A Portion for Levi

The Rashbam and Tosfos write that in the Messianic era, the division of Eretz Yisroel will be different in two respects.
1. The Tribe of Levi will receive a portion along with the other tribes.
2. Menasheh and Efraim will receive a portion as one tribe – the sons of Yosef; and not as two different tribes.

The Ra”n, Maharsha and others all challenge this from the verses in Yechezkel which clearly indicate that Yosef will receive two portions. It is also evident from there that Levi will not receive a portion at all!?

The verse that mentions Levi and also mentions Yosef as one is referring to the twelve gates that will be in Yerushalayim corresponding to the twelve tribes.

The Minchas Chinuch asks: How can it be that in the future, the prohibition against giving the Tribe of Levi a portion in Eretz Yisroel will be violated? A prophet does not have the right to institute any new commandments, so how could Yechezkel negate this prohibition explicitly written in the Torah?

Reb Dovid Pavarsky answers that the prohibition was not that Levi should not receive a portion; rather, it was that Levi should not take a portion that was not his. In the future, they will not be taking a portion that does not belong to them! It will be rightfully theirs!

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CALCULATIONS OF DEATHS

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There were no holidays for Israel like the 15th of Av and Yom Kippur. The Gemora offers several reasons for the celebration on the fifteenth of Av. Rabbah bar bar Chanah states in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that this was the day that the last of those who were destined to die in the desert died and that was when Hashem returned to speak to Moshe.

Rashbam cites the words of Chazal which are found in the Yerushalmi and the Medrashim in Eichah. Rabbi Levi said: Each year on the eve of Tishah b’Av, an announcement would be sent throughout the camp, saying: “Go out and dig graves, go out and dig graves.” The people would go out and dig graves and sleep in them. In the morning it would be announced to separate the dead from the living. They would arise and find their number diminished. In the last of the forty years, they did this but found themselves undiminished. They said, “We must have made a mistake in counting. Could it be that the Elders had miscalculated the beginning of the month through a mistaken sighting of the new moon?” They did the same thing on the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth, but still no one died. When the moon was full, they said, “It seems that the Holy One has annulled the decree from all of us,” so they made the fifteenth a holiday. They rejoiced at the realization that their entry to Eretz Yisroel was imminent. It was at that time that prophecy returned to Moshe.

Tosfos asks that according to this, they ceased to die on the ninth of Av preceding the last year. Why wasn’t the prophecy returned to Moshe from that year? He answers that since they were still under the impression that the following year, there once again will be thousands of deaths; they were still in a state of sadness and the Shechinah does not rest on one who is not happy. It wasn't until the fifteenth of Av when they came to the realization that there will be no more deaths; that brought about joy and the Shechinah came down to Moshe.

Tosfos states that every year there would be a little more than twenty-one thousand deaths. The deaths over twenty-one thousand totaled fifteen thousand over the duration of the forty years.

The Maharsha and other commentators ask on Tosfos that there were 603,000 people who came out of Egypt, and according to Tosfos, if you make the calculation, it would emerge that over the course of forty years, there will be over eight-hundred thousand deaths.

The Chavos Yair (250) cites from Harav Dovid Oppenheim who explains that any year that Tisha b’Av occurred on Shabbos; there would be no deaths. According to the calendar, it would emerge that there were nine times that this occurred in the Wilderness. It emerges that there were only twenty-eight years that the Bnei Yisroel would die. Multiply twenty-one thousand times twenty-eight and that will total five-hundred and eighty eight thousand. The numbers more than twenty-one thousand, over the course of the forty years equaled fifteen thousand and that is how the 603,000 people died.

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Miracle of Yocheved

The Gemora states that Yocheved bore Moshe when she was 130 years old, as Hashem performed a miracle and restored her to a youthful state.

The Ibn Ezra (Braishis 46:23) questions why the Torah does not even mention this miracle, when it goes to such length to describe and expand upon the miracle Hashem did to allow Sarah to conceive at the age of 90.

The Magid Midubno says that at the time of Sarah, it was rare for a woman to miraculously conceive a child under such conditions, and thus the miracle was a rarity and deserving of elaborate mention. However, at the time of Moshe’s birth, Chazal tell us that the women gave birth to six children at a time. At a time when miraculous childbirth was so common, the miracle of Yocheved conceiving at the age of 130 was not as outstanding, and therefore is not mentioned explicitly.

Age vs. Wisdom

The Gemora discusses the precedence of age vs. Torah wisdom in various settings. The summary of the halachah, as ruled in Shulchan Aruch (Y”D 244:18) is:
Older person Wiser person Torah setting General celebration
Advanced age Extraordinarily wise Wiser Older
Advanced age Wiser Older
Older Extraordinarily wise Wiser
Older Wiser Older

The older person only takes precedence if he is somewhat wise in Torah as well.

Husband vs. Sage in Oaths

The Gemora compares and contrasts hatarah and hafarah. The mechanism of the two and their parameters are different, and are not interchangeable. A Sage who invalidates an oath does hatarah, and by discovering a reason why the person regrets the oath, or would have never made the oath, makes the oath as if it were in error, and never in effect. However, a husband who breaks his wife’s oath, since it brings her discomfort, or impacts on their relationship, is empowered by the Torah to do hafarah, which removes the oath’s prohibition on his wife from this point on.

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DESCENDANTS OF YOSEF

The Gemora in Sotah (36b) explains: Even though Levi was below, the people standing by Mount Gerizim were more numerous because the descendants of Yosef (who were very populous) were with them; as it says: And the descendants of Yosef spoke to Yehoshua, saying, “Why have you given me but one lot and one portion for an inheritance, seeing that I am a huge nation?”

Rashi in Yehoshua notes that the descendants of Yosef were from the Tribe of Menasheh. The Radak explains that the descendants of Efraim did not have any legitimate complaint, for they had more people in their tribe when they left Egypt than now, when they entered Eretz Yisroel. Menasheh, on the other hand, had a valid complaint, for they had twenty thousand and five hundred more people now than when they left Egypt. The portions of land were allocated according to the amount of people each tribe had when they left Egypt, and since they were more numerous when they entered Eretz Yisroel than when they left Egypt, each one of them would be receiving a lesser portion.

Minchas Yaakov adds that this explanation can inferred from the verse which states that the descendants of Yosef spoke to Yehoshua. Reb Yaakov Kaminetzky in Emes l’Yaakov asks: Why by the spies, does the Torah state, to the Tribe of Yosef, to the tribe of Menasheh, but by Efraim, the Torah only writes, to the Tribe of Efraim? Why isn’t Yosef’s name mentioned? He answers that it is written [Breishis 48: 5 – 6]: And now, as for your two sons, who were born to you in the land of Egypt, until I came to you, to the land of Egypt they are mine. Efraim and Menasheh shall be mine like Reuven and Shimon. But your children, if you beget any after them, shall be yours; by their brothers’ names, they shall be called in their inheritance. The children born to Yosef afterwards did not merit being included in the Tribe of Yosef. Yosef had the choice of delivering them to any tribe that he wished. Since Menasheh was the firstborn, he combined all of his other children with them. It emerges that the descendants of Yosef, who were not offspring of Menasheh and Efraim, were included in the Tribe of Menasheh. It is for this reason that the Torah writes, to the Tribe of Yosef, to the tribe of Menasheh.

Our verse, which states that “the descendants of Yosef spoke to Yehoshua” is referring to the Tribe of Menasheh, which consisted of Menasheh’s offspring, plus the offspring of Yosef.

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The Masculine Gender Used for an Heiress

By: Meorod Hadaf HaYomi

According to Rabbeinu Tam in Tosfos (s.v. Melamed), Anah mentioned in the verse “and these are the children of Tzivon: Ayah and Anah” was a daughter, though later referred to in the masculine gender: “…he is Anah”. The reason, he asserts, is that her brother Ayah died before Tzivon’s demise and she therefore inherited Tzivon’s estate.

Rebbe Heshel of Krakow zt”l supported the view that heiresses are referred to in the masculine from the story of Tzelofchod’s daughters: Hashem tells Moshe to give them (lachem, in the masculine) a portion of their father’s estate (Bemidbar 27:7) as they inherited it like any sons (Chanukas HaTorah, Pinchas).

The commentator Pardes Yosef adds that Yaakov said to Rachel and Leah: “Hashem saved your father’s (avichem, in the masculine) livestock and gave it to me” (Bereishis 31:9). Lavan had no sons till Yaakov came to Charan (see Rashi on Bereishis 30:27) and his estate would have fallen to Rachel and Leah. Hashem saved the property destined for Rachel and Leah from Lavan’s sons and gave it to Yaakov.

The Torah’s Viewpoint on the
Rights of Inheritance

The Torah says in Bemidbar 27:8 that “if a man dies without a son, pass his estate to his daughter.” Now, had we been asked to formulate the verse, we would probably write “if a man dies, pass his estate to his son and if he has no son, to his daughter.”

In his Torah Temimah (ibid), Rabbi Baruch Epstein explains that the Torah thus hints that a son is his father’s natural heir and that there is no need to state this detail. The Torah starts to dictate the order of inheritance from the point where a father has no son.

The Torah Temimah is just one of the commentators who elucidate that the Torah’s order of inheritance may be understood by ordinary intelligence. For many reasons, a son is his father’s natural heir. Even his name, ben, is related to the word boneh – “builder” – as a son builds and perpetuates his father’s family. Nachalah – “inheritance” – comes from nachal, a “stream,” in the sense that it forms a continuity, and, in contrast, the Torah calls passing an estate to a daughter ha’avarah – “transfer” (HaGaon Rav Binyamin Tsvi Rabinovitz-Teomim zt”l in Be’inyan Yerushas HaBas).

In his Dinei Mamonos, HaGaon Rav Yechezkel Abramsky zt”l asserts that a son’s inheritance is not a statute beyond our understanding – a chok – as our sugya in 119b quotes Tzlofchod’s daughters as saying “had he a son, we would not have spoken”; i.e., they themselves understood that a son would have been the natural heir (see Tosfos, s.v. Ilu).

A Person Wants his Relatives to Inherit his Estate

In his aforesaid work, Rav Abramsky explains that the inner logic of the Torah’s property-related statutes conforms to human understanding since the Torah sees deeply into human nature. The first rule of inheritance, for example, determines that the closest relative takes precedence in inheriting the estate if there are no children. We understand this rule quite well as any person who has toiled his whole life to amass an estate wants the person closest to him, of all his family, to inherit it. The Torah also explains the firstborn’s double portion of the estate as his due because of his being the first of his father’s “strength” (Devarim 21:17). A firstborn is beloved to his father like an only child before he has more children, with a love unshared with others. Moreover, a firstborn usually helps his father in his business to increase his wealth and therefore earns a double portion.

“And it will be to you…a statute of judgment”

What about twin boys born within minutes of each other or other instances where the above characteristics of a firstborn do not actually apply? Rav Abramsky therefore explains the following important point: The laws of inheritance express the deceased’s intention and conform to human understanding. Once the Torah rules them, however, their observance does not depend on our understanding, as the final verse in the chapter on inheritance concludes: “…and it will be to you…a statute of judgment” (Bemidbar 27:11). A general rule of the Torah is that many halachos are based on logical estimation, such as that a wife only makes a vow that her husband would approve, etc., but once the Torah determines them, they cannot be changed.

Should Daughters Sign that they Relinquish any Inheritance Rights?

A daughter inherits no part of her father’s estate if she has brothers but over the generations various people have tried to uproot the halachah and match it to gentile custom. The first were the Tzedokim (Sadducees), as mentioned by our Gemora, who were strongly repressed by our sages.

Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderes, known as the Rashba, reacted vociferously to those claiming that “the law of the government is the law” and that daughters should be given inheritance rights equal to those of sons (Responsa Rashba, VI, 254, cited in Beis Yosef, C.M. 26): “There will never be such a custom in Israel lest the Torah be girded in sackcloth because of them” (regarding “the law of the government”, see Vol. 5 of the bound series Meoros HaDaf HaYomi, p. 124).

A Signature has a Price

Still, the laws of various countries caused a disagreement among halachic authorities. In some places the law ruled that no estate should be divided till all the heirs sign that they consent to the planned division and daughters sometimes refused to sign till their brothers paid them a considerable fee or, say, compensation. Is such a demand legitimate? In his Responsa Penei Moshe (II, 15), HaGaon Moshe Benbeneshti remarks that some believe that a daughter does not have to sign any document without receiving a fair price – some say 10% of the worth of the estate and some say even more (see Responsa Shoel Umeshiv, 2nd edition, I, 1 and III, 110; Chukos HaChayim by HaGaon Rav Chayim Falaji, 184; etc.) while others say that the fee should be ruled by a beis din according to the exigencies of each circumstance (Responsa Rav Pe‟alim, II, 15).

A Sister’s Signature is like Returning a Lost Article

Nonetheless, Maharit and other halachic authorities hold that a sister must sign such a declaration out of her simple obligation to return a lost article – the estate – to her brothers as without her signature, they would be losing it. The Chasam Sofer even describes any attempt to extract a fee for such as outright robbery (Responsa, C.M. 142). In his Responsa Tzitz Eli‟ezer (XVI, 52), HaGaon Rav E.Y. Waldenberg cites Responsa Divrei Chayim (C.M., II, 3) that the poskim tend to be lenient toward the sisters and grant them a fee for their declaration and signature.

Though, strictly speaking, daughters do not inherit their father’s estate if they have brothers, our sages instituted regulations for the welfare of those daughters who are still minors, as explained in Kesubos 52b: The brothers must support their minor, unmarried sisters and give them funds to enable their marriage. We shall even learn further in Chapter 9 of our tractate that when funds from the estate are limited, daughters are given precedence over the sons for their basic needs. A custom began about 700 years ago for a father to give his daughters a document for “half of a male’s inheritance” (shtar chatzi zachar) at their marriage. Moreover, some families have a custom for the sons to voluntarily grant a considerable portion of their inheritance to their sisters though the latter are not allowed to demand such.

We conclude with Rav B. Rabinovitz-Teomim’s clarification that the above regulations are not meant to rectify the Torah, as some Reformers charged, but to rectify our lives (Kuntres Be’inyan Yerushas HaBas). The regulations serve to apply the light of the Torah to all situations and for all times, providing support and building protective fences in all facets of life.

The Tradition that no Tribe ever becomes Extinct

What Is a Tribe?

The above quote from our Gemora condenses the entire subject of the twelve tribes of Israel. We understand that our nation is eternal, with no possibility of ever disappearing, but there is also a vital need for the perpetuation of the twelve tribes. Our division into twelve tribes stems from our very essence as a people and cannot be canceled and there will always be at least one person surviving from each tribe to enable their perpetuation. As a source for this principle, the Rishonim cite the verse in Malachi (3:6) that “I, Hashem, have not changed and you, the sons of Yaakov, have not become extinct” (Rashbam, s.v. Amar Abayei in the name of Rabeinu Chananel; Yad Ramah on Sanhedrin 69b).

Israel’s division into twelve tribes is hinted in Hashem’s promise to Yaakov in Bereishis (35:11): “A nation and a community of nations will come from you”, a double expression that needs clarification.

HaGaon Rav Y.Z. Soloveichik of Brisk zt”l points out Onkelos’translation: “a nation and a collection of tribes” (Chidushei HaGriz al HaTorah, Vayechi). In other words, aside from the promise that the Jewish nation will arise from Yaakov’s offspring, Hashem promised that that nation will be comprised of tribes.

With the understanding that the twelve tribes are like the vital members of one body, Rav Soloveichik explains the verses in Bereishis 48 concerning the selection of Menasheh and Efrayim as distinct tribes. Yaakov informs Yosef that Hashem told him: “I shall make you fruitful and plentiful and shall allow you to be a community of nations” (again translated by Onkelos as “a collection of tribes”) and then adds that Efrayim and Menasheh “will be to me like Reuven and Shimon”, blessing them with “the redeeming angel will bless the boys and my name will be called in their midst.” Ramban and Rashbam comment on this passage that Yaakov’s name being called in their midst refers to the perpetuation of their offspring. Yaakov made Efrayim and Menasheh into tribes making them inseparable from the whole nation, essential members of the same body and, consequently, eternal (see more illuminating expansions on the topic, ibid).

Now, remarks Rav Soloveichik, we can better understand the meaning of Rabeinu Gershom Meor HaGolah in his Selichos prayer “Remember the covenant of Avraham and the binding of Yitzchak,” said on the eve of Rosh HaShanah and, with expansions, on the Fast of Gedaliah (Mateh Efrayim, 603). We ask Hashem to remember “the covenant of the fathers, the mothers and the tribes.” We know about the covenant with the fathers and mothers but what covenant was made with the tribes? Indeed, says Rav Soloveichik, this refers to the tradition recorded in our sugya that no tribe ever becomes extinct and we therefore plead: “The covenant of the fathers, the mothers and the tribes, Your mercy and kindnesses with the passage of time, Hashem, remember the stricken and afflicted who are slaughtered for you all the day long.”

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Retracting a Kinyan

Rabbah and Rav Yosef argue about when a kinyan may be retracted. Rabbah rules that a kinyan may be retracted as long as the parties are still sitting. Rav Yosef rules that a kinyan may be retracted as long as the parties are still discussing the transaction.

What type of kinyan are Rabbah and Rav Yosef discussing? The CHIDUSHEI HA’RAN quotes an opinion that explains that the Gemora refers only to a matnas shechiv mei’ra (the gift of a deathly ill person), because a sick person is likely to retract his words as long as they are talking about the topic of his estate. In contrast, in the case of a matnas bari (the gift of a healthy person), the person may retract his words only “toch ke’dei dibbur” – (within the time of an utterance).

The RASHBAM (D”H Hachi Garsinan) explains that the Gemora clearly refers to the type of kinyan which the Gemora discussed previously, a matnas bari or a matnas shechiv mei’ra. The Ran quotes this opinion in the name of most of the Rishonim, including the RAMBAM and RAMBAN. The Rashbam explains that one certainly may retract the kinyan as long as the parties are still discussing the conditions of the transaction (the gift). The Chachamim understood that a person does not finalize the gift until he is satisfied with all of the conditions which he stipulates.

Does this reasoning apply to other forms of kinyanim? The ROSH (#5) writes that the Chachamim gave time for the parties to consider the conditions of the transaction only in the case of a kinyan chalifin (which is often used to finalize a matanah). However, “in other kinyanim, such as where the person picks up, pulls, or gives over an object... a person cannot retract the kinyan after ke’dei dibbur.” The Rosh clearly says that although there is no extended time period in which one may retract in the case of other kinyanim, one may retract any kinyan within the time of “toch ke’dei dibbur.”

RABEINU YONAH initially agrees with the Rosh, but then he says that one can argue that when one takes possession of an object (movable objects) through meshichah or one takes possession of land through chazakah, the kinyan is finalized with the action of the kinyan, and it cannot be retracted even within “toch ke’dei dibbur.”

Why, though, should meshichah and chazakah differ from all other forms of kinyan? RAV GERSHON EIDELSTEIN shlit’a writes that Rabeinu Yonah clearly understands that the degree of finality of an act of kinyan in the mind of the person depends on the specific type of kinyan. For example, when the Gemora in Nedarim (87a) states that acts of kidushin and gerushin cannot be retracted even within “toch ke’dei dibbur,” it is because the acts of kidushin and gerushin are so serious that a person deems them final at the moment he performs the act. Similarly, when one performs an act of meshichah or chazakah, such an act may be considered more final and conclusive than other forms of kinyanim.
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What’s in a Sign?

The Gemora, before citing the various reasons offered for the second verse referring to a husband, includes the word “siman” - sign. This word usually introduces a mnemonic device for the information which will be presented. However, our text of the Gemora simply has the word siman, with no obvious mnemonic device. Some write that the device was lost. Others offer novel interpretations of what the word siman is meant to convey in our Gemora. Some say that the word is actually the name of a sage, either Siman or Seemon. Others explain that the word siman or a variation are reflective of the answers given (ish, yidbeku, matos, ben), while some say that the missing word of the mnemonic device is Amar, for the names of those offering the answers (Rav Ashi, Rav Nachman, Rava).

Transfer to a Son;
Transfer to a Husband

The Gemora cites two braisos that explain the meaning of the two verses that prohibit the transfer of a woman’s inheritance to another tribe.

The Rashbam says that the text of the Gemora states that we have one braisa that focuses on the transfer to a son, and one that focuses on the transfer to a husband. The first braisa cited is the one which cites the first verse, and states that it refers to a transfer to a son, since the second verse already refers to a transfer to a husband. The Gemora introduces this braisa as the one which focuses on the transfer to a son, since it begins with that transfer. The second braisa cites the second verse, and states that it refers to transfer to a husband, since the first verse already refers to the transfer to a son. The Gemora introduces this braisa as the one which focuses on the transfer to a husband, since it begins with that transfer. The Gemora then proceeds to discuss why both braisos agree that the second verse refers to a transfer to a husband.

Rabbeinu Tam (112b Hachi Garis) disagrees with the Rashbam, and offers a different text of the Gemora. The first braisa cites the first verse about transfer, and states that it refers to transfer to a husband, proving this from the fact that the second similar verse is referring to such a transfer, indicating that both verses, in context, are only referring to a transfer to a husband. This first braisa is introduced as the braisa which focuses on the transfer to a husband, since it accepts only such a transfer as forbidden. The second braisa cites the second verse, and states that it refers to a transfer to a husband, since the first one already refers to a transfer to a son. The Gemora then discusses why both braisos – although they differ on the meaning of the first verse – agree that the second verse refers to a transfer to a husband.

Rabbeinu Tam challenges the Rashbam’s reading. According to the Rashbam, both braisos agree in the meaning of both verses, so there is no reason for the Gemora to identify them as focusing on different transfers. Furthermore, the Gemora could have stated that both braisos agree on the first verse referring to the transfer to a son, and not just to their agreement on the second verse.

Below is the flow of the Gemora, according to Rashbam and Rabbeinu Tam:

Rashbam Rabbeinu Tam
There is a braisa that focuses on transfer to a son, and one that focuses on transfer to a husband
The one which focuses on a son is: The one which only forbids transfer to a husband is:
Braisa 1:
First verse refers to a son, by process of elimination, since second verse refers to a husband First verse refers to a husband, from the context of the second verse, which refers to a husband
The one which focuses on a husband is: The one which also forbids transfer to a son is:
Braisa 2:
Second verse refers to a husband, by process of elimination, since the first verse refers to a son
Both braisos agree that the second verse refers to a husband
[They differ only in emphasis] [They differ on the first verse only]

The Kovetz Shiurim discusses what practical difference there between being concerned about a transfer to a husband or if we are also concerned about a transfer to a son. He lists three possible differences:
1. The prohibition of transfer to a husband takes effect as soon as they are fully married, and he inherits her (nisuin), while the prohibition of transfer to a son will take effect only upon conception or birth.
2. If a woman is sterile, there will be no prohibition due to transfer to a son, but only due to transfer to her husband.
3. If the husband relinquished his right to inherit his wife, there is no transfer, and the marriage is permitted. However, the prohibition of transfer to the son will still be in effect.

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“His Plot”

Rav Pappa asked Abaye: How can it be proven from there that a husband inherits his wife? Is it not possible to maintain that a husband, in fact, does not inherit his wife, and as to those Scriptural verses (the first three), they may speak of a transfer through the son (when a daughter inherited property, married a man from a different tribe; when she dies, her son will be her heir, and her inheritance will have transferred from one tribe to another)? And the verses discussing Yair and Pinchas might not be referring to an inheritance at all, for perhaps Yair bought those cities, and Pinchas bought that hill (and the purpose of the verses is merely to demonstrate their wealth)!?

Abaye responded: It cannot be said that Pinchas had bought the land, for, if so, it would follow that the field must be returned by Yovel, and it would emerge that the righteous man (Elozar ben Aharon) would be buried in a grave which was not his own.

The Nimukei Yosef writes that our Gemora teaches us that it is a lack of dignity for the deceased to be buried in a grave site owned by another.

The Chasam Sofer (Responsa Yoreh Deah 330) citing our Gemora as its source says that the prevalent custom is that everyone pays for his own grave. Even a poor person, who lacks the means to pay full price, nevertheless should pay something, even at a considerably reduced price - for his own burial plot.

He writes that there was an incident where the Chevra Kadisha was charging an enormous amount of money for a burial plot, so much so, that it made the price which Avraham paid Ephron Hachiti seem miniscule. He proves from there and from our Gemora that it is of extreme importance that the burial plots should belong to the deceased in order that it satisfies being “his plot.”

“Al haDaf” quotes the Dover Meisharim (Responsa, Vol. 1:4) who asks that even if we say that Pinchas inherited the property from his wife, how would we refer to this as “his plot” in reference to Elozar?

He answers that Pinchas had an available solution, for he could have given land as a present to his father (he cites Responsa Rashba that there is a possibility of acquisition for a dead person) and this is according to Rabbi Meir (Bechoros 52b) who rules that a gift does not return by Yovel.

He also offers another novel interpretation that “his plot” really means the son’s plot - a plot that the son bought or inherited, and there is actually no need to gift it to the father who has died.

They add that the example that the Chasam Sofer cites, regarding Sarah, would prove either hypothesis. Either Avraham gifted the plot to Sarah after her death, or the requirement of “his plot” here would refer to Avraham, and since he was her husband that would suffice.

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Hashem’s Kal Vachomer

Why did Hashem respond to Moshe through a kal vachomer (and not any other way)?

The Baal Shem Tov answers that Moshe Rabbeinu davened to Hashem to heal Miriam by saying: “Keil na, refa na lah” – Please Hashem, heal her now. It is known that the thirteen principles of biblical hermeneutics correspond to the Thirteen Attributes of Mercy. The first of the biblical hermeneutics is a kal vachomer. It corresponds to “Keil” of the Thirteen Attributes of Mercy. Since Moshe opened his tefillah with “Keil,” Hashem responded with a kal vachomer.

When Rabeinu Gershom Sat a Double Shiv’ah for his Son

By: Meoros Hadaf Hayomi

The Rishonim relate the sad story that the son of Rabeinu Gershom Meor Hagolah together with his mother, Rabeinu Gershom’s second wife, left the Jewish faith. Subsequent halachic authorities record that Rabeinu Gershom sat shiv’ah for his son for a period of 14 days.

Maharam of Rottenberg remarks in his Responsa (§544) that there is no obligation to sit shiv’ah for those who convert to another religion (Shulchan Aruch, Y.D. 340:5) but that Rabeinu Gershom did so out of his extraordinary sorrow.

Radvaz confirms the fact that Rabeinu Gershom sat shiv’ah for his son, not mourning his death but rather that his son had not repented while alive (Responsa Radvaz, III, 558).

Other sources, though, report that he mourned for his son while he was still alive and as for the 14-day period, the Or Zarua (II, 428) offers an explanation in the name of his mentor, Rabbi Shimshon zt”l: Rabeinu Gershom learnt his behavior from our sugya concerning Miriam. Hashem’s honor is double that of even a parent and if a person mourns seven days for a human who has left this world, one should surely mourn 14 days for the loss of a soul to Hashem by apostasy.

The Gerer Rebbe zt”l, author of Imrei Emes, wondered about this reasoning: According to our sugya, Hashem Himself ruled that even though by ordinary logic, His honor is double that of a parent and Miriam should have been punished for 14 days – still, “da’yo…” - that which is learnt from another instance should not be more severe” and she was therefore punished for only seven days. Why, then, did Rabeinu Gershom mourn for 14 days? The Imrei Emes explains in the name of his brother-in-law, the Rabbi of Bendin zt”l, that only Hashem could apply “da’yo” to forgo His honor whereas we cannot ignore Hashem’s honor and the logic of extending the mourning to 14 days still holds for us [Michtevei Torah, 55-56].

The firstborn Takes a Double Portion

2, 20, 200

According to the Maharal of Prague, the root letters of bechor (“firstborn”) – i.e., beis, kaf and reish – hint at his right to a double portion of his father’s estate as all their numerical values are multiples of 2: beis = 2, kaf = 20 and reish = 200! Others point out that beis, kaf and reish can be rearranged to spell berech, “a knee”: Just as our knees support our whole body, a firstborn supports his father.

And if her Father Spat in her Face

HaGaon Rav M.M. Krengel zt”l expressed a wonderful idea about the story of Miriam described in our sugya: The Midrash (quoted by Rashi on Shemos 2:1) relates that when Pharaoh decreed for every newborn son to be thrown into the Nile, Miriam’s father Amram left his wife Yocheved and all the Israelites followed suit. Miriam, though, protested to Amram that his decree was worse than Pharaoh’s: “Pharaoh issued a decree against the sons but you issued a decree against both sons and daughters!” Miriam thought she was justified in admonishing her father as, in her opinion, he had transgressed the Torah: after all, according to Beis Shamai, a person has fulfilled the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply only if he begets two sons and, at that time, Moshe had not yet been born. Still, when many years later Miriam complained about Moshe because he isolated himself from his wife, she was also punished for upbraiding her father as Moshe already had two sons, Gershom and Eliezer.

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Root of Yehonasan’s Sin

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora states that a person’s children will inherit the attributes of the family he marries into. Moshe married the daughter of Yisro who spent his life steeped in idolatry and therefore had Yehonasan as a grandson who served as a priest for the idol of Micah. But, Aharon, who married the daughter of Aminadav (sister of Nachshon), had Pinchas who was a great tzadik.

The connection between marrying the sister of Nachshon and having a child like Pinchas seems clear. Nachshon was known for his dedication to sanctifying Hashem’s Name, being the first to jump into the Yam Suf. Pinchas was also moser nefesh by being mekadesh shem shamayim by killing the Nasi of Shimon, despite the ridicule he had to suffer (as the Gemora says that all the Tribes mocked him that he descended from Yisro who worshiped idols).

It would seem that the connection between Yisro and Yehonasan is also clear. They were both involved in idolatry. But, the Gemora on 109a explains that Yehonasan was misled by a tradition that he heard: A person shall rather hire himself out to service idols rather than be in need of the charity from others. Yehonasan understood this literally, that for sustenance, one may work as a priest for idolsh.

The Rashbam seems troubled by how he could made such a mistake and writes that Yehonasan thought that as long as he is not intending to worship the idols, he is not doing anything wrong. This seems to be an honest mistake based on the misunderstanding of the tradition, so why does the Gemora indicate that he was evil? He never actually worshiped idolatry!?

The Rashbam quotes a Yerushalmi that elaborates on the behavior of Yehonasan. Yehonasan was entirely motivated by money. People would bring sacrifices to t Michah’s idol, to which Yehonasan would say that they are wasting their time. He would then tell them that they should give him precious gifts and he will bring it to the idol. When they left he would indulge in the gifts. When confronted, he admitted that the idol has no power and he is only working there for sustenance. The sin of Yehonasan is that his desire for wealth blinded him from realizing what he is doing. He may have honestly been confused and thought that the tradition allowed him to do what he was doing, but the only reason he made such a grave error is because he was blinded by his desire for wealth.

\Where did this great desire for wealth and physical possessions come from? Perhaps this came from Yisro. In Parshas Yisro we find that Yisro comes to Moshe (according to Ramban, it was prior to the Giving of the Torah), and after giving Moshe advice, he returns to his family, but the Ramban explains that he came back again while the Jews were still camped as Sinai. Then in Parshas B’ha’aloscha (10:29), he tries to leave again. Why? Rashi explains that he wanted to go back to his wealth rather than join the Jews into Eretz Yisroel. Moshe then begs him not to leave because, as Rashi explains, people will say he only converted to get a portion in Eretz Yisroel, so when he realized that converts aren’t entitled to a portion, he left. Moshe then has to guarantee Yisro some financial incentive to get him to stay. Rashi explains that the “good” that is being referred to is that when Eretz Yisroel was divided, Yisro received the fertile land of Yericho, which he would have until the time when the Beis Hamikdash would be constructed. The Ramban (Yisro) understands from this Rashi that Moshe successfully convinced Yisro to stay by offering financial incentive. Targum Yonasan also says that the good that Moshe promised to Yisro was a portion in Eretz Yisroel.

Based on this, we can suggest that the poison that Yisro brought into the genetic pool of Moshe’s descendants was not service of idol because Yehonasan his grandson never actually worshiped idols. The poison that Yisro brought, which the Gemora refers to, is the great desire for material wealth that caused Yehonasan to make such a fatal error.

Should you check out your future wife’s brothers nowadays?

By: Meoros Hadaf Hayomi

Rava asserts the well-known rule that he who plans to marry should check her brothers since, as Rashbam comments, “most of a woman’s children resemble her brothers” (s.v. Sheyivdok). The purpose of the examination is not to determine the woman’s own nature as that can be perceived by observing her, but aims to foresee her children’s character as they are assumed to resemble her brothers (Chida in Pesach Einayim on our sugya).

Rabeinu Tam explains that the link between a woman, her brothers and her children stems from their all having the same mazal (Tosfos, Yevamos 62b, s.v. Vehanosei). If so, why examine her brothers? If she and her brothers have the same mazal, would it not suffice to examine her alone? The answer is that males and females have different natures even if being under the same mazal; hence one must check her brothers to see how her sons will be (Maharal, Chidushei Agados).

The Gemora in Yevamos (63a) remarks that he who weds his sister’s daughter will enjoy marital bliss and the Meiri (ibid) attributes this promise to the fact that they have the same nature.

Rabbi Vidal HaTsarfati, who lived over four centuries ago, offered an alternative explanation in his Imrei Yosher on Midrash Rabah (Shemos 6:23): A woman’s children are accustomed to be in their uncles’ homes and, in a sense, are also brought up by them and learn from their behavior. (See also the commentaries on tractate Soferim, end of Ch. 15; Maharsha on our Gemora; Gur Aryeh on Shemos ibid; etc.)

The rule to check out one’s prospective brothers-in-law is not mentioned by Rambam, Shulchan Aruch or other halachic works. Rabbi Yehudah HeChasid, though, stresses the severity of the matter (Sefer Chasidim, 374-78) and the Shelah HaKadosh even adds that anyone not obeying the rule “deviates from our Sages’ instructions and is considered as abandoning life” (Shnei Luchos HaBeris on Shemos 6:23).

We can further understand the application of the issue from the advice offered by the Steipler Gaon Rav Yaakov Kanievski zt”l, to a young man who had difficulty finding a shiduch. The boy eventually was engaged to a young woman whose brother had completely left the path of Torah and mitzvos and he asked the Steipler if he was acting wisely or perhaps should renege on the shiduch.

Rav Kanievski then offered six reasons to adhere to the shiduch:
(1) There should be no worry if she also has observant brothers as her children might well resemble them in their behavior.
(2) Most people fail to heed this Talmudic warning and the Gemora itself says of similar cases “Hashem guards the naïve” (Tehilim 116:6; Yevamos 12b; etc.).
(3) Was her brother exposed to a negative environment as a young child and, as a result, tempted from the right path? If so, he is judged as a child led into captivity and not responsible for his actions.
(4) The stinging insult to the fiancée if the shiduch is canceled should be considered.
(5) If the boy cancels the shiduch, he won’t easily find another and might remain single for a long time.
(6) The ruling is not cited by halachic authorities and is apparently intended as merely an extra measure of piety (midas chasidus).

Finally, Rav Kanievski concluded that the young man should decide the matter for himself (Orchos Rabeinu, IV, p. 255, and quoted almost in full in Karyana D’igarta, II, 18).

What should you check for?

Rav Kanievski’s pupil, HaGaon Rav A. Horvitz, reports that his mentor offered another reason to forgo examining her brother (ibid, p. 234): In former times, families lived in a totally observant environment and a brother who deviated from the right path apparently indicated that something was amiss in his family. Now, though, the very streets are awash in heresy, the media tempt the youth in all directions and parents cannot protect their children from exposure to deleterious influences. A brother who stops being observant nowadays has no bearing on his family and we should have no worry as long as the potential bride is worthy and virtuous.

HaGaon Rav E.M. Shach zt”l further remarked that the examination concerns character and attributes, not actions which depend on a person’s choice (Michtavim Umaamarim, VI, p. 128).

A Woman of Valor, Who Can Find?

Concerning Rava’s warning to examine a prospective bride’s brothers, the Chida found the topic hinted in the initials of “A woman of valor, who can find?” – eishes chayil mi yimtza, spelling achim – brothers; alternatively, mi ach? – “Who is the brother?” (Pesach „Einayim, on our sugya; Kisei Rachamim on tractate Soferim, end of Ch. 15; Bris Olam on Sefer Chasidim, p. 374).

HALACHOS OF THE DAF

Not Accepting Charity

One should distance himself from accepting charity, and should live a life of poverty, rather than to avail himself unto others. Chazal say that a person should make his Shabbos a weekday (i.e. he shouldn’t spend so much), rather than to collect charity. Even if he is a well respected Talmid Chacham that became poor, he should work, even in a menial labor, just so that he shouldn’t have to accept charity.

Having said that, if a person can’t survive without accepting charity, and he can’t work due to sickness or old age, or even if his salary can’t make ends meet, and such a person doesn’t accept charity due to pride or misguided piety, then it’s as if he committed murder. Furthermore, all the pain and suffering that he has because of his poverty, will not be considered merits; on the contrary, it will be considered sins.

However, a person who can survive, and he chooses to live a life of abject poverty just so that he won’t have to avail himself unto others, Hashem guarantees him that he will eventually become wealthy and he will support others.

If a charlatan collects charity when he has no need for it, he will eventually become poor and really need charity.

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We do not Start with a Punishment

By: Meoros HaDaf Hayomi

A Lesson in Composition

The Gemora had asked that the Mishna should first state that sons inherit their father, as we do not start off with punishments (sons dying in the lifetime of the father)!

It is noteworthy that the Rambam begins his Laws of Divorce with the statement: “A wife is never divorced except with a written document called a get”. Radvaz comments that Rambam chose that mode of expression, as opposed to saying “A wife is divorced with a written document…” since our sugya explains that we should never open a topic with punitive connotation. We should not want a wife to get divorced and Rambam therefore wrote that she “never” gets divorced except in certain conditions” (Responsa Radbaz [manuscript], 1).

A Niece Is a Granddaughter?

The Rashbam frequently refers to a niece as a granddaughter (neched - s.v. Velo manchilin), as also evidenced later (114b, s.v. HaIshah). HaGaon Rav Shemuel Shtrashun and other commentators tried to find a solution with no success while Mahari Ya’avetz attempts to correct the text. A certain rabbinical scholar told us that we have no need for any correction: The Rishonim in France sometimes called nephews grandchildren, such as in the Rosh’s responsa addressed to “my grandson” but signed “your uncle” (see, for instance, Kelal 12:3, 98:1, etc.). Apparently, the same word was used for nephew and grandson or niece and granddaughter in the Romance languages of that era.

How do Heirs Assume Ownership of their Inheritance?

The process of an heir’s acquisition of an estate from the deceased has no parallel in the realm of halachos relevant to the acquisition of property. The Acharonim explain that an inheritance involves no usual property-related kinyan as customary in other transfers of assets. When a father passes away, rather, his son takes his place and therefore assumes ownership of all the deceased’s assets. In other words, property usually moves or is taken into another’s ownership whereas in the instance of inheritance, the former owner departs and another takes his place while the property stays put (see Chidushei HaGaon Rav Naftali Trop, Bava Basra 126b; Nesivos HaMishpat 276, S.K. 4; Responsa Machaneh Chayim, II, C.M. 41). The method of this transfer of ownership has far-reaching implications as to the types of assets included in an inheritance. A person, for example, cannot acquire an item stolen from its owner and not on his, or the original owner’s, premises. A son, though, inherits all his father’s property, even if stolen, as he simply assumes his father’s place: just as his father would still own assets stolen from him, the same applies to the son.

Distributing Funds Earmarked for Charity Included in an Estate

One of the more frequent implications of the above halachah is expressed if the deceased set aside funds for the poor. An heir finds, for instance, that, aside from not having been distributed, the money had never been designated for any particular person or group. While the father was alive, only he, of course, had the right to choose to whom to give the funds (Remo, Y.D. 257:10). Do his heirs, however, inherit that right as well or should the money be distributed in some other fashion? Indeed, the topic is far from simple: After all, even the father could not sell or grant the right, known as tovas hanaah, to another as it “lacks substance” and cannot be transferred. Rav Hai Gaon defines the matter by comparing an article acquired or transferred to the owner’s body: just as our bodies have material substance, we can acquire property or transfer its ownership only if that property has physical dimensions (Sefer HaMikach, Sha’ar 2). The right, then, to choose to whom to distribute charitable funds cannot be transferred or sold. In the light of the above, though, that a son takes his father’s place, does he also inherit this apparently untransferrable right?

The Shach (C.M. 276, S.K. 5) and Nesivos HaMishpat (ibid, S.K. 4) hold that, based on this principal, a son also inherits the right of tovas hanaah. As far Rav Hai Gaon’s rule, they contend that the maxim refers to all property matters except inheritance since, as explained above, inheritance is an automatic change of ownership, not bound by the rules of other methods of acquisition. Still, Ketzos HaChoshen (ibid) maintains that tovas hanaah can’t be inherited as it is not, in itself, a property-related right in the usual sense. In his opinion, then, the son must give the funds to the first poor person he meets or who approaches him, or leave them where the poor can divide them among themselves (see ibid; Taba’as HaChoshen, ibid; and Beiur HaGera, S.K. 23, who holds that tovas hanaah is a weak property-related right that cannot be inherited).


A Wife Inherits from her Husband

Are Bank Accounts always Divided among all the Heirs?

A fascinating question was referred to HaGaon Rav Chayim Ozer Grodzhinski zt”l, the chief rabbi of Vilna. A local Jew passed away, leaving a huge sum in a bank account. According to halachah, his widow is entitled to the amount stipulated in her kesubah while the other heirs divide the rest of the estate. The bank, in conformity with local laws, regarded the widow as the sole heir and bestowed her with the entire sum in the account whereas the other heirs were denied access thereto. Being conscientious in her observance of mitzvos, she turned to Rav Shlomo Heiman, later famous as Rosh Yeshivah of Torah VaDaas in Brooklyn, and asked if the halachah obligated her to transfer the huge sum to the other heirs. This is apparently the halachic decision we would have reached.

Now, most people are accustomed to consider their bank accounts as “deposits.” They, and the bankers, say they “deposit” money in the bank and we are all familiar with “linked deposits,” CDs (certificates of deposit) and the like. Still, these so frequently used terms are basically wrong. A deposit – pikadon – as used in the Talmudic and halachic literature, is anything given to another to be kept or watched or used without exchanging it for an identical item or harming it. The money you give a bank clerk, then, is not a deposit as it, itself, will not be returned, but rather a loan. Funds put in a bank are not watched there but their value is accredited to your account. In our case, then, the deceased lent the bank money and, according to halachah, the latter must repay it to his heirs. The bank, however, accredited the widow with the whole amount. Has she received the deceased’s money? No! It belongs to the bank and was mistakenly accredited to her, such that she has no obligation towards the other heirs. (She is not even considered as having caused them a loss [gerama], as the laws of the country forbade their access to the funds). Rav Heiman sent this wonderfully simple decision to Rav Grodzhinski, who remarked that the issue had long been obvious to him (Chidushei Rabbi Shlomo, Kesavim Uteshuvos, 8).

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Collecting a Debt from the Brothers

It was stated: If brothers split an inheritance, and a creditor took one of their portions, Rav says that their division is nullified (and they divide the remaining estate). Shmuel says: The brother lost his portion. Rav Assi says: The brother whose possessions were seized should take a quarter of his brother’s land or one quarter of money. [The other brother has the right to give one-quarter money or one-quarter land.]

Tosfos asks: What gives the creditor the right to collect his debt from only one of the brothers? Isn’t the responsibility to repay the father’s debt equally shared by both brothers? He should not be able to seize property that belongs to one, and not the other!?

Tosfos answers: We are referring to a case where the father made this particular land into an apotiki. (A person may designate any type of property as security to the creditor without placing it in the possession of the creditor. The creditor has a lien on this property, and if the debt is not otherwise repaid, the creditor can collect his debt from the security. This security is called an apotiki.) It is this land that the creditor wishes to seize. Tosfos continues that it cannot be speaking that the father told the creditor, “You can collect from any other place,” for if so, he would not be able to push off the creditor by paying him with money.

The Rosh (Bava Kamma 1:6) writes that the halachah which requires the creditor to collect equally from all the brothers is only if he is able to collect a complete field; but he is not required, however, to take half a field from one brother and half from another. The reason for this is because it is not a proper payment and lenders would refuse to lend money. Accordingly, the Pilpula Charifta writes that it is not necessary to interpret the Gemora to be referring to an apotiki. Rather, we can say that if the creditor would not collect the property of one brother, he would be compelled to take half a field from each brother. It is for this reason that he has the right to take the field from one of the brothers.

HALACHOS OF THE DAF

Dividing an Inheritance with an Unknown Brother
When a person dies, his inheritance is divided by his sons by means of a lottery. However, there are times when the sons must divide the inheritance a second time. Below are two scenarios.

Two brothers that divided an inheritance, and then along came a third brother whom they never knew existed, the halachah is that the entire dividing is void, and they split the inheritance again; this time - including the third brother.

This is true even if the two brothers had inherited three fields, and had divided it between themselves, and each brother received a whole field and half of the third. Then the third brother made his appearance and his lot fell on the third field that was split. Even if the third brother is happy with this arrangement, any one of the brothers may void the entire dividing of the inheritance, and they must all draw lots again. Furthermore, even if the third brother is satisfied with the third field even without having to draw lots, any one of the brothers may void the splitting of the inheritance. The reason for all of this is, since originally, it was a mistaken division, the entire lottery can be voided.

Another scenario would be, if after dividing the inheritance, one of the fields got taken away by a person who lent their father money and now is collecting his debt. Here too, the division is voided, and they all once again draw lots to divide the inheritance.

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Delineating a Field

By: Reb Yechezkel Khayyat

The Mishna discusses a case of one who delineates the field he is selling. By delineating the field, we allow more leeway in an error in the field’s size.

The Rashbam and Tur (quoting the Rema) say that the same is true if the seller showed the field to the buyer, and told him that he was selling “this field.” However, the Ri Migash says that showing an actual field is equivalent to the earlier case of hen chaser hen yeser (more or less), and does not have the same leeway as our Mishna.

The limit of the error accepted in such a sale is a sixth of the specified size. The Rashbam explains that although this amount is the same as the proportion for ona’ah (over or under charging), the mechanism is different. The limit in the case of a delineated field is simply a measure of how far away from the specified size a buyer will forgive, while the limit in ona’ah is defined by the variation accepted in a marketplace.

Beyond a sixth, the Mishna says that the price must be adjusted. The Rosh and Ran say that the adjustment is for the whole error. The Kesef Mishnah (Mechirah 28:12) holds that the Rambam agrees, while the Magid Mishnah suggests that the Rambam may only obligate a reduction in price to bring it to within a sixth of the specified size.

Exactly a Sixth

The Gemora cites the dispute of Rav Huna and Rav Yehudah in the case of an error of exactly a sixth of the size, with Rav Huna placing it together with less than a sixth, and Rav Yehudah placing it together with more than a sixth.

The Rishonim discuss different versions of the text of the Mishna, and how they are read according to Rav Huna and Rav Yehudah.

The Mishna rules on two cases:
1. pachos mishtos (less than a sixth): valid sale
2. Until shtos price must be adjusted

The versions of the first case are:
1. pachos shtos = a sixth less [than the size] (Tosfos 106a Hachi)
2. pachos mishtos = less than a sixth [away from the size] (Tosfos ibid)
3. piches shtos = [if he] reduced [the size] by a sixth (Bach note 3)
4. piches mishtos = [if he] reduced [the size] by less than a sixth (Bach note 1)

According to the first and third versions, this case seems to read simply like Rav Huna. In fact, this is a weakness with these versions, since Rav Huna proceeds to explain how to read this first case in accordance with his ruling. Rav Yehudah has to read this case, “[up to] a sixth less.” According to the second and fourth versions, the Mishna does not explicitly discuss the case of a sixth, leading to the dispute.

The second case of the Mishna discusses the rule ad - until a shtos. Here, Rav Yehudah and Rav Huna dispute whether this ad - until is inclusive or exclusive.

Tosfos explains that Rav Yehudah can explain that the Mishna did not explicitly discuss a sixth in the second case, lest we think that more than a sixth would invalidate the sale. According to Rav Huna, the Mishna did not explicitly discuss a sixth in the first case, to indicate that a sixth is a valid sale, just as much as less than a sixth is.

A Silver Goblet Raffled a few Times on Purim

By: Meoros Hadaf Hayomi

Our sugya explains that the heirs to a commonly inherited estate may divide it by lots and, according to Rav Ashi, the halachic validity of the lottery is based on the heirs’ consensus to divide the estate by that means. We bring you a story about a Purim raffle held somewhere in Germany about 325 years ago, next-door to HaGaon Rav Yair Bachrach, author of Responsa Chavos Yair.

A dozen exuberant friends and relatives were having their Purim banquet at the same table. Somewhat inebriated, they decided to raffle an expensive silver goblet with each paying a participation fee. Each of their names was written on a separate slip and put in a box while another box held 12 more slips – 11 blank and one announcing mazal tov! The word was given and a child was picked to take out a slip with a name from the first box and another slip from the second. On the first try, the slip from the second box was blank but already on the second try, the slip from the second box said mazal tov and the happy winner was handed his prize. Some people, though, wondered how anyone could win so soon and decided to examine all the slips. They then found another mazal tov slip in the second box and an argument soon erupted. The winner claimed that his luck caused him to win and had there been merely one such slip, he would also have won while the other participants insisted that the whole raffle was invalid as the original conditions of 11 blank slips and one mazal tov had not been met. All the participants went to Rav Bachrach’s home and the Gaon instructed them to conduct the raffle anew.

This time, someone else won but the situation was just as confusing. One of the participants examined all the slips in the box of names and discovered one missing. They all wanted to invalidate the raffle but the winner asserted that as there had been just 11 names in the box, each of the 11 had had a greater chance to win so what are they complaining about? “The only one I should confront,” he retorted, “is the twelfth, whose name was missing, and I’m willing to compromise and give him a third of the goblet’s worth.” The group again came to Rav Bachrach who ruled that even if the twelfth person would agree to the compromise, the others could invalidate the raffle (Responsa, 61).

He found a source for his decision in our sugya: Two brothers divided three fields of equal size by drawing lots. Reuven got field A and Shimon field B and they then divided field C equally between them. They then discovered another brother, Levi, whom they had never known and the three drew lots anew for the entire estate while Levi won field C! In Tosfos’ opinion (s.v. Ushmuel), Rav and Shmuel disagreed if a new lottery should be conducted or if Reuven and Shimon could keep their originally won fields and just give field C to Levi without drawing lots. The halachah was ruled according to Rav invalidating the first lottery entirely and we thus deduce that a lottery or raffle somehow excluding a participant who should have been included is invalid.

Basic Conditions for the Results of a Raffle to be Binding

According to the Chavos Yair, the reason for the above halachah is that the results of a lottery must be determined strictly by Hashem without human machinations or errors. Divine providence works its effect only when a lottery or raffle is conducted properly. If, then, even 13 slips had been put in the name box, with someone’s name appearing twice, and even had that person not won despite his greater chances, the other participants could invalidate the raffle as a raffle not conducted according to the rules has no validity.

This novel opinion, that even someone whose name was recorded twice could invalidate a raffle, was supported in a wonderfully simple explanation by HaGaon Maharil (Reb Yehoshua Leib) Diskin zt”l in his commentary on the Torah (Miketz). The twice-inscribed person could claim that he paid to participate in the raffle, assuming he had a chance to win. Had he won, though, the other participants could invalidate the proceedings, being that his name was recorded twice and thus giving him a greater chance to win. This very possibility, then, invalidates his participation retroactively since he had no chance of winning. Moreover, he could further claim that Divine providence wants him to win but his name did not appear for even had he won, the others would invalidate his winning anyway; he is therefore allowed to invalidate the whole procedure.

The Winner of the Lottery Gets the Aliyah

In a certain congregation in Eretz Yisroel, the members decided that, for the sake of good order, the Shabbos when a bar mitzvah boy would be called to maftir should be determined a year in advance. One day, a congregant came to the gabai and informed him that his son would be bar mitzvah and receive maftir the coming Shabbos. He already sent invitations, he asserted, and the desired aliyah laTorah was even mentioned therein. The gabai protested that that Shabbos was reserved for another bar mitzvah boy whose father obeyed the regulations and had advised the congregation a year ago. The question was referred to HaGaon Y.S. Elyashiv, who ruled that the son had no reason to suffer because of his father’s negligence and that the boys should draw lots for their aliyah (Tuvecha Yabi’u, II, p. 68).

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WHEN THE SELLER GETS BACK LAND

By: Rabbi Yaakov Montrose

The Mishna (103b) teaches that when the size of a field is estimated at a beis kor (thirty se'ah) at the time it is sold, both the buyer and the seller must agree to accept a loss or a gain of one quarter of a kav per se’ah. This means that if there is up to one quarter of a kav of extra land per se’ah, the buyer may keep that land. If the extra land is more than one quarter of a kav per se’ah, “the seller has the upper hand in a case where he gave nine extra kav in a field.” Rav Huna and Rav Nachman disagree about the intent of the Mishna. Rav Huna explains that the Mishna means that if the land contains nine extra kav including the one extra quarter of a kav per se’ah that a buyer normally is allowed to keep, all of the extra land goes back to the seller. Rav Huna understands that the seller would never intentionally add so much land, which itself is considered a proper field. Therefore, in a case in which an area of two kor (60 se’ah) of land was sold and one quarter kav was left per se’ah, all of the extra land returns to the seller.

Rav Nachman disagrees and explains that every kor may contain up to seven and a half extra kavin. If there is more than nine kav, the land returns to the seller.

What does Rav Nachman mean to say?

The RASHBAM (DH v'Iy) explains that Rav Nachman means that if there is even a small bit more than a quarter of a kav per se’ah, and altogether there is more than nine extra kav, all of the extra land goes back to the seller. Accordingly, whether the extra land returns to the seller depends on the size of the land being sold. If two kor are sold and there is one quarter of a kav extra per se’ah, all of the extra land goes to the buyer unless the extra land is slightly more than one quarter of a kav per se’ah. If one kor is sold and there is one quarter of a kav extra per se’ah, the buyer keeps the land. If, however, in this second case there is one kav and a half more of extra land, all of the land goes back to the seller. If there is more than seven and a half kav but less than nine kav extra, the buyer must compensate the seller for all of the extra amount (including the seven and a half kav; see Rashbam to 103b, DH Yeser Mikan). This is also the opinion of the RA'AVAD.

The Rashbam cites another opinion which explains that when Rav Nachman says, “If there is more than nine kav it goes back,” he means more than nine kav over the normal amount of one quarter kav per se’ah, regardless of how many kor are being sold.
The Rashbam cites a third opinion which explains that if there is more than nine kav per kor, all of the land goes back to the seller.

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HALACHOS OF THE DAF

Selling a Specific Beis Kor


If the seller said, “I’m selling to you this beis kor”, then it’s as if he said “I’m selling to you a beis kor even if it’s more or less than an exact beis kor.” Therefore, if there is found to be missing up to a 24th of a se’ah (a se’ah is 6 kav and a kav is split into quarters) which is a quarter-kav, or there was found to be extra, up to a quarter-kav, then the sale stands, and neither the buyer or the seller needs to give additional money.

If there is found to be missing or extra land, more than a quarter-kav, then all quarter-kavs that were missing, the seller pays back to the buyer, and all the quarter-kavs that were extra, the buyer returns to the seller.

It is interesting to note, that if only one quarter-kav was extra (or missing), then the sale stands, but if for example there were two extra, then both get returned. The reason explains the S”ma, is that once they start returning, everything that is not exactly a beis kor gets returned as well. Since the seller certainly does not intend to let the buyer receive that much extra land, he therefore takes back all of the extra land. The S”ma cites other examples where the halachah follows this logic.

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Bequeathing to One Son

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Rava said: Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah’s reason is based upon the following verse: It shall be on the day that he bequeaths to his sons. This indicates that the Torah gave authority to a father to bequeath to whom he desires to inherit his estate.

It is brought in the Sifri that the father has such a right even on prospective property, i.e. those that he does not currently own, but they will become his. He can say that he wants property that is not actually in existence yet to be inherited by whomever he desires. Reb Akiva Eiger, however, cites the R”if, who holds that the father cannot give away property that is not yet in existence.

There is another dispute regarding this halachah: The Nesivos quotes a Rit”va, who holds that the father may retract from this stipulation up to the moment he dies. The Ketzos Hachoshen disagrees.

The Mikdash David explains these two arguments with the following chakirah: When the father bequeaths his property to one of the sons, is he establishing that this particular son is his sole inheritor, or are all the children inheritors; the father is merely designating this property that it should belong to this particular son?

If the father is establishing that this particular son is his sole inheritor, this stipulation will be effective even on property that is not yet in existence, for once this son has been established as the inheritor, he will inherit whatever potentially should have belonged to the father. If, however, he is merely designating this property to belong to one of his sons, he can only do that on property which currently belongs to him.The same can be said regarding retraction: If the father is establishing that this particular son is his sole inheritor, he cannot retract from that (he may, however, in the future, add other inheritors, for he is not taking away the inheritor status from this son). If, however, he is merely designating this property to belong to one of his sons, he may retract up until the moment that they actually take possession of the property.

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Shabbos Chanukah and Selling a Beis Kur

By: Meoros Hadaf Hayomi

An ancient, anonymous song for Shabbos Chanukah, Ichlu Mashmanim, appears in siddurim and is chanted in some communities. The whole composition sings the praises of food, meals, meat dishes, wine and miscellaneous culinary delights to be consumed on that Shabbos and the line ending each stanza goes: “A beis kur sell or lease; rent a beis kur for Shabbos Chanukah!”

In his Responsa (137), Mahari of Bruna, a pupil of the Terumas HaDeshen, remarks that no Torah scholar could have written the song as a Chanukah meal is not defined as a se’udas mitzvah. Others even stress that only foolhardy people could have composed it, as evident from its contents (Orchos Chayim, 670:8). On the other hand, some rebbes, such as Rebbe Pinchas of Koritz zt”l, sang it on Shabbos Chanukah and a few scholars attribute it to Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra as the initial letters of its lines form Avraham. Those favoring the song were somehow able to lend its contents a spiritual connotation and some surmise that beis kur is used as a pun: In Old French a yard for raising and fattening poultry was called a bas court (“low courtyard” – the final s was then, as in certain dialects today, pronounced). The message, then, is “Sell your beis kur” – your field – and rent a bas court for Shabbos Chanukah.

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Burying a Stillborn (neifel)

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora says that they would make special graves inside the burial chamber especially designed for nefalim (stillborns). This would indicate that there is in fact a mitzvah to bury a neifel.

The Rema in Hilchos Yom Tov (526:10) writes that one is not allowed to bury a neifel on Yom Tov, rather he should be buried the next day.

The source is from the Hagahos Maiomonies who holds that there is no mitzvah to bury a neifel.

However, the Magen Avrohom (20) says that in his opinion, there is a mitzvah to bury a neifel.

The Hagahos Maimonies cites the Gemora in Pesachim (9a) which implies that there was a pit that was designated to throw nefalim into, implying that there isn't any mitzvah of kevurah (burial).

The Gr"a also takes this approach - that the fact that they were thrown into a pit indicates that there isn't a mitzvah of kevurah. But, the Magen Avraham disagrees and holds that being thrown into a pit would qualify as a kevurah. Furthermore, the Magen Avraham cites a proof from the Toras Kohanim which says that a Kohen cannot become tamei for his son or daughter that is a neifel; this implies that there is a mitzvah of kevurah because if there wouldn't be a mitzvah of kevurah, it would be obvious that a Kohen cannot become tamei since he can only make himself tamei for the purpose of kevurah. Finally, he cites our Gemora which says that they would make graves for nefalim, implying that there is a mitzvah of kevurah.

The Magen Avraham concludes by saying that the Gemora in Nidah implies that not only would there be a mitzvah of kevurah for a neifel, but there would even be a la’av (transgression) of ba’al talin (delaying the burial of the deceased overnight).

On this last point, the Noda Beyehudah (OC Kamma, end of 16) says that he doesn’t understand where the Magen Avraham is drawing his proof from that there is a violation of ba’al talin. The Noda Beyehudah argues that logically, the la’av of ba’al talin is a halachah in providing respect to the deceased, which would not apply to a neifel.

The Machatzis Hashekel tries to justify the proof of the Magen Avraham that there would be a la’av of ba’al talin, from Tosafos in Nidah (57) who says that the Cutheans would temporarily bury the neifel with the intent of moving them later. If they were going to move them later, why bury them temporarily? This implies that there would be a violation of ba’al talin that would compel one to bury the neifel temporarily.

It would seem that Tosfos in Pesachim (9a) also holds that there is a mitzvah to bury a neifel. Tosfos writes that the Kohen who leaned over to check if there was a neifel in the pit was a fool. Why? It was because even if it was his own child, a Kohen can only make himself tamei for a viable person, not a neifel. Tosfos continues by saying that the Kohen couldn’t make himself tamei because it wasn’t a need of the deceased. This implies that if it were for the purpose of burying the deceased, he would be able to make himself tamei, presumably because there would be a mitzvah of kevurah (proof to Magen Avraham).

But, perhaps Tosfos means to say that a neifel is always considered not for the need of the deceased since there isn’t any mitzvah of kevurah (like the Hagahos Maimonies).

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Halachos on the Daf - Bava Basra 101

Graves

When one sells a ma’amad, the buyer gets the area of 4 kavs. The purpose of a ma’amad was to allow the people returning from burying a dead person, to reflect on the vanities and hollowness of this world and to repent. Its main purpose though, was to comfort the mourners and to cry along with them. So they would walk along this area, and repeatedly sit and then get up again.

When one sold a grave and included in the sale was the path to the grave and the room for eulogies and the area for ma’amad, the relatives of the dead person in the grave may bury another family member there, even over the objections of the buyer. The reason being, since it was the custom to bury all the family members in one area, the buyer is of course entitled to a full refund on the grave. However, the buyer is not forced to give back the area used for ma’amad and eulogies, rather he allows them to use it as needed for the funeral, and then he takes it back.

When one sells an area for the purpose of making a grave, then he gets an area 4 amos by 6 amos. The custom in those days, was not to bury the dead in single graves in a cemetery, rather they would dig out an area 4 by 6 amos, and they would bury up to 8 people in that area, usually all belonging to one family. The design was as follows. Along the length of the wall (6 amos) they would bury 3 on each side, in individual chambers, and along the width – the back wall (4 amos), they would bury two more. The front wall was used as an entranceway or a stairwell to get underground. Each chamber was 6 tefachim wide and 4 amos deep and the height was 7 tefachim (basically the shape of a coffin). Between the chambers on the length, there was a space of an amah and a half, and between the two along the back wall, there was a space of two amos.

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Halachos of the Daf - Bava Basra 100

Public Paths

A path that is used by the public is considered public property. Therefore, if a path is used by the public passes through a private field, the owner may not take away the path. Such a scenario can happen if this path was always used, even before this owner came along and bought this field.

Furthermore, if the owner of the field decided to provide a path for the public on the edge of his field instead of the one running through the middle of his field, the public may use both the old and new paths. Even though this seems unfair to the owner, for after all, he has provided an alternate means to walk across his field, nevertheless, they may use both.

The reason Chazal instituted such a law is because they were afraid that the owner would provide a circuitous route, which would inconvenience the public. Another reason is that even if the new path is straight, it will still inevitably inconvenience some people. Since people from both sides of the field use this path, if it’s moved to the right, it will trouble those who come from the left, and vice versa.

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Avraham Walking the Land

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora cites a braisa: If one walked in it through the length and width of it, he has acquired the place where he walked; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer. The Chachamim, however, say: Walking accomplishes nothing unless he makes a propriety act.

Rabbi Elozar said: What is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason? It is written: (Hashem said to Avraham:) Arise walk through the land in the length and width of it, for I will give it to you. [Evidently, he acquired it through walking.] The Chachamim, however, hold that there, Hashem told him that (since He loved him), that his children will be able to conquer the land with ease (for they will not be accused of being thieves).

There are several explanations in the Chachamim’s opinion.

1. Rashbam - It is a way to demonstrate to the Satan that Eretz Yisroel belonged to Avraham’s descendants and they cannot be accused of stealing it.

2. Ramban in Lech Lecha explains that it was a ma'aseh avos siman l'banim. It was symbolic of the Jews taking over Eretz Yisroel in the future.

3. Rambam and Kesef Mishneh in hilchos Bikkurim write that Avraham became the av hamon goyim - - “the father of all nations,” which means that all the nations of the world could theoretically have an equal claim on Eretz Yisroel. Based on this, we can explain that Avraham had to display ownership over it prior to his name being changed to Avraham.

4. It was a psychological acquisition. The purpose was to make the children of Avraham feel that Eretz Yisroel was theirs, so that they would be moser nefesh to conquer it in the future.

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Space for the Holy Ark

The Gemora states that neither the body of the keruvim, nor the ark itself took up any space in the inner sanctum.

The Maharsha says that this miracle was done to indicate that Hashem has no physical aspect, and therefore the ark and keruvim which were designated as the ultimate resting place of Hashem's presence did not use up any physical space.

The Ben Yehoyada says that the ark took up no space to hint that any expenditures that one makes for Torah do not come off his general budget set by Hashem for a year (as per Beitza 16a). The keruvim, which symbolize the Jewish nation, took up no space to hint that all sustenance provided to the Jewish nation is done miraculously by Hashem, and is not part of the general account made for the world's sustenance. He quotes his son, Yaakov, as explaining that this miracle was done to teach us that when one is involved in Torah (symbolized by the ark) and mitzvos (symbolized by the keruvim), he should do so without any earthly intentions, just as these items were not related to the physical space where they were situated.
Shabbos in the Daf
The Gemora states that the Aron, the Holy Ark, did not take up any room in space in the Mishkan and in the Bais HaMikdash. This was truly a miracle. Similarly, we can suggest that Shabbos, despite the prohibition from refraining to work, does not take up any space either.

The Zohar states that one’s sustenance is blessed from Shabbos. Although one refrains from work on Shabbos and it would seem that this would be detrimental to ones livelihood, one should not be concerned, because by observing Shabbos, his efforts during the week will be blessed.

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Halachos of the Daf - Bava Basra 93

Selling Defective Seeds


If one sold seeds which are not eaten, rather they are only used for planting, and the buyer after planting them sees that nothing grew out of those seeds, the seller is responsible and must pay back the money to the buyer, even if he didn’t know that there was anything wrong with the seeds. The buyer is not reimbursed for his money or efforts to plant the defective seeds. This is true only in a case where it is readily apparent that the seeds were defective. If however the field was flooded or a similar type of outside factor, then the seller is not responsible, since it may not have grown because of the flooding. On the other hand, if the buyer had not yet paid and he planted them and there was a flood, the seller cannot demand payment, since it could have very well not grown even without the flood, because maybe they were defective. In an instance where the seller can prove that his seeds were not defective, and the buyer’s field was flooded, the buyer must pay.

If one sold seeds which are also eaten, and the buyer plants them and it does not grow, the seller is not responsible, and does not have to give back the money to the buyer. If, however, the buyer said that he’s buying these seeds to plant them, then the seller is responsible. In an instance where the buyer had not yet paid, and he planted them and they did not grow, he may still claim that he had bought it for planting, and the seller would be responsible.

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Majority in Monetary Halachah

Shmuel states that we do not follow the majority in monetary halachah. We rule in accordance with Shmuel (Tur and Shulchan Aruch C”M 232:23). The Rishonim and Acharonim discuss the rationale and parameters of Shmuel's position, in context of other sources in Shas.

The Gemora implies that if the buyer always buys for plowing, we assume this sale was for plowing as well, and the sale is void. Rashbam says that this is true only when the seller knows the buyer, and therefore had to assume that he was buying it for plowing. Rashi (BK 46a) says that even if the seller does not know the buyer, if we know that he only buys animals for plowing, he may void the sale.

The Gemora also implies that if the price of oxen for plowing is different than the price for meat, then the sale price can prove what the purpose of the purchase was. Although the Sages (77b) rule that we cannot use the sale price to prove what was included in an ambiguous sale, they agree that the sale price can resolve the doubt in the sale of an ox. Rashbam explains that in the earlier case, the simple understanding of the sale (for a plow attachment) would not support the buyer, and the buyer must therefore prove his position. Simply paying a higher price is not a sufficient proof. However, in the case of Shmuel, since we already know that this buyer does sometimes buy oxen for plowing, the sale price can resolve that this sale followed a normal pattern of purchase.

Tosfos (92a vLechze) says that in this case, either side has a support to their position – the buyer has a majority, and the seller has possession. Therefore, the sale price is enough to tip the case to either one's supported position. In the earlier case, the sale price is not enough to support the buyer against the seller, who is supported by both majority (of people who mean only to the plow accessory) and possession (of the purchase money).

The Ramah (quoted by the Tur CM 232) states that Shmuel only precludes following the majority when it would remove money from one currently in possession. Therefore, in the case of the goring ox sold, we allow the seller to retain the purchase money, and may not remove the money based on a majority. However, if the buyer has not yet paid, we allow the buyer to retain the money.
Tosfos (B”K 27b Ka mashma lan) asks how Shmuel is consistent with the fact that we follow majority rule in monetary court cases. Tosfos answers that in a court case, the minority is subsumed in the majority, and neither party is considered in possession, since the court has the power to remove money from anyone's possession.

The Terumas Hadeshen (314) quotes Tosfos saying that Shmuel only precludes majorities that are based on general rules (deductive), but not observed majorities (inductive). This will explain how we can follow a majority in a court case.

The Ketzos in Kuntras hasefeikos (2) quotes the Maharam Chaviv, who explains that the dissenting judges nullify their opinion to the majority opinion, and therefore we are no longer following merely a majority. The Ketzos himself (3) explains that Tosfos is saying that a court has the power to nullify a litigant's possession. Since Shmuel only precludes majorities in monetary halachah due to the possession of a litigant, a court's majority is applicable in monetary cases.

Rav Shimon Shkop (Sha'arai Yosher 3:3) explains Tosfos's explanation of court majority. He states that Shmuel's principle is based on the fact that in monetary halachah, we follow possession, due to simple logic. To defy the current possession, we need a clear proof, and majority is a Torah rule, not a clear proof. However, the Torah rules for a court mandate that its decisions are decided by majority. Once that is decided, the court has full power to render and impose judgments, even in monetary halachah. [See also Chidushei Rabbi Shimon Shkop BK 27, where he explains that court rulings are an attempt to arrive at an intellectual conclusion, based on a majority of opinions. Once that intellectual conclusion has been reached, it has full force in all areas of halachah].

Rav Dovid Lifshitz (Chulin Shiur 22:2) explains, based on Rav Shimon Shkop, that Tosfos means that the minority is subsumed in the majority, just as a minority of non kosher meat is subsumed in a majority of kosher meat. Once that occurs, the court is not simply a majority, but a full unit, all ruling the majority's conclusion. To prove this idea, he notes that if a court of three imposed a judgment based on a 2-1 ruling, if the ruling is reversed, all three judges must equally make amends. This indicates that even the dissenting judge is considered to have ruled the majority's opinion.

Tosfos (Kesuvos 15b l'hachazir) says that Shmuel only precludes majority in a case where the buyer willingly gave his money to the seller, in the context of a sale. To remove that money requires more than a majority. However, in the case of a lost object, whose owner never willingly parted with his property, we do apply majority, to decide if it was lost by a Jew or non Jew.

Tosfos (Sanhedrin 3b Dinei Nefashos) asks why Shmuel does not apply majority to monetary cases. The Gemora proves that we follow a majority of judges in monetary cases with a kal vachomer (a fortiori) from capital court cases. Tosfos asks why this kal vachomer will not apply to Shmuel's case. Tosfos further explains that we apply even deductive majorities in capital cases, and therefore should do so in monetary halachah, as well. Tosfos answers that Shmuel only rejects inferior majorities in monetary halachah, but accepts bona fide majorities in all areas of halachah.

See Bach (CM 232) who explains that an inferior majority is one where only one aspect of the case is a majority. For example, although most oxen sold are for plowing, most buyers buy oxen for meat. A buyer who buys oxen for plowing buys many more than any individual buyer who buys for meat.

See Shev Shma'atsa (4:8-9), who explains that Tosfos in Sanhedrin and Tosfos in Bava Kamma disagree on whether a bona fide majority can be used in monetary halachah.

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Halachos of the Daf - Bava Basra 91

Fasting and Blowing Trumpets


The Torah commands us to blow trumpets when a community faces a calamity or danger. In such circumstances, we fast and pray as well, in order that Hashem should have mercy on us.

The reason we blow trumpets explains the Chinuch, is because a person needs to be jolted out of his complacency.

The Pri Megadim elaborates: The whole point of blowing trumpets and praying when there is an impending calamity is so that we take to heart the fact that everything that happens is from Hashem, even the calamity that is imminent. Therefore we fast and pray, and most of all repent, and Hashem will take away the danger. The primary reason why Hashem sent it in the first place is to get us to repent.

There are many different types of dangers that would require us to fast and blow trumpets. Among them include the following:

1) A non-Jewish army is on the way to wage war against the Jews, or to impose taxes, or to forcibly take away a piece of land, or even if they would decree that Jews may no longer adhere to a particular Mitzvah.

2) A plague that kills people (even non-Jews), or pigs. Pigs are of concern since they have similar intestines to people, therefore we are afraid that the plague will travel to people.

3) If the price of any item (or items) which is largely the sole profit of the region, would plummet to nearly half the price. Although at first glance this would seem to be good news, since the poor can now afford these items, it is a serious calamity, for without this item being sold at the regular profit, the population will find themselves in a depression.

Whenever a fast day was instituted, there was a specific schedule. From after Shacharis until midday - the Beis Din would analyze the actions of the community, to determine if there was any area that could use strengthening. If they would find a problem, they would immediately fix it. From after midday until nightfall – in the first half the community would read from the Torah and Neviim, and in the second half the community would pray Mincha intensely.

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Halachos of the Daf - Bava Basra 90

Basic Staples

Basic staples are food items which are needed to live, they include wine, flour and oil. There are special laws in regard to commerce when dealing with basic staples.

1) One may not sell these items above the common price. Items which are added to the basic staples (i.e. spices), the limit one may profit from them, is double the cost. There is no limit that one may charge, for all other items.

2) When one buys these items, he may not stockpile them. One can do so however, if he grew them himself. In times of famine, one may only store away enough of these items to last him a year.

3) One may not export such items from Eretz Yisroel or from a place which is mostly populated by Jews.

4) In Eretz Yisroel one may not make a business out of selling these items, rather everyone brings his little bit of produce to the marketplace and sells them. This does not apply in a place where it is mostly populated by Jews.

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Halachos of the Daf - Bava Basra 89

Accurate Weights

It is a Torah prohibition to weigh something with an inaccurate measure, weight or scale. Furthermore, one may not keep such items in his home. However if everyone in his community uses scales weights or measures which are engraved with a certain symbol, then he may keep the inaccurate ones in his home. This is because no one will buy from him if he uses those weights.

One may not store his weights in salt. Some Rishonim understand the reason to be, because the salt would make the weights heavier, and the buyer might use these weights to his advantage. Since if for example the weight weighs a pound, and after it was kept in salt it weighs a little more, the buyer stands to gain more merchandise for his money. Other Rishonim explain that the reason weights may not be stored in salt is because the weights will decrease in volume, and the seller might use it to his advantage.

One should cover the weights which are used to weigh gold and silver, for even the slightest nick can cause a large discrepancy in price.

A scale must be perfectly balanced. The proper size of the scale is essential to achieve accurate results.

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Halachos of the Daf - Bava Basra 87

A Minor as a Shliach

A non-Jew cannot be made a shliach (agent), for any type of shlichus. Nor can a Jew be made a shliach for a non-Jew for any type of shlichus.

All Jewish men and women, and non-Jewish slaves and maidservants, may be used as a shliach. A deaf-mute, a deranged person and a minor (boy younger than 13, girl younger than 12), may not be made a shliach. Therefore if the father sent a minor to a store with a dollar and a flask in order to buy oil which costs 50 cents, and then the storekeeper measured for the child 50 cents worth of oil, and gave him 50 cents change, and on the way home, the child lost the flask of oil and the change, the storekeeper is liable to pay the father for the flask, oil and the 50 cents change.

The reason being, since the father only sent the child to the store to let the storekeeper know that he needs 50 cents worth of oil, and the father expected the storekeeper to send it with someone else. According to the Rema the storekeeper is liable to pay for the flask only if the storekeeper took the flask from the child and measured the oil. However if the storekeeper merely poured the oil into the flask which never left the child’s hands, then he does not have to pay for the flask.

The S”ma and others disagree. They maintain that the storekeeper is never liable for the flask, since by giving the flask to the child, the father essentially was mafkir it, and the storekeeper is not required to guard it. Rather the storekeeper is liable for the dollar (50 cents change, and 50 cents worth of oil), since he should have either sent back the dollars worth (the oil and change) with someone else, or waited until he met the father and then given him back the money. If the storekeeper gave back the dollar to the child, then he is not liable at all.

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Halachos of the Daf - Bava Basra 86

Selling with a Measurement

In an instance where the seller is selling items that require measurement (i.e. fruits), using his own utensils, in a simta (alleyway), or even in the buyers property, the halachah will depend on how the sale was phrased.

If the seller said, “I’m selling you thirty pounds for thirty dollars,” then the buyer may retract, as long as the seller did not yet measure the entire thirty pounds. The reason is because we consider the expression “thirty pounds for thirty dollars” to be one big sale. Therefore since the seller did not finish measuring, the buyer had not yet bought anything, and may retract.

According to the Mechaber, if the fruits were being measured with the buyers utensils, then we say that whatever was already measured, the buyer may not retract, since the sale is taking place in the buyers property, and his utensils are being used, we understand that the buyer agrees to immediately acquire whatever was measured. However the Rema maintains that even if the buyer’s utensils were used, since the expression “thirty pounds for thirty dollars” was used, the buyer wants to get the full thirty pounds for his thirty dollars. Therefore he may retract until the entire thirty pounds was measured.

If the seller said, “I’m selling you thirty pounds at a dollar a pound” (or if he said, “I’m selling you at a dollar a pound, thirty pounds”), then we consider each pound to be a separate sale. In a case where the buyer’s utensils were used and the sale is taking place in the buyers property (or even in a simta), then as soon as they decided on the price, even before measuring, the buyer has acquired the fruits and may not retract. The Rema disagrees and holds that even in such an instance, if the buyer did not yet pay, then he may not retract.

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Normal Way of Carrying

Abaye sat and related the above halachah. Rav Ada bar Masnah asked him from the following braisa: [There is a halachah of kim leih bid’rabbah minei -whenever someone is deserving of two punishments, he receives the one which is more severe.] If one steals a purse on Shabbos, he is obligated to pay for the purse as well, as he had already stolen before he had been liable to be stoned (for desecrating Shabbos). If he was dragging the purse little by little out of the original owner’s domain, he is exempt from paying for the purse, as the act of desecrating Shabbos and the act of stealing happened at the same time. Now, a purse is something that is normal to be lifted, and nevertheless, it is acquired through meshichah!?

Abaye answered: It is referring to a purse that is tied by a string.

Rav Ada (thinking that Abaye meant that it was small) asked him back: I also understood it to be referring to a small purse (and that is why I asked my question that it should not be acquired through meshichah; rather, through hagba’ah)!?

Abaye responded: It is referring to a purse that needs a string attached to it (due to its large size, it can only be dragged; not lifted).

Tosfos asks: How could the Gemora think that the braisa is referring to a small purse which can be lifted? If so, he should not be liable for violating the Shabbos, since it is not the normal way of carrying something!?

Tosfos answers that although with respect to acquisitions, the item can only be acquired through lifting, for this is its normal mode of transport; nevertheless, with respect to Shabbos, it is regarded as normal.

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