Eliyahu's Locker Room

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The Gemora (Sukkah 5a) states that the presence of Hashem (as manifested in the higher worlds) never descended to within ten tefachim of the physical world. Similarly, Moshe and Eliyahu could not ascend to within ten tefachim of the upper worlds.

Discussing that Gemora, the Chasam Sofer explains that this was only as long as Eliyahu was encumbered by his physical body. However, once his soul was freed from its body, he assumed the status of an angel, and was not bound by any of these limitations.

The Chasam Sofer proceeds to say that when Mashiach comes, Eliyahu will once again don his body and live as a human amongst the other great people of that great generation. He will be allowed to rule on any halachic issues (a privilege reserved for mankind) since at that time he will have reassumed the existence of a human being. Meanwhile, however, he has the status of an angel, and therefore he is not bound by any of the limitations imposed upon men. This applies for halachah as well; Eliyahu may traverse the globe on Shabbos to go to a bris milah, even though this involves traveling beyond the permitted distance, since as an angel he is not bound by halachah.

Our Gemora relates an incident where Rabbah bar Avuha encountered Eliyahu in a graveyard. Rabbah asked him how he was permitted to be there despite his being a Kohen. The Chasam Sofer explains that Eliyahu must have been in his body at the time, because otherwise, he would have the status of an angel, and Rabbah would have known that as such, these halachos do not apply to him.

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Verbally committing to a Sandek or a Mohel

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The Rishonim discuss a case where a father committed to honor someone with part of the bris ceremony, either as a sandak or a mohel, and then changed his mind. (See Beis Yosef YD 264)

The Maharam says that since these commitments are routinely made and kept, the commitment is enforceable in court.

Rabbeinu Yechiyel limits this to a commitment made after the baby was born.

The Radvaz holds that if the commitment was made before the baby was born, he is not obligated to honor it at all, for this would have the status of selling something that is not yet in existence. However, if he told him this after the baby was born, since these commitments are routinely made and kept, he cannot retract from his words. He concludes by saying that it is a well established principle by us that a custom is extremely significant, and one should not break it.

He proves this from our Gemora, which states: Rav Papi said in Rava’s name: A mark of identification (which the buyers would mark if they planned on buying it) on the wine barrels can effect possession (although they left them in the possession of the seller). This proves that although a proper kinyan was not performed, the making of an identifying mark can effect acquisition based on the custom of that locality.

The Rosh disagrees and says that only a standard kinyan is enforceable.

Rabbeinu Tam says that if one committed to a mohel to do his son’s bris, this has the status of a verbal commitment, and one who does not keep it is considered untrustworthy.

The Pri Yitzchak says that committing to a mohel has the status of a small gift, since the father typically cannot perform the bris, and he is simply giving the right to choose the mohel. However, committing to a sandak is a large gift, since the father himself can do that, and he is giving that right to the sandak. Since it is a large gift, a verbal commitment would not be binding.

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The Famous Taz

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Estate Money and Interest

The Gemora allowed an administrator of an estate to invest the orphan’s money in an investment with favorable terms for them, although this is generally Rabbinically prohibited.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 160:18), based on the Rambam and Rosh, applies this license to all Rabbinically prohibited interest, and extends this to money of charity, money donated to Torah scholars, and money donated for use in a synagogue.

What did the Torah Permit?

The Gemora quotes a statement of Rav Huna that prohibits charging interest from a non Jew. The Gemora debates why this is prohibited, and how to reconcile this statement with the verse and Mishna that seem to permit such a loan.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) asks why the Gemora was concerned with reconciling this Rabbinic law with the verse and Mishna, and answers that the Gemora assumed that the Sages would not prohibit something the Torah permitted.

The Taz states in numerous places that although the Sages have leeway to enact their own new prohibitions, they may not prohibit something explicitly permitted by the Torah.

The Taz in YD 117:1 applies this to the Rabbinic prohibition on commerce in forbidden foods. Since the Torah explicitly allows one to sell neveilah meat to a non Jew, the Rabbinic prohibition had to allow for such commerce when one chanced upon the forbidden food, so as to not fully prohibit an act the Torah explicitly allows.

The Taz in OC 588:5 discusses a question raised by earlier poskim. We find the Sages prohibited the performance of numerous mitzvos on Shabbos (e.g., Shofar, Lulav), due to a concern of one accidentally carrying to perform the mitzvah. Why did the Sages not apply this to bris milah, prohibiting a bris milah which falls on a Shabbos.

The Taz says that since the Torah explicitly said that one must perform a bris milah on the eighth day, even if it is a Shabbos, the Sages could not prohibit it.

The Chavos Yair 142 challenges this Taz from our Gemora, among others. Our Gemora is an instance where the Sages prohibited an action explicitly permitted by the Torah – i.e., charging a non Jew interest on a loan. Therefore, the Chavos Yair rejects the Taz’s thesis.

Later poskim dispute the Chavos Yair’s disproof. The Shla, quoted by the Chasam Sofer (YD 106), says that the Sages did not prohibit charging a non Jew interest, since that is indeed explicitly permitted by the Torah. Instead, the Sages prohibited a Jew from lending to a non Jew at all, and only thereby precluded the Jew from receiving interest from him.

The Chasam Sofer (YD 106, 109) says that Tosfos themselves (70b Tashich, 64b v’Lo) seem to support the Taz, and actually explain the Gemora based on his principle. According to Tosfos, when the Gemora challenged Rav Nachman from the verse, the Gemora was stating that since the Torah explicitly allowed a Jew to charge a non Jew interest, the Sages cannot prohibit it. The Chasam Sofer says that the reason the Sages were allowed to do so is due to the exclusions built in to their prohibitions (for livelihood, or for a Torah scholar). Just as the Sages allowed commerce in forbidden food when the Jew chanced upon it in order to avoid explicitly prohibiting an act allowed by the Torah, so too, the Sages allowed charging a non Jew interest in some cases, to avoid explicitly such a prohibition.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 1:134) says that the Gemora’s answer that we read the verse only as tashich – explicitly allowing a Jew only to pay interest, means that the Torah never did explicitly allow a Jew to charge interest, giving the Sages the leeway to prohibit it. See Rabbi Akiva Eiger YD 117 on the Taz for more details.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) says that nowadays we lend money to non Jews with interest. Tosfos advances three reasons for this behavior:
1. The economic situation and lack of other professions available to Jews makes the interest necessary for the creditor’s basic needs, in which case it is permitted.
2. Ravina’s answer understood that the prohibition was to limit our interactions with non Jews. Since we are forced into such interactions due to economic circumstances, there is no added interaction that will be prevented by refraining from charging interest.
3. The second version of Rav Huna’s statement does not prohibit interest from a non Jew at all, but only prioritized an interest free loan to a Jew above it.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 159:1) rules that charging interest from a non Jew is prohibited by the Sages, unless the creditor needs the interest for his basic needs, or is a Torah scholar. However, the Shulchan Aruch says that it is permitted nowadays, based on the first two reasons of Tosfos (see Shach 2).

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Commitment to an Honor (mohel or sandek)

The Rishonim discuss a case where a father committed to honor someone with part of the bris ceremony, either as a sandak or a mohel, and then changed his mind. (See Beis Yosef YD 264)

The Maharam says that since these commitments are routinely made and kept, the commitment is enforceable in court.

Rabbeinu Yechiyel limits this to a commitment made after the baby was born.

The Rosh disagrees, and says that only a standard kinyan is enforceable.

Rabbeinu Tam says that if one committed to a mohel to do his son’s bris, this has the status of a verbal commitment, and one who does not keep it is considered untrustworthy.

The Pri Yitzchak says that committing to a mohel has the status of a small gift, since the father typically cannot perform the bris, and he is simply giving the right to choose the mohel. However, committing to a sandak is a large gift, since the father himself can do that, and he is giving that right to the sandak. Since it is a large gift, a verbal commitment would not be binding.

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Seudas Mitzvah

Seudas Mitzvah

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora (Bava Kamma 80) tells Rav and Shmuel and Rav Assi once met at a circumcision of a boy, or as some say, at the house for the salvation of a son (the redeeming of a firstborn). Rav would not enter before Shmuel, nor Shmuel before Rav Assi (for Rav Assi was greater), nor Rav Assi before Rav (for Rav Assi was Rav’s student). They therefore discussed who should go in last, and they decided that Shmuel should go in last, and that Rav should enter and then Rav Assi.

Rashi comments that the “week of the son” refers to a bris milah, whereas the “salvation of the son” refers to a party that was done for the pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn).

The Maharsha points out that from Rashi we find a source for making a party for pidyon haben, but it is not a source for making a party for a bris milah.

The Maharsha seems to understand that the requirement to make a party for pidyon haben is better sourced than the requirement to make one for bris milah. However, the Maharshal (Yam Shel Shlomo 37), in his famous discussion about seudas mitzvah asks a question from the Gemora in Chulin 95b which states that Rav did not partake in any “voluntary” feast!? Why then was Rav participating in this seudah? The Maharshal explains that by milah, the feast itself is a mitzvah just like it is by a wedding, however, there is no mitzvah to have a party by pidyon haben. The Maharshal clearly understands that whether it was milah or pidyon haben, Rav was joining and eating at the party. He assumes that the requirement to have a seudah for milah is more basic than having one at pidyon haben. Since the seudah of pidyon haben is only voluntary, how could Rav join and eat? [Evidently he holds that it is not a mitzvah at all by pidyon haben!?]

From this, the Maharshal is mechadesh a major yesod that any seudah whose purpose is to give praise to Hashem and either publicize a mitzvah (such as pidyon haben) or a miracle (such as the birth of a child which is Rabbeinu Tam's explanation of “salvation of a son” i.e.a shalom zachor) qualifies as a seudas mitzvah.

The source for a siyum on a masechta of Gemora qualifying as a seudas mitzvah, the Maharshal says, is from a Gemora in Shabbos 118b that Abaye would make a party when he would see a torah scholar finish a masechta (the Maharshal then launches into a suggestion to make the bracha of “hasimchah bi’me’ono” at a siyum, which he retracted from after he felt that it was the reason that a siyum he once attended was totally ruined). At the end of the perek, the Maharshal continues to show from this Gemora in Shabbos that even those who aren't actually finishing the masechta should celebrate with the one completing the masechta, just as we find that Abaye would make the seudah for his students even when he didn't actually learn it with them.

The Maharshal also points out that the Gemora in Ta'anis 30b cites that one of the reasons for establishing a Yom Tov on the fifteenth of Av was because it was the day that they completed the mitzvah of cutting the wood for the mizbei’ach. Just as there is a point to make a seudah and Yom Tov upon the completion of a mitzvah, so too, there would be with the completion of a masechta, because there is no greater mitzvah than completing a sefer. As surprising as it may seem, the seudah at the siyum masechta seems to be better sourced as a seudas mitzvah, more than bris milah (which the Maharsha questions) and pidyon haben (which the Maharshal initially questioned).

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Women Plowing during Shemitah

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The Gemora in Moed Katan presents a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elozar whether one would incur the thirty-nine lashes if he would plow during Shemitah.

Rashi (2b) states that there is a positive commandment which forbids plowing on Shemitah. It is written [Shmos 34:21]: From plowing and harvesting you shall desist. The point of contention between the two Amoraim is if there is a negative commandment as well.

The Rambam in Hilchos Shemitah rules that one who plows during Shemitah does not incur the thirty-nine lashes. Kesef Mishna explains: Since in our Gemora, it was left ambiguously regarding which Amora held what, we cannot administer the lashes when there is uncertainty.

Sha’ar Hamelech in the beginning of Hilchos Shemitah writes that the Yerushalmi in Shabbos (7:2) states that Rabbi Yochanan is the one who maintains that he does not receive the lashes and the rule is that when Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elozar argue, the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan.

Minchas Chinuch (112) comments that women are obligated in this mitzvah even though it is a positive commandment that has a time element to it and the principle is that women are exempt from any positive mitzvah which is governed by time. He explains that this is applicable only regarding a positive mitzvah that is incumbent on the body of the person and not a mitzvah like Shemitah, which is a mitzvah that is dependent on the land (mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz).

Proof to this is cited from the Ritva in Kiddushin (29a). The Gemora rules based on a Scriptural verse that women are not obligated to perform a circumcision on their sons. Tosfos asks: Why is a verse necessary; circumcision is a positive mitzvah which is governed by time since the mitzvah can only be performed by day, and women are exempt? The Ritva answers: Any mitzvah which is not related to the person themselves; this principle does not apply. The mitzvah of milah is to perform the circumcision on the son and therefore women would be obligated if not for the special verse teaching us otherwise.

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Meat and Fowl

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said (Nedarim 54b): If one makes a neder prohibiting himself from meat, he is permitted in fowl. It is evident that he maintains that fowl is not included in meat.

The Chasam Sofer asks: How can he hold that fowl is not included in “meat,” when it is seemingly clear from the Torah that it is? The Jews in the Desert complained that they desired meat and the Ribbono shel Olom sent fowl to them. Evidently, fowl is a type of meat!

He answers that the Gemora explains that fowl is not included in “meat” because it is not healthy to eat fowl on a day of blood letting. Since in the Desert, the northern wind did not blow, and that is the reason why there was no circumcision then (the wind is needed to heal the child). Accordingly, there was no blood letting in the desert, as well. It emerges that there would be no distinction between fowl and meat in the Desert and fowl would be included in “meat.”

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Food for Thought - Nedarim Daf 32

*** The Beraisa quotes Rebbi as making the following statement: Milah is a great mitzvah, as there is no one who was involved in mitzvos like Avraham Avinu, and yet he was only called complete through milah, as the passuk says “walk before me and be complete,” and it says “and I will put my covenant between us.”

The Ksav Sofer asks: Perhaps milah is a minor mitzvah, but it was the mitzvah that rendered Avraham Avinu complete, for even a minor deficiency can prevent completeness?

*** Rabbi Ami bar Aba also says: The “Satan” numerically equals three hundred and sixty four (implying that one day a year he is powerless, which is Yom Kippur).

The Chidah asks: What is the advantage to us that the Satan is powerless on Yom Kippur? Why, there are so many other days in the year where he is detrimental to us?

He answers: On Yom Kippur, the Satan contradicts what he is saying the rest of the year. On Yom Kippur he says that there is no nation with such kedusha as Klal Yisroel. This renders him a liar (for that which he says the rest of the year) and gives us the strength to fend off his attacks on us for the rest of the year.

*** Rabbi Zecharyah said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Hashem wanted to have kehunah descend from Shem, as the passuk says “and he was a kohen for Hashem on high.” However, once Shem said a blessing to Avraham before saying a blessing to Hashem, Hashem decided to have kehunah descend from Avraham. This is as the passuk states, “and he blessed him and he said: blessed is Avram to the Hashem on high, Owner of heaven and earth, and praised is Hashem.” Avram asked Shem: Is it appropriate to mention first a blessing of the servant before that of his master? Kehunah was immediately given to Avraham, as the passuk states, “the word of Hashem was to my master, until I make your enemies into a footstool for your feet,” and it states “and he is a kohen for Hashem on high.” This implies that he (Shem) was a kohen, but his children would not be kohanim.

It is written in Pirkei d’Rabbi Eliezer that Avraham married Keturah, who was Hagar, after she converted.

Reb Yosef Engel asks: If Avraham was a kohen, how was he permitted to marry a divorcee?

He answers: This Medrash is of the opinion that Avraham did not have a daughter. Consequently, he had not fulfilled the mitzvah of procreation yet. There was no other woman fitting for Avraham to marry, and therefore, the positive commandment of procreation was able to override the prohibition against a kohen marrying a divorcee.

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What was Moshe's sin? Enthusiasm for Mitzvos

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah says (Nedarim 31b) : Great is circumcision, concerning which even Moshe the righteous was not spared for an hour.

The Ran comments: As soon as Moshe was lax, the angel wanted to kill him.

The Maharsha asks: Just because Moshe negated the mitzvah of circumcising his son on the eight day, is that a justification for him to be liable for death?

He answers: It is either because Hashem judges the righteous strictly or it is because a “ben Noach” is liable for death when he commits any type of transgression, and since it was prior to the Giving of the Torah, Moshe was being judged as a “ben Noach.”

Reb Meir Bergman asks: According to this explanation, how could the Mishna bring a proof from here that circumcision is great; perhaps it is different because of the special circumstances?

The Gemora states further: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah said: Great is circumcision, for all the meritorious deeds performed by Moshe our teacher did not protect him when he tarried in fulfilling the commandment of circumcision (regarding his son Eliezer), as it is written [Shmos 4:24]: And Hashem met him, and sought to kill him. Rabbi Yosi said: Heaven forbid that Moshe delayed circumcising his son, but rather, this is what Moshe said, “If I circumcise my son and immediately leave Midian to return to Pharaoh, I will endanger his life. I cannot circumcise him and wait three days, for the Holy One, blessed be He, has commanded me to go and return to Egypt! Why then was Moshe punished? It was because he occupied himself with arranging a place of lodging first prior to circumcising his son.

The Mefaresh explains: Since he was close to Egypt, he should have performed the circumcision when he stopped for lodging, for the small journey that remained would not have posed a danger to the child. He concludes that the child was only eight days old on that day.

Accordingly, the question is strengthened: Why would Moshe deserve such a strict punishment if he anyway performed the circumcision on the eight day? He was only guilty of not fulfilling the concept of zerizin makdimin l’mitzvos – a mitzvah should be fulfilled at the first moment possible. Why should he deserve to die?

Perhaps we may suggest the following answer (Rabbi Bergman answers in a very similar manner): The primary purpose of Moshe Rabbeinu’s life was to take the Jews out of Egypt and to give them the Torah. It is written regarding the birth of Moshe [Shmos 2:2]: The woman conceived and bore a son, and [when] she saw him that he was good, she hid him for three months. The Gemora in Sotah (12a) states that when he was born, the entire house was filled with light. This can be in reference to the light of Torah.

The Gemora in Megillah (16b) expounds on the verse that states [Esther 8:16]: Layehudim haysa orah visimcha visasson vikar. The Jews had light, gladness, joy and honor. Light is referring to Torah; Gladness is referring to the festivals; Joy is referring to circumcision; Glory is referring to tefillin.

The question is asked: If the Megillah wished to say that the Jews were saved because they fulfilled the Torah, festivals, milah and tefillin, why didn’t the Megillah write that explicitly? Why was it mentioned only in code form?

Rabbi Eliezer Ginzburg in his sefer, The King’s Treasures states the following: It is well known that evil decrees instituted against the Jewish people are always in correspondence with their sins. Each transgression draws a particular type of negative force in its wake. Hence, in order to determine what sin the Jewish people are being held accountable for at any given time, one need only consider the dominant characteristic of the nation threatening them, for their enemies are nothing more than a reflection of their transgressions.

Amalek was able to strike the Jewish people when their enthusiasm for Torah observance waned. The Mechilta says in reference to the verse [Shmos 17:8]: Amalek came and battled Israel in Rephidim. Amalek came because Israel loosened their grip on the Torah. This is why Rabbi Elozar introduced his lecture on the scriptural portion of the Book of Esther with the following verse: Through laziness the ceiling collapses, and through idleness of the hands the house leaks – because of the laziness of the Jews, who did not engage in Torah study, the enemies were capable of attacking.

Perhaps, Rabbi Ginzburg continues, this is what the Megillah is teaching us by saying that “the Jews had light,” and not simply saying that “the Jews had Torah.” The Jews were not guilty of completely neglecting Torah study, or for that matter, any other mitzvah. Their shortcoming was their lack of enthusiasm for mitzvos. It was the inner light of the mitzvah which they lacked, the spark of excitement and fervor for doing Hashem’s will. The miracles which Hashem performed for Israel stoked the smoldering embers within each Jew and evoked a new fervor for the performance of mitzvos, reawakening the “light” of Torah study, the “gladness” of the Yom Tov holidays, the “joy” of circumcision and the “glory” of tefillin.

Using this principle, perhaps we can suggest why the angel wished to kill Moshe for procrastinating in the fulfillment of a mitzvah. It was not that he was deserving to die for this relatively minor transgression. Rather, when Moshe displayed a slight lack of enthusiasm for the mitzvos, he could not be the one to deliver the Torah to the Jewish people, and this was the purpose of his life. Thereupon, Tziporah immediately went and took a sharp stone and performed the circumcision of her son. Rabbi Bergman concludes that Moshe repented for this and merited to accept the Torah from Hashem and to deliver it to the Jewish people.

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Positive Commandment Overriding a Negative One

The Gemora (Kesuvos 40a, Shabbos 132a) states that a positive commandment can override a prohibition that carries with it a standard punishment.

The Gemora provides an example for this: The positive commandment of performing circumcision overrides the negative commandment of cutting off tzaraas.

My brother, Reb Ben cites the opinion of Rabbeinu Nisim Gaon, who writes the following: Many people cast doubt on this precept, as we know that a negative commandment is more stringent than a positive commandment, so why should a positive commandment supersede a negative commandment? Rabbeinu Nisim answers that a positive commandment is set, and if there is a negative commandment, the negative commandment only functions if there is no contradiction to the positive commandment. This is what Hashem decreed, that the positive commandments remain in place, and the negative commandment only functions if there is no contradiction to the positive commandment. The Ramban , however, writes that the reason a positive commandment supersedes a negative commandment is because in reality, a positive commandment is greater than a negative commandment. A positive commandment is a reflection of the love Hashem has for us, because one who fulfills the instructions of his master is beloved by his master and the master will have compassion on him. A negative commandment, however, is a reflection of Hashem’s Attribute of Judgment, and stems from fear. Since love is greater than fear, the Torah states that a positive commandment supersedes a negative commandment.

Based on this premise, the Meshech Chochmah explains that one who violates a negative commandment deserves a greater punishment than one who does not fulfill the will of Hashem. Nonetheless, since it is the will of Hashem that one observes both positive and negative commandments, one who fulfils a positive commandment demonstrates his love for Hashem. One who does not violate a negative commandment, however, merely demonstrates that he is afraid and nothing more. For this reason, the torah states that a positive commandment supersedes a negative commandment. An example of this is one can wear Tzitzis with Techeiles on a garment of linen, as the positive commandment of wearing Tzitzis supersedes the negative commandment of shaatnez. The reason for this is that one who wears shaatnez does not transgress the will of Hashem. In fact, the opposite is true, as by donning Tzitzis, he is fulfilling the will of Hashem.

In regards to the question: Why is it that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition and yet the punishment for transgressing a prohibition is much more severe than the punishment for not fulfilling a positive commandment?, Reb Yossie Schonkopf said over a parable from his Rebbe: A trucker is hired to transport a load across the country and the owner warns him not to go beyond the speed limit, not to crash the vehicle and to follow all the road instructions. If the trucker does everything perfectly but doesn't unload the goods at his destination; rather, he arrives at the destined location and immediately turns around carrying the same load, what is accomplished by the fact that the trucker obeyed the speed limit and followed all the rules?

The meaning is as follows: Our mission in life is to accomplish in this world and 'build the love towards HaShem,’ therefore, this building overrides the transgressions. The prohibitions are only there to protect what has been built and not to suffocate the building.

This concept is elucidated by the Ramban in Parshas Yisro. He states that the fulfillment of a positive commandment is based on ahavas HaShem, loving HaShem and refraining from committing a transgression is based on yiras HaShem fearing HaShem. It is a higher level to serve HaShem through love, but it is worse to violate a prohibition, which is based upon fearing HaShem.

My brother, Reb Ben asked a similar question: The Gemora states that a positive commandment will override a negative commandment when both commandments are performed simultaneously. It is noteworthy that the Gemora in Sota states that a mitzvah cannot extinguish an aveira, a sin, yet an aveira can extinguish a mitzvah. Apparently, the principle that a positive commandment can override a negative commandment is not a contradiction to this Gemora. Perhaps the idea is that when one performs an aveira intentionally, he has rebelled against HaShem, and it is not possible for one to appease HaShem with a mitzvah when he has just committed an act of rebellion. When one is simultaneously overriding the negative commandment by performing a positive commandment, however, he is demonstrating that he is fully aware that he is performing a negative commandment, yet he is permitted by the Torah to override the negative commandment. This principle allows him to perform the positive commandment and be rewarded for its performance.

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PROTECTING THE FOOLS (who smoke) - Yevamos 72 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora asks: Why weren’t they circumcised in the Wilderness?

You can answer that it was due to the fatigue of the journey (this would have threatened their lives).

Alternatively, you can answer that it was because the north wind did not blow for them (the north wind is neither hot nor cold, and it usually scatters the clouds which enable the sun to shine through and heal the circumcision wound.)

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t the north wind blow?

The Gemora answers: They were being rebuked by Hashem (on account of the sin of the golden calf or because of the spies).

Alternatively, you can say that the northern wind didn’t blow in order that the Clouds of Glory should not scatter.

Rav Pappa said: Therefore, circumcision should not be performed on a cloudy day or on a day when the south wind blows; nor should one let blood on such a day. At the present time, however, since many people are in the habit of disregarding these precautions, we apply the verse [Tehillim 116:6]: Hashem protects the fools.

Rabbi Winston discusses the statement of "Hashem protects the fools." It is often used in situations of halachically- reasonable risk (Shabbos 129b; Yevamos 12b). For example, when many people do something that may be somewhat risky for one's health, but statistically, nothing has become conclusive, then halachically, one can continue to perform the act and not worry about the consequences. Even should there be some latent danger in the act, G-d will intercede on the person's behalf and protect the "fool."

For a long time, cigarette smoking fell into this category. Though the Torah is against all kinds of physical addiction for obvious reasons, as long as there wasn't conclusive proof that the risk factor wasn't as great as we now know it to be, and many people smoked without negative results, it remained halachically permissible to do so; G-d protects the fools.

However, cigarette smoking is now known to be the number one man-made killer of human beings, and this consciousness has made its way into the Torah world, albeit somewhat late. We are no longer "fools" with respect to the effects of cigarette smoking, and, the Poskim (those who decide Torah-law) have now posted signs asking those who still smoke to begin weaning themselves from doing so. For years already, however, they have forbid anyone to start smoking.

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CIRCUMCISION QUESTIONS - Yevamos 71 - Daf Yomi

*** The Gemora states: The words in the verse teach us that a circumcised Arab and a circumcised Gibeonite are included in the prohibition against eating from the Pesach offering.

The Gemora asks: But aren’t these people considered circumcised? We learned in a Mishna: If one takes a vow that he will not derive any pleasure from areilim (uncircumcised people), he is permitted to derive pleasure from uncircumcised Jews, but he is prohibited from deriving pleasure from a circumcised idolater. If one takes a vow that he will not derive any pleasure from mulim (circumcised people), he is permitted to derive pleasure from circumcised idolaters, but he is prohibited from deriving pleasure from an uncircumcised Jew. (It is evident that a circumcised idolater is regarded as uncircumcised.)

What is the comparison between the two cases? Perhaps it can be said that regarding vows, the halacha is that we interpret his words based on the vernacular, and an idolater is described as being uncircumcised even though they in fact are circumcised.

*** Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a convert who circumcised, but did not immerse himself yet in a mikvah is considered a full-fledged Jew; and he maintains that a child who born circumcised does not need covenantal blood to flow from him.

The Rama rules that if one circumcises a child at night, he is required to cause covenantal blood to flow from him. He also rules that if one circumcises a child before he is eight days old, he is not required to cause covenantal blood to flow from him.

What is the difference between the two cases?

*** Rava explained the braisa (the father was not considered negligent for not circumcising his son at the time of the slaughtering of the korban Pesach, but he is negligent for not circumcising him at the time of the eating) to be referring to a case where the father and mother of the child were released from prison after their korban was slaughtered. (An agent slaughtered the korban for them, but the circumcision of their child is incumbent on them to perform.)

Rashi explains that the mitzvah of circumcision rests on the father and the mother.

Doesn’t the Gemora in Kiddushin state that a woman is exempt from circumcising her son based on a verse in the Torah?

Why can’t the father appoint an agent to circumcise his son for him?

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 2 - Yibum with a Niddah

The Mishna lists fifteen women that exempt their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from chalitzah and from yibum. One of them is his wife’s sister.

Tosfos asks: Why didn’t the Mishna include a case where the yevamah was a niddah at the time that she fell to yibum? She is forbidden to him at that time and he would be subject to the penalty of kares; wouldn’t there be a prohibition against performing a yibum with her even after she purifies herself?

Tosfos compares this case to the case listed in the Mishna; his wife’s sister. He cannot perform a yibum with her even if his wife would die (one is permitted to marry his wife’s sister after his wife dies). The explanation is: We consider the situation at the time when she falls to yibum; since at that time she was forbidden, she remains prohibited forever. Tosfos’ question is: Why don’t we apply the same logic to a woman who was a niddah at the time that she fell to yibum and just as she is forbidden at that time, she should remain prohibited even after she purifies herself?

Tosfos cites a Gemora in Pesachim (72b) which seems to indicate that a yavam who performs a yibum with a niddah had accomplished a mitzvah, and he has acquired her despite the fact that a transgression was committed.

(Tosfos answers this question by creating a distinction between his wife’s sister, who is only forbidden to him and a niddah, who is forbidden to everyone.)

The Acharonim ask: How can it be that the yavam has fulfilled the mitzvah of yibum by performing a yibum with a niddah; shouldn’t this be considered a mitzvah habaah b’aveirah, a mitzvah that is a result of an aveira that is performed? The positive commandment of yibum cannot override the negative transgression of engaging in relations with a niddah; this transgression is subject to the penalty of kares and cannot be overridden by a positive commandment. There are many Rishonim who maintain that one who performs a mitzvah and simultaneously commits an aveira does not fulfill the mitzvah at all.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman (Kovetz Heoros 11:1) answers: One does not fulfill the mitzvah by a case of mitzvah habaah b’aveirah when the mitzvah is merely an action, such as shaking a lulav or blowing a shofar; he cannot be credited with a mitzvah when that action was an aveira, as well. However, when the mitzvah is more than an action, but rather what the action accomplished, this principle is not applicable. If one circumcises a nine-day old baby on Shabbos, the milah is valid and he has fulfilled a mitzvah, despite the fact that a transgression was committed. This is because the mitzvah is that the child should be circumcised and that result was attained. The mitzvah of yibum is the acquisition of the yevamah through an act of yibum. While one who performs a yibum with a niddah has violated the prohibition of having relations with a niddah, he nevertheless has acquired the yevamah and thus has fulfilled the mitzvah of yibum.

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Daf Yomi - Taanis 12 - BRIS MILAH ON TISHA B’AV THAT WAS POSTPONED

Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Tzadok said: I was of the sons of Sna'av from the tribe of Binyamin. One time Tisha B'av occurred on Shabbos and it was pushed off to Sunday. We fasted but did not complete the fast because it was our Yom Tov. Rashi explains that the lottery for bringing the wood offering for that family was on the Tenth of Av during the days of Ezra, and it was a Yom Tov for them forever. It is evident that it is considered a valid fast even though it was not completed. The Gemora answers that this was not meant to be a genuine fast; it was only undertaken to afflict them somewhat.

The Tur (O”C 559) writes that one year Tisha B'av fell on Shabbos and it was pushed of to Sunday. Rabbeinu Ya'avetz was a Ba'al Bris and he davened Mincha early in the afternoon. He washed and did not complete his fast because it was a Yom Tov for him - and his source was the case of Rav Elazar bar Tzadok.

The Chasam Sofer (O”C 157) writes that the Yom Tov for the bringing of the wood was established before Tisha B’av and therefore takes precedence over Tisha B’av; however a bris milah where the obligation came about after the establishment of Tisha B’av does not take precedence and therefore they would be required to complete the fast.

The Chasam Sofer concludes that the proof is actually from Rabbi Elozar ben Rabbi Tzadok who was a kohen. He was a son-in-law of Sna’av as Tosfos in Eruvin (41) explains. It emerges that Tisha B’av should have taken precedence over his Yom Tov and nevertheless he did not conclude his fast. This was the proof of Rabbeinu Ya’avetz.

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