Must a Prospective Bride Inform the Groom regarding her Absence of Blood?

The following question was posed to Reb Moshe Feinstein: There was a girl who was over twenty years old who had pubic hairs; however, she did not commence menstruating yet. Some doctors told her that when she gets married and cohabits with her husband, she will begin her cycle and she will have the ability to bear children. Is it permitted for her father to arrange a match for her without informing the groom of the situation? Is there a concern that this will be regarded as a mistaken kiddushin or not?

Reb Moshe (E”H, III, 27) addresses the question and cites proof from our Gemora (Kesuvos 10b).

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel the Elder and said, “Rebbi, I have had marital relations but did not find any blood.” His wife said, “Rebbi, I am from the Durkati family who does not have either menstrual blood nor virgin blood.” Rabban Gamliel investigated regarding her relatives, and found that she was correct. He said “go and take your purchase (wife, as she indeed was a virgin), praised are you who have merited (a wife) from the house of Durkati.” What does Durkati mean? A cut-off (from these bloods) generation.

Rabbi Chanina said that Rabban Gamliel comforted this man with illogical comfort. This is because Rabbi Chiya taught that just as yeast is good for dough, so is blood is good for a woman (as it causes her to become pregnant quicker).” The Braisa also says in the name of Rabbi Meir that any women who has much blood, has many children.

It is said that Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Aba stated (that the phraseology of go and take your purchase in the case immediately above means) “acquire your purchase,” he said to him. Rabbi Yossi bar Avin says “you are obligated in your purchase,” he said to him. The opinion that he meant “you are obligated in your purchase” is understandable according to the words of Rabbi Chanina (that this wasn’t great as his wife couldn’t have so many children, nor get pregnant quickly). However, according to the opinion that says “acquire,” what kind of meritorious acquisition is this (that he should use a term referring to both acquiring and implying that it is a great merit to do so)? The Gemora answers, that the husband will never have a doubt whether or not his wife is a Nidah.

We see that even according To Rabbi Yosi bar Avin who holds that the absence of blood can prevent a woman from bearing children, nevertheless, the kiddushin is valid, and not regarded as a mistake even though it is detrimental to him.

It is evident that the possibility exists that a woman without blood can give birth, although she will not bear many children. Since she is fit to have children, and many men are not particular to have many children and they are also not particular if she becomes pregnant immediately or not, it is not regarded as a mistaken kiddushin.

In our case, where there are doctors that say that her menstrual cycle will return and she will have the ability to bear many children, the father is not obligated to reveal her blemish to the groom’s family. Reb Moshe adds: The father and the bride should resolve that if four years goes by and she doesn’t become pregnant and she does not begin to menstruate, she should accept her bill of divorce without a hassle and without and monetary claims on the husband.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 10 - Highlights

Conflicting Decrees

It is said that Rav Nachman said that Shmuel said in the name of Rebbi Shimon Ben Elazar that the sages established decreed for Jewish girls that a virgin should receive (a kesuvah containing a guarantee that she will receive in case of divorce or widowhood) two hundred (zuz). A widow should receive one hundred (zuz). They (the sages) also believed the groom to say that he found an open opening (and he could thereby cause her to lose the two hundred zuz). If so, what did the sages help with their decree (of establishing this guaranteed money in her kesuvah)?

Rava answered that the sages decree was still helpful, as it is established that a person will not bother to prepare a wedding feast and lose it (for a marriage that will only last a couple days). [Accordingly, we do not assume that the groom will make this claim unless it is true.] (10a)

Rabban Shimon ben Gamilel’s Opinion: Torah Law
or Rabbinic Decree?

The Braisa states that since this is a fine established by the sages, she can only demand collection from his worst property. The Gemora asks, what is the fine (that is given to the groom, what did he do wrong)? It must mean to say that since this is a decree of the sages, she can only demand collection from his worst property. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the money in the kesuvah is a Torah law.

Did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel actually say this? Doesn’t the Braisa state that the passuk states “He should take money like the amount given to virgins.” The Braisa continues that this teaches that the amount (given to the father of a seduced girl) should be equal to the amount given to virgins, and the amount given to virgins must be equal to the amount given to this person (the father of the seduced girl). The sages understood from this passuk that it is a reliable source that the concept of money guaranteed in a kesuvah is Torah law. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel argued that the concept of kesuvah is not Torah law but rather from the words of the scribes (sages).

The Gemora answers that the opinions in this Braisa must be switched around. The Gemora asks, what do you see that makes you switch the opinions of the latter Braisa? Why not switch the opinions of the previous Braisa (and say Rabban Gamliel indeed holds kesuvah is a decree of the sages)?

The Gemora answers that we see from another source that Rabban Gamliel holds that the concept of kesuvah is based in Torah law. The Mishna (106b) states that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that he must pay her with Kaputkiya currency. [Rashi explains that Kaputkiya currency was better than the currency of Eretz Yisrael. Rabban Shimon said that if a person married there this meant that his kesuvah must be a lean that is linked to Kaputkiya currency. The Rabbanan there argue and allow him to pay even in Eretz Yisrael currency, as long as the divorce took place in Eretz Yisrael. They seemingly understand that the sages allowed the monies they instituted to be paid in the currency of the place of marriage or divorce, which means that they did not treat it like a loan. This implies that Rabban Shimon treated the monies in the kesuvah like the Torah treats a loan, and he therefore must hold the concept of monies in the kesuvah is Torah law.]

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that the entire latter Mishna is Rabban Shimon, and it is missing some words and is supposed to be read in the following way. The sages understood from this passuk that it is a reliable source that the concept of money guaranteed in a kesuvah is Torah law. However, the concept of kesuvah for a widow is not Torah law, but rather from the words of the scribes (sages),as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that the concept of kesuvah of a widow is not a Torah law but rather from the words of the sages. (10a)
Rav Nachman’s Ruling on the Claim of Finding an Open Opening

There was a man who came before Rav Nachman and said that he had found an open opening. Rav Nachman said, “give him lashes with thorny palm fronds, as he had those (prostitutes) from Birchasa who were struck by him.”[Rav Nachman meant that if he knew how to determine this, he must have been someone who knew what this felt like because of prior experience with prostitutes for which he deserves lashes.]

The Gemora asks, doesn’t Rav Nachman himself say that this claim is believed? The Gemora answers that he indeed says the claim is believed, but he is also given lashes (for knowing that he has a claim)! Rav Achai answered, that when Rav Nachman said he is believed he meant when he was already married (and therefore does not receive lashes, as he could know this from past permitted experience). This story was talking about someone who was never previously married. (10a)
Other Rulings in this Case

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel and said that he had found an open opening. Rabban Gamliel said, “perhaps you turned to the side (and she is actually still a virgin). I will give you a parable, to what is this compared to? To a person who was walking in the darkness of night, (and when he reaches the door of his house and there is an obstacle preventing the door from opening normally). If he turns, it is as if he found it open (and he doesn’t realize that he would not have been able to open the door normally). If he does not turn (and he tries to go in normally) he will find it locked.

Others say that Rabban Gamliel replied to the man that perhaps you purposely turned, and uprooted the door and the lock. I will give you a parable, to what is this compared to? To a person who was walking in the darkness of night, (and when he reaches the door of his house and there is an obstacle preventing the door from opening normally). If he purposely turns (forcefully), it is as if he found it open (and he doesn’t realize that he was the one who knocked away the barrier). If he does not turn (and he tries to go in normally) he will find it locked. (10a)
Ways to Determine Virginity

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel bar Rebbi and said that he had had marital relations and did not find any blood. His wife said, “Rebbi, I was a virgin.” Rabban Gamliel said, “bring me the sheet.” They brought him the sheet, he soaked it in water and laundered it, and he found on it many drops of blood. He replied to the man “go and take your purchase (wife, as she indeed was a virgin).”

Huna Mar the son of Rava from Parzakya said to Rav Ashi that we should also do this test (if this claim is brought before us). He answered that our ironing (that they used to do with glass stone, see Rashi) is like their laundering. If you will say that we should therefore iron (the sheet), the glass will take away the spots.

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel and said that he had had marital relations and did not find any blood. His wife said, “Rebbi, I was a virgin.” Rabban Gamliel said, “bring me two maidservants, one who is a virgin and one who is not, and sit them down on a barrel of wine. The one who is not has the smell of the wine wafting (in that area, as it is not closed), and the one who is a virgin does not. This women too (can be tested to determine her status). They sat her down on the barrel of wine and the smell did not waft. He said “go and take your purchase (wife, as she indeed was a virgin).”

The Gemora asks, why didn’t he just check this with her originally (why did he also do this with two maidservants)? The Gemora answers that he had heard this tradition, but he never saw it done. He therefore thought that perhaps the tradition was inaccurate. It was also not normal to denigrate Jewish girls (for this purpose, so he ordered that they bring maidservants who were not Jewish).

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel the Elder and said, “Rebbi, I have had marital relations but did not find any blood.” His wife said, “Rebbi, I am from the Durkati family who does not have either menstrual blood nor virgin blood.” Rabban Gamliel investigated regarding her relatives, and found that she was correct. He said “go and take your purchase (wife, as she indeed was a virgin), praised are you who have merited (a wife) from the house of Durkati.” What does Durkati mean? A cut-off (from these bloods) generation.

Rabbi Chanina said that Rabban Gamliel comforted this man with illogical comfort. This is because Rabbi Chiya taught that just as yeast is good for dough, so is blood is good for a woman (as it causes her to become pregnant quicker).” The Braisa also says in the name of Rabbi Meir that any women who has much blood, has many children.

It is said that Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Aba stated (that the phraseology of go and take your purchase in the case immediately above means) “acquire your purchase,” he said to him. Rabbi Yossi bar Avin says “you are obligated in your purchase,” he said to him. The opinion that he meant “you are obligated in your purchase” is understandable according to the words of Rabbi Chanina (that this wasn’t great as his wife couldn’t have so many children, nor get pregnant quickly). However, according to the opinion that says “acquire,” what kind of meritorious acquisition is this (that he should use a term referring to both acquiring and implying that it is a great merit to do so)? The Gemora answers, that the husband will never have a doubt whether or not his wife is a Nidah.

There was a man who came before Rebbi and said, “Rebbi, I had marital relations and did not find blood.” His wife said, “Rebbi, I was still a virgin but it was a year of famine.” Rebbi saw that their faces were black from famine. He commanded that they should be put into the bathhouse, he fed them, and gave them to drink, and then had them enter a room. The husband then had marital relations and found blood. Rebbi said to him, “acquire your purchase.” Rebbi said about them the passuk “their skin was stuck to themselves, dry like wood.” (10a – 10b)
Mishna

The kesuvah of a virgin is for two hundred (Zuz), and that of a widow for one hundred (Zuz). A virgin widow, divorcee, and woman who received chalitzah who were only formerly betrothed receive a kesuvah of two hundred and her husband has the ability to claim that he did not find that she was a virgin. (10b)
The Word “Almanah”

Why does the Mishna call the opposite of a virgin an “Almanah” – “widow” (see Chasam Sofer who explains that the correct opposite would seemingly be “Beulah” – “one who has had marital relations)? Rav Chana from Bagdas answers that this is an acronym for “Al Shem Manah” -- “due to the one hundred (that she gets for her kesuvah).” [This is why the Mishna stated “Almanah” and not “Beulah” as the word itself hints that she only receives one hundred.]

What about a widow who was merely betrothed (she receives two hundred)? The Gemora answers that since a regular widow from marriage receives one hundred, a widow from betrothal is also called an Almanah (even though she receives two hundred). What is the reason that the Torah calls a widow an “Almanah” (the Torah never talks about a kesuvah, and it is argued above whether or not it is even a Torah concept)? The Gemora answers, the Torah called a widow an “Almanah” as in the future the Rabbanan would decree that a widow should receive a kesuvah of one hundred.

The Gemora asks, is there a pasuk in the Torah that is based on future events? The Gemora answers that there is. This is evident from the passuk in Bereishis “and the third river is called Chidekel, it is the one that goes to the east of Ashur.” Rav Yosef taught that Ashur is a city called Slika. Was this city extant during the time period discussed in the pesukim (the creation of the world)? It must be that it was said in the context of the future. Accordingly, we can also say that the Torah’s name for a “widow” - “Almanah” is based on the future. (10b)

Other Interesting Words and their Characteristics

Rav Chana from Bagdas also says that dew waters, saturates, fertilizes, gives a shine (to the fruit), and helps things grow. Rava bar Rebbi Yishmael says, and some say Rav Yeimar bar Shalmiya says, what is the passuk that tells us this? The passuk “its rows are saturated to allow its rows (to give bounty for people, see Rashi in Tehilim), with dew it will moisten (alluding to fertilization), its produce will be blessed (shine and help grow).”

Rabbi Elazar states that the mizbe’ach (altar) “meizi’ach” – “atones,” supplies, causes love and “mechaper” – “atonement.” The Gemora asks, aren’t “meizi’ach” and “mechaper” redundant, as they both mean atonement? The Gemora answers that “meizi’ach” means that it atones to take away bad decrees from Bnei Yisrael. “Mechaper” means that it atones for their sins.

Rav Chana from Bagdas also stated that dates make a person, warm, full, loosen his bowls, give him strength, and do not make him too finicky. Rav says that if one eats dates he should not rule on halachic matters. The Gemora asks from a Braisa that states that dates are good to eat (after eating one’s meal) in the morning and at night, in the early afternoon they are bad, and in the late afternoon there is nothing as good as them. They take away three problems: worry, stomach sickness, and having to go the bathroom for too long. [This seemingly indicates that a person should be able to rule halachic matters after eating them.]

The Gemora answers, did we say they are not good? They are very good! For a little while, however, they can confuse one’s mind in a matter similar to wine, in the same manner as Mar stated that someone who drinks a Revi’is (86-150 ml) of wine should not rule on halachic matters.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that this is not a question. One (statement of Rav) is before eating and one (Braisa) is regarding after eating. This is as Abaye said that his foster mother told him that eating dates before a meal is like an ax to a palm tree, and eating dates after a meal is like the bolt on a door.

Rava states that the word “Dasha” – “door” is an acronym for “Derech Sham” – “that way.” “Darga” – “step,” Rava states, is an acronym for “Derech Gag” – “the way to the roof.” “Purya” – “bed,” Rav Papa says, is an acronym for “she’parin v’ravin aleha” – “that people are fruitful and multiple on it.” Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak states that the word “aylonis” is an acronym for “A ram that cannot give birth.” (10b – 11a)

[END]

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Counterclaim - Kesuvos 9 - Daf Yomi

Rabbi Elozar said: If the husband (after his first act of cohabitation with his virgin bride) claims, “I found an open entrance (her hymen has been torn by someone else),” he is believed to render her forbidden to him.

It is not clear from the Gemora regarding the counterclaim of the woman. Most Rishonim maintain that she is forbidden to him only if she contradicts him and states that her entrance was not opened, or if she remained quiet. However, if she concedes that her entrance was opened, but she claims that she was violated or she was wounded by wood, she is believed, and she will not be forbidden to him. This is because the husband’s claim is an uncertain one, but she knows what happened, and a certain claim has more validity than that of an uncertain one, especially when we can combine her certain claim with her presumption of innocence.

The Rosh disagrees with this. He states: Since there is only one doubt, we must rule stringently, and she is not believed. It is also established that we do not give more credence to a certain claim over an uncertain one, especially when there is a majority contradicting her claim. Most women cohabit willingly, and when they are violated, there is usually a rumor to that effect. A majority is superior to a presumption of innocence. We can therefore, not rely on her claim, and she is forbidden to her husband. The Rashba, while agreeing with the Rosh, states that she is believed regarding her kesuvah.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 9 - Highlights

I Found an Open Entrance

Rabbi Elozar said: If the husband (after his first act of cohabitation with his virgin bride) claims, “I found an open entrance (her hymen has been torn by someone else),” he is believed to render her forbidden to him.

The Gemora questions this ruling: Why should she become forbidden to him? It is a double doubt if she should be forbidden to him. It is uncertain whether she cohabited with another man during her betrothal to him (in which case she is regarded as an adulteress who is forbidden to live with her husband) or perhaps it occurred before she was married to him. And even if you say that she cohabited with another man during her betrothal to him, there is another doubt whether she was violated or by her own free will.

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Elozar is referring to a case where she is the wife of a Kohen (in which case, she will be forbidden to the husband even if she was violated). Alternatively, he can be referring to the wife of a Yisroel, but the case is where her father accepted kiddushin for her when she was under three years old and one day (in which case, she will be forbidden to her husband, since she obviously cohabited while she was married to him, for if it occurred before she was three, her virginity would not be affected).

The Gemora asks: What is the necessity for Rabbi Elozar’s ruling? Didn’t we learn Rabbi Elozar’s main point (that a man may, by his own testimony, may prohibit for himself a thing or a person otherwise permitted to him) in the following Mishna: If a man says to a woman, “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You have not betrothed me,” she is permitted to marry his relatives, but he is prohibited to marry her relatives.

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that only in the Mishna’s case does one become forbidden by his own words because he is certain regarding his claim, but in Rabbi Elozar’s case, where his claim is not a certainty, for he really does not know if he found an open entrance or not, perhaps she does not become forbidden to him; Rabbi Elozar teaches us that she is indeed forbidden to him.

The Gemora asks: Did Rabbi Elozar really say that she is forbidden to him? But surely, Rabbi Elozar had said: A wife does not become forbidden to her husband except in the case when there is a warning and seclusion (if the husband warned the wife not to seclude herself with a specific man and she disregards his warning and secludes herself with that man, she becomes forbidden to her husband), and as we find in the occurrence that happened (between King David and Bas-sheva)? (It is evident that Rabbi Elozar does not prohibit the wife to her husband just based on his claim that he didn’t find signs of her virginity.)

The Gemora questions the last statement: Was there a warning and seclusion by the incident with King David and Bas-sheva? And furthermore, was Bas-sheva rendered forbidden to her husband?

The Gemora explains: This is no difficulty, for this is what Rabbi Elozar meant to say: A wife does not become forbidden to her husband except in the case when there is a warning and seclusion, and this we learned from the occurrence that happened, where there was no warning and seclusion, and that is why Bas-sheva was not forbidden to her husband.

Nevertheless, the original question remains: She is only forbidden to her husband if there is a warning and a seclusion, but she would not be rendered forbidden based on his testimony that he found an open entrance.

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Elozar’s statement cannot be taken literally, for will she only be forbidden to her husband if there is a warning and a seclusion, bit if witnesses testify that she committed adultery, will she not be rendered forbidden? Obviously, yes! Rather, the following is what Rabbi Elozar meant: A woman will not be rendered forbidden to her husband through the testimony of one witness, but rather, only through the testimony of two witnesses. And a warning and seclusion even with through one witness (on the seclusion) will render her forbidden. A husband’s claim that he found an open entrance is regarded as if there would be two witnesses (because he is certain regarding his claim). And why was Bas-sheva not rendered forbidden to David (the adulteress becomes forbidden to the adulterer)? It is because she was violated (it was without her consent, and in such cases, the woman would be permitted to her husband, therefore, she is permitted to the adulterer as well).

Alternatively, the Gemora answers according to what Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said in the name of Rabbi Yonasan: Everyone who goes out into the war of the House of David writes for his wife a deed of divorce beforehand (so that in case he falls in battle his wife should be free to marry without the necessity of chalitzah. The get would in that case take effect retroactively from the date of its writing; this is why she did not become forbidden to her husband; she did not commit adultery). (8b – 9b)

Support from the Mishna

Abaye cites support for Rabbi Elozar’s ruling from our Mishna: The Mishna had stated: A virgin is married on Wednesday. We may infer from here that she is only married on Wednesday, but not on Thursday. What is the reason for this? It is because we are concerned that his anger will subside (by waiting for the next time that Beis Din would be in session; they were in session in the big cities on Monday and Thursday; if a husband, who got married on Wednesday, will have a claim regarding his wife’s virginity, he would be able to go early the next morning to the Beis Din). What were the Rabbis concerned about? If it was regarding her kesuvah, what is the reason to concern ourselves with that; let the husband give her the kesuvah (if he so desires)? Rather, it must be that she is forbidden to him. Isn’t the Mishna referring to a case where the husband claimed that he found an open entrance (and this would prove that the wife is forbidden to him based on such a claim)?

The Gemora rejects the proof: Our Mishna could be discussing a case where he claimed that he did not find any blood (only in this case, where his claim is a more certain one, will she be rendered forbidden to him). (9b)

Deprive her of the Kesuvah

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: If the husband (after his first act of cohabitation with his virgin bride) claims, “I found an open entrance (her hymen has been torn by someone else),” he is believed to cause her to lose her kesuvah.

Rav Yosef asks: What is the necessity of Shmuel’s ruling? Have we not learned this principle from the following Mishna: One who eats at his father-in-law's house (between the time of betrothal and the time of marriage) in Judaea (where this was common practice) without witnesses, cannot raise the claim (after the marriage) regarding his bride’s virginity, because he has secluded himself with her (and we suspect that he might have had intimate relations with his bride). The Gemora infers from here that it is only in Judaea that he cannot raise this claim, but in the Galilee (where it was not customary for the husband to seclude himself with the bride before they were married), he can raise it. Regarding what, was his claim? If his intention was to render her forbidden to him, why should he not be able to raise this claim in Judaea? (If he is sure that he has not been intimate with her during the time of betrothal and he charges her with unfaithfulness, he renders her, by the mere charge, forbidden to him?) It is evident that his claim is to cause her to lose her kesuvah. Isn’t the Mishna referring to a case where the husband claimed that he found an open entrance (and this would prove that he is believed to cause her to lose her kesuvah based on such a claim)?

The Gemora rejects the proof: The Mishna could be discussing a case where he claimed that he did not find any blood (only in this case, where his claim is a more certain one, will she lose her kesuvah). (9b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 9 - Highlights

I Found an Open Entrance

Rabbi Elozar said: If the husband (after his first act of cohabitation with his virgin bride) claims, “I found an open entrance (her hymen has been torn by someone else),” he is believed to render her forbidden to him.

The Gemora questions this ruling: Why should she become forbidden to him? It is a double doubt if she should be forbidden to him. It is uncertain whether she cohabited with another man during her betrothal to him (in which case she is regarded as an adulteress who is forbidden to live with her husband) or perhaps it occurred before she was married to him. And even if you say that she cohabited with another man during her betrothal to him, there is another doubt whether she was violated or by her own free will.

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Elozar is referring to a case where she is the wife of a Kohen (in which case, she will be forbidden to the husband even if she was violated). Alternatively, he can be referring to the wife of a Yisroel, but the case is where her father accepted kiddushin for her when she was under three years old and one day (in which case, she will be forbidden to her husband, since she obviously cohabited while she was married to him, for if it occurred before she was three, her virginity would not be affected).

The Gemora asks: What is the necessity for Rabbi Elozar’s ruling? Didn’t we learn Rabbi Elozar’s main point (that a man may, by his own testimony, may prohibit for himself a thing or a person otherwise permitted to him) in the following Mishna: If a man says to a woman, “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You have not betrothed me,” she is permitted to marry his relatives, but he is prohibited to marry her relatives.

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that only in the Mishna’s case does one become forbidden by his own words because he is certain regarding his claim, but in Rabbi Elozar’s case, where his claim is not a certainty, for he really does not know if he found an open entrance or not, perhaps she does not become forbidden to him; Rabbi Elozar teaches us that she is indeed forbidden to him.

The Gemora asks: Did Rabbi Elozar really say that she is forbidden to him? But surely, Rabbi Elozar had said: A wife does not become forbidden to her husband except in the case when there is a warning and seclusion (if the husband warned the wife not to seclude herself with a specific man and she disregards his warning and secludes herself with that man, she becomes forbidden to her husband), and as we find in the occurrence that happened (between King David and Bas-sheva)? (It is evident that Rabbi Elozar does not prohibit the wife to her husband just based on his claim that he didn’t find signs of her virginity.)

The Gemora questions the last statement: Was there a warning and seclusion by the incident with King David and Bas-sheva? And furthermore, was Bas-sheva rendered forbidden to her husband?

The Gemora explains: This is no difficulty, for this is what Rabbi Elozar meant to say: A wife does not become forbidden to her husband except in the case when there is a warning and seclusion, and this we learned from the occurrence that happened, where there was no warning and seclusion, and that is why Bas-sheva was not forbidden to her husband.

Nevertheless, the original question remains: She is only forbidden to her husband if there is a warning and a seclusion, but she would not be rendered forbidden based on his testimony that he found an open entrance.

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Elozar’s statement cannot be taken literally, for will she only be forbidden to her husband if there is a warning and a seclusion, bit if witnesses testify that she committed adultery, will she not be rendered forbidden? Obviously, yes! Rather, the following is what Rabbi Elozar meant: A woman will not be rendered forbidden to her husband through the testimony of one witness, but rather, only through the testimony of two witnesses. And a warning and seclusion even with through one witness (on the seclusion) will render her forbidden. A husband’s claim that he found an open entrance is regarded as if there would be two witnesses (because he is certain regarding his claim). And why was Bas-sheva not rendered forbidden to her husband? It is because she was violated (it was without her consent).

Alternatively, the Gemora answers according to what Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said in the name of Rabbi Yonasan: Everyone who goes out into the war of the House of David writes for his wife a deed of divorce beforehand (so that in case he falls in battle his wife should be free to marry without the necessity of chalitzah. The get would in that case take effect retroactively from the date of its writing; this is why she did not become forbidden to her husband; she did not commit adultery). (8b – 9b)

Support from the Mishna

Abaye cites support for Rabbi Elozar’s ruling from our Mishna: The Mishna had stated: A virgin is married on Wednesday. We may infer from here that she is only married on Wednesday, but not on Thursday. What is the reason for this? It is because we are concerned that his anger will subside (by waiting for the next time that Beis Din would be in session; they were in session in the big cities on Monday and Thursday; if a husband, who got married on Wednesday, will have a claim regarding his wife’s virginity, he would be able to go early the next morning to the Beis Din). What were the Rabbis concerned about? If it was regarding her kesuvah, what is the reason to concern ourselves with that; let the husband give her the kesuvah (if he so desires)? Rather, it must be that she is forbidden to him. Isn’t the Mishna referring to a case where the husband claimed that he found an open entrance (and this would prove that the wife is forbidden to him based on such a claim)?

The Gemora rejects the proof: Our Mishna could be discussing a case where he claimed that he did not find any blood (only in this case, where his claim is a more certain one, will she be rendered forbidden to him). (9b)

Deprive her of the Kesuvah

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: If the husband (after his first act of cohabitation with his virgin bride) claims, “I found an open entrance (her hymen has been torn by someone else),” he is believed to cause her to lose her kesuvah.

Rav Yosef asks: What is the necessity of Shmuel’s ruling? Have we not learned this principle from the following Mishna: One who eats at his father-in-law's house (between the time of betrothal and the time of marriage) in Judaea (where this was common practice) without witnesses, cannot raise the claim (after the marriage) regarding his bride’s virginity, because he has secluded himself with her (and we suspect that he might have had intimate relations with his bride). The Gemora infers from here that it is only in Judaea that he cannot raise this claim, but in the Galilee (where it was not customary for the husband to seclude himself with the bride before they were married), he can raise it. Regarding what, was his claim? If his intention was to render her forbidden to him, why should he not be able to raise this claim in Judaea? (If he is sure that he has not been intimate with her during the time of betrothal and he charges her with unfaithfulness, he renders her, by the mere charge, forbidden to him?) It is evident that his claim is to cause her to lose her kesuvah. Isn’t the Mishna referring to a case where the husband claimed that he found an open entrance (and this would prove that he is believed to cause her to lose her kesuvah based on such a claim)?

The Gemora rejects the proof: The Mishna could be discussing a case where he claimed that he did not find any blood (only in this case, where his claim is a more certain one, will she lose her kesuvah). (9b)

[END]

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