Yahrtzeit; Paying a Father's Debt; Davar shelo ba L'olam

A Yahrtzeit

Rabbi Meir Shapiro, the founder of the Daf Hayomi passed away on the day that those who were studying the daf during that cycle were learning Kesuvos 91.

The Gemora states: The orphans have a mitzvah to pay the debt of their father.

Hundreds of Reb Meir Shapiro’s students, who viewed themselves as only children of their beloved Rebbe swore by his coffin that they would continue building the illustrious Yeshiva of their Rebbe spiritually and financially. It was in this manner that they felt that they were paying the debt of their father; continuing his legacy.

And so it was. For the next six years, until the Holocaust, his Yeshiva flourished; his spirit was present in the walls of the Yeshiva, and served as a tremendous influence to all of his disciples.

Mitzvah to Pay the Father’s Debt


By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

Tosfos explains that the concept of their being a mitzvah on inheritors to pay the debts of their fathers depends on a few variables:
a. whether the father left them property from which to collect.
b. whether a debt without a contract is collectible from the orphans.
c. whether the orphans inherited anything from their father.

1. If the father leaves over property on which there is a loan with a contract - the orphans have a mitzvah to pay and we force them in beis din to pay.

2. If the father doesn’t leave over property - the orphans have a mitzvah to pay, but we don’t force them to pay [Rashash points out that the Shulchan Aruch (107) rules like the Hagahos Ashri that if the father doesn’t leave over anything, they don’t even have a mitzvah to pay at all].

3. If the father leaves them property on which there is a verbal loan, it depends: One opinion holds that a verbal loan is collected from orphans, so we force them to pay. But according to Rav and Shmuel that a verbal loan isn’t collected from orphans, they have a mitzvah to pay but we don’t force.

Perhaps the concept of forcing the orphans to pay is under the rubric of forcing for positive mitzvos. This seems to be supported clearly by Tosfos who quotes this Gemora not only for the reason that one must repay their own debt, but to justify why we force orphans to pay their fathers debt (when it is a contractual debt and he leaves over property). The difficulty is: if we force for mitzvas aseh, why don’t we force in all situations where they have a mitzvah to pay, even when he doesn’t leave over property on which there is a lien?

Conveying Properties that are not in Existence

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Our sugya says that this principle applies to dinei mamonos [cases involving monetary matters]. As long as an article is nonexistent, it cannot be acquired (C.M. 209:4). However, under certain circumstances, when a kinyan [an act of acquisition] is made for something nonexistent, the seller must carry out the transaction.

Two Jews, one a Turkish chacham and businessman and the other captain of a cargo ship, went to the Maharit for a ruling. The Turkish chacham told the Maharit that he had recently signed a contract in which he had committed to sell four hundred skins to the captain. Now, after the chacham had reneged on his side of the deal, he argued that he had never been obligated to deliver the goods. He only intended to sell skins that were nonexistent at the time of sale and therefore the transaction is null and void since “nonexistent items cannot be sold.”

However, the Maharit ruled that the chacham could not use this excuse to sidestep his obligation. We can differentiate between selling a nonexistent article and obligating oneself concerning such an article. Although the sale of the nonexistent item is invalid, this is because there is nothing tangible for the sale to take effect upon. However, an obligation to sell such an article is binding because the obligation lies upon the person, who does exist. We regard his obligation as a monetary debt in the form of an object. The monetary debt is binding, for surely one can undertake to give money to someone else (see Ktzos HaChoshen 203:4).

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The Beilis Blood Libel

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The following story is printed in the Sefer Margaliyos HaShas amongst others and the text of the entire story can be found here: shemayisrael.

The Beilis Affair shook the ground under those Jews who had thought that the modern world was a more rational one, a world in which outrageous accusations might be levied but would certainly not gain credence. When Mendel Beilis was brought to trial for a blood libel accusation, it seemed that the progress of a century would be completely wiped away in an instant.

Jews around the world were stirred to action. There was also an outpouring of sympathy from non Jews who recognized the injustice and absurdity of the accusations. A progressive newspaper in Germany reported that libels that echo with the style and content of the darkest medieval times are being hurled against the Jewish minority in Russia. Diplomats, statesmen and other men of prominence urged the Russian government to retreat from this bizarre enterprise. But against this flood of outrage, the anti-Semites of the world only strengthened and increased their own accusations.

The Jewish world was in turmoil. In congregations around the globe, special daily prayers were instituted for the deliverance of Beilis and all the Jewish people. Community leaders, rabbis, chassidic rebbes and influential activists became involved. The Chazon Ish was an active participant in the fight, as were Rabbi Meir Shapiro, the Lubliner Rav, the Lubavitcher Rebbe and the Chortkover Rebbe. The main thrust of their efforts was ambitious. They sought not only to clear Beilis of the unfounded charges but also to uproot the very idea of the blood libel.

The lawyer that headed the defense team was the legendary Oscar Gruzenberg. He knew that the prosecutions attack was going to be directed against the Talmud and other works of Jewish scholarship and that the expertise in devising a defense would have to be provided by the rabbis. Rabbi Mazeh, Chief Rabbi of Moscow, was chosen to head the rabbinic advisory team for the defense.

On October 8, 1913, right after Yom Kippur, the trial opened. The long-awaited spectacle was now under way. Jew and non-Jew in Russia and around the world awaited the outcome with breathless anticipation.

As the trial began, the indictment accused Menachem Mendel the son of Tuviah Beilis, 39, of having murdered together with other people, not discovered, under duress of mysterious religious obligations and rituals, one Andrei Yustchinsky.

The twelve jurors were carefully chosen; their identities and ideologies had been thoroughly prepared prior to the charade of the trial. The first witnesses testified to such blatant lies that the defense lawyer did not even feel compelled to discredit their testimonies. These preliminary stages were clearly a farce, and the audience, near and far, waited for the real trial to begin. At last, the parade of experts began. And the trial became an examination of the Talmud's view on various issues.

What does the Talmud say about the place from which the soul exits the body? Is it correct that the Talmud states that stealing from a gentile is permissible?

The constant refrain was about the Talmud. There, in the depths of the main courthouse of Kiev, all one could hear was Talmud. The prosecutor was prepared with an avalanche of quotes from the Halachic (legal) and the Aggadic (homiletic) portions of the Talmud. Anti-Semites around the world had done their homework and had rallied to the cause of condemning the Jewish people and the Jewish religion in a court of law.

The crucial question was posed: How dare the Jewish sages claim that [the Jewish people] are called adam, man, while the idol worshippers are not called adam?

The illustrious Rabbi Meir Shapiro was then the Rabbi of Galina. (Later, he would establish and serve as the head of the famous yeshivah of Lublin, and he would also institute the Daf Yomi.) When Rabbi Shapiro heard about attacks against the Talmud, he understood that the Talmud was being accused of inciting Jew against non-Jew. Rabbi Shapiro sent off a very clear letter to Rabbi Mazeh dealing with this accusation. He told him to explain to the court that a very important insight into the nature of the Jewish people is revealed in this Talmudic quote.

The Torah states, he wrote, that kol Yisrael areivim zeh lazeh, all Jews are responsible for each other. (Shevuos 39) According to this principle, it stands to reason that the fate of Mendel Beilis, for example, which is in essence the fate of one single Jew, nevertheless touches the entire Jewish people. The Jewish people tremble for his welfare and would do everything in their power to remove the prisoner's collar from him. What would have been the reaction of the gentile world if one specific gentile had been accused of a similar crime and was standing trial in a faraway country? Clearly, no more than the people of his own town would show any interest in the libel. Perhaps, at most, people in other parts of his own country would criticize the proceedings. But people in other countries? They certainly wouldn't take a personal interest in him.

This, therefore, is the difference between the Jewish people and all other peoples. The Jews are considered adam, the singular form of the word man, an indication of the extreme solidarity of the Jewish people. For us, when one Mendel Beilis is put on trial, the entire Jewish world stands at his side like one man. Not so the other peoples of the world. They may very well be considered anashim, the plural form of the word man, but they cannot be considered adam, a nation that stands together as a single man.

There is no way of knowing which particular effort of which particular rabbis may have had some impact on the trial. All in all, however, the concerted efforts of the Jews bore out the interpretation of Rabbi Meir Shapiro that you [the Jewish people] are called adam, for the Jews did set aside their internal differences and stood together as one man until the verdict of not guilty was returned.

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Afflictions Purge a Person's Sins

The Gemora (Bava Kamma 91) states that if a master knocks out the tooth of his slave, or if he blinds his eye, he must release the slave.

It is noteworthy that Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemora in Brochos (5a) derives from here that a person is considered fortunate if Hashem inflicts him. It is taught through a kal vachomer as follows: If the loss of a tooth or an eye, which is only one of the limbs in a person’s body, nevertheless, a slave gains his freedom because of it, then afflictions, which cleanse the person’s entire body, should certainly free a person from sin because of them!

Rish Lakish derives this same lesson from a different source. He says: The word covenant is written with respect to salt and the word covenant is written with respect to afflictions. Just as salt sweetens the meat, so too, afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins.

The Bobover Rebbe in Kedushas Tziyon notes that there is a distinction between the two expositions. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the afflictions will only cleans a person if they emanate from Heaven, similar to the halachos of a slave, where he will only be set free if his master knocks out his tooth or eye. He will not gain his freedom if someone else injures him. However, according to Rish Lakish, any type of afflictions will cleanse him, in the same manner as the salt sweetening the meat. It makes no difference as to who applies the salt.

Based upon this, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank explains the following. It is written [Shmos 6:5]: And also, I heard the moans of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians are holding in bondage, and I remembered My covenant. The Jewish people thought that the Egyptians were their masters and they were those who were afflicting them. They did not realize that their suffering was decreed from Heaven. Because they didn’t know who was causing them their hardships, they did not gain their freedom. It was only because Hashem remembered His covenant, that all afflictions cleanse a person from his sins, that was the reason they were released from the bondage.

Reb Meir Shapiro adds to this: If a slave does not come to court and testify that his master knocked out his tooth or eye, he will not gain his freedom. If he says that it happened by happenstance, he will not go free. So too, it is with afflictions. If a person does not believe with complete faith that the afflictions are affecting him because of Divine Providence, the afflictions will not purge him of his sins. However, if this principle was derived through the gezeirah shavah from salt, it would not make any difference.

The Rashba was asked the following question: If a slave initiates a fight with his master and strikes the first blow, and the master counters with some strikes of his own and knocks out the slave’s tooth, will the slave gain his freedom?

He replied that the slave goes free. The proof is from the aforementioned Gemora, where Rabbi Yochanan derived that afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins through a kal vachomer from the laws of the slave. How can the two be compared? Afflictions come to a person because he has sinned! It was his own fault! Perhaps, then, those afflictions will not purge him from his sins!? Evidently, we see that a slave also gains his freedom, even if he was the one who initiated the fight!

Read more!

Afflictions Purge a Person's Sins

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here

The Gemora states that if a master knocks out the tooth of his slave, or if he blinds his eye, he must release the slave.

It is noteworthy that Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemora in Brochos (5a) derives from here that a person is considered fortunate if Hashem inflicts him. It is taught through a kal vachomer as follows: If the loss of a tooth or an eye, which is only one of the limbs in a person’s body, nevertheless, a slave gains his freedom because of it, then afflictions, which cleanse the person’s entire body, should certainly free a person from sin because of them!

Rish Lakish derives this same lesson from a different source. He says: The word covenant is written with respect to salt and the word covenant is written with respect to afflictions. Just as salt sweetens the meat, so too, afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins.

The Bobover Rebbe in Kedushas Tziyon notes that there is a distinction between the two expositions. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the afflictions will only cleans a person if they emanate from Heaven, similar to the halachos of a slave, where he will only be set free if his master knocks out his tooth or eye. He will not gain his freedom if someone else injures him. However, according to Rish Lakish, any type of afflictions will cleanse him, in the same manner as the salt sweetening the meat. It makes no difference as to who applies the salt.

Based upon this, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank explains the following. It is written [Shmos 6:5]: And also, I heard the moans of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians are holding in bondage, and I remembered My covenant. The Jewish people thought that the Egyptians were their masters and they were those who were afflicting them. They did not realize that their suffering was decreed from Heaven. Because they didn’t know who was causing them their hardships, they did not gain their freedom. It was only because Hashem remembered His covenant, that all afflictions cleanse a person from his sins, that was the reason they were released from the bondage.

Reb Meir Shapiro adds to this: If a slave does not come to court and testify that his master knocked out his tooth or eye, he will not gain his freedom. If he says that it happened by happenstance, he will not go free. So too, it is with afflictions. If a person does not believe with complete faith that the afflictions are affecting him because of Divine Providence, the afflictions will not purge him of his sins. However, if this principle was derived through the gezeirah shavah from salt, it would not make any difference.

The Rashba was asked the following question: If a slave initiates a fight with his master and strikes the first blow, and the master counters with some strikes of his own and knocks out the slave’s tooth, will the slave gain his freedom?

He replied that the slave goes free. The proof is from the aforementioned Gemora, where Rabbi Yochanan derived that afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins through a kal vachomer from the laws of the slave. How can the two be compared? Afflictions come to a person because he has sinned! It was his own fault! Perhaps, then, those afflictions will not purge him from his sins!? Evidently, we see that a slave also gains his freedom, even if he was the one who initiated the fight!

Read more!

Afflictions Purge a Person's Sins

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 42b) states that if a master knocks out the tooth of his slave, or if he blinds his eye, he must release the slave.

It is noteworthy that Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemora in Brochos (5a) derives from here that a person is considered fortunate if Hashem inflicts him. It is taught through a kal vachomer as follows: If the loss of a tooth or an eye, which is only one of the limbs in a person’s body, nevertheless, a slave gains his freedom because of it, then afflictions, which cleanse the person’s entire body, should certainly free a person from sin because of them!

Rish Lakish derives this same lesson from a different source. He says: The word covenant is written with respect to salt and the word covenant is written with respect to afflictions. Just as salt sweetens the meat, so too, afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins.

The Bobover Rebbe in Kedushas Tziyon notes that there is a distinction between the two expositions. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the afflictions will only cleans a person if they emanate from Heaven, similar to the halachos of a slave, where he will only be set free if his master knocks out his tooth or eye. He will not gain his freedom if someone else injures him. However, according to Rish Lakish, any type of afflictions will cleanse him, in the same manner as the salt sweetening the meat. It makes no difference as to who applies the salt.

Based upon this, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank explains the following. It is written [Shmos 6:5]: And also, I heard the moans of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians are holding in bondage, and I remembered My covenant. The Jewish people thought that the Egyptians were their masters and they were those who were afflicting them. They did not realize that their suffering was decreed from Heaven. Because they didn’t know who was causing them their hardships, they did not gain their freedom. It was only because Hashem remembered His covenant, that all afflictions cleanse a person from his sins, that was the reason they were released from the bondage.

Reb Meir Shapiro adds to this: If a slave does not come to court and testify that his master knocked out his tooth or eye, he will not gain his freedom. If he says that it happened by happenstance, he will not go free. So too, it is with afflictions. If a person does not believe with complete faith that the afflictions are affecting him because of Divine Providence, the afflictions will not purge him of his sins. However, if this principle was derived through the gezeirah shavah from salt, it would not make any difference.

The Rashba was asked the following question: If a slave initiates a fight with his master and strikes the first blow, and the master counters with some strikes of his own and knocks out the slave’s tooth, will the slave gain his freedom?

He replied that the slave goes free. The proof is from the aforementioned Gemora, where Rabbi Yochanan derived that afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins through a kal vachomer from the laws of the slave. How can the two be compared? Afflictions come to a person because he has sinned! It was his own fault! Perhaps, then, those afflictions will not purge him from his sins!? Evidently, we see that a slave also gains his freedom, even if he was the one who initiated the fight!

Read more!

A Yahrtzeit

Rabbi Meir Shapiro, the founder of the Daf Hayomi passed away on the day that those who were studying the daf during that cycle were learning Kesuvos 91.

The Gemora states: The orphans have a mitzvah to pay the debt of their father.

Hundreds of Reb Meir Shapiro’s students, who viewed themselves as only children of their beloved Rebbe swore by his coffin that they would continue building the illustrious Yeshiva of their Rebbe spiritually and financially. It was in this manner that they felt that they were paying the debt of their father; continuing his legacy.

And so it was. For the next six years, until the Holocaust, his Yeshiva flourished; his spirit was present in the walls of the Yeshiva, and served as a tremendous influence to all of his disciples.

Read more!

Count the Stars

In this week's parsha, Avrohom was told to look up at the heavens and count the stars. How was it possible for him to fulfill such an unattainable task? Reb Meir Shapiro whose yahrtzeit is today, explains that an inteligent person would have obviously been perplexed when receiving such an overwhelming instruction, knowing that it is impossible to complete. Avrohom was also well aware of this, but he knew that by following Hashem's commandment, he would receive a special syata dishmaya and with that knowledge, he began counting 1, 2, 3 .... Hashem, recognizing this enthusiasm and Avrohom's willingness to fulfill His commandments immediately blessed him with the brocha of children.

Anyone can join the learning of Daf haYomi; all you have to do is start, one day at a time.

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Introducing: Daf Hayomi

The Braisa states that Rabban Gamliel related the following incident: I was once traveling in a boat and I saw a boat break, and I was pained regarding the Torah scholar who was in that boat. Who was that? Rabbi Akiva. And when I went ashore, he (Rabbi Akiva) came, sat, and judged before me a Halachic matter. I said to him, “My son, who took you out (of the water)?” He answered “A board from the ship chanced by me, and at every wave that came over me I bent my head.” From here the Chachamim said that if a person encounters evildoers he should bend his head to them. Rabban Gamliel stated that he said at this time, “How great are the words of the Chachamim that they said that (if one falls into) water that has an end, his wife is permitted, into water that does not have an end, his wife is forbidden!”

Reb Meir Shapiro introduced the concept of Daf HaYomi with this Gemora.

The time period, in which those Tannaim lived was regarded as one of the harshest for the Jewish people throughout their history. There were constantly decrees against the studying of Torah and the observance of mitzvos. Many people were not able to withstand these decrees. Rabbi Akiva stood out as an exception to this rule. He was able to return the crown of Torah to its glory and eventually, he established a Beis Medrash and had twenty-four thousand students.

Rabban Gamliel, upon observing this miraculous sight, wished to know the secret of Rabbi Akiva’s success. How was he capable of accomplishing such an astonishing feat?

Rabbi Akiva answered: It was the “Daf shel sefinah,” the board from the ship that chanced by me. It is the establishment of the Daf HaYomi that brought about this change. The inspiration of all the Jews in the entire world to study the same page of Gemora one day, and to continue with the following page the next day, that lifted the Jewish people from their rut, and instilled enthusiasm into the studying of Torah world wide.

The Gerrer Rebbe, the Pnei Menachem, said by the Siyum Hashas in Tel Aviv in the year 5735: One cannot begin to fathom the amount of Torah that was learned because of the establishment of Daf Hayomi.

The Gemora in Avodah Zarah (5b) states: A person does not fully realize and appreciate his teacher until after forty years. It is now forty years since the churban of Europe, and now we can fully comprehend the true value of learning Daf Hayomi.

The Gemora in Eruvin (13b) states: Rebbe said: The reason why I am sharper than my colleagues is because I saw Rabbi Meir from his backside. This means that he saw him at a distance of time since he departed this world. Chazal say: On e could not fully comprehend Rabbi Meir, but Rebbe said many years later that now he was closer to ascertaining Rabbi Meir’s words. It is only now, years after the passing of Reb Meir Shapiro, that we are able to grasp the brilliance of the establishment of Daf Hayomi.

May Hakodosh Boruch Hu give us all strength to continue on the path that Reb Meir Shapiro set for us; we should be zoche to commence and conclude Meseches Kesuvos (beginning Monday iy”H) and may we all merit to witness the coming of Mashiach bimeheira, Amen!

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Beilis Blood Libel - Rabbi Meir Shapiro's Response - Yevamos 61 - Daf Yomi

The following story is printed in the Sefer Margaliyos HaShas amongst others and the text of the entire story can be found here: shemayisrael

The Beilis Affair shook the ground under those Jews who had thought that the modern world was a more rational one, a world in which outrageous accusations might be levied but would certainly not gain credence. When Mendel Beilis was brought to trial for a blood libel accusation, it seemed that the progress of a century would be completely wiped away in an instant.

Jews around the world were stirred to action. There was also an outpouring of sympathy from non Jews who recognized the injustice and absurdity of the accusations. A progressive newspaper in Germany reported that libels that echo with the style and content of the darkest medieval times are being hurled against the Jewish minority in Russia. Diplomats, statesmen and other men of prominence urged the Russian government to retreat from this bizarre enterprise. But against this flood of outrage, the anti-Semites of the world only strengthened and increased their own accusations.

The Jewish world was in turmoil. In congregations around the globe, special daily prayers were instituted for the deliverance of Beilis and all the Jewish people. Community leaders, rabbis, chassidic rebbes and influential activists became involved. The Chazon Ish was an active participant in the fight, as were Rabbi Meir Shapiro, the Lubliner Rav, the Lubavitcher Rebbe and the Chortkover Rebbe. The main thrust of their efforts was ambitious. They sought not only to clear Beilis of the unfounded charges but also to uproot the very idea of the blood libel.

The lawyer that headed the defense team was the legendary Oscar Gruzenberg. He knew that the prosecutions attack was going to be directed against the Talmud and other works of Jewish scholarship and that the expertise in devising a defense would have to be provided by the rabbis. Rabbi Mazeh, Chief Rabbi of Moscow, was chosen to head the rabbinic advisory team for the defense.

On October 8, 1913, right after Yom Kippur, the trial opened. The long-awaited spectacle was now under way. Jew and non-Jew in Russia and around the world awaited the outcome with breathless anticipation.

As the trial began, the indictment accused Menachem Mendel the son of Tuviah Beilis, 39, of having murdered together with other people, not discovered, under duress of mysterious religious obligations and rituals, one Andrei Yustchinsky.

The twelve jurors were carefully chosen; their identities and ideologies had been thoroughly prepared prior to the charade of the trial. The first witnesses testified to such blatant lies that the defense lawyer did not even feel compelled to discredit their testimonies. These preliminary stages were clearly a farce, and the audience, near and far, waited for the real trial to begin. At last, the parade of experts began. And the trial became an examination of the Talmud's view on various issues.

What does the Talmud say about the place from which the soul exits the body?

Is it correct that the Talmud states that stealing from a gentile is permissible?

The constant refrain was about the Talmud. There, in the depths of the main courthouse of Kiev, all one could hear was Talmud. The prosecutor was prepared with an avalanche of quotes from the Halachic (legal) and the Aggadic (homiletic) portions of the Talmud. Anti-Semites around the world had done their homework and had rallied to the cause of condemning the Jewish people and the Jewish religion in a court of law.

The crucial question was posed: How dare the Jewish sages claim that [the Jewish people] are called adam, man, while the idol worshippers are not called adam?

The illustrious Rabbi Meir Shapiro was then the Rabbi of Galina. (Later, he would establish and serve as the head of the famous yeshivah of Lublin, and he would also institute the Daf Yomi.) When Rabbi Shapiro heard about attacks against the Talmud, he understood that the Talmud was being accused of inciting Jew against non-Jew. Rabbi Shapiro sent off a very clear letter to Rabbi Mazeh dealing with this accusation. He told him to explain to the court that a very important insight into the nature of the Jewish people is revealed in this Talmudic quote.

The Torah states, he wrote, that kol Yisrael areivim zeh lazeh, all Jews are responsible for each other. (Shevuos 39) According to this principle, it stands to reason that the fate of Mendel Beilis, for example, which is in essence the fate of one single Jew, nevertheless touches the entire Jewish people. The Jewish people tremble for his welfare and would do everything in their power to remove the prisoner's collar from him. What would have been the reaction of the gentile world if one specific gentile had been accused of a similar crime and was standing trial in a faraway country? Clearly, no more than the people of his own town would show any interest in the libel. Perhaps, at most, people in other parts of his own country would criticize the proceedings. But people in other countries? They certainly wouldn't take a personal interest in him.

This, therefore, is the difference between the Jewish people and all other peoples. The Jews are considered adam, the singular form of the word man, an indication of the extreme solidarity of the Jewish people. For us, when one Mendel Beilis is put on trial, the entire Jewish world stands at his side like one man. Not so the other peoples of the world. They may very well be considered anashim, the plural form of the word man, but they cannot be considered adam, a nation that stands together as a single man.

There is no way of knowing which particular effort of which particular rabbis may have had some impact on the trial. All in all, however, the concerted efforts of the Jews bore out the interpretation of Rabbi Meir Shapiro that you [the Jewish people] are called adam, for the Jews did set aside their internal differences and stood together as one man until the verdict of not guilty was returned.

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 10 - LITTLE MEIR (SHAPIRO) CHILD PRODIGY

TO THE MOUNTAINS,I LIFT MY EYES,LIKE HILLEL AND NOT SHAMAI

Rabbi Meir Shapiro, the founder of the Daf Hayomi, was known as a child prodigy. His sharpness allowed him to grasp even the deepest concepts quickly.

It is related that the Vishnitzer Rebbe once sought to observe Reb Meir when he was merely nine years old. Little Meir recited for the Rebbe the entire first section of Yoreh Deah by heart. Meir was not only capable of reciting the words verbatim, but he also was able to explain the rulings in a manner similar to a Torah scholar.

Once during a Shabbos meal, Meir was asked to explain an enigmatic passage that is sung in the Shabbos zemiros. The zemiros state: To the mountains, I lift my eyes, like Hillel and not Shamai. Meir was asked, “What is the juxtaposition of these two seemingly unrelated ideas and what is their correlation to Shabbos?”

The little genius did not have to think long before responding. The Gemora in Chagigah (10a) states: The laws of Shabbos are like mountains hanging on a hair, as they have few Scriptural allusions, but many halachos. The Gemora explains that the Torah only prohibits one to perform a meleches machasheves, a calculated labor, on Shabbos. Rashi explains that the Torah juxtaposes the laws of prohibited labors on Shabbos to the construction of the Tabernacle. Regarding the construction of the Tabernacle it is said meleches machasheves, calculated labor. Since the guidelines are not written by Shabbos, they are compared to mountains hanging on a hair.

The Gemora in Menochos (40a) cites a dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel whether one is permitted to wear a garment of tzitzis that contains shatnez (wool and linen mixed together). Rashi explains: Beis Hillel maintains that the linen garment is subject to the mitzva of tzitzis because the Torah juxtaposes the mitzva of tzitzis to the commandment against wearing shatnez. Beis Shamai disagrees because he does not expound juxtapositions.

This then is the meaning of the verse: To the mountains, I lift my eyes; the halachos of Shabbos are compared to a mountain hanging on a hair. Like Hillel and not Shamai; for Beis Shamai does not expound juxtapositions and therefore he cannot derive the principle of meleches machasheves by Shabbos because this is written by the Mishkan and not by Shabbos.

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