The Famous Taz

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Estate Money and Interest

The Gemora allowed an administrator of an estate to invest the orphan’s money in an investment with favorable terms for them, although this is generally Rabbinically prohibited.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 160:18), based on the Rambam and Rosh, applies this license to all Rabbinically prohibited interest, and extends this to money of charity, money donated to Torah scholars, and money donated for use in a synagogue.

What did the Torah Permit?

The Gemora quotes a statement of Rav Huna that prohibits charging interest from a non Jew. The Gemora debates why this is prohibited, and how to reconcile this statement with the verse and Mishna that seem to permit such a loan.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) asks why the Gemora was concerned with reconciling this Rabbinic law with the verse and Mishna, and answers that the Gemora assumed that the Sages would not prohibit something the Torah permitted.

The Taz states in numerous places that although the Sages have leeway to enact their own new prohibitions, they may not prohibit something explicitly permitted by the Torah.

The Taz in YD 117:1 applies this to the Rabbinic prohibition on commerce in forbidden foods. Since the Torah explicitly allows one to sell neveilah meat to a non Jew, the Rabbinic prohibition had to allow for such commerce when one chanced upon the forbidden food, so as to not fully prohibit an act the Torah explicitly allows.

The Taz in OC 588:5 discusses a question raised by earlier poskim. We find the Sages prohibited the performance of numerous mitzvos on Shabbos (e.g., Shofar, Lulav), due to a concern of one accidentally carrying to perform the mitzvah. Why did the Sages not apply this to bris milah, prohibiting a bris milah which falls on a Shabbos.

The Taz says that since the Torah explicitly said that one must perform a bris milah on the eighth day, even if it is a Shabbos, the Sages could not prohibit it.

The Chavos Yair 142 challenges this Taz from our Gemora, among others. Our Gemora is an instance where the Sages prohibited an action explicitly permitted by the Torah – i.e., charging a non Jew interest on a loan. Therefore, the Chavos Yair rejects the Taz’s thesis.

Later poskim dispute the Chavos Yair’s disproof. The Shla, quoted by the Chasam Sofer (YD 106), says that the Sages did not prohibit charging a non Jew interest, since that is indeed explicitly permitted by the Torah. Instead, the Sages prohibited a Jew from lending to a non Jew at all, and only thereby precluded the Jew from receiving interest from him.

The Chasam Sofer (YD 106, 109) says that Tosfos themselves (70b Tashich, 64b v’Lo) seem to support the Taz, and actually explain the Gemora based on his principle. According to Tosfos, when the Gemora challenged Rav Nachman from the verse, the Gemora was stating that since the Torah explicitly allowed a Jew to charge a non Jew interest, the Sages cannot prohibit it. The Chasam Sofer says that the reason the Sages were allowed to do so is due to the exclusions built in to their prohibitions (for livelihood, or for a Torah scholar). Just as the Sages allowed commerce in forbidden food when the Jew chanced upon it in order to avoid explicitly prohibiting an act allowed by the Torah, so too, the Sages allowed charging a non Jew interest in some cases, to avoid explicitly such a prohibition.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 1:134) says that the Gemora’s answer that we read the verse only as tashich – explicitly allowing a Jew only to pay interest, means that the Torah never did explicitly allow a Jew to charge interest, giving the Sages the leeway to prohibit it. See Rabbi Akiva Eiger YD 117 on the Taz for more details.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) says that nowadays we lend money to non Jews with interest. Tosfos advances three reasons for this behavior:
1. The economic situation and lack of other professions available to Jews makes the interest necessary for the creditor’s basic needs, in which case it is permitted.
2. Ravina’s answer understood that the prohibition was to limit our interactions with non Jews. Since we are forced into such interactions due to economic circumstances, there is no added interaction that will be prevented by refraining from charging interest.
3. The second version of Rav Huna’s statement does not prohibit interest from a non Jew at all, but only prioritized an interest free loan to a Jew above it.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 159:1) rules that charging interest from a non Jew is prohibited by the Sages, unless the creditor needs the interest for his basic needs, or is a Torah scholar. However, the Shulchan Aruch says that it is permitted nowadays, based on the first two reasons of Tosfos (see Shach 2).

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A Single Grain is Sufficient

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Rabbi Chiya bar Avin inquired of Rav Huna (Kiddushin 58) : Is the “benefit of gratitude” regarded as money or not?

The Gemora comments: Let us say that this is a matter of a Tannaic dispute, for we learned in a braisa: If one steals the tevel (untithed produce) of his fellow, he is obligated to pay him for the value of the entire tevel (including the terumah and ma’aser that is mixed in, according to its value to him based upon his ability to choose who he wants to give them to). Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah says: He is only obligated to pay him for the value of the chulin. It must be that Rebbe holds that the ability to choose who to give something to has a monetary value, while Rabbi Yosi holds it does not.

The Gemora rejects this, and gives an alternate explanation to their argument. Everyone holds that the matanos (gift portions for the Kohen) that were not yet separated are considered as if they were separated, and the “benefit of gratitude” is not regarded as money, and the dispute is regarding Shmuel’s ruling, for Shmuel said: One grain of wheat can exempt an entire pile (and there would be no need to separate any more terumah). Rebbe holds of Shmuel’s ruling (and the thief would be required to pay the full value, for the owner could have exempted himself with one grain of wheat), and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah does not.

The Acharonim ask that Shmuel is only discussing the Biblical requirement, but the Chachamim instituted that one must give at least one sixtieth of his produce to the Kohen as terumah! If so, the thief should be exempt from paying the value of terumah that he is Rabbinically required to give!?

The Oneg Yom Tov answers based on the Tosfos Ri”d, who says that even Rabbinically speaking, one grain of wheat can exempt an entire pile from the prohibition of tevel. The Chachamim instituted that there is a mitzvah of giving to the Kohen. This, however, the owner could claim that he would not have given, and the thief would therefore be required to pay the entire amount.

The Mishnah Lamelech disagrees and holds that if one does not give at least one-sixtieth to the Kohen, it is Rabbinically regarded as tevel. Accordingly, the thief should not be required to pay the entire amount!?

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Permitted Rulings

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 41b) had stated, applying the classic principle that it is preferable to render a permissible ruling. Rashi in Beitzah (2b) explains that this means that something that is permitted indicates that the Tanna is relying on his knowledge of the subject matter, and is not afraid to rule leniently. One can be strict even if he is in doubt and it does not necessarily indicate the conclusiveness of the ruling.

Rashbam in Pesachim (102a) writes that if there is no compelling logic to rule stringently, then ruling leniently is not regarded as a more preferred option. Rather, it is the only option. The Rema in his responsa (§ 54) rules that one is not allowed to be stringent regarding an issue where there is no uncertainty.

Pischei Teshuvah (Yoreh Deah 116:10) cites a dispute amongst the Acharonim if one is permitted to be stringent for himself regarding a matter that has been permitted by the Torah, such as a prohibited matter that was nullified.

Bnei Yissachar writes that it is a mitzvah not to be stringent in such a situation.

The Tzlach writes that it is preferable to record the permitted ruling regarding a situation that may be subject to a Biblical prohibition, because if there would be uncertainty, we would be compelled to rule stringently. The Tanna would not be introducing a novel ruling if the ruling was that the matter is prohibited. Regarding a matter that may be subject to a Rabbinic prohibition, however, the reverse would be true. It is preferable to record the stringent ruling because if there would be uncertainty, we would rule leniently.

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Validity of Signatures

The Mishna had stated: The witnesses sign the get to benefit the public.

The Gemora asks (Daf Yomi: Gittin 36a) : Do the witnesses only have to sign on the Get because of “Tikun Ha’Olam” – “benefiting the world?” This is a Torah law! This is evident from the verse, “And it should be written in a document and signed!”

Rabbah says: The Mishna’s statement is needed according to Rabbi Elozar, who holds that the witnesses for the giving of the document cause the document to take effect. Even according to him, Chazal instituted that witnesses should also sign the Get because of tikun ha’olam. This is because there are times when the witnesses of the giving of the Get might have died or went overseas (and at least the witnesses signed will be able to contradict the ex-husband in case he claims that he did not divorce her).

Rav Yosef says: Even according to Rabbi Meir (who holds that the witnesses for the giving of the document cause the document to take effect), they decreed that witnesses should specify their names in a Get, due to tikun ha’olam. This is as the braisa states: Originally, people would sign, “I, So-and-so (without writing his name), have signed as a witness.” If there was a different document with the same handwriting that was verified to be authentic, this document would also be valid. If not, it is not valid. Rabban Gamliel said: They made a great decree when they instituted that witnesses should specify their names in a Get, due to tikun ha’olam.

The mefarshim ask on the Rambam in Hilchos Edus (3:4), who states that the requirement for witnesses to sign on a document is only mi’divrei sofrim (a Rabbinical obligation). The Gemora expressly states that this is a Biblical requirement!?

The Megillas Sefer answers that when the Gemora states that it is Biblically required, it is not being completely accurate, for the verse where this obligation is derived from is a verse in Yirmiyah. The Gemora only meant to ask that from the Mishna it would seem that the witnesses sign only because of Rabban Gamliel’s decree, when in truth, this was established generations beforehand!

The Pnei Yehoshua answers that it is only a Biblical requirement according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that the witnesses who sign the document are those who render it effective. However, the Rambam rules in accordance with Rabbi Elozar, who holds that the witnesses who observe the delivery of the document are those who render it effective. Therefore, the Rambam writes that the signatures are only a Rabbinical requirement.

The Nesivos Hamishpat, Chasam Sofer and others answer that the Rambam is only referring to proof documents, since the witnesses are obligated to testify in Beis Din so that the judges will have the ability to cross examine them. Testimony is valid only from the mouths of the witnesses, but not on the basis of any documents or writings. However, regarding a document that is made to affect something, either a marriage, divorce, sale etc., the Rambam will agree that the signatures of the witnesses are Biblically required.

Reb Chaim Brisker adds that a document, like a get, which later will be used as proof that the woman got divorced can still be Biblically valid. For once the document rendered an effect, it is as if it has been investigated in Beis Din, and would not any longer be disqualified because of the rule that testimony must come from their mouths and not from their writings.

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Holding a Sacred Object

The Gemora (Nedarim 25a) relates the following incident: There was a person who was owed money by his friend, and the two of them came before Rava. The lender said: Pay me! The borrower said: I already did! Rava said: Swear that you paid him. The borrower then filled his cane with the amount of money he borrowed and leaned on it while walking to Beis Din. Before he took the oath, the borrower asked the lender to hold his cane for him while he took the oath. The borrower then took a Sefer Torah and swore that he had given the lender whatever he had owed him. When the lender heard this he got upset and broke the cane, causing the money to fall out. It was apparent that he had “paid” him all of the money.

Rabbeinu Tam understands this Gemora to mean that the borrower denied the entire claim and was liable only for a Rabbinic oath (called a shevuas hesseis). Nevertheless, he took the Sefer Torah in his hand prior to taking the oath. This would prove that one needs to hold a sacred object even by a Rabbinical oath.

He also presents proof to this from the Gemora in Shavuos (41a) which inquires as to the differences between a Biblical oath and a Rabbinical one. The Gemora does not offer this difference; namely, that a Biblical oath would necessitate the holding of a sacred object and a Rabbinical one would not. This proves that a Rabbinical oath also required the holding of a sacred object.

The Gaonim disagree and maintain that one is not required to hold a sacred object when taking a Rabbinical oath. The Meiri writes that our Gemora cannot serve as a proof against this, for we are discussing a case where the borrower decided himself to hold the Sefer Torah. He did this as a ruse in order to get the lender to hold his cane.

According to the Ran’s explanation of our Gemora, there would be no proof at all. For our Gemora is discussing a case where the borrower admitted to part of the claim made against him. Since he wishes to avoid paying the rest of the claim, he is Biblically obligated to take an oath that he does not owe the remainder of the claim. This oath obviously requires him to hold a sacred object.

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Drinking Wine by Kiddush

The Gemora (Nedarim 4a)explains that the novelty of a chatas nazir is that it cannot be pledged to be brought as a vow. When we asked earlier that this is a trademark of all chatas offerings, it is possible to answer that all other chatas offerings are obviously not brought because they are pledged, as they are obligated to be brought to atone for a sin. However, why is a korban chatas of a nazir brought? [One might therefore have thought the prohibition of delaying vows does not apply to it, which is why the hekeish is needed.]

The Gemora asks: The korban chatas of a woman who gives birth is also not brought for a sin that she committed, but nonetheless we know the prohibition for delaying vows does apply to her korban chatas. [Why should a korban chatas of a nazir be different?]

The Gemora answers: Her korban chatas is still different than that of a nazir, as it enables her to eat kodoshim (korbanos, which she was unable to eat beforehand and is a mitzvah).

The Meiri asks: Doesn’t the chatas offering of a nazir help him that he is now permitted to drink wine?

Tosfos and the Ran answer that drinking wine is a voluntary act, and it is not a mitzvah like the eating of kodoshim.

However, we can ask: What about the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush and havdalah? The Gemora Pesachim (106a) derives from the verse Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it that there is an obligation to recite kiddush over a cup of wine. Accordingly, we should say that a nazir’s bringing of the korbanos is similar to that of a woman who gave birth; he is bringing the korban in order to be permitted to partake in the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush?

The Meiri answers: The mitzvah of drinking the wine for kiddush is only a Rabbinical one, and the korban is not coming for that.

Tosfos explains that although there is a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush with wine, the obligation that the one who recites the blessing should drink the wine is only Rabbinical.

Reb Koby Shapiro in the Hebrew Midrashiya states that there may be a practical difference in halacha whether the mitzvah of drinking the wine is a Biblical one or merely Rabbinical.

It is ruled upon in Shulchan Aruch that a woman is Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush on Shabbos. Accordingly, she would be allowed to discharge a man of his obligation by reciting the kiddush for him.

The Acharonim raise the following question: When a man comes home from Shul Friday night, he has already fulfilled his Biblical obligation of kiddush in the Shemoneh Esrei of ma’ariv. He still has a Rabbinical obligation to recite the kiddush over a cup of wine. His wife, on the other hand, who did not daven ma’ariv, still has a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush. How can the man, who only has a Rabbinical obligation discharge his wife of her Biblical obligation?

Some answer that she should recite vayechulu prior to kiddush.

Reb Akiva Eiger answers that there is no concern here because of the principle that one who has fulfilled the mitzvah can nevertheless discharge an obligation for someone who did not yet fulfill the mitzvah. This works because every Jew is a guarantor for another. Some Acharonim are not satisfied with this answer because they say that a woman is not included in this guarantee for each other.

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is as if the husband had intention not to fulfill the Biblical obligation of kiddush when he is davening ma’ariv. This way, they are both Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush.

This entire discussion is based upon the Meiri’s opinion that the mitzvah of drinking the wine is merely a Rabbinical mitzvah. However, if we would hold that there is a Biblical mitzvah to drink the wine of kiddush, then, there would be no discussion, for the husband still has not discharged his own obligation by davening ma’ariv; he still has a Biblical obligation to drink the wine.

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Biblical and Rabbinical Oath

The Gemora (Kesuvos 88a) had stated: Rav Papa said (regarding the case where there is one witness testifying that the woman collected her kesuvah): A wise husband could bring his wife to take a Biblical oath with the following method: He pays her the kesuvah (a second time) in front of another witness (and now, if se will deny receiving the kesuvah, there will be two witnesses against her) and he claims that the first monies that he paid her were actually a loan (and if she denies the loan, there will be one witness testifying against her; she will be Biblically obligated to take an oath; this will be a case of taking an oath in order to retain the money and it will be a case which doesn’t involve a lien on land)!

The Raavad explains: Even if there is no severity in the Biblical oath more than the Rabbinical one, it is still regarded as advantageous for the husband to force her to be subject to a Biblical oath besides a Rabbinical one.

Rashi explains that there is a halachic severity in taking a Biblical oath. One is required to use the Name of God and hold a Torah scroll when he takes a Biblical oath; a Rabbinical oath does not have this stringency.

Tosfos points out that Rashi himself maintains that a Rabbinical oath of our Mishna is of the same severity as a Biblical oath; it is only an oath instituted by the Amoraim that is treated leniently.

The Rishonim discuss at great length other differences between the two oaths.

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Timtum Haleiv

The Gemora cites a braisa (Kesuvos 60a): A child may be nursed until he is twenty-four months. From that age and onwards, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing (the Rabbis forbade it); these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua said: He may nurse even for four or five years. If, however, he ceased nursing after twenty-four months and started again, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing.

The Rashba asks: Something that is forbidden on a Biblical level, we are not permitted to provide for a child; however, there is no prohibition to give a child something that is only Rabbinically prohibited. Why would it be forbidden to let the child nurse?

Rav Elyashiv adds: Here, there is not even a Rabbinical prohibition!

He answers: We find that there is a halachic stringency not to allow a child to nurse from an idolater; this may result in timtum. So too, when a child is beyond the age where he should be nursing, if we allow him to nurse, it can lead to timtum.

There is a discussion amongst the Poskim if one eats a permitted item in a time that it is prohibited to eat (such as Yom Kippur, prior to davening or kiddush etc.); does that eating result in timtum or not. However, in our case, Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein asks: The milk is not a forbidden item at all! If we would extract the milk and place it into a utensil, it would be permitted for consumption; the prohibition is only when the child is nursing directly from the mother. Why should we assume that this may result in timtum?

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Changes Due to a Leap Year

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 60) deals with the amount of time an infant usually suckles: A nursing mother is forbidden to re-wed till her infant becomes two years old (Yevamos 42a; Shulchan ‘Aruch, E.H. 13:11) lest she become pregnant and cut off the source of her infant’s sustenance while her husband, who is not the infant’s father, won’t see to alternative food. In a leap year, the author of Terumas HaDeshen writes (Responsa, 216), she must wait 25 months, as the Gemara explains that the suckling period is two years and in the leap year the suckling period is prolonged according to the year! (We should point out that the Remo ruled the halachah only “to worry as a first preference” while others disagree; see Pischei Teshuvah, ibid, S.K. 16, and Responsa Chasam Sofer, E.H. 137). (Meoros HaDaf Yomi Vol. 296)

They also cite other examples to this concept: Meoros HaDaf Yomi Vol. 296 brings the
Gemara in Niddah which states something astounding. The nine months of pregnancy become shorter or longer according to how the Sanhedrin determines the calendar! The Gemara says that the shofar blown at the start of the month to announce the new month as determined by the beis din causes a new calculation concerning everything connected with calculating various dates.

The Rashba writes (Toras HaBayis, bayis 7, sha’ar 3,amud 9): “Certainly the shofar is the cause, because everything that beis din below does, the beis din on High agrees, as we are told: ‘(the appointed times) that you (beis din) shall call them’.” Hashem gave power to the beis din below and gave them authority and responsibility to decide the length of months and declare leap years by adding a month.

The Rashba says that if beis din declares a leap year, they delay Pesach by a month: on the days that originally would have been Pesach it is allowed to eat chametz, and they fixed a new Pesach.

The Rashba continues that the beis din above behaves according to the rulings of the beis din below. Even nature changes according to their decisions. We have gathered a few interesting examples to demonstrate this wonderful connection between people and the Heavenly beis din, by means of the Torah.

Treifah: A treifah animal (whose body is defective such that it cannot live longer than 12 months) doesn’t live longer than 12 months but some say that in a leap year it can live 13 months! (Shach, Y.D. 57, S.K. 18, and see Pri Chadash, ibid).

An animal’s life depends on the chacham’s ruling: The Chazon Ish zt”l writes (O.C. 39, os 15) wonderful things about the power of Torah: “But deciding the measure of an individual treifah was given to the chacham and what appears to him, is the root of the halachah said to Moshe at Mount Sinai… and it’s possible that its life depends on the chacham’s ruling, if the ruling was made during its life.” Worms live long: Certain fruits have worms in them only while they’re still attached to the tree. These fruits must be examined during 12 months after picking as the worm lives for six months and its body disintegrates after six more months and then there is no prohibition to eat it (Shulchan ‘Aruch, Y.D. 84:8, and ‘Aroch HaShulchan, ibid, se’if 66). However, in a leap year the worms live longer and the fruit should be examined for 13 months! (See Pri Megadim, ibid, and Gilyon Maharsha, ibid).

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RETROACTIVELY NOT MARRIED AND THE CONSEQUENCES - Yevamos 90 - Daf Yomi

Rav Chisda attempts to bring a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: If a husband annulled his letter of divorce (that was sent to his wife in the hands of an agent), it is annulled (even though he nullified it in front of a Beis Din in the absence of his wife or the agent); these are the words of Rebbe. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel said: He may neither annul it nor add a single condition to it, since, otherwise, of what avail is the authority of the Beis Din (since Rabban Gamliel the Elder ordained that such an annulment must not be made, since the woman in her ignorance of it might marry again and thus unconsciously give birth to illegitimate children). Now, even though, the letter of divorce may be annulled in accordance with Biblical law, we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world.

Rabbah rejects this proof and states: Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.)

As I was saying the Daf, I was asked the following question: If the Rabbis revoked the marriage retroactively, would she be permitted to marry a Kohen?

Since we are presently located in Marshall, Indiana, we do not have all the necessary seforim to discuss this in depth, but here is a brief synopsis of the topic matter.

Tosfos in Gittin (33b) goes to such an extent as to say that she was not considered a married woman, and if someone had cohabited with her during the time that she was "married," he would not be liable for cohabiting with a married woman, since the Rabbis revoked her marriage retroactively.

The Ramban in Kesuvos (3b) writes that there would be a Rabbinical prohibition retroactively, and she would be regarded as a divorcee, and hence, she would be forbidden to a Kohen.

Some say that she is forbidden to a Kohen because it "smells" like a get.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger discusses the following case: If she was a daughter of a Yisroel who married a Kohen, and therefore ate terumah during her "marriage," would it be regarded retroactively as if she ate terumah as a zar?

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TERUMAH FACTS - Yevamos 81 - Daf Yomi

Rashi and many other Rishonim maintain that the requirement to separate terumah from figs and other fruits from a tree is only Rabbinical even in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh. The Biblical obligation of terumah only applies to grain, olives and grapes. The Gemora, that mentions Rabbinical terumah in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh can be referring to figs.

The Rambam (Terumos 2:1) holds that there is a Biblical obligation to separate terumah from all fruits on a tree. The Gemora, that mentions Rabbinical terumah in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh can be referring to vegetables or terumah from any land outside of Eretz Yisroel.

It emerges from our Gemora that there is an argument between Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish if there is a Biblical requirement to separate terumah nowadays. The Rambam (ibid. 26) rules in accordance with Rish Lakish that there is only a Rabbinical obligation to separate terumah nowadays. The Ra’avad disagrees, and states that the halacha follows Rabbi Yochanan.

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RABBINICAL OFFENSE IS MORE SEVERE - Yevamos 36 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that the Rabbis were stricter and strengthened their enactments more than for those of the Torah.

The Gemora in Shabbos (110a) cites the verse in Koheles [10:8]: One who breaks through a stone wall will be bitten by a snake. This is referring to someone who does not heed the words of the Sages. One is not permitted to scoff at the decrees of the Rabbis. The Gemora in Eruvin states that one who transgresses the words of the Chachamim is liable to death at the hand of Heaven.

Rashi in Avoda Zarah (27b) states that even if he will be given medicine for this snake bite and will be healed, other snakes will come and he will eventually die.

The Maharal explains: The Rabbis goal was to erect a fence to safeguard the commandments of the Torah. One who negates these decrees is causing a breakdown for the mitzvos of the Torah. This is why we deal with him so harshly.

Rabbeinu Yonah explains why one who violates a Rabbinical decree is dealt with in a stricter manner than one who transgressed a Torah commandment. One who violates a Biblical prohibition respects the law, but he is motivated by his physical desires to sin. He is not rebuffing his obligation, rather it can be regarded as a momentary slip in his observance. One who violates a Rabbinical enactment does so because of a lack of regard for their decrees. He belittles them on account that they were not written in the Torah and there is no real necessity to keep them. He is rejecting his obligation and therefore deserving of death.

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Daf YomiI - Yevamos 21 - FENCES AND SAFEGUARDS

Rabbis Safeguard Against Assimilation, As It Leads To Intermarriage
by Rabbi Frand

http://wap.torah.org/learning/ravfrand/5764/achareimos.html

Fences of Holiness

by Rabbi Zev Leff

http://www.shemayisrael.co.il/parsha/leff/archives/ach_kdsh.htm

A Fence Around the Torah – The Key to Yiras Shomayim

by Rabbi Zvi Sobolofsky

http://www.torahweb.org/torah/2006/parsha/rsob_acharei.html

Our Dual Relationship with the Secular World
by Rabbi Hershel Schachter

http://www.torahweb.org/torah/2005/parsha/rsch_vayishlach.html

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THE STATUS OF THE WIVES AFTER ONE OF THEM PERFORMS CHALITZAH presented by: Kollel Iyun HaDaf

Kollel Iyun HaDaf

QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the status of the surviving brothers and the wives (Tzaros) of the deceased brother after Chalitzah is performed by one of the brothers with one of the Tzaros. Reish Lakish maintains that all of the brothers are prohibited to all of the Tzaros with an Isur Kares (the Isur of "Eshes Ach"), with the exception of the brother and the woman who did Chalitzah, who are prohibited to each other only with a Lav (the Isur of "Lo Yivneh"). Rebbi Yochanan maintains that they are all prohibited to each other with only a Lav and not with Kares.

The Gemara explains Rebbi Yochanan's reasoning. It does not make sense that one brother (the one who did Chalitzah) should be prohibited to the woman with only a Lav while the other brothers are prohibited to her with an Isur Kares, since they were all equally entitled to do Chalitzah. Rather, the brother who did Chalitzah acted as a Shali'ach on behalf of all the other brothers, and the woman who did Chalitzah acted as a Shali'ach on behalf of all the Tzaros.

It is clear that Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the Isur Kares of "Eshes Ach" disappears completely in a situation of Yibum, when one brother dies and his wives fall to Yibum (or Chalitzah) to the other brothers. According to Rebbi Yochanan, at exactly what point does the Isur Kares of "Eshes Ach" of all the wives disappear? Is it removed as soon as the brother dies or only when a surviving brother performs Chalitzah? The words of the Gemara provide apparently conflicting implications.

The first part of Rebbi Yochanan's reasoning (that the Isur Kares should be removed from all of the brothers because initially any one of them could do Chalitzah or Yibum) implies that even before any brother performs Chalitzah, the Isur Kares is removed. On the other hand, the second part of his reasoning (that the Yavam and Yevamah who perform Chalitzah (or Yibum) act as Shelichim for the others) implies that it is the act of Chalitzah which removes the Isur Kares, and until that act is done the Isur remains in force.

ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS (10b, DH Ihu) implies that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" remains in force until Chalitzah is performed, at which time the act of Chalitzah removes the prohibition. Rebbi Yochanan -- who says that when the wife falls to Yibum any brother may perform Chalitzah -- does not mean that there is no prohibition of "Eshes Ach," but rather that it is logical that the Torah would not give a Mitzvah to the brothers from which they could excuse themselves and pass on to another brother. Rather, the brothers never actually remove themselves from the obligation. Whichever brother performs Chalitzah (or Yibum) does so on behalf of all of the other brothers.

This also seems to be the opinion of RASHI (52a, DH Nasan), who calls the Yevamah an "Eshes Ach" even during the period of Zikah.

Support for this approach may be adduced from the opinion of Aba Shaul (39b). Aba Shaul disagrees with the Rabanan and maintains that performing Chalitzah is preferable over performing Yibum, because one who performs Yibum with impure intentions "is considered as though he lives with an Ervah, and the child is virtually a Mamzer." If the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed at the time the woman falls to Yibum and before Yibum is done, there should be no prohibition of Ervah whatsoever and no reason to say that the child is close to being a Mamzer. (See also Insights to Yevamos 7:1:b.)

(b) However, the RASHBA (41a, end of DH Shomeres Yavam) writes that Rebbi Yochanan's statement, "If this [brother] wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it, and if this one wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it," implies that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" actually falls away as soon as the brothers become permitted to perform Yibum.

According to the Rashba, why does Rebbi Yochanan add that the brother acts as a Shali'ach on behalf of the other brothers? Even if he does not perform Chalitzah or Yibum on their behalf, the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" has already been removed from them!

Moreover, how does the Rashba understand the opinion of Reish Lakish who says that all of the other brothers are prohibited to the woman with an Isur Kares when one brother performs Yibum with her? The Rashba cannot explain that the Isur Kares falls away and then returns to the other brothers when one brother performs Yibum, because the Rashba himself asserts that once the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed it cannot return.

The Acharonim offer two approaches to answer these questions. The simple approach is that the reason why Rebbi Yochanan says that one brother acts as a Shali'ach for the others is not to explain why the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed (because it is not removed when the brother performs Yibum, but earlier, at the time the woman falls to Yibum). Rather, when Rebbi Yochanan says that one brother acts as a Shali'ach for the others his intent is to explain why the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" takes effect for the other brothers. Although the verse implies that the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" applies only to the brother who performed Chalitzah (and prohibits him from attempting to "rebuild" his brother's family), Rebbi Yochanan says that the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" applies to all of the brothers (and Tzaros) because of the Shelichus. (This approach is difficult to read into the words of the Gemara.)

How does the Rashba understand the opinion of Reish Lakish? The Rashba apparently understands that Reish Lakish indeed maintains that the prohibition of "Eshes Ish" could return even if it was removed at the time the Yevamah fell to Yibum. Therefore, when one brother performs Chalitzah or Yibum, the prohibition returns to the other brothers. (This also appears to be the intention of the Rashba to 44a, DH v'Nachlotz, as printed in the Mosad ha'Rav Kook edition.)

A second approach is suggested by RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN Hy'd in KOVETZ HE'OROS (4:9 and 1:7). From various sources it seems that when one brother performs Yibum or Chalitzah, his act determines retroactively that the other brothers were not involved with the Zikah at all (see Insights to Yevamos 18:1, 24:1, and Imrei Moshe, end of #5). Perhaps this is Reish Lakish's intention when he says that the other brothers are prohibited to the Yevamah with an Isur Kares. Once one brother has performed Yibum, it becomes determined retroactively that he was the only one who was permitted to her. To which brother the Heter applies becomes known only after the Heter is actually utilized by one of the brothers.

Rebbi Yochanan also agrees that, in theory, the Zikah would be retroactively removed from any brothers and Tzaros not involved in the Chalitzah. However, he maintains that because of the Shelichus, they are all considered to be involved in the Zikah even retroactively, and thus the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed from all of them. (According to the proposal that Rebbi Yochanan agrees that Zikah can be removed retroactively, it is not clear what he tries to prove from the words, "If this [brother] wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it." How does Rebbi Yochanan prove from those words that the Zikah applies retroactively to all of them? Also, the Rashba clearly states that even when one brother can no longer do Yibum, the Yevamah is still permitted to him. This is contrary to the logic which Rav Elchanan applies to Reish Lakish's opinion.)

Another problem with the opinion of the Rashba is why the Gemara needs a verse to prove that the brother may remarry the Yevamah (with whom Yibum has been performed) after he divorced her (8b). His allowance to remarry her should be obvious if the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" can never return to the Yavam. Perhaps the Rashba maintains that it is only after the above verse is expounded that the Gemara understands that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed permanently once the Yevamah falls to Yibum.

Another possible explanation is that the Rashba accedes that after Yibum (or Chalitzah) is performed, the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" can return. Since the prohibition can return, a verse is necessary to teach that the Yavam may remarry the Yevamah (with whom Yibum was performed) after he divorced her. If this indeed is the view of the Rashba, it also explains why Reish Lakish can posit that the brothers become prohibited to the Yevamah with an Isur Kares, and why Rebbi Yochanan needs to introduce the concept of Shelichus.

As for how the Rashba adduces support for his opinion from the Gemara, perhaps he merely intends to show that there is a logical reason to assume that once the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed, it remains permitted as long as possible (until Yibum according to Reish Lakish, and even after Yibum according to Rebbi Yochanan).

How does the Rashba understand Aba Shaul's statement (that it is better to do Chalitzah than Yibum because Yibum with impure intentions "is considered as though he lives with an Ervah")? The Kovetz He'oros explains that either the Rashba discusses only the opinion of the Rabanan, or he understands that Aba Shaul's statement expresses only a Halachah d'Rabanan and not a Halachah d'Oraisa.

In conclusion, there is a basic difference in understanding among the Rishonim with regard to whether the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed at the moment the woman falls to Yibum (RASHI and TOSFOS) or whether it is removed only at the time of Chalitzah or Yibum (RASHBA). (See also Insights to Yevamos 20:2 and 20:3.)

This dispute may have other Halachic implications. For example, the Gemara (54a) states that if the Yavam unknowingly has relations -- before he has performed Yibum -- with his deceased brother's wife (for example, he was asleep during the act), no Kinyan takes effect. According to Rashi and Tosfos, she should become disqualified from eating Terumah since she has had a forbidden relationship with an Ervah. According to the Rashba, the act was not forbidden at all, and thus she should remain permitted to eat Terumah and to marry a Kohen. (See, however, Insights to Yevamos 35:2.)

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 18 - Placing a Stumbling Block by a Rabbinic Prohibition

There is a matter of dispute among the Rishonim if the prohibition against performing labor on Chol Hamoed (the intermediate days of Pesach and Sukkos) is Biblical (Rashi) or Rabbinic (Tosfos).

Our Gemora cites Scriptural verses illustrating that it is forbidden to perform labor during Chol Hamoed. Tosfos states that it is implicit from the Gemora that this is a Biblical prohibition.

Tosfos asks: It is permitted to work on Chol Hamoed to prevent an irretrievable loss or various types of labor; this would be understandable if the prohibition would be Rabbinic in nature, however, if it is a Biblical prohibition, where do we find distinctions in the types of work that some will be forbidden and some will be permitted?

Tosfos concludes that the prohibition against working during Chol Hamoed is only a Rabbinic injunction and the verses cited are merely Scriptural supports for this decree.

Tosfos asks from a Gemora in Avodah Zarah (22a) which states that there would be a prohibition of placing a stumbling block before a blind man (lifnei iver) by performing labor on Chol Hamoed. (One is forbidden from assisting another fellow to violate a prohibition, where the sinner could not accomplish the transgression without his aid.)

The Reshash explains Tosfos: The prohibition of lifnei iver is only applicable by a Biblical prohibition and not when it pertains to a Rabbinical injunction; accordingly, Tosfos asks why the Gemora states that lifnei iver applies by the prohibition of working on Chol Hamoed, when that is only a Rabbinic injunction.

Tosfos in Avodah Zarah (22a) states explicitly that the commandment of lifnei iver applies by a Rabbinic prohibition, as well. The Steipler Gaon explains a different Tosfos (Avodah Zarah 15b) that Tosfos is uncertain regarding this principle and it is indeed a dispute among two answers in Tosfos if lifnei iver applies by a Rabbinic prohibition or not.

This principle requires an explanation. Why should lifnei iver not apply by a Rabbinic prohibition? One is forbidden from providing flawed advice to his fellow (the Minchas Chinuch discusses if giving shoddy counsel violates this prohibition); every Rabbinic decree entails a Biblical prohibition of not swaying from the words of our sages.

What is the logic to differentiate between assisting someone to violate a Biblical prohibition or one that is merely Rabbinic?

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 17 - RABBINIC MITZVAH OF SEFIRAS HAOMER

Tosfos states that after the counting of the omer, one should say the following tefillah: Is should be the will of Hashem that the Beis Hamikdosh should be rebuilt. This is recited because the mitzvah nowadays is rabbinic and serves to commemorate the biblical mitzvah in the times when the Beis Hamikdosh was in existence.

Tosfos asks: What is the difference between the mitzva of sefiras haomer and the mitzvos of sounding the shofar and taking a lulav which is also only rabbinic nowadays and this additional tefillah is not recited?

He answers: The mitzvah of sefiras haomer is merely a reminder of the Beis Hamikdosh and the other mitzvos involve an action. The distinction is extremely ambiguous and the commentators struggle to explain the difference.

The Gemora in Menochos (66a) says: Ameimar would count days and not weeks. He said: The mitzvah of counting the omer is only to commemorate the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Brisker Rov explains: The rabbinic mitzvah of sefiras haomer is different that other rabbinic mitzvos. A regular rabbinic mitzvah, such as eating marror on Pesach, is the identical mitzvah nowadays as was in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh. The only difference is that then it was biblical and now it is only rabbinic. Sefiras haomer is different. The purpose of the mitzvah mitzva of counting the omer nowadays was not for the counting, but rather it was established to commemorate the Beis Hamikdosh. The mitzvah nowadays is not the same mitzvah as it was then. This is why Ameimar maintains that in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh, they counted days and weeks and nowadays, we only count the days.

According to this, he explains the Ba’al Hamaor at the end of Pesachim. The Ba’al Hamaor says that we do not recite a shehechiyonu on sefiras haomer like we do by other mitzvos because it is only a mitzvah of remembering the Beis Hamikdosh. Shehechiyonu is recited at a time of joy and it would not be appropriate to recite it when we are recalling the tragedy of the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh and the present exile. By other rabbinical mitzvos, a shehechiyonu is recited because the purpose of the mitzvah was for the sake of the mitzvah and not to remind us of the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

This is the explanation of Tosfos. The special tefillah of requesting the building of the Beis Hamikdosh is exclusively reserved for the mitzvah of sefiras haomer, which was only instituted to commemorate the Beis Hamikdosh.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 28 - Deriving Benefit from a Mitzva by Reb Jay

If one makes a vow not to derive benefit from his friend and his friend blew shofar for him, he has fulfilled his obligation. This is because of Rava’s statement in the Gemora that the mitzvos were not given for the sake of deriving benefit, rather they were given as a yoke upon one’s neck.

The Ran cites an interesting Baal Hameor who writes that this is so only if the mitzva was a Biblical mitzva; however, for a Rabbinical mitzva, for example a person who made a vow not to derive benefit from his friend and his friend blew trumpets on a fast day (which is only a Rabbinical mitzva), he must leave the shul, as we do not say that the mitzvos were not given for the sake of deriving benefit by a Rabbinical mitzva.

The Ran questions that if so, how can the person stay past the first nine blasts on Rosh Hashanah, as the remaining blasts are not Biblical but Rabbinic? Perhaps we can answer that evn though the remaining blasts are Rabbinic but they are considered to be part of the Biblical mitzva.

What is the difference between a Biblical mitzva for which we say that the mitzvos were not given for the sake of deriving benefit and a Rabbinical mitzva that we do not? How are we to understand this Baal Hameor?

Mitzvos were not given for the sake of deriving benefit means that the mitzvos are given as yoke upon one’s neck. Perhaps we can say that a Biblical mitzva is qualitatively stronger than a Rabbinical mitzva (for example when it comes to a doubt on a Biblical mitzva, we rule stringently and yet we are lenient on a Rabbinical mitzva). Therefore, the strength of the commandment that is Biblical negates any benefit from the mitzva. A Rabbinical mitzva, however, is not as strong and cannot negate the benefit from the mitzva.

The Keser Dovid elaborates and writes that while a Biblical mitzva has one step (from Hashem to us directly), a Rabbinical mitzva has two steps, from Hashem to us via the mitzva of “lo sassur” - do not sway from the teachings of the Sages.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 28 - Mitzvos not Given for Pleasure

Tekiyas shofar and mitzvot lav le'henot nitnu by Reb Chaim B.

Here is the link for Divrei Chaim's Torah. Look there for other lomdishe posts.

The gemara (R”H 28) tells us that it is permitted to use a shofar from a korban olah or shelamim because “mitzvot lav le’henot nitnu” – fulfilling a mitzvah is not considered a form of hana’ah. The Ba’al haMaor writes that this halacha applies only to the tekiyos of Rosh haShana which are mitzvos d’oraysa, but tekiyas chatzotzros which was done on a ta’anis would be prohibited. (It is unclear from the Ba’al HaMaor whether all tekiyos of R”H are permitted, or only the shiur needed to fulfill the mitzvah d’oraysa). At first glance this opinion of the Ba’al HaMaor is very difficult to understand. Firstly, tekiyas chatzotzros is also a mitzvah d’oraysa and not derabbanan – what distinction is the Ba’al haMaor trying to draw? Secondly, if the hana’ah one gets from having fulfilled a significant mitzvah d’oraysa which one would otherwise have to find some other way of accomplishing is not considered enough hana’ah to prohibit using the shofar, doesn’t it stand to reason that the hana’ah received from being able to fulfill a more minor mitzvah derabbanan is not considered significant enough hana’ah to create an issur? IOW, if mitzvos lav le’henot is a function of the shiur (quantity) of hana’ah received, then one would expect to draw the opposite conclusion as the Ba’al haMaor? There must be some other model of understanding mitzvot lav le'henot nitnu which the Ba'al haMaor subscribes to - to be continued bl"n...
posted by Chaim B. at 11:09 AM

10 Comments:
Avromi said...
Perhaps as a thought one could make a distinction between shofar which is a mitzva to be shomea (acc to some rishonim) and therefore the pleasure of the listening does not bother us for one is fulfilling his mitzva with that, however by chatzotzros which the rambam states is a mitzva to blow them on a taanis similar to tefillah, there we are concerned on the benefit he would be getting from listening without getting a mitzva with that.

4:27 PM
Anonymous said...
Is the BH"M referring to the shofar that is blown next to the chatzotzros on a ta'anis, or the chatzotzros themselves?

4:43 PM
Arthur Digby Sellers said...
What is the heter to use this shofar (it's assur b'hana'a)?

The answer is, I'm fulfilling a bona-fide mitzva, and that use is not classified as hana'a. If, however, I'm just being mikayeim an auxilliary mitzva (like the shofar on the sides of the chatzotzros), that is not enough of a "matir" to allow me the use of the chefta shel issur. The product of the use of that cheftza is still deemed hana'a.

4:50 PM
Avromi said...
Anon: I didnt see it, but if its from an olah or shelomim, id assume he means a shofar - chatzotzros were made of silver.

A.D.S. I hear what you are saying, but if the mitzva is to blow, then what benefit is he getting? Are you saying the B"hM maintains that the hannah of fulfilling the mitzva is ossur here even though mitzvos lav lehonos, but thats only by a real mitzva?

5:15 PM
Chaim B. said...
Avromi, your original sevara (pleasure of listening) is said by the Sha'ar haMelech (though I may be misremembering the source). It seems to reduce the Ba'al haMaor's chiluk to ancillary pleasure vs. no ancillary pleasure, not d'oraysa vs. derabbanan. The Shu't HaRashba raises the issue of giving a lulav to a friend one is mudar hana'ah from on Yom Tov sheni - no ancillary pleasure from picking up a lulav, but the mitzvah is only derabbanan. Rashba says mutar, which fits your hesber nicely.

5:24 PM
Arthur Digby Sellers said...
The mitzva of tekias shofar by a taanis does not constitute a "matir". Use of this shofar is prohibited. You need a good reason to remove that prohibition. A quasi-mitzva is not enough of a reason.

5:25 PM
Avromi said...
mitzvos lav lehonos nitnu

5:35 PM
Avromi said...
For a nice kasha from oneg yom tov and discussion, you can see here.
http://dafnotes.blogspot.com/2006/09/daf-yomi-sukkah-9-sukkah-in-rain.html

5:38 PM
Chaim B. said...
Oh, you're Avromi from daf notes! I added a link to you on the side.

10:00 PM
Avromi said...
thanks and im waiting for part 2 of your shtikel

10:25 PM

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 25 - OBEY THE RABBIS EVEN WHEN RIGHT IS LEFT AND LEFT IS RIGHT

Divrei Beit Hillel

In Devarim 17:10 it says "You shall not turn from the commandment to the right or left."
Rashi explains that this pasuk comes to teach us that we must listen to the Sages in all circumstances, even when they tell us that right is left and left is right.

Does this really mean that we must obey our Rabbis when they are wrong? This seems to clearly contradict the Gemara Yerushalmi in Horiyot, which states: You might think that if the Rabbis say the right is left or the left is right you have to listen to them. Therefore it says, to the right and left: when they tell you that the right is right and the left is left.

This textual tension is assuaged when we refer to the source for Rashi's statement, the Sifrei, which states that one must listen to their commandment, even if IT SEEMS to him that the right is left and the left is right.

Therefore it would appear that the verse is not giving blanket ability to the Rabbis to make mistakes, but rather restricting disobedience of their commandments to select cases in which it is clear that they are wrong. However, where does one draw the line?

Rambam, in his Sefer Mitzvot, draws on Shevuot 39A, which states: How do we know that Bnei Yisrael were bound at Har Sinai to commandments that were yet to come in addition to those that were commanded at Har Sinai? As it says (Esther 9), Kimu VKiblu HaYehudim - the Jews fulfilled and accepted it - they fulfilled that which was already accepted at Har Sinai. He expands on this idea by stating that one who violates a Rabbinic commandment also violates the negative Torah commandment given in our verse "Do not turn to the right or left." How can one risk violating this commandment by perceiving a Rabbinic commandment as fallible? While the Ramban does disagree with the Rambam over the technical violation entailed in such a disobedience, he agrees that one is obligated to obey whatever the Rabbis rule, EVEN if they err. As a support, he cites the mishnah in Rosh Hashanah 25, in which R. Yehoshua is forced to appear with his walking stick and traveling bag on the day he calculated was Yom Kippur in deference to R. Gamliel, the Av Beit Din, who disagreed.

Ramban even seems to indicate that one must listen to the Sanhedrin if they violate the Torah! This he bases on the verse (Tehillim 119:126) Et laasot laHashem - There is a time to do the will of Hashem. Indeed the Sefer HaChinuch states that even if the Sanhedrin erred and we are aware of this, we must do as they have commanded. He explains that this is because it is better to have unity, though we might be wrong, than to promote strife brought on by factionalism.

Still, do the Rabbis really have the right to contradict something in the Torah? The Gemara (Horiyot 4A) states: R. Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel, The Beit Din after teaching a false ruling is not liable to bring a korban until they teach a law that the Sadduccees do not agree with. But if they teach a thing erroneously that the Sadduccees agree with, they are liable. What is the reason? It is a matter that can be learned in school. The point of this Gemara is that an individual is expected to know when a law is clearly in the Torah (the kind that the Sadduccees agree with). Therefore, when Beit Din contradicts this law, the individual should know not to follow them, and is therefore responsible for his own actions. However when the Beit Din teaches Torah Shebeal Peh (which the Sadduccees do not give legitimacy to), they are responsible for what they say. This indicates that one indeed should disobey a Beit Din when it contradicts a Torah law.

Perhaps the Kli Yakar, in his commentary on our pasuk, sheds some light on our understanding of Et laasot. He explains that in many issues, there are reasons one both sides to influence the outcome one way or the other. These issues are normally decided according to the side that is more compelling. However, in special cases, certain issues can be decided according to the other side. A proof of this is the statement by Chazal that a person cannot become a member of the Sanhedrin until he can give 150 reasons to declare a sheretz (dead rodent that is normally tameh) tahor. This does not mean that what is clearly left is being made right. What instead follows is that sometimes things that may seem clearly to the right or left by us, are really ambidextrous, if you will. It is up to the Rabbis to take the gray and decide whether it is black or white. The decision process that they go through is not within our right to disregard, and according to the Rambam, even carries the severity of a negative Torah commandment. (Courtesy of Divrei Beit Hillel – Shoftim)

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 23 - Ruling Stringently by a Rabbinic Prohibition

Abaye, in explaining the Gemora’s reasoning as to why they didn’t institute to light the torches only on the night of the thirty-first is because this would compel the people of Bavel to cease from work for two days in the beginning of Tishrei. Those residing in Bavel would always refrain from work on the thirtieth of Elul since perhaps that day is Rosh Hashanah and if the torches will not be lit until after the thirty-first day, this would force them to abstain from work another day since perhaps Elul had thirty days and the thirty-first day is Rosh Hashanah. This is Rashi’s explanation.

Tosfos disagrees and understands the Gemora to be referring to every Rosh Chodesh where there is also a prohibition against working.
Turei Even asks that since the prohibition against performing work on Rosh Chodesh is only Rabbinic, shouldn’t we act leniently and allow those that are in doubt regarding the actual day of Rosh Chodesh to work?

He answers that if we would apply the principle of whenever there is a doubt on a Rabbinic matter, we rule leniently, we would be compelled to act in this manner on both days of Rosh Chodesh since there is a doubt on each day. On each day, we would say that the other day is indeed Rosh Chodesh. It will emerge that the prohibition against working will be uprooted completely. In such a circumstance, we do not apply the principle of ruling leniently.

This logic can be found in the Ran in Pesachim. There is a discussion regarding the four cups of wine that we drink on Pesach night. The Gemora is uncertain if there exists an obligation of reclining by the first two cups or the last two. The ruling is that since there is a doubt, we require one to recline by all four cups.

The Ran asks that since the mitzva of reclining by the drinking of the four cups is only Rabbinic, shouldn’t we act leniently? He answers that if we would indeed act leniently, we would be forced to rule that there is no obligation to lean by the first two cups or the last two cups which would result in the mitzva being uprooted completely. The principle of acting leniently does not apply in such situations.

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