Daf Yomi - Sukkah 43 - Highlights

1. There is a concern that one who is not proficient regarding the laws of waving the lulav or reciting the blessing will carry the lulav four amos in the public domain on Shabbos, which is a biblical prohibition. For this reason the Chachamim enacted a decree that when Shabbos occurs on one of the last six days of Sukkos, one does not take the lulav in the Bais HaMikdash. (42b3-43a1)
2. The residents of Eretz Yisroel were permitted to take the lulav even when the first day of Sukkos occurred on Shabbos. The reason for this was because they were aware of the institution of the new month. (43a2)
3. There is a dispute whether one can cut a lulav from a tree or tie the lulav with the other species on Shabbos. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that since it is said and you shall take for yourselves on the first day… the word bayom, the first day, teaches us that the preliminaries involved in taking the lulav also override the Shabbos restrictions. The Chachamim, however, maintains that one cannot perform the preliminaries of the lulav on Shabbos, and they use the word bayom to teach us that the lulav obligation only applies during the day and not at night. (43a3)
4. The Gemara concludes that the mitzvah of Sukkah applied by day and by night. This is derived by employing a gezeirah shavah from the Miluim, when Aharon and his sons were inaugurated into the service of the Mishkan, where it is said and at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting you shall dwell day and night for seven days. (43a3-43a4-43b1)
5. The taking of the aravah in the Bais HaMikdash when the seventh day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos was permitted so that everyone would be aware that there is a biblical obligation to take the aravah in the Bais HaMikdash. There was no concern that one would carry the aravah on Shabbos four amos in a public domain because the agents of the Bais Din, the court, would bring the aravos to the Bais HaMikdash. There was also no concern that one would bring the aravos to an expert to learn how to recite the blessing, because only the Kohanim took the aravos, and the Kohanim were knowledgeable regarding the laws of reciting the blessings. (43b1)
6. There is a dispute whether they circled the mizbeiach with the aravah or with the lulav. Abaye maintains that they circled the mizbeiach with the aravah, whereas Rav Yosef maintains that they circled the mizbeiach with the lulav and they performed the biblical obligation of aravah by standing the aravos around the mizbeiach. (43b3-43b4)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 43 - Sukkah and the Mishkan

The Gemara states that the obligation to dwell in a Sukkah is by day and by night. This is derived by employing a gezeirah shavah from the Miluim, the inauguration of Aharon and his sons into the service of the Mishkan. It is noteworthy that the sefarim write that the Sukkah reflects the Bais HaMikdash, so it is appropriate that we derive the mitzvah to dwell in the Sukkah from the Mishkan. A further association between Sukkos and the Mishkan is that the Vilna Gaon is of the opinion that we celebrate Sukkos on the fifteenth of Tishrei because that is when the Clouds of Glory returned to shield the Jewish People. The Clouds of Glory were a sign that HaShem was pleased with the Jewish People, and the building of the Mishkan was also a sign that HaShem had forgiven the Jewish People for worshipping the Golden Calf.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 43 - Hoshanos on Shabbos

The Gemara states that the Chachamim would always ensure that the seventh day of Sukkos, known as Hoshanah Rabbah, would not occur Shabbos. Tosfos wonders why it was more important to ensure that the seventh day of Sukkos not occur on Shabbos as opposed to ensuring that Rosh HaShanah or the first day of Sukkos do not occur on Shabbos. On both Rosh HaShanah and the first day of Sukkos there are biblical mitzvos to perform. The Chachamim should have been more concerned with ensuring the observance of these mitzvos than ensuring the continuity of the aravah mitzvah which is only a rabbinical institution to commemorate the mitzvah that was performed in the Bais HaMikdash. Tosfos answers that there was no concern that people would assume that the mitzvah of blowing shofar on Rosh HaShanah and taking the lulav on the fist day of Sukkos were rabbinical in nature. Regarding the mitzvah of aravah, however, if the seventh day of Sukkos would occur on Shabbos and the aravah would not be taken, people would view the custom as irrelevant and they would not take the aravah in the future. Furthermore, if the seventh day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, there would not be another opportunity to take the aravah, because one would not be able to take the aravah on Shemini Atzeres because it may be an independent festival and taking the aravah would contradict the theme of the day. Regarding the mitzvah of shofar and lulav, however, one would be able to perform the mitzvah on the second day of the festival.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 43 - Litveshe Kasha / Chasidishe Vort

We posted this before, but with a slight mistake, so we are correcting it now - thanks.

The Gemora states that the Chachamim made a decree not to take the lulav on Shabbos lest one come to carry it four amos in a public domain.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks the following question. Ben Azai maintains that "mehalech k'omed" one who carries an object four amos in a public domain does not violate the Biblical prohibition of carrying for every step he takes. The moment he places his foot down it is considered as stopping and therefore, he is not walking four amos continuously. The only way for him to transgress this prohibition is to jump four amos at one time.

Tosfos in Rosh Hashona states that Ben Azai would agree that there is a prohibition of carrying four amos since it is a halacha l'Moshe misinai and even though it would not be a contiguous four amos, it is nonetheless not allowed. However, the Yerushalmi holds that Ben Azai disagrees with this prohibition. Tosfos cites a proof that the Bavli disagrees. Reb Akiva Eiger asks that Tosfos should bring a clear proof that the Bavli maintains that Ben Azai agrees that there exists a four amos prohibition for otherwise there should not be any injunction against blowing the shofar or shaking the lulav on Shabbos. The sages were concerned of one carrying the shofar or lulav four amos in a public domain and according to Ben Azai this would not be a violation of Shabbos. It is not logical to assume that one might take the shofar and jump four amos?

Reb Leibel Eiger answered that in the person's excitement to for the mitzva of shofar, how can he not jump!

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Highlights

1. Rabbi Yose rules that if the first day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos and one forgot and carried the lulav into a public domain, he is not liable a chatas offering because he was preoccupied with performing a mitzvah. Abaye qualifies this ruling to be referring to a case where one has not yet fulfilled the mitzvah, but once he has fulfilled the mitzvah, he will be liable a chatas for carrying. The Gemara questions this because it would see that he automatically fulfills the mitzvah when he picks up the lulav. Abaye answers that Rabbi Yose refers to a case where he turned the lulav upside down and one only fulfills the mitzvah when holding the lulav straight up in the manner that it grows. Rava answers that Rabbi Yose refers to a case where one took the lulav out in an undignified manner on a plate, in which case he does not fulfill the mitzvah. (41b4-42a1)
2. Rabbi Yose rules that if a Kohen found a bird olah amongst other bird chatas offerings and the Kohen assumed that that this bird was a bird chatas and he ate it, he is not liable a meilah offering, despite the fact the halacha is that a bird olah is entirely burned on the mizbeiach and a bird chatas is eaten entirely by the Kohanim. The rationale for this ruling is that Rabbi Yose maintains that one who is preoccupied with a mitzvah is not liable if he errs. (42a1-42a2)
3. The Mishna rules that the lulav can be returned to water on Shabbos so that it should not wilt. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that on Yom Tov one is even permitted to add water and on Chol HaMoed one would be permitted to change the water. (42a2-42a3)
4. A father is obligated to begin training his child who is a minor in the mitzvah of lulav if the child knows how to wave the lulav. The Gemara enumerates other mitzvos and the age for when a father is required to train his son to perform those mitzvos. (42a3-42a4-42b1)
5. The Mishna records the various mitzvos that are performed on Sukkos and on which days they are performed. The mitzvah of lulav and the mitzvah of aravah can be performed either six days or seven days. If the first day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, the mitzvah of lulav would be performed but one would not perform the mitzvah of lulav on Shabbos when the first day of Sukkos occurs on any other day of the week. If the seventh day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, the mitzvah of aravah would be performed but the mitzvah of aravah would not be performed when the seventh day of Sukkos occurs on any other day of the week. The obligation of reciting Hallel and the obligation to eat meat from the shelamim offering when the Bais HaMikdash stood applies for all eight days of Sukkos. The mitzvah to sit in the Sukkah and the mitzvah of the water libation on the mizbeiach apply to the seven days of Sukkos. The mitzvah to play musical instruments at the Simchas Bais Hashoeva, the Celebration of the Place of the Water Drawing, was performed either five or six days of Sukkos. The reason for this ruling is because it is forbidden to play music on Shabbos or Yom Tov. (42b2)
6. When the first day of Sukkos occurred on Shabbos, the people would bring their lulavim to the Beis HaMikdash on Friday and every person would stipulate that if someone else were to receive his lulav, it should belong to that person as a gift. When this procedure became dangerous because everyone would fight in their enthusiasm to receive their lulavim, it was instituted that each person should take the lulav in his house rather than in the Bais HaMikdash. (42b3)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42- Lekavod Shabbos and Shemini Atzeres

The Gemara states that when the first day of Sukkos occurred on Shabbos, the lulav was taken for seven days in the Bais HaMikdash. The reason for this is because taking the lulav on the first day of Sukkos is of biblical origin and the Chachamim did not enact a decree to that would prohibit one from taking the lulav on Shabbos. It is noteworthy that the Gemara earlier states that one extends the lulav outward and inward to ward off harmful winds, and one raises them up and lowers them down to ward off damaging dews. Although on Shabbos all evil influences depart from our midst, in the time of the Bais HaMikdash there was a requirement to take the lulav on Shabbos. The Sfas Emes suggest that nowadays we do not take the lulav on Shabbos because Shabbos is a day of rest and the Jewish People only are required to battle with the evil forces during the week. The Shem Mishmuel suggests that the reason that they were required to take the lulav on Shabbos in the Bais HaMikdash was because the lulav represents daas, knowledge, and Shabbos itself is daas, and an excess of daas could be detrimental. Nonetheless, in the Bais HaMikdash there were many actions involved with the sacrifices, so there was no concern regarding the taking of the lulav.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Teaching Torah to a child

The Gemara states that when a child knows how to talk, his father teaches him Torah and the recitation of Shema. The Gemara states that Torah means that the father should teach him the verse that states Torah tzivah lanu Moshe morashah Kehillas Yaakov, the Torah that Moshe commanded us is the heritage of the Congregation of Yaakov. There is an allusion to this teaching in the context of the verses themselves. Prior to this verse it is said af choveiv amim kol kedoshav beyadecho veheim tuko leraglecho yisa midabrosecho, indeed, You loved the tribes greatly, all its holy ones were in Your hands; for they planted themselves at Your feet, bearing the yoke of Your utterances. Rashi explains that the word midabrosecho, Your utterances, is derived from the word dibbur, speech. Thus, the verse can be interpreted as follows: midabrosecho, when the child begins to speak, teach him the verse of Torah tzivah lanu Moshe morashah Kehillas Yaakov.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Wrong Place Esrog

Rabbi Yosi rules that if one forgets and carries the lulav to a public domain on Shabbos, he is not liable since he was preoccupied with a mitzva. Abaye qualifies this to be referring to a case where he had not fulfilled the mitzva yet. The Gemora asks that he seemingly would automatically fulfill the mitzva when he picks up the lulav. Abaye answers that he turned it around and therefore did not discharge his obligation.

Rashi explains that he turned the esrog over with the pittum down. Rabbeinu Chananel learns that he took the lulav in his left hand and the esrog in his right hand.

The Ritva asks that even if he placed the lulav in the wrong hand, he nonetheless fulfills the mitzva? Chasam Sofer answers that by switching hands he is indicating that he does not intend to fulfill the mitzva now.

This can be the source for the two options brought down in halacha regarding the reciting of the brocha on the lulav. In Shulchan Aruch, it states that one should hold the esrog upside down during the brocha in order that the brocha will be prior to the performance of the mitzva. The Gra rules that one should have intention that he does not want to fulfill the mitzva at this moment and this will be sufficient even if the esrog is being held correctly.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Shakin'

The Acharonim cite several proofs that the mitzvah of waving the lulav is an integral part of the mitzvah of lulav. One proof is from our Gemara that states that a father is obligated to train his child who is a minor in the mitzvah of lulav when the child knows how to wave the lulav. The proof is from the fact that the Gemara did not state that the obligation begins when the minor knows how to hold the lulav. Rather, the Gemara states that the obligation begins only when the child knows how to wave the lulav.Further proof to this thesis is from the Gemara that we learned earlier that states that a lulav must be four tefachim in height to allow one to wave the lulav. The commentators discuss which waving the Gemara refers to. Is it the waving one performs when reciting the blessing on the lulav or is it the waving that is performed when reciting Hallel?

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Highlights

1. There is a dispute in the Gemara if the sanctity of Shemittah produce can be deconsecrated onto money by exchanging the money for the produce. All agrees that when the produce is sold, the sanctity rests on the money. The dispute is when the owner attempts to exchange the produce for money. Rav Ashi qualifies this dispute as referring only to the deconsecrating of the money that was exchanged with Shemittah produce. All agree, however, that the Shemittah produce itself cannot be deconsecrated with an ordinary exchange as one can do with hekdesh. Rather, the Shemittah produce must be purchased. (41a1)
2. The Mishna states that originally, the mitzvah of lulav was for seven days in the Bais HaMikdash and for one day outside the Bais HaMikdash. After the destruction of the second Bais HaMikdash, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai instituted that the lulav should be taken for all seven days of Sukkos as a commemoration to the Bais HaMikdash. (41a2)
3. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai also instituted that one is not permitted to eat from the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. In the times of the Bais HaMikdash, the new grain could only be eaten after the omer offering was brought on the sixteenth of Nissan. Subsequent to the destruction of the Bais HaMikdash, one was biblically permitted to eat the new grain on the sixteenth of Nissan in the morning. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai was concerned, however, that the Bais HaMikdash may be built the following year on the night of the sixteenth of Nissan and there would not be enough time to prepare the omer offering. People might then say that the new grain will be permitted in the morning just as it was the previous year. This assumption would be erroneous, because the previous year there was no Bais HaMikdash, thus there was no possibility of offering the omer, and for that reason the new grain was permitted in the morning. During the present year, however, there is a Bais HaMikdash, and one must wait for the offering of the omer or one must wait until the end of the day. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai therefore instituted that one was prohibited from eating the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. (41a2-41a3-41a4)
4. The Mishna states that when the first day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, the people would bring their lulavim to the synagogue on Friday and the next day, which was Shabbos, they would come early to the synagogue and each person would recognize his lulav and take it. The reason each person was required to take his own lulav is because there is a Halacha that one must fulfill his obligation on the first day of Sukkos with his own lulav, so one was not permitted to take a lulav that belonged to someone else. (41b1)
5. The Gemara relates an incident where Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav with him, which he had purchased for a thousand zuz. Rabban Gamliel first fulfilled his own obligation with the lulav and he then gave the lulav to the other rabbis so that they could discharge their obligation. The Gemara states that since it was recorded that Rabbi Akiva returned the lulav to Rabban Gamliel, we can deduce a law that a present given on condition that it be returned is considered a present. Thus, the rabbis were able to fulfill their obligation with the lulav that belonged to someone else, despite the fact that the incident occurred on the first day of Sukkos when one is require to own the lulav. From the fact that the Baraisa mentioned that Rabban Gamliel purchased the lulav for a thousand zuz, it is evident how the sages of those times cherished the mitzvos. (41b2-41b3)
6. The Gemara states that one should not hold Tefillin or a Sefer Torah in his hand while he is praying Shemone Esrei. The reason for this ruling is because he will be concerned about protecting the Tefillin or Sefer Torah and he will not be able to concentrate on his prayers. Ameimar would hold his lulav while praying, and this was also the custom of the people of Jerusalem. The reason that they were permitted to hold the lulav while they prayed is because taking the lulav is a mitzvah and since they cherished the mitzvah, they were not preoccupied by its weight and by the necessity to guard the lulav from falling from their hands. (41b3-41b4)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Building the Gates

Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai instituted that one is not permitted to eat from the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. In the times of the Bais HaMikdash, the new grain could only be eaten after the omer offering was brought on the sixteenth of Nissan. Subsequent to the destruction of the Bais HaMikdash, one was biblically permitted to eat the new grain on the sixteenth of Nissan in the morning. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai was concerned, however, that the Bais HaMikdash may be built the following year on the night of the sixteenth of Nissan and there would not be enough time to prepare the omer offering. People might then say that the new grain will be permitted in the morning just as it was the previous year. This assumption would be erroneous, because the previous year there was no Bais HaMikdash, thus there was no possibility of offering the omer, and for that reason the new grain was permitted in the morning. During the present year, however, there is a Bais HaMikdash and one must wait for the offering of the omer or one must wait until the end of the day. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai therefore instituted that one was prohibited from eating the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. Rashi wonders how the Bais HaMikdash could be built on the night of the sixteenth of Nissan, as the Gemara in Shevuos 15b states that the Bais HaMikdash cannot be built at night. Rashi answers that it is only regarding a Bais HaMikdash built by humans that there is a restriction of building it at night. The third Bais HaMikdash, however, will descend from Heaven miraculously, thus there are no restrictions regarding the building of the third Bais HaMikdash. The Maharil Diskin is troubled by this answer, as the Jewish People have an obligation to build the Bais HaMikdash, so why would HaShem prevent us from performing this mitzvah? The Maharil Diskin answers based on a Medrash in Eicha that states that when the Bais HaMikdash was destroyed, the gates of the Bais HaMikdash sank into the ground and in the future, the Jewish People will excavate the gates and affix them to the Bais HaMikdash. The Gemara in Bava Basra rules that one who secures the gates in an ownerless field is deemed to be the one who acquires the field. Thus, we will fulfill the mitzvah of building the Bais HaMikdash when we secure the gates of the Bais HaMikdash. This can also be the explanation of the words that we recite in the Shemone Esrei of Mussaf on the festivals, show us its rebuilding and gladden us in its perfection. The word for perfection is tikkuno, which can allude to the securing of the Bais HaMikdash gates.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Yekum Purkan

The Gemora states that a person should not daven shmoneh esrei and hold a sefer Torah or tefillin in his hand at the same time. This is because he will be concerned about protecting the torah and tefillin and will detract from his concentration for davening. This is in contrast to the custom in Yerushalayim where they would daven shmoneh esrei and hold the lulav in their hands at the same time. The Gemora explains that holding the lulav will not detract from his concentration since holding the lulav is a mitzva and therefore it is dear to him and not a burden to hold it.

The Mishna Berura 96:2 rules that the chazan can hold the sefer Torah as he is reciting yekum purkan on Shabbos since his intention at the time is to daven for the people learning Torah and not to guard the Torah. This is akin to holding the lulav during shmoneh esrei.

Rav Elyashiv comments that it’s apparent the prominence the tefillah of yekum purkan has if the Mishna Berura is comparing it to shmoneh esrei.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Love perverts accepted conduct

The Gemara records that Mar the son of Ameimar said that his father would pray with the lulav, i.e. Ameimar cherished the mitzvah of lulav so much that he would hold the lulav while praying. The term that the Gemara uses is tzaluyei ka metzalei bei. Regarding the verse that states lo sateh mishpat, you shall not pervert judgment, the Targum renders the translation lo satzlei din. This usage of the word tzalei refers to bending and twisting justice. Perhaps we can interpret the statement of the Gemara here homiletically to mean that normally one should not hold an object while praying because his preoccupation with the object will detract from concentrating on his prayers. Ameimar, however, cherished the mitzvah of lulav so much that he personified the statement of the Medrash that Ahavah mekalkeles es hashurah, the love for Hashem and his mitzvos perverts what is normally accepted behavior, and thus Ameimar held the lulav even while he was praying.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Un...tzum...drite...mol!! Sold!!!

The Gemora relates a story that Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav which he had purchased for over a thousand zuz. It is evident from this Gemora how precious mitzvos were to them that Rabban Gamliel spent a thousand zuz on his lulav.

The Aruch Lener asks on the language of the Gemora. Why does it say "How precious mitzvos were to them" when in fact, Rabban Gamliel was the only one who purchased the lulav for that enormous sum?

He answers that from the fact that Rabban Gamliel paid a thousand zuz for the lulav, it is evident that there were other potential buyers that were interested and a bidding war erupted, especially since it is well documented that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva were rich people.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Preferential Treatment

The Gemora relates a story that Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav which he had purchased for over a thousand zuz. Rabban Gamliel initially fulfilled his mitzva with the lulav and then gave it to the other Tanaim to enable them to discharge their obligation. The Gemora states that from the extra wording in the story we can derive that a present given with the stipulation to be returned is considered a present and they can fulfill the mitzva even on the first day when the lulav must be yours. It is also evident from this Gemora how dear mitzvos were to them that Rabban Gamliel spent a thousand zuz on his lulav.

The Chasam Sofer asks on the order of the Tanaim. Why did Rabbi Yehoshua who was a Levi receive the lulav before Rabbi Eliezer who was a kohen? He answers that it must be because Rabbi Yehoshua was exceptional in Torah learning and an elder, therefore they honored him first. If so, continues the Chasam Sofer, why wasn't Rabbi Akiva the first? He answers that the merit of being a Talmid Chocham can propel him one level and that is why Rabbi Yehoshua who was a levi and an exceptional Talmid chocham can have preferential treatment over Rabbi Eliezer who was a kohen; however Rabbi Akiva, who was a yisroel cannot skip over two levels and therefore Rabbi Eliezer was before him.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40 -Highlights

1. The Gemara states that if one gathered various leaves for kindling, they do not posses the sanctity of Shemittah. This is derived from the verse that states the Sabbatical produce of the land shall be for you to eat. The words for you have to be akin to the words to eat. This allows only uses whose benefit is equivalent to consuming the item. This excludes wood where the benefit of baking only comes after the wood has been transformed to coals, so the wood will not have the sanctity of Shemittah. Regarding a lulav, however, whose primary use is as a broom, its benefit is equivalent to its consumption, i.e. becoming worn from use, so a lulav will have the sanctity of Shemittah. (40a2)
2. There is a dispute whether firewood has the sanctity of Shemittah. One opinion maintains that firewood has sanctity of shemittah. (40a2-40a3)
3. Rabbi Yose maintains that one is allowed to use Shemittah produce for washing clothing but one cannot use Shemittah produce for medicinal purposes. (40a2-40a3-40b1)
4. There is a dispute in the Gemara whether the sanctity of Shemittah produce can be deconsecrated onto money, and this would be accomplished by exchanging the money for the produce. All agree that when the Shemittah produce is sold, the sanctity carries over to the money. The dispute is only regarding a case where the owner seeks to exchange the produce for money. (40b1-40b2)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40- The dust of their feet

The Gemara discusses the harsh punishment that one incurs when he treats the laws of Shemittah lightly. The Gemara uses the term avak shel sheviis, the dust of Shemittah, to refer to the less stringent laws of Shemittah. We find elsewhere that the Gemara uses the term avak Lashon hara to describe slander that is rabbinically prohibited, and the term avak ribbis in describing rabbinically prohibited interest on a loan. Why does the Gemara use the word avak, dust, in these instances? It is noteworthy that when Yaakov struggled with the angel of Esav, it is said vayeiavek ish imo, and a man wrestled with him. The Gemara in Chullin 91a states that the angel of Esav appeared to Yaakov like a Torah scholar. Perhaps the meaning of the Gemara is that the angel of Esav attempted to convince Yaakov that although one must follow the mitzvos that are stated explicitly in the Torah, one can be more lenient regarding the rabbinical prohibitions. This is alluded to in the word vayeiavek, which is derived from the word avak, dust. For this reason the Gemara refers to certain rabbinical prohibitions with the term avak, to allude to the idea that it is the evil inclination, a.k.a. the angel of Esav, who is attempting to convince the person that he can be lenient regarding rabbinical prohibitions. We must adhere to the dictum recorded in Pirkei Avos 1:4, where it is said vehevay misabak bafar ragleihem, literally translated as sit in the dust of their feet, and homiletically interpreted that one should adhere to even the less stringent rabbinical prohibitions.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40 - Reverse Situation

The Gemora explains that wood which is projected to be used for kindling a fire does not have the sanctity of shemitah. This is derived from a possuk which states that only something which its pleasure and destruction from the world are simultaneous have shemitah sanctity; however firewood where the pleasure comes only after the wood transforms into coals does not have kedushas shemitah. A lulav is not projected to be used for kindling, rather as a broom for sweeping a house and therefore will have limitations due to shemitah.

The Chachamim were not concerned about purchasing the lulav since the lulav blossomed in the sixth year, it is not bound by the shemitah limitations. The esrog, even though it grew in the sixth year, is regarded as a shemitah fruit because it was plucked off the tree in the seventh year.

The Commentators ask as to what the halacha would be in a reverse situation from the Gemora. In the eighth year of the shemitah cycle, it should be forbidden to purchase the lulav because it grew in the seventh year and the esrog should be permitted to purchase since it was cut from the tree in the eighth year? (According to some, this case is a more frequent one than the Gemora’s.) The Kapos Temorim states that the halacha would be the same in reverse and it is inferred from the Mishna’s case.

Dayan Weiss in Minchas Yitzchok states (I believe) that the solution of the Gemora would not apply in this case. One can purchase a lulav and have the cost of the esrog absorbed in the lulav since in those days the lulav was more expensive than the esrog; however the reverse does not work. One cannot absorb the cost of the more expensive item i.e. the lulav into the cost of the inexpensive esrog.

There are those that state in the Rambam that a lulav does not have the sanctity of shemitah at all. This would seemingly be inconsistent with our Gemora, however it would explain why the situation is not addressed.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40 - Meticulous about Shemitah

The Gemara states that if one is not meticulous even regarding the lenient laws of Shemittah, i.e. one sells Shemittah produce, he will be forced to sell all of his possessions and eventually he will be forced to sell himself as a slave. Rashi at the end of Parshas Behar quotes the full text of the Baraisa that is mentioned in Arachin 30b and Kiddushin 20a. The Ramban in the beginning of Parshas Behar writes that one should be careful to adhere to the laws of Shemittah just as one would be meticulous in observing the laws of Shabbos, as Shemittah is the secret of Creation. When one treats the laws of Shemittah lightly, he will be the catalyst that causes the Jewish People to be exiled for he is demonstrating that he does not affirm the belief that HaShem created the world and he also denies the concept of the World to Come.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Highlights

1. Rava rules that when responding to the recital of Kaddish, one should not pause between the words yehei shmei rabbah and the word mevarach because this will give the appearance that the word mevarach is disconnected and does not have its own meaning. Rav Safra disagreed with Rava and Rav Safra maintains that even if one were to pause in his response, the meaning of his response would still be the same, i.e. may His great Name be blessed. (39a1)
2. The recital of the blessing upon the completion of Hallel depends on the particular custom of that area, whereas there is an obligation upon everyone to recite a blessing before reciting Hallel. (39a1)
3. The Gemara rules that one should always recite a blessing before performing a mitzvah. (39a1)
4. One is not allowed to purchase a fruit that grew in the Shemittah year. The Mishna therefore rules that if one is purchasing a lulav and esrog from his friend during the Shemittah year, he must purchase the lulav and receive the esrog for free. (39a2)
5. The Gemara explains that it is preferable to receive the esrog for free. If the seller does not agree, however, then the cost of the esrog should be incorporated into the cost of the lulav. (39a2)
6. The reason one cannot purchase an esrog of the Shemittah year outright is because one is not permitted to conduct business with the fruits of the Shemittah year or with the money that was exchanged for the fruits. During the Shemittah year one is required to consume the fruits and the money that was exchanged for the fruits. When an ignorant Jew sells the esrog, we are concerned that he will save the money for after Shemittah. One should thus not purchase the esrog from the ignorant Jew because he would be causing the seller to stumble and transgress the prohibition of saving the money for after Shemittah. (39a2)
7. One is permitted to purchase fruits of the Shemittah year as long as the price of the food does not exceed the cost of three meals. This is only permitted for fruits that were not guarded during the Shemittah year. Fruits that were protected during the Shemittah year cannot be purchased at all. (39a3-39b1)
8. The Chachamim were not concerned about one purchasing a lulav during the Shemittah year because a lulav that one purchases during the Shemittah year grew during the sixth year, and subsequently the lulav is not confined to the Shemittah year restrictions. Regarding the esrog, however, even if it grew in the sixth year, it is deemed to be a Shemittah fruit because it was plucked from the tree in the seventh year. (39b2)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Blessings prevent anger

The Gemara states that one must recite the blessing for a mitzvah prior to performing the mitzvah. This is referred to as over laasiyasan. There are a number of instances in the Torah where the word over is used and the Medrash and Gemara interpret the word to denote anger. An example of this is regarding the laws of inheritance, where it is said, vhaavartem es nachalaso lebito, and you shall cause his inheritance to pass over to his daughter. The Gemara derives from the usage of the word vhaavartem that HaShem is angered by one who does not leave over a male child to inherit his estate. The same interpretation can be applied here. One must recite a blessing over laasiyasan, i.e. to prevent anger. We learned earlier on 38a that the remnants of a mitzvah can prevent punishment from occurring. It would follow then that although we rule that blessings do not prevent the fulfillment of the mitzvah, one should certainly be meticulous in reciting a blessing prior to performing a mitzvah, as the recital of the blessing will afford him protection and ward off any harmful agents.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Story Regarding Brochos

The Sefer Bais Shearim records an incident regarding a person who walked into Shul while the Congregation was reciting Hallel. The man took out his lulav and joined them in the recital of Hallel. After he finished reciting Hallel, he realized that he had forgotten to recite the blessing on the lulav. The Bais Shearim ruled that he could no longer recite the blessing because he had forfeited the essential aspect of the mitzvah, which is to take the lulav bundle and wave it during the recital of Hallel, and the blessing on the mitzvah can only be recited prior to or during the performance of the mitzvah and not afterwards. The Bikkurei Yaakov, however, disagreed, and he maintained that since it is our custom to recite Hoshanos while still holding the lulav, it was deemed as if he was still in the midst of performing the mitzvah, thus allowing him to recite the blessing.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Mitzva Remnants

Tosfos rules that one who took the lulav and did not recite the blessing can still do so as long as he has not yet waved the lulav. Although one can fulfill the mitzvah of lulav without waving it, the mitzvah is not deemed to be complete until he waves the lulav. This follows the principle that one can recite a blessing for a mitzvah as long as he has not completed the mitzvah. Thus, one can recite the blessing of netilas yadayim after washing his hands because the mitzvah is not deemed to be complete until one dries his hands. The Pri Megadim writes that if one commenced lighting the Chanukah lights without reciting a blessing, he can still recite the blessing as long as he has not kindled all of the lights that are required for that particular night. Regarding Chanukah lights we also apply the rationale that although one essentially discharges his obligation by kindling one light, the subsequent lights are also deemed to be a part of the mitzvah. Thus, one who has not completed lighting all the lights for that particular night is deemed to be engaged in the mitzvah and he can still recite the blessing.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Recital of Blessings

The Gemora rules that all brochos should be recited before one performs the mitzva. The Tashbatz comments that it is evident from the language of the Gemora that the brocha should be recited immediately prior to the performance of the mitzva and not some time beforehand. This is apparent from the fact that the Gemora used the word ‘over l’assiyoson’ and not ‘kodem l’assiyoson.’

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Yehei Shmei Rabbah

Rava rules that one should not pause when answering by kaddish between yehei shmei rabbah and mevarech since the mevarech will be disconnected and have no meaning by itself. Rav Safra disagreed with him and maintains that even with a pause the meaning is still the same – The great name of Hashem should be blessed.

The Rama 56 rules that one should not pause in between those words. The Magen Avrohom asks that this is against the conclusion of our Gemora. He answers that in actuality it depends on the meaning of yehei shmei rabbah mevarech. According to the Machzor Vitri, the meaning is that Hashem’s name should become great, by becoming complete. In the future, Hashem’s throne will be complete and that is what we are praying for. According to this one should not pause between yehei shmei and rabbah.

The Magen Avrohom concludes that the explanation in the Rama could be that one should not pause for longer than one breath and this would be consistent with our Gemora.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 38 - Highlights

1. The Mishna rules that if one arrived home from traveling and he did yet not fulfill the mitzvah of lulav, he has the entire day to fulfill the mitzvah. The Mishna rules further that if one commenced his meal without having yet fulfilled the mitzvah, he should interrupt his meal and perform the mitzvah. The Gemara explains that this refers to a case where there is not enough time left in the day to perform the mitzvah and therefore he must interrupt his meal to perform the mitzvah. (38a1)
2. The Gemara speculates that there might be a distinction between a Biblical mitzvah and one that is only Rabbinic in nature. One would be obligated to interrupt his meal to perform a Biblical mitzvah like the mitzvah of lulav. One would not be obligated, however, to interrupt a rabbinical mitzvah such as prayer. The Gemara concludes that one is only required to interrupt his meal if there is not enough time left to perform the mitzvah. If there is enough time, however, he can continue eating even if he has before him a Biblical mitzvah to perform. (38a2)
3. The Gemara further suggests that the Mishna can be referring to the mitzvah of lulav which is a rabbinical obligation on the intermediate days of Sukkos. A proof to this idea is because the Mishna states that he was traveling on the road and arrived at his house, and this clearly cannot be discussing a case that he returned from traveling on the first day of the festival, as one is forbidden to travel on the festival. Rather, the Mishnah refers to a case where he returned from traveling on the intermediate days of Sukkos. (38a2)
4. If one does not know how to recite Hallel by himself, it is preferable to have a male adult recite Hallel for him and he should respond after him the refrain of Hallelukah after the completion of every phrase. If a Canaanite slave, a minor or a woman read Hallel, he must repeat each word after the one reading Hallel. (38a3)
5. The Gemara discusses many halachos which are derived from the manner in which Hallel was recited in the times of Rava. (38a4-38b1-38b2)
6. The Gemara states that originally when Hallel was recited and one did not know how to recite it himself, someone else would recite each phrase and the person who was not familiar with the recital of Hallel would respond with the refrain of Hallelukah. (38b1)
7. The Gemara speculates if one would fulfill the mitzvah if he would listen to the Hallel being recited and he would not respond. The Gemara concludes that one who listens to the Hallel is deemed as having recited Hallel himself and for this reason, even if he does not respond with the refrain of Hallelukah, he has fulfilled his obligation. (38b2)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 38 - Befriending the Satan

The Gemora relates that when Rav Acha bar Yaakov would shake the lulav in all the directions, he would say to the Satan, “Look and see that you cannot stop us from performing the mitzvos.” The Gemora concludes that this is not a proper thing to say for it will only stir up the energy of the Satan to entice us to sin even more.

The Aruch Lener comments that Rav Acha himself was not concerned about this for he befriended the Satan and he was secure. The Gemora in bava Basra quotes Levi as saying that the Satan and Penina did their actions for the sake of Hashem. Rav Acha cited this in a drasha and the Satan came and kissed him.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 38 - Shomea Keoneh

The Gemora states that originally when Hallel was recited and one did not know how to recite it himself, someone else would recite each possuk and the person who couldn’t say the Hallel would answer Hallelu-kah.

The Gemora speculates as to what the halacha would be if one would listen to the Hallel being recited and he would not respond, would he still fulfill the mitzva? The Gemora concludes that he would.

The Reshash asks from an explicit Mishna in Rosh Hashana that rules in an instance that someone is walking in back of a Shul and hears the Megillah being read, if he has intention to fulfill the mitzva, he fulfills the mitzva. It is evident that one does not have to recite anything and nonetheless he fulfills the mitzva. This is based on the principle that one who hears is as if he has recited. Why is our Gemora pondering this issue?

The Darkei Moshe 167 quotes the Ohr Zorua who rules that when one hears another reciting a brocha and he wants to be yotzei with that brocha, he must answer Amen to the brocha. The Darkei Moshe concludes that there is no basis for this ruling in Gemora or Shulchan Aruch. What is the explanation for the opinion of the Ohr Zorua?

Rav Elyashiv explains that since the Sages instituted that the listener to a brocha should respond with answering Amen, if he doesn’t, it is as if he is not listening to the brocha and he cannot join that person’s brocha.

Perhaps this is the issue in our Gemora. If one doesn’t respond by answering Hallelu-kah, he cannot join the one who is reciting the Hallel and therefore he cannot be regarded as reciting the Hallel himself.

The conclusion of the Gemora is that one who listens to the hallel is as if he himself is reciting it and therefore even if he doesn’t respond with Hallelu-kah, he is fulfilling his obligation. This also explains why the halacha is not in accordance with the Ohr Zorua. Even if one doesn’t answer Amen, by listening to the brocha, it is as if he is reciting it himself.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 38 - Remnants of a mitzvah keep one from falling

The Gemara states that shiyarei mitzvah, the remnants of a mitzvah performance, can prevent punishment form occurring. Proof to this is from the waving of the sacrifices, which was not an essential part of the sacrifice, yet the waving would ward off harmful winds and dews. What is the significance in performing the remnants of a mitzvah? Regarding the leftover matzah and maror that the Jewish People brought out with them from Egypt, the Sfas Emes explains that although the essence of the mitzvah performance is reckoned with in heaven, the remnants can protect one in this world. Furthermore, one who performs even the remnants of the mitzvah will be strengthened when he has a period of falling in his spiritual quests. This is the meaning of the Medrash that states that one must remember the Exodus from Egypt even by night, as night symbolizes a time of struggle and failure. One who performs the remnants of the mitzvah will be protected even in the dark nights when one is more prone to falling and struggling. Thus, one should always ensure that he performs a mitzvah whole-heartedly and with joy, so he will always have the protection of the mitzvah.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 38 - Chol Hamoed

The Mishna ruled that if someone came home from the road and did not fulfill the mitzvah of lulav yet, he has the entire day left to fulfill the mitzvah. The Mishna continues that if he started eating without fulfilling the mitzvah, he should interrupt his meal and perform the mitzvah. The Gemora explains that this is referring to an instance where there is no more time in the day and that is why he should interrupt his meal to perform the mitzvah.

The Gemora speculates that there might be a distinction between a Biblical mitzvah and one that is only Rabbinic. One would be obligated to interrupt his meal to perform a Biblical mitzvah, such as lulav; however a rabbinical mitzvah, like Tefillah, he would not be obligated to interrupt. The Gemora concludes that one interrupts his meal only if there is no time left to perform the mitzvah, however if there is time, he can continue eating even by a Biblical mitzvah.

Our Mishna can be referring to the Rabbinic mitzvah of lulav on the intermediary days of Sukkos. Proof for this is cited by the fact that the Mishna states that he was coming from the road and that is obviously not referring to Yom Tov Rishon, rather the second days of Yom Tov.

The Ritva states that from here is a proof that Chol Hamoed is referred to as Yom Tov since it is forbidden to do work. He cites other examples to this as well. The reason we do not say in Shemoneh Esrei “Es Yom Tov mikro kodesh hazeh,” is because some work is permitted and it would be degrading to a regular Yom Tov.

There is a debate amongst the poskim (see Magen Avrohom 490:1 and Kaf Hachaim 490:14) if the harachaman in Bircas Hamazon which is reserved for Yom Tov is recited on Chol Hamoed.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha states that through this, it can help explain the opinion which maintains that one should not wear tefillin on Chol Hamoed. The Gemora Eruvin 96a rules that we do not don tefillin on Shabbos and Yom Tov since they are referred to as a ‘sign’ and tefillin is a ‘sign.’ Chol Hamoed is also a Yom Tov and therefore tefillin are not worn.

Read more!

Esrog with a Gartel from Bar-Kochva

Was Bar-kochva a Chasid?

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Highlights

1. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one can only use the four species for the s’chach of the Sukkah. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the s’chach can be from anything, provided that the s’chach grows from the ground and is not susceptible to tumah. (36b3)
2. There is a dispute in the Gemara regarding the permissibility of holding the lulav with a material that interposes between ones hands and the lulav. The Gemara cites one opinion that maintains that the lulav must be held with ones hands and one cannot hold the lulav through any other means. (37b1)
3. The Gemara rules that one is prohibited from smelling and deriving pleasure from the fragrance of the hadassim that are used for the mitzvah. One is permitted, however, to smell the esrog. The Gemara states that the distinction between the esrog and the hadassim is that normally a hadas is used for smelling so prior to Sukkos one sets aside the hadassim for the mitzvah and thus it is set aside from smelling, whereas the esrog is normally used for eating and one sets it aside for the purpose of the mitzvah. Thus, one sets aside the esrog from eating but one does not set aside the esrog from the benefit of smelling. (37b1)
4. The Mishna rules that we shake the lulav when reciting the words hodu laHashem and when reciting the words ona Hashem. There is a dispute between Bais Shammai and Bais Hillel if one shakes the lulav when reciting the words ana HaShem hatzlicha na. (37b2)
5. The Gemara states that the significance of shaking the lulav and esrog is that one shakes them outward and inward to demonstrate that Hashem owns all four directions of the world. One shakes them upwards and downwards to signify that the heavens and the earth belong to Hashem. (37b3)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - To Shake or not to Shake -That is the Question

The Mishna rules that we shake the lulav by ‘hodu’ and ‘ona Hashem.’ There is a debate between Bais Shammai and Bais Hillel if we shake by ‘hatzlicha no.’ The Gemora explains the significance of the shaking of the lulav and esrog. We bring it in front of us and behind to indicate that Hashem resides in all four directions. We shake it up and down to signify that the heavens and the earth belong to Hashem.

Does anyone have an explanation as to why Bais Hillel maintains that we shake the lulav by ‘hoshia no’ and not ‘hatzlicha no’?

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Hoshanos Clip for $3.75

The Gemora rules that the lulav should be held in the right hand and the esrog in the left. It was the custom and still is that during hallel and hoshanos, we hold all of the four species in our right hand. The Taz 651:14 states that this is not a concern and one fulfills his mitzvah in this manner. It is assumed that this was the always the method of holding the lulav and esrog.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Foresight and Prophecy

The Mishnah states that Rabbi Akiva said, “Tzofeh hayisi beRabban Gamliel,” I was watching Rabban Gamliel. Why does the Mishnah use the word tzofeh and not the conventional word for sight, roeh? The word tzofeh is often associated with prophecy, as it is said in Yeshaya (52:8) kol tzofayich nasu kol, the voice of your lookouts, i.e. prophets, they raised their voice. Perhaps Rabbi Akiva was alluding to the idea that although the Bais HaMikdash would be destroyed and salvation would appear distant, he saw in a form of prophecy that the words of the prophets who predicted the Ultimate Redemption would be fulfilled. This idea is consonant with the Gemara in Makkos that records an incident where Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues passed by the site of the Bais HaMikdash. The rabbis cried and Rabbi Akiva laughed. Rabbi Akiva explained his enigmatic actions by quoting Scripture that foretells of the ultimate rebuilding of Jerusalem and the Bais HaMikdash.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - More Hadas Aroma

The Gemara rules that one is prohibited from smelling and deriving pleasure from the fragrance of the hadassim that are used for the mitzvah. The Acharonim challenge this ruling from the Gemara that states that sound, sight and aroma are deemed inconsequential and one who inhales a fragrance from an item in the Bais HaMikdash will not have violated the prohibition of meilah. Why, then, is there a concern if one were to smell the hadas? HaRav Elyashiv Shlita explains that the above-mentioned principle only applies when one smells, sees or hears something incidentally and one was not intending for the smell, sight or sound. One who inhales the hadas for its aroma, however, is acting deliberately and this is forbidden. Harav Elyashiv cites a proof to this from the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah which discusses if one can fulfill his obligation of shofar with a shofar that one is forbidden to derive benefit from. The issue in the Gemara there is if the benefit that one derives while performing a mitzvah is deemed a prohibited benefit or not. Although sound is normally deemed inconsequential, regarding shofar it is obvious that he intends for the sound and this intention is thus taken into consideration.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Hadas Sniffing

The Gemora rules regarding the hadasim which are being used for the mitzvah, it is forbidden to smell it and derive pleasure from its fragrance; however one is permitted to smell the esrog. The Gemora explains the distinction between them and states that the anticipated use of a hadas is for its smell and therefore it is set aside from before Yom Tov for the mitzvah and not for smelling, however an esrog’s predictable use is for eating and therefore it is forbidden to eat and not for smelling.

Rashi adds that it is forbidden to derive any benefit from the hadas all seven days akin to the halacha that we learned previously regarding the wood of the sukkah. The Kapos Temorim asks that the words of Rashi are superfluous since the Gemora explicitly states the reason for the prohibition is because of ‘haktzoah,’ something which is set aside before Yom Tov and not because of deriving pleasure?

The Pri Megadim answers that Gemora is teaching us that even if the hadas would become disqualified from use on Yom Tov and hence would not have the prohibition of deriving pleasure from it similar to the halachos of the wood of the sukkah that fell during yom Tov, it would still be forbidden to smell it because of the halachos of ‘haktzoah.’

This can explain the opinion of the Mordechai who rules in the second Perek of Pesachim regarding something that is forbidden to have pleasure from, one would be permitted to smell it if it is something that is not intended for smelling. He cites our Gemora as a proof to this for only the hadas has the prohibition and not the esrog. The Shach questions this proof from the fact that ur Gemora is not discussing pleasure but rather what it was set aside for from before Yom Tov. According to the Pri Megadim, the Gemora is involving itself in both issues and therefore the Mordechai has a proof.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 36 - Highlights

1. The Gemara rules that if there is a hole that goes through the entire esrog, the esrog will be invalid even if the hole is miniscule. If the hole does not go through the entire esrog, then the esrog is only invalid if the hole is the size of an issar coin. (36a1)
2. The Gemara lists other criteria that could invalidate an esrog. If the esrog is bloated, spoiled, steeped in vinegar or mustard, it is invalid. If one grew the esrog in its formative stage inside a form that has a different shape than an esrog and the fruit subsequently grew into the shape of the form, the fruit is invalid for use of the mitzvah. (36a2)
3. Rabbi Chanina would dip his esrog into a sauce, eat part of it and then he would fulfill the mitzvah with the partially eaten esrog. The Gemara states that the reason this was permitted was because a hole in an esrog is only invalid on the first day of Sukkos whereas Rabi Chanina fulfilled his obligation with a partially eaten esrog on the second day of Sukkos or afterwards. (36b1)
4. The Mishna cites a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Meir if the lulav should be tied to the other species with the leaves of the lulav or if the lulav can be tied with any material.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 36 - Biblical Injunction

Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the maximum measurement of an esrog is the size at which one can hold two esrogim in one hand. Rabbi Yose maintains that an esrog is valid even if one needs two hands to hold one esrog. Rav Yosef Engel lists approximately twenty instances throughout Shas where we find that the Torah states that something is not allowed and the prohibition is due to a concern that one will violate a different transgression. One example that he cites is the Ran in Pesachim who suggests that perhaps the reason the Torah prohibited one to see chametz on Pesach is because the Torah was concerned that a person will eat the chametz, as chametz is something that a person usually does not stay away from. Another example that Rav Yosef Engel cites is a Medrash in Parshas Naso that states that the Torah prohibited a nazir from drinking vinegar wine because the Torah was concerned that the nazir may come to drink regular wine. In the Sefer Ma’adanei Chaim, Rav Chaim Cohen wonders how Rav Yosef Engel, with all his erudition and scholarship in Shas and Poskim, did not cite our Gemara as one of the examples. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that an esrog cannot be too large as there is a concern that he may have mistakenly placed the lulav bundle in his left hand and the esrog in his right hand, and when he attempts to reverse them, he may drop the esrog. Rashi (based on the explanation of the Sfas Emes) and the Ritva explain that if one drops the esrog, it may cause the esrog to become deficient and the person may not realize it, and he will unknowingly not have fulfilled the mitzvah of taking the four species. Although the measurements for the four species are derived from a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai which is a Biblical requirement, it is nonetheless apparent that the rationale for the maximum measurement of an esrog is due to a concern that perhaps one may drop the esrog. The Sfas Emes maintains that based on this Gemara, we must say that Rabbi Yehduah’s requirement regarding the size of an esrog is only rabbinical in nature.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 36- Gold and humility

The Mishnah states that the people of Jerusalem would bind their lulav bundles with gold strings. The Chachamim said to Rabbi Meir that they would first bind the lulav with material of the same specie in order to fulfill the mitzvah properly and then they added the gold strings as decoration. It is interesting that the word that the Mishnah uses for these gold strings is gimoniyos, which Rashi explains is derived from the word ki’agmon, which means bent. Perhaps the Mishnah is teaching us that the people of Jerusalem would glorify the mitzvah of lulav with gold fibers, which usually can be interpreted to be a display of arrogance. Nonetheless, the people of Jerusalem acted for the sake of Heaven, and their actions were done “bent over,” i.e. in a humble fashion.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35 - Highlights

1. An esrog is a fruit whose fruit and bark have the same taste. Rebbi maintains that an esrog tree is unique in that it has small ones and large ones growing at the same time. Rabbi Abahu maintains that this can be derived from the word hadar, which can be read as haddar, which refers to a fruit that can dwell on the tree from one year to the next. (35a1-35a2)
2. There is a dispute in the Gemara as to why an esrog from an orlah tree is invalid. One opinion maintains that it is invalid because it cannot be eaten. Another opinion maintains that it is invalid because it has no value as it is forbidden to derive pleasure from it. (35a2)
3. The Gemara offers several reasons as to why one should not use an esrog of terumah for the mitzvah outright. One of the reasons offered is because the esrog will become susceptible to tumah when it becomes wet. Another reason offered is because handling the esrog will eventually cause the outer peel to become ruined and one is forbidden to ruin fruit that is terumah. (35b1)
4. There is a discussion in the Gemara regarding chazazis, boils, on an esrog. There is a distinction between a spot that is in one location and if there are spots in two or three locations. (35b3)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35 - Magnifying Glass

Rashi and the Ran write that the reason that small spots at the top of the esrog invalidate the esrog whereas spots on other parts do not invalidate the esrog is because the top of the esrog is the area which is clearly visible to the eye. The Magen Avrohom in Orach Chaim 648:16 quotes the Mabit who writes that a discoloration at the top of the esrog will only invalidate the esrog if it is visible to all. If the discoloration is so small that one can see it only by gazing intently and others cannot even see it, the esrog will still be deemed as hadar. The Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha writes that this ruling is the source for those who maintain that a black spot or discoloration which can only be viewed with a magnifying glass will not invalidate an esrog. It is noteworthy that there are those who use the magnifying glass to validate a spot that others expressed concerned about.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35 - Esrog Joining the Lulav

The Gemora offers several reasons as to why l’chatchila one should not use an esrog of terumah for the mitzvah. One of the reasons given is because it will make it susceptible to become tamei. Rashi explains this based on a Mishna later which states that the wife takes the lulav from the husband and can return it to water on Shabbos. This would be done in order that it shouldn’t become dry. Subsequently when the water will touch the esrog, it will now be susceptible to become tamei. Tosfos states that the water might drip onto the esrog.

Rav Elyashiv understands this to be an argument between Rashi and Tosfos. Rashi holds that the esrog will certainly become wet and Tosfos maintains that it is a possibility that might occur but it is not a certainty.

This argument can be based on an argument in Shulchan Aruch 651:11 if one is required to have the esrog touch the lulav during the shaking of the lulav. Rashi maintains that in order to fulfill the obligation of shaking the lulav, the esrog must be touching the lulav and therefore it is a certainty that the esrog will become wet. Tosfos would hold that it is not required to do so and thereby it is only a possibility that the esrog will become wet.

See before where we discussed the reason behind the joining of the esrog to the lulav.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35- Lekavod Shabbos

The Gemara states that an esrog is described in the Torah as a pri eitz hadar, the fruit of the hadar tree, and the word hadar can be interpreted to mean haddar, that dwells. Thus, the esrog is a fruit that dwells on its tree from one year to the next year. It is noteworthy that the Rishonim write that the word esrog is derived from the Aramaic word merogeg, which means desire. Similarly, we find that the Zohar states that regarding Shabbos it is said the Children of Israel shall observe the Shabbos, to make the Shabbos an eternal covenant for their generations. The Zohar states that the word ledorosam can be interpreted to read lederosam, for their dwelling places. Furthermore, it is said thus the heaven and the earth were finished, and all their array, and the Targum Yerushalmi interprets the word vayechulu, were finished, as vechamad, and He desired. Thus, the esrog and the Shabbos both share the same characteristics in that they are desired items and that they both have a permanent dwelling.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - Chatzotzros Growing

The Gemora states that there are three words that their names changes since the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh. One of the words is chatzotzros (trumpets) to shofar and vice versa. The Gemora proceeds to state that the relevance of this is regarding the shofar of Rosh Hashana. Rashi explains that a shofar is bent and chatzotzros are straight and not obtained from a ram.

It would appear from Rashi that although the chatzotzros are not from a ram, they are indeed derived from a different animal. This is very problematic because the torah explicitly states that the chatzotzros are made from solid silver.

Tosfos in Avoda Zora 47 asks this precise question on a Gemora there that speculates as to what the halacha would be with the horns of animal to be used a schatzotzros in an instance where someone would bow down to an animal as avoda zora. Tosfos asks that chatzotzros were made out of silver and not obtained from an animal? He answers that although the chatzotzros that the kohanim used were made from silver, there were also chatzotzros that the leviim used as musical instruments and these were indeed obtained from an animal.

The Kapos Temorim asks that it seems from Rashi that the chatzotzros are disqualified to be used for Rosh Hashana because it is straight and not from a ram. This, he asks, is not the halacha. Using a ram’s horn is only a preference and if the shofar is not bent, it is still valid? Actually, the Rambam does rule that one may only use a ram’s horn for a shofar.

The Aruch Lener answers that the explanation in Rashi is that it is unfit to be used for Rosh Hashana because it is metal.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - Aravos

Abba Shaul learns from the words in the possuk ‘arvei nachal’ that there are two separate mitzvos of arovos, one together with the lulav and one for the Mikdash. Rashi explains that the second one was used to circle the mizbeach. It would appear from Rashi that they circled the mizbeach with the arovos. In actuality, there is an argument later on daf 43 if they circled the mizbeach with the arovos or with the lulav.

The Kapos Temorim mentions this as a question on Rashi because l’halacha we hold that they circled the mizbeach with the lulav and not with the arovos? He answers that when Rashi states the words ‘to circle the mizbeach,’ he actually is referring to the lulav and the arovos would be leaned against the mizbeach as the Gemora in daf 45 explains this opinion.

It seems a bit odd that the Kapos Temorim is compelled to force this explanation into Rashi when the simple explanation would be to say that Rashi is going according to the opinion that maintains that the aravos were used to circle the mizbeach and not the lulav?

Read more!

Connectivity Issues

We are currently undergoing connectivity problems - we hope to be able to post soon. At that time, there will be posts on daf 34, 35, 36 and 37. Please stay tuned. Thanks and a gutten Moed to you.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - A perfect game

The Gemara derives from the word ulekachtem, and you shall take, that the four species are essential to each other, i.e. that one must have all four species available when he is prepared to fulfill the mitzvah. It is noteworthy that the Gemara derives this ruling from the word ulekachtem. The sefarim write that the festival of Sukkos is corresponding to Yaakov, regarding whom it is said and Yaakov journeyed to Sukkos. The Medrash states that on Rosh Hashanah the Jews and the gentiles enter into judgment, and it is not discernable who the victor is until the Jews exit from judgment waving the lulav on Sukkos. It is said regarding the Yom Kippur service, the he-­goat will bear upon itself all their iniquities, and the Medrash states that the word for their iniquities is avonosam, which is an acrostic for the words avonos tam, the sins of Yaakov, who is referred to as tam, the perfect one. Thus, Yaakov is victorious on Yom Kippur when the he-goat, symbolizing Esav, carries away Yaakov’s sins, and this victory is reflected in the Jewish People waving the lulav on Sukkos. The statement of the Gemara here is thus complemented by the statement of the Medrashim that the sins of the tam are removed and Yaakov is then able to perform a lekicha tama, a perfect taking of the lulav.

Read more!