Nezirus Shimshon

It is evident from our Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 14a) that one cannot nullify a nezirus Shimshon. If so, our version of hataras nedarim (the nullification of our vows) that we recite on Erev Rosh Hashanah is very problematic. We state explicitly that we are petitioning the Beis Din to annul all of our nedarim and nezirus, and even a nezirus Shimshon! How can it be nullified?

The Pischei Teshuvah (Y.D. 139:6), based on this question writes that our version is an erroneous one.

However, the Nitzotzei Ohr cites a Minchas Chinuch (368), who says in the name of the Leket Hakemach that nezirus Shimshon cannot be nullified only if the nezirus had begun already; however, if it did not start yet (i.e. he said, “I will be a nazir Shimshon in twenty days”), it may be annulled. On Erev Rosh Hashanah, we are petitioning the Beis Din to annul any future vows of nezirus that we may utter.

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Moshe's Death and Nezirus on Shabbos

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 14a): inquires: What is the halacha if he said, “like Moshe on the seventh of Adar”? (Is he referring to Moshe’s birthday – a day of celebration, and then, he would not be declaring himself as a nazir; or perhaps, he was referring to the day that Moshe died – a day of sorrow, and then, he would be declaring himself as a nazir?)

Tosfos writes that on the day that Moshe died, there were presumably many Jews who declared a vow of nezirus because of their sorrow.

The Ben Poras asks: Behold, Moshe died on Shabbos! (Tosfos in Menachos (30a) cites a dispute regarding this. Some say that he died on a Friday.) How was it permitted for them to accept a vow of nezirus on Shabbos? He explains: The Rama Mipano rules that a Kohen Gadol cannot be anointed with the anointing oil on Shabbos because this oil renders him holy, and this would be regarded as tikkun gavra (repairing him, which would be forbidden on Shabbos). Accordingly, it should be forbidden for one to accept nezirus on Shabbos, for with his vow, he becomes holy!

He answers that since it is possible to have the nezirus annulled, and he is not a permanent nazir, it is not regarded as a tikkun gavra.

The Pardes Yosef answers that they accepted nezirus on Motzoei Shabbos; not on Shabbos. This would certainly be congruent with the opinion who holds that he died at sunset towards the conclusion of Shabbos. It is for this reason that we recite the tefillah of tzidkascha tzedek by Mincha on Shabbos.

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Son, but not a Daughter

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 13a): If someone says: “I will be a nazir when I will have a son,” he becomes a nazir when he has a son. If he has a daughter, or a tumtum (no signs of gender), or an androgynous (signs of both genders), he does not become a nazir.

Tosfos explains: He declares the nezirus in this manner as a way of thanking Hashem for providing him with a son.

The Beis Yosef explains that according to Tosfos, it is understandable why the Mishna said “a son,” and not “a daughter,” for otherwise, we would have said that the Mishna was not precise with its wording.

The Mabit (1:120) adds that if he would have a daughter, he would not be a nazir, for he is saddened that he had a daughter and not a son. In general though, a daughter would be included when he says, “a son.”

The Meiri writes that the explanation of the Mishna is as follows: Even though the word “son” connotes any child, and not necessarily a son, but its primary meaning suggests a male child.

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Daughter, not a Tumtum

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 13a)states: If someone says: “I will be a nazir when I will have a son,” he becomes a nazir when he has a son. If he has a daughter, or a tumtum (no signs of gender), or an androgynous (signs of both genders), he does not become a nazir.

Tosfos explains that he does not regard a tumtum or an androgynous as his son.

The Maaseh Rokeach wonders what would be the halacha if he said, “I will be a nazir when I will have a daughter,” and he has a daughter, or a tumtum, or an androgynous. Do we say that he is not a nazir, for his condition was not met? Or perhaps, he will be a nazir, for when he said “a daughter,” he meant “when he will be built up,” and he is considered “built” with a son, tumtum or androgynous. Although the Gemora said that he does not mean, “when he will be built up,” perhaps that is only when he declared to be a nazir on the condition that he will have a son, but if he said, “when I will have a daughter,” perhaps they would be included, for it changed for the better (when his wife gives birth to a son)?

The Keren Orah writes that whether he says, “when I will have a son” or if he says, “when I will have a daughter,” a tumtum will not be included. Even if he says, “I will be a nazir when I have a son or a daughter,” and his wife gives birth to a tumtum or an androgynous, he will not be a nazir.

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Clear Expression

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 13a) states: If he says, “I will be a nazir when I will have a child,” he becomes a nazir even if he has a daughter, tumtum, or an androgynous.

If his wife miscarries (a child was born and died soon afterwards; we are uncertain if the baby was full term or not), he is not a nazir. Rabbi Shimon says: He should say the following (he rules that he is a nazir out of doubt; the problem is that if he is not a nazir, he is forbidden from shaving his head and he is not allowed to bring a korban chatas): “If the child was viable, I am already a nazir for my previous obligation, but if not, I am voluntary declaring myself to be a nazir.”

The Rishonim explain that if he would not make such a condition, he would remain a questionable nazir for the rest of his life. He would be forbidden to shave, drink wine or become tamei to the dead.

The Brisker Rav explains that that this is not a deficiency in the halacha of hafla’ah (clear expression) that there is by nezirus. A clear expression of nezirus is required in order to accept an obligation of nezirus on oneself. Here, there is a clear acceptance of nezirus, and of that, there is no issue. The question arises only because he stipulated a time for the nezirus to take effect, and we are uncertain if the condition was met. This is why he would remain a questionable nazir for the rest of his life unless he utilizes Rabbi Shimon’s ploy.

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Eliezer’s Wit

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 11b - 12a) states: One who tells his agent, “Go and betroth a woman for me” (and the agent died), the man is prohibited from marrying any woman in the world because there is a presumption that the agent accomplished that which he was asked to do.

The Mefaresh explains: Since the man did not specify a particular woman for him to marry and we do not know which woman he betrothed, this man may not marry any woman, for we are concerned that the woman he wishes to marry is the mother, or daughter, or sister of the woman that the agent married for him.

The Mahari Asad uses this Gemara to answer the following questions: Avraham Avinu sent his servant Eliezer to find a suitable wife for his son, Yitzchak. Eliezer went to the house of Besuel. The Torah writes: And he (Besuel) placed food in front of him (Eliezer) to eat, and he (Eliezer) said, “I cannot eat until I have spoken my words.”

Why didn’t Eliezer want to discuss with Besuel the instructions that Avraham, his master gave him before he ate?

Chazal say that Besuel intended to kill Eliezer by poisoning his food. What did Besuel hope to accomplish with that?

He explains: Besuel knew that if Eliezer would die, Yitzchak would be forbidden to all women in the world, for each and every woman might be the relative of the woman to whom Eliezer betrothed. This is why Besuel wanted Eliezer dead. Eliezer understood this and therefore refused to eat until he had spoken. He informed Besuel that Avraham gave him specific instructions that he should only take a wife for Yitzchak from his own family. Accordingly, even if Eliezer would die without notifying Avraham whom he betrothed, Yitzchak would only be forbidden to the women in his own family, but he would be permitted to all other women in the world. He was telling Besuel that he would not be accomplishing much by murdering him.

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Conditions

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 11a) states: If one says, “I am hereby a nazir on the condition that I will drink wine and become tamei to the dead,” he is a nazir and all the prohibitions apply to him.

The Gemora explains: Everyone agrees to this halacha, for he is stipulating “against that which the Torah states and such conditions are null and void.

Tosfos asks: Why was it necessary for the Gemara to state this reason? The Gemora could have said the following: There is a principle that anything which cannot be performed through an agent, cannot take effect with a condition either. Since nezirus cannot be accomplished through an agent, it should not take effect with any condition (even if the stipulation is not against that which is written in the Torah)!

Tosfos answers: Since others are able to bring the korbanos for him, nezirus is regarded as something that can be performed through an agent.

The Gerrer Rebbe (Pnei Menachem in the sefer Torascha Shasu’oy) uses this Tosfos to answer the following question: It is written [Breishis 28: 20 – 21]: And Yaakov uttered a vow, saying, “If God will be with me, and He will guard me on this way, upon which I am going, and He will give me bread to eat and a garment to wear; and if I return in peace to my father’s house, and the Lord will be my God. A neder cannot be fulfilled through an agent, so a conditional neder should not take effect!

According to our Tosfos, he suggests as follows: A neder with respect to hekdesh may be performed through an agent. One person can consecrate something for his fellow. Although Yaakov’s neder was not a neder regarding hekdesh; since nedarim in general could be performed through an agent, all nedarim may take effect even with a condition attached.

The Ramban answers Tosfos’ question by saying that the principle of “anything which cannot be performed through an agent, cannot take effect with a condition either” only applies by something that a person does with his fellow. However, when a person stipulates a condition with himself, the condition is valid and takes effect even though all of the guidelines effecting conditions are not met. Since by nazir, his condition is only relevant to himself, the condition takes effect even though nezirus cannot be performed through an agent.

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Talking Cow

The Mishna had stated (Daf Yomi: Nazir 10a): If one said, “This cow said, ‘I am hereby a nazir if I stand up,’” or he said, “This door said, ‘I am hereby a nazir if I open’” (the Gemara will explain these cases), Beis Shamai says: He is a nazir. Beis Hillel says: He is not a nazir.

The Gemora asks: Does a cow talk?

The Gemora suggests different interpretations of the Mishna. It is noteworthy that Tosfos cites Rabbeinu Peretz saying that the Mishna is discussing a case where the cow actually did talk!

There are numerous times in Chazal that we find a statement that would seem to indicate that a tree, animal or even an inanimate object was speaking. The Gemora in Sanhedrin (108b) records a conversation that Noach had with the raven. The Gemora Eruvin (18b) relates what the dove told to Noach. The Yerushalmi in Sanhedrin (2:6) discusses the complaint of the letter yud before the Ribbono shel Olam (that he was removed from Saray’s name).

The Maharatz Chiyus in his introduction to the Ein Yaakov states that Chazal do not mean to say that the animal’s or letters were actually talking; rather, they are relating what they could have claimed if they would have been given the power of speech.

However, Reb Boruch Epstien in his notes on the Pardes Yosef (58) cites our Tosfos, which seems to say otherwise.

Reb Yaakov Emden comments that it would appear from our Gemora that if the cow would have been able to talk, the Mishna would be understandable. He asks: What would it accomplish if the cow had the ability to speak in the same manner as Bilam’s donkey? Can a person become a nazir because of the animal’s declaration? Even if another human would declare that his fellow should be a nazir, he wouldn’t be a nazir!

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Ruling Leniently by a Nazir; Even Nowadays

The braisa states (Nazir 8a): If someone said that he will be a nazir on condition that in this silo there are one hundred kur (type of measurement), and it was found out that some of the grain was stolen or lost and there is therefore no way of knowing for sure how much grain was there, Rabbi Shimon says he must be a nazir as a doubt of nezirus is resolved stringently.

Rabbi Yehudah said: He does not have to be a nazir, as a doubt of nezirus is resolved leniently.

The Mefaresh explains that we do not rule that he should be a nazir based upon our uncertainty, since we do not want that he should offer unconsecrated sacrifices (if he is actually not a nazir) into the Beis Hamikdosh upon conclusion of his nezirus.

It should emerge, according to this logic, that nowadays, when there are no korbanos, and the aforementioned concern is not applicable, Rabbi Yehudah should agree that we should rule stringently that he is a nazir.

However, the Maharam Mipadava (71) writes that we find many places that the ruling does not change because perhaps the Beis Hamikdosh will be built the following day. So too, here, we say that the Beis Hamikdosh might be built the following day, and he will be bringing unconsecrated offerings into the Beis Hamikdosh. Therefore, the ruling remains that he is not regarded as a nazir.

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A Short Term of Nezirus

The Mishna states (Nazir 7a) : If one says, “I am hereby a nazir for one large period,” or “I am hereby a nazir for one small period,” or “from here until the end of the world,” he is a nazir for thirty days.

The Meiri explains that when he said “one small period,” he meant to accept a nezirus less than thirty days; and when he said “one large period,” he meant to accept a nezirus longer than thirty days.

Tosfos explains differently: When he said “one small period,” he meant that the observance of the laws of nezirus is easy for him; it is not a bother for him at all. When he said, “one large period,” he meant that an abstinence of thirty days seems to him as a very long time and is a burden upon him.

The Mishna Lemelech asks: Why did Tosfos not explain like the Meiri?

The Be’er Moshe answers: Tosfos wanted the two cases to be similar. Just like by the case of “the large period,” he meant that it is difficult for him, so too, in the case of “the small period,” he meant that it would be easy for him.

The Birchas Rosh writes that there is a practical halachic difference between the two explanations. If one would say, “I am hereby a nazir for one large period and for one small period.” According to Tosfos, he will be required to observe two periods of nezirus. However, according to the Meiri that “a small period” means a nezirus less than thirty days, it will be regarded as if he said, “I am a nazir and one day,” where the halacha is that he will be a nazir for thirty-one days.

Reb Moshe Mordechai Halevi Shulzinger writes that there can be another difference according to that which the Minchas Chinuch (368:4) states: If one accepts to become a nazir for one day, although he is obligated to observe a nezirus for thirty days, nevertheless, the prohibition against violating his word is only applicable for one day. According to the Meiri, when one said, “I am hereby a nazir for a small period,” he is only accepting for one day. Although the halacha is that he is a nazir for thirty days, the prohibition against violating his vow will only be applicable for one day. However, according to Tosfos, he is accepting an ordinary nezirus; he is just saying that it is easy for him. Accordingly, the prohibition against violating his word will apply for the entire nezirus.

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Thirty Day Extreme

The Mishna (Nazir 5a) states: An ordinary nezirus is for thirty days (if he doesn’t specify for how long he wishes to be a nazir, he is a nazir for thirty days; he also cannot specify for any time less than thirty days).

The Ram”a (Toras Ha’olah) explains the significance of the thirty days. The Gemora had stated: Whoever sees a sotah when she is being degraded should restrain himself from consuming wine. The nazir wishes to inspire himself that he should not be influenced by the sotah’s immoral behavior. For one to break a trait which is at one extreme, he should go to the opposite extreme. Eventually, after practicing this condition for some time, he will balance out to the correct measure. This is why the nazir abstains from drinking any wine.

We find that situations are established after thirty days. Halacha states that it takes thirty days for one to become accustomed to a change in davening. If one is uncertain if he inserted a certain prayer during Shemoneh Esrei, after thirty days of recital, we can assume that he said it. One is regarded as a resident of a city after he lives there for thirty days. So too, the Ram”a suggests, this can be applicable to a change in one’s character traits. Someone who wishes to be cured from his desires to act immorally should become a nazir for thirty days. Practicing this extreme for thirty days will enable him to reach the perfect balance in this area.

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Partial Day as a Minimizer

The Gemora (Nazir 5b) stated that Rav Masna maintains that the Tanna of the Mishna would hold that part of a day is like the entire day and therefore, a nazir may shave on the thirtieth day, even though his nezirus is not complete until the conclusion of the day.

Reb Yosef Engel asks that the Rema Mipano asserts that with respect to things involving sanctity, we do not say that part of a day is like the entire day. This is why it is not sufficient to observe Shabbos and Yom Tov for only part of the day, and on the contrary, we add on in the beginning and upon its conclusion. If so, how could our Gemora say that this principle applies by a nazir? Shouldn’t nezirus be included in halachos involving sanctity?

He answers that since a nazir is referred to as a sinner because of his abstaining from permissible things through a vow, we therefore apply the rule that a part of the day is regarded as the entire day, in order to minimize his sin (by decreasing the amount of time that he would have been required to observe for his nezirus).

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Maharal on the Yetzer Hora

By Rabbi Shaya Karlinsky

That man's yetzer harah exists only as a result of his arrogance is alluded to by the Rabbis in a number of places. In Nedarim (9b) Shimon HaTzaddik said: I have never partaken from a Nazir sacrifice, except for one time. Once, a person came from the south (at the conclusion of his nazir period) and I saw that he was very handsome, with his hair arranged in long curls. I said to him: My son, why did you see fit to destroy such beautiful hair? (A nazir must cut off all his hair at the end of the nazir period. By undertaking to become a nazir, he ensured that all his hair would have to be cut off.) He said to me: "I was a shepherd for my father in my home town, and I once went to draw water from the spring. As I looked at my reflection, my yetzer harah surged forth in an effort to distract me and undermine my existence. (The commentary attributed to Rashi explains that when he saw how handsome he was, his yetzer harah wanted to seduce him to improper behaviours.) I said: 'Evil one! How can you be arrogant in a world that is not yours, trying to incite one who is destined to become a worm (in the grave). I swear that I will shear you for the sake of Heaven.'" Immediately, I (Shimon HaTzadik) stood up and kissed him on his forehead and said to him "My son, there should be many more Jews like you who commit to a nazir period. It is those like you to whom the Torah refers in the verse 'A man who will make a nazir oath, for the sake of G-d (Bamidbar 6:2)'."

We see that when the man saw how handsome he was (leading to a feeling of arrogance) the yetzer harah was immediately aroused, with the intention of distracting him and leading him astray in order to undermine his existence. For this is the goal of the yetzer harah: To destroy a structure which has a stable existence. When the structure is already in a tenuous state, there is no need to undermine it further, and the yetzer harah leaves it alone. This young man recognized how vulnerable he was to the yetzer harah, and in order to remove (and undermine) the source of his arrogance (which he understood as being the breeding ground for the yetzer harah, and caused by a lack of sufficient clarity of his dependency on G-d) he vowed to cut off his hair for the sake of Heaven. (How much of our arrogance is caused by unwarranted attention given to our appearance? How much of that attention is caused by our need to cover up our own feelings of insecurity?) It was for this reason that Shimon HaTzadik praised him with the blessing that there should be more Jews who undertake neziruth for these pure motivations, and applied the phrase "an oath for the sake of Heaven" to this person.

Normally a person vows neziruth out of remorse for a sin that he committed. But as the neziruth drags on, he may come to regret the neziruth itself, as it becomes more difficult than he anticipated. This regret is even more likely when the person began the neziruth out of feelings of remorse for an earlier act, indicating that his decisions are frequently subject to vacillation. Just as he swung from a sinful act to an act of self-denial, it is possible that, as the difficulty of the neziruth weighs on him, he will once again change his mind.

But this young man wasn't motivated by any regret, making his neziruth purely for the sake of Heaven. (When the source of activity is reactive, it embodies the potential for regret, and is also built on personal motivations - in this case, the desire to protect himself from damage and to eliminate guilt. So the element of lshaim shamayim, for the sake of Heaven, is lacking. When one's behavior is proactive, as it was in the case of the young man in our story, the motivation is to reach beyond the level at which he finds himself, out of an altruistic desire to elevate himself to become closer to G-d. We have discussed in a number of the shiurim the difference between service of G-d out of love and out of fear. Service out of fear includes a dimension of personal motivation. You are afraid of what will happen to you if you don't do the right thing. Service out of love is purely altruistic, and is therefore on a much higher level. This also has relevance to chumroth, adapting halachic stringencies. The Mahral in Chapter 1 indicates that the proper motivation for these stringencies is an intense love of G-d, with the desire to reach higher spiritual levels in order to come closer to Him. Too often, however, people are motivated to increase stringencies out of fear and self-centered motivations.)

(The Maharal will now elaborate on how each element of the young man's story reflected the purity of his motivations, and the fact that he was not acting in a way in which future regret was likely.)

The reason it mentions that he "came from the south," which is a long distance (from Jerusalem, where the nazir sacrifice was brought) is to emphasize that the person knew when he made the vow that he would have to travel that long distance to bring the sacrifices. This diminished the likelihood that the great distance he would have to travel would subsequently cause him to regret that he took the vow. Only unanticipated difficulties, those which a person rarely experiences, such as abstaining from wine for a significant time, raise the possibility of later regret.

The reason that it mentions that he was "a shepherd for his father in his home town" is because the yetzer harah besets a person when he is idle instead of being involved in productive activity. If the young man's yetzer harah was aroused due to his own idleness, then he would have been responsible for having invited the yetzer harah to entice him. Activities which would then be necessary to neutralize that self-inflicted yetzer harah could not be termed "for the sake of Heaven," but would have been a protective measure taken for his own welfare, in response to his own negligence. Therefore, it was significant that he had been a shepherd (a productive activity), not wasting his time in an idle way and not making himself vulnerable to the yetzer harah. Furthermore, the work of being a shepherd was being done for his father, so he was involved in a mitzvah (honoring his father) further insulating him from the yetzer harah. In addition, the task was being done in his home town, where he felt subject to the influence and authority of his father (which enhances humility, further insulating him from the yetzer harah) . Had he been far away from his home, he may have felt the desire and the ability to resist the authority his father, creating a sense of independence and arrogance, inviting the control of the yetzer harah. A neziruth made to in response to a feeling of independence and arrogance would not be judged purely "for the sake of Heaven." (When a person travels away from home, there is a common tendency to lower our inhibitions compared to the way we would behave at home. This is true for young men and women going away to university or camp, and for adults away on vacation or a business trip. This is an important and very relevant insight that we have from the Maharal's explanation.

But the young man did nothing to induce the yetzer harah. Rather it came upon in an unexpected way, as he unexpectedly saw his reflection in the pond and realized how handsome he was, inducing an urge to show off this beauty. This attack by the yetzer harah was no fault of his, and the response to become a nazir, resulting in his cutting off his hair, was purely "for the sake of Heaven."

(In order to fully to understand the connections being made by the Maharal, we again need to focus on the difference between serving G-d out of love and out of fear, which we discussed in the first chapter, especially in Mishna 3. Most dependable people will intervene to rectify a situation for which they feel responsible, with an element of ego being one of the motivating forces. So in the case where the individual was responsible for creating his vulnerability to the yetzer harah, the response to neutralize that yetzer harah can be viewed as having a self-centered component. But when someone observes a situation for which he has no responsibility, he will only take action to rectify a problem if he feels a connection to the outcome on a transcendent level. You look to help a loved one without examining how the situation developed, because of your love and commitment to that person. It is an altruistic and giving perspective. When someone finds himself in a situation where he has a legitimate excuse for inaction, the motivation for taking action is on a higher plane than action taken when one will be blamed for a negative outcome. So, when our young man found himself beset by the yetzer harah through no fault of his own, it would have been very easy to succumb to that yetzer harah. His proactive response, not looking for excuses but looking to do what needed to be done to fulfill the will of G-d, is the result of "service out of love," and is why Shimon HaTzakik referred to this as a nezirut that was purely "for the sake of Heaven," motivated by something that transcends the individual.)

From every element of this story, we see that the source of the yetzer harah is arrogance, with the goal of distracting man from the purpose of his existence in the world, leading to his ultimate destruction.

The class is taught by Rabbi Shaya Karlinsky, Dean of Darche Noam Institutions, Yeshivat Darche Noam/Shapell's and Midreshet Rachel for Women.

http://www.torah.org/learning/maharal/p3m1part2.html

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Humility

By Rabbi Yosef Levinson

The Torah details the laws which apply to one who makes a vow to be a nazir. He must refrain from drinking wine and eating fresh grapes and raisins, grapeseeds and skins. He may not shave his hair; rather he must let it grow long. A nazir may also not defile himself by coming in contact with a corpse. And when the term of his vow has ended, and the nazir wishes to revert to his former life, he must first shave off all his hair and then bring korbanos, offerings, to Hashem. In total, there are ten mitzvos pertaining to the nazir (Sefer Hachinuch Mitzvos 368:377).

The mitzvos which are enumerated in the parsha of nazir were given by Hashem in order to provide a means of self-sanctification for one who wishes to do so. The Chinuch (mitzva 374) writes that by abstaining from wine, one breaks his desires and humbles himself. (While one's main focus should be on spiritual pursuits, nevertheless one should not ignore his physical needs. Abstaining from wine allows the nazir to break his desires in a manner that is not detrimental to his health, Sefer HaChinuch, ibid.)

The Chinuch adds that this is also why the nazir must let his hair grow long. By not concerning himself with his appearance, he humbles himself. Similarly, the nazir shaves his hair completely at the end of his nazirus because there is no doubt that either, extremely long hair or totally bald distorts the appearance of man.

The Chinuch proves that the purpose for growing the hair is to subdue the yetzar hara, evil inclination from the following anecdote recorded in the Gemara (Nedarim 9b). "Shimon Hatzaddik (who was the Kohen Gadol) related that once a certain nazir appeared before him. The man had beautiful eyes, was very good looking and his locks were arranged in curls. Shimon Hatzaddik asked him: 'Why do you make a vow of nazirus, which necessitates that you destroy your beautiful hair?' (For he will be required to shave his head at the end of his nazirus.) The man replied: 'I was a shepherd for my father. Once I went to draw water from the well and gazed at my reflection in the water. My yetzer hara seized me and wished to drive me from the world. I said - Rasha (wicked one), why are you conceited in a world that is not yours, with one who is destined to be consumed by maggots and worms? I swear that I will shave you for the sake of Heaven.' "

The Steipler Gaon, HaRav Y. Y. Kanievsky zt"l observes that although the shepherd did not mention the sin that the yetzer hara was enticing him to transgress, nevertheless from his response to himself, we see that he was concerned lest he become conceited. Indeed there is nothing that can drive one from both this world and the next, other than ga'ava, haughtiness. As it is written: "It is an abomination to Hashem, all who are haughty in their heart (Mishlei 16:5)." Chazal also say that regarding one who is conceited, Hashem says: "I and him cannot live in the world together" (Sota 5a). The Shechina departs from a ba'al ga'ava and he is left to his own defenses to combat his yetzer hara and survive in this world.

The Steipler continues that when one is praised for his accomplishments, he is overjoyed. At times, he might let this joy "go to his head" and he begins thinking that he is deserving of honor. One must be wary lest he fall into the trap of haughtiness. We see how this shepherd trembled when he saw his handsome features and realized that it might lead him to ga'ava. He therefore took an oath of nazirus.

HaRav Yerucham Levovitz zt"l points out that growing one's hair can have the opposite effect and can lead to ga'ava as is evident from Shimon Hatzaddik's story. It all depends on one's intent. One may become obsessed with his appearance and become conceited. Hashem despises such a person. On the other hand, if one lets his hair grow so that he appears disheveled, he will be humbled. Such an individual is Kadosh L'Hashem, holy to Hashem. Moreover, the hair itself becomes kadosh. This is meant literally - the law states that it is forbidden to derive pleasure from the hair of a nazir. Thus, the status of the nazir's hair is similar to the status of Kodashim (articles sanctified for the Beis Hamikdash).

This is the lesson of the nazir. We must realize the significance of humility. In addition, the nazir teaches us that we have the ability to elevate and sanctify ourselves. If by abstaining from wine and letting one's hair grow, a nazir is sanctified, all the more so, one who sincerely undertakes to improve himself and tackle his desires and bad character traits, is Kadosh and beloved to Hashem.

Daf Hashavua Kollel Beth HaTalmud Copyright (c) 2002 by Rabbi Yosef Levinson and reprinted here with permission

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A Virtuous Nazir and Food for Thought

The Gemora (Nazir 4b) states: A nedavah for nezirus is regarded as virtuous in cases such that of Shimon the Righteous (a great Kohen Gadol who served in the beginning of the second Beis Hamikdosh). For we learned in a braisa: Shimon the Righteous said, “I never ate from the meat of an asham sacrifice offered by a nazir who had become tamei except for one case. There was once a handsome young man from the south with beautiful eyes and locks of hair arranged in curls (who had become tamei and came to the Beis Hamikdosh to have his hair removed and to offer the required sacrifice). I asked him why he had taken upon himself a vow to become a nazir, which would eventually lead to having such beautiful hair removed (even if he would have completed his term of nezirus without becoming tamei, a nazir shaves his head upon completion). He responded to me, ‘I was a shepherd for my father and one day I went to a spring to fill my pail of water and saw my reflection in the water. My evil inclination suddenly tempted me to take advantage of my looks and wished to drive me out from this world. I said to my evil inclination: Wicked one! Why are you being so haughty in a world that is not yours, with one that in the future will be worms and maggots? I swore at that time to become a nazir.’ I was so impressed (by his piety) that I kissed him on his head and said to him, May there be more vowers of nezirus like you in Israel.”

The question that is asked is why the young man with the locks of hair arranged in curls did not simply go to a barber for a haircut to remove this temptation.

Rabbi Mendel Weinbach answers that on the way to the barber he was likely to change his mind and give in to temptation. The only solution was to immediately take upon himself a vow of nezirus which would eventually force him to eliminate his hair and the problems that accompanied it.

Food for Thought

*** What was the necessity to state that the nazir came from the south? What difference did it make where he came from?

*** How was he permitted to look at his reflection in the water; isn’t it forbidden for a man to look at a mirror?

*** Why connection is there between the “haughtiness” of the evil inclination and the temptation to sin?

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Nazir and Fasting on Shabbos

The Gemora asks: [Why does the Mishna assume that beautiful means “nazir?”] Perhaps it means that he will perform mitzvos in a beautiful fashion. The braisa states: “This is my G-d and I will beautify him” means that I will beautify my mitzvos. I will make a nice Sukkah, Lulav, Tzitzis, and Sefer Torah with nice silks. Shmuel says: The case is where he holds onto his hair and says that he will be beautiful.

The Gemora asks: If accepting nezirus is regarded as sinful (abstaining from permissible things), how can we call it “beautiful”?

The Gemora answers: Yes! For even according to Rabbi Elozar HaKappar, who says that a nazir is a sinner, that is only referring to a nazir who became tamei, for he is required to start his nezirus over again, as it is written [Bamidbar 6:12]: the previous days shall be canceled because his nezirus has become tamei. Since he is now obligated to observe a longer nezirus than he originally anticipated, he might come to violate his nezirus, but a nazir tahor is not referred to as a sinner.

Tosfos asks: There are several Gemora’s elsewhere, where it is evident that Rabbi Elozar HaKappar holds that even a nazir is referred to as a sinner since he pained himself by abstaining from wine.

Tosfos answers that while it is true that a nazir tahor can be referred to as a sinner, but nevertheless, the mitzvah of becoming a nazir is greater that the sin of abstaining from wine, and therefore, he can be called “beautiful.” A correlation to this (something that is both a mitzvah and an aveirah) could be the halacha of fasting on Shabbos for one who experienced a bad dream. There is a mitzvah to fast on Shabbos in order to nullify the bad dream (this Tosfos would seemingly be inconsistent with the Shalah, who maintains that one should not fast on Shabbos unless the fasting is a pleasure to him, since otherwise, he would be more distressed) even though there is a semblance of a sin by fasting on Shabbos and negating the obligation of having pleasure on Shabbos.

The Gevuros Ari challenges Tosfos’ comparison: He asserts that fasting on Shabbos is not a mitzvah, for it is negating the obligation of having pleasure on Shabbos, but rather, one is permitted to fast on Shabbos if the dream is causing him distress. And furthermore, one who fasts on Shabbos is obligated to fast another day during the week in order to atone for the sin of fasting on Shabbos. However, in regards to a nazir, who has no reason to accept the nezirus, it is either a mitzvah or a sin. If the transgression is greater that the mitzvah, it should be regarded as a sin, and if the mitzvah is greater, it should not be regarded as a sin at all!

The Tosfos Nazir explains Tosfos to mean as follows: There are times when there is somewhat of a necessity for a person to accept upon himself the vow of nezirus. If a person is in a difficult situation, or he wishes to atone for a transgression that he committed, or if he saw an adultress in her debasement, there is a mitzvah to become a nazir. In these cases, although there is an element of sin, the mitzvah is greater than the aveirah, and he will not be referred to as a sinner.

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Distancing Oneself from a Sotah

The braisa (Nazir 2a) states that whoever sees a sotah when she is being degraded should restrain himself from consuming wine.

The Alter from Kelm said that it is evident from the Gemora that even the extremely righteous people, upon seeing the adulteress in her disgrace, can be effected by this. Even though it is highly improbable that they will succumb to sin, perhaps a semblance of desire will penetrate their thick armor, and they, therefore, should abstain from wine as well.

One may ask: If the sotah is seen in her disgrace, wouldn’t this be a motivation for people not to sin?

It would seem evident from our Gemora that just being in the vicinity of immorality, even while the adulteress is being humiliated and punished, can induce a person to sin.

Reb Chaim Kanievsky adds: The verse: ki yafli lindor neder nazir l’hazir is the same gimatriya as “kol haroeh sotah b’kilkulah, yazir atzmo min hayayin.”

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Stolen Water is Sweet

(Nedarim 91b)A certain adulterer visited a woman. Her husband came, whereupon the adulterer went and hid himself behind a curtain before the door. There was some cress lying there that a snake had ate from while the husband was away, and now the husband was about to eat from the cress without his wife’s knowledge. The adulterer exclaimed, “Don’t eat from it, because a poisonous snake has tasted it!”

Rava said: The wife is permitted, for had he committed a sin, he would have been pleased that the husband should eat from it and die, as it is written: For they have committed adultery, and there is blood on their hands.

The Gemora asks: Surely that is obvious?

The Gemora answers: I might have thought that he had committed a sin, and as for his warning, that is because he prefers the husband not to die, so that his wife may be to him as stolen waters are sweet, and bread of secrecy is pleasant; therefore Rava teaches otherwise.

Tosfos explains that although it is true that “stolen waters are sweet,” an adulterer is not aware that this is the cause for his pleasure; rather, he thinks that his desires will be fulfilled if the husband dies and he can marry her publicly.

Rabbi Eliyahu Dessler in Michtav M’Eliyahu explains as follows: The reason that “stolen waters are sweet” is because the forbidden pleasures which the sinner desires are out of his reach. Once he reaches it and brings himself to the gratification that he was seeking, he loses his desire for that enjoyment.

The sinner, however, does not realize this. He thinks that he is genuinely attracted to that forbidden pleasure. He therefore deludes himself into thinking that finding a legal way to enjoy this forbidden pleasure will bring him the gratification that he desires.

Rava understood that this man did not realize what the driving force behind his desires is. This is why he ruled that the woman is permitted. If he indeed was an adulterer, he would have chosen the simple way for him to fulfill his desires; let the husband die. He did not do that, and that to Rava was an indicator that he was indeed innocent.

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The Violation of a Kohen's Wife

The Mishna (Nedarim 90b) stated: At first they said that the following three women must be divorced and they also receive their kesuvah: One (a wife of a Kohen) who declares, “I am defiled to you (I have been violated forcibly by another man),” or “Heaven is between me and you (my husband is impotent),” or “May I be kept away from the Jews (a vow to have no cohabitation with any of them; such a vow is assumed to be the result of the pain that cohabitation may cause her, and therefore justified).” This ruling was afterwards retracted in order that a wife might not cast eyes upon another man and act immorally towards her husband. Instead, it was ordained that one (a wife of a Kohen) who declares, “I am defiled to you (I have been violated forcibly by another man)” must bring evidence in support of her statement; in respect of a woman who tells her husband, “Heaven is between me and you (my husband is impotent),” peace is made between them by way of a request addressed to the husband that he should treat his wife properly; and if a woman vowed, “May I be kept away from the Jews,” the husband revokes his part of the vow and she may cohabit with him, though she remains removed from all other Jews.

The Meiri writes that it became common for women to cast their eyes upon other men, and they would gain their release from their husband with these claims. Even in the case where she made a neder prohibiting cohabitation with all Jews, they were still concerned that she might later petition a sage to have the neder annulled.

The Ra”n asks: If with these claims, she is believed, and therefore, halachically forbidden to her husband, how did the Chachamim permit her to her husband? Where has the prohibition gone?

The Ra”n answers that the Chachamim have the authority to retroactively take away their marriage, and it would emerge that at the time that she was violated, she was unmarried, and therefore, she is legally permitted to her husband. The Chachamim have this right, for any marriage is contingent upon the consent of the Chachamim, and if they see a reason to nullify the kiddushin, they may do so.

The Ra”n suggests an alternative answer: In truth, the woman should not be believed with respect to these claims, because she cannot release herself from her obligations to her husband. The initial ruling believed her to be speaking the truth, for otherwise, she would not have disgraced herself with these claims. Afterwards, when their level of morality deteriorated, and they realized that the women were casting their eyes upon other men and falsely claiming that there were grounds for divorce, the Chachamim rejected her claim.

The Rishonim ask: Why don’t we apply the principle of “shavya a’nafshei chaticha d’issura,” one who states that something is forbidden, even if he is not believed in respect to everyone else, renders the object forbidden to him? If so, she should be forbidden to him, even if we do not believe her!

Tosfos quotes from Rabbeinu Eliezer that a Kohen’s wife who is violated is forbidden as a zonah, is only a prohibition on the Kohen, but not on her, so since she is not believed, she is permitted to remain with him.

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The Man and the Servant

In our Mishna (Nedarim 89a), when it says, “This is the rule” (once she enters into her own jurisdiction for even one moment, the husband cannot revoke her vows), it is coming to include a case where the father gave her over to the husband’s agents, or the father’s agents gave her over to the husband’s agents. From this point and on, the husband may not revoke any of his wife’s prior vows.

For once she was given over to them, her father no longer has any jurisdiction over her, because this handing over is regarded like nisuin. The husband may revoke nedarim that she makes from this time on, but with respect to her prior nedarim, he may not revoke them. He cannot revoke them in conjunction with her father either, because she has left her father’s jurisdiction, and he no longer has any rights over her.

Based upon this principle, the Pardes Yosef explains the following verse [Breishis 24:61]: And Rivkah and her maidens arose and rode on the camels, and they followed the man; and the servant took Rivkah and left. Why was Eliezer first referred to as “the man,” and afterwards, “the servant”?

We can answer as follows: As long as Rivkah was under the jurisdiction of her father, although Eliezer was the servant of Yitzchak, because Avraham gave over all his possessions to him, nevertheless, he was not the servant of Rivkah. Therefore, Eliezer (with respect to Rivkah) was called, “the man.” However, after Rivkah’s maidens, who were Lavan’s agents, handed her over to Eliezer, she entered into the jurisdiction of Yitzchak, for her father gave her over to the husband’s agent (Eliezer). Once she entered into her husband’s authority, Eliezer now became her servant, and therefore, the Torah refers to him as “the servant.”

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Within a Period of an Utterance

The Gemora (Nedarim 87a) issues a halachic ruling: The halacha is that a statement which follows another statement within the period of an utterance is regarded as if it were made together with the first one except in the case of blasphemy, idolatry, betrothal and divorce. (If one commits blasphemy or practises idolatry, and immediately, within the period of utterance, retracts, his retraction is unavailing, and he will still incur the death penalty. If a man betroths a woman or divorces her, and immediately thereafter changes his mind, such withdrawal is invalid.)

The Ra”n comments that he doesn’t know why these cases are different and from where did the Rabbis derive this. It would seem, he says, that in regards to other things that are not as serious, when a person does them, he doesn’t do them with absolute intent. Rather, his intention is that he will be able to retract them within the time it takes for an utterance. But these, since they are so serious, a person will not proceed unless he has made up his mind completely, and for this reason, retraction, even within the period of time it takes for an utterance, is not effective.

The Ramban in Meseches Bava Basra quotes Rabbeinu Tam who says that the halacha that within the time it takes for an utterance is regarded as a single utterance is a decree that the Rabbis made because of a student who is purchasing something and his teacher comes, so that he will be able to greet him. They issued this ruling for all things except for these.

The Ra”n asks: How could they make a decree in respect to nedarim which will permanently uproot something from the Torah in a manner that involves actively doing something?

The Imrei Binah answers according to the Radvaz, who says that we are more lenient with respect to nedarim because they can be annulled by a sage. Therefore, the Torah gave the power to the Chachamim to permit a Biblical prohibition, even when it involves actively uprooting it.

Reb Shimon Shkop asks on the Ra”n: If the logic that enables one to retract within the period of an utterance is because he lacks absolute intent, how can this apply to the halacha of rending one’s garments over a death? There is no intention required!

They explain as follows: The principle of “within the time required for an utterance” accomplishes that any act performed can be viewed as continuing for a further amount of time (“the period of an utterance”). Therefore, when he rends his garments and then, within the time required for an utterance, discovers who died, it may be regarded as if he tore his clothes at that time.

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Blessing on the Torah

The Land Became Lost

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav (Nedarim 81a): What does the verse mean when it says: Who is the man who is wise and can understand this? This (the reason for the destruction of the Second Temple) was asked to scholars and prophets and they could not explain it, until Hashem explained it Himself, as it says: And Hashem said that it is because they left my Torah. Isn’t the phrase “and they did not listen to My voice” the same as the phrase “and they did not go in its ways”? Rav Yehudah explains in the name of Rav: This means that they did not recite a blessing before learning Torah.

The Chanukas HaTorah explains: The Gemora in Brochos (48b) asks: From where do we derive that one should recite a blessing prior to studying Torah? Rabbi Yishmael says: It is derived by means of a kal vachomer. If a blessing is recited before partaking in “sustenance for the moment” (food), it certainly follows that a blessing should be recited on “eternal sustenance”! The Gemora (Brochos 38a) also states: Prior to reciting a blessing, the land belongs to Hashem; after the blessing is recited, the land is given over to man.

Accordingly, it can be said that if they refrained from reciting a blessing before studying Torah, it is clearly evident that they did not recite a blessing before eating as well. For if they would have made a blessing before the consumption of food, they certainly would have made a blessing before studying Torah (based upon the kal vachomer). Since they didn’t recite a blessing on their food, the land became lost, for prior to a blessing, the land belongs to Hashem.

They didn’t Recite the Blessing on the Torah “First”

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: What does the verse mean when it says: Who is the man who is wise and can understand this? This (the reason for the destruction of the Second Temple) was asked to scholars and prophets and they could not explain it, until Hashem explained it Himself, as it says: And Hashem said that it is because they left my Torah. Isn’t the phrase “and they did not listen to My voice” the same as the phrase “and they did not go in its ways”? Rav Yehudah explains in the name of Rav: This means that they did not recite a blessing before learning Torah.

The language of the Gemora is that they didn’t recite a blessing on the Torah “techilah.” What is that word coming to exclude? We do not recite any blessings after we conclude learning Torah! (The Levush says that the two blessings that we recite before studying Torah are actually “one before” and “one after,” except that we never finish studying Torah, so the Rabbis instituted that both blessings should be recited beforehand.)

The Orach Yesharim explains: When a person receives a present, he values both the gift and the giver. Even if the gift is a small one, he will value it, if it was given to him by a prominent person. Similarly, he will appreciate something given to him by an ordinary person, if the item is a valuable one.

The Torah is praised with noth elements. It is written: Ki lekech tov nasati lachem, the Torah itself is valuable, and that it is being gifted to Klal Yisroel from Hashem.

This could be the explanation as to why we recite two blessings before studying Torah. The first brocha is asher bachar banu, Hashem chose us; Torah is special because Hashem has given it to us. The second bracha is v’chayei olam nata b’socheinu, Torah is precious because of its inherent value.

This is the meaning of our Gemora: They appreciated the value of Torah, and therefore, they recited the second blessing. However, they were not fully appreciative of the Giver of the Torah, and they therefore refrained from reciting the first blessing on the Torah. This is why the Torah did not continue to flourish with their children.

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Is the Fetus a "Swallowed Item"?

The following halacha is derived from our Gemora (Nedarim 75b): If a person swallows a tahor ring and subsequently enters a room containing a corpse, the ring does not contract tumah. This is based on a Gemora in Chulin (71b), which states that a “swallowed item” does not contract tumah.

The Minchas Chinuch (263:3) asks the following question: How can Rabbi Akiva in Chulin (72a) rule that a fetus inside of its mother’s womb can Biblically contract tumah? Shouldn’t the fetus be regarded as a “swallowed item,” and therefore, be shielded by the mother’s body from becoming tamei?

He answers that the fetus is considered like a thigh of its mother and therefore is rendered tamei just like any other one of the mother’s limbs.

The Magen Avraham (O”C 343:2) cites the Rokeach as saying the following: Concerning a pregnant wife of a Kohen, she is permitted to enter into a room that contains a corpse (even though the baby might be a male and cannot become tamei). The rationale is based upon a “double doubt.” Perhaps she will miscarry, and even if she will not, perhaps the child will be a female, not a male!

The Magen Avraham asks: Why is this logic necessary? It should be permitted because the fetus can be regarded as a “swallowed item,” and hence, cannot become tamei?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Shiurim (2:41) answers: A Kohen is forbidden from entering into a room that contains tumah (regardless of becoming tamei). A “swallowed item,” although it does not become tamei, it is nevertheless, considered as if it is inside the room. Therefore, the principle of a “swallowed item” will not permit her to enter the room.

According to the Minchas Chinuch, we can answer that the fetus is not regarded as a “swallowed item,” and therefore will not be a reason to permit her to enter.

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Ben Azzai

(Nedarim 74b) When Ben Azzai heard Rabbi Akiva’s argument, he exclaimed in this exact language: It is a pity to you, Ban Azzai, that you did not serve Rabbi Akiva!

The Yad Malachei asks: It is evident from this Gemora that Ben Azzai did not study under Rabbi akiva. However, the Gemora Brochos (62a) states that Rabbi Yehudah told Ben Azzai: For how long will you be brazen towards Rabbi Akiva, your master? It could be answered that Ben Azzai went to study under Rabbi Akiva, and that is what the Gemora in Brochos is referring to.

However, the Gemora Brochos mentions that Ben Azzai said to Rabbi Akiva: For how long will you be brazen towards your master, that you followed Rabbi Yehoshua into the lavatory? If Rabbi Akiva was his master, how could he speak in such a degrading manner towards him? Even a teacher to a student wouldn’t talk like that; certainly a student to his teacher!

Therefore, he writes that it must be that Ben Azzai was a talmid chaver (a peer) of Rabbi Akiva. They were both disciples of Rabbi Eliezer the Great.

The Gemora in Bava Basra (158a) refers to Ben Azzai as the “Talmid chaver” of Rabbi Akiva. Ben Azzai was considered somewhat of a disciple of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbeinu Gershom comments: Since Ben Azzai was a “bochur,” he was unable to comprehend halachic logic as well as Rabbi Akiva.

What is the connection between being a “bochur,” and not comprehending to the fullest extent?

I once heard from my Rosh Yeshiva, HaRav Chaim Schmelczer zt”l that Rabbeinu Gershom means that Ben Azzai was a bachelor, and one who is not married does not have the same level of contentment as one who is married. Torah study requires one to be at ease; one must have a menuchas hanefesh in order to comprehend the depths of the Torah. This is what Ben Azzai was lacking.

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Deaf-mute Revoking

Rami bar Cham inquires (Nedarim 73a): Can a deaf man revoke the nedarim of his wife?

The Ra”n explains that the Gemora is referring to a deaf person who can talk, but cannot hear.

The Rosh adds: We cannot be referring to a deaf-mute, for he can only make a Rabbinical kiddushin through hinting or signing. He will not be able to revoke her nedarim, which are Biblically valid! Furthermore, he would have the halacha of a shoteh, and the halachos of revoking will not be applicable for him.

Reb Yaakov Emden explains the Rosh to mean as follows: The kiddushin of a deaf-mute is only a Rabbinical one. He performs a kiddushin by demonstrating that he wishes to marry her. It is, therefore, impossible for him to revoke his wife’s nedarim, for that is a Biblical halacha, which would only be applicable to a marriage on a Biblical level.

The Acharonim challenge this explanation from a Gemora in Niddah (46b), which states that one who married a minor, who has no father, and the kiddushin is only a Rabbinical one, may nevertheless revoke her nedarim. This is because every woman who makes a neder intends that it will be subject to her husband’s will. This applies by a Rabbinical marriage as well, since she is his wife.

Reb Shmuel Rozovsky (and others) explain the Rosh to mean that since he cannot talk, he is incapable of revoking his wife’s vows. For one needs to speak in order ot revoke a vow; hinting and signing will not be sufficient.

The Nidrei Zerizin is perplexed by this answer: Where does it say that one needs a complete expression in order to revoke a vow? Furthermore, he can revoke it through writing. For there are many opinions that maintain that writing is considered like speaking in regards to making an oath; certainly it should suffice for revoking a vow!

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Pre-existing Conditions

The Gemora (Nedarim 72a) stated that the Mishna is referring to a nesuah, and the reason that the husband cannot revoke her vow is because the halacha is that a husband cannot revoke his nesuah’s prior vows.

The Ra”n explains that it can be referring to a nesuah either in the marriage preceding the divorce or the one that followed it. If she was an arusah by the first marriage and a nesuah at the end, he would not be able to revoke her nedarim, for the husband cannot revoke pre-existing nedarim. If she was a nesuah by the first marriage and an arusah at the end, he cannot revoke her nedarim, for once she is a nesuah, the father loses his rights over her, and the arus is not able to revoke her vows without the conjunction of her father.

The Reshash notes that it would seem from this Ra”n that a husband after nisuin can indeed revoke the nedarim that his wife made while she was an arusah. For otherwise, the Mishna did not have to mention that he divorced her and then remarried her. He cites the Rambam’s opinion that the husband may not revoke the nedarim that his wife made while she was an arusah.

There are those that explain the argument as follows: Does the husband have authority over his wife’s nedarim, while she is an arusah? If you say that the husband has no authority then; it is only in conjunction with her father that he may revoke her nedarim, we can explain the Rambam’s opinion. Once they perform nisuin, the husband acquires the authority to revoke her nedarim, but he can only use this authority on nedarim that his wife makes from now on. However, if you will say that the husband does have authority to revoke her vows even during the erusin, except that this authority is limited in the fact that he may only revoke her nedarim in conjunction with her father, we can understand the Ra”n’s opinion. The husband may revoke the nedarim that his wife made during erusin, for this is not regarded as a pre-existing neder, since he had the authority to revoke this neder even beforehand.

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A Quiet Confirmation

Rava inquires (Nedarim 69a): Is there such a thing as an annulment for a confirmation, or not?

The Ra”n explains: If the father or the husband confirmed the neder and asked on that same day that the confirmation should be annulled, can it be annulled (similar to a neder)? It is obvious that it cannot be annulled on the following day, for it has no less effect than remaining quiet.

It is evident from the Ra”n here and he says so explicitly in Kesuvos that there is certainly no annulment if he had remained quiet.

The Reshash asks: What is the distinction? If he can annul a spoken-out confirmation, why can’t he annul a confirmation that came about because he remained quiet (which is regarded automatically as a confirmation)?

The Steipler Gaon answers: An annulment is only possible on an action performed by a person; however, remaining quiet, although that is deemed a confirmation, is not an action that can be annulled.

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Father Revoking by Himself - Nedarim Daf 67

The Rambam holds that a father has the right to revoke all types of his daughter’s nedarim. The husband, however, can only revoke a neder of personal affliction, and only those that affect their marital relationship. The Ra”n nd the Rosh disagree and hold that the father may only revoke her nedarim that are of personal affliction, and only those matters that are between him and her.

The Keren Orah poses the following question: The halacha is that the father and the husban revoke the nedarim of a betrothed na’arah. According to the Rambam, who maintains that the father can revoke all types of nedarim, what is the halacha if his daughter is a betrothed na’arah and she pronounces such a vow? Do we say that the father has a right to revoke this neder by himself? Or, perhaps, the halacha is that the father may only revoke nedarim in partnership with her husband, and since her husband cannot revoke such a neder, the father cannot revoke it either?

Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach wonders further: This inquiry can be posed according to the Ra”n and the Rosh as well. If the girl makes a neder that is a “matter that is between her father and her,” but it does not affect the husband. For example, she said that she will not assist her father. Do we say that the father can revoke this neder by himself, or do we say that he can only revoke nedarim together with her husband, and since her husband cannot revoke this neder, the father cannot revoke it either?

The Meiri writes that the Rambam would concede that the father does not have the ability to revoke the neder of his betrothed daughter by himself. His rights to revoke his daughter’s neder are only in partnership with her husband, and if the husband cannot revoke the neder, since it is not a neder that affects him, the father cannot revoke it either.

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Spit in his Eye

The Yerushalmi in Sotah relates the following: Rav Meir was accustomed to deliver a Torah lecture every Friday night. A certain woman was always in attendance. One time, Rabbi Meir said a lengthy drasha and by the time she arrived home, the Shabbos candles had already burnt out. Her husband was angry with her and told her, “I do not want to see you again until you spit into the eye of the person who was giving the lecture that you attended.”

The Medrash records that the woman sat outside of her house for several weeks. All the women saw her and asked her what was going on. She explained the story. The women went to Rabbi Meir and related the situation to him in hope that he would have a solution. (The Yerushalmi states that Rabbi Meir realized through Divine spirit what the situation was even before the women came to him.)

Rabbi Meir pretended to be suffering from pain in the eyes, and announced: “If there is any woman skilled in whispering charms for the eyes (a type of "medicine" which was believed to be effective in those days) , let her come and whisper.” When this particular woman came to him, he asked her: “Are you skilled in whispering charms for the eyes?” She said that she didn’t. Rabbi Meir told her, “Do not worry. I will tell you what to do. Just spit into this eye seven times and all will be well.” After she did as she was instructed, Rabbi Meir told her to go to her husband and say that you only requested of me to spit in his eye once; I did so seven times.

His students asked him: “Master! Should Torah be degraded in such a manner?” Rabbi Meir replied: “Should my honor be treated in a higher regard than the honor of the Omnipresent? If, in order to make peace between a husband and a wife, the Torah commanded: Let My Name, which was written in sanctity, be erased in the destructive waters, how much more so I, where I can forego my honor in order to bring about peace between a man and his wife.

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Four People are Considered as Dead

The braisa (Nedarim 64b) states: Four people are as if they are dead. These are a poor person, a leper, a blind person, and someone who does not have children. A poor person is as if he is dead, as derived from the passuk above, ““Because all of those (who have sought to kill you) have died.” A leper is considered like he is dead, as the passuk states, “let her not be as if she is dead.” A blind person is considered dead, as the passuk states, “In the darkness he placed me like the dead of the world.” Someone who does not have sons is considered dead, as the passuk states, ““give me children, and if not I am dead.”

Reb Chaim Shmulevitz explains that the common denominator among these four is that they do not feel someone else’s pain and that they cannot provide benefit for others.

A poor person is considered as dead not because he is lacking himself, but rather, it is because he cannot give to others.

A blind person cannot see others and therefore, he is unable to perceive their pain or suffering. He cannot join in his tribulation.

A metzora is banished from the camp and therefore, he is unable to offer assistance to others.

One who does not have children to nurture is lacking the ability to provide benefit to those that are dear and close to him. It is a natural instinct for a person to desire to give whatever he has to his children.

Only a life where one can share with others is worth living.

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Delaying by a Neder

The Mishna (Nedarim 63a) had stated: If one made a neder against tasting wine for the year, and the year was proclaimed to be a leap year, he is forbidden for the year and its extension.

The Ra”n explains: The Mishna is teaching us that even if one made the neder from the beginning of the year, since he said “this year,” we do not say that he meant “one year,” but rather, he is prohibited for an extra month, which is thirteen months. However, if he said “one year” without any specification, the extra month is not included, even though the year was a leap year. For behold, if he did not abide by his prohibition this year, he makes it up the next year, which is a regular year. And although, it is forbidden for him to do that, because there is a prohibition against delaying, since if he would delay, he could make it up in another year, his neder is not connected to this year, which is a leap year. Therefore, even if he fulfills it this year, the extra month is not included.

The Rashba holds that even if he says, “one year from today,” the extra month is not included.

It is evident from the Ra”n that he holds of the following novelty: One can violate the transgression against delaying, even by a prohibatory neder.

The Rambam and Ramban, both maintain that this prohibition is only applicable by a neder for hekdesh, when one is obligating himself to do something.

The Machaneh Efraim adds that this transgression can apply by all nedarim to fulfill a mitzvah.

Reb Shimon Shkop states that the Ra”n’s words are perplexing. The prohibition against delaying is applicable when the person has an obligation to do soemthing. A neder is a prohibition on an object. If the object is forbidden, it is forbidden, but if it is not, how can there be a prohibition against delaying?

Reb Dovod Pervarsky explains: A neder also begins with an obligation resting on the person. He is obligated to fulfill his neder. If the forbidden object is in existence, the neder takes effect upon that object. However, if it is not in existence at that time, the person has a responsibility to render it forbidden when it comes into this world. If he fails to do so immediately, he is violating the transgression against delaying.

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An Abbreviated Cycle

The Gemora (Nedarim 61a) presents a dispute regarding the counting of Yovel. The Chachamim hold that Yovel is the fiftieth year in the cycle and the following year is the first year of the next cycle. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the fiftieth year is reckoned for both cycles. It is the fiftieth year of the previous cycle and the first year of the forthcoming cycle.

The Turei Even poses an interesting question according to the viewpoint of Rabbi Yehuda. In the first Shemitah cycle after a Yovel, there will only be five field working years between Yovel and Shemitah since during Yovel one is not permitted to work his field.

In a normal Shemitah cycle, each of the six years has a designated tithing that one is required to separate from his field. One is obligated to take maaser sheini (he would bring one tenth of his produce to Yerushalayim to be eaten there) on the first, second, fourth and fifth years. He would separate maaser oni (given to the poor) on the third and sixth years. The Turei Even wonders what the arrangement would be according to Rabbi Yehuda in the first cycle following a Yovel, where there is only five years.

The Netziv and the Sfas Emes state that in the third year, one would separate maaser oni and regarding the remaining years, he would take maaser sheini. This is because the Torah states that maaser oni should be separated every three years; however the Torah does not prescribe set years for maaser sheini. A year that does not have a requirement for maaser oni, automatically has an obligation for maaser sheini.

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Term Expired and Fasting for "One Day"

Annulment after the Term of the Neder Expired

The Mishna (Nedarim 60a) states: If a person says: “Konam” (he forbids himself with a vow) that he will not taste any wine today, he is only forbidden from doing so until it gets dark.

Rabbi Yirmiyah says: When it gets dark, he must ask a scholar (to permit his vow). The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Yosef answers: It is a decree, lest he confuse this case with a vow that he will abstain “for one day” (which the Mishna stated means that he is forbidden for twenty-four hours, not just until dark).

The Acharonim ask: Why can’t he have the neder annulled before the night? Why must he wait for the night?

The Chasam Sofer answers: If he would have the neder annulled before the night, it would retroactively annul his neder. It would emerge that he had abstained for nothing. However, if he waits until the night to annul the neder, he has fulfilled his neder, since the term of his neder was for that day. It was only a stringency based upon a decree that he should have it annulled at night.

It is evident from the Chasam Sofer that he maintains that a neder cannot be annulled after its term has been completed. The Tosfos Ri”d holds that a neder can be annulled by a sage even after its term has expired.

Fasting Nowadays

The Ra”n asks on our custom of accepting to fast for one day, and immediately by nightfall, he is permitted to eat without petitioning a sage first. According to our Gemora, shouldn’t he be required to have the neder annulled because of Rav Yosef’s decree of “one day”?

The Ra”n answers: Everyone knows that the Chachamim instituted that the time for a fast is from morning until night. It is not similar to other nedarim, which do not have a set time. There, therefore, is no reason for a decree, for everyone understands that the halachos of nedarim and the halachos of fasting are distinct from each other.

The Rashba answers: The Gemora’s decree is only applicable in a case where he made a neder, saying, “Today, I will not drink wine,” which is similar to the case where he said, “I will not drink wine for one day.” There, we rule that he must have the neder annulled at nightfall, since it is similar to the case where he made the neder for “one day,” where he was permitted in the beginning of the day. However, regarding a fast, where one is forbidden to eat from the beginning of the day until its conclusion, there is no reason for any decree. One would easily think that the reason why we are lenient and allow him to eat at nightfall is because we were stringent upon him at the beginning of the day. When he makes the neder in middle of the day, and he was permitted up until then, we decree that he is required to petition a sage for annulment of his neder at nightfall.

The Rashba offers another answer: There is no place for Rav Yosef’s decree by a neder to fast, for even if one would make a neder to fast for “one day,” he will not be required to fast for twenty-four hours like by a different neder. Therefore, on a regular fast, he may begin to eat immediately upon nightfall.

The Yados Nedarim answers: This decree was never issued by a neder for a mitzvah. One who vows to fast is regarded as a mitzvah, as the Gemora refers to him as a kodosh.

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Pigs in the Future

(Nedarim 59a) The Rishonim disagree regarding a food item that the Gemora is uncertain if it is forbidden or not and it remains unresolved. The inquiry will remain in that state until Eliyahu Hanavi clarifies it for us. The Ohr Zarua maintains that this is regarded as “something which can become permitted,” since there is a possibility that Eliyahu will say that it is permitted. The Rashba (Beitzah 4a) disagrees and he explains: If Eliyahu will decide that the food is forbidden, it will emerge that this item will never be permitted. If he will rule that it is permitted, it actually was never forbidden. Either way, he argues, it cannot be labeled as “something which can become permitted.” The Bach cites a Mordechai that it is not considered “something which can become permitted,” for by the time Eliyahu will permit it, the food will be already ruined.

The Chasam Sofer cites the following question from the Rav in Frankfurt: Chazal write that a pig is called a “chazir,” for in the future, Hashem will reverse the prohibition of the pig and it will be permitted. If so, according to those Rishonim, pig should be regarded as “something which can become permitted”?

The Chasam Sofer answers based upon that which was written in the Toldos Yitzchak: The Torah forbids animals that do not have split hooves, or those that do not chew their cud because those animals are naturally conceited; they trample with their feet and they have a poison inside of them, which is extremely dangerous for a Jew to eat. The animals that do not digest their food easily and they are compelled to chew their cud; those animals are permitted to eat.

If so, explains the Chasam Sofer, there will be no change in halacha regarding the pig. It was forbidden and will remain forbidden. Rather, Hashem will change the nature of the pig and it will begin to chew its cud. That is why it will be permitted then. Accordingly, the only pigs that will be permitted then, are those that will be born after this change occurs; however, the pigs that were in existence prior to that will remain forbidden. This is why a pig is not classified as “something which can become permitted.”

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Women and Shemitah

The Chinuch states that there is a positive commandment which forbids plowing on Shemitah. It is written [Shmos 34:21]: From plowing and harvesting you shall desist.

The Minchas Chinuch (112) asks that if so, women should be exempt from this mitzvah, and they should be permitted to plow on shemitah because it is a positive commandment that has a time element to it and the principle is that women are exempt from any positive mitzvah which is governed by time?

He answers that women are obligated in this mitzvah because that rule is applicable only regarding a positive mitzvah that is incumbent on the body of the person and not a mitzvah like shemitah, which is a mitzvah that is dependent on the land (mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz). This can be better understood based upon our Gemora which says that the shemitah prohibition is on account of the ground.

Proof to this distinction is cited from the Ritva in Kiddushin (29a). The Gemora rules, based on a Scriptural verse that women are not obligated to perform a circumcision on their sons. Tosfos asks: Why is a verse necessary; circumcision is a positive mitzvah which is governed by time since the mitzvah can only be performed by day, and women are exempt? The Ritva answers: Any mitzvah which is not related to the person themselves; this principle does not apply. The mitzvah of milah is to perform the circumcision on the son and therefore women would be obligated if not for the special verse teaching us otherwise.

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Something that will become Permitted

Rabbi Shimon said Nedarim 58a): That Mishna is only referring to the halacha of bi’ur i.e. removing (the produce of Shemitah may be kept as long as that produce is still available in the fields for the animals; afterwards, it may no longer remain in the house).

The Ra”n explains: Since it was possible to eat it before that time, it is regarded as something that can become permitted.

The Sha’ar Hamelech and the Noda B’Yehudah ask: According to this logic, why is it only not nullified if it becomes intermingled with its type? The halacha should be that it should not become nullified even if it becomes mixed up in something that is not its type? For the Ra”n above (52a) explained at great length in the name of the Ri”f that something which is permitted presently to be consumed will not be nullified, even with a mixture of things that aren’t its type?

The Sha’ar Hamelech answers: The Ra”n only said that rule in respect of things that will be permitted forever, such as meat, which will always be permitted to be eaten with other meat or foods that are not from milk. However, here, the Shemitah produce will become forbidden forever, i.e. after the “time of removal.” It is therefore compared to something that will become permitted, where it will not become nullified only in a mixture of things that aren’t its type.

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Superstition

Ula says (Nedarim 56a): A dargash bed is a bed of good fortune.

The Rishonim ask: Shouldn’t such a bed be forbidden on account of the prohibition of nichush; One should not act upon the basis of omens or lucky times (Vayikra 19:26)?

The Radvaz answers that it is being used as a sign to strengthen one’s luck, but not to be superstitious about it. R’ Eliezer MiMitz disagrees with him and maintains that even that would be forbidden.

The Shitah Mikubetzes explains that this is a bed designated for the guardian angel of the house. It was done for the purpose of honoring the Holy One, blessed is He. This is similar in the manner that we prepare a chair for Eliyahu Hanavi by a bris milah.

The Ra”n in Sanhedrin explains that it is a bed which is constantly made and kept empty in order to demonstrate that the household has more than they need. Through this, one is recognizing that Hashem has blessed him with wealth and thanking Him for it.

The Rambam writes that dargash is a small bed that is placed before a larger bed; it is used as a stepping-stool in order to climb onto the higher bed.

The Rosh explains that the angel in charge of poverty resides in a dirty house and the angel in charge of riches and success resides in a clean house. The dargash is a bed which always remained clean in order to beckon the angel of wealth to reside in the house.

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Those that Study and those that Support Torah

Rav Yosef said to him (Nedarim 55a), “Do not sit down until have explained the following verse [Bamidbar 21: 18 – 19]: And from the wilderness to Mattanah; and from Mattanah to Nachaliel; and from Nachaliel to Bamos?” Rava replied, “When one makes himself as the wilderness, which is open to everyone (willing to teach them Torah), the Torah is given to him as a gift, as it says: And from the wilderness to Mattanah (a gift). And once it is given to him as a gift, Hashem makes it his inheritance, as it says: and from Mattanah to Nachaliel (inheritance from Hashem). And after Hashem gives it to him as an inheritance, he ascends to greatness, as it says: and from Nachaliel to Bamos (to heights). And if he becomes haughty, Hashem will lower him down, as it says: And from Bamos to the valley. And furthermore, Hashem sinks him into the ground, as it says: overlooking the surface of the wilderness. However, if he repents, Hashem will raise him up once again, as it says: every valley shall be raised.

The verse prior to these verses states: A well dug by princes, carved out by nobles of the people, through the lawgiver with their staffs, and from the desert to Mattanah. The Vilna Gaon says that this verse must be explained according to our Gemora as well.

He explains: The well is referring to the wellsprings of Torah. The princes are those that delving into the depths of Torah. The nobles are those people who are engaged in business activities and support those who are studying Torah. The verse concludes that both those that study Torah and those that support others who are studying have a portion in Torah.

The Chozeh mi’Lublin adds: Since the verse concludes with the words: and from the Desert to Mattanah, and we derived from there one is obligated to make himself similar to the wilderness; opened to teach Torah to all, this must be true for the supporters as well. One who is supporting Torah must view his support as if the Torah scholar is receiving it from the wilderness, and not directly from him. He should not expect a return on his investment in this world; the reward for supporting Torah is given out in the World to Come; the same time that those who study Torah receive their reward.

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Meat and Fowl

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said (Nedarim 54b): If one makes a neder prohibiting himself from meat, he is permitted in fowl. It is evident that he maintains that fowl is not included in meat.

The Chasam Sofer asks: How can he hold that fowl is not included in “meat,” when it is seemingly clear from the Torah that it is? The Jews in the Desert complained that they desired meat and the Ribbono shel Olom sent fowl to them. Evidently, fowl is a type of meat!

He answers that the Gemora explains that fowl is not included in “meat” because it is not healthy to eat fowl on a day of blood letting. Since in the Desert, the northern wind did not blow, and that is the reason why there was no circumcision then (the wind is needed to heal the child). Accordingly, there was no blood letting in the desert, as well. It emerges that there would be no distinction between fowl and meat in the Desert and fowl would be included in “meat.”

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Following the Majority

The Beraisa states (Nedarim 52a): If someone makes a vow not to have oil in Eretz Yisroel, he is permitted to have sesame oil and not olive oil. In Babylon, he may not have sesame oil but he can have olive oil. In a place where both are used, he is forbidden to have both.

The Gemora asks: This is obvious! The Gemora answers: The case is where most people use one kind of oil. One might think that the vow is considered like the usage of most people. This is why the Beraisa tells us that he is forbidden to both oils, because a doubt regarding a prohibition is judged stringently.

The Ra”n explains what we would have thought: Even though there is a minority that makes use of the other kind, there is a possibility that his intention might have been even from those.

The Lechem Mishna asks: Why don’t we follow the majority? Why, in all matters of prohibition, we issue a ruling based upon the majority?

He explains: If it would be a certainty that the vower was referring to the oil used by most people, we would definitely rule that that the vow takes effect only upon that type of oil. However, here he used a language which may include both types of oil, therefore, there is an assumption that he is excluding himself from the majority. We therefore rule stringently and forbid him on both types of oil, since his language can include both.

The Netziv answers that we only follow the majority in cases where the minority is in conflict with the majority. However, here, the minority is not in contradiction with the majority, since he may have intended for both. We therefore rule stringently and forbid him on both types of oil.

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Winter Vinegar; Date Honey; Milk and Whey

The Mishna states (52a): If a person makes a vow that he will not partake of dates, he can still eat date honey. If he makes a vow not to partake of winter grapes, he may partake of the vinegar made from those grapes. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseirah says: Whenever a product is called a name that reflects upon its source and a person vows not to partake from that source, he is forbidden to have the product as well. The Chachamim permit this.

The Ra”n asks: Who is this first Tanna? It is neither Rabbi Yosi nor the Chachamim! For we learned above, in the dispute regarding milk and whey, that whenever they called it “whey of milk,” it was forbidden according to everyone! If so, the date honey and the vinegar should be forbidden!

The Rashba answers: The cases are not similar. For in the case of the whey of milk, its form has not been changed. Even initially, when it was mixed with the milk, it was in that very same form. But here it has changed physically.

Furthermore, in the case of whey, the reason it is called “whey of milk,” is because it still has the law of milk. It is not to distinguish it from some other kind of whey, for there is no other kind. But here, when it is called “date honey” or “winter-grape vinegar,” it is not that they still have those laws; rather, it is to distinguish them between other types of honey and vinegar.

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Something that can become Permitted - Davar she'yeish lo Matirin

(Nedarim 52a) If one makes a neder prohibiting himself from wine, he is permitted in cooked food which has in it the taste of wine. However, if he said, “Konam this wine that I will not taste,” and it fell into a cooked dish, if it contains enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture, it is forbidden.

This would imply that if there is not enough to give flavor, it would be permitted. The Ra”n quotes his teachers who ask the following: Something which is forbidden on account of a neder is “something that can become permitted” (davar she’yeish lo matirin), and we have established that anything that can become permitted is not nullified even in a thousand!?

They answer that when we say that it is not nullified even in a thousand, that refers to something that has been mixed with its own kind. But here, when it says, “and it became mixed,” it is referring to something else that is not the same kind, like the case of eggs that were cooked with it. Anything that is mixed with something else that is not its kind is permitted, provided that it does not give flavor, even if it is “something that can become permitted.” The Ra”n cites proof to this from a Mishna in Chalah and a Yerushalmi in our perek.

They, therefore, objected to the statement of the Ri”f in Meseches Chulin concerning bread that was baked in an oven with roasted meat. The Gemora states that it is forbidden to eat it with a dairy sauce even though it has been established that we are not halachically concerned with vapors. The reason it is forbidden is because the bread is “something that can be permitted,” since one may eat it together with meat. For that reason, it is not nullified, even in a thousand. It is evident from the Ri”f that he maintains that “something that can be permitted” is not nullified even in something that is not its kind.

The Ra”n, however, agrees to the Ri”f. When the Mishna here says that “something can become permitted” becomes nullified in something that is not its own kind, that is referring to something that is forbidden now, but will become permitted in the future, like nedarim. For the Ra”n has the following question: Since according to the Chachamim, all forbidden things become nullified in their own kind just as in a different kind, why did the Chachamim make a distinction in the case of “something that can become permitted,” between its own kind and a different kind?

The reason is as follows: The Chachamim and Rabbi Yehudah disagree whether or not something can be nullified in its own kind. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a forbidden item is not nullified in its own kind, because anything that is similar to another thing does not weaken and nullify it; rather, it preserves it and strengthens it.

The Chachamim disagree and hold that a forbidden item and something which is permitted are not similar to each other, even if they are the same kind. This is because one is forbidden and one is permitted. For it is not fitting to follow the similarity of their substance, but rather the difference in their being forbidden and permitted.

It is for this reason that the Chachamim learned concerning “something that can be permitted” for the sake of being strict towards the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. For since the forbidden item is not completely different from the permitted one, because the forbidden one will eventually become permitted, we say that it is not nullified in its own kind. It will only become nullified when mixed with a different kind, for the difference that exists between one kind and another will make up for the equality that is added here because it is “something that can be permitted.” It is the difference between kinds that is the cause of nullification, and equality interferes with nullification.

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Small Fish, Large Fish

Rav Papa said to Abaye (Nedarim 51b): How do we know that when he says, “Fish (dag) that I will not taste,” dag implies large ones only? It is because it is written [Yonah 2:1]: Now Hashem had prepared a large fish (dag) to swallow up Yonah? But isn’t it also written: Then Yonah prayed to Hashem, his God from the inside of the fish (dagah)?

The Gemora answers: This is no difficulty: Perhaps the large fish spit him out and he was swallowed again by a smaller one.

But, the Gemora asks: What of the verse regarding the plague of blood, where it is written [Shmos 7:21]: And the fish (dagah) that was in the river died? Did only the small fish die, not the large?

The Gemora concludes: Dagah written in the Torah implies both large and small, but regarding vows, the language used by the public is followed.

It would seem that according to Abaye, the word dagah in the Torah refers only to small fish. Accordingly, we would be compelled to say that only the small fish dies in the plague of blood. Why would this be?

The Rogatchover Gaon explains: The river was dug by the hands of the Egyptians. The Yerushalmi rules regarding fish that swim into one’s private water; he acquires only the small ones and not the large ones. Accordingly, it can be explained that only the fish belonging to the Egyptians died, but the large fish, which they did not own, there was no reason for them to die.

The Rama in Shulchan Aruch (C”M 331:1) rules that a worker may return to his home on Friday afternoon, early enough that he will have the time to fill a jug of water and roast a small fish.

The Shach asks as to what is the source for the Rama’s ruling that it is sufficient if he has ample time to cook a small fish? Perhaps, he should leave his work with enough time to cook a large fish?

The Nitzotzei Ohr answers that the language of the Yerushalmi, which is the source for this halacha, is dagah, and the Rama understands that to be referring to a small fish.

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The prohibition remaining even after the item leaves his possession

Avimi inquired (Nedarim Daf 47): If one said to his friend, “Konam, your entering this house,” and then he dies or sold it to someone else, what is the halacha? Does a person have the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership or not?

The Nimukei Yosef cites a Ritva, who quotes the following Yerushalmi: A person will only have the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership. However, he cannot initially prohibit the item only for the time after it leaves his possession.

The Haflaas Nedarim explains: The only reason that someone would have the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership is because it is similar to hekdesh. Since the item in question is presently in his possession, the neder takes effect and the prohibition remains on this object forever just like hekdesh. However, one does not have the ability to consecrate an item that is presently not in his possession, and therefore, a neder to prohibit something only for the time after it leaves his possession will not take effect.

The Korban Nesanel asks: Why couldn’t this inquiry be resolved from the Gemora above (42a-b) which concluded that if one says to his fellow, “These possessions should be forbidden to you”; if he vowed prior to shemitah, he may not enter his field and he may not eat from the fruits which are growing on the branches outside of his field even when shemitah arrives? This is because a person has the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership! Shouldn’t the halacha be the same in our case where he sold the property to someone else?

He answers that shemitah is different. Since the vower has the right to acquire the fruits that are growing just like anyone else, it is regarded as if it is still in his possession, and that is why the fruits remain forbidden. (This is a tremendous chiddush that something can be considered yours because you have the right to acquire it.) However, the Gemora’s inquiry here is regarding a case where he sold the property. In this case, the item is not in his possession at all, and perhaps, the prohibition will not remain after it leaves his possession.

The Shitah Mikubetzes answers that Avimi did not know the conclusion of the Gemora above and that is why he made this inquiry.

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Hefker in Front of Three - Nedarim Daf 45

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Biblically, it is considered hefker even if his declaration was only in front of one person. Why was it decreed upon that it should be in front of three? It is in order for there to be one person who will take possession and two people to testify to this.

The Rishonim ask from the Mishna that we learned above (43a), which stated: If a person vowed not to have benefit from someone and these two people were walking together on the road, and the person who cannot benefit from his friend had no food, the halacha is that if there is nobody else around, he can put the food on the rock or fence and say, “These are ownerless for anyone who wants to take them.” The other person can then eat. If they are the only two present, it should not be regarded as hefker?

The Ritva answers that the Rabbis were lenient in a case where there was an extreme necessity to provide the person with food. They ruled in this case that the Biblical law stands and the hefker is valid.

The Bach answers that even when there are not three people present, the hefker is valid. The Sages instituted that he can retract from his hefker declaration if three people weren’t present. However, as long as he did not retract, the hefker is completely valid.

The Shach cites Tosfos that the Rabbinical decree requiring three people to be present was only said in regard to the hefker of land; however, regarding movables, such as food, it does not apply.

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