An Av and its Toladah

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here

The Gemora (Bava Kamma 2a) notes: We see regarding Shabbos that there are thirty-nine main categories of melachos (that are forbidden to perform according to Torah law) on Shabbos. This implies that there are sub-categories as well. Regarding Shabbos, we say that the sub-categories are like the main categories. Whether one transgresses a main category or sub-category unwittingly, he must bring a korban chatas. Whether one transgresses a main category or sub-category willfully, he is liable to be stoned. What difference, then, does it make that one is called a main category and one is called a sub-category? The difference is that if one performs two main category prohibitions or two sub-category prohibitions, he is liable twice. However, if he performs a main category prohibition and its sub-category prohibition at the same time, he is only liable for transgressing Shabbos once (and would only bring one korban chatas).

Rashi explains that when one performs an av (main category) together with its toladah (sub-category), he is liable for the av, and not for the toladah. For example, if one planted a tree (av) and watered a plant (a toladah of zore’a), he is liable for the av, and not for the toladah.

The commentators ask: What practical difference does it make if he is liable for the av or the toladah? The bottom line is that he is required to bring one korban chatas!?

Reb Tzvi Pesach Frank suggests the following: The Gemora in Shabbos (71b) rules that if one eats two olive-sized pieces of cheilev (forbidden fats) in one state of unawareness, and he is apprised of the first and he brings a korban. If subsequently, he becomes aware of the second, he is now required to bring another chatas for that one (for the bringing of one korban cannot exempt one from bringing a korban for a violation that he did not know about at the time). Accordingly, if one would perform an av and its toladah together, and he would be apprised of the av, but not the toladah, he would bring a korban for the av. If afterwards he is made aware of the toladah, he would be liable to bring a korban for it, for according to Rashi, one is not liable for a toladah when it is done together with its av.

Read more!

Katafreis Connection

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 16a) cites a Mishna in Taharos: A jet of liquid from a jug (nitzok), or liquid flowing down a slope (katafreis), or liquid enough to moisten (mashkeh tofe’ach) does not form a connection for tumah or for taharah. [The explanation that they are not a connection for tumah: Nitzok – if one pours liquid from a tahor vessel into a tamei one and the flow of the liquid is uninterrupted between them, it is not regarded as a connection to make the upper vessel tamei. Katafreis – if a liquid from a pool flows down a board on a slope into a pool of liquid which is tamei, the upper pool remains tahor. Mashkeh tofei’ach – a moist trough has two pools of liquid on opposite sides; one of them tamei and one of them tahor. Although the trough is damp enough that it can moisten anything that touches it, the tamei pool does not contaminate the tahor one. The explanation that they are not a connection for taharah: A mikvah must contain forty se’ah of water in order to be valid. If there are two mikvaos and neither of them contain forty se’ah and they are connected through any one of the three ways mentioned above, they are not considered halachically connected to form one large valid mikvah.]

The Vilna Gaon asks: Even without the connection through katafreis, why don’t we say that each droplet of tamei water should contaminate another drop, and ultimately, the water in the upper pool should be rendered tamei?

He answers that the halacha of katafreis would be necessary in a case where a tevul yom (one who was tamei, but has immersed himself in a mikvah; he is considered a tevul yom until nightfall) touched the liquid, for he cannot contaminate a food item with the capability of contaminating something else (and therefore, one droplet will not cause the other to become tamei). Through the principle of katafreis, it could be regarded that the entire flow is regarded as one body of liquid, and the upper pool could become tamei (if it would be considered connected).

Reb Shimon Shkop asks on his answer from the Rambam, who rules that these halachos would apply by tumas sheretz as well, and a sheretz can contaminate one drop to render the others tamei!?

He answers that one drop cannot render the other drops tamei because of the principle of beis hasetarim (for the drops touching each other are not recognizable).

Rav Elyashiv answers simply that if the liquid would be rendered tamei because of its contact with the first droplet, it would only be Rabbinically tamei, for that which a liquid is ruled to be a rishon l’tumah is only a Rabbinic decree. Hence, kodoshim that contracted tumah in such a manner could not be burned. However, through the principle of katafreis, the entire liquid would be rendered tamei on a Biblical level, and if kodoshim would be involved, it would be required to be burned.

Read more!

The Law of the Government

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin Daf 10b) notes: The Mishna did not make any distinction between a document of sale and one of a gift. It is understandable that a document of sale can be valid even if idolaters are signed on it, for when the buyer gave the money before the judges is actually the time that he acquired the land; the document is only a proof to the sale. If the buyer had not given money in front of the judges, they would not have discredited their reputation by writing the document for him. But with respect of a gift, with what did he acquire the property? It is only through this document! But this document is equivalent to a shard! [Why does the Mishna rule that even in this case, the document is valid?]

Shmuel answers: The law of the government is the law (even according to our law).

The Gemora in Shabbos (88a) teaches that when Bnei Yisroel stood at Mount Sinai and heard the word of Hashem, He held the mountain over our heads. Hashem declared, “If you’ll accept the Torah, all will be well. If not, this will be your burial place!” Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: This can now be used as an excuse for Klal Yisroel when they do not perform the mitzvos. For when they are summoned for judgment, they can claim that they were coerced into accepting the Torah; it was not done willingly.

The Perashas Derachim asks from our Gemora which states that the law of the kingdom is the law. If so, this should certainly apply by The Holy One blessed is He, Who is the King of all Kings. How could Klal Yisroel use the coercion as an excuse? The law of the kingdom is the law, and they took an oath obligating themselves to perform His mitzvos!

He answers that Rabbeinu Tam holds that the principle of the law of the kingdom is the law is only applicable if the king decrees on all his subjects. However, if the decree is issued only on part of his kingdom, this principle does not apply. Since Hashem is the King over all the nations of the world and He only forced Bnei Yisroel to accept His mitzvos, this principle would not apply and hence, a claim of coercion can be effective.

It emerges that regarding the seven mitzvos that were given to all Bnei Noach, the principle of the law of the kingdom is the law would apply, and a claim of coercion would not be valid.

According to this, the Ketzos HaChoshen explains the argument between Pharaoh and the midwives. Pharaoh asked them, “Why didn’t you listen to my commandment? The law of the kingdom is the law and since I the king decreed that all the Jewish children should be killed, you are obligated to listen to me!” They responded to him, “Your decree is not a universal one; it was only issued regarding the Jewish children and not to any others. Accordingly, the principle does not apply and we are not obligated to adhere to the laws of the kingdom. Thereupon, Pharaoh immediately decreed that all children born must be thrown into the sea.

Reb Shlomo Kluger uses this principle to explain Adam HaRishon’s response to Hashem. He answered, “The woman which you gave to me gave me from the tree and I ate.” What kind of answer was this? Adam HaRishon was saying that since his was wife was here as well and she was not commanded not to eat from the tree. Therefore, the law of the kingdom does not apply and that is why he ate.

Read more!

Pauper Acting Rich

The braisa (Daf Yomi: Nazir 25b - 26a) states: Other people who are obligated to bring bird offerings by the Torah (because they cannot afford to buy animal offerings) who already designated the money to buy the birds (and then became rich), if they now want to bring a chatas or olah offering instead, they may do so.

The Mefaresh understands this Gemora to be referring to a rich woman who has given birth, where her chatas is a bird.

It is noteworthy that after the Torah discusses the korban that a rich woman who has given birth brings, it says [Vayikra 12:7]: This is the law of a woman who gives birth to a male or to a female. The question is asked: Immediately following this verse, the Torah teaches us the korbanos that a poor woman who has given birth brings. Why would the Torah say regarding the rich woman’s korbanos that “this is law of a woman who gives birth”? It would seem from the verse that only the rich woman’s korbanos are the law, and not the korbanos from the poor woman.

The Kli Chemdah (Parshas Tazria) cites a Gemora in Menochos (110a): It is written: This is the law of an olah. The Gemora expounds: Anyone that studies the laws of an olah is considered as if he brought a korban olah. What would be if a poor person would recite the portion dealing with the rich person’s korbanos? Would it be regarded as if he brought the korban? The answer may be gleaned from the fact that the Torah concluded the portion dealing with the rich woman’s korbanos with the following verse: This is the law of a woman who gives birth. The Torah is informing us that the recital of this portion is sufficient for anyone, even for a poor woman.

[The Gemora states that Hashem told Avraham Avinu that whenever Klal Yisroel will read the Torah portions pertaining to the korbanos, it will be regarded as if they brought korbanos and their sins will be forgiven.

The commentators discuss if this concept applies by other mitzvos as well. Perhaps it can be said that the studying of any mitzvah that cannot be performed nowadays will be regarded as if one fulfilled the mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemora in Bava Metzia (114b) that the Amoraim were fluent in Seder Kodoshim in the same manner as Seder Moed, Nashim and Nezikin. This is because Kodoshim was relevant to them since the learning about the korbanos was regarded as if they actually brought a korban. Implicit in his words that for some reason this was only true regarding Seder Kodoshim and not to Seder Zeroim or Taharos which also has many halachos that do not apply outside of Eretz Yisroel and after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Taz in his sefer Divrei Dovid maintains that the concept applies to all mitzvos and one who studies the laws of Zeraim, it will be regarded as if he gave terumos and ma’asros to the kohanim and levi’im and it will be considered as if he gave all the presents to the poor people. This is the explanation in Yaakov’s words to Esav "Im Lavan garti," which Chazal understand to mean that Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos in Lavan’s house. There were many mitzvos that he was not able to fulfill at that time; it is evident that the studying of these mitzvos are regarded as if he fulfilled them all.

The Ben Ish Cahi explains the verse in Nitzavim: "Ki Korov eilecha hadavar meod b’ficha u’vilvov’cha la’asoso." It is possible to fulfill all the mitzvos with your mouth (by studying them) even those mitzvos that you cannot actually perform.]

We can add that the Mishna in Negaim compliments this explanation. For the Mishna says that if a poor person who is a metzora brings the korban that a rich person is supposed to bring, he fulfills his obligation. The Chinuch (123) states by a korban olah v’yoreid - (certain sins which require a korban chatos, he either brings an animal, bird or flour offering depending on his status - this is called a fluctuating korban) if a poor person brings the korban of a rich person, he does not fulfill his obligation. The Chinuch explains the reason: the Torah had compassion on the poor person, it is not proper for him to compel himself to bring a korban which he cannot afford. How can the Chinuch hold against the Mishna, which explicitly states that he does fulfill his obligation?

The Chasam Sofer answers based on the following Gemora in Shabbos: Hashem punishes each person according to what he can afford. A rich person who sins will lose his cow. A poor person, on the other hand, will lose his chicken or some eggs. Therefore, there is a distinction between the korban of a metzora or a woman who gave birth and the korban olah v’yoreid. A metzora is not required to bring a korban because he sinned, it is to purify him and allow him to eat kodoshim. If a poor metzora decides to bring the rich man’s korban, he will have discharged his obligation. Conversely, a sinner who does that will not have discharged his obligation, for here the Torah prescribed for him the korban which will give him atonement according to his status. The korban is in place of the punishment. It is not decided by the pauper what his punishment should be, and therefore when he brings the korban of a rich person, he does not fulfill his obligation.

The Sfas Emes (here and quoted in Moadim U’zmanim as a story which occurred by a Kenesiya Gedola) answers that there is a basic distinction. A metzora disregarding if he is rich or poor, is required to bring a chatas and an olah. The rich man brings animals and the pauper brings birds. If a poor person brings the korban of a rich person, he fulfills his obligation, for he brought the prescribed amount. A korban olah v’yoreid is different. A rich person brings an animal for a korban chatas and a poor person brings two birds, one for a chatas and one for an olah. If a poor person will force himself to bring the korban of a rich person, he will not fulfill his obligation because he cheated the Altar out of one korban - namely the olah.

There are two questions on this explanation (look in Shemuas Chaim and in Mitzvas Hamelech from Harav Ezriel Cziment). Firstly, the Chinuch says a different reason for his not fulfilling his obligation. He says because the Torah doesn’t want a poor person to overburden himself. He does not say the reason of the Sfas Emes that he missed a korban? Secondly, one must ask, why is it that a poor person is required to bring two korbanos and a rich person only brings one? The Ibn Ezra explains the reason for this: A chatas bird is completely eaten and an olah bird is completely burned on the Altar. These two birds together replace a regular korban which entails a human consumption and the Altar’s consumption. They are actually one korban. Therefore, one can say that a poor person is not missing a korban by bringing one animal instead of two birds?

It would seem, however, that this question can be answered. Even according to the Ibn Ezra, the two birds are not one korban. They are two korbanos complimenting one another. The rationale behind bringing the two korbanos could be because the Torah wants human consumption and the Altar’s consumption; nevertheless, it is still two korbanos and a poor person is missing one korban when he brings the korban of a rich person.

Read more!

Resurrected in their Clothes

by Reb Ben

Rav Chiya bar Yosef states: The righteous will be resurrected in their clothes.

The Gemara (Shabbos 113a) states that the clothing that one wears on Shabbos should be different than the clothing that he wears during the week. The Maharal explains that Shabbos is holy and anything that is holy is distinct from materialism. For this reason, writes the Maharal, one is forbidden to perform labor on Shabbos, as labor by definition is bringing something to fruition, which is considered materialism. An object that is removed from materialism is deemed to contain honor, and for this reason ones Shabbos clothing should be distinct from the clothing that he wears during the week.

Perhaps we can suggest an alternative explanation to this statement of the Gemara. Elsewhere (Sanhedrin 90b) the Gemara states that the righteous will be resurrected in the future with the very clothes that they were buried in. [There is a discussion (See Kesubos 111b and Tosfos and Gilyon HaShas Ibid) whether the righteous will be resurrected in the same clothing that they were buried in or if they will be resurrected in different clothing.]

One must wonder regarding the significance of the righteous being resurrected in their clothing. It would seem that clothing is a covering for the body in this world, but in the future man will be akin to Adam HaRishon before the sin, where there was no need for clothing. Why then will the righteous be wearing clothing at the time of the resurrection? Perhaps the idea of this Gemara is that clothing, besides for the need of covering the body, also symbolizes a state of preparedness. After the sin of Adam HaRishon, HaShem clothed Adam and Chava in garments of skin. The purpose of these garments was so that Adam and Chava would be prepared for the first Shabbos of creation. It is noteworthy that the Gemara in Shabbos (113a) states that one should change his clothing, manner of walking and his manner of speech on Shabbos. The only one of these distinctions that is performed prior to the onset of Shabbos is the changing of ones clothing. Thus, it is evident that changing ones clothing prior to the onset of Shabbos is a symbol of preparedness. This then is the explanation of the Gemara in Sanhedrin regarding the resurrection of the righteous. The righteous will be resurrected in their clothing as a reward for having always been in a state of preparedness in this world. The idea is that the Gemara (Avodah Zara 3a) states that one who toils prior to Shabbos will eat on Shabbos. The period when the righteous will be resurrected is referred to as a day that is completely Shabbos. Thus, when the true Shabbos arrives, the righteous will be prepared in their "Shabbos" clothing. It is for this reason that we change our clothing in honor of Shabbos, so that we reflect a state of preparedness for this Holy Day.

Read more!

Yearning to Return to Zion - Kesuvos 110

It is written [Tehillim 87:5]: And to Zion it shall be said: "this man, this man, was born in her," and He will establish her on high. (This verse is describing the future time when all the nations of the world will bring the Jews back to Zion. They will say regarding each Jew: He is a son of Zion, he was born there, let us bring him back to her.)

Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said (Kesuvos 75a): This verse is applicable to any Jew that was born in Zion and one who yearns to see her. Even Jews who were born elsewhere will be considered children of Zion, provided that they learn to return there.

I began writing the following incident when I was shown that it was already printed in Daf Digest link, so I am writing their version (with a comment or two of my own).

During World War I, Palestine was under Turkish jurisdiction and the Ottomans made life very difficult for the citizens. Press gangs would roam the streets arbitrarily drafting anyone in their wake. The conditions of these forcibly drafted soldiers were exceedingly difficult. They were subjected to hard labor, and since food was exceedingly scarce they were severely underfed.These circumstances could all be circumvented by paying bribes to officials. However, there was one decree that was exceedingly difficult to avert. The Turks declared that anyone not born in Palestine would be deported. This was more difficult to deal with than forcible conscription, since the only way someone born out of the country could get around this was to lie on the government forms.

Since everyone knew that Rav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, zt"l,(where I saw this story brought down, it was with Rav Yosef Rogotchovi from Petach Tikva, but see below)was very careful to avoid falsehood in any form no matter what it might cost, people were afraid that he would forbid people to lie on the forms. During those difficult times, simple honesty would result in the sundering of many homes. When someone ventured to ask the Rav's opinion about this issue, he surprised everyone in the Old Yishuv. "It is certainly permitted!"

“But why is this different from any other falsehood which the Rav prohibits?” the questioner asked.
Rav Sonnenfeld explained, "This is explicit in Kesuvos 75 on the verse, 'And of Tzion it shall be said, each and every man is born therein.' The Gemora learns from the redundancy of the word "man, each and every man" that one who yearns for Tzion is as one who was born there. We see clearly that any Jew who yearns for Tzion is actually considered as one who was born in Tzion! So to write of those who came up to Tzion out of longing for her holiness that they were native citizens is no lie at all: it is a declaration of the absolute truth!"

I saw this ruling from Rav Sonnenfeld in a slightly different context. It was a question regarding people who were not born in Eretz Yisroel and they were seeking permission from the courts to emigrate to Eretz Yisroel. The courts were only granting visas to those who were born in Eretz Yisroel. Rav Sonnenfeld ruled, based on our Gemora that not only is it permitted to testify that you were born in Eretz Yisroel, but one is obligated to do so. It is not regarded as a lie at all, since one who yearns to return to Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he was born there.

The Kloizenberger Rebbe zt"l added the following: It is written that the lifespan of a person is seventy years. The Gemora in Shabbos (89b) states that the Heavenly courts do not administer punishment for the first twenty years of one's life. Consequently, it can be said that the seventy years do not begin until one is twenty years old. So too, it can be said regarding one who emigrated to Eretz Yisroel. The seventy years of his life begins only after he lives in Eretz Yisroel.

This can be proven from Rashi's commentary on the following verse [Breishis 16:3]: So Sarai, Avram's wife, took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaid, at the end of ten years of Avram's dwelling in the land of Canaan, and she gave her to Avram her husband for a wife. Rashi writes: This tells us that the time they dwelled outside of Eretz Yisroel does not count in the calculation.

Read more!

Just in Time for Chanukah

The Gemora in Shabbos (21b) states that it is a mitzvah to place the menorah for Chanukah at the entrance to one’s house. During the dangerous times, they would light the menorah on the table inside and that would be sufficient.

What would be the halacha nowadays? Can one light the menorah on his table and with that, fulfill his mitzvah? Do we say that since it is not dangerous now, the halacha reverts back to the original ruling that the menorah must be lit facing outside?

The Dvar Yehoshua offers proof from the beginning of Meseches Kesuvos (3b). There it says that during the dangerous times and onward, they would marry on a Tuesday, and the Rabbis did not protest. The Shitah Mekubetzes writes that even after the danger was over, they still married on a Tuesday. This was because there was a concern that it may return to the dangerous times.

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 89a) states: Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: From the time of danger (when the idolaters decreed that mitzvos may not be performed) and onwards, a woman may collect her kesuvah without a get, and a creditor may collect without a pruzbul.

The Rambam in Hilchos shemitah (9:24) rules: If a lender claims that he had a pruzbul and he lost it, he is believed, for from the time of danger and onwards, a creditor may collect without a pruzbul.

The Kesef Mishna explains: Although presently, there is no danger, we do not differentiate between two different times. Accordingly, you might be able to apply the same logic regarding lighting the menorah on a table inside the house even when there is no danger.

The Reshash offers the following comment according to the Kesef Mishna: It is for this reason that the Mishna uses the precise terminology of, “and from the time of danger and onwards.” This teaches us that the halacha is applicable even after the danger is no longer here.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein writes that accordingly, there would be no proof from this halacha to the lighting of the menorah. There, the Gemora states that during the dangerous times, they would light the menorah on the table inside and that would be sufficient. It does not say, “and from the time of danger and onwards.” Therefore, it can be said that one would not fulfill his mitzvah of lighting the menorah if he lights it on the table.

Read more!

Blessing by a Bas Mitzvah

The Rema (O”C 225:2) writes that one whose son is becoming bar mitzvah should recite the following blessing: Blessed are You, Hashem, our God, King of the universe, that You freed me from the punishment due this boy. He concludes that it is preferable to recite this blessing without mentioning Hashem’s name.

The question is asked: Why is this blessing not recited when one’s daughter becomes bas mitzvah?

The Peri Megadim states that it would depend on what the reason is for this blessing.

The Magen Avraham (ibid; 5) explains this blessing as follows: Up until this juncture, the father was punished when his son sinned because he obviously did not train him well enough. Once the child becomes an adult, he is responsible for his own actions.

The Levush, however, interprets this blessing in the exact opposite manner. Up until now, the child gets punished for the sins of his father, as the Gemora Shabbos (32b) states: For the sin of unfulfilled vows, a person’s children die when they are young. The meaning of the blessing is that his son will now not incur any punishments on account of the parents.

According to the Levush, there is no reason to make any distinction between a son and a daughter. However, according to the Magen Avraham, we can say that the blessing is only applicable to a son, where there is an obligation of chinuch. However, a father does not have a mitzvah of chinuch for a daughter and therefore there is no reason to recite the blessing when she becomes bas mitzvah.

The Kaf Hachayim writes that we can apply a different logic according to the Magen Avraham. It is customary for a father to sustain his daughter until she is married and therefore, she is naturally under his jurisdiction until then. He is capable of rebuking her until she marries and will be under the jurisdiction of her husband. He therefore does not recite the blessing when she becomes bas mitzvah since he is still rebuking her.

He explains according to the Levush as well. The Levush said that the reason for the blessing is because up until then, the son gets punished for the sins of his parents. It is possible to say that a daughter, who is already under the mazal of her husband, as it is said: It is announced in heaven, “The daughter of So-and-So will be married to So-and-So,” his mazal will benefit her that she will not be punished on account of her father’s sins.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein questions this explanation from our Gemora (Kesuvos 78a). The Gemora states: In the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yannai, they replied: In the first case, it was into her possession that the property had come (prior to becoming an arusah, she is the legal possessor of whatever is given to her); in the latter case, the property came into his possession. I, however, do not understand his question. It seems that he understands the words “z’chuso and z’chusa” to mean “whose mazal caused the property to fall to her.” The simple explanation in our Gemora is in whose jurisdiction was the woman when the properties fell to her.

Read more!

Yearning to the Return to Zion

It is written [Tehillim 87:5]: And to Zion it shall be said: "this man, this man, was born in her," and He will establish her on high. (This verse is describing the future time when all the nations of the world will bring the Jews back to Zion. They will say regarding each Jew: He is a son of Zion, he was born there, let us bring him back to her.)

Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said (Kesuvos 75a): This verse is applicable to any Jew that was born in Zion and one who yearns to see her. Even Jews who were born elsewhere will be considered children of Zion, provided that they learn to return there.

I began writing the following incident when I was shown that it was already printed in Daf Digest link, so I am writing their version (with a comment or two of my own).

During World War I, Palestine was under Turkish jurisdiction and the Ottomans made life very difficult for the citizens. Press gangs would roam the streets arbitrarily drafting anyone in their wake. The conditions of these forcibly drafted soldiers were exceedingly difficult. They were subjected to hard labor, and since food was exceedingly scarce they were severely underfed.

These circumstances could all be circumvented by paying bribes to officials. However, there was one decree that was exceedingly difficult to avert. The Turks declared that anyone not born in Palestine would be deported. This was more difficult to deal with than forcible conscription, since the only way someone born out of the country could get around this was to lie on the government forms.

Since everyone knew that Rav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, zt"l,(where I saw this story brought down, it was with Rav Yosef Rogotchovi from Petach Tikva, but see below)was very careful to avoid falsehood in any form no matter what it might cost, people were afraid that he would forbid people to lie on the forms. During those difficult times, simple honesty would result in the sundering of many homes. When someone ventured to ask the Rav's opinion about this issue, he surprised everyone in the Old Yishuv. "It is certainly permitted!"

"But why is this different from any other falsehood which the Rav prohibits?" the questioner asked.

Rav Sonnenfeld explained, "This is explicit in Kesuvos 75 on the verse, 'And of Tzion it shall be said, each and every man is born therein.' The Gemora learns from the redundancy of the word "man, each and every man" that one who yearns for Tzion is as one who was born there. We see clearly that any Jew who yearns for Tzion is actually considered as one who was born in Tzion! So to write of those who came up to Tzion out of longing for her holiness that they were native citizens is no lie at all: it is a declaration of the absolute truth!"

I saw this ruling from Rav Sonnenfeld in a slightly different context. It was a question regarding people who were not born in Eretz Yisroel and they were seeking permission from the courts to emigrate to Eretz Yisroel. The courts were only granting visas to those who were born in Eretz Yisroel. Rav Sonnenfeld ruled, based on our Gemora that not only is it permitted to testify that you were born in Eretz Yisroel, but one is obligated to do so. It is not regarded as a lie at all, since one who yearns to return to Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he was born there.

The Kloizenberger Rebbe zt"l added the following: It is written that the lifespan of a person is seventy years. The Gemora in Shabbos (89b) states that the Heavenly courts do not administer punishment for the first twenty years of one's life. Consequently, it can be said that the seventy years do not begin until one is twenty years old. So too, it can be said regarding one who emigrated to Eretz Yisroel. The seventy years of his life begins only after he lives in Eretz Yisroel.

This can be proven from Rashi's commentary on the following verse [Breishis 16:3]: So Sarai, Avram's wife, took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaid, at the end of ten years of Avram's dwelling in the land of Canaan, and she gave her to Avram her husband for a wife. Rashi writes: This tells us that the time they dwelled outside of Eretz Yisroel does not count in the calculation.

Read more!