Showing posts with label chazakah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label chazakah. Show all posts

Thursday, August 27, 2009

Chazakah on a Sukkah

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By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora says that generally, if a person builds a hut which infringes on his friend’s property, there is a grace period of thirty days in which the owner graciously permits the hut owner to use the area and doesn’t have to protest. But, after that grace period has passed, if the owner doesn’t protest, the hut owner will have an established right to be able to claim that he purchased the rights of use. But, if the hut is built for a sukkah on Sukkos, then immediately after the seven days of s Sukkos passes, the lack of the owners protest enables the builder to claim that he purchased the right to leave it there permanently. [This is according to Rashi, but the Hagahos Ashri cites other opinions that it is seven days in addition to the thirty days.]

Tosfos points out that in truth, the builder doesn’t have a chazakah after seven days; he only has a chazakah after eight days since on the eighth day, which is Shemini Atzeres, it wasn’t possible to remove the sukkah.

The Ya’avetz asks: What compelled Tosfos to say that he will not have a chazakah until the eighth day is over. Perhaps we assume that the owner would have allowed him to use the space for the mitzvah, but as soon as the mitzvah ends, the owner is expected to protest. The fact that the owner fails to protest would not enable the builder to claim that he has acquired permanent rights to this area!?

It would seem that Tosfos holds that although the owner can protest the sukkah immediately after the seven days pass, even before the eighth day ends, he is not expected to do so. Why? It is because he is well aware that his protest is futile. The owner can claim that for the duration of Sukkos, he allowed the hut owner to fulfill his mitzvah. On the eighth day he also did not protest because he knew that his protest would be in vain, since the hut owner could not remove the sukkah until after Sukkos. Therefore, Tosfos holds that the owner has the right to protest through eight days.

From this we can learn that even after one has been machzik for enough time to create a chazakah, it is only effective if by the owner protesting he could have forced the hut owner to leave. But in a situation, where the owner could not have forced the hut owner to leave, such as when the chazakah concludes on a Shabbos or Yom Tov, the owner is not expected to protest and is given an extra day to voice his protest.

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Thursday, August 07, 2008

Between Eighty and One Hundred

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 28a) had stated: If an agent was bringing a get and he left the husband old or sick, he may give the get under the assumption that the husband is still alive (for we assume, based upon the principle of chazakah, that nothing changed from the status quo). [If we would be certain that the husband died before the agent delivered the get to the wife, he may not give it any longer.]

The Chasam Sofer says: By the fact that the Mishna did not say ‘an old and sick person,” we may infer that if in fact the husband was old and sick, the agent would not be allowed to deliver the get, for then we can no longer assume that he is still alive.

The Chasam Sofer adds that this would apply for anyone over sixty years old.

The Maharshal in Yam shel Shlomo disagrees and says that even if the husband is old and sick, we nevertheless, assume that he is still alive, and we deliver the get. He adds that this is only if he is younger than eighty years old. However, if he is over eighty, it would depend upon his strength.

Reb Akiva Eiger in Shulchan Aruch writes that he is uncertain as to what the halacha would be if the husband was old and sick.

The Shiltei Giborim writes that when the Mishna rules that if the husband is sick, we still assume that he is alive, that is only if he is the sickness befell him from the hand of Heaven, such as a sickness which was caused by exposure to the cold or the heat. However, if he was knifed in the stomach or his skull was crushed, we do not assume that he is still alive, and we would not deliver the get.

The Yam shel Shlomo rules as follows: If the husband is over the age of one hundred, the agent may deliver the get even if he is sick as well. However, if he is over eighty years old, but not yet one hundred, the agent should not deliver the get if the husband is sick. The distinction between them is as follows: The Gemora refers to someone alive over eighty as a “ben gevuros,” a man of strength. This is true if he is healthy. However, if he took ill, then he is not at full strength, and therefore we cannot assume that he is still alive. Contrast this to someone who is over one hundred years old. Someone so old is always frail and weak, and there should not be any assumption that he will remain alive. However, the Gemora applies the logic that once he has reached such an age (over one hundred), he is regarded as an exceptional person (due to his longevity), and we may therefore assume that he is still alive, even if he is sick.

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Tuesday, July 10, 2007

CHAZAKAH HA’ASUYAH L’HISHTANOS - Yevamos 68 - Daf Yomi

Rava interprets the Mishna: The Mishna is referring to a case where a nine year old boy with a blemished lineage (a mamzer) cohabited with a woman; she is disqualified from eating terumah (and the latter part of the Mishna teaches us that she is disqualified even if there is uncertainty regarding his age), as is stated in the following braisa: A boy who is nine years and one day old, who is an Amonite, Moabite, Egyptian, or Edomite convert (who are not permitted to marry into the congregation), or is a Cuthean, Nasin, chalal, or mamzer, who cohabited with a Koheness, Leviah, or an Israelite woman has disqualified her from the Kehunah.

Tosfos asks: Why don’t we apply the principle of chazakah; any matter which is uncertain to us should be resolved by a presumption that the previous status continues to prevail until there is a clear indication that it has indeed changed? Let us say that since he was younger than nine previously, we will assume that he was still a minor at the time that he cohabited with her, and she should still be qualified to eat terumah?

Tosfos answers: We are referring to a case where the boy is presently older than nine years old, and therefore his present status of precludes the use of chazakah.

It is evident from Tosfos that if we still would be uncertain if he is older than nine years old, we would have relied on the chazakah that during cohabitation, he was younger than nine, and she would still be qualified to eat terumah.

This proves that Tosfos maintains that a chazakah which is likely to change still has the force of a regular chazakah until it has been established that this status changed.

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