Miracle of Prayer

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The Mishna in Rosh Hashanah states that whenever Moshe held up his hand, Israel prevailed (against Amalek). The Mishna asks, do Moshe's hands make or break the battle? Rather, this teaches you that so long as Israel were looking upwards and subjugating their hearts to their Father in Heaven, they were victorious; if not, they would fall.

The Netziv in Merumei Sadeh asks on the Mishna's question. What was so strange about Moshe's hands making the battle? Didn’t Moshe’s hands split the sea and perform other miracles as well through his hand?

He answers that the fight against Amalek had to be won in a natural way and not through a miracle. Perhaps we can add that fighting Amalek is in essence the fight that we have daily with our evil inclination. This fight could not be left to miracles. This is what is bothering the Mishna. Could the battle have been won through Moshe's hands like the other miracles? The Mishna’s answer is no, it could not have been since this battle required a victory through natural means.

Let us examine the answer of the Mishna. Rather, this teaches you that so long as Israel were looking upwards and subjugating their hearts to their Father in Heaven, they were victorious; if not, they would fall. Isn't the Mishna stating that they relied on a miracle from Above. They looked upwards and they were victorious. How can this be explained?

The Gemora in Kiddushin (29b) relates an incident with Abaye and Rav Acha bar Yaakov. There was a certain demon that haunted Abaye’s Beis Medrash, so that when two people entered, even by day, they were injured. Abaye instructed the community not to provide Rav Acha shelter when he would arrive in the city, thus forcing the father to spend the night at the Beis Medrash; perhaps a miracle will happen [in his merit]. Rav Acha entered the city and spent the night in that Beis Medrash, during which the demon appeared to him in the guise of a seven-headed dragon. Every time Rav Acha fell on his knees in prayer one head fell off. The next day he reproached them, “Had not a miracle occurred, you would have endangered my life.”

The Maharsha in his commentary to Kiddushin asks that how did Abaye have permission to place Rav Acha in such a precarious position. One is forbidden to rely on a miracle? He answers that Abaye understood the potency of Rav Acha’s prayer. Abaye was certain that Rav Acha’s prayers to the Almighty would be answered and that this is not a miracle. Hashem has instilled in this world the power of prayer and incorporated it into the natural order of the world.

This is what our Mishna is answering. Amalek has to be defeated through natural means and that is what Klal Yisroel did at that time. They cried out to Hashem and subjugated their hearts towards Him and were answered.

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Women Plowing during Shemitah

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The Gemora in Moed Katan presents a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elozar whether one would incur the thirty-nine lashes if he would plow during Shemitah.

Rashi (2b) states that there is a positive commandment which forbids plowing on Shemitah. It is written [Shmos 34:21]: From plowing and harvesting you shall desist. The point of contention between the two Amoraim is if there is a negative commandment as well.

The Rambam in Hilchos Shemitah rules that one who plows during Shemitah does not incur the thirty-nine lashes. Kesef Mishna explains: Since in our Gemora, it was left ambiguously regarding which Amora held what, we cannot administer the lashes when there is uncertainty.

Sha’ar Hamelech in the beginning of Hilchos Shemitah writes that the Yerushalmi in Shabbos (7:2) states that Rabbi Yochanan is the one who maintains that he does not receive the lashes and the rule is that when Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elozar argue, the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan.

Minchas Chinuch (112) comments that women are obligated in this mitzvah even though it is a positive commandment that has a time element to it and the principle is that women are exempt from any positive mitzvah which is governed by time. He explains that this is applicable only regarding a positive mitzvah that is incumbent on the body of the person and not a mitzvah like Shemitah, which is a mitzvah that is dependent on the land (mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz).

Proof to this is cited from the Ritva in Kiddushin (29a). The Gemora rules based on a Scriptural verse that women are not obligated to perform a circumcision on their sons. Tosfos asks: Why is a verse necessary; circumcision is a positive mitzvah which is governed by time since the mitzvah can only be performed by day, and women are exempt? The Ritva answers: Any mitzvah which is not related to the person themselves; this principle does not apply. The mitzvah of milah is to perform the circumcision on the son and therefore women would be obligated if not for the special verse teaching us otherwise.

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Don't Call him Evil

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The Gemora Kiddushin Daf 28 states: One who calls someone else a slave should be excommunicated! If he calls him a mamzer, he receives lashes! If he calls him an evil person, he (the insulted person) may descend against his life (he is permitted to hate him to such an extent that he may attempt to reduce his income).

Rashi in Bava Metzia (71a) explains this to mean that the insulted person may fight with him as if the libeler hit him, and it is as if he was coming to kill him. Furthermore, Rashi heard that he can compete against him in his line of business in an attempt to decrease his income.

Rashi asks that it is hard to understand how the Chachamim would allow this person to take revenge.

Some answer that here it is permitted because he suffered personally and he was subject to a public humiliation. The Chafetz Chaim, however, writes that it is unclear if this is the accepted halachah, and therefore, one should be stringent in the matter and not take revenge.

Others answer that it is permitted because if people think that he is indeed an evil person, his income will suffer tremendously, for people will not have compassion on him.

Tosfos in Bava Metzia writes in the name of the Gaonim that it is permitted to burn one-third of his grain. Tosfos concludes that this is bewildering, for where is the source for this?

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Akiva ben Yosef (Kiddushin 27)

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It happened once that Rabban Gamliel and some elders were traveling on a ship. Rabban Gamliel said to them: The tithe (ma’aser rishon) which I shall measure off when I come home is given to Yehoshua (ben Chananyah, who was a Levi) and the place where it lies is leased to him. [Rabbi Yehoshua gave him a perutah for the rental and acquired the ma’aser together with the land with kinyan agav.] And the other tithe (ma’aser ani) which I shall measure off is given to Akiva ben Yosef that he may acquire possession of it for the poor, and the place where it lies is leased to him.

The commentators ask: Why by Rabbi Akiva, does the Gemora mention his father’s name, Yosef, and By Rabbi Yehoshua, it does not?

Reb Tzadok HaKohen (Peri Tzadik; Ki Seitzei) answers that this is to hint to us that the root of Rabbi Akiva was from Yosef HaTzadik. Just as Yosef was the provider of the food in Egypt, so too, Rabbi Akiva was the treasurer and the one responsible to sustain the poor people.

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Kinyan Agav

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 26) inquires: Must the movable property be piled on the real property in order for the kinyan agav (by making a kinyan on the land, he automatically acquires the movable property) to be effective?

The Rishonim ask: If the halachah would be that kinyan agav is only effective if the movable property is piled on the land, why would it be necessary to use agav? The movable property should be acquired because it is resting in his courtyard!?

The Ritv”a answers: The Gemora is referring to a case where the courtyard is not protected and therefore it cannot be used to make a kinyan. That is why agav is necessary.

The Shitah Mekubetzes answers that a courtyard can acquire for a person only movable property that entered it after it became his. However, a courtyard cannot acquire property that was in it before the courtyard became his.

The Steipler Gaon writes that the Shach states this halachah only with respect to the acquisition of a courtyard without the knowledge of the owner. However, if he intends to use the courtyard to acquire the movable property which is found in it, it will be effective even if the property entered the courtyard before it became his.

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L'chatchilah and B'dieved

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 25) explains that while it is true that Rebbe holds that the water is not required to enter the person’s mouth, it must, however, be a place which is fit for the water to enter (and since a bone was lodged between her teeth, the water could not touch her entire mouth; this invalidated her immersion).

This logic follows the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, who says in regards to a korban minchah: A flour-offering that is fit for mixing (of the flour and the oil of the offering; with one log of oil for sixty esronim of flour, and a maximum of sixty esronim in one pan, perfect mixing is possible), the mixing is not critical to it (and the offering will be valid even without mixing); whereas, a flour-offering that is not fit for mixing (where, the proportions of the mixture were less than a log for sixty esronim or where more than sixty esronim were placed in one pan), the mixing is critical (and the offering will not be valid).

Tosfos asks: If the Torah repeated the halachah of “mixing,” it should be critical to the minchah, and if it did not, why is it necessary for it to be “fit for mixing”?

Tosfos answers: Although it is written many times in the Torah, it is not mandatory for it to be mixed, since it is not written in the language of a commandment. We may only derive that the flour and oil should be fit for mixing.

Tosfos in Niddah writes that none of those verses are extra, for they are all necessary to teach various halachos. If so, they ask: Why is it necessary for it to be “fit for mixing”?

Tosfos answers: Since the Torah was particular that a mixing should be done, it is only logical that it should be fit for mixing, for otherwise, the mitzvah would be negated completely.

The Rishonim similarly ask with regards to immersion: Why is it required that his mouth (or other areas) should be a place where water is fit to enter?

Tosfos answers: It is because it is written: And he shall immerse all his flesh in the water. This would seemingly include even all the hidden areas. However, since we expound the verse “his flesh” to be referring only to the exposed parts of the body, the term “all his flesh” teaches us that all parts must be fit for the water to enter.

Evidently, Tosfos holds that this halachah is a Biblical requirement. Other Rishonim hold that it is only a Rabbinical obligation.

Tosfos in Niddah asks: Why isn’t there a requirement at least l’chatchilah that the water should enter even the hidden areas (the same way there is a halachah that the minchah should l’chatchilah be mixed)?

Tosfos answers: With respect to immersion, there is no logic to mandate that the water should enter even the hidden areas of his body, for the Torah is only interested in the person becoming tahor; since b’dieved he will be tahor anyway (even if the water does not come into contact with these areas), what sense is there to require it in the first place? However, with respect to mixing the minchah, which is a mitzvah, it is understandable that the Torah desires that the minchah should be mixed, even though it will be valid even if it isn’t.

My Rosh Yeshivah, Rabbi Avrohom Chaim Levin Shlit”a explains this Tosfos in the following manner: When the discussion pertains to a chalos (something taking effect), it is either valid, or it is not. It is not logical to state that in order for something to be effective, the Torah wants it done in this specific manner. However, even if that is done, it is effective anyway. [L’chatchilah and b’dieved cannot be said regarding a Torahdike chalos.] However, when we are discussing a mitzvah, it is possible to say that there are different levels with respect to the fulfillment of the mitzvah. One will fulfill the mitzvah regardless, but it is still preferable to do it in a certain specific manner.

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Afflictions Purge a Person's Sins

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The Gemora states that if a master knocks out the tooth of his slave, or if he blinds his eye, he must release the slave.

It is noteworthy that Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemora in Brochos (5a) derives from here that a person is considered fortunate if Hashem inflicts him. It is taught through a kal vachomer as follows: If the loss of a tooth or an eye, which is only one of the limbs in a person’s body, nevertheless, a slave gains his freedom because of it, then afflictions, which cleanse the person’s entire body, should certainly free a person from sin because of them!

Rish Lakish derives this same lesson from a different source. He says: The word covenant is written with respect to salt and the word covenant is written with respect to afflictions. Just as salt sweetens the meat, so too, afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins.

The Bobover Rebbe in Kedushas Tziyon notes that there is a distinction between the two expositions. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the afflictions will only cleans a person if they emanate from Heaven, similar to the halachos of a slave, where he will only be set free if his master knocks out his tooth or eye. He will not gain his freedom if someone else injures him. However, according to Rish Lakish, any type of afflictions will cleanse him, in the same manner as the salt sweetening the meat. It makes no difference as to who applies the salt.

Based upon this, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank explains the following. It is written [Shmos 6:5]: And also, I heard the moans of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians are holding in bondage, and I remembered My covenant. The Jewish people thought that the Egyptians were their masters and they were those who were afflicting them. They did not realize that their suffering was decreed from Heaven. Because they didn’t know who was causing them their hardships, they did not gain their freedom. It was only because Hashem remembered His covenant, that all afflictions cleanse a person from his sins, that was the reason they were released from the bondage.

Reb Meir Shapiro adds to this: If a slave does not come to court and testify that his master knocked out his tooth or eye, he will not gain his freedom. If he says that it happened by happenstance, he will not go free. So too, it is with afflictions. If a person does not believe with complete faith that the afflictions are affecting him because of Divine Providence, the afflictions will not purge him of his sins. However, if this principle was derived through the gezeirah shavah from salt, it would not make any difference.

The Rashba was asked the following question: If a slave initiates a fight with his master and strikes the first blow, and the master counters with some strikes of his own and knocks out the slave’s tooth, will the slave gain his freedom?

He replied that the slave goes free. The proof is from the aforementioned Gemora, where Rabbi Yochanan derived that afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins through a kal vachomer from the laws of the slave. How can the two be compared? Afflictions come to a person because he has sinned! It was his own fault! Perhaps, then, those afflictions will not purge him from his sins!? Evidently, we see that a slave also gains his freedom, even if he was the one who initiated the fight!

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Kohanim as Agents

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Rabbah inquired: Can a Canaanite slave make a messenger to accept his Get for him from his master? Do we say that being that we derive his laws from a woman (who can make a messenger), he too can make a messenger? Or do we say that a woman who can accept her Get can make a messenger, but he, who cannot accept a Get cannot make a messenger? After Rabbah asked the question, he resolved that he can make a messenger, based upon the above gezeirah shavah.

The Gemora asks: Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua says that Kohanim are Hashem’s messengers. If we would say that they are our messengers, is it possible that there is something that a person themselves cannot do, yet they have the power to create a messenger to do it for them?
However, based on what we just said, this logic seems flawed. After all, a slave cannot accept his own Get, yet, he can make a messenger who will accept it for him!?

The Gemora answers: This question is incorrect. A regular Jew cannot have anything to do with bringing a korban. A slave, however, has a connection with emancipation documents. This is as the braisa states: It appears that a slave can act as a messenger to accept his friend’s Get from his friend’s master. However, he cannot accept a Get from his own master.

The Gemora in Nedarim (35b) poses the identical inquiry and states that a practical difference between the two perspectives is with regard to someone who declared that he would not derive benefit from a certain Kohen. If the Kohen is our agent, he will not be permitted to perform the service for the one who vowed against him. However, if the Kohen is an agent of Heaven, he would be permitted to perform the service for him.

The Rishonim ask: Why didn’t the Gemora there resolve this inquiry from that which Rav Huna said here that if we would say that they are our messengers, is it possible that there is something that a person themselves cannot do, yet they have the power to create a messenger to do it for them?

1) Tosfos answers that the Gemora wished to resolve the inquiry from a Mishna or a braisa, not from an Amoraic statement.

2) Furthermore, Tosfos notes that we can only prove from Rav Huna that the Kohanim are also agents of Heaven, and not only our agents, for if they would only be our agents, how can they perform the service when the Yisroel, who sent them, cannot perform it! However, it can still very well be that they are the agents of both.

3) The Ritva answers that we can prove from Rav Huna that the Kohanim are agents of Heaven only when they are offering the korbanos of a Yisroel; however, there would still be a matter of doubt with respect to a case when they are sacrificing the korbanos for another Kohen. Here, Rav Huna’s logic would not be applicable, for the sender is able to perform the service himself!

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The Beautiful Captive

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The Gemora teaches regarding a “beautiful captive” that she should not be subjugated by the soldier during battle.

Rashi learns that the soldier should not cohabit with her during the battle. Cohabitation is not allowed until the captive is brought to the soldier’s house and converts to Judaism.

Tosfos asks four questions on Rashi.

1) Why does the braisa state that the Torah’s permission for a soldier to have relations with a captive is based upon the Torah’s recognition of the strength of one’s Evil Inclination? If according to Rashi, he may not cohabit with her until she converts in his house, how is his desire appeased during the war? Shouldn’t we still be concerned that the beautiful female captives would represent an overwhelming temptation for the Jewish soldier, and he will engage in illicit relationships with them?

Tosfos answers that since she will be permitted to him after some time, we are not concerned that he will be tempted to engage in an illicit relationship with her during the war. He will be able to overcome this desire and wait until she will be permitted to him. This is based upon the concept of having “bread in his basket.”

2) Why does the braisa compare the permission of the beautiful captive with eating meat from a slaughtered animal that had been dangerously ill? It is not so proper to eat such meat, as the Gemora in Chullin (37b) considers it repulsive to eat such meat! But according to Rashi, cohabitation with the captive after her conversion is completely permitted and allowed! What is the comparison between the two?

Tosfos answers that it is nevertheless regarded as a permission b’dieved, because since the conversion is done without her consent, it is not regarded as a bona fide conversion.

3) The Gemora in Sanhedrin (21a) records that Tamar was the daughter of a beautiful captive, Maachah, whom David had taken as a wife. Tamar was therefore permitted to Amnon, David’s son, for she was not regarded as David’s daughter. However, according to Rashi that David did not have relations with Maachah until she converted, why would Tamar be permitted to Amnon? Since she was born from her mother after she converted, it emerges that she was Amnon’s sister, for they shared the same father!?

Tosfos answers that Rashi will learn that Tamar was not the daughter of David at all; rather, Maachah was pregnant with her even before David had taken her from the battle.

4) However, Tosfos concludes that he has no explanation according to Rashi why the Gemora above said that there is a distinction with respect to a Kohen between the initial act of cohabitation and the second act. This is only understandable if the initial act is done during the battle and the second act is done after she converts (which is the way Rabbeinu Tam learns the Gemora). However, according to Rashi, both the second act of cohabitation and the first one are only after she converts! Why would the first be permitted and the second would be forbidden?

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Using a Kohen

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The Rambam rules that a Jewish servant who is a Kohen cannot become a nirtza, for he will be rendered a baal mum (a blemish, which will disqualify him from performing the Temple service).

The Mishnah La’melech asks that the Maggid Mishnah understands in the Rambam that there is no required amount for how large the piercing of the servant’s ear must be. If so, why can’t the Kohen servant become a nirtza, and they will pierce his ear in a manner which will not cause a blemish?

He answers based upon a Yerushalmi which says that we are concerned that they will forget and create a large hole, which will render him a baal mum.

The Sma”g writes that it is evident from our Gemora that it is permitted to have a Kohen work for you as a servant. He says that the prohibition is only when the Kohen is working for free; however, if he is receiving compensation for the work, it is permitted.

The Makneh asks: Accordingly, the Kohen servant should not be allowed to become a nirtza because then, he will be working for free!?

He answers based upon the Mordechai in Gittin, who says that the Kohen, if he so desires, can be mochel, and then it would be permitted for him to work for you.

The Mordechai (Gittin 461) relates that Rabbeinu Tam once instructed a Kohen to pour him some water. This caused one of his students to inquire as to how he could allow a Kohen to serve him, being that the Yerushalmi states that whoever uses a Kohen for his own needs is in violation of the prohibition of me’ilah (since the Kohen is sacred). Rabbeinu Tam's response was that the Kohen who served him in 12th century France was without the clothing of the Kohen and, therefore, not a Kohen (based upon the Gemora Sanhedrin 83b). The student persisted that if so, we shouldn’t give a Kohen the first aliyah. Rabbeinu Tam remained quiet. Rabbeinu Peter then suggested that a Kohen can voluntarily forfeit the respect due to him as a Kohen and, therefore, there was no problem with Rabbeinu Tam's use of him.

The Ta”z asks that the Kohen is not permitted to forfeit his kedushah and marry a divorcee!? What is the difference between the two?

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Three Insights

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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ANOTHER WIFE!?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers: It means that if he comes into slavery with a wife and child, his master can give him a Canaanite slavewoman (to have relations with). Otherwise, he cannot.

The commentators ask: Isn’t this illogical? If he doesn’t have a wife, the master should be able to give him a slavewoman, and if he does have a wife, why should the master give him another wife?

The Daas Zkeinim explains that if he is married to a Jewish woman, he will not be so attracted to the Canaanite slavewoman and will not follow her ways. However, if she is his only wife, he is liable to follow her ways. The Torah did not want this.


REPENTANCE IN THE
SAME SITUATION

It is written [Yirmiyah 22:10]: Cry intensely for one who leaves, because he will not return again and see the land of his birthplace. Rav Yehudah said: This is referring to one who departs this world without children.

Rav Huna said: The verse is referring to a person who committed a sin and repeated it. The Gemora states: Rav Huna is following his reasoning stated elsewhere that one who commits a sin and repeats it; it has become permitted to him.

The Gemora asks: Do you actually think that it is permitted? The Gemora answers: Rav Huna means that it becomes to him as if it was permitted.

The Gemora (Yoma 86b) explains that a true penitent is one who committed a sin in the past and then the opportunity for the same sins comes again a first time and a second time and he is saved from the sin on both occasions.

The Sefer Chasidim writes that a person should not put himself into a situation where he is tempted to sin, because he may not be able to withstand temptation.

The Tzlach questions the words of the Sefer Chasidim from the commentary of the Kli Yakar in Parshas Chukas, who writes regarding the phenomena of the Parah Adumah that the Parah Adumah was capable of rendering pure those that were impure and conversely, rendering impure those that were pure.

The Kli Yakar likens this idea to certain medicines that are beneficial for one who is ill but can prove fatal for one who is healthy. There is a parallel between remedying the body and remedying the soul. One who wishes to repent must be with the same woman that he sinned with the first time, at the same time of the year in which he had sinned, and at the same place where he sinned with her. Thus, the temptation to sin is particularly strong, as his Evil Inclination will entice him to respond exactly as he did before. By resisting the temptation, he demonstrates that he is a true penitent.

The Kli Yakar adds that this is what the Gemora (Brochos 34b) means when it states that in the place where penitents stand, the completely righteous do not stand, i.e. the completely righteous cannot stand in a place of temptation. Yet, according to the Sefer Chasidim, a righteous person is not permitted to endanger himself by entering into such a situation.

TRANSGRESSION COMMITTED ONLY ONCE

The Gemora states that if one commits a transgression and repeats it, it becomes like it is permitted to him.

Rav Shach was once giving rebuke and he questioned if there is any among us that have committed a sin and not repeated it. Woe is to us.

The Mabit in Beis Elokim (shaar hateshuva ch 11) writes that our sages have said if one commits a transgression three times, it becomes like it is permitted to him. Did he have a different version in the Gemora than us? Our Gemora states this to be correct if a person commits a sin even twice.

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Condition against the Torah

The Gemara cites a Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah regarding whether a person may make a Tenai modifying the obligations stipulated by the Torah regarding monetary law ("Masneh Al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah"). Rebbi Meir says that if a man is Mekadesh a woman on condition that he not be obligated to give her She'er, Kesus, and Onah, the Tenai is invalid and the Kidushin takes effect fully (and he is obligated to provide her with She'er, Kesus, and Onah). Rebbi Yehudah says the Tenai is valid, and the Kidushin takes effect and he is not obligated to provide her with She'er, Kesus, and Onah.
Rebbi Meir's view is difficult to understand. If the Tenai is null and void, then why should the Kidushin take effect at all? The man was Mekadesh the woman on condition that if he is not obligated to give her She'er, Kesus, and Onah, then he wants the Kidushin to take effect, and conversely, if he will be obligated in She'er, Kesus, and Onah, then he does not want the Kidushin to take effect! (Rebbi Meir requires a "Tenai Kaful" -- both sides of the condition stated explicitly -- whenever a Tenai is used, as the Mishnah says in Kidushin 61a.) Since the man specified clearly that he does not want the Kidushin to be valid if he will be obligated to give She'er, Kesus, and Onah, then how can the Kidushin take effect and obligate him in She'er, Kesus, and Onah? He did not have in mind for the Kidushin to take effect under such circumstances! (TOSFOS DH Harei Zu)


ANSWERS:

(a) The RI explains that we learns all the laws of Tenai, including the very fact that one may make a Tenai, from a verse (in Kidushin, ibid.) If not for the fact that the Torah teaches that there is such a thing as making a Tenai, we would not have known that there is a concept of Tenai at all. Had the Torah not taught us the concept of Tenai, that one may make a stipulation when making a Kinyan, we would have thought that when a person makes a Tenai as a precondition to a certain Kinyan, we just ignore the Tenai and the Kinyan takes effect. By teaching that a Tenai does work, the Torah is teaching that if the condition is not fulfilled, the Kinyan is annulled retroactively. In the situations in which the Torah does not teach that a Tenai works (such as a situation in which the Tenai counters that which is written in the Torah), we revert back to the original way we would have ruled had the Torah not taught us the concept of Tenai, and the Kinyan works regardless of the fulfillment of the Tenai.
This answer of Tosfos is very difficult to understand. Even without the Torah teaching us the laws of Tenai, we should know, logically, that if a person sells an item to his friend and stipulates that the sale should not be valid unless his friend gives him something or does something, then if the friend fails to fulfill the Tenai the sale should not be valid, since the person did not fully commit himself to the sale!
To answer this question, we must first analyze a related Halachah -- the Halachah of Bereirah. In many places in the Gemara we find the view that holds "Ein Bereirah," which means that a Kinyan cannot be effected if -- at the moment that it takes effect -- it is not clear upon what it takes effect. For example, a person cannot pick up an item in order to be Koneh it and say, "If it rains tomorrow, I want this act of Kinyan to be for Reuven, and if it does not rain tomorrow, I want this act of Kinyan to be for Shimon." If a person does make such a stipulation, then even if it rains the next day, the object will not belong to Reuven. Similarly, a person cannot eat fruits today, "The portion that I will choose to separate tomorrow will be Terumah on these fruits starting from now." If he does so, then even if he separates a portion tomorrow, it will not serve as Terumah.
The logic for this, as the RAN explains in Nedarim (45b), is that "it is not appropriate for a Kinyan to take effect in a way that leaves a doubt as to how it took effect." This means that the Kinyan must take effect at the same moment at which the action which accomplishes the Kinyan is performed (such as the act of Hagba'ah (lifting up an item) in the case of a purchase, or Dibur (speech) in the case of making something Terumah). The Kinyan cannot take effect after the act, because the act which makes the Kinyan is no longer present. Thus, if at the moment that the act is performed, the Kinyan "does not know" where to take effect, the Kinyan does not take effect (or it takes effect on one of the two, regardless of what happens the next day; see Insights to Eruvin 37b). The Kinyan cannot see into the future, so to speak.
What is the difference between Bereirah and a Tenai? No Tenai should ever work if we say "Ein Bereirah," because the Kinyan cannot know what will happen in the future (whether the Tenai will be fulfilled or not) in order to be able to take effect now!
RASHI and TOSFOS (Gitin 25b, DH u'l'Chi Mayis) explain that when a person makes a Tenai, it is in his ability, and it is his intention, to fulfill the condition (for otherwise he would not have made the Kinyan in the first place). Hence, the Kinyan is not taking effect in a matter that leaves doubt. Rather, it takes effect for certain at the time the act of Kinyan is made, since he intends to fulfill the Tenai. What, then, is it that revokes the Kinyan retroactively when the condition is not fulfilled? The Kinyan has already been made and completed; it took effect, so how can it be revoked retroactively? The answer is that this is the reason why the Torah has to teach us the novel concept of Tenai -- even though the Kinyan was made, it can be revoked through not fulfilling the condition. This is what the Ri means to say -- since the Torah did not teach the concept of Tenai in a case where the Tenai contradicts the obligations of the Torah, then we revert to saying that the Kinyan is completed and nothing can uproot it retroactively, since it has already been done and has already taken effect. The person who made the Kinyan did intend for the Kinyan to take effect for certain, since he was expecting the Tenai to be fulfilled.
For this reason, when a man makes a Kidushin on condition that he not be obligated to give She'er, Kesus, and Onah, he obviously thinks that he is able to create such a Kidushin and he has in mind that the Kidushin should be completed, except that it should be uprooted if it turns out that he is obligated to give She'er, Kesus, and Onah. But by that time, it is too late to revoke the Kidushin, since it already took effect.
(b) RABEINU TAM (cited by the Tosfos Yeshanim and the Tosfos ha'Rosh), the RITVA, and the RASHBA (cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes) explain that when a person makes a Tenai that contradicts the Torah, he does not really mean it, but he is just being "Mafligah b'Devarim" -- he is just frightening her with words. The Beraisa in Gitin (84a) teaches such a concept with regard to a person who says to his wife that he is giving her a Get on condition that she does something that is physically impossible to do (see Rashi there, DH Mafligah). Since he knows that the Halachah of the Torah requires that Kidushin be done in a certain way with certain obligations, it must be that he is not serious about his condition to alter those obligations, and therefore he probably has in mind to make a Kidushin, and he is just saying this condition in order to frighten her.
Rabeinu Tam might have rejected the explanation of the Ri because his explanation is logically sound only when the condition is something that will be fulfilled or not fulfilled at a point after the Kinyan is completed. In the case of Kidushin, though, the Kidushin takes effect at the same time that the obligations of She'er, Kesus, and Onah take effect (or do not take effect). Thus, since the Kidushin does not depend on a future event but on a present event, the Kidushin should not take effect (since he did not have in mind to make such a Kidushin that obligates him in She'er, Kesus, and Onah). (See also Rebbi Akiva Eiger.)
The Ri might have explained like the Rashba, who says that the condition that the husband was stipulating was not that Kidushin should take effect without the obligations of She'er, Kesus, and Onah. Rather, the husband was stipulating that Kidushin should take effect only if the woman forgoes her entitlement to She'er, Kesus, and Onah. This can take place after the Kidushin is effected. (This is not like the opinion of Rabeinu Elchanan as quoted later in Tosfos.)
The Ri, on the other hand, did not accept Rabeinu Tam's explanation, because "Mafligah b'Devarim" can only be applied to a Tenai made against something written in the Torah, but not when any of the other details of Tenai were omitted. However, we find that if a person makes a Tenai in the wrong order ("Ma'aseh Kodem le'Tenai"), then the Kinyan takes effect and we ignore the Tenai even though the logic of "Mafligah b'Devarim" does not apply (as the RE'AH points out)!

INSIGHTS INTO THE DAILY DAF
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Esav the Apostate

Rabbi Chiya bar Avin said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that an idolater inherits his father according to Torah law! This is apparent from the verse, “For an inheritance to Esav I gave Mount Seir.”

The Gemora asks: Perhaps an apostate Jew, suchas Esav, is different (and this law does not apply to a genuine gentile)?

The Gemora answers: Rather, the proof is from the verse, “For to the children of Lot I gave Ar as an inheritance.”

Rabbeinu Bachye writes that Esav was considered an apostate because he was the child of the Forefathers, but yet, he did not follow in their path.

Reb Tzadok HaKohen writes that he was regarded as an apostate because he was not circumcised. Although the Chasam Sofer (responsa Y”D 245) writes that this was because he was red (Admoni) and that exempted him from performing this mitzvah (on account of the danger), this argument can be rejected because before the Giving of the torah, there was no commandment of “You shall live by the mitzvos,” and therefore, even though there was a health concern, he still would have been obligated to be circumcised.

In the sefer Torascha Shashuay, he explains why Yaakov was allowed to say, “I am Esav, your first-born” based upon the fact that Esav was an apostate. Accordingly, it would have been forbidden for Yitzchak to eat from Esav’s shechitah. The halachah is that one is permitted to lie in order to prevent someone else from transgressing a prohibition. If one is allowed to lie for the sake of peace, he certainly can lie to protect someone from sinning!

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Father (outside) and Mother (inside)

The braisa (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 18) states: A person can accept kiddushin for his daughter again (if she became widowed or divorced after betrothal), he can sell her again, and he can marry her off after selling her as a maidservant. However, he cannot sell her after marrying her off. Rabbi Shimon says: Just as he cannot do this, he cannot sell her as a maidservant after he already sold her once.

This is like the argument of the following Tannaim. The braisa says: “When he betrayed her.” Once he spread his cloak over her (in marriage), he cannot sell her; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says, “When he betrayed her,” teaches that once he betrayed her (sold her as a maidservant) he cannot sell her.

What is their argument? Rabbi Eliezer says: The way the word is written in the Torah is important. Rabbi Akiva says: The way it is read is important. Rabbi Shimon says: Both are important. [“Important” here refers to how we understand the intent of the Torah. If we focus on the word as it is read, it refers to clothing, while if we focus on the letters, it refers to being sold.]

This is similar to a debate in the Gemora in Sukkah which discusses if a sukkah requires two full walls and a third wall that is at least a tefach, or should there be three complete walls. This debate is based on whether one reads the word Sukkos in the Torah with the letter vav or without the letter vav. The Chachamim maintain that we say yeish eim lemasores, the transmitted written form has primacy, whereas Rabbi Shimon maintains that yeish eim lemikra, the pronounced form has primacy.

The Rif was questioned as to why the Gemora uses the word eim, which means mother, and not av, which means father. A similar question would be that the Gemora refers to one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics as a binyan av and not a binyan eim.

The Rif initially responded that he never heard anyone shed light on this matter, but then he proceeded to offer a possible explanation. When the purpose of a principle is to teach a concept in a different area, the Gemora uses the term av, whereas if the discussion at hand is regarding relying on a principle, the Gemora uses the word eim.

Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha explains the words of the Rif. The mother is the akeres habayis, the mainstay of the house as it is said every honorable princess dwelling within. For this reason we say yeish eim lemikra or yeish eim lemasores, as the mother is the central figure in the house and it is the mother who everyone is dependant upon. The father, on the other hand, is not usually found in the house, as he leaves the house to seek a livelihood. The principle of a binyan av, however, is that we are building from one location to another, and this is analogous to a father who influences others. (See Rabbeinu Bachye to Devarim 33:8 for further discussion on the differences between the father and mother.)

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Yovel for a Runaway Servant

Rav Sheishes (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 17) explained a braisa (which ruled that a servant who runs away does not receive gifts) to be referring to a case where the servant ran away, and Yovel intervened. The braisa is teaching us that he does not receive gifts in this case (and he is not considered as if the master has freed him).

The Ramba”m rules that the runaway servant does gain his freedom when Yovel intervenes. The Ritv”a explains that there is no servant who remains by the master after Yovel.

The Sma”g, however, disagrees, and he bases his ruling upon a Yerushalmi which indicates that a servant who is not under the jurisdiction of his master when Yovel intervenes, does not go free by Yovel.

The Kesef Mishna asks: Why would the Sma”g rule in accordance with the Yerushalmi when the Bavli (our Gemora) rules that he does go free?

The Lechem Mishna explains that the Sma”g will explain our Gemora differently. He would learn that the Gemora’s conclusion is that the runaway servant does not go free in this case, and that is why he does not receive any severance gifts.

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Singing after the Egyptian's Died

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 16) cites a braisa that a servant who runs away is required to complete the remainder of his six-year term.

The Chanukas Hatorah asks the following question in Parshas Beshalach: Why did Bnei Yisroel not break out in song immediately upon leaving Egypt? Why did they wait until after the splitting of the Sea?

He answers: The halachah is that if a servant runs away before his term expires, he is required to complete it. However, the halachah is that if the master dies, he is not obligated to finish his servitude.

We know that the Jewish people left Egypt prior to the four-hundred years that they were destined to remain there. Accordingly, they would have been required to complete this term at some later date. However, once the Egyptians died, they were completely freed. This is why they waited to sing until after they saw that the Egyptians died.

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Maidservant

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 15) used a verse to teach us that a Jewish maidservant does not have the option of remaining a servant by becoming a nirtza.

The Rishonim ask: Why is a special verse necessary for this? Since the halachah is that only a servant sold by Beis Din can become a nirtza, but not one who sells himself; isn’t it therefore obvious that a maidservant cannot become a nirtza? She is not sold by Beis Din!?

Tosfos answers: It could have been said that anyone who is sold without their consent can become a nirtza, and in this respect, a maidservant is similar to someone sold by Beis Din. Her father sells her and she has no say in the matter. Another verse is required to teach us that she cannot become a nirtza.

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A Widow's Permission

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It is written in the sefer Siach Sarfei Kodesh: The Rebbe Reb Bunim was learning with his students. Amongst them was Reb Hersh Temishvar. He was one who would listen intently, but never once did he ask or answer anything.

One day, the other students came over to Reb Hersh and informed him of the new policy: If he wouldn’t contribute anything to the class, he would be asked to leave.

They were learning that day the portion in Gemora Kiddushin (Daf Yomi: 13a)dealing with the question of where is the source that teaches us that the husband’s death completely permits the wife to remarry.

The Kotzker Rebbe asked his students: Why can this not be derived from the fact that Dovid HaMelech married the wife of Naval after he died? If the husband’s death does not allow the wife to remarry, how could Dovid have married her?

Reb Hersh spoke up and answered as follows: It would not be a proof from that incident, for Naval was considered a rebel against Dovid’s Kingdom, and therefore all of his possessions legally belong to Dovid. Accordingly, even if we would say that a husband’s death would not permit the wife to remarry, Dovid would still be permitted to marry his wife, for he is the owner of all of Naval’s possessions. We would have thought that Naval’s wife would have been included in his possessions, and that would have allowed Dovid to marry her.

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Kiddushin Daf 12

MONEY; NOT DIRT

Shmuel Daf yomi Kiddushin 12a said: If someone betroths a woman with a date, even if a kur of dates is only worth a dinar, we say that she is betrothed, as a single date might be worth a perutah in (the country of) Media (where dates are not so common).

The Ra”n explains that this is because she can say that to her, the date is worth a perutah.

This explanation is challenged by the Acharonim, for if so, the kiddushin should be valid even if it is not worth a perutah in Media (similar to the incident involving Rav Kahana and the kerchief cited above)?

The Pardes Yosef answers: In order for someone to say, “It is worth a perutah to me,” it has to be regarded as “money,” and not mere earth. It is considered “money” if it valued as a perutah somewhere in the world. If the date is worth a perutah in Media, the woman can say here, “It is worth a perutah to me.”

PERUTAH

Today, the custom, based upon the Ram”a is as follows: Under the chupah, prior to the man giving the ring to the woman, the Rabbi asks the witnesses in the presence of the bride whether, in their opinion, the ring is worth a perutah, the minimum amount necessary for the marriage to be effective. This is done in order that the woman should know that her husband is only marrying her with one perutah of the value of the ring, and the remaining value is a present. It follows, therefore, that if the ring were to be found fake, it should not affect the marriage. As long as the ring was worth a perutah, she cannot claim that she consented to the marriage under an erroneous assumption. Although she thought that her present (the ring) was worth more than it actually did, it cannot affect the marriage.

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Kiddushin at Night

The Mishna had stated: The monetary transaction, according to Beis Shamai, must be done with a dinar or the equivalent of a dinar.

The Gemora Daf Yomi Kiddushin 11a asks: What is Beis Shamai’s reasoning?

Rabbi Zeira answers: A woman is particular that she should not become betrothed for less than a dinar.

Abaye asks: If so, what about the daughters of Rabbi Yannai, who are generally particular not to accept kiddushin of less than three kav of gold dinars? Are you saying that if she would accept only a dinar from someone that it would not be a valid kiddushin?

Rabbi Zeira responds: If she would knowingly take this amount of kiddushin, indeed it would be valid. The case I am referring to is if she took the money at night (and was unable to see the value of the coin). Alternatively, the case is where she made a messenger to accept kiddushin for her, and did not specify how much she wants.

The Mizrachi maintains that a get given at night is Biblically invalid. Accordingly, the halachah should be that kiddushin given at night is also invalid, for kiddushin is juxtaposed to geirushin (divorce).

The Acharonim challenge this ruling from our Gemora which clearly states that a kiddushin given at night is valid!?

The Shaar HaMelech writes that our Gemora can be referring to a kiddushin where the man gave money to the woman at night, for kiddushin through money is not derived from geirushin. The Mizrachi, however, is referring to kiddushin through a document. That will not be valid if done at night, for that we derive from geirushin.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman disagrees and states that the Rishonim who assert that kiddushin through money is not learned out from geirushin only say that with respect to the act of kiddushin, and that is why kiddushin is valid with using something that is connected to the ground (even though a get of that type will be invalid). However, with respect to the validity of the kiddushin, all types of methods of kiddushin are derived from geirushin (and then the halachah of invalidating a kiddushin occurring at night can quite possible be derived from geirushin, even when it is done through money).

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Expert in all Areas

Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira Daf Yomi Kiddushin 10a sent back to Ben Bag Bag: You do not hold this way? I understand that you are an expert in many areas of the Torah. Don’t you know how to derive a kal vachomer?

Why must he be an expert in many areas of the Torah in order to expound a kal vachomer? Isn’t a kal vachomer based upon logic?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman cites from Reb Chaim Brisker who explained as follows: One need not be an expert to expound a kal vachomer; however, the kal vachomer might be refuted from another area of Torah. In order for one to expound a kal vachomer that will not be refuted from anywhere else in the Torah, he must be an expert in all areas of Torah.

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Diamond Ring

The Gemora Daf Yomi Kiddushin 9aconcludes that silk (or things of unknown value that are clearly worth a perutah or more) do not require an evaluation before kiddushin.

Tosfos writes that this is only regarding items that their value is somewhat known and it is uncommon for people to make mistakes about it. However, items such as gems and pearls, where there are some that have very little value, people are apt to think that they are worth a lot, when in truth, they are worth very little; these require appraisal before they are used for kiddushin. This is why it has become the custom not to give diamond rings for kiddushin.

[Why has it become the custom to use a ring for kiddushin?]

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Rav Kahana Ha'Kohen

Rav Yosef states (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 8a): How do I know this (that an equivalent of money used for kiddushin must have a defined monetary value)? The braisa states: If someone says, “This calf or garment is for the redemption of my firstborn son,” he has not said (or done) anything (even if he gives it to the Kohen). If he says, “This calf or garment that is worth five sela’im is to the Kohen for the redemption of my firstborn son,” it is valid. What is the case? If they are not actually worth five sela’im, why should we think it is valid? It must be the first case is where it really is worth five sela’im, but was not appraised.

The Gemora answers: The (second) case is where it was not appraised, but the Kohen accepted it as if it was worth five sela’im. Rav Kahana indeed used to accept a (special male) head covering for the redemption, and he would say, “For me this is worth five sela’im.”

Rav Ashi says: This only applies to Rav Kahana, who was a great man and required a head covering. This would not apply to everyone. This is similar to the incident where Mar bar Rav Ashi bought a head covering from the mother of Rabbah in Kubi, and paid thirteen although it was worth ten. [One explanation is that important people pay more for things that they need than regular people (others give a different explanation, see Chidushei Ha’Rashba).]

Tosfos deduces from our Gemora that Rav Kahana was a Kohen.

However, he asks that it is evident from a Gemora in Pesachim (49a) that he was not a Kohen (rather, his wife was a Kohenes)!?

Tosfos answers that the Rav Kahana mentioned in our Gemora was evidently not the same one mentioned in the Gemora Pesachim. Alternatively, Rav Kahana took the redemption money for the firstborn on behalf of his wife.

Reb Akiva Eiger notes that the father has discharged his obligation by giving the money to Rav Kahana, for his wife is certainly pleased that he accepted the money for her.

It is noteworthy that other Rishonim disagree with Tosfos and maintain that the redemption money for a firstborn must be given only to a male Kohen, and not to a Kohenes!

The Mishneh La’Melech writes that it would seem from Tosfos that he is uncertain regarding this matter, and that is why he offers two answers.

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Mentioning Evil First

Rava stated: Let us see; where do we derive the rule for conditions? It is from the condition mentioned in the Torah regarding the Tribes of Reuven and Gad. Therefore, just as there, the positive feature (they will receive the land if they fulfill the condition) comes before the negative (if they do not fight together with the rest of Klal Yisroel, they will not receive that land), so too, it should be in all cases.

It is written [Bamidbar 16:29 - 30]: If these men die as all men die and the fate of all men will be visited upon them, then Hashem has not sent me. But if Hashem creates a creation, and the earth opens its mouth and swallows them and all that is theirs, and they descend alive into the grave, you will know that these men have provoked Hashem.

The Haflaah in Panim Yafos asks: Shouldn’t Moshe have stated the positive feature before the negative?

He answers: Our Gemora (Gittin 75) states that a man does not want to begin with a mention of evil for himself, and therefore he will say, “If I do not die” before stating, “If I will die.” So too, Moshe did not want to begin with mentioning evil even for these wicked people, and therefore, he worded the stipulation in a manner that the mention of this horrific type of death should be delayed for as long as possible.

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Compliance with the Rabbis - Gittin 73

Rabbah and Rava did not agree with Rav Huna (and they hold that if a deathly ill person gives a get and recovers, it is a valid get), as they were afraid it might lead people to think that a get could be given after death.

The Gemora asks: Since the get is void in accordance with Biblical law, how can we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world?

The Gemora answers: Yes! Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.)

The Rashba asks: Why don’t we apply this rule in the case in Yevamos where a man fell into water that has no end? There, we rule that the wife will remain an agunah because the husband might have exited the water from a place that was not visible to us. Why don’t we say that the Chachamim revoked the original kiddushin from him, and she may remarry another man?

He answers: It is only applicable in certain cases. If, for example, there was a get, except that it was written with a condition, and an uncertainty arose regarding the condition, the Chachamim can revoke his kiddushin. Another example where the Chachamim would revoke the kiddushin is where one witness is testifying on the woman’s behalf (that her husband died). However, when there is no get and no witness, the Chachamim did not go ahead and revoke a kiddushin.

The Gemora in Yevamos (110a) records an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid).

Rav Ashi explains that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Chachamim therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. (This is following the opinion of Rav, who maintains that for the marriage of a minor to become valid, she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult, and if not the marriage is invalid.)

The Chachamim were empowered to remove the kiddushin in this case because he acted improperly in the beginning of the kiddushin.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei Hashas cites a Teshuvos haRashba who writes that we only apply the principle of “Since he acted improperly, the Chachamim acted improperly with him” in places that are specifically mentioned in Chazal. The Sages did not annul the marriage in every case where one acts with trickery. This can be proven from a Gemora in Kiddushin (58b). The Gemora states: One who instructs his fellow to marry a woman for him (as an agent), and the agent goes ahead and marries her for himself, she is married to the second one. We do not say that since he acted improperly, the Chachamim invalidated his marriage.

This can also be proven from the fact that even if one betroths a woman who is subject to a negative prohibition, kiddushin, nevertheless takes effect. This is also true if someone marries a woman who is a secondary ervah to him. Obviously, sometimes this principle is applied, and sometimes, it isn’t.

The Chasam Sofer asks: Why, in these cases (where he betroths a woman subject to a negative prohibition, or a secondary ervah) do we not say that the Chachamim revoked his kiddushin?

He answers, based upon Tosfos, who says that it is for this reason that the groom tells the bride that he is betrothing her according to the laws of Moshe and all of Israel. The kiddushin is only effective if Israel, i.e. the Chachamim consent to the marriage. However, one who is violating the Torah, or the sages, is obviously not marrying with such a stipulation and therefore, the marriage can still be effective. [According to the Chasam Sofer, not every marriage has that stipulation attached to it.]

The Shiltei Giborim states that this principle applies by a get as well. Anyone who divorces a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis may, in certain cases retroactively revoke the divorce.

Based upon this, the Taamei Yaakov answers the following famous question on Rabbeinu Gershom’s decree: Since the Torah expressly permits one to divorce his wife without her consent, how can this be banned? The Taz lais down a rule that the Rabbis do not have the authority to prohibit something which is explicitly permitted by the Torah!?

He answers that since the Rabbis forbid giving a get in such a manner, it is automatically nullified, for one’s betrothal and divorce can only be effective if he is compliance with the Rabbis’ ordinances. In these cases, the Rabbis did not consent to such a get.

[I am uncertain as to how this answers the question. Granted, the get will be ineffective since it is prohibited to give a get without the woman’s consent; but how did the Rabbis have the authority to issue such a decree? If the Torah expressly permits it, they cannot forbid it!?]

Path to Sanctity

The Gemora states: Whoever betroths a woman in Jewish marriage, betroths her subject to the will of the Rabbis.

The baalei mussar say: One who wants to sanctify and purify himself in his service to his Creator, should do so subject to the will of the Rabbis. He should go to the Rabbis and the righteous people of his generation, and they shall guide him in his quest. One who tries to forge a path himself is apt to stumble and make mistakes; nothing substantive will result from it.

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Directly from Hashem

The Gemora (Gittin 72) cited a braisa: If a scribe wrote a get for the sake of a specific woman, and the witnesses signed it for her sake as well, although they wrote, signed and gave it to the husband, and the husband gave the get to his wife, it is not valid until the scribe and the witnesses hear the husband’s voice telling them to write and sign it.

It is evident from here that if one person tells another to tell another, it is not regarded as if the third person heard it from the first.

Reb Yosef Engel asks from a Gemora in Kiddushin (22b), which states: Why is the ear different than all the other limbs in the body (that it is chosen for piercing for a slave that chooses to stay by his master)? The Holy One, Blessed be He said, “The ear that heard My voice on Mount Sinai when I said, ‘Bnei Yisroel are slaves to Me, and not slaves to other slaves,’ and this person went and acquired another master for himself, his ear should be pierced!” Why is it regarded as if he heard these words from Hashem? Bnei Yisroel only heard the first two commandments from Him; the rest were said over by Moshe!? We could have answered that since Moshe heard it directly from Hashem, and Bnei Yisroel heard it from Moshe, it is regarded as if they heard it directly from Hashem. However, based on our Gemora, that is incorrect!?

He answers that since when Moshe spoke, the Shechinah was talking through Moshe’s throat, it was considered as if they heard the commandments directly from Hashem.

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From their Mouth's and not from their Writings

The Gemora (Gittin 71) states that testimony is valid only from the mouths of the witnesses, not on the basis of any documents. It is evident that writing is not the same as talking.

The Gemora Chagigah (10b) cites Shmuel who states that one who resolves to make a vow must express the vow with his lips; otherwise, it is meaningless.

The Noda b’Yehudah (Y”D I: 66) inquires if an oath that was written down but not expressed would be valid as an oath. His underlying question is: Do we regard his written word as an expression of his lips?

This should be dependent on a dispute between the Rambam and Rabbeinu Tam regarding the validity of testimony from a written document. The Rambam maintains that testimony must be from the mouth of the witnesses and a document will not be Biblically acceptable for testimony. Rabbeinu Tam disagrees and holds that one who is physically capable of testifying may testify through the means of a document.

He concludes, however, that even the Rambam would agree that writing is considered testimony and yet, a written document cannot be accepted by Beis Din. The logic for this is as follows: An act of writing can constitute speech, but only during the time that it is being written. Beis Din will only accept an oral testimony when they hear it directly; hearsay is disqualified. Witnesses who signed a document are testifying, but Beis Din is not present at that time. If they would sign in front of Beis Din, that would be considered valid testimony.

With this principle, you can answer what would seemingly be a contradiction in the Rambam. He rules in Hilchos Eidus (3:7) that testimony must be from the mouth of the witnesses and a document will not be Biblically acceptable for testimony; yet later in Perek 9:11, he writes that one is required to testify with his mouth or at least that he is fitting to testify with his mouth. This would imply that if he is fitting to testify with his mouth, he would be permitted to testify through the means of a document. According to the Noda b’Yehudah’s explanation, it can be said that the Rambam allows witnesses to testify through the means of a document, but only if they sign the document when Beis Din is present. Accordingly, we can say that an oath taken through writing will be binding.

Reb Akiva Eiger discusses some other practical applications for this principle.

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Healing an Idolater

(Gittin 70) For a skin disease (moist outside and dry inside), he should take seven plump wheat stalks and roast them over a new hoe and smear himself with the oil that exudes from them. Rav Shimi bar Ashi used this remedy for a certain idolater for “something else” (leprosy), and it cured him.

Tosfos asks from the Gemora in Avodah Zarah (26b) which states that it is forbidden to heal an idolater. The Gemora rules that one may not assist an idolater woman giving birth, even for payment, for she will raise the child to serve idols!?

Tosfos answers that Rav Shimi was permitted to heal the idolater, for this would help him perfect his medical skills, and thus enable him to heal other Jews.

Tosfos in Avodah Zarah adds that Rav Shimi was not an expert practitioner at all, and he was training when he cured the idolater.

Furthermore, in cases where the idolater knows that the Jew has the ability to cure him, it would be permitted to heal him, for otherwise, it would propagate hatred from them to us.

Alternatively, there may be a distinction between a child being born, who will serve idols, and one who already worships idols.

The Geresh Yerachim asks: How was Elisha permitted to heal Naaman from his leprosy?

He answers that Elisha knew that Naaman would not serve idols any longer, and therefore, it was permitted.

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Frontwards and Backwards

The Gemora (Gittin 69) states: For blood running out of one’s nose, one should bring a Kohen whose name is Levi, and he should write the name Levi backwards.

The Tiferes Yosef explains: It is well-known in the books of Kabbalah that the alef beis written forward connotes kindness, for this way, the inspiration comes in the regular manner; descending from Heaven to earth. The alef beis written backwards connotes judgment, similar to fire, which ascends from the earth.

It is written in the Zohar that a Kohen is a man of kindness, and a Levi is one of judgment. This is why the name Levi, written backwards, signifying judgment, should be written by a Kohen, for he represents kindness.

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Ancient Cures

The Maharsha (Gittin 69) asks: The Gemora in Brochos (10b) states that Chizkiyahu hid the book of remedies and the sages praised him for this. This book contained instructions on healing various diseases through the use of different herbs and plants. Rashi explains that the sages praised him for hiding the book, because people were relying upon these remedies and they were not praying to Hashem for healing. If so, why does the Gemora record all these remedies here?

The Maharsha answers: A doctor definitely has permission to heal the sick, and he therefore has the right to know the cure for all sicknesses. However, these should not be publicized to all people, for some people will not have faith in Hashem; rather, they will rely on these natural remedies. And just as it was permitted to write down the Oral Law, for otherwise, it would be forgotten; so too, it was permitted to write down these cures, for otherwise, they would all be forgotten.

The Geresh Yerachim answers: the book of remedies that Chizkiyahu hid contained cures that were accurate and functioned for any sick person. If that would have remained in existence, people would rely only on that, and not on Hashem. However, the remedies mentioned in our Gemora do not work for every person. There are many factors that would prevent a person from being cured, even if he followed the exact instructions. Therefore, even when these remedies would be applied, one would still need to pray to Hashem in order to be healed.

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Traits of the Sages

It was stated (Gittin 67) : Shmuel said in the name of Rebbe that the halachah is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who said that verbal instructions cannot be passed on to an agent.

Rabbi Shimon the son of Rebbe said to Rebbe: Seeing that Rabbi Chanina of Ono and Rabbi Meir disagree with Rabbi Yosi, what was Rebbe’s reason for saying that the halachah follows Rabbi Yosi?

He replied: Be quiet, my son, be quiet; you have never seen Rabbi Yosi. Had you seen him, you would know that he always had reasons for his views. For we learned in a braisa: Issi ben Yehudah used to specify the praiseworthy merits of the various Sages. Rabbi Meir was a scholar and a scribe. Rabbi Yehudah was a scholar when he desired to be. Rabbi Tarfon resembled a heap of nuts. [When he was asked a question, he cited proofs from Scripture, Medrash, Mishnah, halachah and aggadah, like a heap of nuts toppling over one another.] Rabbi Yishmael resembled a well-stocked shop. [Whenever someone asked him something, he replied immediately, without keeping him waiting.] Rabbi Akiva was like a storehouse with compartments. [All his learning was organized by subject and each subject was taught separately.] Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri was like a basket of a spice peddler. [He could answer questions from any subject.] Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah was like an individual’s basket of spices. [The spice peddler has many varieties of spices.] The teachings of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov were measured but pure. [He did not issue many rulings, but the halachah follows him.] Rabbi Yosi always had reasons for his views. Rabbi Shimon used to grind a lot and let out only a little. It was taught in a braisa that this meant that he used to forget little, and whatever he did forget was only bran (teachings that were not in accordance with halachah). And so too, Rabbi Shimon said to his disciples: My sons, learn my teachings, since my teachings are the cream of the cream of Rabbi Akiva’s.

*** The Peri Megadim asks: It is forbidden to speak the praises of a person, even in his presence!?

He answers: Rebbe spoke these praises to himself.

*** The Maharsha asks: Why is it considered a praise about Rabbi Yehudah that he was a scholar when he desired to be? Isn’t that derogatory?

The Aruch explains that Rabbi Yehudah was the first of the speakers. The Iyun Yaakov explains that he was humble, and although he had permission from the king to speak first, he did not want this honor, and he only used it when it was absolutely necessary.

*** The Kesef Mishnah in Hilchos Beis Habechirah (2:18) states that the halachah follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov only when he is mentioned in a Mishna, but not when he is mentioned in a braisa.

The Chacham Tzvi challenges this from the fact that Shimon ben Azai found this rule in the Megillas Setarim, which was written before Rebbe arranged the Mishnayos, so obviously, the rule is all encompassing, even the braisos!?

Tosfos Yom Hakippurim asks that the Kesef Mishnah contradicts himself, for he explains the Rambam in Hilchos Teshuvah (2:8) that the Rambam holds like Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov because his teachings were measured but pure, and this halachah was mentioned in a braisa!?

He explains that whenever he is mentioned in a Mishna, the halachah follows him. However, when he is mentioned in a braisa, it depends upon the logic of his argument.

The Yad Malachei writes that in truth, the Kesef Mishnah holds that the Rambam always rules like Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, even when he is mentioned in a braisa. The Kesef Mishnah that was cited above was in fact a gloss from one of his students, and it erroneously got inserted into the text of the Kesef Mishnah.

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Demons

If someone was thrown into a pit and calls out that anyone who hears him should write a get to his wife (specifying his name and his city), those who hear this should indeed write and send the get to his wife (we assume that he omitted the instruction of giving the get due to the confusion of his situation).

The Gemora (Gittin 66) asks: Is it not possible that it was a demon (who are suspect of evil behavior, such as deceiving people) that issued that proclamation?

Rav Yehudah replied: The Mishna is referring to a case where they saw in him the form of a man.

The Mishnah Lamelech proves that that there were only two people heard the voice, for if there were three people there, a demon would not reveal itself to them. Now, if there are only two people, it must be that one of them is writing the get and signing on it. This will prove that the signature of a scribe together with one witness is sufficient! This would be problematic, for Amoraim below argue on this exact issue!?

Poras Yosef answers that the Mishna can be referring to a case where there were three people there, and the demon would nevertheless reveal itself, because they were far away from each other.

The Beis Aharon writes that in a place where demons are accustomed to be, such as inside pits, they will reveal themselves even in the presence of three people.

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Chalifin for a MInor - Gittin 65

Rava said: There are three categories of a minor: If he would be given a rock, he would discard it, but if given a walnut, he would accept it, he can make an acquisition on things, but he may not acquire for others.

Tosfos asks that it seems from a Gemora in Bava Basra that a minor does not have the ability to acquire anything!?

Tosfos answers: The Gemora there could be referring to a minor who has not yet reached this stage of understanding.

Alternatively, they answer that the Gemora there is referring only to a kinyan chalifin (acquiring something through an exchange with a kerchief or other object), where a minor has a more difficult time grasping the mechanics of the kinyan.

The Ra”n explains that the Rabbis instituted for a minor only those kinyanim where the object is raised or pulled by the minor; however, other types of kinyanim, where the concepts are difficult to grasp, are not effective for the minor.

The Rashb”a adds that since we rule that the object being used for the chalifin must be owned by the one making the acquisition, it emerges that the minor must convey the object to the seller. He does not have enough knowledge to accomplish that and therefore the kinyan is not effective.

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Rav Kahana and the Poor Man's Dates

The Gemora (Gittin 61) relates an incident: Rav Kahana was going to Hutzal and he saw a certain person who was throwing sticks at a palm tree so that the dates would fall to the ground. Rav Kahana picked up the dates and ate them. The person said to Rav Kahana, “You saw that I had picked some of the dates with my hand (and therefore it is actual theft for you to take them).”

Rav Kahana said to him: You must be from Rabbi Yoshiyah’s city (who often gave public discourses in the city; that is why you know these halachos). Rav Kahana applied the following verse to Rabbi Yoshiyah: And a righteous man is the foundation of the world.

Tosfos asks: Even if Rav Kahana did not know that the person picked the dates with his hand, he still should not have eaten them!? Why was he not concerned with our Mishna’s ruling that we do not take from the poor in the interest of peace?

Tosfos answers that the man was taking the branches off the tree and the dates were falling off themselves. Rav Kahana thought that the man had no interest in the dates.

The Ramban answers that Rav Kahana thought that he was an idolater and the Mishna did not rule that the produce of an idolater is protected because of harmony.

The Rashba answers that Rav Kahana himself was a poor person (or he was regarded as one since he was traveling). [This answers why he would have been permitted to take the dates that was seemingly reserved for the poor.]

The Meiri writes that the decree of promoting harmony was instituted primarily for a poor person who would be taking for himself and eating in his house; however, the enactment for the interest of peace would not affect a passerby, such as Rav Kahana, who would be eating on the road.

The Vilna Gaon says that this decree was instituted only with respect to olives, but not for dates.

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Kohen takes Precedence, even after Ressurection - Gittin 59

It is written [Vayikra 21:8]: You shall sanctify him, for he offers the bread of your God. And it was taught in the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yishmael: You shall sanctify him teaches us that in all matters pertaining to holiness, the Kohen takes precedence. He should be the first one called to read the Torah. He should be the first to recite the blessing by a meal. He takes the first portion (if he is dividing something with a Yisroel, the Kohen has the right to choose the first portion).

The Gemora in Megillah records the following incident: Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira ate the Purim meal together. They became intoxicated. Rabbah got up and slaughtered Rabbi Zeira. On the following day, Rabbah pleaded for mercy and he revived Rabbi Zeira. On the next year, Rabbah invited Rabbi Zeira to eat with him. Rabbi Zeira replied: A miracle does not occur at all times.

The Kli Chemda at the end of Parshas Breishis cites a kuntrus called Over Oreach. In this sefer, a question is asked: The Gemora Brochos (46a) records an incident where Rabbi Avahu honored Rabbi Zeira to recite the blessing and cut the bread. The Rashba asks that this is inconsistent with the halachah which states that this honor should be reserved for the host. The Rashba answers: since the meal was on behalf of Rabbi Zeira (he had recovered from a sickness), Rabbi Zeira was considered the host. Why didn’t the Rashba answer that Rabbi Zeira was a Kohen (Yerushalmi Brochos 8:6)? He answers that since this incident happened after the episode of Rabbah with Rabbi Zeira mentioned in Megillah (Rabbah slew him and the following day revived him), Rabbi Zeira lost his sanctity of being a Kohen and did not merit the right of this honor.

The Kli Chemda is greatly perplexed by this answer. Every Kohen is considered a Kohen because his father was a Kohen. It is obvious that he did not lose his relations with his relatives because he dies, so why shouldn’t he be a Kohen? (Rabbi Chaim Berlin cites a Gemora in Sanhedrin, proving that the Kehunah remains even after resurrection.) Perhaps he would have required a new inauguration to serve in the Beis Hamikdosh but he definitely did not lose the status of being a Kohen. He cites proof from the story with Elisha that one does not relinquish his relations with his relatives after he dies.

(Look at the Ramban in the beginning of Parshas Emor, where he writes that a Kohen has certain halachos because he is a descendant of Aharon HaKohen and other halachos are because he is a Kohen himself.)

After his resurrection, would he be required to marry his wife again? Reb Elchonon Wasserman discusses the status of the wife of Eliyahu after he ascended to Heaven without dying.

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Child Prodigy

The Gemora (Gittin 58) related the following incident: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah once happened to go to the great city in Rome, and he was told there that there was in the prison a child with beautiful eyes and face and his curly hair was arranged in locks. He went and stood at the doorway of the prison and said, “Who gave Yaakov over for spoil and Israel to the plunderers?” The child answered (by continuing the verse mentioned by Rabbi Yehoshua), “Is it not Hashem? It is on account of this; we have sinned against Him, and our fathers did not want to go in His ways, neither did they listen to His Torah.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah said: I feel sure that this child will be a teacher in Israel. I swear by the Temple service that I will not move from here before I ransom him with whatever price that they demand for him. They said that he did not leave the spot before he had ransomed him with a huge amount of money, and it was not too long afterwards before he became a teacher in Israel. Who was he? He was Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha.

The question is asked: What was so exceptional about the boy’s answer that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah declared that he was certain that this child will grow up to be a tremendous Torah scholar?

The Vilna Gaon explains based on the following Gemora in Brochos (4a): It is written: “Ad ya’avor amecha Hashem; ad ya’avor am zu kanisa.” Until your people pass through, Hashem; until this people that You have acquired pass through. Until your people pass through, Hashem is in reference to the first time that the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisroel (in the times of Yehoshua). Until this people that You have acquired pass through is in reference to the second time that the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisroel (in the times of Ezra). From here, the Chachamim have said: The Jewish people deserved that a miracle should be performed for them at the time of Ezra (when they were crossing the Jordan River into Eretz Yisroel) in the same manner that happened to them in the times of Yehoshua. However, due to their sins, they lost this reward.

Accordingly, it can be said that this is what Rabbi Yehoshua was asking: Who gave Yaakov over for spoil and Israel to the plunderers? Although the Jewish people were on a low level when they entered Bavel (as the name Yaakov connotes), but why weren’t they redeemed with a complete redemption (when they were on a higher level, as the name Israel connotes)?

The child answered: It is on account of this (zu); we have sinned against Him. By the second redemption, it is written zu, this; and since we have sinned, we lost the reward that we originally deserved.

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Haman's Descendants

The Gemora (Gittin 57) had stated that some of Haman’s grandchildren (his son’s sons) taught Torah in Bnei Brak.

There are those who ask the following: How is this possible? Why, behold, we do not accept converts from Amalek!?

Reb Yosef Engel answers that it is possible in the following scenario: An Amaleki woman got married to an idolater from a different nation. She gave birth to a son. That son is not regarded as an Amaleki, for the law regarding idolaters is that a child’s heritage is based upon his father, not his mother. A child from this son could be accepted as a convert. It emerges that the Gemora did not mean that Haman’s son’s sons converted; rather, there were descendants from Haman who converted and taught Torah in Bnei Brak.

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Kamtza and Bar Kamtza

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 55b - 56a) had stated: The destruction of Yerushalayim came about through Kamtza and Bar Kamtza in the following way: A certain man had a friend Kamtza and an enemy Bar Kamtza. He once made a party and said to his attendant, “Go and bring Kamtza.” The man went and brought Bar Kamtza. When the host found him there, he exclaimed, See, you are my enemy, what are you doing here? Get out!” Bar Kamtza said to him, “Since I am here, let me stay and I will pay you for whatever I eat and drink.” The host refused. Bar Kamtza said, “Then let me give you half the cost of the party.” “No,” said the host. “Then let me pay for the whole party,” Bar Kamtza said. He still refused and he took him by the hand and threw him out. Bar Kamtza said, “Since the Rabbis were sitting there and did not rebuke him, this shows that they agreed with him. I will go and slander them to the Government.” He went and said to Caesar, “The Jews are rebelling against you.” Caesar asked him, “Who says so?” He replied, “Send them an animal as a sacrifice and see whether they will offer it on the Altar. So he sent with him a fine calf. While on the way, Bar Kamtza made a blemish on its upper lip, or as some say, he cause a cataract in the eye, in a place where we consider it a blemish, but they do not. The Rabbis were inclined to offer it in order not to offend the Government. Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas said to them, “People will then say that blemished animals are offered on the Altar!” They then proposed to kill Bar Kamtza so that he should not go and inform against them, but Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas said to them, People will then say that one who makes a blemish on consecrated animals is to be put to death!”

There is a well known question: It is understandable why the Gemora lays the blame of the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash on Bar Kamtza, for he was the one who slandered the Jews to Caesar; however, what did Kamtza do wrong? Why does the Gemora introduce the incident by saying that it was on account of both of them?

The Ben Yehoyada answers that anyone who has the ability to protest when a sin is being committed and does not do so; the sin is called upon his name as well. Chazal understood that Kamtza, being a friend of the host, had the ability to prevent the host from evicting Bar Kamtza from the banquet. Since he did not do so, he became a partner in all the events that resulted from the eviction.

The Yalkut HaGershuni answers, based upon the premise that Kamtza was not at the banquet; he did not attend, for he did not receive an invitation. It was very possible that if he would have been there, the host would not have gotten so angry, for he would have seen that his friend joined him at the banquet. Kamtza, out of haughtiness, did not attend the party. He said to himself, “If he didn’t send me an invitation, I am not attending!” It emerges that Kamtza, due to his evil attribute, also had a share in Bar Kamtza’s actions.

The Chida answers that in truth, Kamtza did nothing wrong. The meaning of the Gemora is as follows: It was because the attendant was not careful regarding his master’s words that brought about this destruction. He did not distinguish between Kamtza and Bar Kamtza. This is as the Chachamim say: One must be extremely careful in the words he speaks, and one who listens to another person talking must pay careful attention, for sometimes, due to one mistaken word, there can be deadly consequences.

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Neder like a Bamah

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The Sefas Emes and Noam Elimelech teach us that the word neder, vow is related to the word dira, dwelling. What does an oath have to do with a dwelling?

Reb Chaim from Divrei Chaim cites the Shem m’Shmuel who questions the entire essence of nedarim: How is it that a person has the power through his verbal declaration to create prohibitions (in the case of nidrei bituei) and create a status of hekdesh (nidrei hekdesh)? This power goes so far that the Gemora is uncertain whether the object of a neder is subject to the laws of me’ilah for violating a neder!

He suggests the following: In essence no new kedushah is being created. The concept of neder is a recognition that beyond what meets the eye, there is a level of kedushah already inherent in the reality around us - the Shechinah already dwells immanently in the world.

Sefas Emes notes that the first person in the Torah to take a neder is Yaakov Avinu. While the other Avos revealed Hashem’s presence as similar to a mountain or a field, Chazal tell us that Yaakov revealed Hashem’s presence as the bayis, a dwelling. Chazal tell us that taking a neder is like building a bamah, an altar used outside the Mikdash. Hashem metaphorically “dwells” in the Bais haMikdash – to create a sanctified space for him - outside those confines is a task fraught with challenge.

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Husband's Knowledge

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b - 46a)had stated: Rabbi Meir says: If it is a vow which requires examination by a Chacham (and the husband cannot annul it by himself), he may not take her back, but for one which does not require examination by a Chacham (the husband can annul it himself), he may take her back (because in this case, the husband cannot advance the claim that the divorce was due to a misunderstanding). Rabbi Elozar said: They prohibited him to remarry in the case where the vow required examination by a Chacham to annul it only on account of the case where the vow did not require examination by a Chacham to annul it (since in the latter case, the husband might claim that he was not aware that he had the right to disallow the vow; in the former case, however, no such claim can be advanced because no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law).

The Gemora asks: What is the core of their argument? Rabbi Meir maintains that a husband does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law and therefore forbids remarriage on account of the first reason mentioned above, since the first husband might claim that if he had known that the vow could be disallowed by a Chacham, he would not have consented to give a divorce. Rabbi Elozar holds that no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law.

The Tosfos Rid explains the argument in the following manner. If the vow required a Chacham to permit it, he may not remarry her. This is because we are scared that he will say that if I merely knew that a Chacham could permit it, I would never have divorced her. He would have had her go before a Beis Din to have her vow permitted, despite the fact that this is embarrassing. However, if it is a vow that he could have nullified as her husband, there is no suspicion. This is because everyone knows that they can nullify certain vows that their wives make. The fact that he did not do so shows that he clearly wanted to divorce her; regardless of whether or not the vow was actually made. Rabbi Elozar holds that a husband does not always realize that he can nullify his wife’s vows. Therefore, they cannot remarry if he divorced her because of such a vow, as he will later claim that if he had known he could have done so, he would not have divorced her. Furthermore, Rabbi Elozar says that a vow that requires a Chacham or Beis Din is not really cause for them not to remarry. This is because he would not have taken his wife to a Chacham or beis din anyway, because it is denigrating. However, in this case as well they are forbidden to remarry because of the similarity to the case where a Chacham is not required.

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Ransoming for more than their Value

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The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b) had stated: We do not redeem captives for more than their true value for “the benefit of the world.”

The Gemora inquires: Does “the benefit of the world” (with respect to redeeming the captives for more than their worth) relate to the burden which may be imposed on the community (they will all become impoverished), or to the possibility that the bandits will take more captives? [The difference would be in a case where a private individual, such as a relative, wishes to redeem him.]

Come and hear: Levi ben Darga ransomed his daughter for thirteen thousand golden dinars.

Abaye asked: But are you sure that he acted with the consent of the Sages? Perhaps he acted against their will!

Rashi explains that “more than their true value” is referring to the amount that they would fetch if they would be sold in the slave market.

The Meiri writes that their value is based upon their individual wealth and prominence.

The Radvaz rules that we may ransom any captive with the amount of money that is usual to redeem other captives during that time period.

He adds: It has become the custom to redeem captive for more than their worth in the market, for an elderly person or a minor are not worth more than ten dinars, and nevertheless, they are ransomed for more than one hundred dinars. His explanation why there is no concern that the bandits will take more captives is because the captives are not being ransomed for any more that their gentile counterparts. He concludes that nothing should be told to Klal Yisroel about this, for they are a charitable nation, and it is better for them to remain that way.

Tosfos and the Ramban disagree regarding the halachah if the captive himself is allowed to ransom himself for more money than he is actually worth.

The Gemora in Kesuvos (52b) states: If one’s wife was captured and the kidnappers sought ten times her fair value for redemption, the first time the husband must redeem her. Afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that we do not redeem captives for more than they are worth for “the establishment of the world” (that captors should not thereby be encouraged to demand exorbitant prices for the ransom of their captive).

This issue had an extraordinary public application about 700 years ago. The leader of Ashkenazic Jewry at the time was Rabbi Meir ben Boruch of Rottenberg. He was imprisoned by a German ruler, Rudolph, whose voracity knew no bounds. Rabbi Meir (known as Maharam Mi’Rottenberg) was imprisoned until his death, and his body was not released. The community did not ransom him, as he himself had ruled. Seven years after his death, a private member of the community paid almost all of his own money to release the body, with the stipulation that he be buried next to him.

There is a question whether according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel a man would be permitted to ransom his wife if the ransom exceeds her worth. The Ritva holds that he may do so, and the Chelkas Mechokeik disagrees.

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Three Hundred Silver Pieces

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The Gemora in Megillah (16b) expounds the following verse [Breishis: 45:22]: He [Yosef] gave them all changes of clothes, and to Binyamin he gave three hundred [pieces of] silver and five changes of clothes. The Gemora asks: Is it possible that Yosef would stumble on the precise action that caused him to suffer? Yaakov had given Yosef a nice woolen garment which caused the brothers to become jealous and prompted them to sell him to Mitzrayim. Should Yosef now favor Binyamin over the other brothers? Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefes answers: Yosef was hinting that a descendant of his will go in front of a king dressed in five royal garments (referring to Mordechai).

The commentators ask: Why didn’t it bother the Gemora that Yosef gave to Binyamin three hundred pieces of silver, and none to the other brothers? Wouldn’t that have caused jealousy as well?

The Chasam Sofer answers based upon our Gemora, which states: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who sells his slave to an idolater; we penalize him and force him to buy him back for up to ten times the value of the slave.

An ordinary slave is worth thirty silver coins, as we know from the halachah in the Torah that if an ox gores and kills a slave, the owner must pay the master thirty silver coins.

Accordingly, the brothers who sold Yosef should have been obligated to pay the penalty of ten times Yosef’s value in order to redeem him. Since they did not redeem him, they therefore owed to Yosef three hundred silver coins (30 ∙ 10 = 300). This is why Yosef did not give them the three hundred silver coins that he gave to Binyamin. Binyamin, who was not involved in the selling at all, rightfully deserved this amount, and therefore, Yosef was not concerned that this would be a cause for jealousy.

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