Saving the Whales

by: Reb Avi Lebovitz

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The Gemora suggests a kal vachomer that would result in their being a mitzvah of preserving the life of animals. Although one may have a mitzvah to feed his own animals, the Gemora concludes that there is surely no mitzvah to support the animal (when it is no longer profitable), and certainly one is not obligated to support animals that are not his.

The Tosfos HaRosh asks in the name of Rabbeinu Meir: Why would we have thought differently? There should be an obvious challenge to this kal vachomer from the fact that one is not allowed to slaughter people, but may slaughter animals - this obviously shows that there isn’t any mitzvah to preserve the life of animals!?

The Tosfos HaRosh responds to this question by saying that we would have thought that this mitzvah would apply to animals that one is not allowed to slaughter, such as a bechor that is intermingled with an ox that is destined to be stoned (shor haniskal).

Aside from the actual question of the Tosfos HaRosh, the entire thought that one would be obligated to support animals and help them survive seems a little strange. Especially since in the end, the mitzvah of preserving a life only applies to a Jew and not to an idolater!?

The Biur Halachah (330:2) writes that one is obligated to help a ger toshav woman give birth because on a ger toshav, there is a mitzvah to preserve their life. He entertains the possibility that the Jew can even violate a Rabbinic prohibition to help the ger toshav give birth because when there is a mitzvah to preserve a life, the Rabbis did not issue their decrees. Based on this application of the mitzvah to preserve a life, the mitzvah goes beyond tzedakah; it compels one to actually take care of others and help them through physically challenging circumstances.

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The Designation of Money and the Timeliness of a Mitzvah

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The Gemora cited a braisa: The Purim collections must be distributed for Purim (and nothing else). The local collections belong to that town only, and we are not required to be so precise in the matter (how much is needed for Purim, and how much the poor of the city needs), but calves are purchased in abundance, slaughtered and eaten, and the surplus goes to the charity fund. Rabbi Eliezer said: The Purim collections must be used for Purim only, and the poor may not even buy straps for their shoes, unless it was stipulated in the presence of the townspeople that such shall be granted; these are the words of Rabbi Yaakov, who said it in the name of Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is lenient in the matter (and allows the poor person to use the charity funds for other uses besides the Purim feast). [We may derive from here that Rabbi Meir holds that we cannot deviate from the owner’s intent.]

The Gemora notes that this braisa does not prove that (whoever deviates from the owner’s stipulation is regarded as a thief), for perhaps there too, the reason is that the donors gave the charity only that it should be used for Purim, and not for any other purpose? [Regarding charity funds, there is a significant difference between the two purposes, whereas the two routes discussed in our case are not significantly different than each other, for one is not more dangerous in any way than the other.]

The Chavos Yair quotes a Sefer Chasidim, who derives from this Gemora that if one sends his fellow a gift of food to be eaten on Shabbos, it is forbidden for the recipient to eat it during the weekdays. If he has leftover, he should let the rest of household partake in it, but only on Shabbos. If the donor explicitly stipulated that he should be the only one to eat from it, he may not give it to others.

It would seem from our Gemora that this is not merely an act of piousness; but rather, it is halachically mandated. We can extrapolate further that if one gives money or wine to his fellow and he tells him that is should be used for Kiddush, he must use it for Kiddush, and nothing else. It would be forbidden to buy fish for Shabbos with this money, for Kiddush is a Biblical mitzvah, and eating fish on Shabbos is merely a Rabbinic one.

However, according to the prevailing custom that money is given to Torah scholars, and they are told to use it for Shabbos and Yom Tov, that is only out of respect, but they are not actually being particular as to what it should be used for; in such cases, they could use the money for whatever they desire.

Reb Yosef Engel cites the following Yerushalmi: If one vows to bring a flour-offering on Yom Tov, he should not bring it on a weekday. This is why the seforim write that a transgression committed on Shabbos is more severe than one committed on a weekday, for the holiness of the day plays a role. So too it may be said regarding the performance of a mitzvah; There will be a greater reward for a mitzvah performed on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

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Kodoshim Damaging

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Rabbi Abba(Bava Kamma 13) says: If shelamim damage, one collects from their meat (which is eaten) and not from their limbs (which is burnt on the mizbe’ach).

The Ketzos Hachoshen asks: Why, even according to Rabbi Yosi HaGelili, who holds that kodshim kalim are not the property of the High, should one be liable to pay for the damages? It is forbidden to derive pleasure from this animal, and something that is forbidden to derive benefit from is regarded as if it is ownerless!?

The Minchas Chinuch notes that this question is only according to the Rishonim, who maintain that something that is forbidden to derive benefit from is regarded as if it is ownerless. However, there are Rishonim who hold that one is considered the owner on things that are forbidden for benefit; it is just that it is not regarded as being under his domain. Accordingly, one would still be liable if his korban shelamim damaged.

Reb Shimon Shkop distinguishes between two types of items that are forbidden for pleasure. There are things that the Torah requires one to destroy. Such items are considered ownerless, and one cannot betroth a woman with those items. However, there are other items that are forbidden to derive benefit from because they are designated for a mitzvah, such as a sukkah during the holiday of Sukkos, tefillin and korbanos – these items are regarded as his. One would be allowed to sell them, for that does not retract from the mitzvah – it does not contradict that which it was designated for. One would be permitted to betroth a woman with a korban. This is why he would be liable if his shelamim damaged.

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A Single Grain is Sufficient

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Rabbi Chiya bar Avin inquired of Rav Huna (Kiddushin 58) : Is the “benefit of gratitude” regarded as money or not?

The Gemora comments: Let us say that this is a matter of a Tannaic dispute, for we learned in a braisa: If one steals the tevel (untithed produce) of his fellow, he is obligated to pay him for the value of the entire tevel (including the terumah and ma’aser that is mixed in, according to its value to him based upon his ability to choose who he wants to give them to). Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah says: He is only obligated to pay him for the value of the chulin. It must be that Rebbe holds that the ability to choose who to give something to has a monetary value, while Rabbi Yosi holds it does not.

The Gemora rejects this, and gives an alternate explanation to their argument. Everyone holds that the matanos (gift portions for the Kohen) that were not yet separated are considered as if they were separated, and the “benefit of gratitude” is not regarded as money, and the dispute is regarding Shmuel’s ruling, for Shmuel said: One grain of wheat can exempt an entire pile (and there would be no need to separate any more terumah). Rebbe holds of Shmuel’s ruling (and the thief would be required to pay the full value, for the owner could have exempted himself with one grain of wheat), and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah does not.

The Acharonim ask that Shmuel is only discussing the Biblical requirement, but the Chachamim instituted that one must give at least one sixtieth of his produce to the Kohen as terumah! If so, the thief should be exempt from paying the value of terumah that he is Rabbinically required to give!?

The Oneg Yom Tov answers based on the Tosfos Ri”d, who says that even Rabbinically speaking, one grain of wheat can exempt an entire pile from the prohibition of tevel. The Chachamim instituted that there is a mitzvah of giving to the Kohen. This, however, the owner could claim that he would not have given, and the thief would therefore be required to pay the entire amount.

The Mishnah Lamelech disagrees and holds that if one does not give at least one-sixtieth to the Kohen, it is Rabbinically regarded as tevel. Accordingly, the thief should not be required to pay the entire amount!?

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Half and Half

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 38a) relates an incident: There was a certain slavewoman in Pumbedisa who was used by men for sinful acts. Abaye said: Were it not that Rav Yehudah has said in the name of Shmuel that whoever emancipates his Canaanite slave violates a positive commandment, I would compel her master to write an emancipation document for her.

Ravina said: In such a case, Rav Yehudah would agree that this is proper, in order to prevent the immorality.

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t Abaye permit this as well? But Rav Chanina bar Rav Katina has said in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak: There was an incident regarding a certain woman who was half slavewoman and half free woman (she had two masters, and one of them freed her), and they forced her master to make her a free woman. And Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: It was because people were acting immorally with her!?

The Gemora answers: In that case, she was not suitable to marry a slave or a free man; here, they could have designated a slave for her, and he would have protected her (therefore, there is no reason to free her).

The Minchas Chinuch (§ 347) asks from this Gemora on the Rashba, who holds that there is no prohibition against freeing a half slave, half free man because of his “free half.” If so, what is the Gemora asking on Abaye from the case of the half slavewoman and half free woman? Abaye would concede there that it is permitted to free her because she is already half free!?

The Oneg Yom Tov (§ 51) answers that the Rashba only said that regarding a slave, where his free half is obligated in more mitzvos than his slave half, for if he gains his freedom, he will have the ability to fulfill the mitzvah of procreation. The Torah, therefore, did not obligate the master to work him forever. However, by a slavewoman, who will not have the mitzvah of procreation even if she gains her freedom, the prohibition against emancipating her remains!

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An Idolatrous Name

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel (Daf Yomi: Gittin 34b): The Jews from abroad sent to Rabban Gamliel the following inquiry: If a man comes here from Eretz Yisroel whose true name is Yosef, but who is known here as Yochanan, or whose name is Yochanan, but who is known here as Yosef, how can he divorce his wife? Rabban Gamliel thereupon stood up and decreed that they should write in the get, “This man So-and-so or by whatever names he is known,” “This woman So-and-so or by whatever names she is known,” in order to benefit the public.

They asked Rabbeinu Tam regarding a Jew who worships idols and he divorced his wife with a get which had only his Jewish name written on it, and not his idolatrous name. What is the status of such a get?

He answered: Heaven forbid to even mention an idolatrous name on a get which is written according to the law of Moshe and all of Israel!

The Ra”dach in his response explains that his idolatrous name is not regarded as his name at all, and if that would be the only name written on the get, it would be as if the get would be written without the name of the divorcing husband.

However, Reb Yosef Engel notes that from the language of Rabbeinu Tam, it would seem that there is a different explanation. It is on account of the sanctity of the get that his idolatrous name cannot be written.

And the Rad”vaz in his response writes like that as well. He says that any holy scroll, such as a Sefer Torah, Tefillin, or Mezuzah, where there lies an obligation that it should be written lishmah, and also a get has sanctity, for it is also has a requirement to be written lishmah.

He concludes that the matzah which is being baked to be eaten on Pesach night also possesses sanctity, for it is required to be baked lishmah.

It is possible that this could explain the custom of many righteous people to kiss the matzah before they eat it on the night of the seder.

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Sinner should not Gain

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 15a) cites a braisa: Rabbi Shimon said: In truth, the sinner’s minchah should require oil and levonah, for we do not want the sinner to gain. Why then does it not require them? It is because we do not want his minchah to be elegant.

The Gemora (Yoma 86b) states that repentance is so great that willful transgressions can be regarded as merits, providing that one is motivated to repent by love.

The question is asked: How can that be? Isn’t the sinner gaining?

The Maharsha answers: The Gemora does not mean that the sin itself converts into a merit; but rather, through his repentance out of love, he will merit performing other mitzvos and good deeds.

Reb Tzadok Hakohen answers: The sin does convert into a merit. This is because once a person has tasted the pleasure of a sin, it becomes more difficult for him to control himself and not sin again. If, after sinning, one can nevertheless restrain himself from transgressing again, he will merit that his sins are converted into merits.

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Reasons for a Mitzvah

The Tur (Y”D 181) cites the Rambam who writes that the Torah prohibits rounding the corners of one’s head and destroying one’s beard because it was the practice of idolaters.

The Tur writes that we do not need to seek out the reasons for mitzvos, for they are the King’s commandments, even if we do not understand the reason.

The Beis Yosef defends the Rambam, and he writes that there is no one who is concerned for the honor of the Torah and its mitzvos more than the Rambam. Although the laws of the Torah can be decrees from the King, nevertheless, wherever a reason for the mitzvah is found, it may be said. Whenever a reason cannot be found, it should be attributed to our shallow understanding. We are, nonetheless, obligated to fulfill those mitzvos that we do not understand its reasons in the same manner as we are obligated to fulfill those mitzvos that we do understand.

He concludes that the Rambam did not think up the reason for these mitzvos himself; rather, he saw from the juxtaposition of the verses that this is the reason for these prohibitions.

The Rama explains the Tur: Heaven forbid to think that the Tur suspected the Rambam to mean that if one does not understand the rationale for a mitzvah, he is not obligated to fulfill it. No sage will believe such a thing! However, those heretics who deny the truth of the Torah only believe in a mitzvah that they understand its reason. Rather, the following is the way that the Tur understood the Rambam: It is only if one shaves his head or destroys his beard in the same manner that the idolaters do; that is when one has transgressed this prohibition. The Tur writes that it is forbidden in any fashion whatsoever. Since the reason is not explicit in the Torah, the prohibition always applies. There is no room for leniency in a place where the reason is not applicable!

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Practical Guidelines for Visiting the Sick

The Gemora (Nedarim 40a) cites an incident: Rav Chelbo fell ill. Thereupon, Rav Kahana went out and proclaimed: Rav Chelbo is sick. But no one visited him. He rebuked them, saying, “Did it not once happen that one of Rabbi Akiva’s students fell ill and the Sages did not visit him? Rabbi Akiva himself went to visit him, and because they swept the ground and settled the dust before him (as per Rabbi Akiva’s instructions), he recovered. ‘My master,’ said the student, ‘you have revived me!’ Rabbi Akiva went out and lectured: He who does not visit the sick is regarded as if he spills blood (since it may lead to his death).”

The Rosh gleans from this Gemora and the Aruch Hashulchan (Y”D 335:2) rules accordingly that the primary mitzvah of visiting the sick is to check on the sick person’s needs and to do whatever is deemed necessary. The Aruch Hashulchan (ibid. 8) concludes that one who visits the sick and does not pray for mercy on his behalf has not fulfilled the mitzvah.

Our affiliate, Hakhel wrote about some of the important requirements of properly performing the mitzva of visiting the sick person. They are:

1. Davening for the choleh while visiting. Since the Shechina rests above the head of a sick person, tefilah is more efficacious in front of the sick person (Rema, Yoreh Deah 335:4). The tefilah should include the following nusach "Hamokom Yerachem Alecha B'soch Cholei Yisroel", so that the choleh benefits from the z'chus harabim (Yoreh Deah 335:6). Tefila in the presence of the choleh can be said in any language, because the Shechina is present and, of course, understands all language of prayer (Yoreh Deah 335:5).

2. Seeking help for the choleh, both physically and emotionally—Does he have everything he needs—all the medications, the deodorant, toothpaste? Does he need Torah Tapes (718-438-3904)? Does his nurse know what an important person he is? Does he need to see a Rov or more friends? (Yoreh Deah 335:8)

c. 3. Providing Positive Reinforcement. Is the choleh kept in the right frame of mind all day? Provide positive reinforcements, words of encouragement, bring in light (open the shades) and cleanliness (clean up the bedroom floor if need be). (Nedorim 40A; Ahavas Chesed 3:3)

4. According to the Chochmas Odom (151:3) the ikar (main point) of Bikur Cholim is davening for the sick person while visiting him. In fact, the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (193:3) poskens that one has not fulfilled the mitzvah of Bikur Cholim if he visits, but does not daven to Hashem while there. This is because the Shechina is present above the head of the sick person, and your tefillos are, k’viyachol, in front of the Shechina itself (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 335, Shach seif katan 3). In your tefillah, you should ask for Hashem’s mercy for that particular choleh “b’soch cholei Yisroel” (amongst the other sick of Israel), because, in the merit of the many, your tefillos will be better received (ibid., Shach seif katan 4).

5. Bikur Cholim should not be performed when it is convenient for the visitor, but when it is best for the choleh. As the halacha states, one should not visit in the first three hours of the day… the last three hours of the day…, etc. (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 335:4).

6. In addition to tefillah, there is a mitzvah to give the choleh “nachas ruach” (Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:3). This does not mean that one should speak on and on, or even with witticisms. Statements should as “You’ll now have to take that medicine for the rest of your life,” or “Next time, you’ll be more careful,” or even “How will this affect your life going forward?” may be equated with smacking a poor person across the face and knocking out a few teeth as you hand him a hundred dollars with a smile.

7. The Chazon Ish (Collected Letters, Volume I:138) writes that everyone has the mitzvah to perform “Bikur Cholilm” upon himself, as well. This means that he must take care of his body and use the most effective means possible for his personal health.

8. One should try to tidy up and make the atmosphere more cheery for the choleh, if possible. The Gemara (Nedarim 40A) relates that Rabbi Akiva himself swept and cleaned the floor for his sick student. As a result, the student told him, “You have caused me to live.” Rabbi Akiva then taught, “He who does not perform the mitzvah of Bikur Cholim, it is as if he spilled blood.” The reverse is also, of course, true. In fact, the Gemara clearly teaches that one who acts wisely with the ill will himself be saved from “a bad day” by Hashem (see Tehillim 41 and Gemara, Nedarim 40A).

9. Finally, one should consider a choleh’s status after he leaves the hospital, and even after he returns to shul or to work. The fact that he has somewhat healed does not necessarily mean that he is not suffering pain or is otherwise in distress. One should continue to daven for, and inquire as to, a person’s welfare, until he is confident that the choleh has received his refuah shlaimah.

Hakhel

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Distinction between Charity and Returning a Lost Object

The Gemora (Nedarim 33) states regarding one who is forbidden by a vow to derive benefit from his fellow; the fellow is permitted to return his lost property to him. This is permitted because his primary intention is to fulfill the mitzvah, and he is not intending to provide pleasure to his friend.

This, explains the Shitah Mikubetzes, is in contrast to the mitzvah of giving charity, which would be forbidden. What is the difference between the two mitzvos? He explains: When charity is given to him, he is benefiting directly from the money; therefore, it is forbidden. When his lost object is returned, he is not deriving pleasure from the item; he is getting benefit from the fact that his fellow troubled himself to return the object to him. Regarding his fellow’s exertion, it may be said that his intention is to fulfill the mitzvah, and not to provide pleasure.

Others make the following distinction: Charity may be given to any poor person; it does not have to be given to this specific poor person. That is why it is prohibited to give this particular poor person charity. However, in order to fulfill the mitzvah of returning a lost object, it must be returned to the one who lost the item, and therefore, it would be permitted.

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Incidental Benefit

Abaye explains the Gemora (Nedarim 16b) as follows: In the case of a vow, one says, “The pleasure of the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” (Since the vow is upon the object, not the person, it is effective.) However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not derive any pleasure from the sukkah.” (Since the oath is upon the person and the mitzvah is upon the person, they are contradicting each other and the oath cannot take effect.)

Rava asks on Abaye’s language: Were mitzvos given to derive benefit from them? (He should still be able to sit in the sukkah?)

Rather, Rava explains: In the case of a vow, one says, “The sitting in the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not sit in the sukkah.”

The Reshash asks on Rava’s question: Although the mitzvos were not given for the purpose of deriving benefit from them, it still should be forbidden to sit in the sukkah in this situation? This is because he is enjoying the incidental pleasure of the shade!

He answers that if it is shade that the person desires, he could stay inside the house. The reason he chose to sit in a sukkah is solely because of the mitzvah. It is therefore not regarded as if he is befitting from the shade of the sukkah.

The Machaneh Efraim is not satisfied with this answer. He asks that the bottom line is that he is not dwelling in his house; he is inside the sukkah and enjoying its shade! Why should this be permitted?

The Oneg Yom Tov answers: We are only concerned with the physical pleasure when the benefit is purely incidental and not related to the mitzvah. However, the mitzvah of sukkah is different. The Torah commands us to dwell in the sukkah in the same manner that one would live in his house. The enjoyment of sitting in a sukkah is not regarded as an incidental benefit; this is the fulfillment of the mitzvah. And since mitzvos were not given for the purpose of deriving pleasure from them, the (direct) benefit that one receives as he is fulfilling the mitzvah is not regarded as a benefit, and is therefore permitted.

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Ran Elucidated - Daf 16

Distinction between a vow and an oath - The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for this: How do we know that one cannot swear to transgress a mitzvah? It is because it is written [Bamidbar 30:3]: If a man makes a vow to Hashem or makes an oath to prohibit himself, he shall not desecrate his word; according to whatever came out of his mouth, he shall do. We see from here that only “his word” (a discretionary matter) he should not desecrate. However, he may desecrate it when it involves the wishes of Heaven (where his oath contradicts a mitzvah).

The Gemora asks: Why is a vow any different? If it is because it says makes a vow to Hashem, which implies that he should not desecrate his word even when his vow involves the wishes of Heaven, why, by an oath, it is also written makes an oath to Hashem (since the words “to Hashem” is written between a vow and an oath)?

Abaye answers: In the case of a vow, one says, “The pleasure of the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” (Since the vow is upon the object, not the person, it is effective.) However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not derive any pleasure from the sukkah.” (Since the oath is upon the person and the mitzvah is upon the person, they are contradicting each other and the oath cannot take effect.)

The Ran explains: It is reasonable that the word “to Hashem” should be referring to a vow, but not an oath. It is logical to assume that a neder in this manner will take effect. This is because he is not vowing directly against the Torah’s commandment. The neder takes effect and he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the sukkah because we cannot force a person to eat something that is forbidden to him. However, by an oath, he is saying that he will not sit in the sukkah. This is a direct contradiction to the Torah’s commandment and he doesn’t have the power to free himself from the Torah’s commandment to sit in a sukkah.

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Oath to Fulfill a Mitzvah

The Ran and Rosh (Nedarim 8a) argue whether an oath to fulfill a mitzvah is binding in the sense that one would be in violation of “desecrating his word” for not keeping his promise. Ran understands that an oath on a mitzvah is not binding for the purpose of being liable for a korban, but is binding, and if he transgresses the mitzvah, he has violated the prohibition against desecrating his word. The Rosh seems to understand that it is not binding at all. This is also the opinion of the Ramban brought by Reb Akiva Eiger.

Reb Avi Lebowitz points out that based on this understanding, they also argue as to what the novelty of Rav Gidal’s teaching is. The Ran understands that the oath is binding and therefore obviously not an oath taken in vain, so the novelty is that one is encouraged to make these types of oaths (even those who generally refrain from taking oaths), for it will inspire him to fulfill the mitzvah. But, according to the Rosh that the oath is not really binding, the novelty is simply that by making such an “oath,” it is not an automatic violation of an oath taken in vain, since it at least accomplishes a function of encouraging the person to fulfill the mitzvah.

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Drinking Wine by Kiddush

The Gemora (Nedarim 4a)explains that the novelty of a chatas nazir is that it cannot be pledged to be brought as a vow. When we asked earlier that this is a trademark of all chatas offerings, it is possible to answer that all other chatas offerings are obviously not brought because they are pledged, as they are obligated to be brought to atone for a sin. However, why is a korban chatas of a nazir brought? [One might therefore have thought the prohibition of delaying vows does not apply to it, which is why the hekeish is needed.]

The Gemora asks: The korban chatas of a woman who gives birth is also not brought for a sin that she committed, but nonetheless we know the prohibition for delaying vows does apply to her korban chatas. [Why should a korban chatas of a nazir be different?]

The Gemora answers: Her korban chatas is still different than that of a nazir, as it enables her to eat kodoshim (korbanos, which she was unable to eat beforehand and is a mitzvah).

The Meiri asks: Doesn’t the chatas offering of a nazir help him that he is now permitted to drink wine?

Tosfos and the Ran answer that drinking wine is a voluntary act, and it is not a mitzvah like the eating of kodoshim.

However, we can ask: What about the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush and havdalah? The Gemora Pesachim (106a) derives from the verse Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it that there is an obligation to recite kiddush over a cup of wine. Accordingly, we should say that a nazir’s bringing of the korbanos is similar to that of a woman who gave birth; he is bringing the korban in order to be permitted to partake in the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush?

The Meiri answers: The mitzvah of drinking the wine for kiddush is only a Rabbinical one, and the korban is not coming for that.

Tosfos explains that although there is a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush with wine, the obligation that the one who recites the blessing should drink the wine is only Rabbinical.

Reb Koby Shapiro in the Hebrew Midrashiya states that there may be a practical difference in halacha whether the mitzvah of drinking the wine is a Biblical one or merely Rabbinical.

It is ruled upon in Shulchan Aruch that a woman is Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush on Shabbos. Accordingly, she would be allowed to discharge a man of his obligation by reciting the kiddush for him.

The Acharonim raise the following question: When a man comes home from Shul Friday night, he has already fulfilled his Biblical obligation of kiddush in the Shemoneh Esrei of ma’ariv. He still has a Rabbinical obligation to recite the kiddush over a cup of wine. His wife, on the other hand, who did not daven ma’ariv, still has a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush. How can the man, who only has a Rabbinical obligation discharge his wife of her Biblical obligation?

Some answer that she should recite vayechulu prior to kiddush.

Reb Akiva Eiger answers that there is no concern here because of the principle that one who has fulfilled the mitzvah can nevertheless discharge an obligation for someone who did not yet fulfill the mitzvah. This works because every Jew is a guarantor for another. Some Acharonim are not satisfied with this answer because they say that a woman is not included in this guarantee for each other.

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is as if the husband had intention not to fulfill the Biblical obligation of kiddush when he is davening ma’ariv. This way, they are both Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush.

This entire discussion is based upon the Meiri’s opinion that the mitzvah of drinking the wine is merely a Rabbinical mitzvah. However, if we would hold that there is a Biblical mitzvah to drink the wine of kiddush, then, there would be no discussion, for the husband still has not discharged his own obligation by davening ma’ariv; he still has a Biblical obligation to drink the wine.

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Light of Torah

Rabbi Elozar said (Kesuvos 111b): One who uses the light of Torah, the light of Torah will revive him; those that do not use the light of Torah, the light of Torah will not revive them.

The Chafetz Chaim explains: Every Jewish person merits a portion in the World to Come. The distinction is as follows: The soul of a person will bask in the pleasure of Gan Eden because it is the soul of a Jewish person; however, regarding the body, which has already become dust, nothing will revive it except for the light of Torah that he learned himself, or if he supported others in their study of Torah and certainly if he provided for his children the ability to learn Torah. Those people that did none of these things will merit a share in Gan Eden, but are in grave danger of not being resurrected.

The Beis Halevi explains: There is a distinction between an article that was used for holiness and one which was used for a mitzvah. An article used for a mitzvah may be discarded immediately after usage because the holiness has ceased upon the completion of the mitzvah. However, regarding an article used for holiness, the holiness remains forever; it must be treated as a holy object and may not be discarded.

The body of someone who learns Torah is considered an article of holiness; even after he dies, the holiness remains and that is what revives him at the time of Resurrection. However, concerning one who does not study Torah, his body is regarded as an article that was used for a mitzvah; when he dies, his body does not retain the holiness and he cannot revive at the time of Resurrection.

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The Parameters of Living in Eretz Yisroel Atoning for our Sins

Rabbi Elozar says: One who lives in Eretz Yisroel lives without sin (their sins are forgiven).

The Chasam Sofer writes: He must be a permanent resident of Eretz Yisroel in order to merit this. One who is a guest in Eretz Yisroel does not merit having his sins forgiven.

The Ben Yehoyadah disagrees and says that while he is living in Eretz Yisroel, even if his intention is to return to the Diaspora, his sins will be atoned for.

The Pnei Yehoshua is bothered by this Gemora: If every sin committed in Eretz Yisroel is forgiven automatically, why were our forefathers punished and driven into Exile and the Beis Hamikdosh was destroyed because of their sins? He states that Eretz Yisroel has the capacity to forgive sins if one is living there because there is a mitzvah to settle Eretz Yisroel because of its holiness. He wants that the merit of Eretz Yisroel should protect him against sinning. A person who happens to live there because he was born there, or one that resides in Eretz Yisroel because of its delicious produce and certainly the brazenly wicked people will not be protected from sinning and will not be granted atonement for their sins.

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Settling in Eretz Yisroel Nowadays

The Mishna (Kesuvos 110b) had stated: A man may force all of his family members to go up to Eretz Yisroel, but he may not force them to leave Eretz Yisroel. A man may force all of his family members to go up to Yerushalayim, but he may not force them to leave Yerushalayim. This applies to both men and women (a wife can force the husband).

The Gemora explains that these halachos are based upon the mitzvah of furthering the settlement of Eretz Yisroel.

The Ramban says that this mitzvah is a Biblical commandment. The Rambam omits this mitzvah is his Sefer Hamitzvos. There are those that explain that the Rambam holds that it’s only a Rabbinical mitzvah. Other say that the Rambam holds it is not a mitzvah at all; the only reason why a man can force his family members to move to Eretz Yisroel is because this way, they will be able to fulfill the mitzvos which are dependent upon the Land of Israel.

The Ritva writes that the applications of the Mishna apply to nowadays also. Proof to this is from the fact that Rebbe incorporated these halachos into the Mishna even though he was living in the times after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

Tosfos cites Rabbeinu Chaim Kohen that there is no mitzvah nowadays because there are many mitzvos there which entail many punishments, and it will be impossible for one to be careful regarding all of them. This can be simply understood to mean that although there might be a mitzvah to live in Eretz Yisroel, it is simply not worth it, for one will lose out by transgressing many aveiros there. Reb Avi Lebowitz (and afterwards I found this logic in the Beis Halevi) explains a little differently: Rabbeinu Chaim is actually describing the mitzvah of living in Eretz Yisroel to be for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzvos that apply there. If one were to live in Eretz Yisroel without properly performing the mitzvos, they are not only losing out on these additional mitzvos; they are also not fulfilling the mitzvah of living in Eretz Yisroel.

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Distinction between Charity and Returning a Lost Object

The Gemora (Kesuvos 108a) states regarding one who is forbidden by a vow to derive benefit from his fellow; the fellow is permitted to return his lost property to him. This is permitted because his primary intention is to fulfill the mitzvah, and he is not intending to provide pleasure to his friend.

This, explains the Shitah Mikubetzes, is in contrast to the mitzvah of giving charity, which would be forbidden. What is the difference between the two mitzvos? He explains: When charity is given to him, he is benefiting directly from the money; therefore, it is forbidden. When his lost object is returned, he is not deriving pleasure from the item; he is getting benefit from the fact that his fellow troubled himself to return the object to him. Regarding his fellow’s exertion, it may be said that his intention is to fulfill the mitzvah, and not to provide pleasure.

Others make the following distinction: Charity may be given to any poor person; it does not have to be given to this specific poor person. That is why it is prohibited to give this particular poor person charity. However, in order to fulfill the mitzvah of returning a lost object, it must be returned to the one who lost the item, and therefore, it would be permitted.

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Showing Gratitude to the Swindlers

The Gemora (Kesuvos 68) cites an incident: Rabbi Chanina had a poor man to whom he regularly sent four zuz on every Erev Shabbos. One day he sent the money with his wife who came back and told him that the man was in no need of charity. Rabbi Chanina asked her, “What did you see?” She replied, “I heard that he was asked, ‘On what would you like to dine? Would you like silver or gold tablecloths?’” Rabbi Chanina remarked, “It is because of such cases that Rabbi Elozar said: Come and let us be grateful to the swindlers (who pretend to be poor), for were it not for them, we would have been sinning every day (on account of ignoring the poor).

*** The Gemora cites a Scriptural verse proving that one is regarded as a sinner if he does not give charity to a poor person. Why is a special verse necessary? The mitzvah of giving tzedakah should be like any other mitzvah, and one who refrains from giving to a pauper should automatically be transgressing this mitzvah?

*** How can we give gratitude to the swindlers; it is prohibited to provide assistance for one who is committing a transgression? Cheaters and swindlers are from the group that will not merit seeing the Shechina; wouldn’t it be better if there weren’t any swindlers at all?

*** What sin are we showing gratitude to the swindlers for? Is it for the sin of ignoring a genuine poor person, or perhaps, it is only if we ignore a person whom we are uncertain if he is actually poor or not?

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Yevamah’s Mitzvah

The Gemora (Kesuvos 64a) states that we don’t write a certificate of rebelliousness against the yavam because we tell the yevamah, “Go, you are not obligated in this mitzvah!”

Rashi explains: The mitzvah to procreate obligates men, but not women.

The question can be asked: What about the mitzvah of yibum? Even if the woman is exempt from the commandment to procreate, but if she is obligated in the mitzvah of yibum, it should be regarded as the yavam is depriving the yevamah of her mitzvah. It is evident from our Gemora that the mitzvah of yibum is applicable only to the yavam, and not to the yevamah.

The Avudraham writes that the yevamah does not recite a blessing when she submits to chalitzah or yibum because she is exempt from the mitzvah of procreation. It seems that the two mitzvos are dependent upon each other; since she is not obligated to have children, she is exempt from the mitzvah of yibum.

The Rambam in his Sefer HaMitzvos (216) writes that there is a commandment for the yavam to perform a yibum with his brother’s wife when his brother died childless.

The Minchas Chinuch (1:15) states that it is implicit from the Rambam that he maintains that the mitzvah of yibum is an obligation for the man (the yavam) and not for the woman (the yevamah).

The Chinuch (Mitzvah 598 and 599) states explicitly that the mitzvah of yibum is only applicable to men and not to women.

The Minchas Chinuch cites a Pnei Yehoshua in Kesuvos (40a) that the mitzvah of yibum also applies to the yevamah.

Why should there be an obligation for the yevamah; the Torah explicitly states that the brother should marry his brother’s wife. It is not written anywhere that she shall be taken for yibum?

Reb Ezriel Cziment, in his sefer Mitzvos Hamelech answers: Besides the mitzvah of performing a yibum, there is also an obligation to establish a name for the deceased. It is this mitzvah that the yevamah plays an integral role in and she is thus included in the mitzvah obligation.

This would seemingly be inconsistent with our Gemora.

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