just a matter as to how we expound the pesukim. The Sfas Emes asks on Tosfos that the din should be clearly that whichever mitzva one is holding by, that is the one he should perform and if one is ready to bring the morning tamid, he should bring the nesachim with that one, even if the afternoon tamid is the primary one.

The Biur Halacha (109) has a shaila if one davens normally a long Shemoneh Esrei and he will certainly miss kedusha, should he daven with the tzibur and fulfill the mitzva of tefila b'tzibur or should he wait and fulfill the mitzva of reciting kedusha.

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Friday, May 04, 2007

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 26 - LINGERING TASTE

The Gemora states: The Kohanim would lift the Table and show the festival pilgrims the showbread. They would tell them: “See how beloved you are before the Omnipresent; the bread is just as hot and fresh now (at the time of removal from the Table) as it was when it was arranged.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: There was a great miracle that transpired with the showbread. The showbread was placed on the Table on Shabbos, and it was subsequently removed the following Shabbos. For the bread to remain fresh in such a state was an open miracle.

There were many miracles that transpired in the Beis HaMikdosh; why was this the miracle chosen to show the pilgrims?

The Sfas Emes answers: The pilgrims attained extremely high levels of spirituality when they visited the Beis HaMikdosh during the festival. They felt the Shechina in close proximity. They observed the Kohanim performing the sacrificial offerings and were uplifted.

We wanted to ensure that the heights that they reached during the festival would not be lost and it was for this reason that the miracle regarding the showbread was displayed to them. The bread was placed on the Table the Shabbos before, but it can still remain hot and fresh the following week.

This also explains why we answer the wise son by the seder night; one is forbidden to eat anything after the eating of the afikoman. The discussions of emunah and bitachon, thanking HaShem for redeeming us and becoming the Chosen Nation brings us to spiritual heights that we never achieved before. We tell the wise son, don’t let this slip away. The taste of the matzah should linger in your mouth all throughout the night, demonstrating that it is our wish that the levels of sanctity and purity that have been reached should not be cast away.

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Tuesday, July 18, 2006

Daf Yomi - Yoma 41 - A Pauper Bringing the Korban of a Rich Person

The Gemora quotes a Mishna in נגעים, if a poor person who is a מצורע brings the קרבן that a rich person is supposed to bring, he fulfills his obligation. The Chinuch (123) states by a קרבן עולה ויורד - (certain sins which require a korban chatos, he either brings an animal, bird or flour offering depending on his status - this is called a fluctuating korban) if an עני brings the קרבן of an עשיר, he does not fulfill his obligation. The Chinuch explains the reason: the Torah had compassion on the poor person, it is not proper for him to compel himself to bring a korban which he cannot afford. How can the Chinuch hold against the Mishna, which explicitly states that he does fulfill his obligation?

The Chasam Sofer answers based on a Gemora Shabbos that states that Hashem punishes each person according to what he can afford. A rich person who sins will lose his cow. A poor person, on the other hand, will lose his chicken or some eggs. Therefore, there is a distinction between the קרבן of a מצורע or יולדת (a woman who gave birth) and the קרבן עולה ויורד. A מצורע is not required to bring a קרבן because he sinned, it is to purify him and allow him to eat kodoshim. If a poor מצורע decides to bring the rich man's קרבן, he will be יוצא. Conversely, a sinner who does that will not be יוצא, for here the Torah prescribed for him the קרבן which will give him atonement according to his status. The קרבן is in place of the punishment. It is not decided by the עני what his punishment should be and therefore when he brings the קרבן of an עשיר, he does not fulfill his obligation.

The Sfas Emes (here and quoted in Moadim U'zmanim as a story which occured by a כנסיה גדולה) answers that there is a basic distinction. A מצורע disregarding if he is an עשיר or an עני is required to bring a חטאת and an עולה. The rich man brings animals and the pauper brings birds. If the עני brings the קרבן of an עשיר, he fulfills his obligation, for he brought the prescribed amount. A קרבן עולה ויורד is different. A rich person brings an animal for a קרבן חטאת and an עני brings two birds, one for a חטאת and one for an עולה. If an עני will force himself to bring the קרבן of an עשיר, he will not fulfill his obligation because he cheated the מזבח out of one קרבן - namely the עולה.

There are two questions on this explanation (look in שמועת חיים and in מצות המלך from Harav Ezriel Cziment). Firstly, the chinuch says a different reason for his not being יוצא. He says because the Torah doesn't want the עני to overburden himself. He does not say the reason of the Sfas Emes that he missed a קרבן? Secondly, one must ask, why is it that an עני is required to bring two קרבנות and an עשיר only brings one? The אבן עזרא explains the reason for this: A חטאת העוף is completely eaten and an עולת העוף is completely burned on the מזבח. These two birds together replace a regular קרבן which entails אכילת אדם and אכילת מזבח. They are actually one קרבן. Therefore, one can say that the עני is not missing a קרבן by bringing one animal instead of two birds?

It would seem, however, that this question can be answered. Even according to the אבן עזרא, the two birds are not one קרבן. They are two קרבנות complimenting one another. The rationale behind bringing the two קרבנות could be because the Torah wants אכילת אדם and אכילת מזבח, nevertheless, it is still two קרבנות and the עני is missing one קרבן when he brings the קרבן of an עשיר.

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