FEAR OF HEAVEN ON SHABBOS - Yevamos 93 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora relates the following incident: Rebbi Yanai used to have a sharecropper that would bring a basket of fruit every Erev Shabbos. One Erev Shabbos, the sharecropper did not arrive on time. Rebbi Yanai relied on the fruit that he knew the sharecropper would eventually bring, and counted them in his taking of Terumos and Ma’asros. Rebbi Chiya endorsed his action by citing the following verse: “In order that you should learn to fear Hashem all of the days,” and stating that the verse indicates that this includes Shabbos and Yom Tov.

Rashi explains: One should ensure that his requirement of having pleasure on Shabbos should not be disturbed because of the prohibition of eating tevel (produce which has not been tithed yet). Take precautionary measures to remove the prohibition in order that the produce can be consumed and enjoyed.

Rabbi Yosef Lieberman in his sefer, Mishnas Yosef comments that this verse is also teaching us how one has to have a fear of Hashem on Shabbos and Yom Tov, even more than he does during the weekdays, for the laws of Shabbos are like mountains hanging on a hair, for they have few Scriptural allusions, but many halachos. It is extremely easy to stumble and transgress one of the many prohibitions on Shabbos.

Furthermore, he writes that these are days of pleasure and enjoyment; a time that is vulnerable for sin, like the Tur (O”C 529) writes. One should sit on Shabbos with a tremendous trepidation so that he does not inadvertently sin on Shabbos. And one who attempts to purify himself, Hashem will assist him.

The Gemora says elsewhere that one does not need to be concerned about eating d’mai (produce purchased from an am ha’aretz, and we are uncertain if ma’aser was taken from it) on Shabbos because we can ask the am ha’aretz, and we are confident that he will not lie on Shabbos.

I once heard from Rav Shmuel Feivelson the following explanation: Shabbos is a sampling of the World to Come. We are basking in the presence of the Shechinah. It is impossible to lie when the truth is staring you straight in the face.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 93 - Highlights

RABBI AKIVA’S POSITION ON DAVAR SHELO BA LA’OLAM

The Gemora proves that Rabbi Akiva holds Adam Makneh Davar Shelo Ba La’Olam (meaning that a person can effect transactions regarding things that have not yet materialized) from his position in the Mishna in Nedarim (85a). The Mishna there discusses a case where a woman swore that her earnings should be forbidden to her husband. The Tanna Kama states that her husband does not have to be Meifer (Torah process of a husband nullifying his wife’s vows) the vow, as she has no right to make such a vow. Being that when she married her husband, she essentially gave over the rights to her earnings to her husband, her vow is meaningless, as it contradicts her prior commitment.

However, Rebbi Akiva argues that a husband should make sure to be Meifer the vow. Being that the Mishna in Kesuvos (64b) states that there is a limit to the amount of earnings that must be given to one’s husband, and any amount over that limit can be kept by the wife, the vow is valid, as it can be assumed to relate to future earnings above that amount. This shows that Rebbi Akiva even considers monies that do not currently exist to effect vows. It therefore follows that Rabbi Akiva holds Adam Makneh Davar Shelo Ba La’Olam.

Rav Huna, however, understands the case of the Mishna in Nedarim (85a) differently. He understands that the case is where the woman states her hands should be considered holy to the One Who made them. This would take away our proof regarding Rebbi Akiva’s position, as the hands that are the topic of her vow are clearly extant when she makes the vow. Whatever the reason for the argument between Rebbi Akiva and the Tanna Kama, it would not seem to involve Davar Shelo Ba La’Olam. (93a)

RAV NACHMAN’S LIST

The Gemara explains that Rav Huna’s way of understanding the Mishna argues with Rav Nachman. Rav Nachman lists many Amoraim and Tanaim who have the opinion that Adam Makneh Davar Shelo Ba La’Olam, with the earliest opinion being that of Rebbi Akiva, which he deduces from this Mishna. The Gemara now starts to provide the sources for every Amora and Tana on Rav Nachman’s list, proving Rav Nachman’s words that they indeed hold Adam Makneh Davar Shelo Ba La’Olam.

It is clear that Rav Huna, the first Amora on the list, holds this way. This is apparent from his ruling in a case where a person, during the rainy season, sold the dates that would (hopefully) grow on his palm tree to his friend, before the fruit even appeared on the tree. Rav Huna states that the deal can be retracted before the fruits appear. Once the fruit appear, the transaction is automatically ruled to be valid. This is despite the fact that the transaction was clearly made at a time when there was no fruit on the tree. This shows that Rav Huna holds Adam Makneh etc. Rav Nachman indeed argues on this principle, and therefore states that even when the fruit appears on the tree the deal is nonbinding, as the sale was done at a time when the goods were not extant. Rav Nachman agrees that if the two appear to stick to their deal and the buyer starts eating the fruit, we don’t take the fruit away from him.

We can prove that Rav, the second Amora on Rav Nachman’s list, holds Adam Makneh etc. from a statement which is attributed to him by Rav Huna. Rav Huna states in the name of Rav that someone told his friend he was about to purchase a field. He then proceeded to say that when he purchases the field, he wants his friend to own it retroactive to this very moment. This clearly doesn’t mean that his friend will literally own it retroactively, as someone else currently owns the field. The actual meaning of his words is that he (the purchaser) will not be able to retract his decision to give this gift to his friend once he has purchased the field. Rav states that the gift is valid, and he cannot retract. This shows that he also holds Adam Makneh etc.

It is apparent that Rebbi Yanai and Rebbi Chiya hold this way from the following story. Rebbi Yanai used to have a sharecropper that would bring a basket of fruit every Erev Shabbos. One Erev Shabbos, the sharecropper did not arrive on time. Rebbi Yanai relied on the fruit that he knew the sharecropper would eventually bring, and counted them in his taking of Terumos and Ma’asros. Rebbi Chiya endorsed his action by citing the following verse: “In order that you should learn to fear Hashem all of the days,” and stating that the verse indicates that this includes Shabbos and Yom Tov.

The Gemara asks, what is the Halachic question that Rebbi Yanai discussed with Rebbi Chiya, and that Rebbi Chiya endorsed? If it was a question of whether or not he was allowed to take off Ma’asros on Shabbos, Rebbi Chiya’s Passuk does not seem relevant to the topic. Being that taking off Ma’aser is only a Rabbinic prohibition, and was never discussed by the Pesukim, it would not seem that a Passuk would shed light on whether or not this is a permitted action. It must be that Rebbi Chiya was hinting to him, by using a Passuk discussing future Shabbasos that one can even take Ma’asros for the purpose of Oneg Shabbos on fruit that he does not have in his possession, but he knows that he will eventually receive.

Rebbi Yanai later asked Rebbi Chiya, if my actions were proper, why then did I have a dream where I was read a Passuk with the words “Kanah Ratzutz” -- “a reed that is stuck?” Rebbi Chiya understood his question, and explained that he should not think that his dream referred to the Passuk in Melachim Beis (18:21) where the King of Ashur asked King Chizkiyahu if he was relying on the Egyptians, whom he degradingly called a “Kanah Ratzutz.” Rather, Rebbi Chiya explained, your dream referred to the Passuk in Yeshaya (42:3) which states that a “Kanah Ratzutz” will not break. This shows, Rebbi Chiya reassured Rebbi Yanai, that your actions were correct.

Rebbi, next on Rav Nachman’s list, clearly holds Adam Makneh etc. as well. This is apparent from Rebbi’s statement (as interpreted by Rav Nachman) that if a person buys an Eved Kenani on the condition that when he buys the slave, the slave will immediately be set free, he is indeed not allowed to use him for any labor after the purchase. According to Rebbi, this is the meaning of the prohibition “Lo Sasgir Eved El Adonav” -- “do not close a servant unto his master” (Devarim 23:16, meaning that a master cannot work his slave once he has already been freed). This shows Rebbi must hold Adam Makneh etc., as otherwise the condition would not be valid.

Rebbi Meir, next on Rav Nachman’s list, also clearly holds Adam Makneh etc. This is apparent from his ruling that if a person states to a woman that he is betrothing her now for when she will convert, become freed from slavery, after her husband or sister (whom he is married to) dies, or after you receive Chalitzah, the Kidushin is valid (he also gives the same cases from the man’s perspective, i.e. “the Kidushin should be valid after I convert” etc.). The Tana Kama indeed argues that the Kidushin is invalid, as he holds Ain Adam Makneh etc.

Rebbi Eliezer Ben Yaakov, next on the list, clearly holds this way from the fact that he allows one to separate Terumos and Ma’asros now while using some fruits and vegetables that are not yet obligated in Terumos and Ma’asros (i.e. they are still connected to the ground, not grown enough, etc.) though they will be in the near future. Although he agrees that the separation only actually takes effect when all of the fruits and vegetables are eligible for separation, he holds that the verbal separation can occur earlier. This also shows that he holds Adam Makneh etc.

As stated above, Rav Nachman then proves that Rebbi Akiva, the last Tana on his list, holds Adam Makneh etc. based on his simple interpretation of the Mishna in Nedarim (85a), as explained at length in the beginning of this Daf. (93a – 93b)

CAN ONE WITNESS ENABLE A WOMAN TO FALL TO YIBUM?

Rav Sheishes was asked: Can one witness enable a woman to fall to Yibum? Do we say that the reason a single witness is normally believed to allow a woman to remarry is because we assume the witness is telling the truth about a person, who, if alive, would clearly turn the witness into a liar (and the witness therefore would not lie)? Or do we say that one witness is usually believed because we know that the woman herself is careful to ascertain that her husband is really dead before she would remarry? If this is the case, we might not accept one witness to allow Yibum, as it is possible that the widow likes her brother-in-law and won’t carefully ascertain her husband is dead before Yibum?

Rav Sheishes answered the question by citing the Mishna (92a). A woman was told that her son died, and then her husband died, which meant she should have Yibum. She proceeded to have Yibum done to her. Later, it was revealed that the opposite had been true: her husband had died when the son was still alive, meaning that she was not supposed to fall to Yibum. She therefore must leave her current husband, and her children from the Yavam are Mamzerim.

What was the case? If the original testimony was from two witnesses, and the second testimony was also from two witnesses, why should we rely on the latter more than the former? Additionally, this would only make her children at most Safek Mamzerim (possible Mamzerim), not definite Mamzerim. One cannot suggest that the Mishna is not being didactic in its ruling about the Mamzerim,. as the latter part of the Mishna (in a similar case) clearly defines which children are Mamzerim and which are not. It must therefore be, concludes Rav Sheishes that the first testimony was from one witness, and his testimony was overturned by two witnesses. From the fact that the testimony of the first witness was accepted, we see that one witness is also permitted to enable a woman to undergo Yibum. (93b)

[END]

Read more!

DOCTORS AND THEIR ROLE IN HALACHIC RULINGS - Yevamos 92 - Daf Yomi

The Rogatchover Gaon was writing a letter (in a 1933 letter to Rabbi Shimon Schwab, deciphered by Rabbi Aryeh Carmell) regarding the issue of a father learning with his son other studies. He cites a Gemora in Sanhedrin (78) regarding a case where one man hit another with a stone or a fist, and caused injury to the other. The victim was initially assessed to be viable, and then died. The halacha is that the murderer is exempt from capital punishment. We say that either the victim's health worsened afterwards (not directly due to the striking), or that one cannot be found guilty of a murder after he had been previously acquitted of it. This, says the Rogatchover, is unlike the Gemora in Yevamos (92), which states that we would say that this was not a legitimate legal ruling, but rather, a blunder. If it would be regarded as an error on Beis Din’s part, they should have the ability of ruling again, and convicting the murderer. It emerges from here that the Torah assigns the authority to evaluate and to rule to the expert doctors.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 92 - Highlights

RUMOR THAT THE HUSBAND IS ALIVE

(The Mishna had stated: If a woman's husband went overseas, and one witness came and said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married, and afterwards her husband returned, she must leave this one and this one. The Mishna continued by listing many penalties that the Rabbis imposed on her.)

Rav Ashi said: We are not concerned about a mere rumor (that her first husband is still alive).

The Gemora asks: What kind of rumor is he referring to? If you will suggest that he is referring to a rumor after marriage, Rav Ashi has said this once before, for Rav Ashi stated: We are not concerned about any rumor that originated after marriage.

The Gemora answers: It might have been assumed that since she approached the Beis Din to obtain the authorization for her marriage, the rumor is regarded as one that arose before her marriage to the second husband, and she should therefore be forbidden to him. Rav Ashi taught us that even in such circumstances, a rumor is disregarded. (91b – 92a)

TESTIMONY AND THEN A REVERSAL

The Mishna states: If a woman's husband and (only) son went overseas, and they came and said to her, “Your husband died, and afterwards your son died (as the son was alive when his father died, the widow is not subject to yibum or chalitzah),” and she married, and afterwards they said to her, “The reverse was the case (the son died first, so that when his father died afterwards, the widow was subject to yibum or chalitzah),” she must leave her second husband, and the first (before they knew that the order was reversed) and last child is a mamzer.

If they said to her, “Your son died, and afterwards your husband died,” and she was married by yibum, and afterwards they said to her, “The reverse was the case,” she must leave the yavam, and the first and last child is a mamzer.

If they said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married, and afterwards they said to her, “He was alive (at the time in which you remarried), and he died since then,” she must leave the second husband, and the first child is a mamzer, and the last is not a mamzer.

If they said to her, “Your husband died,” and she became betrothed to another man, and afterwards her husband came back, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the latter one gave her a bill of divorce, he did not disqualify her from the Kehunah. This was expounded by Rabbi Elozar ben Masya: It is written [Vayikra 21:7]: And nor shall the Kohanim take in marriage a woman divorced from her husband. This teaches us that a woman who is divorced from her legal husband is forbidden to be married to a Kohen, but a woman divorced from a man who is not her husband will not disqualify her. (92a)

MAMZER FROM A YEVAMAH

The Mishna had stated: If a woman's husband and (only) son went overseas, and they came and said to her, “Your husband died, and afterwards your son died (as the son was alive when his father died, the widow is not subject to yibum or chalitzah),” and she married, and afterwards they said to her, “The reverse was the case (the son died first, so that when his father died afterwards, the widow was subject to yibum or chalitzah),” she must leave her second husband, and the first (before they knew that the order was reversed) and last child is a mamzer.

The Gemora cites a braisa: The Mishna’s ruling is following the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that kiddushin does not take effect with women who are prohibited by a negative prohibition (the yevamah marrying someone other than the yavam, and therefore the Mishna rules that the child born from such a union will be rendered a mamzer). But the Chachamim say that the child born from the union of a yevamah with another man will not be rendered a mamzer.

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t the Chachamim say that a child born from a woman that is subject to a negative prohibition will not be rendered a mamzer (why did they only mention the case of the yevamah)?

The Gemora answers: This Tanna actually holds like Rabbi Akiva, but he maintains that Rabbi Akiva said that only a union with a relative subject to a negative prohibition will produce a mamzer; a union of a yevamah with someone other than the yavam will not produce a mamzer. (92a)

A YEVAMAH
MARRYING A STRANGER

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: How do we know that kiddushin (betrothal) will not be valid with a yevamah (if she marries someone other than the yavam)? Because it is written [Devarim 25:5]: The wife of the deceased should not be outside to a strange man. The verse teaches us that a stranger cannot marry her. Shmuel said: As a result of our intellectual poverty (we do not know the correct interpretation of the verse), the yevamah would require a letter of divorce from the stranger.

The Gemora explains Shmuel’s opinion: He was uncertain if the verse was coming to teach us that there is a negative prohibition against the yevamah for marrying a stranger, or perhaps the verse was teaching us that kiddushin cannot be effected with her.

Rav Mari bar Rachel said to Rav Ashi: Ameimar said that the halacha follows Shmuel.

Rav Ashi said: Now that Ameimar had said that the halacha is in accordance with Shmuel, if the yevamah married another man, and the yavam was a Kohen, the yavam should perform chalitzah and she is permitted to remain with her husband. (If the man will divorce her in accordance with Shmuel, she will anyway be forbidden to the yavam because a Kohen may not marry a divorcee; she may therefore remain married to the stranger. This halacha is referring to a case where they did not know at the time of the marriage that were committing a transgression, i.e. the case of the Mishna: If a woman's husband and (only) son went overseas, and they came and said to her, “Your husband died, and afterwards your son died (as the son was alive when his father died, the widow is not subject to yibum or chalitzah),” and she married, and afterwards they said to her, “The reverse was the case (the son died first, so that when his father died afterwards, the widow was subject to yibum or chalitzah).” Otherwise, she would not be permitted to remain with him.)

The Gemora asks: Should we allow them to benefit on account of their transgression? If so, it will emerge that we are rewarding a sinner because of a transgression.

Rather, the following was Rav Ashi’s halacha: If her yavam was a Yisroel, the stranger should give her a letter of divorce and then she is permitted to the yavam. (92a – 92b)

KIDDUSHIN; NOT, NISUIN; YES

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef in the name of Rav: Kiddushin is not effected with the yevamah, but nisuin is. (The Gemora assumes that he is referring to the case of the Mishna where she married based on the testimony of a false witness, and she would not need a letter of divorce if she only underwent kiddushin, but she will need a letter of divorce if she underwent nisuin.)

The Gemora asks: If kiddushin is not effective with her, then nisuin should also not be effected with her?

The Gemora answers: Let us emend Rav’s statement to mean that kiddushin and nisuin is not effective with her.

Alternatively, you can answer that when Rav said “nisuin,” he meant that nisuin should be regarded as an illicit relationship, and he is ruling in accordance with Rav Hamnuna. For Rav Hamnuna stated: A yevamah who is awaiting yibum, who has an illicit relationship with another man is prohibited to be married to the yavam. (A letter of divorce will not be required.)

Alternatively, Rav can be explained like we had though initially: Kiddushin is not effected with the yevamah, but nisuin is. The reason why nisuin is effective with her, and she requires a letter of divorce is because this case might be mistaken for that of a woman whose husband went overseas. (92b)

[END]

Read more!

ERRONEOUS RULINGS- Yevamos 91 - Daf Yomi

Rav Papa desired to decide a case on the principle of “What should she have done?” (He permitted a woman who remarried based on the testimony of two witnesses to return to her husband after he reappeared.) Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua asked to Rav Papa: How can you rule like this? But surely all those Mishnayos were taught that challenged this ruling?

Rav Papa replied: Were they not explained?

Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua said in return: Shall we then rely on explanations in order to render a lenient decision?

Rav Papa accepted this argument and retracted his ruling.

Shulchan Aruch (E”H 17:26) rules accordingly that a woman who remarried based on the testimony of two witnesses, and then her husband reappears, she must leave both of them.

The Rashba in his teshuvos (Vol. I, 1,189) writes regarding a woman who marries based on the ruling of the Beis Din, for example, there was a question regarding the effectiveness of the kiddushin, and Beis Din ruled that the kiddushin did not take effect. She married to another man and then Beis Din realized that they had erred in their previous ruling, and she is actually a married woman to the first man. The halacha is that she is permitted to her first husband because it was an unavoidable circumstance. What should she have done? There is no reason to penalize her.

The Rama (E”H, 17:58) rules in accordance with the Rashba.

The Taz (ibid. 71) and the Beis Shmuel (ibid. 172) are bewildered regarding this ruling. Why is this case different than the ruling from our Gemora regarding the woman’s remarriage based on two witnesses? It is clearly ruled upon that she is penalized and is forbidden to return to her first husband.

Furthermore, the Beis Shmuel asks: The Rama contradicts himself! He rules (ibid. 31:10) in accordance with the Maharik, who states: A woman who married another man based on a faulty ruling of a Sage regarding her first marriage is prohibited from returning to her initial husband. What is the difference between Beis Din’s mistake and the Sage’s mistake?

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 91 - Highlights

PENALIZE THE DAUGHTER OF A LEVI

The Mishna had stated: If she was the daughter of a Yisroel, she is disqualified from the Kehunah.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t this halacha obvious? Any woman who commits adultery is disqualified from the Kehunah?

The Gemora answers: This ruling was stated only as a means to introduce the next ruling that if she was the daughter of a Levi, she is disqualified from ma'aser, which is indeed a novel teaching.

The Gemora asks: Is this ruling correct? But we learned in the following braisa: A daughter of a Levi that was held captive or cohabited promiscuously, we provide her with ma’aser and she is permitted to eat it.

Rav Sheishes answers: In the case of the Mishna, it was a Rabbinic penalty since she was lax and relied on one witness without investigating the matter thoroughly. (The case of the braisa is relatively uncommon, so the Rabbis did not institute a decree.) (90b – 91a)

KESUVAH FOR THE MALE CHILDREN

The Mishna had stated: And the heirs of neither this one, nor of this one inherit her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: Why are we mentioning kesuvah here? The Mishna had already taught us that she does not receive a kesuvah.

Rav Papa answers: The Mishna now is referring to the kesuvah conditions for the male children. (Stipulated in the kesuvah is that her sons are entitled to receive her kesuvah from their father's estate when he dies, even if their mother died first and their father married again and had sons with his second wife. They receive her kesuvah in addition to their shares in their father's estate to which the sons of both the first and the second wife are equally entitled. In the case spoken of in our Mishna, however, the sons of the first wife lose their claim to her kesuvah.)

The Gemora asks: But isn’t this also obvious? If there is no kesuvah, there are obviously no conditions in the kesuvah either?

The Gemora answers: If the Mishna would not have explicitly taught us this halacha, we would have thought that she forfeits her rights to the kesuvah because she transgressed a prohibition; however, her shildren, who did nothing wrong, perhaps they should be entitled to their portion of the kesuvah. The Mishna teaches us that they also do not have a claim in the kesuvah. (91a)

THREE LENIENT TANNAIM

The Mishna had cited three Tannaim who dissent from the Tanna Kamma of the Mishna. They are more lenient than him regarding the penalties imposed on the woman. The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yosi says: Her first husband’s estate is responsible for her kesuvah. Rabbi Elozar says: The first husband is entitled to an object she finds and to her earnings, and he is authorized to annul her vows. Rabbi Shimon says: Cohabitation with her or her chalitzah to the brother of the first husband exempts her co-wife from chalitzah or yibum, and the child born from the first husband is not a mamzer.

The Gemora presents a dispute among two Amoraim in their explanation of these various viewpoints. Rav Huna said: The latter agree with the former (Rabbi Yosi), but the former do not agree with the latter. Rav Huna explains: Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rabbi Elozar since he (Rabbi Shimon) does not penalize the woman in the case of cohabitation which constitutes the main prohibition, how much more so with respect to being entitled to an object which she finds and to her earnings, which are only monetary matters. Rabbi Elozar, however, does not agree with Rabbi Shimon since it is only in respect to the objects she finds and to her earnings, which are monetary matters, that he does not penalize her, but in respect to cohabitation, which constitutes the main prohibition, he does penalize her. And both of them agree with Rabbi Yosi since they do not penalize the woman in respect of those matters which are applicable while she continues to live with her husband, how much more so with respect of the kesuvah, the purpose of which is for the woman to take it and depart, they certainly would not penalize her. Rabbi Yosi, on the other hand, does not agree with them since it is only in respect of the kesuvah, the purpose of which is for the woman to take it and depart that he does not penalize her, but in respect of those matters which are applicable while she continues to live with her husband, he does penalize her.

Rabbi Yochanan disagrees: The former agree with the latter (Rabbi Shimon), but the latter do not agree with the former. Rabbi Yochanan explains: Rabbi Yosi agrees with Rabbi Elozar since he does not penalize the woman in respect of the kesuvah, which has to be taken from the husband and given to the wife, how much more so with respect to being entitled to an object which she finds and to her earnings, which have to be taken from her and given to him, he certainly would not penalize her. Rabbi Elozar, however, does not agree with him since it is only in respect to an object which she finds and to her earnings, which have to be taken from the woman and given to the husband that he does not penalize her, but in respect of the kesuvah, which has to be taken from him and given to her, he does penalize her. And both of them agree with Rabbi Shimon since they do not penalize her in respect of matters which are applicable while her first husband is alive, how much more so with respect of cohabitation with the yavam, which takes place after his death. Rabbi Shimon, however, does not agree with them since it is only in respect of cohabitation, which takes place after her husband's death that he does not penalize her, but with respect of those matters which are applicable while he is alive, he does penalize her. (91a)

RAV AND RABBI SHIMON

The Mishna stated: (Rabbi Shimon said:) If she married without permission (there were two witnesses that her husband died), she is permitted to return to him (since she was not expected to investigate and clarify the matter).

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: Like so is the halacha.

Rav Nachman said to him: Why do you act surreptitiously? If you hold in accordance with Rabbi Shimon (even though he is in the minority), why don’t you say overtly that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon? And if you will respond that if you would say that, it would imply that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon even with respect to his first ruling in the Mishna, why Don’t you say that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon only in regards to his last ruling?

The Gemora remains with a difficulty.

Rav Sheishes said: It would seem that Rav said this when he was drifting off to sleep (for otherwise, he would never have said it). For by stating that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon, he is implying that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon and penalize a woman who remarried on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses that her husband died. Now, how could that be? What should she have done (there is no better proof than two witnesses); it is a case of unavoidable circumstance?

And furthermore, Rav Sheishes asks from the following braisa: All of the women involved in an incestuous marriages forbidden in the Torah, do not require a letter of divorce from the man who married them except a married woman who remarried in accordance with a decision of a Beis Din. This implies that only where she remarried in accordance with a decision of a Beis Din does she require a letter of divorce, but where the marriage took place on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, she would not require a letter of divorce (since it was unavoidable).

Now, whose view is represented here? If you would suggest that it is the view of Rabbi Shimon, would he hold that the woman requires a letter of divorce even where her marriage took place in accordance with a decision of the Beis Din? Surely it was taught in the following braisa: Rabbi Shimon said: If the Beis Din acted based on the testimony of one witness, the marriage is regarded like an intentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman (and she is forbidden to return to her husband if he reappears). If, however, they acted on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, the marriage is regarded as an unintentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman (and she would be permitted to return to her husband if he reappears). In both cases, however, a letter of divorce is not required (Rabbi Shimon did not mention divorce at all). Evidently, it must represent the view of the Rabbis. (This proves that they also admit that a divorce is not necessary where the marriage was contracted in reliance on two witnesses.) Who is it, then, that differs from Rabbi Shimon that it should have been necessary for Rav to declare the halacha to be in agreement with his view?

The Gemora defends Rav’s statement: The first braisa actually represents the view of Rabbi Shimon and the second braisa should be interpreted as follows: Rabbi Shimon said: If the Beis Din acted based on the testimony of one witness, the marriage is regarded like an intentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and the woman consequently requires a letter of divorce. If, however, they acted on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, the marriage is regarded as an unintentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and the woman consequently would not require a letter of divorce.

Rav Ashi offers an alternative explanation to the braisa: The braisa was only concerned with respect to the woman’s prohibition to the husband (and not with respect to whether a letter of divorce is required or not). The following is what the braisa is saying: If the Beis Din acted based on the testimony of one witness, the marriage is regarded like an intentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and she is forbidden to return to her husband if he reappears. If, however, they acted on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, the marriage is regarded as an unintentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and she would be permitted to return to her husband if he reappears.

Ravina offers an alternative explanation to defend Rav’s statement: The braisa was concerned only with respect to liability to a chatas offering. The following is what the braisa is saying: If the Beis Din acted based on the testimony of one witness, the marriage is regarded like an intentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and the woman does not bring a chatas (since only inadvertent transgressions are liable for a chatas). If, however, they acted on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, the marriage is regarded as an unintentional act of adultery between a man and a married woman, and the woman is required to bring chatas.

Alternatively, however, you could say that the first braisa represents the view of the Rabbis, and the following is what the braisa is saying: All of the women involved in an incestuous marriages forbidden in the Torah, do not require a letter of divorce from the man who married them except a married woman (who remarried based on the testimony of two witnesses) and a married woman who remarried in accordance with a decision of a Beis Din. (It emerges that the Rabbis dispute Rabbi Shimon in the case where she remarried based on the testimony of two witnesses, and a letter of divorce is required; she is not considered blameless. This supports Rav’s statement that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon, for in fact, the Rabbis do dispute this.) (91a -91b)

WHAT SHOULD SHE HAVE DONE?

(Rav Sheishes had questioned Rav’s statement that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon, for he is implying that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon and penalize a woman who remarried on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses that her husband died. Now, how could that be? What should she have done, there is no better proof than two witnesses; it is a case of unavoidable circumstance?)

Ula asked: Do we indeed say this argument “what should she have done”? But we have learned in the following Mishna: If a letter of divorce was dated according to the reign of the Unworthy Kingdom (the Roman Empire), according to the Kingdom of Media, or according to the Kingdom of Greece, according to the building of the Beis Hamikdosh, or the destruction of the Beis hamikdosh, or if he was in the East and he wrote that he was in the West, or he was in the West and he wrote that he was in the East, she must leave her first and her second husband (if she remarried based on this defective document from her husband), and all the penalties (enumerated in the Mishna) are applicable to her. But why? Let it be argued, “What should she have done?”

The Gemora answers: She should have arranged for the letter of divorce to be read by an expert (to determine its validity).

Rav Simi bar Ashi questions Rav Ashi from a different part of the aforementioned Mishna: Come and hear from the following Mishna: If a yavam married his brother’s wife, and her co-wife went and married another man, and then the brother’s wife was found to be an aylonis (incapable of procreation), the co-wife must leave her husband and the yavam and all the penalties (enumerated in the Mishna) are applicable to her. But why? Let it be argued, “What should she have done?”

The Gemora answers: She should have waited (until it has been definitely determined that the yevamah was not an aylonis).

Abaye questions Rav Ashi from a different part of the aforementioned Mishna: Come and hear from the following Mishna: If the co-wives of any of the forbidden relatives concerning whom it has been said that they exempt their co-wives from yibum and chalitzah went and married, and any such forbidden relatives were found to be an aylonis, the co-wife must leave her husband and the yavam and all the penalties (enumerated in the Mishna) are applicable to her. But why? Let it be argued, “What should she have done?”

The Gemora answers: She should have waited (until it has been definitely determined that the ervah was not an aylonis).

Rav Papa desired to decide a case on the principle of “What should she have done?” (He permitted a woman who remarried based on the testimony of two witnesses to return to her husband after he reappeared.) Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua asked to Rav Papa: How can you rule like this? But surely all those Mishnayos were taught that challenged this ruling?

Rav Papa replied: Were they not explained?

Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua said in return: Shall we then rely on explanations in order to render a lenient decision?

Rav Papa accepted this argument and retracted his ruling. (91b)

[END]

Read more!

RETROACTIVELY NOT MARRIED AND THE CONSEQUENCES - Yevamos 90 - Daf Yomi

Rav Chisda attempts to bring a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: If a husband annulled his letter of divorce (that was sent to his wife in the hands of an agent), it is annulled (even though he nullified it in front of a Beis Din in the absence of his wife or the agent); these are the words of Rebbe. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel said: He may neither annul it nor add a single condition to it, since, otherwise, of what avail is the authority of the Beis Din (since Rabban Gamliel the Elder ordained that such an annulment must not be made, since the woman in her ignorance of it might marry again and thus unconsciously give birth to illegitimate children). Now, even though, the letter of divorce may be annulled in accordance with Biblical law, we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world.

Rabbah rejects this proof and states: Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.)

As I was saying the Daf, I was asked the following question: If the Rabbis revoked the marriage retroactively, would she be permitted to marry a Kohen?

Since we are presently located in Marshall, Indiana, we do not have all the necessary seforim to discuss this in depth, but here is a brief synopsis of the topic matter.

Tosfos in Gittin (33b) goes to such an extent as to say that she was not considered a married woman, and if someone had cohabited with her during the time that she was "married," he would not be liable for cohabiting with a married woman, since the Rabbis revoked her marriage retroactively.

The Ramban in Kesuvos (3b) writes that there would be a Rabbinical prohibition retroactively, and she would be regarded as a divorcee, and hence, she would be forbidden to a Kohen.

Some say that she is forbidden to a Kohen because it "smells" like a get.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger discusses the following case: If she was a daughter of a Yisroel who married a Kohen, and therefore ate terumah during her "marriage," would it be regarded retroactively as if she ate terumah as a zar?

Read more!

EATING MEAT ONLY ON SHABBOS - Yevamos 90 - Daf Yomi

The Mekubalim explain the custom of some Chassidim as to why they would not eat meat during the week. Our Gemora said that when the Kohanim eat the meat from a sacrificial offering, the owner receives atonement. There are wicked people who after their death. Their soul enters into an animal as a gilgul. When a person consumes this animal, the soul of the wicked person intermingles with the soul of the person who ate the animal. When he sleeps at night and the soul ascends to the Heaven, the two souls separate. The soul belonging to the wicked person remains in Heaven and receives atonement. This is what is meant that the owner receives atonement. This process could only be accomplished together with the sanctity of Shabbos. This also explains the opinion of Beis Shamai. When they saw an animal that had a spark of sanctity contained within it, they would save that animal for Shabbos.

Sefer Chemdas Yamim

Read more!

INVITE KOHANIM TO PARTAKE IN PURIM FEAST - Yevamos 90 - Daf Yomi

It is brought in the name of the Arizal that one should invite Kohanim to partake in the Purim feast. The explanation is based on the Tikunei Zohar which states that Purim is similar to Yom Kippur. Just as the day of Yom Kippur provides atonement without eating and drinking, Purim provides atonement only through eating and drinking. Kohanim should be invited to partake in the Purim feast because the Gemora states that through the Kohanim’s eating, the owners will receive atonement.

Sefer Shevet Mi’Yehudah

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 90 - highlights

REPAYMENT WITH CHULLIN TAMEI

Rav Chisda attempts again to bring a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: If a non-Kohen inadvertently ate terumah which was tamei, he must repay the Kohen with chullin (unconsecrated) produce that is tahor. (That which he compensates the Kohen with replaces the terumah and acquires terumah sanctity; this is why he pays him with produce that is tahor.) If he paid the Kohen with chullin that is tamei, Sumchos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he used tamei produce inadvertently, the repayment is valid (this tamei produce now becomes terumah, and he has no further obligation). If he used tamei produce intentionally, the repayment is invalid (the Rabbis penalized him; the tamei produce is returned to him and he must repay the Kohen with tahor produce). The Chachamim say: Whether he did so inadvertently or willingly, the repayment is valid, and he must repay again with tahor produce (this second repayment does not acquire terumah sanctity).

The Gemora asks on Rabbi Meir: Rabbi Meir ruled that if a non-Kohen inadvertently ate terumah which was tamei, and he inadvertently paid the Kohen with chullin that is tamei, he is penalized, and the repayment is invalid. Why should that be the case? On the contrary, let him be blessed for doing such a noble thing! He ate something that was unfit for the Kohen to eat while he was tamei (for a Kohen is always forbidden from eating terumah tamei), and he is repaying him with something (that he thinks) is fit for the Kohen to eat while he is tamei (in truth, the Kohen will not be able to eat this because the tamei chullin produce becomes terumah tamei).

Rava answers: It is as if the braisa was missing some words, and this is what the braisa is teaching us: If a non-Kohen inadvertently ate terumah which was tamei, he repays the Kohen with anything (even with chullin produce that is tamei). If he ate terumah which was tahor, he must repay the Kohen with chullin (unconsecrated) produce that is tahor. If he paid the Kohen with chullin that is tamei, Sumchos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he used tamei produce inadvertently, the repayment is valid (this tamei produce now becomes terumah, and he has no further obligation). If he used tamei produce intentionally, the repayment is invalid (the Rabbis penalized him; the tamei produce is returned to him and he must repay the Kohen with tahor produce). The Chachamim say: Whether he did so inadvertently or willingly, the repayment is valid, and he must repay again with tahor produce (this second repayment does not acquire terumah sanctity).

Rav Chisda presents his proof: In the case where he repaid the Kohen with tamei chullin produce, this compensation is Biblically valid (since we previously learned that tamei produce may be sanctified as terumah), and if the Kohen would betroth a wife using this produce, the kiddushin would take effect. And yet, according to Rabbi Meir, the Rabbis declared that the repayment is invalid, and this married woman (Biblically) is now permitted to marry anyone else. It is apparent that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah.

Rabbah objects to this proof: Rabbi Meir did not mean that the repayment is invalid and that it must be returned; he meant that he must repay again with chullin which is tahor. (The first payment, however, still belongs to the Kohen, and consequently, the woman with whom he betrothed with this produce will remain a married woman.)

The Gemora asks: If so, Rabbi Meir and the Chachamim are ruling precisely the same?

Rav Acha the son of Rabbi Ikka answers: They are only arguing in a case when he repaid inadvertently with tamei chullin. (90a)

KOHEN THROWING TAMEI BLOOD

Rav Chisda attempts to bring another proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: If the blood of a sacrifice became tamei and a Kohen nonetheless threw the blood against the mizbeiach (Altar), the halacha is as follows: If he did so inadvertently, the offering is accepted, but if he did so intentionally, the offering is not accepted.

In the case when he threw the tamei blood deliberately, the offering is accepted Biblically, for we learned in the following braisa: The tzitz effects acceptance (Regarding the tzitz it is said: It shall be on Aharon’s forehead, so that Aharon shall bear a sin of the sacred offerings. This teaches that if the service of an offering is done in a prohibited fashion, the tzitz will atone for the sin and the sacrifice is then acceptable. The sin referred to here is the sin of tumah.) for the blood, meat or sacrificial parts that became tamei. This law applies whether it was done inadvertently or intentionally, through a mishap or willingly, and whether the offering was offered by an individual or by a community. And yet, the Rabbis declared that when he threw the blood intentionally, the offering is not accepted, which will result in the fact that when he brings another offering in its place, he is bringing an unconsecrated animal into the Courtyard for a sacrifice (which is Biblically forbidden). It is apparent that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah.

Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina rejects this proof: When the Rabbis declared that the offering is not accepted, they did not mean that the offering is not accepted, and he will be obligated to bring another in its stead; rather, they meant that the meat of the sacrifice may not be eaten, but the owner has achieved atonement with it.

Rav Chisda responds: But the bottom line is that the Rabbis have uprooted the obligation of eating the meat. It is written [Shmos 29:33]: And they shall eat them, those who gain atonement through them. This verse teaches that the Kohanim eat the offering and then the owner receives atonement. It still emerges that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah.

Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina rejects this as well: He says that a Rabbinical decree which involves sitting and not acting (as is the case with the prohibition against eating the sacrificial meat) is different than decreeing that an active transgression of a Biblical law can be performed (such as Rav Chisda’s ruling in the case of turning consecrated terumah into unconsecrated produce). (90a)

OTHER CASES OF
SITTING AND NOT ACTING

Rav Chisda, (upon hearing the last reply) said to Rabbah: It was my intention to raise objections against your view (that Beis Din does not have the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah) from the Rabbinical decrees regarding the uncircumcised (one who converted on Erev Pesach, and who, by Rabbinic law, is forbidden to participate in the korban pesach, though Biblically it is his duty to bring the korban pesach as an Israelite), sprinkling (Rabbinically, it is forbidden to sprinkle the purification waters on one who is tamei on Shabbos, though Biblically it would be permitted. Should the Sabbath on which such sprinkling is due happen to be ErevPesach, the person affected would, owing to the Rabbinical prohibition, remain tamei and would, in consequence, be deprived of bringing the korban pesach, which is a Biblical obligation.) the knife of circumcision (which is forbidden to carry on Shabbos in Rabbinically prohibited domains even though this will result in the child not being circumcised on the eighth day, a Biblical commandment), the linen garment with tzitzis (there is a Rabbinic prohibition against inserting fringes of wool in a linen garment, and this prohibition sometimes results in the abrogation of the Biblical commandment of tzitzis), the lambs of Shavuos (if Shavuos fell out on Shabbos, and these lambs were not offered for the purpose for which they were designated, the sacrificial blood may not, in accordance with a Rabbinical prohibition, be sprinkled upon the altar, though such sprinkling is Biblically permitted), the shofar (if Rosh Hashanah falls out on Shabbos, the Biblical commandment of sounding the shofar is abrogated by the Rabbis for fear it might be carried from one domain into another), and the lulav (the branches of palm trees which are taken during Sukkos; This Biblical commandment is abrogated on Shabbos for the same reason as in the case of the shofar). Now, however, that you taught us that abstention from the performance of an act is not regarded as uprooting a Biblical law, I have nothing to say since all these are also cases of abstention. (90b)

OBEYING A PROPHET

Rav Chisda cites proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah even if it involves an active transgression of a Biblical law. He cites the following braisa: It is written [Devarim 18:15]: To him you shall listen. Even if a prophet instructs you to transgress one of the commandments in the Torah, such as Eliyahu at Mount Carmel (where he offered a sacrifice on an improvised altar despite the prohibition against offering sacrifices outside the Temple), each case according to the needs of the moment, you must obey him.

Rabbah rejects this proof: There it is different because it says explicitly to listen to him.

Rav Chisda asks: Let us learn from there that the sages can do the same thing?

Rabbah answers: Safeguarding a measure is different. (Eliyahu was compelled to act in that manner to prevent widespread idol worship; the Rabbis cannot issue a decree against a Biblical law only as a preventive measure.) (90b)

ANNULLING A DIVORCE

Rav Chisda attempts to bring a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: If a husband annulled his letter of divorce (that was sent to his wife in the hands of an agent), it is annulled (even though he nullified it in front of a Beis Din in the absence of his wife or the agent); these are the words of Rebbe. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel said: He may neither annul it nor add a single condition to it, since, otherwise, of what avail is the authority of the Beis Din (since Rabban Gamliel the Elder ordained that such an annulment must not be made, since the woman in her ignorance of it might marry again and thus unconsciously give birth to illegitimate children). Now, even though, the letter of divorce may be annulled in accordance with Biblical law, we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world.

Rabbah rejects this proof and states: Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.) (90b)

BEIS DIN ADMINISTERING PUNISHMENTS

Rav Chisda attempts to bring a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah. He cites the following braisa: Rabbi Elozar ben Yaakov said: I heard from my teachers that even without any Biblical authority for their rulings, Beis Din may administer lashes and death penalties. They may not be done for the sake of transgressing the words of the Torah, but in order to build a fence for the Torah. And it once happened that a man rode on horseback on Shabbos in the days of the Greeks, and he was brought before Beis Din and he was stoned. They didn’t do this because he deserved this penalty, but rather, it was because the times demanded it. And another incident occurred with a man who cohabited with his wife under a fig tree, and he was brought before Beis Din and received lashes. They didn’t do this because he deserved such a penalty, but rather, it was because the times demanded it.

Rabbah responded: Safeguarding a measure is different. (These incidents occurred in times of religious laxity when rigid measures were necessary.) (90b)

[END]

Read more!

KESUVAH OBLIGATION - EXPLANATION OF TOSFOS - Yevamos 89 - Daf Yomi

As per your request, here is an explanation of tosfos, 89a s.v. Mai Tayma.

The Gemora states: The reason that the Rabbis instituted a kesuvah (an obligation for the husband or his estate to pay the wife a certain amount of money in case he divorces her or dies) is in order for it to be not so light in his eyes to divorce her.

Tosfos asks: From this Gemora, it seems apparent that a kesuvah obligation is merely Rabbinic in nature; yet it is written in the kesuvah explicitly that one is obligated Biblically to present his wife with two hundred silver zuzim, according to the law of Moshe and Israel.

Tosfos answers that our Gemora is referring to a kesuvah given to a widow, where the obligation is only a Rabbinic one in order that the husband should not easily divorce her.

Tosfos explains our Gemora: Just as the Rabbis enacted that there is a kesuvah obligation to a widow for the aforementioned reason, so too, the Rabbis penalized a virgin, where the kesuvah obligation is a Biblical one, that if she went and married another man based on the testimony of one witness, and the husband reappeared, she should not receive her kesuvah in order for the husband to divorce her easily.

Many Rishonim disagree with Tosfos and maintain that the kesuvah obligation is merely Rabbinic even for a virgin.

The Rosh explains: The phrase “according to the law of Moshe and Israel” which is written in the kesuvah does not mean that there is a Biblical obligation; it is merely stipulating the type of silver that the husband is required to give to his wife.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 89 - Highlights

THE KESUVAH OBLIGATION

The Mishna had stated: If a woman's husband went overseas, and they came (one witness) and said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married, and afterwards her husband returned, she must leave this one and this one and she does not receive her kesuvah from either one of them.

The Gemora explains: The reason that the Rabbis instituted a kesuvah (an obligation for the husband or his estate to pay the wife a certain amount of money in case he divorces her or dies) is in order for it to be not so light in his eyes to divorce her; in this case (when the husband reappears), we want him to separate from her. This is why there is no kesuvah obligation. (89a)

THE CONDITIONS INCLUDED IN THE KESUVAH

The Mishna had stated: She does not receive compensation for the fruits that he consumed from her usufruct property, or sustenance, or depreciation (if the husband made use of her melog property until it was worn-out, he is not required to pay her its monetary value); not against this one and not against this one.

The Gemora explains: All these are conditions that are included in the kesuvah. If she does not receive the kesuvah, she does not receive the conditions either. (89a)

SHE MUST RETURN THE MONEY

The Mishna had stated: If she took any of these payments from this one or from this one, she must return it.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t this halacha obvious? If she is not entitled to these payments, of course she would be required to return them?

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that since she grabbed these monies, Beis Din will not compel her to return them; the Mishna teaches us that we take the money away from her.

SEPARATION OF IMPROPER PRODUCE AS TERUMAH

The Mishna had stated: And the child born from either of these men is a mamzer (the child from the first man is a mamzer Biblically and the child from the second one is a mamzer Rabbinically).

The Gemora cites a Mishna: One may not separate terumah from produce which is tamei for produce which is tahor (since it is not edible, the Kohen will be losing out). If he did so inadvertently, the terumah is valid. If he did so intentionally, (the Chachamim instituted) it has no validity.

The Gemora asks: What does the Mishna mean when it states that it has no validity?

The Gemora answers: Rav Chisda says: It has no validity at all; even the produce which was separated as terumah reverts to its previous status of tevel (untithed produce that one cannot eat until tithing has been performed). Rabbi Nosson the son of Rabbi Oshaya says that it has no validity in regards to rectifying the remainder of the produce; however, the produce that was used to separate the terumah is regarded as terumah.

The Gemora explains why Rav Chisda does not agree with Rabbi Nosson the son of Rabbi Oshaya, for if the produce that was used to separate the terumah is regarded as terumah, sometimes he will be negligent and not separate terumah again for the remainder.

The Gemora asks on Rav Chisda: Why is this case different from that which we learned in the following Mishna: If one separated terumah from cucumbers on other cucumbers, and they were found to be bitter (and not edible). Similarly, if one separated terumah from melons on other melons, and they were found to be spoiled, the terumah is valid, but he must separate terumah again. (We see that even if he separated terumah incorrectly, the terumah is still valid; why does Rav Chisda maintain that the terumah has no validity at all?)

The Gemora answers: The two cases are not comparable. The Mishna is discussing a case where he separated the terumah incorrectly, but inadvertently; hence, the terumah is valid. Rav Chisda is discussing a case where he intentionally transgressed and a forbidden act has been committed.

The Gemora asks from two cases where he acted unwittingly: In the first Mishna, when he unwittingly separated terumah which is tamei, the terumah is valid, but in the other Mishna (in the case of the spoiled cucumbers or melons), he must separate terumah again. What is the reason for this distinction?

The Gemora answers: In the case of the spoiled cucumbers, it is an erroneous act, which is almost a willful one since he should have tasted it first (to determine if they are in fact edible); however, in the case of the terumah which is tamei, there was no way of knowing that the produce was tamei.

The Gemora asks from two cases where he acted willfully: In the first Mishna, when he willfully separated terumah which is tamei, the terumah has no validity. However, contrast this with what we learned in the following Mishna: If a man separated terumah of a non-perforated plant-pot (which is not subject to terumah, since it has not grown directly from the ground) for the produce of a perforated pot (which is subject to terumah because a plant in a perforated pot is deemed to be growing from the ground since it derives its nourishment through the holes of the pot from the ground itself), the former becomes terumah, but he must separate terumah again from the remainder. (Why is the terumah in this case valid, while in the case of the produce which was tamei, it has no validity at all?)

The Gemora answers: In the case of produce grown in two different vessels (the produce designated as terumah grew in one kind of pot while the other produce grew in another kind of pot) a man would obey to separate terumah again; however, in the case of the tamei and the tahor which grew together, he might not obey (to give terumah again, were the portion he has set aside was allowed to retain the name of terumah. He would argue that, in view of the validity of his act, no further terumah should be separated. Hence it was ordained that his act is void and that the quantity he has set aside is not to be regarded as terumah).

The Gemora turns its attention to Rabbi Nosson the son of Rabbi Oshaya. He said that terumah which was separated from produce which is tamei has no validity in regards to rectifying the remainder of the produce; however, the produce that was used to separate the terumah is regarded as terumah.

The Gemora asks: What is the distinction between this case and that which we learned in the following Mishna: If a man separated terumah of a perforated plant-pot (which is subject to terumah) for the produce of a non-perforated pot, the terumah is valid, but the Kohanim cannot eat from it until terumah is separated again for the produce of the non-perforated pot. (Why does Rabbi Nosson rule that the terumah is regarded as terumah, whereas in this Mishna, the terumah is regarded as tevel?)

The Gemora answers: The tamei produce is considered terumah because Biblically, it is a valid terumah separation, for Rabbi Ilai said: one who separates terumah from inferior quality produce for a superior quality, his terumah is valid. Rabbi Ilai provides a Scriptural source for this. (89a – 89b)

BEIS DIN UPROOTING SOMETHING FROM THE TORAH

The Gemora returns to Rav Chisda’s opinion: Rabbah asked Rav Chisda: According to you that maintains that one who inadvertently separated terumah which was tamei for produce that was tahor has no validity at all, and even the produce which was separated as terumah reverts to its previous status of tevel; what is your reasoning? It is based on a Rabbinical decree that if the produce that was used to separate the terumah is regarded as terumah, sometimes he will be negligent and not separate terumah again for the remainder. Is it halachically possible for the produce to be terumah under Biblical law, and on account of our concern for negligence, the Rabbis removed it from its terumah status and returned it to its tevel state? Does Beis Din have the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah?

Rav Chisda answered Rabbah: And you do not hold that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah? Did we not learn in our Mishna that the child born from either of these men is a mamzer? It is understandable that the child born from the second man is classified as a mamzer because she is legally married to the first man; but, why is the child born from the first man a mamzer? Isn’t the woman his legal wife, and the child should be regarded as a legitimate child? Nevertheless, the Rabbis decreed that this child is a mamzer, and he would be permitted to marry a mamzeres. This indicates that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah.

Rabbah said to Rav Chisda: Shmuel said that this child is forbidden to marry a mamzeres. Ravin also said this in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. Why does the Mishna refer to him as a mamzer? It is only because he is prohibited to marry an ordinary Jewess. (89b)

BEIS DIN CAN DECLARE THAT SOMEONE’S PROPERTY IS OWNERLESS

Rav Chisda sent the following message to Rabbah in the hands of Rav Acha bar Rav Huna: Do you think that Beis Din does not have the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah? But we learned in the following braisa: When does a husband become entitled to inherit the estate of his wife who is a minor? (The braisa is discussing a case where they were only Rabbinically married; a minor girl’s father died, and her mother or brothers married her off. She can perform mi’un, a refusal, and leave the marriage until she becomes an adult. In this case, she dies before becoming an adult. The braisa is inquiring: At what age may it be definitely assumed that the minor is no longer likely to make a declaration of refusal and may, consequently be regarded as one's proper wife?) Beis Shamai say: When she becomes an adult. Beis Hillel say: After she enters the chupah with him (although she can still perform mi’un, we assume that after nisuin, she will not leave him). Rabbi Elozar says: From after she cohabits with him. According to each of the opinions, it is from that point and on that her husband is entitled to inherit her if she would die, and he may become tamei to her corpse (if he is a Kohen), and it is at that time that she is eligible to eat terumah because of him.

The Gemora explains Beis Shamai to mean that she became an adult and entered the chupah with him; entering chupah as a minor is not effective.

The Gemora explains Rabbi Elozar to mean that she became an adult and she cohabited with him.

Rav Chisda presents his proof: The braisa states that once we are not concerned for mi’un, the husband inherits her even though her father (his heirs) should inherit her from a Biblical standpoint (since she is still not Biblically married to her husband). Nevertheless, the Rabbis decreed that her husband inherits her. This is a proof that Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah.

Rabbah objects to this proof: The reason why the husband is the inheritor even though he is not Biblically her husband is not because Beis Din has the authority to make a condition that will uproot something from the Torah; rather, it is because Beis Din has a right to declare the person’s property ownerless. (The Rabbis have consequently full authority to transfer the property of the minor from her father's heirs to her husband, and such transfer cannot be regarded as uprooting a Biblical law.)

The Gemora provides two sources that Beis Din has authority to declare a person’s property ownerless, and in fact, it becomes ownerless. (89b)

[END]

Read more!

TESTIMONY OF A WOMAN - Yevamos 88 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that regarding testimony for a woman whose husband died overseas, we accept testimony from a witness who heard testimony from another witness, although we normally do not accept such testimony. Similarly, even the testimony of a person who is normally invalidated for testimony, such as a woman, a slave and the like, their testimony will be accepted to allow a woman to remarry.

The Reshash asks: Tthe Mishnah states that there is no liability of a korban shevuas haeidus, if one takes an oath that he does not know testimony regarding a woman. The question is, if regarding testimony on behalf of a woman, even a woman’s testimony is acceptable, then one should be liable a korban shevuas haeidus for testimony regarding a woman.

The Reshash answers that the testimony of woman is not considered a testimony. Even if she is a “kosher” witness, she is not considered to be “kosher” with regard to the laws of testimony, only that she can reveal what happened in a certain situation. This answer is corroborated by Rabi Akiva Eiger .

The Shav Shmattsa answers that what we believed the words of a woman is not because of testimony, but rather because we assume that her words are the facts. If so, regarding the liability of a korban shevuas haeidus, Rashi writes that we require that the person was fit to testify. So it follows that a woman and anyone else who is invalidated from testifying will not fall under the category of liability for a korban shevuas haeidus.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 87/88 - Highlights

MISHNA REGARDING A HUSBAND WHO WENT OVERSEAS

If a woman's husband went overseas, and they came (one witness) and said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married, and afterwards her husband returned, she must leave this one and this one (A woman who committed adultery is forbidden to her husband and the adulterer. This woman has the same halachos. Even though the Sages accepted the testimony of one witness regarding a woman for the sake of agunos, they ruled in this manner because they relied upon the woman not to marry until she had thoroughly investigated and clarified the matter. Since she did not clarify the matter and married, the Sages penalized her that she must leave both.); and she requires a bill of divorce from this one and from this one; and she does not receive her kesuvah, or fruits (The husband does not pay her for the fruits that he consumed from her usufruct property. Even though the husband's right to the fruits of his wife's melog property is a compensation for his obligation to ransom her if she is taken captive by non-Jews, and he is not required to ransom this wife who is prohibited to him, and it therefore would be proper that he pay her for what he consumed of the fruits of her melog property, nonetheless the Sages punished her and she cannot collect from him the fruits he consumed, just as she does not collect her kesuvah.), or sustenance, or depreciation (if the husband made use of her melog property until it was worn-out, he is not required to pay her its monetary value); not against this one and not against this one. And if she took any of these payments from this one or from this one, she must return it. And the child born from either of these men is a mamzer (the child from the first man is a mamzer Biblically and the child from the second one is a mamzer Rabbinically). And neither this one nor this one may render himself tamei for her (if she dies). And neither this one nor this one is entitled to an object she finds, or to her earnings, and they are not authorized to annul her vows. If she was the daughter of a Yisroel, she is disqualified from the Kehunah, and if she was the daughter of a Levi, she is disqualified from ma'aser, and if she was the daughter of a Kohen, she is disqualified from terumah. And the heirs of neither this one, nor of this one inherit her kesuvah. And if they died, the brother of this one and the brother of this one submit to chalitzah and do not marry by yibum. Rabbi Yosi says: Her first husband’s estate is responsible for her kesuvah. Rabbi Elozar says: The first husband is entitled to an object she finds and to her earnings, and he is authorized to annul her vows. Rabbi Shimon says: Cohabitation with her or her chalitzah to the brother of the first husband exempts her co-wife from chalitzah or yibum, and the child born from the first husband is not a mamzer.

The Mishna continues: If she married without permission (there were two witnesses that her husband died), she is permitted to return to him (since she was not expected to investigate and clarify the matter).

If she married with the consent of Beis Din (through the testimony of one witness), she must leave both men (if the husband returns), and she is exempt from an offering (since a person who sins in consequence of a ruling of Beis Din is exempt from a sin-offering). If she did not marry with the consent of Beis Din (there were two witnesses that her husband died), she must leave both men, and she is liable to bring a sin-offering. Such is the power of Beis Din that it exempts her from an offering.

If Beis Din ruled that she may be married, and she went and acted improperly (she cohabited with another man), she is liable to bring a sin-offering, for they permitted her only to be married. (87b)

THE VALIDITY OF ONE WITNESS

The Gemora analyzes the first case of the Mishna, which stated: If a woman's husband went overseas, and they came and said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married, and afterwards her husband returned, she must leave this one and this one. Since the Mishna states later: If she married without permission, she is permitted to return to him; the latter ruling must be referring to a case where Beis Din didn’t grant permission, but rather, there were two witnesses (for otherwise, why would she be permitted to return to her first husband?). This implies that the former ruling is referring to a case where Beis Din granted permission based on the testimony of one witness. It emerges from here that one witness is trusted to permit a woman to remarry.

The Gemora cites another Mishna to support this conclusion. The Mishna states: It became established throughout Israel that if a person testifies that someone else witnessed the death of a man overseas, we accept the testimony of the second witness to allow the wife to remarry. We also accept the testimony of a woman who acquired her testimony by the mouth of a second woman. We also trust a woman who acquired her testimony by the mouth of a slave or a maidservant. (Although the second person’s testimony is not biblically valid, the Chachamim were lenient so the woman should not remain an agunah, a woman who is left in limbo regarding her marital status. Furthermore, every Jewish marriage is contingent on rabbinical protocol, and the Chachamim reserved the right to invalidate a marriage where a person offers hearsay testimony that the woman’s husband died overseas.) It emerges from here that one witness is trusted to permit a woman to remarry. (87b)

ONE WITNESS REGARDING OTHER PROHIBITIONS

The Gemora cites another Mishna proving that one witness is believed even in regards to other Biblical prohibitions. The Mishna states: If one witness testifies that a certain person ate cheilev (forbidden fats) inadvertently, and thus is liable to bring a chatas (sin-offering). That person claims that he did not eat it at all. The halacha is that he is exempt from bringing a chatas.

The Gemora analyzes the Mishna. The reason why he is exempt from bringing the chatas is because he contradicted the witness and claimed that he did not eat the cheilev. If, however, he would have remained quiet, he would be liable to bring a chatas. It emerges from here that one witness is trusted even in regards to other Biblical prohibitions. (87b)



THE BIBLICAL SOURCE FOR ACCEPTING ONE WITNESS

The Gemora asks: How do we know from the Torah that one witness is believed in regards to Biblical prohibitions?

The Gemora answers: It was taught in the following braisa: It is written [Vayikra 4:23]: If his sin becomes known to him….he shall bring his chatas offering. The Torah teaches us that he must be aware of his sin, and not that others make him aware. One might think that even if he does not contradict the testimony, he should not be liable to bring the chatas; therefore the Torah states: If it becomes known to him, he is liable to bring the chatas in all cases.

The Gemora analyzes the braisa: What is the case that the braisa is discussing? If there are two witnesses, and he does not contradict them, why is the verse necessary (of course, he would be obligated to bring a chatas)? Obviously, the braisa is discussing a case where one witness testified, and he would be believed if he is not contradicted. We can learn from this braisa that one witness is believed even when it is relevant to Biblical prohibitions.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps he is liable to bring the chatas because he kept quiet, and this is a sign of admission (and the braisa would not be a proof that one witness is believed)?

The Gemora proves from the latter portion of the braisa that the reason he would be liable to bring the chatas is not because we believe one witness, but rather, it is because his silence is an admission of guilt. (87b - 88a)

The Gemora states that it is logical that one witness is believed. For the testimony regarding the husband who went overseas is similar to a case of a piece of fat that we are uncertain if it is cheilev (and it is forbidden), or if it is shuman (and it would be permitted), and one witness testified that it is shuman. Just as he is believed in that case, he should be believed in this case (that the husband died).

The Gemora objects to this comparison: Perhaps the one witness is believed only by the piece of fat, where a state of prohibition was not previously established. However, in the Mishna’s case, the state of prohibition of a married woman was already established, and the one witness will not be believed. Furthermore, there is a principle that two witnesses are required in all matters concerning ervah (forbidden marital relationships). (88a)

The Gemora offers another logical reasoning to believe one witness. For the testimony regarding the husband who went overseas is similar to the testimony of one witness permitting produce that had been previously established as tevel (untithed produce that one cannot eat until tithing has been performed), or permitting objects that had been previously established as hekdesh (consecrated items), or permitting an object that had been established to be subject to the prohibition of konamos (when one makes a vow not to derive pleasure from a certain object).
.
The Gemora analyzes all three cases: What is the case of tevel? If the produce is his own (the witness’), perhaps the reason that the witness is believed is not because one witness is believed, but rather, it is because he has the capability of rectifying the prohibition through tithing the produce himself. Rather, it must be referring to a case where the tevel belongs to someone else. What does the one who offered this comparison hold? If he holds that separating terumah from his own produce for the sake of rectifying someone else’s produce does not require the willingness of the owner, what is the comparison? Perhaps the reason that the witness is believed is not because one witness is believed, but rather, it is because he has the capability of rectifying the prohibition through tithing the produce himself. And if he holds that separating terumah from his own produce for the sake of rectifying someone else’s produce requires the willingness of the owner, and the one witness testifies that the produce has in fact been tithed, how do we know that the witness would be believed in this situation?

What is the case of hekdesh? If the consecrated item is one that merely possesses monetary sanctity, perhaps the reason that the witness is believed is not because one witness is believed, but rather, it is because he has the capability of redeeming the object himself. And if the case we are discussing is dealing with a consecrated item that possesses physical sanctity (which cannot be redeemed), let us examine the case further. If the consecrated item is his own, perhaps the reason that the witness is believed is not because one witness is believed, but rather, it is because he has the capability of asking a sage to annul his vow, which would render the item unconsecrated. If the consecrated item belonged to someone else, and the witness testified that he knew that the owner asked a sage to annul his vow, how do we know that the witness would be believed in this situation?

The Gemora examines the case of konamos. If the one who offered this comparison holds that there is a halacha of me’ilah (the sin of deriving benefit from consecrated property) by konamos, and therefore these objects would obtain monetary sanctity, perhaps the reason that the witness is believed is not because one witness is believed, but rather, it is because he has the capability of redeeming the object himself. If he holds that there is no halacha of me’ilah by konamos, but merely an ordinary prohibition, let us examine the case further. If the item is his own, perhaps the reason that the witness is believed is not because one witness is believed, but rather, it is because he has the capability of asking a sage to annul his vow. If the item belonged to someone else, and the witness testified that he knew that the owner asked a sage to annul his vow, how do we know that the witness would be believed in this situation? (88a)

LENIENCY TO ALLOW A WOMAN TO REMARRY AND NOT TO REMAIN AN AGUNAH

(The Gemora did not find a source proving that one witness will be believed against an established prohibition.) Rabbi Zeira says: The reason why one witness is believed (that the husband died) is because of the severity with which we applied to her (the wife) at the end (when the husband returned), we are lenient with her at the beginning (and allow her to marry through the testimony of one witness).

The Gemora asks: Let us not treat her severely at the end (by not imposing penalties on her if the husband returns) and we would not be compelled to be lenient with her in the beginning?

The Gemora answers: Since we were concerned that the woman will remain an agunah (a woman that cannot get married because we do not have sufficient evidence that her husband died), the Rabbis treated her leniently, and accepted the testimony of one witness. (88a)

REMARRYING BASED UPON TWO WITNESSES

The Mishna had stated: If a woman's husband went overseas, and they came (one witness) and said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married, and afterwards her husband returned, she must leave this one and this one. Rav says that this is the halacha only if she married on the basis of the testimony of one witness. However, if she remarried on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, she is not required to leave.

In Eretz Yisroel, they mocked at this ruling by saying: “The first husband has returned, and you say that she is not required to leave the second husband?”

The Gemora answers: Rav is discussing a case where we did not recognize the man who claims to be her first husband.

The Gemora asks: If we do not recognize him, then she should be permitted to stay with her second husband even if there was only one witness testifying that her husband died?

The Gemora answers: Rav is referring to a case where we do not recognize the man who claims to be her first husband, and there are two witnesses who testify and say the following: “We were with this man from the moment he left until now (and we are certain that he is her husband), and you do not recognize him because his appearance has changed.”

The Gemora proves from Yosef and his brothers that it is possible that a person’s appearance can change in such a manner that even his family will not recognize him.

The Gemora asks: But the bottom line in this case is that we have contradictory witnesses. We have two witnesses testifying that the husband died, and two witnesses testifying that the husband has returned. One who cohabits with this woman should be liable to bring an asham taluy (a korban that one is required to bring if he is uncertain if he mistakenly committed a transgression). Why then, do we allow the second husband to remain married to her?

Rav Sheishes answers: We are discussing a case where she is married to one of the witnesses who testified that the husband has died. (He is not required to bring an asham taluy since he does not suspect at all that he has committed any transgression.)

The Gemora asks: But, what about her? She herself is liable to bring an asham taluy.

The Gemora answers: We are discussing a case where she is certain that her husband died (and the man claiming to be her husband is a fraud).

The Gemora asks: If so, what is the novelty of Rav’s ruling? Even Rabbi Menachem the son of Rabbi Yosi said that a couple must separate when the legitimacy of their marriage is in question only if they married after both sets of witnesses testified; however, if they married on the basis of testimony from one set of witnesses and a conflicting set testified afterwards, they are not obligated to separate. For it was taught in the following braisa: If two witnesses testify that her husband died or that they got divorced, and another set of witnesses testify that the husband did not die or they did not get divorced, she should not get married. If she does remarry, she is not obligated to leave. Rabbi Menachem the son of Rabbi Yosi says: She is required to leave. Rabbi Menachem the son of Rabbi Yosi explains: When do I say that she is required to leave? Only if she remarried after the testimony of both sets of witnesses. However, if she remarried based on the supporting testimony from one set of witnesses, and afterwards, the opposing witnesses testified, she is not required to leave. (Accordingly, why did Rav need to repeat this ruling?)

The Gemora answers: Rav is referring to a case where she remarried after the testimony of both sets of witnesses, and Rav ruled that she is not required to leave in accordance with the Tanna Kamma, and to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Menachem the son of Rabbi Yosi.

There are others that say that the reason Rav ruled that she is not required to leave is because she married prior to the testimony from the opposing witnesses; however, if she remarried only after both sets of witnesses testified, she would be required to leave. This would be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Menachem the son of Rabbi Yosi. (88a – 88b)

Rava asks on Rav from the following braisa: How do we know that if a Kohen does not want to separate himself from tumah or from a forbidden woman that we physically force him until he obeys? It is written [Vayikra 21:8]: And you shall sanctify him. The Torah teaches us that it is incumbent upon Beis Din to force him to comply.

Rava examines the braisa: What is the case of the forbidden woman? If we are referring to a case where the Kohen married a woman based upon the testimony of witnesses who testified that her husband had died, and the Kohen was not one of the witnesses, and she did not claim that she is certain that her husband died, is it necessary to teach us that we force the Kohen to separate from the woman? Obviously not! Rather, the braisa must be referring to a case where the Kohen is one of the witnesses who testified that her husband died, and she is certain that her husband died, and nevertheless, the braisa rules that Beis Din forces the Kohen to separate from her. This would be inconsistent with Rav’s ruling that they are permitted to remain married.

The Gemora answers: We are stricter when we are dealing with a Kohen, whereas Rav was discussing a non-Kohen.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that the braisa is not discussing a case where both sets of witnesses testified, and we obligate the couple to separate. The case is that the Kohen wishes to marry her based on the testimony of one set of witnesses. The Torah requires that we force him to refrain from marrying her until we determine that there are no opposing witnesses.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that the braisa is discussing a case where both sets of witnesses testified, and only then do we require the couple to separate. This would be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Menachem the son of Rabbi Yosi. (88b)

[END]

Read more!

RULING ON HASHKAFA - Yevamos 86 - Daf Yomi

Tosfos discusses the penalty that Ezra established regarding the Levi’im and their ma’aser. In the middle of this discussion, Tosfos issues the following statement: We have ruled that Malachi is the same person as Ezra.

The Maharatz Chayus asks: How can Tosfos rule regarding this issue? The entire discussion of who Malachi was, is a historical fact, and the issue is one of Aggadata, and not halacha. It seems strange to issue a ruling on a historical fact.

(http://divreichaim.blogspot.com/2007/07/psak-on-hashkafa-and-formulating-torah.html) Divrei Chaim discusses this issue at depth. Can there be a ruling on hashkafic matters?

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 84 - Highlights

The Mishna states: There are those women that are permitted to remain with their husbands, but if the husband dies childless, they are forbidden to their yavams. There are some that are permitted to their yavams, but they are prohibited to remain with their husbands. There are some that would be permitted to both, and there are some that are forbidden to both.

The Mishna explains: There are those women that are permitted to remain with their husbands, but if the husband dies childless, they are forbidden to their yavams: An ordinary Kohen who marries a widow, and he has a brother who is a Kohen Gadol (she is forbidden to him because a Kohen Gadol may not marry a widow); a Kohen, who is a chalal marries a legitimate woman, and he has a brother who is a legitimate Kohen (she is forbidden to him because she becomes a chalalah by cohabiting with a chalal, and a legitimate Kohen may not marry a chalalah); A Yisroel that marries the daughter of a Yisroel, and he has a brother who is a mamzer; a mamzer married a mamzeres, and he has a brother who is legitimate.

The Mishna explains the second category: There are some that are permitted to their yavams, but they are prohibited to remain with their husbands. A Kohen Gadol who betrothed a widow, and he has a brother who is an ordinary Kohen; a legitimate Kohen who married a chalalah, and he has a brother who is a chalal; a Yisroel who married a mamzeres, and he has a brother who is a mamzer; a mamzer who married the daughter of a Yisroel, and he has a brother who is a Yisroel.

The Mishna explains the last category: The following women are forbidden to both: A Kohen Gadol who married a widow, and he has a brother who is a Kohen Gadol, or an ordinary Kohen (she is forbidden to him because she becomes a chalalah through cohabitation with the Kohen Gadol); an ordinary legitimate Kohen who married a chalalah, and he has a legitimate brother; a Yisroel who married a mamzeres, and he has a brother who is legitimate; a mamzer who married the daughter of a Yisroel, and he has a brother who is a mamzer; these women are prohibited to their husbands and to their yavams.

All other women are permitted to their husbands and to their yavams.

The Mishna continues: There are secondary arayos that are only forbidden on account of a decree by the early Sages. If a woman is a secondary ervah to her husband, but not a secondary ervah to the yavam, she is prohibited to the husband and permitted to the yavam. If she is a secondary ervah to the yavam, but not a secondary ervah to the husband, she is prohibited to the yavam and permitted to the husband. If she is a secondary ervah to both of them, she is prohibited to both of them. She does not receive her kesuvah, or fruits (The husband does not pay her for the fruits that he consumed from her usufruct property. Even though the husband's right to the fruits of his wife's melog property is a compensation for his obligation to ransom her if she is taken captive by non-Jews, and he is not required to ransom this wife who is prohibited to him, and it therefore would be proper that he pay her for what he consumed of the fruits of her melog property, nonetheless the Sages punished her and she cannot collect from him the fruits he consumed, just as she does not collect her kesuvah.), or sustenance, or depreciation (if the husband made use of her melog property until it was worn-out, he is not required to pay her its monetary value), and the child is legitimate, and they compel him to divorce her.

The Mishna concludes: If a widow is married to a Kohen Gadol, a divorced woman or a chalutzah to an ordinary Kohen, a mamzeres or a nesinah to a Yisroel, the daughter of a Yisroel to a nesin or to a mamzer, they receive their kesuvah. (84a)

Rav Pappa asks: If the halacha is in accordance with the following ruling that Rav Dimi reported in the name of Rabbi Yochanan when he came from Bavel: If a second-generation Egyptian convert married a first-generation Egyptian convert, their son is regarded as a second-generation Egyptian, our Mishna should also have taught: If a second-generation Egyptian convert married two Egyptian women, one of the first, and the other of the second-generation, and he had sons from the first and from the second, if they (the sons) married in the proper manner (i.e., if the son of the second-generation Egyptian woman, who thus belongs to the third and is permitted to enter the congregation, married the daughter of an Israelite, while the other who belongs to the second generation married a second-generation Egyptian), the two wives are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yavams. And if they married in the reverse (forbidden) order (i.e., if the son of the second-generation Egyptian woman married a second-generation Egyptian, while the while the other who belongs to the second generation married the daughter of an Israelite), the wives are permitted to their yavams and forbidden to their husbands. The Mishna’s category of women that are permitted to both the husband and the yavam could be represented by an ordinary female convert who married one of the brothers. The Mishna’s category of women that are prohibited to both the husband and the yavam could be represented by an aylonis who married the brother who is a second-generation Egyptian convert.

The Gemora answers: The Tanna taught some cases and omitted others.

The Gemora asks: What else did he omit that he should have omitted this also?

The Gemora answers: He omitted the case of the petzua daka.

The Gemora asks: If this is all that can be pointed out, the case of the petzua daka cannot be regarded as an instance of an omission, since those that are subject to the penalty of negative precepts were already mentioned?

The Gemora answers: Were not several specific cases mentioned of those that are subject to the penalty of negative precepts? Surely it was stated: An ordinary Kohen who marries a widow and then again the Mishna stated: A Kohen, who is a chalal marries a legitimate woman?

The Gemora counters that this case (a chalal who marries a legitimate woman) was required for the specific purpose of informing us that the halacha is in agreement with Rav Yehudah’s ruling that he reported in the name of Rav, for Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: Women of legitimate status (daughters of Kohanim) were not forbidden to be married to chalalim. (The Torah’s prohibition against a Kohen marrying a chalalah is applicable only to the man, but the woman is permitted to marry a chalal.)
.
The Gemora attempts to disprove again that the negative precept of the widow to the Kohan Gadol mentioned in the Mishna includes other negative precepts as well. Didn’t the Mishna state the case where a chalal married a legitimate woman and then again the Mishna stated: A Yisroel that marries the daughter of a Yisroel, and he has a brother who is a mamzer?

The Gemora counters that these two cases are necessary. The Tanna taught us first regarding a negative precept which is not applicable to all (the case of the chalal is applicable only to Kohanim) and then he taught us regarding a negative precept which is applicable to all.

The Gemora answers: Why then, did the Tanna have to state two cases dealing with a mamzer? The Mishna states first: A Yisroel that marries the daughter of a Yisroel, and he has a brother who is a mamzer, and then the Mishna stated: A mamzer married a mamzeres, and he has a brother who is legitimate.

The Gemora concludes: It has thus been proven that the Tanna taught some cases while others he omitted. This indeed proves it. (As a result, nothing can be proven regarding the Mishna’s omission of the cases involving the Egyptian converts.) (84b)

[END]

Read more!