Abstaining from Wine

Rabbi Elozar HaKappar asks (Bava Kamma 91) : What does the verse mean when it says, “and he shall atone for him for having sinned on his soul?” What “soul” did he “sin” against? It must be referring to the fact that he pained himself by abstaining from wine. This additionally teaches us that if this person who merely abstained from wine is called a sinner, someone who abstains from many things is certainly a sinner.

Ben Yehoyadah explains why one who deprives himself from wine or any food is regarded as a sinner. Portions of one’s soul are contained within foods and drinks. When one recites a blessing before eating these foods, he can cause a remedy for those parts of the soul, and through his blessing, they will be able to go to their rightful place. It emerges that one who declares himself to be a nazir and therefore refrains from eating grapes or drinking wine, is sinning regarding his soul, for now his soul will remain deficient.

Furthermore, there are many mitzvos where wine is required, such as kiddush on Shabbos and Yom Tov, havdalah, birkas hamazon, bris milah and sheva brochos. Chazal established the mitzvos in this manner in order to rectify the sin of Adam Harishon, which was with wine. One who vows to be a nazir and therefore abstains from drinking wine causes anguish to his soul.

Read more!

Cup Should be Whole

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

The Gemora (Bava Kamma 54) explains: It is written: And the carcass shall be his. This implies (that the pit owner would be liable to pay for) all things that are subject to death.

The Gemora asks: If so, whether according to the Chachamim who exclude utensils or according to Rabbi Yehudah who includes utensils, are utensils objects that are subject to death?

The Gemora answers: It may be said that their breaking is their death.

It is written in the Sefer Hayashar in the name of the Gaonim that a cup of blessing (the cup of wine over which Birchas Hamazon is recited) must be whole; it cannot be broken. It cannot be chipped at all. This is what the Gemora Brochos (51a) means when it states that the cup of blessing must be chai (alive). “Alive” means that it is whole. This is based upon our Gemora which states that the breakage of a utensil is equivalent to its death.

The Olas Tamid, however, disagrees and holds that as long as the cup can stand on its base, it is qualified to be used, save for the fact that there is a mitzvah to beautify the mitzvah (and because of that, it is preferable not to have any cracks in it whatsoever).

Read more!

Waiter in a Non-Jewish Restaurant

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here

(From Meoros Daf HaYomi)

Our Gemara (Kiddushin 69) quotes the words of Nechemiya ben Chachalya, who is referred to in Ezra (2:63) as “Hatirshasa.” His job was to attend to King Nebuchadnezzar and to serve him his wine. Based on the Talmud Yerushalmi, Rashi (s.v. Hatirshasa) explains that part of Nechemiya’s task was to taste the wine before serving it as a security measure to prove that he was not trying to poison the king. As such, chachamim granted Nechemiya a special dispensation [heter] to drink [shasa] wine made by non-Jews, and therefore was given the name “Hatirshasa.”

Source of the prohibition against non-Jewish wine: Since Nebuchadnezzar was not an idol-worshipper, his wine was not considered libation wine, which is forbidden by the Torah (Avoda Zara 29b). Still, the Sages had to grant Nechemiya explicit permission to drink his wine because when Daniel was exiled to the Babylonian king’s palace, he pledged not to defile himself by drinking the king’s wine, even if it was not used for libation offerings (Daniel 1:8). This decree was enacted once again for Klal Yisrael by the talmidim of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel (Shabbos 17b), who prohibited drinking non-Jews’ wine, even in a Jewish home (see Beis Yosef, Y.D. 123, Os 1; see also Encyclopedia Talmudis, “Yayin shel goyim” p. 335).

A man who made his living as a waiter asked the Radvaz (Part IV §22) whether he would be allowed to work in a non-Jewish restaurant and serve wine there. The Radvaz replied that although Nechemiya ben Chachalaya served wine to Nebuchadnezzar, this should not be used as an example, for he had no alternative. Had he tried to disobey the king’s standing orders, he would have placed his life in danger. But a Jew may not engage in this profession of his own volition, and he should be rebuked and, if possible, prevented from doing so. Furthermore, said the Radvaz, a Jew should not set foot at non-Jewish parties to prevent him from learning their ways.

The Kol Eliyahu (Responsa II §27) adds that if a waiter is involved in warming or preparing the food, he is liable to come to taste it and to transgress a Torah prohibition.

Read more!

Once a Nazir; Always a Nazir

It is written: And afterwards, the nazir may drink wine. The Gemora cites several opinions as to when precisely is he permitted to drink wine and become tamei to the dead. According to one opinion, he only has to wait until after one of the korbanos have been brought, and according to another opinion, he is required to wait until all the korbanos have been brought.

The question is asked: Why does the Torah say that the nazir is permitted to drink wine? He is no longer a nazir!

Reb Moshe Feinstein answers that the inspiration that a nazir attains from abstaining from some of the worldly pleasures remains with him his entire life. Although the halachos of nezirus no longer apply to him, he is nevertheless in an elevated state, similar to the sanctity he had imposed upon himself during the term of his nezirus.

Read more!

Benefits of a Nazir

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 34a) had stated: There are three different types of prohibitions relevant to a nazir. He is forbidden to become tamei through corpse tumah; he may not shave his head; he is prohibited from eating grapes or drinking wine and anything that comes from a vine.

Reb Tzadok in Pri Tzadik (Naso) explains that abstaining from these three things can be a remedy for the three things that can cause a person to be driven out of this world. Growing one’s hair can be a cure for the character traits of jealousy and anger. Refraining from eating or drinking any product that comes from a vine can be a remedy for desire. Withholding from becoming tamei can be an antidote for someone who chases after his own honor. This is because of the fact that one who pursues honor can be punished with death. This can be proven from the Torah, where after the snake convinced Adam and Chava to eat from the tree of knowledge, where they were told that would be like Hashem, the concept of death was brought into this world.

K’zayis and Revi’is

The Mishna had stated: And he will not be liable for lashes until he eats a k’zayis (size of an olive) from the grapes. According to the earlier Mishna, a nazir will not be liable until he drinks a revi’is (one-fourth of a log) of wine. Rabbi Akiva said: Even if he soaked his bread in wine and there is enough in it to equal a k’zayis, he will be liable. (Rabbi Akiva disagrees with the earlier Mishna, and holds that even regarding drinking wine, the amount for which a nazir incurs lashes is a k’zayis, which is the amount displaced from a full cup of wine when an olive is placed within it; therefore, edibles combine with liquid to equal a k’zayis. He also teaches us that a permissible item can combine to equal the amount needed to be liable.)

The Bartenura explains the first opinion of the Mishna to be like Rabbi Akiva that a nazir will be liable for eating a k’zayis of grapes or drinking a k’zayis of wine. The early Mishna maintains the exact opposite that he will only be liable if he eats a revi’is of grapes or drinks a revi’is of wine.

Rabbeinu Tam asks on this explanation: Why would the Tanna of the Mishna first state the later Mishna’s opinion, then teach the early Mishna’s ruling and then return to the later teaching? He asks other questions as well.

Tosfos therefore explains that when the Mishna taught that the required amount to be liable for grapes is a k’zayis, that is according to everyone. There is only an argument regarding drinking. According to the early Mishna, it is a revi’is, and according to Rabbi Akiva, it is a k’zayis.

The Rambam rules that a nazir is liable if he eats a k’zayis of grapes, and he would be liable if he drinks a revi’is of wine. It would emerge that he is ruling according to the earlier Mishna. This is extremely odd, for the ruling is usually according to the later teaching!

The Brisker Rav explains that the Mishna actually lists three opinions. The Tanna Kamma holds that grapes are a k’zayis and wine is a revi’is. The Rambam rules that this is indeed the halacha. The second opinion is the early Mishna which rules that he is not liable unless he eats or drinks the equivalent of a revi’is. Rabbi Akiva holds that everything is a k’zayis.

Read more!

Thirty Day Extreme

The Mishna (Nazir 5a) states: An ordinary nezirus is for thirty days (if he doesn’t specify for how long he wishes to be a nazir, he is a nazir for thirty days; he also cannot specify for any time less than thirty days).

The Ram”a (Toras Ha’olah) explains the significance of the thirty days. The Gemora had stated: Whoever sees a sotah when she is being degraded should restrain himself from consuming wine. The nazir wishes to inspire himself that he should not be influenced by the sotah’s immoral behavior. For one to break a trait which is at one extreme, he should go to the opposite extreme. Eventually, after practicing this condition for some time, he will balance out to the correct measure. This is why the nazir abstains from drinking any wine.

We find that situations are established after thirty days. Halacha states that it takes thirty days for one to become accustomed to a change in davening. If one is uncertain if he inserted a certain prayer during Shemoneh Esrei, after thirty days of recital, we can assume that he said it. One is regarded as a resident of a city after he lives there for thirty days. So too, the Ram”a suggests, this can be applicable to a change in one’s character traits. Someone who wishes to be cured from his desires to act immorally should become a nazir for thirty days. Practicing this extreme for thirty days will enable him to reach the perfect balance in this area.

Read more!

Distancing Oneself from a Sotah

The braisa (Nazir 2a) states that whoever sees a sotah when she is being degraded should restrain himself from consuming wine.

The Alter from Kelm said that it is evident from the Gemora that even the extremely righteous people, upon seeing the adulteress in her disgrace, can be effected by this. Even though it is highly improbable that they will succumb to sin, perhaps a semblance of desire will penetrate their thick armor, and they, therefore, should abstain from wine as well.

One may ask: If the sotah is seen in her disgrace, wouldn’t this be a motivation for people not to sin?

It would seem evident from our Gemora that just being in the vicinity of immorality, even while the adulteress is being humiliated and punished, can induce a person to sin.

Reb Chaim Kanievsky adds: The verse: ki yafli lindor neder nazir l’hazir is the same gimatriya as “kol haroeh sotah b’kilkulah, yazir atzmo min hayayin.”

Read more!

Drinking Wine by Kiddush

The Gemora (Nedarim 4a)explains that the novelty of a chatas nazir is that it cannot be pledged to be brought as a vow. When we asked earlier that this is a trademark of all chatas offerings, it is possible to answer that all other chatas offerings are obviously not brought because they are pledged, as they are obligated to be brought to atone for a sin. However, why is a korban chatas of a nazir brought? [One might therefore have thought the prohibition of delaying vows does not apply to it, which is why the hekeish is needed.]

The Gemora asks: The korban chatas of a woman who gives birth is also not brought for a sin that she committed, but nonetheless we know the prohibition for delaying vows does apply to her korban chatas. [Why should a korban chatas of a nazir be different?]

The Gemora answers: Her korban chatas is still different than that of a nazir, as it enables her to eat kodoshim (korbanos, which she was unable to eat beforehand and is a mitzvah).

The Meiri asks: Doesn’t the chatas offering of a nazir help him that he is now permitted to drink wine?

Tosfos and the Ran answer that drinking wine is a voluntary act, and it is not a mitzvah like the eating of kodoshim.

However, we can ask: What about the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush and havdalah? The Gemora Pesachim (106a) derives from the verse Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it that there is an obligation to recite kiddush over a cup of wine. Accordingly, we should say that a nazir’s bringing of the korbanos is similar to that of a woman who gave birth; he is bringing the korban in order to be permitted to partake in the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush?

The Meiri answers: The mitzvah of drinking the wine for kiddush is only a Rabbinical one, and the korban is not coming for that.

Tosfos explains that although there is a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush with wine, the obligation that the one who recites the blessing should drink the wine is only Rabbinical.

Reb Koby Shapiro in the Hebrew Midrashiya states that there may be a practical difference in halacha whether the mitzvah of drinking the wine is a Biblical one or merely Rabbinical.

It is ruled upon in Shulchan Aruch that a woman is Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush on Shabbos. Accordingly, she would be allowed to discharge a man of his obligation by reciting the kiddush for him.

The Acharonim raise the following question: When a man comes home from Shul Friday night, he has already fulfilled his Biblical obligation of kiddush in the Shemoneh Esrei of ma’ariv. He still has a Rabbinical obligation to recite the kiddush over a cup of wine. His wife, on the other hand, who did not daven ma’ariv, still has a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush. How can the man, who only has a Rabbinical obligation discharge his wife of her Biblical obligation?

Some answer that she should recite vayechulu prior to kiddush.

Reb Akiva Eiger answers that there is no concern here because of the principle that one who has fulfilled the mitzvah can nevertheless discharge an obligation for someone who did not yet fulfill the mitzvah. This works because every Jew is a guarantor for another. Some Acharonim are not satisfied with this answer because they say that a woman is not included in this guarantee for each other.

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is as if the husband had intention not to fulfill the Biblical obligation of kiddush when he is davening ma’ariv. This way, they are both Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush.

This entire discussion is based upon the Meiri’s opinion that the mitzvah of drinking the wine is merely a Rabbinical mitzvah. However, if we would hold that there is a Biblical mitzvah to drink the wine of kiddush, then, there would be no discussion, for the husband still has not discharged his own obligation by davening ma’ariv; he still has a Biblical obligation to drink the wine.

Read more!

Perhaps they Repented

The Maharik (shoresh 33) writes concerning a case where one witness testifies that a certain shochet was slaughtering improperly and the shochet himself contradicts the witness; since the witness is not believed, he himself is permitted to eat all future meat slaughtered by this shochet. This is not comparable to a case where a witness testifies regarding wine that is forbidden on account of it being yayin nesech because here there is a possibility that the shochet will repent and slaughter properly.

The Pri Chadash (Y.D. 1, 14) asks: Why don’t we apply the principle of “shavya a’nafshei chaticha d’issura,” one who states that something is forbidden, even if he is not believed in respect to everyone else, renders the object forbidden to him (as is evident from the Gemora in Kesuvos 9a)? All the meat slaughtered by this shochet should be forbidden to this witness!?

The Pri Megadim (Sifsei Daas, ibid, 41) answers that the Maharik is referring to a case where the witness retracted and said that he had testified falsely. In such cases, the principle of “shavya a’nafshei chaticha d’issura” does not apply.

Rav Elyashiv answers: The reason why one can render the object forbidden with the principle of “shavya a’nafshei” is not because he is believed in respect to himself; rather, it is because it is regarded as an oath. The witness is taking a vow forbidding himself from this particular object. Accordingly, he explains that the witness who testified regarding the shochet it making a vow that he will not eat the meat from this animal, however, he will not be prohibited, on account of his vow, against eating from any other animal that this shochet slaughters.

The Mishna Lemelech (Hilchos Shechitah 1:26) challenges the ruling of the Maharik from our Gemora (Kesuvos 44a) which discusses a case where two deeds were given over regarding the same field. The ruling is that the second deed cancels the first one. Rafram explains that the recipient has admitted to the other that the first deed is invalid. Accordingly, the Gemora continues that these witnesses must be regarded as legally unfit for further evidence concerning this recipient since he is stating that they put their signatures to an invalid document. We do not say that they should be valid witnesses later, for perhaps they repented. What is the difference between the two cases?

The Shaar Hamishpat (92:7) answers: The Maharik rules that all meat slaughtered by this shochet will be permitted to eat by the witness because there is a double doubt; perhaps, he has slaughtered the animal properly and perhaps he repented. Just because he slaughtered improperly (according to the witness’ testimony) one time, it is not logical that we should prohibit his slaughtered meat forever. However, in respect to testimony, once the recipient has stated that these witnesses testified falsely, they will be disqualified to offer testimony for him forever. Even according to those that hold that we can apply the principle of a double doubt in regards to monetary judgments, here, it will not apply. What can be said? Perhaps the witnesses will testify truthfully and perhaps they repented. This logic is not applicable by testimony, for testimony functions as a proof, and if we are uncertain if the witnesses repented or not, they cannot be accepted as witnesses because we have no proof that they are testifying truthfully. Therefore, they will not be believed for all future testimonies regarding this recipient.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Taanis 17 - STORY REGARDING KOHANIM

The Ponovezher Rav relates the following story. He recalled how it was only a short while after he arrived to the Yeshiva in Radin and one morning after Shacharis, the Chafetz Chaim was standing by the doorway of the Yeshiva with his tallis bag in his hand. He looked at me in a striking manner as the baalei mussar commonly do when they wish to speak with someone. I went over to him and he grabbed my arm and said, “You are kohanim and I want to ask you a question. The Gemora in Taanis 17a states that Rebbe maintains that it is appropriate for kohanim nowadays to abstain from drinking wine. This is because we anticipate the rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdosh at any moment and the kohanim will be needed to perform the service. However, since the kohanim cannot identify as to which mishmar they belong to and there will be a long line of kohanim by Eliyahu Hanavi discovering their mishmar, by that time the effect of the wine will dissipate and they will be able to perform the service.”

The Chafetz Chaim continued, “This is a legitimate answer regarding wine, but what will a kohen who is not familiar with the correct methods of performing the service do? Kohanim who are not proficient in all facets of the service will not be able to serve. Sleep and traveling can help a drunkard but what is the remedy for an ignorant kohen?”

He concluded by telling me “You are a kohen and we are anxiously awaiting Mashiach’s arrival any moment. You must be prepared to perform the service in the Beis Hamikdosh. It is essential that you begin to learn the halachos of kodoshim immediately.”

The Ponovezher Rav said, “I had just arrived from learning in Telz and I was accustomed to making distinctions. I answered the Chafetz Chaim and regrets what I said then even today.
I told him that since he, the Chafetz Chaim was a kohen, and he is proficient with all the laws of kodoshim, so I will observe how the Rebbe performs the service and I will do it in that precise manner.”

The Chafetz Chaim didn’t retract and said sternly, “Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon you to learn kodoshim.”

It was these words that inspired the Ponovezher Rav to join the Kodoshim Kollel.

The Maggid from Eretz Yisroel, Rav Yaakov Galinsky says over that the Ponovezher Rav once told him this story in his house and he added one point. The Rav was greatly disturbed as to how he could have even contemplated that he would merit being able to stand next to the Chafetz Chaim in the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Chafetz Chaim told him then that the Gemora Sotah (5a) states that Hashem says regarding one who is haughty, “I and him cannot exist in the world together.”

Why is one who is conceited worse than a wicked person or a thief that they both can merit Hashem’s kindness and they are not pushed away so strongly?

The Chafetz Chaim explained that one who is haughty is actually a fool. Regarding what can a person honestly brag about? Everything comes from Hashem. A person that understands that and nevertheless chooses to be arrogant, he is a foolish person and Hashem does not reside together with fools. (Meir Einei Yisroel – chelek hey)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Taanis 7 - GLASS CUPS BY THE SEDER

"Woe, that such beautiful wisdom must sit in such an ugly container," Caesar's daughter said to R' Yehoshua ben Chananya, intimating that he might be wise, but definitely not handsome.

"Tell me," he answered her, "doesn't your father keep wine in the earthenware vessels?"

"What other vessels should he use?" she asked him. "Surely, everyone keeps wine in earthenware vessels?"

"Important people like you," he declared, "should use nothing less than gold and silver."

She told this to her father, and he transferred his wine to gold and silver vessels. The wine soured.

"Who advised you to do this?" the king asked her.

"Rebbi Yehoshua ben Chananya," she answered. He summoned R' Yehoshua.

"Why did you tell my daughter this?" he asked.

"I only spoke to her," said R' Yehoshua, "as she spoke to me. She should have realized that just as wine keeps best in plain earthenware vessels, so wisdom only keeps in plain people."

"But surely, there are also good-looking people that are wise?" the king asked.

"If people did not admire them for their good looks," R' Yehoshua answered, "They would be much more learned. To remember wisdom, a person needs great humility, and for people that others admire, this is very difficult.”

It was the custom of the Sanz-Kloizenberg Rebbe that he would only use glass cups for the wine of the four cups on the night of the Seder. The rest of Pesach, he would use his silver cup.

It was said over that the reason for this custom is based on our Gemora which states that wine keeps best in plain earthenware vessels. Since the wine for the four cups will be inside the glass for an extended period of time, it is better to use a glass cup that one made out of gold or silver.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 56 - Women should Recite Kiddush and then Hagafen

Beis Hillel maintains that first one recites the brocha on the wine and then he recites kiddush. This is because the wine is the cause for the kiddush. The Tzlach in Brochos (51b) explains that this is because one has already discharged his obligation of kiddush when he davened maariv. The Chachamim stated that kiddush must be recited with a cup of wine and therefore now the wine is the cause for the kidush.

The Gemora states another reason to explain the opinion of Beis Hillel and that is because of the principle that the blessing which is recited more frequently takes precedence and the brocha on wine is more frequent than the one recited for kiddush. The Tzlach explains this reason in a similar way. He states that the logic of the wine taking precedence because of its frequency is only referring to a case where he previously fulfilled his obligation of kiddush during maariv; however in an instance where one would be reciting kiddush prior to davening maariv, kiddush would take precedence over the blessing on the wine. This is based on a Gemora Zevachim (90b) which concludes (according to the Tzlach) that when presented with two mitzvos and one has more kedusha than the other, but the other is more frequent - the one with the higher level of sanctity takes precedence. If one is still obligated Biblically to recite kiddush, then the kiddush is regarded as being more kodosh and it would take precedence over the brocha on the wine, even though the wine is more frequent.

The Tzlach concludes l'halacha that women who do not daven maariv and thereby are obligated Biblically to recite kiddush, they should make kiddush first and then recite the blessing on the wine.

The Acharonim disagree with the Tzlach arguing that the Gemora in Zevachim is not conclusive and it is quite possible that a mitzva which is more frequent takes precedence over a mitzva with more kedusha.

Read more!