Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 85 - Highlights

Seizing the Boat

The Gemora records an incident: Yeimar bar Chashu had a money claim against a certain person who died and left a boat. Yeimar said to his agent, “Go and seize it.” He went and seized it, but Rav Papa and Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua met him and told him, “You are seizing the ship on behalf of a creditor and thereby you are causing loss to other creditors (who cannot take it). And Rabbi Yochanan ruled: He who seizes a debtor’s property on behalf of a creditor and thereby causes loss to other creditors does not legally acquire it. Thereupon, they seized it themselves (for they too had money claims against the debtor). Rav Papa was rowing the boat while Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua pulled it by the rope (each one attempting to acquire it by moving it). One master declared, “I have acquired the boat,” and the other similarly declared, “I have acquired it.” (Each one claimed that their method of pulling it was superior to that of their fellow.) Rav Pinchas bar Ami met them and said to them: Both Rav and Samuel ruled that seizure from the orphans will only be valid if the produce was piled up in a public domain, but not in a side street (for then, it will belong to the orphans; how then, could they be attempting to seize the boat)? “We too,” they replied, “have seized it at the main current of the river (which is regarded as a public domain).” When they appeared before Rava, he said to them: You are like white (due to their age) geese (on account of their wisdom) that strip the cloaks off people. Rav Nachman has ruled: The seizure is valid only if it took place during the father’s lifetime (however, afterwards, his property may not be seized; this follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva). (84b – 85a)

Payment through an Agent

Avimi the son of Rabbi Avahu had a money claim against him by the people of Chozai. He sent the money to them by the hand of Chama the son of Rabbah bar Avahu. He went there and paid them, but when he asked them, “Return to me the document,” they replied as follows: “This payment was made in settlement of some other claims (this document remains unpaid).

He came before Rabbi Avahu to complain and Rabbi Avahu asked him, “Do you have witnesses that you have paid them?” “No,” he replied. Rabbi Avahu said to him, “Since they could claim that the payment was never made, they are also entitled to claim that the payment was made in settlement of some other claims.”

The Gemora asks: Must the agent in this case pay Avimi (for being negligent by paying them without taking the document first)?

Rav Ashi answers: We examine the exact situation: If the agent was told, “Take the document and give the money,” he is regarded as being negligent and he must therefore pay; however, if he was told, “Give the money and take the document,” he is not required to pay.

The Gemora rejects this ruling and states: The agent must pay no matter what he was told, for the debtor can tell him, “You were sent for my benefit, not for my detriment.” (85a)
Trusting One Witness

There was a certain woman with whom a sack of documents was once deposited (and the owner of the documents died). The inheritors of the depositor came to claim it from her and she said, “I seized them during the depositor’s lifetime (because he owed me money).” She came before Rav Nachman and he said to her, “Do you have witnesses that the depositor claimed it from you during his lifetime and that you refused to return it (and this would indeed prove that she seized it during his lifetime)?” “No,” she replied. Rav Nachman said to her, “If so, your seizure occurred after the owner’s death, and such a seizure is invalid.

A woman was once ordered to take an oath at Rava’s Beis Din. Rav Chisda’s daughter (Rava’s wife) said to him, “I know that she is suspected of swearing falsely.” Rava, therefore, transferred the oath to her disputant.

On another occasion, Rav Papa and Rav Adda bar Masna sat in Rava’s presence when a document was brought to him. Rav Papa to Rava: I know that this document has been paid. Rava asked him: Is there any other man with the master to confirm this statement? No, he replied. Rava said to him: Although the master has testified, there is no validity in the testimony of one witness.

Rav Adda bar Masna asked Rava: Shouldn’t Rav Papa be just as reliable as Rav Chisda’s daughter (who was believed without a corresponding witness)?

Rava answered: As to the daughter of Rav Chisda, I am certain of her that she would not lie; regarding the master, I am not positive about him.

Rav Papa said: Now that the master has stated that a judge who can assert that a certain person doesn’t lie, we may rely upon that person’s testimony, I would tear up a document on the testimony of my son Abba Mar, about whom I am certain that he doesn’t lie.

The Gemora asks: Would he actually tear up a document based upon the testimony of one witness? (Two witnesses would certainly be required to take away a signed document and destroy it; before, Rava relied on his wife’s testimony only to transfer the oath to the other party, but ultimately, the judgment will be decided based upon the oath!) Is such an act conceivable?

Rather, Rav Papa said: I would impair the document based upon his testimony (he wouldn’t collect with it, but he wouldn’t tear it up either).

A woman was once ordered to take an oath at Rav Bibi bar Abaye’s Beis Din. Her disputant suggested to them: Let her rather come and take the oath in our hometown, where she might possibly feel ashamed and confess. She said to them: Write for me the verdict in my favor so that after I shall have taken the oath it may be given to me. Write it out for her, Rav Bibi bar Abaye instructed them.

Rav Papi said: You are descendants of short-lived people (Abaye, being a descendant of Eli had a curse placed upon his family), therefore, you speak frail words. Surely Rava stated: A certification by judges that was written before the witnesses have identified their signatures is invalid. It is apparently evident that such an attestation has the appearance of a false declaration, and so here also, the document that she desires would appear to contain a false statement (since it is written prior to her oath).

This conclusion, however, is invalid, as may be inferred from Rav Nachman’s statement. For Rav Nachman said: Rabbi Meir ruled that even if a husband found a bill of divorce in a rubbish heap, and then signed and gave it to her, it is valid (even though it appears false). And even the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir only in respect to letters of divorce, where it is necessary that the writing shall be done specifically in her name, but in respect of other legal documents, they would agree with him. For Rav Assi stated in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: A man may not borrow again using a document on which he has once borrowed and which he has repaid since the lien incurred by the first loan (to collect land that the borrower had at the time of the loan) was cancelled. It can be inferred that the only reason is because the lien was cancelled, but, otherwise, the document would be valid, and we are not concerned that it has the appearance of a falsehood. (85a – 85b)
Three Related Incidents

A certain man once deposited seven pearls wrapped in a kerchief with Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Rabbi Meyasha died and did not issue instructions regarding his property. They came before Rabbi Ami (the depositor wanted his pearls back and the family members claimed that perhaps the pearls’ belonged to their father). Rabbi Ami said to them: Firstly, I know that Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi was not a wealthy man (and probably did not own these pearls). Secondly, the depositor indicated the identifying marks (by saying that there were seven pearls and that they were wrapped in a kerchief).

The Gemora qualifies this ruling: This ruling, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor at the Rabbi Meyasha’s house, but if he was a frequent visitor there, the identifying marks are not evidence of ownership since it could very well be that another person has made the deposit and he happened to see it.

A certain man once deposited a silver cup with Chasa. Chasa died and did not issue instructions regarding his property. They came before Rav Nachman (the depositor wanted his cup back and the family members claimed that perhaps the cup belonged to their father). Rav Nachman said to them: Firstly, I know that Chasa was not a wealthy man (and probably did not own the silver cup). Secondly, the depositor indicated the identifying marks.

The Gemora qualifies this ruling: This ruling, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor at the Chasa’s house, but if he was a frequent visitor there, the identifying marks are not evidence of ownership since it could very well be that another person has made the deposit and he happened to see it.

A certain man once deposited a silk garment with Rav Dimi the brother of Rav Safra. Rav Dimi died and did not issue instructions regarding his property. They came before Rabbi Abba (the depositor wanted his garment back and the family members claimed that perhaps the garment belonged to their father). Rabbi Abba said to them: Firstly, I know that Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi was not a wealthy man (and probably did not own the silk garment). Secondly, the depositor indicated the identifying marks.

The Gemora qualifies this ruling: This ruling, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor at the Rav Dimi’s house, but if he was a frequent visitor there, the identifying marks are not evidence of ownership since it could very well be that another person has made the deposit and he happened to see it. (85b)

Toviah and Toviah

A dying man once said to those around him, “Let my estate be given to Toviah,” and then he died. A man named Toviah came to claim the estate. Rabbi Yochanan said: Behold, Toviah has come.

The Gemora qualifies the ruling: Now, if he had said, “Toviah,” and Rav Toviah came, he would not be entitled to the estate, since he said “To Toviah,” and not “To Rav Toviah.” If he, however, was on familiar terms with Rav Toviah, the estate must be given to him, since the omission of title might have been due to the fact that he was casual with him.

If two men called Toviah appeared, one of whom was a neighbor and the other a Torah scholar, the scholar is to be given precedence (since we may assume that the dying man desired merits and he granted his property to a Torah scholar). If one was a relative and the other a Torah scholar, the scholar is given precedence.

They inquired: What is the halacha where one is a neighbor and the other a relative? Come and hear from the following verse [Mishlei 27:10]: Better is a neighbor that is near than a brother far away.

If both men named Toviah are relatives, or both are neighbors, or both are Torah scholars, the decision is left to the discretion of the judges. (85b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 84 - Highlights

Rav and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

The Gemora asks: Does Rav hold such a condition is valid? Didn’t Rav say that if someone says to his friend (I am selling you this item) “on the condition that you have no claim of ona’ah (Torah prohibition against charging one-sixth more than the market value for an item)” that there is still ona’ah. Shmuel says: There is no ona’ah.

The Gemora answers: It must be that the law follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that if someone makes a condition which is against Torah law, the condition is invalid. However, not because of Rabban Shimon’s reason. Rabban Shimon understands the reason leads to the conclusion that if the woman (in Mishna 83a) dies the husband inherits her, and Rav holds he does not.

The Gemora asks: This would mean that Rav should hold of Rabban Shimon’s reasoning and not his law, not (as Rav stated) that he holds of Rabban Shimon’s law but not based on his reasoning!

The Gemora answers: It must be that Rav holds like Rabban Shimon’s law that if she dies he inherits, but not based on his reasoning. Rabban Shimon’s reasoning was that a although a condition made against Torah law is invalid, a condition made against Rabbinic law is valid. Rav held that a condition cannot be made even against Rabbinic law.

The Gemora asks: This means Rav holds of both Rabban Shimon’s law and his reasoning. Rav merely adds that a condition against Rabbinic law is also invalid!

The Gemora answers: It must be that Rav holds like Rabban Shimon’s law that if she dies he inherits, but not based on his reasoning. Rabban Shimon’s reasoning was that a husband inherits from his wife according to Torah law, and any condition made against Torah law is invalid. Rav’s reasoning is that a husband only inherits his wife based on a Rabbinic decree, and the sages deemed it necessary to strengthen this law like it was a Torah law (that a condition against it would be invalid). (83b – 84a)

A Husband’s Inheritance: Torah or Rabinnic Law

The Gemora asks: Does Rav really hold that a husband only inherits from his wife because of a Rabbinic institution? The Mishna records that Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah said someone who inherits his wife should give back the fields by yovel (the jubilee year) and subtract money from them. The Gemara inquires: What is Rabbi Yochanan’s reasoning? If he holds that a husband inherits based on Torah law, why should he give it back at all? If he holds that this inheritance is Rabbinic in nature, why does he take money? Rav explained: Rabbi Yochanan holds that a husband’s inheritance is established in Torah law. However, the case here is where his wife owned her family’s burial plots. Being that their inability to bury their dead their and the burial of others there instead would denigrate the family, he should return the plot to them for a (small) amount of money.

The Gemora asks: What does it meant that he should subtract some money? The Gemora answers: This is the amount of money that his wife’s plot is worth. This is in accordance with a statement of a Beraisa that someone who sells his burial plot, the path to it, the place where one stands to deliver a eulogy and the place for the eulogy, his family can come bury him their anyway, as otherwise it is denigrating to the family. [The above shows that Rav says that a husband’s inheritance is a Torah law, not Rabbinic as we stated above!]

The Gemora answers: Rav was merely explaining the position of Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah. He himself did not agree with Rabbi Yochanan that a husband’s inheritance is Torah law. (84a)
Mishna

If someone dies and left a widow, creditor, and inheritors, and he had deposited items of value with others or others owed him money (who receives the money)? Rabbi Tarfon says: It should be given to the weakest amongst them (see the Gemora later). Rabbi Akiva says: We do not have mercy in judgement, rather we give the money to the inheritors. This is because while the others must take an oath in order to collect this money, the inheritors do not. If he left fruit that was not connected to the ground, whoever takes it first (among those listed above) is entitled to it. If the widow grabbed more than her Kesuvah was worth, and a creditor grabbed more than the money owed to him, (what should be done with) the rest? Rabbi Tarfon says: It should be given to the weakest amongst them (see the Gemora later). Rabbi Akiva says: We do not have mercy in judgement, rather we give the money to the inheritors. This is because while the others must take an oath in order to collect this money, the inheritors do not. (84a)

Both a Deposit and a Loan

The Gemora asks: Why did the Mishna state a case where the deceased had either a loan or a deposit (either is enough to get the point across)? The Gemora answers: This was necessary. If the Mishna would have only stated a case of a loan, it is possible that specifically regarding a loan Rabbi Tarfon would say the weakest takes the money because a loan is made to be spent. [The money is not considered to be extant, and therefore not in the domain of the inheritors.] However, in a case of a deposit that is extant we might have thought that he agrees with Rabbi Akiva. If the Mishna would have only stated a case of a deposit, we might have thought that Rabbi Akiva only says that the inheritors receive the money because it is extant, but in a case of a loan he would agree to Rabbi Tarfon. Both cases are therefore necessary. (84a)
Who is “The Weakest”?

The Gemora asks: What does Rabbi Tarfon mean by “the weakest?” Rabbi Yosi b’Rebbi Chanina says: The one with the weakest proof (the document dated the latest). Rabbi Yochanan says: He is referring to the kesuvah of the widow, due to the sages will that the widow should have some money that will help her find favor in the eyes of another husband. This is as stated in a Beraisa. Rabbi Binyamin says: The one with the weakest proof (the document dated the latest), and it is appropriate to rule in this fashion. Rabbi Elazar says: He is referring to the kesuvah of the widow, due to the sages will that the widow should have some money that will help her find favor in the eyes of another husband.

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Akiva, how can the extra fruit be described as “extra?” All of that fruit belong to the orphans/inheritors!

The Gemora answers: This is true. However, because Rabbi Tarfon discussed “extra fruit,” Rabbi Akiva also discussed the “extra fruit” (which according to him are not extra).

The Gemora inquires: Does Rabbi Akiva hold that grabbing works at all in this case? Rava says in the name of Rav Nachman: It only helps if he grabbed the fruit before the person died.

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Tarfon, where were these fruits situated? Rav and Shmuel say: They must have been piled up in a public domain, but not in a side street. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish say: They could even have been piled in a side street. [The argument being whether or not the inheritors automatically acquire the fruit if it is in a side street.]

Certain judges ruled like Rabbi Tarfon, and Reish Lakish made them retract their ruling. Rabbi Yochanan told him: You did the Torah law.

The Gemora asks: Let us say they argue regarding the following concept. One holds that in a case where a judge makes an elementary mistake, the ruling should be retracted. The other argues that it should not be retracted.

The Gemora answers: No, this cannot be, as everyone agrees such a mistake must be retracted. Here they are arguing in the following concept. One understands that the rule that the law always follows Rabbi Akiva’s ruling when he argues on a friend, but not when his Rabbi (Rabbi Tarfon) argues on him. The other says the law always follows his opinion even when he argues on his Rabbi.

Alternatively, the Gemora gives the following explanation. Everyone agrees that the law is only like his opinion when he argues on a friend, not his Rabbi. In this case one opinion is that Rabbi Tarfon was his Rabbi, and the other is that Rabbi Tarfon was his friend.

Alternatively, the Gemora gives the following explanation. Everyone agrees that Rabbi Tarfon was merely his friend. In this case, one opinion is that when we state the law is like Rabbi Akiva, we mean that it is absolute. The other opinion understands that it is the optimal ruling that should be ruled, but if the ruling was made against his opinion it should not be retracted.

The relatives of Rabbi Yochanan grabbed the cow of orphans (whose father owed them money) when it was in a side street. They came before Rabbi Yochanan, who endorsed their actions. When they came before Reish Lakish, he told them that they should return the cow. When they returned to consult with Rabbi Yochanan, he told them that he cannot do anything as someone as great as him argues on him.

A person who used to watch the animals of orphans was watching their animals when a creditor seized one of the animals. The creditor claimed that he seized the animal when the father was alive, while the animal watcher claimed that it was after the father had already died. They came before Rav Nachman. Rav Nachman asked the animal watchman: “Do you have witnesses on this seizure?” The watchman replied that he did not. Rav Nachman stated: Being that the creditor could claim that the animal was originally his, he is believed to say that he grabbed it while the father was still alive.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Reish Lakish say that certain domestic animals do not have a status quo of ownership (where whoever presently has them is believed to say that he bought them, as they frequently wander)? The Gemora answers: An ox is different, as it is given over to a shepherd (who makes sure it doesn’t wander too much).

The house of the Nasi (leader of the Jews in Israel) seized a maidservant of orphans in a side street. Rabbi Avahu, Rabbi Chanina bar Papi, and Rabbi Yitzchak bar Nafcha were sitting, and alongside them was Rabbi Abba. The first three said that the seizure was appropriate. Rabbi Abba said: Just because they are from the house of the Nasi you are flattering them? Weren’t judges who ruled like Rabbi Tarfon overruled by Reish Lakish who made them retract their ruling? (Therefore, the maidservant must be returned.) (84a – 84b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 83 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: If one writes to his wife, “I have no claim or rights to your property,” he may nevertheless eat the produce during her lifetime, and if she died, he inherits her property. If so (the Mishna asks), why did he write to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property?” It accomplishes that if she sold the property or gave them away, it is valid.

If he wrote to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property and its produce,” he does not eat the produce during her lifetime, but if she died, he inherits her property.

Rabbi Yehudah says: He always has the right of eating the produce of the produce unless he writes to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property and its produce and the produce of the produce forever.”

If he wrote to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property and its produce and the produce of the produce, during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not eat the produce during her lifetime, and if she died, he does not inherit her property.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she died, he does inherit her property because he stipulated contrary to that which is written in the Torah; and if one stipulates contrary to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void. (83a)

Husband can Relinquish his Rights Prior to the Nisuin

The Gemora asks: Why is there any validity to what he writes? Did we not learn in a braisa that if one says to his fellow (a partner in the field): “I have no claim or rights regarding this field,” or he says: “I have no business with it,” or he says: “My hand is removed from it,” it is considered as if he said nothing (since he is not stating that he is giving his share to his partner)?

In the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yannai, they said: The Mishna is referring to a case where he wrote it to her while she was still an arusah (and therefore, it has validity since the husband does not own the property yet), and it would be in accordance with that which Rav Kahana said. For Rav Kahana said: A man may stipulate in advance that he does not wish to inherit an inheritance that will come to him through marriage.

This can be proven from Rava’s statement, for Rava said: If a person says, “I do not want to avail myself of a Rabbinic enactment (which was made for his benefit), such as this one, we listen to him.

The Gemora asks: What did Rava mean when he said, “such as this one”? He is referring to that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav. For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman is permitted to say to her husband, “I do not want to be supported by you, and I will not give you my earnings.” (She works and keeps the earnings to herself.)

The Gemora asks: If so, the husband should be able to waive his rights to her property even if she is a nesuah (since her property belongs to him based on a Rabbinic enactment; he should be entitled to refuse this right that was intended for his benefit)?

Abaye answers: His hand is equal to her hand (since she is a nesuah, they are equal partners, and therefore, he cannot waive his rights any longer; he must actually give it away).

Rava said: His hand is even stronger than her hand. (83a)

If he Makes a Kinyan

(The Gemora had stated: if one says to his fellow (a partner in the field): “I have no claim or rights regarding this field,” or he says: “I have no business with it,” or he says: “My hand is removed from it,” it is considered as if he said nothing since he is not stating that he is giving his share to his partner.) The Gemora inquires: If his partner made a kinyan (chalipin; he took a kerchief from his fellow in order to formalize the transfer), does this kinyan give more validity to his statement or not?

Rav Yosef said: He has acquired the waiver of the claim and rights regarding the field (and since the waiver was meaningless, so is the acquisition).

Rav Nachman said: He acquires the land itself.

Abaye said: It is logical that Rav Yosef is correct regarding a case where the initial owner of the field protested immediately (as the other fellow was attempting to take possession of the field; the owner said that his statement and kinyan was only for the purpose of not arguing with him regarding his portion), but if he would have stood quiet for a few days before objecting, we can assume that he (the recipient) has indeed acquired the land.

Ameimar said: The halacha is that he acquires the land itself.

Rav Ashi asked Ameimar: Is the halacha this way even if he objects immediately or only if he stands quiet for a few days?

The Gemora asks: What difference does it make?

Rav Ashi answers: For that which Rav Yosef said (and as Abaye explained).

Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: I do not agree that there is any such distinction (he acquires the land regardless of if the owner stood quiet or even if he objected immediately). (83a – 83b)

Interpreting his Statement

The Mishna had stated (regarding the case when one writes to his wife, “I have no claim or rights to your property,” he may nevertheless eat the produce during her lifetime, and if she died, he inherits her property): If so, why did he write to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property?” It accomplishes that if she sold the property or gave them away, it is valid.

The Gemora asks: Why can’t the wife tell the husband that he removed himself completely from retaining any rights in the property?

Abaye answers: The holder of the document is always at a disadvantage (since the language of the document is vague, we say that he has removed himself from the least valuable right that he had in the property; the husband possesses the rights of (1) produce, (2) inheritance after her death and (3) the seizure of any property she has sold or given away; the least valuable right is the ability to nullify her sale and that is what we assume he renounced).

The Gemora asks: But perhaps he was referring to the right of consuming the produce?

Abaye answers: A small gourd now is more preferable than a large one later (and we assume that the ability to eat the produce now is more advantageous to him).

The Gemora asks: But perhaps he was referring to his right of inheritance after her death?

Abaye answers: Death is common, whereas her selling her melog property is not. A person will generally renounce the rights of an uncommon occurrence rather than renouncing his rights to a common one.

Rav Ashi answers (the original question) differently: The husband had stated that he is withdrawing from any claims to her property. We can infer that he was referring to her property (the ability to nullify her sale), and not to its produce. We can also infer that he was referring to her property during her lifetime, and not to a claim which is only relevant after her death. (83b)

From Heaven

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yehudah says: He always has the right of eating the produce of the produce unless he writes to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property and its produce and the produce of the produce forever.”

The Gemora cites a braisa: If she brought in land into the marriage, the crops from that land are regarded as produce. If she sold the produce from that land and purchased land with the proceeds, the crops that grow from that land is regarded as produce of the produce.

The Gemora inquires as to the exact expression necessary according to Rabbi Yehudah. If the husband withdraws from the produce of the produce, does this include all future produce which comes from her melog property? Does he have to say “forever”? Or, perhaps both expressions are necessary.

The Gemora leaves this issue unresolved. (83b)

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Pumbedisean Rouges

The Gemora (Kesuvos 62a) records an incident: A yevamah fell to a yavam in Masa Mechasya. His (younger) brother wanted to disqualify her for yibum by giving her a letter of divorce. The elder brother said to him, “What is it that you have in your mind? Are you troubled because of the property that I am destined to inherit, I will share the property with you.” The younger brother replied, “I am afraid that you will treat me as the Pumbedisean rogue treated his brother.” (The people of Pumbedisa were known for being deceivers; in the incident cited above, the yavam refused to give up the land and then, Rav Yosef ruled like him.) The yavam said to him, “If you wish, you may take your half at once.”

It is noteworthy that this incident occurred in Masa Mechasya, and it was there that they spoke begrudgingly regarding the citizens of Pumbedisa.

The Gemora (Kerisus 6a) cites several teachings that Rav Mesharsheya told to his son. One such teaching was that it is better to dwell in the garbage heaps of Masa Mechasya than in the mansions of Pumbedisa.

What did Rav Mesharsheya have in mind? Rashi (Horayos 12a) states that in Masa Mechasya, there were Torah scholars who had the ability to answer Halachic questions and they also had exemplary midos. The scholars in Pumbedisa, however, did not excel in midos tovos, and therefore Rav Mesharsheya warned his son not to learn with them.

Reb Yaakov Emden cites our Gemora as proof that the Jewish population of Pumbedisa was known to be plagued with swindlers and cheats. Accordingly, perhaps we can say that Rav Mesharsheya was telling his son that Pumbedisa might not be the best location for one to reside in.

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Two Leniencies and Two Stringencies

The Gemora (Kesuvos 82a) had stated that we do not find a Tanna ruling stringently on two matters in respect to a kesuvah. Rashi explains that since a kesuvah is a Rabbinic enactment in the first place, we cannot rule with extreme stringencies. Therefore, we cannot rule that moveable objects are pledged for the kesuvah (in accordance with Rabbi Meir) and that the kesuvah may be collected from the debtor of the deceased husband (in accordance with Rabbi Nosson).

The Rif writes that this particular halachic ruling is not applicable nowadays. In the times of the Gemora, the society was an agricultural one and therefore, only real estate was pledged for the kesuvah. However, now that we maintain that all of the husband’s possessions are pledged for her kesuvah, this is not regarded as a stringency and therefore we can rule that the kesuvah may be collected from the debtor of the deceased husband.

Rabbi Braun in Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha points out that the inverse is true as well. In a situation where we rule leniently, we do not rule according to two leniencies. Shulchan Aruch (Y”D, 199:7) writes that although there are times that we allow a woman to immerse herself in a ritual bath during the daytime, we will inform her then that she must clean herself immediately prior to immersion, and we do not rely on the leniency which normally allows a woman to prepare herself a significant time before immersion.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 82 - Highlights

Delayed Kinyan

The Gemora records an incident: A yevamah fell to a yavam in Masa Mechasya. His (younger) brother wanted to disqualify her for yibum by giving her a letter of divorce. The elder brother said to him, “What is it that you have in your mind? Are you troubled because of the property that I am destined to inherit, I will share the property with you.” The younger brother replied, “I am afraid that you will treat me as the Pumbedisean rogue treated his brother.” (The people of Pumbedisa were known for being deceivers; in the incident cited above, the yavam refused to give up the land and then, Rav Yosef ruled like him.) The yavam said to him, “If you wish, you may take your half at once.”

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Although when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisroel, he stated in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If a man said to another, “Go and pull this cow, but it shall only become your legal possession after thirty days,” he legally acquires it after thirty days, even if it is standing at the time (after thirty days) in a swamp. That is because the giver had the ability to transfer possession of the cow at the initial time. However, in this case, the younger brother cannot acquire possession of the promised share, for it is not in his power to transfer immediate possession (since prior to yibum, the yavam has no rights on his brother’s land).

The Gemora asks: But, surely, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisroel, he reported in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that he does not acquire possession (in the case of the cow)?

The Gemora answers: This is no difficulty: The first ruling refers to a case where the seller said, “Acquire possession from now,” whereas the other ruling refers to a case where he did not say, “Acquire possession from now.” (82a)

Emend the Mishna

The Mishna had stated: The Chachamim said: The produce which is connected to the ground belongs to the yavam.

The Gemora asks: But why does it belong to him? Aren’t all of the brother’s properties pledges for her kesuvah?

Rish Lakish says that the Mishna must be emended to read that the produce belongs to her. (82a)

Just Like a Wife
The Mishna had stated: Once the yavam marries her, she is regarded as his wife in all respects.

The Gemora asks: Regarding what halacha is the Mishna referring to?

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: This teaches us that the yavam may divorce her with a get, and he also can remarry her afterwards.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t it obvious that he may divorce her with a get?

The Gemora answers: Since the verse [Devarim 25:5] states: The yavam shall cohabit with her, and take her to himself as a wife, and perform yibum with her; one might think that she is always regarded as his yevamah even after marrying her, and perhaps she would require a chalitzah to be released from him. The Mishna teaches us that a get is sufficient.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t it obvious that he may remarry her afterwards?

The Gemora answers: One might have thought that after he fulfilled his mitzvah and subsequently divorced her, she should become subject to the prohibition of being a brother’s wife and she should be forbidden to him; the Mishna teaches us that once she becomes permitted to him, she remains that way. (82a – 82b)

From Heaven
The Mishna had stated: If the yavam marries her, she is regarded as his wife in every respect, except that the obligations stemming from the kesuvah rests upon the property of her first husband.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this?

The Gemora answers: The yavam did not obligate himself to her; the Torah bestowed her upon him. (He is required to write for her a new kesuvah, but his properties are not encumbered towards this obligation; only the properties of the deceased are encumbered for this obligation.) But if there are no assets available from the deceased, the Rabbis established that there should be a kesuvah from the yavam as well, in order that she should not be so easy to divorce. (82b)

Lying on the Table
The Mishna had stated: The yavam should not say to her, “Your kesuvah is lying on the table (designating some of his property for the kesuvah),” but rather, all of his properties are indebted to her kesuvah. Likewise, an ordinary man may not say to her, “Your kesuvah is lying on the table.”

The Gemora asks: Why is it necessary for the Mishna to teach us the same halacha regarding an ordinary marriage; why would we think that there is a distinction?

The Gemora answers: It might have been suggested that the restriction mentioned applies only in the case of the yavam because the yavam does not insert in her kesuvah the clause, “That which I possess and that which I will acquire.” (The yevamah, having her security limited to the yavam’s possessions that were inherited from her deceased husband, would naturally suspect that by “putting her kesuvah on the table,” the yavam intends to escape his full responsibility and desires to deprive her of the possibility of collecting her kesuvah when the occasion arises. This, as might well be expected, would create animosity between husband and wife.) But in the latter case, where he does insert the clause, “That which I possess and that which I will acquire,” she relies upon this guarantee (even if he would designate money); hence, we were told that the ruling applies in both cases. (82b)

Kesuvah when he Divorces her and Remarries her
The Mishna had stated: If the yavam remarries, she is like any other woman and she is entitled only to her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: What is the novelty in this halacha? We have learned in a Mishna regarding an ordinary wife that if the husband divorces her and then remarries her, she is entitled to the initial kesuvah.

The Gemora answers: If the Mishna would not have stated this halacha in respect to a yavam, I would have thought that this would only apply to an ordinary marriage where the man wrote the kesuvah himself; however, in respect to a yevamah, where the yavam did not write the original kesuvah, perhaps when he divorces her and then remarries her, he should be obligated to write her a new kesuvah. The Mishna teaches us that this is not so. (82b)

Origin of the Kesuvah Enactments
Rav Yehudah said: Originally, they would write for a virgin two hundred zuz and for a widow a maneh, and consequently, they grew old and could not take any wives (since the women would not marry if the husband’s possessions were not pledged for her kesuvah). Shimon ben Shetach took the initiative and ordained that all of the husband’s property is pledged for his wife’s kesuvah.

The Gemora cites a braisa which supports Rav Yehudah: Originally, they would write for a virgin two hundred zuz and for a widow a maneh, and consequently, they grew old and could not take any wives. It was then ordained that the amount of the kesuvah was to be deposited in the wife’s father’s house (preventing the husband from hiding it). At any time, however, when the husband would become angry with his wife, he would tell her, “Go to your kesuvah.” It was ordained, therefore, that the amount of the kesuvah was to be deposited in the house of her father-in-law. Wealthy women converted it into silver or gold baskets, while poor women converted it into urinals. Still, whenever the husband had occasion to be angry with his wife, he would tell her, “Take your kesuvah and go.” It was then that Shimon ben Shetach ordained that the husband must insert the pledging clause, “All of my property is pledged to your kesuvah. (82b)
WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
HA’ISHA SHENAFLU

[END]

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A Childless Couple Divorcing and Remarrying

A couple who did not merit having children came to Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein with the following inquiry: Should they get divorced and then remarried, for they had heard that this is a segulah for having children? The woman, however, was refusing because getting divorced was degrading to her. What should they do?

He cited proof from our Gemora that a divorce, even just for a few moments is degrading and therefore, the wife has grounds to refuse the divorce.

The Gemora (Kesuvos 81b) states: Rava sent the following question to Abaye in the hands of Rav Shemayah bar Zeira: Is it indeed true that the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive? But didn’t we learn in the following braisa: Rabbi Abba said: I asked Sumchus: If a yavam (after performing yibum) wishes to sell some of his brother’s properties (something that he is not allowed to do), what should he do?

Sumchus responded: If he is a Kohen (and he cannot marry his divorcee), he should prepare for her a feast (with some wine) and persuade her to allow him to sell the property (which exceeds the amount of her kesuvah). If he is a Yisroel, he should divorce her and then, remarry her (he can either sell the properties before the second marriage or afterwards).

Rava concludes his question: If the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive, let the yavam designate land for her which equals the amount of the kesuvah, and then, he should be permitted to sell the remaining property? This, explains Rashi is a much more preferable option, for getting divorced is degrading!

The Steipler Gaon, when asked the same question, said that a childless couple may try to divorce and remarry (and the husband need not be concerned that after the divorce, the wife will refuse to remarry); however, he personally never heard that this is a valid segulah and he has no opinion regarding its veracity.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 81 - Highlights

The Obligation to Bury a Woman Awaiting Yibum

The Gemora inquires: Who is obligated to pay for the burial if a woman awaiting yibum dies? Is it the responsibility of the husband’s inheritors (namely, the yavam) because they inherit her kesuvah? Or, is it the responsibility of the father’s inheritors because they inherit her property that enters and leaves with her (the melog properties)?

Rav Amram said: Let me bring a proof from the following braisa: If a woman awaiting yibum dies, her inheritors, the inheritors of her kesuvah are obligated to bury her (it is evident that the responsibility rests on the yavam).

Abaye said: This ruling can be supported from the following Mishna: A widow is supported from the property inherited by the orphans and they are entitled to her earnings. They are not obligated in her burial. Her inheritors, the inheritors of her kesuvah are obligated to bury her.

Who is a widow that has two sets of inheritors? It must be a woman awaiting yibum (and it is evident that the responsibility rests on the yavam).

Rava asks: Let the yavam say, “I am inheriting my brother (it was only his brother’s responsibility to bury his wife in return for her kesuvah which he inherits, but not the yavam’s responsibility, since he does not inherit from the widow but from his brother), I have no responsibility to bury his wife.”?

Abaya responds: It is because we come at him from two sides: If he inherits the brother, he should be obligated to bury his wife; and if he wishes not to be responsible to bury his brother’s wife, then, he should pay for her kesuvah (since after all, the burial is in return for the kesuvah).

Rava counters: The following is what I meant to ask: Let the yavam say, “I am inheriting my brother, I have no responsibility to bury his wife.” And if you will say that this is not a valid claim, for then, he would be obligated to pay for her kesuvah, I could answer that a kesuvah is not meant to be payable during the husband’s lifetime (and since he was intending to perform yibum, he stands in the place of his brother; it is therefore regarded as if she died during her husband’s lifetime, where there would be no obligation for the husband to pay her kesuvah).

Abaye replies: Who is the Tanna that holds that we expound the language written in the kesuvah (the exposition being: Since the kesuvah contains the following statement: “When you will be married to another man, you will receive what is prescribed for you,” it may be inferred that, except in the case of divorce, the kesuvah is not payable during the lifetime of the husband, when his wife cannot be married to another man)? It is the opinion of Beis Shamai (in a Mishna in Yevamos, where it deals with a woman who was permitted to be married on the basis of her statement that her husband had died, and Beis Shamai said: She may marry and she takes her kesuvah. Beis Hillel said: She may marry but she does not take her kesuvah; it emerges that Beis Shamai expounds the language of the kesuvah). And we have heard that Beis Shamai holds that a contract which awaits collection is regarded as if it has been collected already (so, also regarding the amount of the kesuvah which is deemed to he in the virtual possession of the widow; the yavam is consequently inheriting it not from his brother but from the widow, in return for which he must incur the obligation of burying her).

The Gemora proves that Beis Shamai holds that a contract which awaits collection is regarded as if it has been collected already. (80b – 81a)

Yavam Selling Property

Rava sent the following question to Abaye in the hands of Rav Shemayah bar Zeira: Is it indeed true that the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive? But didn’t we learn in the following braisa: Rabbi Abba said: I asked Sumchus: If a yavam (after performing yibum) wishes to sell some of his brother’s properties (something that he is not allowed to do), what should he do?

Sumchus responded: If he is a Kohen (and he cannot marry his divorcee), he should prepare for her a feast (with some wine) and persuade her to allow him to sell the property (which exceeds the amount of her kesuvah). If he is a Yisroel, he should divorce her and then, remarry her (he can either sell the properties before the second marriage or afterwards).

Rava concludes his question: If the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive, let the yavam designate land for her which equals the amount of the kesuvah, and then, he should be permitted to sell the remaining property?

Abaye said to Rava: And according to you that the kesuvah of a yevamah was not meant to be collected while the yavam is alive, why don’t you ask from our Mishna which states that the yavam should not say to her, “Your kesuvah is lying on the table (designating some of his property for the kesuvah),” but rather, all of his properties are indebted to her kesuvah. (The fact that he cannot do this should be a proof to Rava.)

Rava responds: The Mishna is not issuing a halachic ruling; rather, it is offering good advice to the yavam. He should not designate money for her kesuvah (for if the money would get lost, he would be obligated to write for her a new kesuvah).

Rava proves this from the latter part of the Mishna which states the same thing regarding an ordinary man, and there, he certainly is permitted to sell some of his own property; it is evident that the Mishna is only offering good advice to the husband.

Abaye answers Rava’s question: Rabbi Abba ruled that one should not designate land for her which equals the amount of the kesuvah (and then, he would be permitted to sell the remaining property) because this would promote hatred between them (for she would think that he is intending to divorce her; it is therefore preferable for him to divorce her and remarry her, for then, she will realize that he divorced her only as a means to sell the property). (81a – 81b)

Ruling on an Incident
The Gemora relates the following incident: There was a yevamah who fell to a yavam in Pumbedisa. His (younger) brother wanted to disqualify her for yibum by giving her a letter of divorce. The elder brother said to him, “What is it that you have in your mind? Are you troubled because of the property that I am destined to inherit, I will share the property with you.”

Rav Yosef, in considering this case said: Since the Rabbis have established that a yavam may not sell properties that belonged to the deceased brother; his sale is invalid even if he had already sold it (and therefore the agreement between the two brothers is not valid). For it was taught in the following braisa: If a man died and left a widow who was awaiting yibum and he also left property valued at a hundred maneh, the yavam may not sell the property although the widow's kesuvah amounts only to one maneh, because all of his property is pledged to her kesuvah.

Abaye said to him: Is it true that wherever the Rabbis ruled that one must not sell, the sale is invalid, even after it had taken place? Did we not, in fact, learn in a Mishna: (If the properties fell to her after she became an arusah and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai said: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel said: She may not sell them. They both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid. ?

The case was sent to Rabbi Chanina bar Papi who sent the same reply as that of Rav Yosef. On this Abaye remarked: Has Rabbi Chanina bar Papi hung jewels upon it? (He has not! His ruling is no more supported by proof or reason than that of Rav Yosef, and may he equally disregarded.)

It was then sent to Rav Minyumi the son of Rav Nachumi who sent the same reply as Abaye, but he added: “Should Rav Yosef offer a new reason, report it to me.”

Rav Yosef thereupon went out, investigated, and discovered that it was taught in the following braisa: If a man who had a monetary claim against his brother died, and left a widow who was awaiting yibum (to the borrower), the borrower is not entitled to claim, “Since I am the inheritor, I have acquired the amount of the debt,” but it must be taken from the yavam and spent on the purchase of land and he is only entitled to its produce (the debt in this case is similar to a sale ex post facto, and nevertheless it is invalid; which proves the correctness of Rav Yosef’s ruling).

Abaye asked: But perhaps they are just advising him in his own interests (since land is more secure than money)?

Rav Yosef replied: The Tanna stated that it is taken from the yavam and you say that it is merely good advice!

The case was again sent to Rav Minyumi the son of Rav Nachumi who said to them: So said Rav Yosef bar Minyumi in the name of Rav Nachman: This braisa is not an authentic teaching.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason (that he dismissed this braisa as a mistake)? If you will suggest that it is because the loan is a movable thing and movables are not pledged to a kesuvah, is it not possible that the statement represents the view of Rabbi Meir who maintains that movables are pledged to a kesuvah. And if you will suggest that it is because he could say to her, “You are not the party I have to deal with (since he didn’t borrow from her; it was from the brother), is it not possible that the statement represents the view of Rabbi Nosson, since it was taught in a braisa: Rabbi Nosson said: How do we know that if one has a claim of a maneh against his fellow and that fellow against another fellow, we will take out a maneh from this one (the debtor’s debtor) and give it to that one (the original creditor)? It is written: And he shall give it to the one to whom he is guilty.

Rather, the Gemora concludes, this is the reason: We never find that a Tanna will impose two stringencies in the matter of a kesuvah. He might agree either with Rabbi Meir or with Rabbi Nosson (but not with both of them).

Rava remarked: If so, I can well understand what Abaye meant when I heard him say, “This braisa is not an authentic teaching” and until now, I did not understand why he said so. (81b – 82a)

[END]

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Two Points to Ponder

*** The Gemora (Kesuvos 78b - 79a) discusses a case where the woman writes a document assigning her property to her daughter for the purpose of depriving her prospective husband from the estate. Would this procedure be effective to evade a creditor as well?

*** The Gemora discusses a dispute between Chanania and the Rabbis regarding the offspring of melog animals. Are they regarded as the principal because we are concerned that the mother might die and the entire principal will be depleted or are they regarded as produce because we are not concerned for death? Tosfos in Yoma says that we are not concerned that the wife of the Kohen Gadol will die on Yom Kippur because it is only one day; but in general, we are concerned for death over a long period of time. Shouldn’t that be the case here? The animal and the slavewoman will eventually die; they will not live forever!

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 79 - Highlights

Evading the Husband

A certain woman (a widow who was about to marry) wishing to deprive her prospective husband of her estate assigned it in writing to her daughter. After she married and was divorced, she came before Rav Nachman to demand the return of her estate (from her daughter, who claimed that the property was legally hers; she brought the document as proof). Rav Nachman tore up the document.

Rav Anan, thereupon, went to Mar Ukva and said to him: “See, master, how Nachman the peasant tears up people’s deeds.” “Tell me now,” Mar Ukva said to him, “how exactly the incident occurred.” “It occurred,” he replied, “in such and such a manner.” Mar Ukva exclaimed, “Did you speak of a deed that a woman intended as a means of evasion? Thus said Rav Chanilai bar Idi in the name of Shmuel: ‘I am an officially recognized judge, and should a deed which a woman intended as a means of evasion come into my hand I would tear it up.’”

Rava said to Rav Nachman: What in fact is the reason? It is obviously because of the fact that no man would neglect himself completely and give his property away to others. But this would apply to strangers only, but to a daughter, one might well give such a gift!

Rav Nachman responded: Even in the case of a daughter, a woman gives preference to herself (and therefore, the gift is invalid).

The Gemora raises an objection from the following braisa: If a woman desires to keep her property from her husband, how is she to proceed? She writes out a deed of trust to a stranger (a document of a pretended sale or gift with which one person entrusts another in order to make people believe that a proper sale or presentation had actually taken place); these are the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel. But the Chachamim said: If the recipient wishes, he may laugh at her (and retain the property) unless she wrote out for him, “You shall acquire possession from today, and whenever I shall approve.” (In this case only is the woman protected against the holder of the deed as well as against her husband. For should her husband claim the property, she can evade him by expressing consent to its acquisition by the stranger; and should the stranger claim possession, she can exercise her right of refusing to give her consent.) The reason that this plan works is because she wrote out for him in the manner prescribed; but, had she not done so, the recipient would have acquired possession of it? (Why did Shmuel rule that the document should be ripped up?)

Rabbi Zeira replied: There is no difficulty. Shmuel is referring to a case where the woman assigned to the stranger all her property (since no person would give away all his property to a stranger; it is pretty obvious that the document related to a fictitious transaction). The braisa is discussing a case where a woman assigned to a stranger only part of her property.

The Gemora asks: But if the buyer does not acquire her property, shouldn’t the husband acquire it!

Abaye answers: This property is treated as property that is unknown to the husband in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon. (78b – 79a)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If money fell to a married woman as an inheritance, land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce. If she inherited produce which is detached from the ground, land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce. If she inherited produce which is attached to the ground, Rabbi Meir said: They assess the field as to how much it is worth with the produce, and how much it is worth without the produce, and with the difference, land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce. But the Chachamim say: That which is attached to the ground is his, and that which is detached from the ground is hers; land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce.

Rabbi Shimon says: Wherever he has an advantage upon her entry (into marriage), he has a disadvantage at her exit (when he divorces her); wherever he is at a disadvantage upon her entry, he has an advantage upon her exit. How is this? Produce which is attached to the ground – when he marries her, it is his, and when he divorces her, it is hers. And produce which is detached from the ground – when he marries her, it is hers, and when he divorces her, it is his. (79a)

Different Types of Land

(The Mishna had stated that when the woman inherits money, they should buy land with it. The Gemora discusses cases where a disagreement arises between husband and wife in regards to what type of real estate should be bought.) It is obvious that if husband and wife differ on the choice of purchase between land and houses, they should buy land (it is a safer and a better investment than houses). If they differ on the choice between houses and date palms, they should buy houses. If one insists on date palms and the other wants fruit trees, they should buy date palms. If one insists on fruit trees and the other wants grapevines, they should buy fruit trees. (79a)

Principal and Produce

If she inherited a thicket of sorb trees (which were primarily used for the cutting of its wood and which is valueless after the wood has been cut) or a fish pond, some maintain that it is regarded as produce (since no capital remains for the woman) and others maintain that it is regarded as principal (since eventually, it will be permanently depleted, the entire inheritance is regarded as principal). This is the general rule: If the stump regenerates, it is regarded as produce, but if the stump grows no new shoots, it is regarded as principal. (79a)

Offspring of Melog Property

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya who said in the name of Rabbi Yannai, and others said that Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya who said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: One who steals the offspring of a melog animal is required to pay the double payment to the wife (the Gemora is assuming now that the offspring is regarded as principal with which they would buy produce; this is because we are concerned that the mother might die and the principal will be lost).

The Gemora asks: Who is this going according to? It cannot be in accordance with the Rabbis nor Chanania, for we learned in the following braisa: The offspring of a melog animal belongs to the husband; the child of a melog slavewoman belongs to the wife. Chanania the son of Yoshiyah’s brother ruled: The child of a melog slavewoman has been given the same legal status as the offspring of a melog animal (and they both belong to the husband; according to both opinions, the offspring of the melog animal belongs to the husband, not to the wife!).

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yannai may be following both opinions, for it is the produce alone that the Rabbis in their enactment have assigned to the husband but not the produce that accrues from this produce.

The Gemora asks: Chanania’s opinion is understandable (that both, the offspring of the melog animal and slavewoman belong to the husband) because we are not concerned that the mother will die (and therefore, the principal will not be depleted). However, what is the logic behind the opinion of the Rabbis?

The Gemora answers: They are concerned that the mother will die, but an animal is different because (even if it dies) the hide of the animal will always remain (and the principal will not be depleted). (79a – 79b)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If old slaves or slavewomen fell to her as an inheritance, they should be sold, and land should be purchased with them, and he enjoys the produce. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She does not sell them because they are the pride of her father’s house.

If old olive trees or grapevines fell to her as an inheritance, they should be sold for wood, and land should be purchased with them, and he enjoys the produce. Rabbi Yehudah says: She does not sell them because they are the pride of her father’s house. (79b)

Qualifying the Argument

Rav Kahana stated in the name of Rav: The argument in the Mishna is only where the olive trees or grapevines fell to the woman in her own field (so that even if the trees die, she will retain the field as principle); but, if they were in a field that did not belong to her, she must, according to everyone, sell them, because otherwise, the principal would be depleted.

Rav Yosef asked from our Mishna: Aren’t slaves and slavewomen the same as trees in a field that does not belong to her (for if they die, no principal will remain), and nevertheless, there is a dispute?

Rather, this is what Rav Kahana stated in the name of Rav: The argument in the Mishna is only where the olive trees or grapevines fell to the woman in a field that did not belong to her, but if they were in her own field, everyone holds that she is not required to sell them because she is entitled to retain the pride of her father’s house. (79b)

[END]

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Blessing by a Bas Mitzvah

The Rema (O”C 225:2) writes that one whose son is becoming bar mitzvah should recite the following blessing: Blessed are You, Hashem, our God, King of the universe, that You freed me from the punishment due this boy. He concludes that it is preferable to recite this blessing without mentioning Hashem’s name.

The question is asked: Why is this blessing not recited when one’s daughter becomes bas mitzvah?

The Peri Megadim states that it would depend on what the reason is for this blessing.

The Magen Avraham (ibid; 5) explains this blessing as follows: Up until this juncture, the father was punished when his son sinned because he obviously did not train him well enough. Once the child becomes an adult, he is responsible for his own actions.

The Levush, however, interprets this blessing in the exact opposite manner. Up until now, the child gets punished for the sins of his father, as the Gemora Shabbos (32b) states: For the sin of unfulfilled vows, a person’s children die when they are young. The meaning of the blessing is that his son will now not incur any punishments on account of the parents.

According to the Levush, there is no reason to make any distinction between a son and a daughter. However, according to the Magen Avraham, we can say that the blessing is only applicable to a son, where there is an obligation of chinuch. However, a father does not have a mitzvah of chinuch for a daughter and therefore there is no reason to recite the blessing when she becomes bas mitzvah.

The Kaf Hachayim writes that we can apply a different logic according to the Magen Avraham. It is customary for a father to sustain his daughter until she is married and therefore, she is naturally under his jurisdiction until then. He is capable of rebuking her until she marries and will be under the jurisdiction of her husband. He therefore does not recite the blessing when she becomes bas mitzvah since he is still rebuking her.

He explains according to the Levush as well. The Levush said that the reason for the blessing is because up until then, the son gets punished for the sins of his parents. It is possible to say that a daughter, who is already under the mazal of her husband, as it is said: It is announced in heaven, “The daughter of So-and-So will be married to So-and-So,” his mazal will benefit her that she will not be punished on account of her father’s sins.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein questions this explanation from our Gemora (Kesuvos 78a). The Gemora states: In the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yannai, they replied: In the first case, it was into her possession that the property had come (prior to becoming an arusah, she is the legal possessor of whatever is given to her); in the latter case, the property came into his possession. I, however, do not understand his question. It seems that he understands the words “z’chuso and z’chusa” to mean “whose mazal caused the property to fall to her.” The simple explanation in our Gemora is in whose jurisdiction was the woman when the properties fell to her.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 78 - Highlights

Mishna

A woman to whom property fell before she became an arusah (and now she is an arusah), Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that she may sell them or she may give them away, and it is valid.(The Mishna is referring to nichsei melog - usufruct property - the property which the woman brings in with her from her father's house, and which is not recorded in the kesuvah, as well as property which comes to her by inheritance or as a gift after the marriage; this property is hers, and her husband is not responsible for it, since he may only usufruct (the right to use and enjoy the profits and advantages of something belonging to another as long as the property is not damaged or altered in any way) it; the term nikhsei melog is derived from the Aramaic word meligah, plucking, i.e., the husband plucks the property just as a chicken is plucked.)

If the properties fell to her after she became an arusah (and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai say: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel say: She may not sell them. They both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.

Rabbi Yehudah said: The Chachamim said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property? Rabban Gamliel said to them: We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old!

If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, they both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, the husband may seize it from the hand of the purchasers.

If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, and now she is a nesuah, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.

Rabbi Chanina ben Akavya said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property? He said to them: We are embarrassed regarding the new, and you impose on us the old!

Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property and property: property that is known to the husband, she may not sell, and if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is invalid. Properties that are not known to the husband, she may not sell, but if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid. (78a)

Erusin to Nisuin
The Gemora asks: What is the essential difference between the first case in which they do not differ (a woman to whom property fell before she became an arusah (and now she is an arusah), Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that she may sell them or she may give them away, and it is valid) and the latter case in which they do differ (if the properties fell to her after she became an arusah (and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai say: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel say: She may not sell them)?

In the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yannai, they replied: In the first case, it was into her possession that the property had come (prior to becoming an arusah, she is the legal possessor of whatever is given to her); in the latter case, the property came into his possession.

The Gemora questions this distinction: If, however, it is maintained that the property came into his possession (since it is after erusin), why is the transfer valid after she sells them or gives them away?

The Gemora answers: In the first case, the property has beyond all doubt come into her possession. However, in the latter case, the property might be said to have come either into her, or into his possession (since at this present time, we are uncertain if a nisuin will take place). Hence, she may not initially sell the property, but if she does sell them or give it away, the transfer is legally valid. (78a)

Clarification of R’ Yehudah’s Statement
The Mishna had stated: (If the properties fell to her after she became an arusah (and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai say: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel say: She may not sell them. They both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.) Rabbi Yehudah said: The Chachamim said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property?

The Gemora inquires: Is Rabbi Yehudah referring to Beis Shamai’s ruling, which allowed her to sell them initially (and the Chachamim are arguing that since she is an arusah, she should not be permitted to sell the properties)? Or, is he referring to Beis Hillel’s ruling, who ruled that the sale is valid after the fact (and the Chachamim are arguing that since she is an arusah,the sale should not be valid at all)?

The Gemora resolves this inquiry from the following braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: The Chachamim said before Rabban Gamliel: Since this one is his wife and this one is his wife (the nesuah and arusah), just as this one’s (the nesuah) sale is void, so too, this one’s (the arusah) sale should be void as well? Rabban Gamliel said to them: We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old!

We see from this braisa that Rabbi Yehudah was referring to Beis Hillel’s ruling that the sale is valid after the fact. That is the point that the Chachamim are contending. (78a – 78b)

Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya
The Gemora cites the conclusion of the braisa cited above: Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya said: Rabban Gamliel did not respond like this (We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old!); rather, the following was his response: It is logical that a nesuah’s sale will be void because her husband is entitled to her findings, earnings and the right to annul her vows. However, regarding an arusah, whose husband is not entitled to these rights, would you say that her sale should be void?

The Chachamim replied: My master! That is understandable if she sold the properties prior to becoming a nesuah; however, what is the halacha if she first became a nesuah and then she sold the properties?

He said to them: In this case, she is allowed to sell them or give them away and her sale would indeed be valid.

They said to him: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property? Rabban Gamliel said to them:

We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old (regarding the properties that became hers before she became a nesuah)!

The Gemora asks: But in the Mishna, the following was said: If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, and now she is a nesuah, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid (and in the braisa that we just cited, Rabban Gamliel said that she is allowed to sell them or give them away and her sale would indeed be valid)?

Rav Zevid answers: The Mishna should be emended to read that she is allowed to sell them or give them away and her sale would indeed be valid (which would be consistent with the braisa).

Rav Papa answers: The Mishna is following the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah in accordance with Rabban Gamliel (that even as an arusah, a woman is not permitted initially to sell or to give away, much less, may she do so after nisuin) and the braisa is following the opinion of Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya in accordance with Rabban Gamliel (that even a nesuah may sell or give away property that came into her possession before she became a nesuah).

The Gemora asks: If so, it will emerge that Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya follows the opinion of Beis Shamai?

The Gemora answers: This is what he was saying: Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel do not argue regarding this matter. (78b)

Rav and Shmuel
Rav and Shmuel both say: Whether the property fell to her before she became an arusah or whether they fell to her after she became an arusah, if she subsequently became a nesuah and sold the properties, the husband may extract the properties from the purchasers.

The Gemora asks: Who are they going accordsing to? This ruling is seemingly not following Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion, nor is it following Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya’s opinion?

The Gemora answers: They are following the viewpoint of “Our teachers,” for we have learned in the conclusion of the above-cited braisa: Whether the property fell to her before she became an arusah or whether they fell to her after she became an arusah, if she subsequently became a nesuah and sold the properties, the husband may extract the properties from the purchasers. (78b)

Husband Selling Nesuah’s Property
The Mishna had stated: If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, they both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, the husband may seize it from the hand of the purchasers.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t the Mishna teaching us the same halacha that we have learned as an enactment of Usha (which was decreed years after the Mishna)? For Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: In Usha they decreed that a wife who sells her melog property while her husband is alive and she dies, the husband may take the land from the purchasers (since he is regarded as a purchaser from the time of his marriage; his purchase of the property predates their purchase).

The Gemora answers: Our Mishna is dealing with the halacha of the field during her lifetime and it is referring to the produce from the land (meaning that the sale is valid, but the husband may enjoy the produce that grows from the land). The decree of Usha was dealing with the status of the land itself and it is referring to the case where the wife died (and then, the husband may seize the land from the purchasers). (78b)

Unknown Properties
The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property and property: property that is known to the husband, she may not sell, and if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is invalid. Properties that are not known to the husband, she may not sell, but if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.

The Gemora asks: What is regarded as known and what is regarded as unknown?

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: Known properties refer to land and unknown properties refer to moveables.

Rabbi Yochanan said: Both of those are regarded as known properties. Unknown properties refer to a case where the woman lives here and properties fell to her as an inheritance in a land overseas.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion: What is regarded as unknown properties? It is where the woman lives here and properties fell to her as an inheritance in a land overseas. (78b)

[END]

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Yearning to the Return to Zion

It is written [Tehillim 87:5]: And to Zion it shall be said: "this man, this man, was born in her," and He will establish her on high. (This verse is describing the future time when all the nations of the world will bring the Jews back to Zion. They will say regarding each Jew: He is a son of Zion, he was born there, let us bring him back to her.)

Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said (Kesuvos 75a): This verse is applicable to any Jew that was born in Zion and one who yearns to see her. Even Jews who were born elsewhere will be considered children of Zion, provided that they learn to return there.

I began writing the following incident when I was shown that it was already printed in Daf Digest link, so I am writing their version (with a comment or two of my own).

During World War I, Palestine was under Turkish jurisdiction and the Ottomans made life very difficult for the citizens. Press gangs would roam the streets arbitrarily drafting anyone in their wake. The conditions of these forcibly drafted soldiers were exceedingly difficult. They were subjected to hard labor, and since food was exceedingly scarce they were severely underfed.

These circumstances could all be circumvented by paying bribes to officials. However, there was one decree that was exceedingly difficult to avert. The Turks declared that anyone not born in Palestine would be deported. This was more difficult to deal with than forcible conscription, since the only way someone born out of the country could get around this was to lie on the government forms.

Since everyone knew that Rav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, zt"l,(where I saw this story brought down, it was with Rav Yosef Rogotchovi from Petach Tikva, but see below)was very careful to avoid falsehood in any form no matter what it might cost, people were afraid that he would forbid people to lie on the forms. During those difficult times, simple honesty would result in the sundering of many homes. When someone ventured to ask the Rav's opinion about this issue, he surprised everyone in the Old Yishuv. "It is certainly permitted!"

"But why is this different from any other falsehood which the Rav prohibits?" the questioner asked.

Rav Sonnenfeld explained, "This is explicit in Kesuvos 75 on the verse, 'And of Tzion it shall be said, each and every man is born therein.' The Gemora learns from the redundancy of the word "man, each and every man" that one who yearns for Tzion is as one who was born there. We see clearly that any Jew who yearns for Tzion is actually considered as one who was born in Tzion! So to write of those who came up to Tzion out of longing for her holiness that they were native citizens is no lie at all: it is a declaration of the absolute truth!"

I saw this ruling from Rav Sonnenfeld in a slightly different context. It was a question regarding people who were not born in Eretz Yisroel and they were seeking permission from the courts to emigrate to Eretz Yisroel. The courts were only granting visas to those who were born in Eretz Yisroel. Rav Sonnenfeld ruled, based on our Gemora that not only is it permitted to testify that you were born in Eretz Yisroel, but one is obligated to do so. It is not regarded as a lie at all, since one who yearns to return to Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he was born there.

The Kloizenberger Rebbe zt"l added the following: It is written that the lifespan of a person is seventy years. The Gemora in Shabbos (89b) states that the Heavenly courts do not administer punishment for the first twenty years of one's life. Consequently, it can be said that the seventy years do not begin until one is twenty years old. So too, it can be said regarding one who emigrated to Eretz Yisroel. The seventy years of his life begins only after he lives in Eretz Yisroel.

This can be proven from Rashi's commentary on the following verse [Breishis 16:3]: So Sarai, Avram's wife, took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaid, at the end of ten years of Avram's dwelling in the land of Canaan, and she gave her to Avram her husband for a wife. Rashi writes: This tells us that the time they dwelled outside of Eretz Yisroel does not count in the calculation.

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Moshe as a King

The Gemora (Kesuvos 74a) had stated: All conditions are learned out from the stipulation that Moshe made with the tribes of Gad and Reuven. (For any condition to be valid, it must be similar to that condition.) A condition that may be executed by an agent, as Moshe did there (Moshe instructed Yehoshua to act, so to speak, as his agent to give the east bank of the Jordan to them), is a valid condition. However, any stipulation that cannot be executed by an agent is not regarded as a valid condition. (Chalitzah cannot be accomplished through an agent and therefore, a stipulation cannot be attached to it.)

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: If Moshe would be giving the tribes of Gad and Reuven something that belonged to him, and he would instruct Yehoshua to act on his behalf, Yehoshua would be regarded as an agent. However, Moshe was only distributing to them land that was an inheritance to them; why should Yehoshua be considered an agent?

He answers that the land of Sichon and Og was not included in Klal Yisroel’s inheritance. Their land belonged to Moshe since it was captured by Moshe and he had the status of a king. As a king, he was allowed to take possession of this land. Moshe, out of his good-heartedness decided to give away this land to the tribes of Gad and Reuven. It emerges that the instructions to Yehoshua rendered him as an agent of Moshe.

Incidentally, I noticed an interesting Makneh in his explanation of a Gemora in Kiddushin (32b). The Gemora relates that Rabban Gamliel was serving his guests by the wedding feast for his son. The Gemora explains that a Nasi is permitted to renounce the honor that should be given to him.

The Makneh asks from the Medrash in Parshas Yisro which states that Moshe acted as the waiter for Yisro and the other guests at the feast. Why was it permissible for Moshe, who had the status of a king, to forego the honor that one is required to give to a king? The halacha is that a king is not allowed to waive this honor!

He answers by citing the source for this halacha. The Gemora (Kesuvos 17a) states that it is written [Devarim 17:15]: Surely you shall appoint a king over you. This (the double expression of som tasim) means that his awe shall be over you at all times. The Makneh explains that at the moment a king chooses to waive his honor, it is tantamount to resigning from royalty and this is not allowed, for we are commanded to enthrone a king over us continually. This is only applicable after the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisroel and were commanded to enthrone a king; however, in the Desert, although Moshe was regarded as a king, he was permitted to waive his honor and serve his guests.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 74 - Highlights

Conditions

Rav Acha bar Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If a person betrothed a woman on a condition (that she had no current vows), and he later cohabited with her (and she was later found to be in violation of that condition), there is no argument between Rav and Shmuel; they both agree that she does not require a divorce (since the marriage is completely void).

Rav Acha (Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s sister’s son) the son of Rav Ika questioned Rav Acha bar Yaakov from the following braisa: If one mistakenly performed chalitzah, it is nonetheless valid.

The Gemora asks: What is the case of the “mistaken” chalitzah?

Rish Lakish said: It is referring to a case where they told the yavam to perform chalitzah, and with that, he will be marrying her (when in fact, chalitzah accomplishes the exact opposite).

Rabbi Yochanan challenged Rish Lakish: I learned in another braisa: Whether the yavam had the intention of performing the commandment of chalitzah and she had no such intention, or whether she had such intention and he did not, chalitzah is invalid. In order for the chalitzah to be valid, they both are required to have such intention. How can you say that the chalitzah is valid?

Rather, Rabbi Yochanan explains the braisa differently: It is referring to a case where they told the yavam to perform chalitzah on the condition that the yevamah will give him two hundred zuz. The halacha is that the chalitzah is valid even if she does not end up giving him the money.

Rav Acha the son of Rav Ika explains Rabbi Yochanan’s viewpoint and then concludes his challenge. The chalitzah is valid in this case because he performed the action of chalitzah (without repeating the condition at that time – Tosfos), therefore, we may assume that he has dispensed with his stipulation (regarding the money). Here too, let us say, since he cohabited with her (without repeating the condition at that time), he has obviously dispensed with the stipulation (regarding her vows) and the marriage should take effect! (Why does Rav Acha bar Yaakov rule in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the marriage is void?)

Rav Acha bar Yaakov replies: Torah scholar! Are you in fact saying the correct reason for that halacha? (I will explain to you the real reason that the chalitzah is valid.) All conditions are learned out from the stipulation that Moshe made with the tribes of Gad and Reuven. (For any condition to be valid, it must be similar to that condition.) A condition that may be executed by an agent, as Moshe did there (Moshe instructed Yehoshua to act, so to speak, as his agent to give the east bank of the Jordan to them), is a valid condition. However, any stipulation that cannot be executed by an agent is not regarded as a valid condition. (Chalitzah cannot be accomplished through an agent and therefore, a stipulation cannot be attached to it.)

The Gemora asks: But a kiddushin through cohabitation, which cannot be executed by an agent, and nevertheless, a stipulation attached to it is a valid one!?

The Gemora answers: That is because we compare the different methods of betrothal to each other. (74a)

Betrothal by a Loan, Stipulation or with Less than a Perutah

Rav Ula bar Abba said in the name of Ula, who said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: If a man betrothed a woman by a loan (which he lent to her; such a betrothal is invalid because loaned money is given to be spent, while a betrothal cannot be valid unless money or its equivalent was actually given to the woman at the time of the betrothal) and then he cohabited with her, or if he betrothed her on a certain condition and then he cohabited with her (and the conditions were not met), or if he betrothed her with less than the value of a perutah and then he cohabited with her, she requires a get from him according to all opinions (because a man does not want his cohabitation to be rendered promiscuous).

Rav Yosef bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Menachem, who said it in the name of Rabbi Ami: If a man betrothed a woman with less than the value of a perutah and then he cohabited with her, she requires a get from him. (Seemingly, he disagrees with Rabbi Elozar regarding one who betrothed a woman by a loan or with a condition that was not fulfilled, and he holds that a get would not be required.)

The Gemora explains Rabbi Ami’s opinion: People do not make a mistake regarding the laws of betrothing with less than a value of a perutah; everyone knows that such a kiddushin is not valid and the man, obviously, cohabited with her for the sake of kiddushin; therefore, a get would be required. By the other two cases (one who betrothed a woman by a loan or with a condition that was not fulfilled), people make a mistake (and the man might assume that a kiddushin can be valid even through a loan, or even if the conditions weren’t met; therefore, the cohabitation might not have been with the proper intent for kiddushin).

Rav Kahana said in the name of Ula: If a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then he cohabited with her (and the conditions were not met), she requires a get from him. There was once such an incident, and the Rabbis did not have the strength to discharge her without a get.

The Gemora notes: This ruling excludes the opinion of the following Tanna: Rav Yehuda quoted Shmuel as saying in the name of Rabbi Yishmael that when the verse states (regarding a married woman who consents to having an affair) “and she was not forced,” it is saying that she is therefore forbidden to her husband. This implies that if she was violated, she is permitted to her (Yisrael) husband. Rebbi Yishmael derives from the word “and she” that there is a case where a different woman was not forced, and is still permitted to her husband. What is this case? It must be where her kiddushin was mistaken (such as our case; a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then he cohabited with her and the conditions were not met; if she would subsequently cohabit with another man, she would still be permitted to return to the first man because her first marriage was not valid) and even if her son is riding on her shoulder, she can pick herself up and walk away from the marriage. (74a – 74b)

Distinction between a Chacham
and a Doctor

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a man betrothed a woman on the condition that she was not under any vows and she subsequently went to a Chacham who released her from the vow, she is betrothed. If however, he betrothed her on the condition that she did not have any defects and she subsequently went to a doctor who cured her from these defects, she is nevertheless, not betrothed.

The Gemora asks: What is the difference between a Chacham and a doctor?

The Gemora answers: The Chacham annuls the vow retroactively (and it is regarded as if she never pronounced the vow), whereas the doctor only cures the defects from that moment onward.

The Gemora asks from a different braisa that states the following: If a man betrothed a woman on the condition that she was not under any vows and she subsequently went to a Chacham who released her from the vow, or if he betrothed her on the condition that she did not have any defects and she subsequently went to a doctor who cured her from these defects, she is nevertheless, not betrothed. (This contradicts the previous braisa regarding the Chacham releasing her from her vow.)

Rabbah answers: the first braisa is following the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the second braisa follows the opinion of Rabbi Elozar.

Rabbah explains: Rabbi Meir holds that a man does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law (by applying in person to the Chacham for the annulment of her vow; it is assumed, therefore, that a man has no objection to betrothing a woman who is under a vow, since she may subsequently apply to a Chacham for a disallowance). Rabbi Elozar maintains that no man wants his wife to be exposed to a court of law (consequently, if he had known that she was under a vow, he would not have betrothed her; therefore, her betrothal is invalid).

The Gemora asks: What is the source for these opinions?

The Gemora answers: We learned in a Mishna (Gittin 45b): If one divorces his wife because of a vow, he may not take her back. If he divorced her because of a bad name (it was rumored that she committed adultery), he may not take her back. (The reason for this halacha is as follows: According to one opinion, it is possible that after the woman had obtained from a Chacham the disallowance of her vow and had married another man, her first husband might regret his action in divorcing her and he might claim that he would not have divorced her had he known that her vow could be disallowed. Consequently, this might impair the validity of her second marriage. By the enactment that “he may not remarry her,” a husband is naturally induced to institute all the necessary enquiries and to consider very carefully his course before he decides upon divorce, and should he nevertheless divorce her and then claim that he was unaware that her vow could be disallowed, his plea might well be disregarded. According to another opinion, the prohibition to marry a woman in the circumstances mentioned is a penalty, and a warning to women to abstain from making vows.) Rabbi Yehudah says: If the vow was known to many, he may not take her back, but for one that was not known publicly, he may take her back. Rabbi Meir says: If it is a vow which requires examination by a Chacham (and the husband cannot annul it by himself), he may not take her back (Rabbi Meir maintains that a husband does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law and therefore forbids remarriage on account of the first reason mentioned above, since the first husband might claim that if he had known that the vow could be disallowed by a Chacham, he would not have consented to give a divorce), but for one which does not require examination by a Chacham (the husband can annul it himself), he may take her back (because in this case, the husband cannot advance the claim that the divorce was due to a misunderstanding). Rabbi Elozar said: They prohibited him to remarry in the case where the vow required examination by a Chacham to annul it only on account of the case where the vow did not require examination by a Chacham to annul it (since in the latter case, the husband might claim that he was not aware that he had the right to disallow the vow; in the former case, however, no such claim can be advanced because no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law).

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source for Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion.

The Gemora asks: How many people is considered public (that a vow pronounced in public may not be annulled)?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: Three people.

Rav Yitzchak said: Ten people. (74b – 75a)

[END]

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A Legitimate Marital Act,not a Promiscuous One

It was taught: If a person betrothed a woman on a condition (that she had no current vows), and he later married her without mentioning that condition (and she was later found to be in violation of that condition), there is an argument between Rav and Shmuel. Rav says that she requires a divorce, while Shmuel argues that she does not require a divorce.

Abaye states: Do not say that the reasoning of Rav is that because he married her without mentioning the condition he must have forgone the stipulation. Rather, Rav’s reasoning is that a person does not make his marital relations into promiscuity.

The Rishonim ask: The cohabitation in this case is anyways a promiscuous, non-marital cohabitation! This is because we learned previously (54b) that if anyone reduces the prescribed kesuvah amount from his wife, any acts of cohabitation is regarded as promiscuous. In our case, she does forfeit her kesuvah since the husband stipulated that she should not be under any vows, and since it emerged that she is under a vow, he would not be obligated to pay her kesuvah! Accordingly, what advantage is there that he does not want his cohabitation to be a promiscuous one (and therefore, the betrothal is valid), it is anyways regarded as a promiscuous one?

The Ran answers: A person is particular that he will not intentionally render his cohabitation to be regarded as a promiscuous one. However, he is not particular if the Rabbis render his cohabitation to be promiscuous (and it is the Rabbis who deemed it to e a promiscuous cohabitation, when he cohabits with a wife without a kesuvah).

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 73 - Highlights

Betrothal on Condition

It was taught: If a person betrothed a woman on a condition (that she had no current vows), and he later married her without mentioning that condition (and she was later found to be in violation of that condition), there is an argument between Rav and Shmuel. Rav says that she requires a divorce, while Shmuel argues that she does not require a divorce.

Abaye states: Do not say that the reasoning of Rav is that because he married her without mentioning the condition he must have forgone the stipulation. Rather, Rav’s reasoning is that a person does not make his marital relations into promiscuity.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rav and Shmuel already have such an argument? It was taught: A minor was married off by her brother or mother in a Rabbinical marriage in her youth, and stayed married to her first husband, and had marital relations with him even once she became older. She then did mi’un (refused the Rabbinical marriage) and married someone else. Rav says: She does not require a divorce from the second person (as she is still married to the first person). Shmuel states: She does require a divorce from her second husband.

[The Gemora presumes that their argument is regarding the status of their marital relations when she became older. Did the first husband have relations when she became older in order to do a Torah betrothal (not just Rabbinical as it was previously), or was this just a continuation of the first marriage? This could fit into the argument of whether or not a person will allow his marital relations to retroactively be deemed promiscuity.]

The Gemora answers: Both arguments are necessary. If Rav would have only discussed the argument regarding the minor, one might think that this is because she did not violate any condition. However, where there was a clear violation of a condition Rav might agree to Shmuel that she does not even require a divorce. Similarly, if the case regarding conditions was the only one stated, perhaps only there Shmuel said a divorce is unnecessary. However, in the case regarding the marriage of the minor, perhaps he would agree to Rav that she does not need a divorce. This is why both arguments are necessary. (72b – 73a)

Challenging Shmuel

The Mishna states: If a person married a woman without conditions, and he found that she had existing vows, he can divorce her without giving her a kesuvah. The Gemora asks: This implies that while she does not receive a kesuvah, she does require a divorce. It must be that this is a case of where he betrothed her on condition and married her without mentioning the condition, and this is inconsistent with the ruling of Shmuel that she does not require a divorce!

The Gemora answers: No, the case is where the entire betrothal and marriage was done without conditions. If the betrothal was on such a condition and the marriage was not, she indeed would not require a divorce.

The Gemora asks: Instead of the Mishna giving a case of a betrothal done on the condition a woman has no existing vows, and saying that if the condition was violated the betrothal was invalid, the Mishna should merely say that if a person marries a woman and she is found to have vows the marriage is invalid. We would certainly know that in a case where the condition was mentioned upon betrothal that the marriage is invalid!

The Gemora answers: The Mishna indeed means to say this in the following manner. If a person betrothed a woman on the condition that she had no vows and he later married her without mentioning that condition, the betrothal is invalid. If the betrothal and marriage is done without condition and it is found that she has vows, she can be divorced without a kesuvah. This implies correctly that although she does not need a kesuvah, she does require a divorce. (73a – 73b)

Distinction between Kesuvah
and a Get

The Gemora asks: What is the difference? Why should she require a divorce but nor receive a kesuvah? The Gemora answers: It is because he says, “I cannot live with a woman who makes vows.”

The Gemora asks: If so, let her not require a divorce as well! Rabbah answers: She only requires a Rabbinical divorce. This is also the opinion of Rav Chisda. Rava says: The Rabbis were unsure if she requires a divorce, and therefore were lenient about the husband’s monetary kesuvah obligation, but were strict that she should receive a divorce (which has halachic ramifications). (73b)

A Betrothal in Error

Rabbah states: The argument (of Rav and Shmuel) is only regarding one who betroths two women in a possibly mistaken fashion. [The case is where he makes a condition with the first that she has no vows, but he married the second lady without mentioning anything. Rav would say that he perhaps liked the second one so much he didn’t care if she had vows, while Shmuel would say his mindset is clearly that he does not want wives with vows.] However, in a case where he made their betrothal conditional but did not mention the condition by the marriage, everyone (even Rav) agrees that he relented on his condition.

Abaye asked: Our Mishna is clearly talking about one woman, and we asked a question on Shmuel above from this Mishna!

The Gemora answers: It must be that this is what Rabbah meant to say. Their argument is regarding a case of one woman but similar to a mistake by two women. [The case is where the betrothal was on condition; he then divorced her before marrying her, and then betrothed her and married her without condition.] However, in a regular case where the betrothal is with a condition and the marriage is unconditional, everyone agrees he relented on his condition.

Abaye asked: The Beraisa states that if a betrothal was a mistake, or done with less than a perutah (small coin), the betrothal was done by a minor, even if he later sent presents to his “fiancé” (when he became older or in any of the cases above), the betrothal is invalid. This is because the presents are an extension of the original invalid betrothal. However, if the couple engage in marital relations, the betrothal is valid. Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Even if they have marital relations the betrothal is invalid. In this case, Abaye asks, the question is regarding one woman, and we see they still argue! [Rav and Shmuel should also argue in such a case!]

The Gemora continues: The case above (mistaken betrothal) must be where he thought that she did not have vows! The Gemora answers: No, it is talking about the case where the betrothal was done with less than a perutah.

The Gemora asks: This cannot be the case of mistaken betrothal mentioned in the Beraisa, as that case is mentioned separately in the Beraisa! The Gemora answers: It is as if the Beraisa stated, “What is a case of mistaken betrothal? Someone who does betrothal with less than a perutah.”

The Gemora asks: What is the reasoning behind the argument in the Beraisa? The Gemora answers: One opinion (Tana Kama) holds that a person knows that betrothal with less than a perutah is invalid. Therefore, when he had marital relations, he had in mind to have a real betrothal. The other (Rabbi Shimon) says that a person doesn’t realize that betrothal cannot be done with less than a perutah. Therefore, when he has marital relations, he does so based upon what he thinks was already a valid betrothal (and he has no intent that this should be a valid betrothal).

The Gemora asks from a Beraisa: If a man says “I will have marital relations (betrothal) with you on condition that my father approves,” the betrothal is valid even if his father does not approve. Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi Yehuda states in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father approves, the betrothal is valid. If not, it is invalid. Isn’t this a case where only one woman is involved and yet they argue?

The Gemora answers: They are arguing about the following. One opinion says that the condition meant that as long as his father is quiet about it, the betrothal is valid. The father was indeed quiet, therefore the betrothal is valid. The other opinion says that the condition meant that verbal approval was needed from the father, and the father remained quiet. Therefore the betrothal is invalid. (73b)


[END]

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Sheitels

The Mishna had stated: And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered.

The Gemora (Kesuvos 72a) asks: Isn’t going out with her hair uncovered a Biblical prohibition?

The Gemora answers: Biblically, it would have been sufficient if she had covered her head with a head-basket (where some of her hair would have shown through the spaces; the Jewish custom would require a complete covering).

The Rambam seems to say that even if the basket covered her hair completely, Jewish practice mandated that she should also wear a shawl that would drape over her body.

The Chasam Sofer writes that the purpose of this shawl was to cover the hairs that protrude from under the head covering.

The Beis Yosef cites a Rashba, who rules that the wife’s hair, which is common to stick out from under the covering, is not regarded as an ervah to the husband if the husband is accustomed to seeing that hair and he would be permitted to recite kerias shema in such a situation.

The Chasam Sofer writes further that the shawl’s purpose is to cover even those hears which protrude from her head covering. However, the hairs that still stick out are not regarded as being an ervah to the husband.

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