Second One Takes Effect

The Gemora (Nedarim 18a) states: Although the Mishna had stated that if someone makes two consecutive oaths that he will not eat something and he eats it, he has transgressed one prohibition (for the second one does not take effect), if the person asked for the first oath to be permitted (and it was), the second oath is now valid.

There is a discussion if the second oath (before the first one was annulled) is regarded as an oath taken in vain (similar to an oath to nullify a mitzvah).

The Ritva writes: If he has the first one annulled, the second one is not regarded as an oath taken in vain, for now, it takes effect. He, therefore, would not incur lashes for the second oath.

The Nimukei Yosef maintains that even while the first oath is intact, the second oath is not regarded as an oath taken in vain. This is because it has potential for being a valid oath, i.e. if the first one is annulled. Others say that it is not considered in vain for the second oath is essentially an oath in order to uphold a mitzvah (fulfilling the first one), and we learned above that this is an admirable thing to do.

Rashi in Shavuos explains the reason why the second oath takes effect after the first one is annulled. He says it is because a sage has the power to retroactively revoke the oath in a manner as if the oath was never uttered. Accordingly, the second one is valid, for there is no first one any longer.

The Shach writes that according to this, the second one will only take effect if a sage annulled the oath. However, if the husband annulled the oath of his wife, her second oath would not take effect. This is because a husband does not retroactively revoke her oath; it is only considered void from this moment and on. The first oath is not regarded as if it never existed and therefore, the second one does not take effect.

Reb Akiva Eiger disagrees. He states: The reason why the second oath does not take effect initially is because one prohibition cannot take effect upon another. The second prohibition exists, but it is in a pending state. As soon as the first prohibition is removed, the second one “wakes up” and takes effect. This would be true when the husband annuls the oath of his wife as well.

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Incidental Benefit

Abaye explains the Gemora (Nedarim 16b) as follows: In the case of a vow, one says, “The pleasure of the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” (Since the vow is upon the object, not the person, it is effective.) However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not derive any pleasure from the sukkah.” (Since the oath is upon the person and the mitzvah is upon the person, they are contradicting each other and the oath cannot take effect.)

Rava asks on Abaye’s language: Were mitzvos given to derive benefit from them? (He should still be able to sit in the sukkah?)

Rather, Rava explains: In the case of a vow, one says, “The sitting in the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not sit in the sukkah.”

The Reshash asks on Rava’s question: Although the mitzvos were not given for the purpose of deriving benefit from them, it still should be forbidden to sit in the sukkah in this situation? This is because he is enjoying the incidental pleasure of the shade!

He answers that if it is shade that the person desires, he could stay inside the house. The reason he chose to sit in a sukkah is solely because of the mitzvah. It is therefore not regarded as if he is befitting from the shade of the sukkah.

The Machaneh Efraim is not satisfied with this answer. He asks that the bottom line is that he is not dwelling in his house; he is inside the sukkah and enjoying its shade! Why should this be permitted?

The Oneg Yom Tov answers: We are only concerned with the physical pleasure when the benefit is purely incidental and not related to the mitzvah. However, the mitzvah of sukkah is different. The Torah commands us to dwell in the sukkah in the same manner that one would live in his house. The enjoyment of sitting in a sukkah is not regarded as an incidental benefit; this is the fulfillment of the mitzvah. And since mitzvos were not given for the purpose of deriving pleasure from them, the (direct) benefit that one receives as he is fulfilling the mitzvah is not regarded as a benefit, and is therefore permitted.

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Ran Elucidated - Daf 16

Distinction between a vow and an oath - The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for this: How do we know that one cannot swear to transgress a mitzvah? It is because it is written [Bamidbar 30:3]: If a man makes a vow to Hashem or makes an oath to prohibit himself, he shall not desecrate his word; according to whatever came out of his mouth, he shall do. We see from here that only “his word” (a discretionary matter) he should not desecrate. However, he may desecrate it when it involves the wishes of Heaven (where his oath contradicts a mitzvah).

The Gemora asks: Why is a vow any different? If it is because it says makes a vow to Hashem, which implies that he should not desecrate his word even when his vow involves the wishes of Heaven, why, by an oath, it is also written makes an oath to Hashem (since the words “to Hashem” is written between a vow and an oath)?

Abaye answers: In the case of a vow, one says, “The pleasure of the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” (Since the vow is upon the object, not the person, it is effective.) However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not derive any pleasure from the sukkah.” (Since the oath is upon the person and the mitzvah is upon the person, they are contradicting each other and the oath cannot take effect.)

The Ran explains: It is reasonable that the word “to Hashem” should be referring to a vow, but not an oath. It is logical to assume that a neder in this manner will take effect. This is because he is not vowing directly against the Torah’s commandment. The neder takes effect and he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the sukkah because we cannot force a person to eat something that is forbidden to him. However, by an oath, he is saying that he will not sit in the sukkah. This is a direct contradiction to the Torah’s commandment and he doesn’t have the power to free himself from the Torah’s commandment to sit in a sukkah.

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Zohar and the Gemora

The Gemora cites a braisa: There is greater stringency in oaths than in vows, and greater stringency in vows than in oaths. There is greater stringency in vows, for vows apply to objects necessary for the performance of a mitzvah just as to optional matters, which is not so regarding oaths (which do not take effect if one would take an oath against performing a certain mitzvah). And there is greater stringency in oaths, for oaths are valid with respect to matters that have substance and matters that are intangible, which is not so regarding vows (which do not take effect on intangible things).

It is noteworthy that the Zohar writes exactly the opposite. An oath, he says, can only take effect on a davar she’yeish bo mamash, something that has substance, whereas a vow can take effect even on a matter that lacks substance.

The Shoel U’meishiv in his haskamah to the sefer Beis Yisroel cites from the Neizer Yisroel that it is a printer’s mistake and the correct version of the Zohar is the way the Gemora states.

Reb Reuven Margoliyos disagrees and cites a Ramban in Shavuos who hints to the version that we have in the Zohar. The Ramban writes that according to Sod, vows do not take effect on matters of substance, whereas an oath will be effective on matters of substance.

In the sefer Mei Hashiloach, he explains the Zohar in a manner that is identical to our Gemora. We find in the Zohar that a davar she’yeish bo mamash frequently means something that has the ability to reproduce. The reason that an oath can take effect even on intangible matters is because an oath is an issur gavra, one is prohibiting himself from the object. The oath, therefore, is taking effect upon the person. The meaning of the Zohar is that an oath takes effect on the person, for he is a davar she’yeish bo mamash, i.e. man has the ability to reproduce; objects do not! An oath takes effect upon the person and not on the object. A vow, on the other hand, takes effect even on a davar she’ein bo mamash, something that does not have the ability to reproduce, i.e. objects. For by a vow, one is prohibiting the object upon himself (issur cheftza), and therefore, the vow takes effect upon the object, not upon the person.

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A Question of Linkage

The Ra”n Elucidated

LINKAGE - Rami bar Chama inquired (Nedarim 11b - 12a): A piece of korban shelamim was sitting next to a loaf of bread, and he said, “This (bread) should be like this (shelamim).” Is he referring to the prohibition that the meat originally had before its blood was sprinkled on the Altar, or is he referring to the fact that the meat is now permitted? If he is referring to the fact that the meat is now permitted, the neder is not effective.

The Ran asks: Even if he is referring to the present status of the meat, the neder should be valid, for there are prohibitions that still exist in the shelamim? A tamei is prohibited against eating from the korban! The “chest and the thigh” are forbidden to any non-Kohen!

He answers: We are only concerned with prohibitions that emerge because of his vow. Any prohibition coming from his vow will be forbidden to everyone because he sanctified this animal. A prohibition that is limited to a select group of people cannot be on account of his vow and therefore, such prohibitions may not serve as an association to his present vow.

Hatfasah to a Shelamim

Rami bar Chama inquired: If someone states, “This is upon me like meat of a korban shelamim after it its blood is sprinkled (on the Altar),” what is the law? The Gemora asks: If he uses this terminology, he is essentially saying that it is permitted to him (as everyone is allowed to eat the meat of a shelamim after its blood has been sprinkled on the altar)! Rather, it must that his question was in a case where a piece of korban shelamim was sitting next to a loaf of bread, and he said, “This (bread) should be like this (shelamim).” Is he referring to the prohibition that the meat originally had before its blood was sprinkled on the Altar, or is he referring to the fact that the meat is now permitted?

Reb Chaim Brisker explains: The inquiry of the Gemora is not regarding the vower’s intention (does he mean to link the object of his vow to the original status of the shelamim or to its present status?); rather, Rami bar Chama’s uncertainty is in respect to the laws of this association. Does one associate the object of his neder with prohibitions that are now present or is the association with the essential state of the shelamim, i.e. its previous state, which is the sanctity that brought about its prohibition?

According to Reb Chaim’s explanation, we can answer a challenge to this Gemora posed by Reb Shmuel Rozovsky and Reb Naftoli Trop. They ask: Why don’t we apply the principle of “undefined nedarim are treated stringently” (we are strict in regard to its meaning until the vower explains differently)? They answer that this principle is applicable only when the vower has declared a valid neder, consisting of a legitimate language fit for a neder; however, there was uncertainty regarding his true intent. In such cases, we apply this principle and we assume that a person does not express himself for nothing. He probably meant to invoke a neder. However, in Rami bar Chama’s inquiry, the question is regarding the explanation of his words; did the vower mean to associate the object of his neder with the original prohibition of the shelamim or to its present status? If he meant to link the object of his neder to the present (permitted) status of the shelamim, he is not invoking a neder at all! When one fails to express his neder with his mouth, we cannot rule stringently.

According to Reb Chaim Brisker’s explanation, however, their question does not even begin. For Rami bar Chama’s inquiry has nothing to do with the vower’s intent. Rami bar Chama is inquiring into the mechanics of invoking a neder through an association. Is the association to the object’s present status or to its previous condition? The principle of “undefined nedarim are treated stringently” does not apply here.

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“From the implication of a negative, we cannot hear the positive"

The Gemora (Nedarim 11a) asks: Who is the author of our Mishna? It cannot be Rabbi Meir, as he does not hold of the concept that if someone makes a negative statement, the positive is automatically implied. [It is not chullin means that it is like a korban.] This is apparent from Rabbi Meir’s statement (in a Mishna). Rabbi Meir states: Any condition that is not similar to the condition made (by Moshe Rabbeinu) with the sons of (the tribe of) Reuven and Gad (the condition was doubled; if the condition is fulfilled, the agreement is valid, but if it is not fulfilled, the agreement is not valid) is not a valid condition. (Obviously, we not infer the positive from the negative.)

The Rishonim ask: The Gemora in Shavuos (36a) states that Rabbi Meir only holds that “the positive cannot be implied from the negative statement” only in regards to monetary matters; however, in regards to prohibitory matters, Rabbi Meir agrees that we may infer the positive from the negative. If so, the Mishna here can very well be following Rabbi Meir’s opinion, for we are discussing the laws pertaining to vows and this is not a monetary matter, but rather, a prohibitory matter?

Tosfos answers: It is evident from the Gemora there that a prohibition that involves money has the status of a monetary matter and Rabbi Meir will still maintain that “from the implication of a negative, we cannot hear the positive.” Since a vow involves money, for one is prohibiting the possession’s of his fellow on himself, Rabbi Meir would not concede in this case.

The Ran answers similarly that since by a vow, one is prohibiting the object upon himself, it is considered a prohibition that involves money.

(A difference between Tosfos and the Ran may be by an oath, where, according to Tosfos, it still would involve money because he is prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from his fellow’s possessions; however, according to the Ran, it would not be regarded as a monetary matter since the object itself is not forbidden.)

Tosfos in Shavuos answers that Rabbi Meir concedes only by a strict prohibition, i.e. one that a person will be liable to death; however, by a vow, which is not regarded as a strict prohibition, Rabbi Meir will still maintain that “from the implication of a negative, we cannot hear the positive.” (The Rashba does not agree that the Gemora states such a distinction.)

The Rosh answers: Since by a vow, we go according to the language of people, it is regarded as a monetary matter. Rabbeinu Avraham min Hahar explains: People generally explain themselves completely. Therefore, by a vow and all money matters (for the same reason), Rabbi Meir maintains that “from the implication of a negative, we cannot hear the positive.”

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Shalom Aleichem - Aleichem Shalom

We learned in the following braisa (Nedarim 10b): Rabbi Shimon says: How do we know that a person should not say (when consecrating an offering) “to Hashem an olah,” “to Hashem a mincha,” “to Hashem a todah,” or “to Hashem a shelamim” (but rather, the Name of Hashem should always be mentioned first)? It is derived from the verse [Vayikra 1:2]: An offering to Hashem.

The Yeshuos Yaakov (Y”D 148) uses our Gemora to explain our custom of greeting your fellow with “Shalom Aleichem,” and they respond with “Aleichem Shalom.” In truth, it should be forbidden to say “Shalom aleichem,” for “Shalom” is one of the Names of Hashem and we should be concerned that a person will die immediately after saying “Shalom” without having the opportunity to conclude and say “aleichem.” If this would happen, it would emerge that he had said Hashem’s Name in vain. However, since Chazal have told us that one who greets his fellow with “shalom” will merit living a long life, there is no need to be concerned that he will die immediately following saying “shalom.” This logic is only applicable to the first one greeting his fellow, for he is the one that has this guarantee. The fellow responding, however, does not have this guarantee, and that is why he replies and says, “Aleichem shalom.”

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Pious and Righteous

The Gemora (Nedarim 10a) states: Rabbi Yehudah said in a braisa: The early pious ones were eager to bring a chatas offering, because the Holy One, blessed be He, never caused them to stumble. What did they do? They arose and made a nedavah vow of nezirus to the Omnipresent, so they should be liable to bring a chatas offering to the Omnipresent (when the nezirus was completed; this was considered virtuous).

Shoel U’meishiv asks: Tosfos writes in several places in Shas that Hashem does not cause the righteous to stumble only in respect to prohibitions dealing with eating; however, they may stumble by other prohibitions. If so, it is still possible for them to bring a chatas offering, when they stumble in other prohibitions, so why were they compelled to take a vow of nezirus?

He answers that Tosfos only said that in regards to the righteous people. They may stumble in other prohibitions. However, the pious people are on a much higher level and Hashem would not allow them to stumble in any prohibition.

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Locks of Hair Arranged in Curls

The Gemora (Nedarim 9b)states: A nedavah for nezirus is regarded as virtuous in cases such that of Shimon the Righteous (a great Kohen Gadol who served in the beginning of the second Beis Hamikdosh). For we learned in a braisa: Shimon the Righteous said, “I never ate from the meat of an asham sacrifice offered by a nazir who had become tamei except for one case. There was once a handsome young man from the south with beautiful eyes and locks of hair arranged in curls (who had become tamei and came to the Beis Hamikdosh to have his hair removed and to offer the required sacrifice). I asked him why he had taken upon himself a vow to become a nazir, which would eventually lead to having such beautiful hair removed
(even if he would have completed his term of nezirus without becoming tamei, a nazir shaves his head upon completion). He responded to me, ‘I was a shepherd for my father and one day I went to a spring to fill my pail of water and saw my reflection in the water. My evil inclination suddenly tempted me to take advantage of my looks and wished to drive me out from this world. I said to my evil inclination: Wicked one! Why are you being so haughty in a world that is not yours, with one that in the future will be worms and maggots? I swore at that time to become a nazir.’ I was so impressed (by his piety) that I kissed him on his head and said to him, May there be more vowers of nezirus like you in Israel.”

The question that is asked is why the young man with the locks of hair arranged in curls did not simply go to a barber for a haircut to remove this temptation.

Rabbi Mendel Weinbach answers that on the way to the barber he was likely to change his mind and give in to temptation. The only solution was to immediately take upon himself a vow of nezirus which would eventually force him to eliminate his hair and the problems that accompanied it.

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Food for Thought

*** What was the necessity to state that the nazir came from the south? What difference did it make where he came from?

*** How was he permitted to look at his reflection in the water; isn’t it forbidden for a man to look at a mirror?

*** Why connection is there between the “haughtiness” of the evil inclination and the temptation to sin?

Humility

By Rabbi Yosef Levinson
The Torah details the laws which apply to one who makes a vow to be a nazir. He must refrain from drinking wine and eating fresh grapes and raisins, grapeseeds and skins. He may not shave his hair; rather he must let it grow long. A nazir may also not defile himself by coming in contact with a corpse. And when the term of his vow has ended, and the nazir wishes to revert to his former life, he must first shave off all his hair and then bring korbanos, offerings, to Hashem. In total, there are ten mitzvos pertaining to the nazir (Sefer Hachinuch Mitzvos 368:377).
The mitzvos which are enumerated in the parsha of nazir were given by Hashem in order to provide a means of self-sanctification for one who wishes to do so. The Chinuch (mitzva 374) writes that by abstaining from wine, one breaks his desires and humbles himself. (While one's main focus should be on spiritual pursuits, nevertheless one should not ignore his physical needs. Abstaining from wine allows the nazir to break his desires in a manner that is not detrimental to his health, Sefer HaChinuch, ibid.)

The Chinuch adds that this is also why the nazir must let his hair grow long. By not concerning himself with his appearance, he humbles himself. Similarly, the nazir shaves his hair completely at the end of his nazirus because there is no doubt that either, extremely long hair or totally bald distorts the appearance of man.

The Chinuch proves that the purpose for growing the hair is to subdue the yetzar hara, evil inclination from the following anecdote recorded in the Gemara (Nedarim 9b). "Shimon Hatzaddik (who was the Kohen Gadol) related that once a certain nazir appeared before him. The man had beautiful eyes, was very good looking and his locks were arranged in curls. Shimon Hatzaddik asked him: 'Why do you make a vow of nazirus, which necessitates that you destroy your beautiful hair?' (For he will be required to shave his head at the end of his nazirus.) The man replied: 'I was a shepherd for my father. Once I went to draw water from the well and gazed at my reflection in the water. My yetzer hara seized me and wished to drive me from the world. I said - Rasha (wicked one), why are you conceited in a world that is not yours, with one who is destined to be consumed by maggots and worms? I swear that I will shave you for the sake of Heaven.' "

The Steipler Gaon, HaRav Y. Y. Kanievsky zt"l observes that although the shepherd did not mention the sin that the yetzer hara was enticing him to transgress, nevertheless from his response to himself, we see that he was concerned lest he become conceited. Indeed there is nothing that can drive one from both this world and the next, other than ga'ava, haughtiness. As it is written: "It is an abomination to Hashem, all who are haughty in their heart (Mishlei 16:5)." Chazal also say that regarding one who is conceited, Hashem says: "I and him cannot live in the world together" (Sota 5a). The Shechina departs from a ba'al ga'ava and he is left to his own defenses to combat his yetzer hara and survive in this world.

The Steipler continues that when one is praised for his accomplishments, he is overjoyed. At times, he might let this joy "go to his head" and he begins thinking that he is deserving of honor. One must be wary lest he fall into the trap of haughtiness. We see how this shepherd trembled when he saw his handsome features and realized that it might lead him to ga'ava. He therefore took an oath of nazirus.

HaRav Yerucham Levovitz zt"l points out that growing one's hair can have the opposite effect and can lead to ga'ava as is evident from Shimon Hatzaddik's story. It all depends on one's intent. One may become obsessed with his appearance and become conceited. Hashem despises such a person. On the other hand, if one lets his hair grow so that he appears disheveled, he will be humbled. Such an individual is Kadosh L'Hashem, holy to Hashem. Moreover, the hair itself becomes kadosh. This is meant literally - the law states that it is forbidden to derive pleasure from the hair of a nazir. Thus, the status of the nazir's hair is similar to the status of Kodashim (articles sanctified for the Beis Hamikdash).

This is the lesson of the nazir. We must realize the significance of humility. In addition, the nazir teaches us that we have the ability to elevate and sanctify ourselves. If by abstaining from wine and letting one's hair grow, a nazir is sanctified, all the more so, one who sincerely undertakes to improve himself and tackle his desires and bad character traits, is Kadosh and beloved to Hashem.
Daf Hashavua Kollel Beth HaTalmud Copyright (c) 2002 by Rabbi Yosef Levinson and reprinted here with permission

Maharal on the Yetzer Harah

By Rabbi Shaya Karlinsky

That man's yetzer harah exists only as a result of his arrogance is alluded to by the Rabbis in a number of places. In Nedarim (9b) Shimon HaTzaddik said: I have never partaken from a Nazir sacrifice, except for one time. Once, a person came from the south (at the conclusion of his nazir period) and I saw that he was very handsome, with his hair arranged in long curls. I said to him: My son, why did you see fit to destroy such beautiful hair? (A nazir must cut off all his hair at the end of the nazir period. By undertaking to become a nazir, he ensured that all his hair would have to be cut off.) He said to me: "I was a shepherd for my father in my home town, and I once went to draw water from the spring. As I looked at my reflection, my yetzer harah surged forth in an effort to distract me and undermine my existence. (The commentary attributed to Rashi explains that when he saw how handsome he was, his yetzer harah wanted to seduce him to improper behaviours.) I said: 'Evil one! How can you be arrogant in a world that is not yours, trying to incite one who is destined to become a worm (in the grave). I swear that I will shear you for the sake of Heaven.'" Immediately, I (Shimon HaTzadik) stood up and kissed him on his forehead and said to him "My son, there should be many more Jews like you who commit to a nazir period. It is those like you to whom the Torah refers in the verse 'A man who will make a nazir oath, for the sake of G-d(Bamidbar 6:2)'."

We see that when the man saw how handsome he was (leading to a feeling of arrogance) the yetzer harah was immediately aroused, with the intention of distracting him and leading him astray in order to undermine his existence. For this is the goal of the yetzer harah: To destroy a structure which has a stable existence. When the structure is already in a tenuous state, there is no need to undermine it further, and the yetzer harah leaves it alone. This young man recognized how vulnerable he was to the yetzer harah, and in order to remove (and undermine) the source of his arrogance (which he understood as being the breeding ground for the yetzer harah, and caused by a lack of sufficient clarity of his dependency on G-d) he vowed to cut off his hair for the sake of Heaven. (How much of our arrogance is caused by unwarranted attention given to our appearance? How much of that attention is caused by our need to cover up our own feelings of insecurity?) It was for this reason that Shimon HaTzadik praised him with the blessing that there should be more Jews who undertake neziruth for these pure motivations, and applied the phrase "an oath for the sake of Heaven" to this person.

Normally a person vows neziruth out of remorse for a sin that he committed. But as the neziruth drags on, he may come to regret the neziruth itself, as it becomes more difficult than he anticipated. This regret is even more likely when the person began the neziruth out of feelings of remorse for an earlier act, indicating that his decisions are frequently subject to vacillation. Just as he swung from a sinful act to an act of self-denial, it is possible that, as the difficulty of the neziruth weighs on him, he will once again change his mind.

But this young man wasn't motivated by any regret, making his neziruth purely for the sake of Heaven.
(When the source of activity is reactive, it embodies the potential for regret, and is also built on personal motivations - in this case, the desire to protect himself from damage and to eliminate guilt. So the element of lshaim shamayim, for the sake of Heaven, is lacking. When one's behavior is proactive, as it was in the case of the young man in our story, the motivation is to reach beyond the level at which he finds himself, out of an altruistic desire to elevate himself to become closer to G-d. We have discussed in a number of the shiurim the difference between service of G-d out of love and out of fear. Service out of fear includes a dimension of personal motivation. You are afraid of what will happen to you if you don't do the right thing. Service out of love is purely altruistic, and is therefore on a much higher level. This also has relevance to chumroth, adapting halachic stringencies. The Mahral in Chapter 1 indicates that the proper motivation for these stringencies is an intense love of G-d, with the desire to reach higher spiritual levels in order to come closer to Him. Too often, however, people are motivated to increase stringencies out of fear and self-centered motivations.)

(The Maharal will now elaborate on how each element of the young man's story reflected the purity of his motivations, and the fact that he was not acting in a way in which future regret was likely.)

The reason it mentions that he "came from the south," which is a long distance (from Jerusalem, where the nazir sacrifice was brought) is to emphasize that the person knew when he made the vow that he would have to travel that long distance to bring the sacrifices. This diminished the likelihood that the great distance he would have to travel would subsequently cause him to regret that he took the vow. Only unanticipated difficulties, those which a person rarely experiences, such as abstaining from wine for a significant time, raise the possibility of later regret.

The reason that it mentions that he was "a shepherd for his father in his home town" is because the yetzer harah besets a person when he is idle instead of being involved in productive activity. If the young man's yetzer harah was aroused due to his own idleness, then he would have been responsible for having invited the yetzer harah to entice him. Activities which would then be necessary to neutralize that self-inflicted yetzer harah could not be termed "for the sake of Heaven," but would have been a protective measure taken for his own welfare, in response to his own negligence. Therefore, it was significant that he had been a shepherd (a productive activity), not wasting his time in an idle way and not making himself vulnerable to the yetzer harah. Furthermore, the work of being a shepherd was being done for his father, so he was involved in a mitzvah (honoring his father) further insulating him from the yetzer harah. In addition, the task was being done in his home town, where he felt subject to the influence and authority of his father (which enhances humility, further insulating him from the yetzer harah) . Had he been far away from his home, he may have felt the desire and the ability to resist the authority his father, creating a sense of independence and arrogance, inviting the control of the yetzer harah. A neziruth made to in response to a feeling of independence and arrogance would not be judged purely "for the sake of Heaven." (When a person travels away from home, there is a common tendency to lower our inhibitions compared to the way we would behave at home. This is true for young men and women going away to university or camp, and for adults away on vacation or a business trip. This is an important and very relevant insight that we have from the Maharal's explanation.

But the young man did nothing to induce the yetzer harah. Rather it came upon in an unexpected way, as he unexpectedly saw his reflection in the pond and realized how handsome he was, inducing an urge to show off this beauty. This attack by the yetzer harah was no fault of his, and the response to become a nazir, resulting in his cutting off his hair, was purely "for the sake of Heaven."

(In order to fully to understand the connections being made by the Maharal, we again need to focus on the difference between serving G-d out of love and out of fear, which we discussed in the first chapter, especially in Mishna 3. Most dependable people will intervene to rectify a situation for which they feel responsible, with an element of ego being one of the motivating forces. So in the case where the individual was responsible for creating his vulnerability to the yetzer harah, the response to neutralize that yetzer harah can be viewed as having a self-centered component. But when someone observes a situation for which he has no responsibility, he will only take action to rectify a problem if he feels a connection to the outcome on a transcendent level. You look to help a loved one without examining how the situation developed, because of your love and commitment to that person. It is an altruistic and giving perspective. When someone finds himself in a situation where he has a legitimate excuse for inaction, the motivation for taking action is on a higher plane than action taken when one will be blamed for a negative outcome. So, when our young man found himself beset by the yetzer harah through no fault of his own, it would have been very easy to succumb to that yetzer harah. His proactive response, not looking for excuses but looking to do what needed to be done to fulfill the will of G-d, is the result of "service out of love," and is why Shimon HaTzakik referred to this as a nezirut that was purely "for the sake of Heaven," motivated by something that transcends the individual.)

From every element of this story, we see that the source of the yetzer harah is arrogance, with the goal of distracting man from the purpose of his existence in the world, leading to his ultimate destruction.

The class is taught by Rabbi Shaya Karlinsky, Dean of Darche Noam Institutions, Yeshivat Darche Noam/Shapell's and Midreshet Rachel for Women.

http://www.torah.org/learning/maharal/p3m1part2.html

[END]

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Oath to Study a Certain Tractate

The Gemora (Nedarim 8a) states that when one makes a vow to learn a specific tractate, it is binding even in regard to a korban, and it is not regarded as a vow to fulfill a mitzvah. The reason is that since the Torah does not explicitly indicate an obligation to learn any more than just kerias shema in the morning and evening, the vow is completely binding on anything beyond what is explicitly stated in the Torah.

The Reshash asks that since one is not obligated to learn that specific tractate, the vow should be binding to learn that specific tractate? Actually, the Ritva uses this approach to understand what the Gemora is saying. Since one can fulfill their obligation with some other type of learning i.e. kerias shema, or any other tractate, therefore, when he makes a vow on a specific tractate, it is fully binding.

Tosfos writes that even if one makes a vow not to learn something specific, the vow is binding. Reb Avi Lebowitz cites Reb Moshe (Dibros Moshe heora #43), who explains that Tosfos cannot be understood to be saying that one is not obligated to learn all sections of Torah, because both the obligation of knowing Torah and the obligation of constantly learning Torah actually requires a person to learn all sections of Torah every day. While it may be impossible to do so, there is still technically an obligation on every single aspect of Torah. Therefore, Tosfos can only be explained like the Ran that the obligation to learn every section of Torah is not stated explicitly. Based on this, the Rosh and Ramban would hold that a vow not to learn even a specific or obscure section of Torah on any particular day would not be binding at all.

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Oath to Fulfill a Mitzvah

The Ran and Rosh (Nedarim 8a) argue whether an oath to fulfill a mitzvah is binding in the sense that one would be in violation of “desecrating his word” for not keeping his promise. Ran understands that an oath on a mitzvah is not binding for the purpose of being liable for a korban, but is binding, and if he transgresses the mitzvah, he has violated the prohibition against desecrating his word. The Rosh seems to understand that it is not binding at all. This is also the opinion of the Ramban brought by Reb Akiva Eiger.

Reb Avi Lebowitz points out that based on this understanding, they also argue as to what the novelty of Rav Gidal’s teaching is. The Ran understands that the oath is binding and therefore obviously not an oath taken in vain, so the novelty is that one is encouraged to make these types of oaths (even those who generally refrain from taking oaths), for it will inspire him to fulfill the mitzvah. But, according to the Rosh that the oath is not really binding, the novelty is simply that by making such an “oath,” it is not an automatic violation of an oath taken in vain, since it at least accomplishes a function of encouraging the person to fulfill the mitzvah.

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Yitzchak's Blessing

Rav Chanin said in the name of Rav (Nedarim 7b) : One who hears his fellow utter Hashem’s name in vain is obligated to excommunicate him; otherwise, he himself is fit to be excommunicated. The Gemora explains the rationale behind this: For wherever the unnecessary utterance of the Divine Name is prevalent, poverty will be prevalent, and poverty is regarded as death. (Thus we see the severity of Hashem’s Name being mentioned in vain.)

Using this Gemora, Reb Shlomo Kluger explains the following verse [Breishis 27:23]: And he did not recognize him because his hands were hairy like the hands of his brother Esav, and he blessed him.

What caused Yitzchak to bless him? What is the connection between the observation that his hands were hairy like Esav and the blessing?

He explains: Wherever the unnecessary utterance of the Divine Name is prevalent, poverty will be prevalent. Up until this moment, Esav did not regularly utter the Name of Hashem. Therefore, Yitzchak had no need to be concerned about Esav becoming poor. However, now that he heard “his hairy son” using the Name of Hashem, he decided that it was time to bless him.

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Yosef's Success

It is written [Breishis 39:3]: And his master saw that the Lord was with him, and whatever he (Yosef) did, the Lord made prosper in his hand. Rashi comments: The name of Heaven was frequently in his mouth.

The Sheiris Yaakov explains Rashi: The Gemora (Nedarim 7b) states: Rav Chanin said in the name of Rav: One who hears his fellow utter Hashem’s name in vain is obligated to excommunicate him; otherwise, he himself is fit to be excommunicated. The Gemora explains the rationale behind this: For wherever the unnecessary utterance of the Divine Name is prevalent, poverty will be prevalent, and poverty is regarded as death. (Thus we see the severity of Hashem’s Name being mentioned in vain.)

Since Yosef commonly used Hashem’s Name, he should not have been successful; nevertheless, his master saw that Hashem was with him and made Yosef successful.

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The Ra”n Elucidated - Daf 7

Rulings – The Gemora left several issues unresolved. The Ran rules that regarding kiddushin, since it is an uncertainty relevant to a Biblical law, we must rule stringently and there would be yados. The Ramban and the Rashba rule similarly regarding charity and in respect to pe’ah. This is based upon the principle that we rule stringently regarding all matters of doubt which are relevant to a Biblical prohibition. The Ran disagrees with their ruling regarding charity and pe’ah because these are monetary matters; the question of the Gemora was if the money or produce designated belongs to the poor people, and therefore, we should rule leniently. The money must remain by the original owner unless there is a proof that he relinquished his rights to it. He also rules that there are no yados by hefker because it is a money matter, and hence we rule leniently. His final ruling is that there is no yados by a designation for a bathroom. He explains that the designation would only be effective on a Rabbinical level, and on all doubts that are relevant to a Rabbinical prohibition, the principle is that we rule leniently.

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Kiddushin Declaration

Rav Papa inquired (Nedarim 6b): Is there a yad for kiddushin or not (A man may betroth a woman by saying, “You are hereby betrothed to me.” What is the halacha if he makes a partial declaration? Do we compare kiddushin to nedarim or perhaps there is a distinction between the two; a vow is strict that it takes effect with merely a declaration, but kiddushin requires an action as well?)

The Gemora explains the case: A man said to a woman, “You are hereby betrothed to me,” and then he said to another woman, “And you.” Do we say that he is saying to her “And you, too,” and based upon this partial declaration, kiddushin would take effect with her. Or, perhaps, he is saying to her, “And you have seen that I married the first woman,” and kiddushin will not take effect? The Gemora leaves the matter unresolved.

Reb Chaim Brisker analyzes Rav Papa’s inquiry: Was he uncertain regarding the words “and you,” if that constitutes a language for kiddushin or not? Or, perhaps, it certainly is a valid expression for kiddushin; Rav Papa inquired regarding someone who uses this language. Is his intention to effect kiddushin or not? Reb Chaim concludes that the Gemora’s doubt is regarding the language, for if the question would be in respect to his intent, there would be a simple solution: Ask him! Reb Shimon Shkop explains the uncertainty of the Gemora to be referring to the man’s intention, and not in respect to the language.

The Avnei Miluim maintains that kiddushin cannot take effect without the man’s declaration of betrothal. Reb Boruch Ber states that the husband’s declaration is an integral part of the kiddushin acquisition. The witnesses are required to hear his declaration. It is insufficient for the witnesses to merely recognize his intent for kiddushin and observe as the man presents the woman with an object worth at least a perutah.

The Steipler Gaon, however, disagrees and holds that the husband’s declaration of betrothal is not necessary to effect a kiddushin. His declaration is only needed for the sake of revealing to us his intent for kiddushin. Accordingly, the Steipler is greatly troubled by our Gemora. What difference would it make if there is a yad for kiddushin or not; it is only their intentions that are the necessary component to effect a kiddushin? If they say that they were intending for kiddushin, what is lacking?

He answers that although it is not necessary to hear the husband’s declaration, it is necessary to hear from him that he intends to perform a kiddushin. Kiddushin will not take effect because he intended to perform a kiddushin, if that intent remained in his heart and it was not verbalized. However, if we can gauge from his words that he undoubtedly intended for kiddushin, the kiddushin will be valid. Rav Papa inquired: Are there yados by kiddushin? If there are yados, then his partial declaration is regarded as a full one; we could then determine that he certainly intended for kiddushin. However, if there are no yados by kiddushin, his declaration remains a partial one; we then, cannot ascertain with any degree of certainty that he intended for kiddushin. The Gemora leaves this matter unresolved.

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The Ra"n Elucidated - Daf 5

Inconclusive Partial Declarations - The Gemora concluded that the following is the explanation behind Shmuel’s statement: Since the vower said, “in that which I will eat from you,” or “in that which I will eat from you,” he is forbidden. However, if he only said, “I am vowed from you,” there is no prohibition whatsoever. What is the rationale for this? If he says, “I am vowed from you,” perhaps he only meant that he does not want to talk with him. If he says, “I am separated from you,” perhaps he meant that he does not want to conduct business with him. If he says, “I am distanced from you,” perhaps he meant that he does not want to stand within four amos of him. (These expressions are all regarded as an inconclusive yad since it is far from evident what his intention was; therefore, the vow is totally ineffective.)

The Ran explains that since his declaration can be understood in two different fashions, the vow does not effect at all. A vow can only be valid when its meaning is clear. Therefore, he is not prohibited to derive pleasure from his fellow, nor is he forbidden to talk with him.

The Ran cites an alternative explanation in the Gemora. One who declares, “I am vowed from you,” is prohibited from conversing with his fellow. One who states, “I am separated from you,” is prohibited from engaging in business with his fellow. One who vows, “I am distanced from you,” is prohibited from standing within four amos of him.

The explanation is that in respect to these prohibitions, his partial declarations are considered conclusive. When the Gemora states that this is an example of a partial declaration that is inconclusive, it is referring to the vow in respect to deriving benefit from his fellow; however; in respect to these other prohibitions, it is regarded as conclusive. The declaration of “I am vowed from you” clearly means that he does not wish to converse with his fellow.

(The Rosh challenges this explanation, for how could the Gemora prove from here that an inconclusive partial declaration is not regarded as a yad? We could say that the reason there is no prohibition in respect to deriving benefit is because his expression is clearly indicative that he does not mean that; he does mean, “I will not converse with you,” and for that reason, he is prohibited from talking with him.)

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His possessions, but not himself - Nedarim Daf 5

Reb Akiva Eiger writes that it would seem from the language of the Ran that when one declares, “I am vowed to you,” he is only prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from his fellow’s possessions, but he would be permitted to derive benefit from the fellow himself. Reb Akiva Eiger wonders as to why this should be the case. Shouldn’t everything be included? (Sefer Beis Arazim says that the Ran could be understood to mean that all benefits are forbidden. As a matter of fact, the Ran in Kesuvos states explicitly that all pleasures are forbidden, even if it does not involve the fellow’s possessions.)

Shalmei Nedarim answers that the expression, “to you” connotes “from something that belongs to you.” The possessions of a person belong to him; his body does not. This is why the vower would be permitted to derive benefit from the fellow, provided that he is not benefiting from his possessions.

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Drinking Wine by Kiddush

The Gemora (Nedarim 4a)explains that the novelty of a chatas nazir is that it cannot be pledged to be brought as a vow. When we asked earlier that this is a trademark of all chatas offerings, it is possible to answer that all other chatas offerings are obviously not brought because they are pledged, as they are obligated to be brought to atone for a sin. However, why is a korban chatas of a nazir brought? [One might therefore have thought the prohibition of delaying vows does not apply to it, which is why the hekeish is needed.]

The Gemora asks: The korban chatas of a woman who gives birth is also not brought for a sin that she committed, but nonetheless we know the prohibition for delaying vows does apply to her korban chatas. [Why should a korban chatas of a nazir be different?]

The Gemora answers: Her korban chatas is still different than that of a nazir, as it enables her to eat kodoshim (korbanos, which she was unable to eat beforehand and is a mitzvah).

The Meiri asks: Doesn’t the chatas offering of a nazir help him that he is now permitted to drink wine?

Tosfos and the Ran answer that drinking wine is a voluntary act, and it is not a mitzvah like the eating of kodoshim.

However, we can ask: What about the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush and havdalah? The Gemora Pesachim (106a) derives from the verse Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it that there is an obligation to recite kiddush over a cup of wine. Accordingly, we should say that a nazir’s bringing of the korbanos is similar to that of a woman who gave birth; he is bringing the korban in order to be permitted to partake in the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush?

The Meiri answers: The mitzvah of drinking the wine for kiddush is only a Rabbinical one, and the korban is not coming for that.

Tosfos explains that although there is a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush with wine, the obligation that the one who recites the blessing should drink the wine is only Rabbinical.

Reb Koby Shapiro in the Hebrew Midrashiya states that there may be a practical difference in halacha whether the mitzvah of drinking the wine is a Biblical one or merely Rabbinical.

It is ruled upon in Shulchan Aruch that a woman is Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush on Shabbos. Accordingly, she would be allowed to discharge a man of his obligation by reciting the kiddush for him.

The Acharonim raise the following question: When a man comes home from Shul Friday night, he has already fulfilled his Biblical obligation of kiddush in the Shemoneh Esrei of ma’ariv. He still has a Rabbinical obligation to recite the kiddush over a cup of wine. His wife, on the other hand, who did not daven ma’ariv, still has a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush. How can the man, who only has a Rabbinical obligation discharge his wife of her Biblical obligation?

Some answer that she should recite vayechulu prior to kiddush.

Reb Akiva Eiger answers that there is no concern here because of the principle that one who has fulfilled the mitzvah can nevertheless discharge an obligation for someone who did not yet fulfill the mitzvah. This works because every Jew is a guarantor for another. Some Acharonim are not satisfied with this answer because they say that a woman is not included in this guarantee for each other.

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is as if the husband had intention not to fulfill the Biblical obligation of kiddush when he is davening ma’ariv. This way, they are both Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush.

This entire discussion is based upon the Meiri’s opinion that the mitzvah of drinking the wine is merely a Rabbinical mitzvah. However, if we would hold that there is a Biblical mitzvah to drink the wine of kiddush, then, there would be no discussion, for the husband still has not discharged his own obligation by davening ma’ariv; he still has a Biblical obligation to drink the wine.

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A Vow to Eat & Concern for Death

A Vow to Eat

The Gemora (Nedarim 3b) states: It is understandable how one can violate the prohibition of Not to desecrate his word; if one would invoke a vow that this bread he will eat, and he does not eat it, he has desecrated his word.

How can this be a valid vow; did we not learn previously (2b) that a vow is when one prohibits the object upon himself; a vow to perform an action should have no validity?

Reb Akiva Eiger adds: The Ran cited the opinion of the Ramban who maintains that if one pronounces a vow using the language of an oath (I make a vow not to eat this bread) or he takes an oath using the language of a vow (This bread is forbidden to me by an oath), even though it is not regarded as a basic type of vow, it does take effect on account of being “a handle of a vow.” It is a partial declaration and he will be prohibited from eating the bread. However, that is only if his intention is to prohibit the object upon himself, but it cannot be regarded as a partial declaration of a vow if he is saying that he vows to eat this bread?

He concludes: May Hashem enlighten my eyes.

The Chasam Sofer explains the case as follows: He said, “This bread should be forbidden to me if I do not eat this other bread.” He went ahead and ate the first loaf of bread. The halacha would be that he is obligated to eat the second bread, for if he does not eat it by the conclusion of the day, he would have retroactively desecrated his word by eating from the first one.

Concern for Death

In Shulchan Aruch (O”C 568:3) it is ruled that if one vows to fast a certain amount of fasts, he is permitted to wait until the winter when the days will be shorter.

The Magen Avraham asks: Shouldn’t the halacha be that he is required to fast immediately, for perhaps he might die? He proves that we are concerned for death in respect to a vow from our Gemora.

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The Ra”n Elucidated - Daf 3

Delaying his Nezirus - The Gemora asks (Nedarim 3b): How does one violate the prohibition of Not to delay by nezirus? If one says, “I am a nazir,” he is automatically a nazir! If he eats grapes or drinks wine, he has violated the prohibition of a nazir, but he has not delayed!?

Rava answers: It is applicable in the following case: If one says, “I will not leave this world without becoming a nazir first,” he has an obligation from that moment on to become a nazir. (Since he might die at any moment, he is required to become a nazir immediately; otherwise, he is delaying.)

Rava cites proof to this concept from the following halacha: If a Kohen says to his wife: “Here is your get on the condition that it should take effect one moment before my death,” she is forbidden from eating terumah immediately because we are concerned that he will die the next moment. This same logic applies in this case of nezirus as well. We are concerned that he will die at any moment; therefore, he is obligated to become a nazir immediately.

The Ran explains that there is a distinction between the two cases. If she would eat terumah and her husband wouldn’t die, she has not violated any prohibition. However, he is obligated to become a nazir immediately, and if he does not, he has violated the prohibition against delaying (even though he didn’t die yet). This is because it is as if he said, “It is upon me to become a nazir in a manner that there is no concern that I will not be able to fulfill this vow of nezirus before I die.”

He asks: When an individual makes a vow to bring an offering, he is not regarded as delaying the fulfillment of his vow, unless three festivals have passed. Shouldn’t we allow the person to become a nazir within three festivals; why is he immediately regarded as procrastinating?

He answers: If one vows that he will bring an offering immediately, he is required to bring it immediately. If he procrastinates at all, he is regarded as delaying and he has violated the prohibition against delaying. He is only allowed to wait three festivals if he vowed to bring an offering without imposing any deadline. Here, we interpret his nezirus vow to mean that he wants to become a nazir immediately; any delay will be regarded as violating the terms of his vow.

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