Carrying a Siddur on Shabbos - Yevamos 114 - Daf Yomi

The following is a discussion from Meorot HaDaf HaYomi: In places without a kosher eiruv, it is forbidden to carry outside on Shabbos. Today, most shuls are well stocked with siddurim. However, in generations gone by, people had to bring their own siddurim from home. It was then a common question how to daven in shul on Shabbos, if one could not carry his siddur from home. R’ Akiva Eiger was once asked if a child could be given a siddur to carry to shul for his parents. For their own benefit: As we learn in our sugya, children may not be fed forbidden foods. Similarly, they may not be encouraged to transgress other prohibitions. However, the Rashba rules that this applies only to Torah prohibitions. Children may be encouraged to transgress a Rabbinic prohibition. As a proof, the Rashba cites the Gemara (Shabbos 139a), that forbids encouraging a child to sow kilayim (mixed seeds) even outside of Israel, where the prohibition is only Rabbinic. The Gemara explains that he might get accustomed to this habit, and continue even after he grows up. From here it seems that only because of this fear, do we forbid encouraging a young child to sow Rabbinically forbidden kilayim. The general prohibition against encouraging children to sin, seems not to apply. The Rashba adds that the fear of him getting accustomed to sin applies only when we ask him to sin for our sake. When we ask him to do something for his own benefit, this does not apply. (For this reason, we encourage children to eat on Yom Kippur). Our streets are not reshus harabim: Accordingly, R’ Akiva Eiger rules that although many Poskim hold that our streets are generally not reshus harabim by Torah standards (since they are not regularly traveled by 600,000 people), it is still forbidden to ask a child to carry a siddur for an adult to use. We may only ask him to carry a siddur for himself, and then look along inside with him (Teshuvos R’ Akiva Eiger 15, cited in Biur Halacha 343). It will not lead to a Torah prohibition: In his public lectures, the Maharam Shick warned against asking children to carry outside where there is no eiruv. However, in his writings he finds some room to be lenient. He explains, based on the Rashba, that the general prohibition against encouraging children to sin does not apply to Rabbinic prohibitions. Furthermore, the concern that he might get accustomed to sin applies only to Rabbinic sins whose Torah counterparts are common. For example, kilayim is forbidden by Rabbinic law in the Diaspora, and forbidden by Torah law in Eretz Yisroel.

However, the Torah prohibition of carrying was almost inapplicable in the Maharam Shick’s time, since there were no roads commonly traveled by 600,000 people. Therefore, perhaps small children may be asked to carry for their parents (Teshuvos Maharam Shik, 173).

The Shulchan Aruch’s ruling: This question is relevant only according to the Rashba, who rules that there is no general prohibition against encouraging young children to transgress Rabbinic prohibitions. However, the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 343) follows the opinion that even this is forbidden. Therefore, there is certainly no room to permit asking a child to carry for an adult, even in a Rabbinically forbidden area.

Chinuch: Furthermore, this discussion concerns only children who are too young to be educated in mitzva observance. Nevertheless, our sugya forbids feeding them Torah prohibited foods. Here, the Rashba rules that Rabbinically prohibited foods may be fed to them. However, the Rashba certainly agrees that once a child has reached the age to be educated in mitzva observance, his father must teach him to observe all the mitzvos – both Torah and Rabbinic. Therefore, he may not carry a siddur even for himself (see Mishna Berura 343 s.k. 3). R’ Akiva Eiger seems to apply that the obligation of chinuch in mitzva observance begins at age nine. The Maharam Shick suggests that perhaps asking a child to carry a siddur to shul is also considered good chinuch, even if there is no eiruv, since one is educating him to daven.

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DEFINING A SHOTAH - Yevamos 113 - Daf Yomi

Generally the understanding of a "shoteh" in the entire Torah as one who is exempt from mitzvos is classified by the Gemora in Chagiga 3b as someone who may have a high IQ but does crazy things.

Reb Moshe (Even Haezer 1:120) has an elaborate and controversial teshuva explaining that if he does one of the crazy acts mentioned, we assume he is a shoteh until proven otherwise, but if we can prove otherwise, then he is no longer considered a shoteh (but he points out that the Rambam implies that we consider him a shoteh even if he is crazy in only one thing and nothing else, he is still exempt from mitzvos- but R' Moshe then issues a novel ruling that regarding giving a get, so long as he understands the issues, it is valid).

A man who has shoteh status cannot divorce his wife since he needs to be mentally competent, but a woman can be divorced against her will and therefore the Gemora says she can receive a get Biblically. However, the Torah requires that in order to receive a 'get', she must: 1. Be able to watch her get, which means to distinguish between the get and something else (Gittin 64b). 2. She must have enough understanding about the concept of divorce that she does not return to her husband’s house. The Gemora concludes that even one who is a shoteh for everything else, can have enough da'as to distinguish between a get and something else, and realize that she must not return. But, since people will take advantage of her and act immorally with her, Chazal do not allow him to divorce her.

Tosafos and Rashi argue about a girl who is unable to distinguish between her get and something else, and will also continue to return after the divorce, whether the father can receive the get for her. Tosafos seems to understand that the father preventing her from returning qualifies, implying that it is a practical consideration that she must be someone who will not return, rather than being an issue of da'as. Rashi seems to understand that the father preventing her from returning isn't sufficient since it is a da'as requirement and she is still missing the da'as. It is interesting to note that according to Tosafos, a woman who is sometimes a shoteh and sometimes healthy, can receive a get at a time where she has enough intellect not to return, even though she is likely to once again become a shoteh and return to her husbands house (v'dok).

Reb Moshe (Y.D. 4:29 and Even Haezer 1:164) makes a very important distinction between a shoteh and someone with a very low IQ, implying that many mentally retarded people do not halachically qualify as a shoteh. I think his approach is very meduyak in the Gemora and Rashi on the bottom of 113a that a low level intellect which thinks clearly and straight (rather than 'krum' qualifies as sufficient da'as). (Reb Avi Lebovitz; Hearos al HaDaf

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WIFE SNATCHER

There was an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid).

Rav Ashi explains that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Rabbanan therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. (This is following the opinion of Rav, who maintains that for the marriage of a minor to become valid, she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult, and if not the marriage is invalid.)

This incident must be referring to a case where she was “snatched” willingly, for otherwise, the kiddushin would anyways not be valid since it is taught in Gemora Kiddushin that a betrothal cannot be valid if the woman does not consent. We must say that the man snatched her, but she nodded with her head in agreement.

The Nimukei Yosef understands the case to be referring to one where originally, she did not consent, but afterwards, he convinced her until she finally agreed.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei Hashas cites a Teshuvos haRashba who writes that we do not apply the principle of “Since he acted improperly, the Rabbanan acted improperly with him” only in places that are specifically mentioned in Chazal. The Sages did not annul the marriage in every case where one acts with trickery. This can be proven from a Gemora in Kiddushin (58b). The Gemora states: One who tells his friend to marry a woman for him (as an agent), and he goes ahead and marries her for himself, she is married to the second one. We do not say that since he acted improperly, the Chachamim invalidated his marriage.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 110 - Highlights

The Validity of a Minor’s Marriage

Rav stated (109b) that a minor who was married off by her brothers/mother, and subsequently married someone else after she became an adult without ever having done mi’un to the first husband does not require a get (halachic divorce document) from her second husband. It must be that Rav is discussing a case where the girl did not have relations with her first husband after she became an adult, and even so she does not need a get from her second husband, as the kidushin of the first husband is valid. The Gemora answers that no, Rav only stated his Halachah when the minor did have relations with the first husband after she became an adult.

The Gemora asks, if this is the case, what is the reasoning of Shmuel (who argues on Rav and state that her second husband is required to give her a get)? [It is clear that the first marriage is valid, and the second is totally invalid!] The Gemora answers that Shmuel holds that whenever someone has marital relations, they do so on the basis of their original kiddushin (not in order to make a new kiddushin).

The Gemora asks, didn’t Rav and Shmuel already argue about these principles? A case was stated where a person made a conditional kiddushin (that the woman would not have any outstanding vows or blemishes), but the nisuin was done without mention of conditions. Rav said that if the condition was later found to have been violated a get is still required. Shmuel said that a get is not required. Rav stated that a get is required because once he married her he essentially relented on his condition. Shmuel said that a get is required because his marital relations are based on the validity of his original kiddushin. [This argument seems to be the same as the previous argument between Rav and Shmuel. Why are both necessary?]

The Gemora answers that both arguments are necessary (using the text of Rashi, see Bach). In the first case of our Gemora, Rav might have only stated that the kiddushin was valid when the first husband had relations with her, because there was no condition against the kiddushin. However, in the second case where there is a condition, Rav might admit to Shmuel that the kiddushin is invalid. If we would only state the second case, maybe the second case (where an explicit condition was violated) is where Shmuel applied his rule. In the first case, perhaps he would agree to Rav. Both cases are therefore necessary.

The Gemora returns to its original question: Does Rav indeed hold that for the marriage of a minor to become valid she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult (and if not the marriage is invalid)? There was an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid). This implies that Rav viewed the first marriage as valid when she became an adult, even before she had relations!

Rav Papa answers that this was because the custom in Narsh was to have the real marriage before the public Chupah (in such a case, meaning that they already had relations since she became an adult). Rav Ashi answers that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Rabbanan therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. Ravina asked that this makes sense if he only did kiddushin with money (as the Rabbanan can invalidate his kiddushin transaction). If he did kiddushin through having marital relations, how can the Rabbanan “take away” his having had marital relations? Rav Ashi answered that the Rabbanan can state that his relations are considered to have been promiscuous and are not valid for kiddushin.

Rav Yehuda states in the name of Shmuel that the law is like Rabbi Eliezer (see Mishna 109a). Rabbi Elazar also stated that the law is like Rebbi Eliezer. (110a)

Mishna

If someone was married to two minors who were orphans and he died, if his brothers do yibum or chalitzah to one of them, the other is then exempt from yibum or chalitzah. This would also be the case if the two girls are (adults and) deaf. If the two wives in such a case are one minor and one deaf girl, doing yibum to one of them does not exempt the other. If one is a regular woman and one is deaf, doing yibum to the regular woman exempts the deaf woman, and yibum to the deaf woman does not exempt the regular woman. If one wife was an adult and the other a minor, the yibum of the adult exempts the minor, but the yibum of the minor does not exempt the adult. (110a)

A Deaf Woman and Chalitzah

The Gemora asks, can a deaf woman have chalitzah? Doesn’t the mishna state that a deaf man who does chalitzah, a deaf woman who receives chalitzah, and a woman who received chalitzah from a minor, their chalitzah are ruled invalid. Rav Gidal says in the name of Rav that the Mishna is actually referring only to yibum as a choice for the deaf woman. Rabah (see side of Gemora) says that the Mishna could even be referring to chalitzah. Our Mishna is talking about a woman who was deaf from birth, and the Mishna earlier is talking about a woman who was originally a Pikei’ach (meaning that he has all of his senses as opposed to being deaf) and then became deaf. It makes sense that a woman who was deaf from birth can receive chalitzah, as just as she got married this way (through hints), so too she should be able to have chalitzah in this way. If she was a Pikachas adult (when she married) and only then became deaf she cannot do chalitzah, as she cannot hear the words of chalitzah.

Abaye asked, is it true that a woman who was originally deaf can have chalitzah? Doesn’t the Mishna (112b) state that if two brothers, one a Pikei’ach and one deaf, married two women of similar types, if the deaf husband of the deaf wife dies, what options are there for the Pikei’ach husband? He should do yibum, and if he wants he can subsequently divorce her. If the Pikei’ach is the one who dies, what should the deaf husband do? He can only do yibum, and he cannot give her a get (as his get cannot take away his brother’s kiddushin, which is more powerful than the kiddushin of a deaf person). Abaye asks, this Mishna seems to be talking about a case where the deaf woman married a deaf man when she was already deaf, and even so the Mishna does not give the option of chalitzah! The Gemora answers the case must be that she became deaf afterwards.

The Gemora further tries to clarify whether or not a woman who was deaf before her marriage can have chalitzah. The Mishna (112b) gives a case where two Pikei’ach brothers marry two women: one who is also a Pikachas and one who is deaf. If the husband of the deaf woman dies, what option is there for the Pikei’ach husband? He can do yibum, and if he wants he can give her a get. If the husband of the Pikachas dies, what options are there for the Pikei’ach who is married to the deaf woman? He may do either yibum or chalitzah. It must be, the Gemora states, that being that the case clearly involves men who were Pikchin originally, even before they married, the woman who is deaf must be someone who was deaf before she was married, and yet only yibum is an option and not chalitzah! The Gemora answers that each person in the case has a different status (and the deaf woman must have only become deaf afterwards).

Abaye asked (a similar question) from a Mishna (112b) regarding two brothers, one a Pikei’ach and one who is deaf, who married two similar sisters. If the deaf husband of the deaf woman dies, what option is there for the Pike’ach husband? The deaf woman is exempt from yibum as she is the sister of her potential yavam. If the Pikei’ach husband of the Pikachas wife dies, what option is there for the deaf husband of the deaf wife? He must divorce his own wife, and not marry his ex-wife’s sister as well. The Gemora asks, if you will say this deaf man is someone who was originally a Pikei’ach before marriage and only later became deaf, can someone like that divorce his wife? The Mishna states that if a wife becomes deaf, she can still be divorced, but if she becomes insane she cannot be divorced. If a man either becomes deaf or insane, he cannot divorce at all. It must therefore be that the braisa is talking about a man who was originally deaf, and his wife was also originally deaf. Being that we have now established a case in this Mishna where sisters (one who was a deaf woman) were originally deaf, it must be that the cases in this same Mishna involving deaf women who are not sisters also refers to women who were originally deaf before marriage! As stated above, these cases clearly conclude that the only option for such women is yibum, not chalitzah! [This proves that women who were deaf before marriage are not eligible for chalitzah, unlike the opinion of Rabah stated above.] This question caused Rabah to remain quiet (seemingly without an answer).

When Abaye went before Rav Yosef, Rav Yosef asked him why he had asked Rabah from these cases. Rabah could still answer that although the case of the deaf sisters discuss sisters who were originally deaf, the cases in the Mishna that deal with two wives who were not sisters deal with women who only became deaf after marriage! Rav Yosef said that you should have asked him from the following case (in the Mishna). Two deaf brother who married either two Pikachas sisters, two deaf sisters, or two sisters one of who was a Pikachas and one who was deaf, and two deaf sisters who married either two Pikei’ach brothers, two deaf brothers, or two deaf brothers one who was a Pikei’ach and one who was deaf, they are all exempt from yibum and chalitzah (in the event that one of the husband’s die). If the wives were not sisters, they can do yibum, and if they want to subsequently divorce them, they can. What is the case? If it talking about husbands who were originally Pikchim and then became deaf, doesn’t the Mishna state that if a wife becomes deaf, she can still be divorced, but if she becomes insane she cannot be divorced. If a man either becomes deaf or insane, he cannot divorce at all. The Mishna must therefore be discussing cases where everyone in the case was originally deaf, and yet the Mishna states that if the wives were not sisters, yibum can be performed. This implies that only yibum, not chalitzah! This question is a Tiyuvta (question that is seemingly impossible to answer) on Rabah. (110a – 110b)

A Minor and a Deaf Woman

Rav Nachman said that he found Rav Ada bar Ahavah and his son-in-law Rav Chana sitting and gathering students (for a study lesson) in the marketplace of Pumbedisa. They stated that this that it states in the Mishna, that the yibum of one of two widows, one who is a minor and one who is deaf, does not exempt the co-wife from yibum, is only true when their husband was a Pikei’ach. We are uncertain if he would have rather had the minor as a wife, or the deaf woman as a wife. He might have preferred to have the minor as a wife as she would eventually be knowledgeable (as opposed to being deaf), or he might have preferred the deaf woman who was physically an adult and a more appropriate mate for marital relations. However, if the husband was deaf, he certainly preferred having a wife who was deaf, as she was better for marital relations and similar to him. Rav Nachman states that he told them that even if these wives were widowed from a deaf husband we are still doubtful.

How indeed do we rectify the status of the minor and deaf widows (who the Mishna states do not exempt each other)? Rav Chisda says in the name of Rav that he should do yibum to the deaf woman, give her a get, and the minor should wait until she is older at which point the yavam can do an effective chalitzah. (110b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 109 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: If a man divorced his wife, and remarried her, she is permitted to the yavam (even though at the time his brother had divorced her, she was prohibited to the yavam, as his brother's divorced wife, nevertheless since at the time of his death she is his brother's wife who requires yibum, she is permitted to the yavam, for we do not say: the yevamah comes before the yavam for yibum on the basis of the first marriage, and from the time that this brother divorced her she is prohibited to the yavam as his brother's divorced wife; but we say: the death of the husband makes the yevamah require yibum; Kehati); but Rabbi Eliezer prohibits. So, too, if a man divorces an orphan (a minor given in marriage by her mother or brothers), and remarried her, she is permitted to the yavam; but Rabbi Eliezer prohibits. A minor who was given in marriage by her father and she was divorced is as an orphan during the father's lifetime. If the husband remarried her, all agree that she is prohibited to the yavam (since her divorce was fully effective by Torah law, since her father had given her in marriage, whereas her subsequent marriage was only valid by Rabbinic law, since she is a minor and she had already left her father's authority, and this marriage does not have the power to cancel the divorce. She therefore is prohibited to the yavam as his brother's divorced wife; Kehati). (108b – 109a)

Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning

Eifah said: What is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason? It is because she was once prohibited to yavam (at the time his brother had divorced her); this prohibition lasts forever.

The Gemora asks: If so, she should not require chalitzah either? It has been taught in a braisa that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that she must perform chalitzah.

Rather, Eifah said: I do not know what Rabbi Eliezer’s reason is.

Abaye said: Rabbi Eliezer is uncertain if it is the husband’s death which causes the yevamah to fall for yibum, in which case, she would be permitted to the yavam since we are only concerned with the moment that he died. Or perhaps he holds that the original marriage causes the yevamah to fall for yibum, in which case, she would be prohibited to the yavam since she was once prohibited to him (at the time his brother had divorced her); this prohibition lasts forever. (This explains why the yavam may not marry her, but chalitzah is nevertheless required.)

Rava explains: Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it is the husband’s death that causes the yevamah to fall to yibum. However, since people are familiar with her divorce and not with the remarriage, it would appear as if the yavam is performing a yibum with his brother’s divorcee. (This explains why the yavam may not marry her, but chalitzah is nevertheless required.)

The Gemora asks: Why should that be the case? Since she is presently living with him, everyone should know that he remarried her.

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Eliezer can be referring to a case where he remarried her at night and he died the next morning; people would not realize that he remarried her.

Rav Ashi explains: The reason Rabbi Eliezer prohibits the yibum is because of a Rabbinic decree that people might confuse this case with an orphan during the father's lifetime (a minor who was given in marriage by her father and she was divorced and later the husband remarried her, all agree that she is prohibited to the yavam). Since everyone agrees in that case that she may not be taken in yibum (since her divorce was fully effective by Torah law, since her father had given her in marriage, whereas her subsequent marriage was only valid by Rabbinic law, since she is a minor and she had already left her father's authority, and this marriage does not have the power to cancel the divorce; she therefore is prohibited to the yavam as his brother's divorced wife), Rabbi Eliezer prohibited yibum in the other cases as well, as a precautionary measure.

The Gemora shows support for Rav Ashi’s explanation from the Mishna. The last part of the Mishna stated: A minor who was given in marriage by her father and she was divorced is as an orphan during the father's lifetime. If the husband remarried her, all agree that she is prohibited to the yavam. The Gemora explains that this halacha is clear and evident and is taught here only in order to teach Rabbi Eliezer's reason in the cases of a man who divorced his wife and took her back, or who divorced an orphan and took her back, i.e., that she is prohibited to the yavam by the Rabbinic enactment of “an orphan during her father's lifetime.”

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rav Ashi’s explanation. The braisa states: The Chachamim agree with Rabbi Eliezer in the case of a minor who was given in marriage by her father and was divorced, she is like an orphan in her father's lifetime; if he remarried her, she is prohibited to the yavam, because her divorce was fully effective, and her remarriage is not. Which case are we referring to? To the case in which he divorced her when she was a minor and he remarried her when she was a minor; but if he divorced her when she was a minor and he took her back when she was an adult, or even if he remarried her when she was a minor and she became an adult when she was with him, and he died, she either performs chalitzah or is married by yibum. They said, in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, She performs chalitzah and she does not undergo yibum.

Rava inquired of Rav Nachman: What is the halacha in regards to her co-wife (according to Rabbi Eliezer, may the co-wife of a divorced minor whom the husband remarried when she became an adult be taken in yibum or not)?

Rav Nachman replied: The prohibition against marrying the divorcee is only Rabbinic in nature; shall we then go so far as to enact a preventive measure against a preventive measure? Obviously not! (109a)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If two brothers were married to two sisters that were minors and orphans, and the husband of one of them died, the yevamah is exempt on account of being the wife's sister. The halacha is the same if they were two female deaf-mutes. If two brothers were married to two sisters, one an adult woman and one a minor, and the husband of the minor sister died childless, the minor is exempt on account of being the wife's sister. If the husband of the adult sister died (he may not perform yibum because he is Rabbinically married to her sister; there is a Biblical zikah-attachment), Rabbi Eliezer says: They teach the minor to refuse him. Rabban Gamliel says: If she refused, she refused (this is referred to as mi’un, which would nullify her marriage retroactively); and if not, she waits until she becomes an adult, and then the other is exempt on account of being the wife's sister. Rabbi Yehoshua says: Woe unto him because of his wife and woe unto him because of his brother's wife. He sends away his wife with a bill of divorce, and his brother's wife with chalitzah. (109a)

Teach her to perform mi’un

The Gemora asks: is it in fact permitted to teach a minor to perform a mi’un? But Bar Kappara taught the following braisa: A man should always cling to three things and keep away from three things. A man should cling to the following three things: Chalitzah, the making of peace and the annulment of vows; and keep away from three things: From mi'un, from receiving deposits and from acting as a guarantor on a loan.

The Gemora answers: Mi'un, when it involves the fulfillment of a commandment (to enable the yibum) is different (and therefore encouraged).

Cling to three things
and keep away from three things

The Gemora had stated above: A man should always cling to three things and keep away from three things. A man should cling to the following three things: Chalitzah, the making of peace and the annulment of vows; and keep away from three things: From mi'un, from receiving deposits and from acting as a guarantor on a loan.

The Gemora explains: “He should cling to chalitzah” is following the opinion of Abba Shaul, who says: One who marries his yevamah on account of her beauty, or for the purpose of being married, or for any other reason besides the fulfillment of the mitzvah is regarded as though he has cohabited with an ervah (his brother’s wife) and the offspring from such a union is close to being a mamzer (he holds that the mitzvah of chalitzah takes precedence over the mitzvah of yibum since he might not have pure intentions).

“He should cling to the making of peace” is derived from the verse [Tehillim 34:15]: Seek peace and pursue it. Rabbi Avahu expounds a gezeirah shavah indicating the reward that is in store for such a person in the World to Come.

“He should cling to the annulment of vows” is following the opinion of Rabbi Nosson, who says in the following braisa: One who vows is regarded as if he built a private altar (in the times that they were forbidden), and one who fulfills the vow is regarded as if he offered a sacrifice on the private altar (fulfilling the vow instead of having it annulled will encourage him to vow in the future).

“He should keep away from mi’un” because she might regret her refusal when she becomes an adult.

“He should keep away from receiving deposits” applies to deposits made by his fellow townsman who considers his house as his own house (since he is a constant visitor at his house, he may remove the deposited object and claim it again from the custodian).

“He should keep away from acting as a guarantor on a loan” is referring to the guarantors of Sheltzion (where the debts were collected directly from the guarantors and not from the creditors). For Rabbi Yitzchak said: Misfortune upon misfortune will come upon those who accept converts, and to the guarantors of Sheltzion and to one who rivets himself to the words of halacha.

The Gemora explains: “Misfortune upon misfortune will come upon those who accept converts” is following the opinion of Rabbi Chelbo who said: Converts are as harmful to the Jewish people as sapachas (a type of tzara’as).

“Misfortune upon misfortune will come upon the guarantors of Sheltzion” for they collect the debts directly from the guarantor without initially seeking payment from the borrower (where now the guarantor is burdened with the task of seeking reimbursement from the borrower).

“Misfortune upon misfortune will come upon one who rivets himself to the words of halacha” is following the opinion of Rabbi Yosi. For it was taught in a braisa: Rabbi Yosi said: One who says that he did not study Torah has no reward for studying Torah.

The Gemora asks: This is obvious; what is Rabbi Yosi teaching us?

Rather, Rabbi Yosi said: One who says that he has only studied torah (but he does not fulfill the commandments) is only rewarded for the studying of Torah.

The Gemora asks: This is also obvious; what is Rabbi Yosi teaching us?

Rather, Rabbi Yosi said: He is not even rewarded for studying Torah.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this?

Rav Papa answers: It is written [Devarim 5:1]: That you may learn them and observe to do them. Whoever is engaged in observance is also regarded as engaged in Torah study (and is thus rewarded), but whoever is not engaged in observance is not regarded as engaged in torah study.

Alternatively, you can say like we said before: Rabbi Yosi said: One who says that he has only studied torah (but he does not fulfill the commandments) is only rewarded for the studying of Torah. This statement is necessary (and not obvious) for the following case: One who teaches others and they perform the mitzvos. One might think that the teacher should be rewarded for the performance of the mitzvos since it is on account of his teaching that the others are performing the mitzvos, Rabbi Yosi teaches us that this is not the case. He will only receive reward for the mitzvos if he himself performs them.

Alternatively, you can say that “Misfortune upon misfortune will come upon one who rivets himself to the words of halacha” is referring to a judge who compares one case to a similar one using his powers of logic, but he does not go to his teacher to confirm if his comparison is indeed correct. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said in the name of Rabbi Yonasan: A judge should always imagine himself as if he had a sword lying between his thighs, and Gehinom was open beneath him; as it is written [Shir Hashirim 3: 7-8]: Behold, it is the couch of Shlomo; sixty mighty men are about it, of the mighty men of Israel etc. Because of the dread in the night is referring to the dread of' Gehinom which is like the night. (109a – 109b)


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