Meat and Fowl

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said (Nedarim 54b): If one makes a neder prohibiting himself from meat, he is permitted in fowl. It is evident that he maintains that fowl is not included in meat.

The Chasam Sofer asks: How can he hold that fowl is not included in “meat,” when it is seemingly clear from the Torah that it is? The Jews in the Desert complained that they desired meat and the Ribbono shel Olom sent fowl to them. Evidently, fowl is a type of meat!

He answers that the Gemora explains that fowl is not included in “meat” because it is not healthy to eat fowl on a day of blood letting. Since in the Desert, the northern wind did not blow, and that is the reason why there was no circumcision then (the wind is needed to heal the child). Accordingly, there was no blood letting in the desert, as well. It emerges that there would be no distinction between fowl and meat in the Desert and fowl would be included in “meat.”

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Following the Majority

The Beraisa states (Nedarim 52a): If someone makes a vow not to have oil in Eretz Yisroel, he is permitted to have sesame oil and not olive oil. In Babylon, he may not have sesame oil but he can have olive oil. In a place where both are used, he is forbidden to have both.

The Gemora asks: This is obvious! The Gemora answers: The case is where most people use one kind of oil. One might think that the vow is considered like the usage of most people. This is why the Beraisa tells us that he is forbidden to both oils, because a doubt regarding a prohibition is judged stringently.

The Ra”n explains what we would have thought: Even though there is a minority that makes use of the other kind, there is a possibility that his intention might have been even from those.

The Lechem Mishna asks: Why don’t we follow the majority? Why, in all matters of prohibition, we issue a ruling based upon the majority?

He explains: If it would be a certainty that the vower was referring to the oil used by most people, we would definitely rule that that the vow takes effect only upon that type of oil. However, here he used a language which may include both types of oil, therefore, there is an assumption that he is excluding himself from the majority. We therefore rule stringently and forbid him on both types of oil, since his language can include both.

The Netziv answers that we only follow the majority in cases where the minority is in conflict with the majority. However, here, the minority is not in contradiction with the majority, since he may have intended for both. We therefore rule stringently and forbid him on both types of oil.

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Winter Vinegar; Date Honey; Milk and Whey

The Mishna states (52a): If a person makes a vow that he will not partake of dates, he can still eat date honey. If he makes a vow not to partake of winter grapes, he may partake of the vinegar made from those grapes. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseirah says: Whenever a product is called a name that reflects upon its source and a person vows not to partake from that source, he is forbidden to have the product as well. The Chachamim permit this.

The Ra”n asks: Who is this first Tanna? It is neither Rabbi Yosi nor the Chachamim! For we learned above, in the dispute regarding milk and whey, that whenever they called it “whey of milk,” it was forbidden according to everyone! If so, the date honey and the vinegar should be forbidden!

The Rashba answers: The cases are not similar. For in the case of the whey of milk, its form has not been changed. Even initially, when it was mixed with the milk, it was in that very same form. But here it has changed physically.

Furthermore, in the case of whey, the reason it is called “whey of milk,” is because it still has the law of milk. It is not to distinguish it from some other kind of whey, for there is no other kind. But here, when it is called “date honey” or “winter-grape vinegar,” it is not that they still have those laws; rather, it is to distinguish them between other types of honey and vinegar.

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Something that can become Permitted - Davar she'yeish lo Matirin

(Nedarim 52a) If one makes a neder prohibiting himself from wine, he is permitted in cooked food which has in it the taste of wine. However, if he said, “Konam this wine that I will not taste,” and it fell into a cooked dish, if it contains enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture, it is forbidden.

This would imply that if there is not enough to give flavor, it would be permitted. The Ra”n quotes his teachers who ask the following: Something which is forbidden on account of a neder is “something that can become permitted” (davar she’yeish lo matirin), and we have established that anything that can become permitted is not nullified even in a thousand!?

They answer that when we say that it is not nullified even in a thousand, that refers to something that has been mixed with its own kind. But here, when it says, “and it became mixed,” it is referring to something else that is not the same kind, like the case of eggs that were cooked with it. Anything that is mixed with something else that is not its kind is permitted, provided that it does not give flavor, even if it is “something that can become permitted.” The Ra”n cites proof to this from a Mishna in Chalah and a Yerushalmi in our perek.

They, therefore, objected to the statement of the Ri”f in Meseches Chulin concerning bread that was baked in an oven with roasted meat. The Gemora states that it is forbidden to eat it with a dairy sauce even though it has been established that we are not halachically concerned with vapors. The reason it is forbidden is because the bread is “something that can be permitted,” since one may eat it together with meat. For that reason, it is not nullified, even in a thousand. It is evident from the Ri”f that he maintains that “something that can be permitted” is not nullified even in something that is not its kind.

The Ra”n, however, agrees to the Ri”f. When the Mishna here says that “something can become permitted” becomes nullified in something that is not its own kind, that is referring to something that is forbidden now, but will become permitted in the future, like nedarim. For the Ra”n has the following question: Since according to the Chachamim, all forbidden things become nullified in their own kind just as in a different kind, why did the Chachamim make a distinction in the case of “something that can become permitted,” between its own kind and a different kind?

The reason is as follows: The Chachamim and Rabbi Yehudah disagree whether or not something can be nullified in its own kind. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a forbidden item is not nullified in its own kind, because anything that is similar to another thing does not weaken and nullify it; rather, it preserves it and strengthens it.

The Chachamim disagree and hold that a forbidden item and something which is permitted are not similar to each other, even if they are the same kind. This is because one is forbidden and one is permitted. For it is not fitting to follow the similarity of their substance, but rather the difference in their being forbidden and permitted.

It is for this reason that the Chachamim learned concerning “something that can be permitted” for the sake of being strict towards the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. For since the forbidden item is not completely different from the permitted one, because the forbidden one will eventually become permitted, we say that it is not nullified in its own kind. It will only become nullified when mixed with a different kind, for the difference that exists between one kind and another will make up for the equality that is added here because it is “something that can be permitted.” It is the difference between kinds that is the cause of nullification, and equality interferes with nullification.

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Small Fish, Large Fish

Rav Papa said to Abaye (Nedarim 51b): How do we know that when he says, “Fish (dag) that I will not taste,” dag implies large ones only? It is because it is written [Yonah 2:1]: Now Hashem had prepared a large fish (dag) to swallow up Yonah? But isn’t it also written: Then Yonah prayed to Hashem, his God from the inside of the fish (dagah)?

The Gemora answers: This is no difficulty: Perhaps the large fish spit him out and he was swallowed again by a smaller one.

But, the Gemora asks: What of the verse regarding the plague of blood, where it is written [Shmos 7:21]: And the fish (dagah) that was in the river died? Did only the small fish die, not the large?

The Gemora concludes: Dagah written in the Torah implies both large and small, but regarding vows, the language used by the public is followed.

It would seem that according to Abaye, the word dagah in the Torah refers only to small fish. Accordingly, we would be compelled to say that only the small fish dies in the plague of blood. Why would this be?

The Rogatchover Gaon explains: The river was dug by the hands of the Egyptians. The Yerushalmi rules regarding fish that swim into one’s private water; he acquires only the small ones and not the large ones. Accordingly, it can be explained that only the fish belonging to the Egyptians died, but the large fish, which they did not own, there was no reason for them to die.

The Rama in Shulchan Aruch (C”M 331:1) rules that a worker may return to his home on Friday afternoon, early enough that he will have the time to fill a jug of water and roast a small fish.

The Shach asks as to what is the source for the Rama’s ruling that it is sufficient if he has ample time to cook a small fish? Perhaps, he should leave his work with enough time to cook a large fish?

The Nitzotzei Ohr answers that the language of the Yerushalmi, which is the source for this halacha, is dagah, and the Rama understands that to be referring to a small fish.

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The prohibition remaining even after the item leaves his possession

Avimi inquired (Nedarim Daf 47): If one said to his friend, “Konam, your entering this house,” and then he dies or sold it to someone else, what is the halacha? Does a person have the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership or not?

The Nimukei Yosef cites a Ritva, who quotes the following Yerushalmi: A person will only have the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership. However, he cannot initially prohibit the item only for the time after it leaves his possession.

The Haflaas Nedarim explains: The only reason that someone would have the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership is because it is similar to hekdesh. Since the item in question is presently in his possession, the neder takes effect and the prohibition remains on this object forever just like hekdesh. However, one does not have the ability to consecrate an item that is presently not in his possession, and therefore, a neder to prohibit something only for the time after it leaves his possession will not take effect.

The Korban Nesanel asks: Why couldn’t this inquiry be resolved from the Gemora above (42a-b) which concluded that if one says to his fellow, “These possessions should be forbidden to you”; if he vowed prior to shemitah, he may not enter his field and he may not eat from the fruits which are growing on the branches outside of his field even when shemitah arrives? This is because a person has the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership! Shouldn’t the halacha be the same in our case where he sold the property to someone else?

He answers that shemitah is different. Since the vower has the right to acquire the fruits that are growing just like anyone else, it is regarded as if it is still in his possession, and that is why the fruits remain forbidden. (This is a tremendous chiddush that something can be considered yours because you have the right to acquire it.) However, the Gemora’s inquiry here is regarding a case where he sold the property. In this case, the item is not in his possession at all, and perhaps, the prohibition will not remain after it leaves his possession.

The Shitah Mikubetzes answers that Avimi did not know the conclusion of the Gemora above and that is why he made this inquiry.

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Hefker in Front of Three - Nedarim Daf 45

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Biblically, it is considered hefker even if his declaration was only in front of one person. Why was it decreed upon that it should be in front of three? It is in order for there to be one person who will take possession and two people to testify to this.

The Rishonim ask from the Mishna that we learned above (43a), which stated: If a person vowed not to have benefit from someone and these two people were walking together on the road, and the person who cannot benefit from his friend had no food, the halacha is that if there is nobody else around, he can put the food on the rock or fence and say, “These are ownerless for anyone who wants to take them.” The other person can then eat. If they are the only two present, it should not be regarded as hefker?

The Ritva answers that the Rabbis were lenient in a case where there was an extreme necessity to provide the person with food. They ruled in this case that the Biblical law stands and the hefker is valid.

The Bach answers that even when there are not three people present, the hefker is valid. The Sages instituted that he can retract from his hefker declaration if three people weren’t present. However, as long as he did not retract, the hefker is completely valid.

The Shach cites Tosfos that the Rabbinical decree requiring three people to be present was only said in regard to the hefker of land; however, regarding movables, such as food, it does not apply.

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Practical Guidelines for Visiting the Sick

The Gemora (Nedarim 40a) cites an incident: Rav Chelbo fell ill. Thereupon, Rav Kahana went out and proclaimed: Rav Chelbo is sick. But no one visited him. He rebuked them, saying, “Did it not once happen that one of Rabbi Akiva’s students fell ill and the Sages did not visit him? Rabbi Akiva himself went to visit him, and because they swept the ground and settled the dust before him (as per Rabbi Akiva’s instructions), he recovered. ‘My master,’ said the student, ‘you have revived me!’ Rabbi Akiva went out and lectured: He who does not visit the sick is regarded as if he spills blood (since it may lead to his death).”

The Rosh gleans from this Gemora and the Aruch Hashulchan (Y”D 335:2) rules accordingly that the primary mitzvah of visiting the sick is to check on the sick person’s needs and to do whatever is deemed necessary. The Aruch Hashulchan (ibid. 8) concludes that one who visits the sick and does not pray for mercy on his behalf has not fulfilled the mitzvah.

Our affiliate, Hakhel wrote about some of the important requirements of properly performing the mitzva of visiting the sick person. They are:

1. Davening for the choleh while visiting. Since the Shechina rests above the head of a sick person, tefilah is more efficacious in front of the sick person (Rema, Yoreh Deah 335:4). The tefilah should include the following nusach "Hamokom Yerachem Alecha B'soch Cholei Yisroel", so that the choleh benefits from the z'chus harabim (Yoreh Deah 335:6). Tefila in the presence of the choleh can be said in any language, because the Shechina is present and, of course, understands all language of prayer (Yoreh Deah 335:5).

2. Seeking help for the choleh, both physically and emotionally—Does he have everything he needs—all the medications, the deodorant, toothpaste? Does he need Torah Tapes (718-438-3904)? Does his nurse know what an important person he is? Does he need to see a Rov or more friends? (Yoreh Deah 335:8)

c. 3. Providing Positive Reinforcement. Is the choleh kept in the right frame of mind all day? Provide positive reinforcements, words of encouragement, bring in light (open the shades) and cleanliness (clean up the bedroom floor if need be). (Nedorim 40A; Ahavas Chesed 3:3)

4. According to the Chochmas Odom (151:3) the ikar (main point) of Bikur Cholim is davening for the sick person while visiting him. In fact, the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (193:3) poskens that one has not fulfilled the mitzvah of Bikur Cholim if he visits, but does not daven to Hashem while there. This is because the Shechina is present above the head of the sick person, and your tefillos are, k’viyachol, in front of the Shechina itself (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 335, Shach seif katan 3). In your tefillah, you should ask for Hashem’s mercy for that particular choleh “b’soch cholei Yisroel” (amongst the other sick of Israel), because, in the merit of the many, your tefillos will be better received (ibid., Shach seif katan 4).

5. Bikur Cholim should not be performed when it is convenient for the visitor, but when it is best for the choleh. As the halacha states, one should not visit in the first three hours of the day… the last three hours of the day…, etc. (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 335:4).

6. In addition to tefillah, there is a mitzvah to give the choleh “nachas ruach” (Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:3). This does not mean that one should speak on and on, or even with witticisms. Statements should as “You’ll now have to take that medicine for the rest of your life,” or “Next time, you’ll be more careful,” or even “How will this affect your life going forward?” may be equated with smacking a poor person across the face and knocking out a few teeth as you hand him a hundred dollars with a smile.

7. The Chazon Ish (Collected Letters, Volume I:138) writes that everyone has the mitzvah to perform “Bikur Cholilm” upon himself, as well. This means that he must take care of his body and use the most effective means possible for his personal health.

8. One should try to tidy up and make the atmosphere more cheery for the choleh, if possible. The Gemara (Nedarim 40A) relates that Rabbi Akiva himself swept and cleaned the floor for his sick student. As a result, the student told him, “You have caused me to live.” Rabbi Akiva then taught, “He who does not perform the mitzvah of Bikur Cholim, it is as if he spilled blood.” The reverse is also, of course, true. In fact, the Gemara clearly teaches that one who acts wisely with the ill will himself be saved from “a bad day” by Hashem (see Tehillim 41 and Gemara, Nedarim 40A).

9. Finally, one should consider a choleh’s status after he leaves the hospital, and even after he returns to shul or to work. The fact that he has somewhat healed does not necessarily mean that he is not suffering pain or is otherwise in distress. One should continue to daven for, and inquire as to, a person’s welfare, until he is confident that the choleh has received his refuah shlaimah.

Hakhel

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Compensation for Teaching Torah

Rabbi Yochanan said (Nedarim 37a): While it’s true that one cannot take money for teaching Scripture, he may take money for teaching them the proper cantillation of the verses.

One is obligated to teach others the laws and statutes of the Torah without demanding payment. The Chasam Sofer rules: Nowadays that the entire Gemora and the poskim are written down, one is not obligated to teach them inside for free; rather, he is required to teach orally the halachos and the rationale behind them. If, however, one teaches the students the Gemora inside, he may demand payment. The reason that the Gemora makes a distinction between Scripture and Midrash is because the Scripture was already written down. (Although Rebbe arranged the Mishna, it was not written down until much later.) Therefore, if one teaches student the correct method to read the Gemora, he may demand payment.

The Ran cites a Yerushalmi which rules that although a person may not receive compensation for teaching Torah, he may demand payment for the loss of income that he suffers by the fact that he does not pursue other means of support. This is true as long as he devotes himself completely to teaching.

Other Rishonim rule that if a teacher has no other means of support, he may receive compensation for teaching Torah.

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Proof Against the Rambam - Nedarim Daf 35

Rav Acha the son of Rav Avya said to Rav Ashi: If one said, “My loaf is forbidden to you,” and then he gave it to that fellow as a gift, who has committed me’ilah? The giver cannot be the one who committed me’ilah, for the loaf was never forbidden upon him. The recipient cannot be the one who committed me’ilah, for he can say, “I am only interested in acquiring permissible loaves; loaves that are forbidden to me, I do not want.”

The Ran writes that this is a refutation to the Rambam’s opinion, who holds that one who forbids another person benefit from himself and then feeds him will incur lashes because he has violated the transgression of “he shall not desecrate his word.”

The meaning of the Ra”n seems to be that if the Rambam is correct that if the vower provides the forbidden item to the other fellow, he has desecrated his word; then, the giver may be guilty of me’ilah as well! Why does our Gemora assume as an obvious point that the giver has not committed me’ilah?

The Machaneh Efraim (35) and the Lechem Mishna answer that although it might be prohibited for the vower to give the other fellow the forbidden item, but that does not mean that he has committed me’ilah. He has desecrated his word, but he is not guilty of me’ilah, for it was not regarded as hekdesh for him.

Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach explains that the Ran’s proof was from the language of the Gemora. The Gemora stated unequivocally that there can be no prohibition on the giver, for the loaf is not forbidden to him. It would seem from the Gemora that there is no prohibition on the giver at all! This is not correct according to the Rambam.

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Placing Money on the Horns of a Deer

The Gemora (Nedarim 33) cites a Mishna: If a person went overseas and someone supported his wife in the interim, Chanan ruled that he has lost his money.

The sons of the kohanim gedolim argued that the supporter may swear how much he gave his wife and collect the monies from him. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinu agreed. Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai said: Chanan is correct; the supporter has placed his monies on the horn of a deer.

What is the meaning of the expression, “He has placed his money on the horn of a deer”?

The Tosfos Yom Tov explains: Just as a deer runs very fast, and one chasing it will probably not catch it; so too, one who “lends” money in this manner will be unlikely to recover the money.

Tosfos Chadashim offers a different explanation: It is common for a deer to bob its head back and forth when it is running. One who places his money on the horn of a deer is likely to lose the money for the money will fall off the horns of the deer.

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Paying Up a Debt of his Fellow

The Gemora (Nedarim 33) rules regarding one who is forbidden by a vow to derive benefit from his fellow; the fellow is prohibited to repay his debt (in a regular case).

Reb Elchonon Wasserman discusses the rationale behind this ruling. Is it prohibited because the one who pronounced the vow is directly benefiting from the money that is being used to repay his debt? Or, perhaps it is because the fellow is causing the lender to forgive the borrower for his debt (once he has the money from elsewhere), and it emerges that he is indirectly receiving pleasure from the fellow?

This question is actually dependent upon a different question: Can someone pay up the debt of his fellow and cause that the debt has been paid? Or, perhaps only the borrower can repay a debt; his friend may give money to the lender with the stipulation being that the lender will forgive the borrower from the debt which he owes?

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Distinction between Charity and Returning a Lost Object

The Gemora (Nedarim 33) states regarding one who is forbidden by a vow to derive benefit from his fellow; the fellow is permitted to return his lost property to him. This is permitted because his primary intention is to fulfill the mitzvah, and he is not intending to provide pleasure to his friend.

This, explains the Shitah Mikubetzes, is in contrast to the mitzvah of giving charity, which would be forbidden. What is the difference between the two mitzvos? He explains: When charity is given to him, he is benefiting directly from the money; therefore, it is forbidden. When his lost object is returned, he is not deriving pleasure from the item; he is getting benefit from the fact that his fellow troubled himself to return the object to him. Regarding his fellow’s exertion, it may be said that his intention is to fulfill the mitzvah, and not to provide pleasure.

Others make the following distinction: Charity may be given to any poor person; it does not have to be given to this specific poor person. That is why it is prohibited to give this particular poor person charity. However, in order to fulfill the mitzvah of returning a lost object, it must be returned to the one who lost the item, and therefore, it would be permitted.

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Food for Thought - Nedarim Daf 32

*** The Beraisa quotes Rebbi as making the following statement: Milah is a great mitzvah, as there is no one who was involved in mitzvos like Avraham Avinu, and yet he was only called complete through milah, as the passuk says “walk before me and be complete,” and it says “and I will put my covenant between us.”

The Ksav Sofer asks: Perhaps milah is a minor mitzvah, but it was the mitzvah that rendered Avraham Avinu complete, for even a minor deficiency can prevent completeness?

*** Rabbi Ami bar Aba also says: The “Satan” numerically equals three hundred and sixty four (implying that one day a year he is powerless, which is Yom Kippur).

The Chidah asks: What is the advantage to us that the Satan is powerless on Yom Kippur? Why, there are so many other days in the year where he is detrimental to us?

He answers: On Yom Kippur, the Satan contradicts what he is saying the rest of the year. On Yom Kippur he says that there is no nation with such kedusha as Klal Yisroel. This renders him a liar (for that which he says the rest of the year) and gives us the strength to fend off his attacks on us for the rest of the year.

*** Rabbi Zecharyah said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Hashem wanted to have kehunah descend from Shem, as the passuk says “and he was a kohen for Hashem on high.” However, once Shem said a blessing to Avraham before saying a blessing to Hashem, Hashem decided to have kehunah descend from Avraham. This is as the passuk states, “and he blessed him and he said: blessed is Avram to the Hashem on high, Owner of heaven and earth, and praised is Hashem.” Avram asked Shem: Is it appropriate to mention first a blessing of the servant before that of his master? Kehunah was immediately given to Avraham, as the passuk states, “the word of Hashem was to my master, until I make your enemies into a footstool for your feet,” and it states “and he is a kohen for Hashem on high.” This implies that he (Shem) was a kohen, but his children would not be kohanim.

It is written in Pirkei d’Rabbi Eliezer that Avraham married Keturah, who was Hagar, after she converted.

Reb Yosef Engel asks: If Avraham was a kohen, how was he permitted to marry a divorcee?

He answers: This Medrash is of the opinion that Avraham did not have a daughter. Consequently, he had not fulfilled the mitzvah of procreation yet. There was no other woman fitting for Avraham to marry, and therefore, the positive commandment of procreation was able to override the prohibition against a kohen marrying a divorcee.

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What was Moshe's sin? Enthusiasm for Mitzvos

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah says (Nedarim 31b) : Great is circumcision, concerning which even Moshe the righteous was not spared for an hour.

The Ran comments: As soon as Moshe was lax, the angel wanted to kill him.

The Maharsha asks: Just because Moshe negated the mitzvah of circumcising his son on the eight day, is that a justification for him to be liable for death?

He answers: It is either because Hashem judges the righteous strictly or it is because a “ben Noach” is liable for death when he commits any type of transgression, and since it was prior to the Giving of the Torah, Moshe was being judged as a “ben Noach.”

Reb Meir Bergman asks: According to this explanation, how could the Mishna bring a proof from here that circumcision is great; perhaps it is different because of the special circumstances?

The Gemora states further: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah said: Great is circumcision, for all the meritorious deeds performed by Moshe our teacher did not protect him when he tarried in fulfilling the commandment of circumcision (regarding his son Eliezer), as it is written [Shmos 4:24]: And Hashem met him, and sought to kill him. Rabbi Yosi said: Heaven forbid that Moshe delayed circumcising his son, but rather, this is what Moshe said, “If I circumcise my son and immediately leave Midian to return to Pharaoh, I will endanger his life. I cannot circumcise him and wait three days, for the Holy One, blessed be He, has commanded me to go and return to Egypt! Why then was Moshe punished? It was because he occupied himself with arranging a place of lodging first prior to circumcising his son.

The Mefaresh explains: Since he was close to Egypt, he should have performed the circumcision when he stopped for lodging, for the small journey that remained would not have posed a danger to the child. He concludes that the child was only eight days old on that day.

Accordingly, the question is strengthened: Why would Moshe deserve such a strict punishment if he anyway performed the circumcision on the eight day? He was only guilty of not fulfilling the concept of zerizin makdimin l’mitzvos – a mitzvah should be fulfilled at the first moment possible. Why should he deserve to die?

Perhaps we may suggest the following answer (Rabbi Bergman answers in a very similar manner): The primary purpose of Moshe Rabbeinu’s life was to take the Jews out of Egypt and to give them the Torah. It is written regarding the birth of Moshe [Shmos 2:2]: The woman conceived and bore a son, and [when] she saw him that he was good, she hid him for three months. The Gemora in Sotah (12a) states that when he was born, the entire house was filled with light. This can be in reference to the light of Torah.

The Gemora in Megillah (16b) expounds on the verse that states [Esther 8:16]: Layehudim haysa orah visimcha visasson vikar. The Jews had light, gladness, joy and honor. Light is referring to Torah; Gladness is referring to the festivals; Joy is referring to circumcision; Glory is referring to tefillin.

The question is asked: If the Megillah wished to say that the Jews were saved because they fulfilled the Torah, festivals, milah and tefillin, why didn’t the Megillah write that explicitly? Why was it mentioned only in code form?

Rabbi Eliezer Ginzburg in his sefer, The King’s Treasures states the following: It is well known that evil decrees instituted against the Jewish people are always in correspondence with their sins. Each transgression draws a particular type of negative force in its wake. Hence, in order to determine what sin the Jewish people are being held accountable for at any given time, one need only consider the dominant characteristic of the nation threatening them, for their enemies are nothing more than a reflection of their transgressions.

Amalek was able to strike the Jewish people when their enthusiasm for Torah observance waned. The Mechilta says in reference to the verse [Shmos 17:8]: Amalek came and battled Israel in Rephidim. Amalek came because Israel loosened their grip on the Torah. This is why Rabbi Elozar introduced his lecture on the scriptural portion of the Book of Esther with the following verse: Through laziness the ceiling collapses, and through idleness of the hands the house leaks – because of the laziness of the Jews, who did not engage in Torah study, the enemies were capable of attacking.

Perhaps, Rabbi Ginzburg continues, this is what the Megillah is teaching us by saying that “the Jews had light,” and not simply saying that “the Jews had Torah.” The Jews were not guilty of completely neglecting Torah study, or for that matter, any other mitzvah. Their shortcoming was their lack of enthusiasm for mitzvos. It was the inner light of the mitzvah which they lacked, the spark of excitement and fervor for doing Hashem’s will. The miracles which Hashem performed for Israel stoked the smoldering embers within each Jew and evoked a new fervor for the performance of mitzvos, reawakening the “light” of Torah study, the “gladness” of the Yom Tov holidays, the “joy” of circumcision and the “glory” of tefillin.

Using this principle, perhaps we can suggest why the angel wished to kill Moshe for procrastinating in the fulfillment of a mitzvah. It was not that he was deserving to die for this relatively minor transgression. Rather, when Moshe displayed a slight lack of enthusiasm for the mitzvos, he could not be the one to deliver the Torah to the Jewish people, and this was the purpose of his life. Thereupon, Tziporah immediately went and took a sharp stone and performed the circumcision of her son. Rabbi Bergman concludes that Moshe repented for this and merited to accept the Torah from Hashem and to deliver it to the Jewish people.

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The Law of the Kingdom is the Law

The Gemora in Shabbos 88a teaches that when Bnei Yisroel stood at Mount Sinai and heard the word of Hashem, He held the mountain over our heads. Hashem declared, “If you’ll accept the Torah, all will be well. If not, this will be your burial place!” Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: This can now be used as an excuse for Klal Yisroel when they do not perform the mitzvos. For when they are summoned for judgment, they can claim that they were coerced into accepting the Torah; it was not done willingly.

The Perashas Derachim asks from our Gemora (Nedarim 28a) which states that the law of the kingdom is the law and we do not allow a person to vow deceptively. If so, this should certainly apply by The Holy One blessed is He, Who is the King of all Kings. How could Klal Yisroel use the coercion as an excuse? The law of the kingdom is the law, and they took an oath obligating themselves to perform His mitzvos!

He answers that Rabbeinu Tam holds that the principle of the law of the kingdom is the law is only applicable if the king decrees on all his subjects. However, if the decree is issued only on part of his kingdom, this principle does not apply. Since Hashem is the King over all the nations of the world and He only forced Bnei Yisroel to accept His mitzvos, this principle would not apply and hence, a claim of coercion can be effective.

It emerges that regarding the seven mitzvos that were given to all Bnei Noach, the principle of the law of the kingdom is the law would apply, and a claim of coercion would not be valid.

According to this, we can explain the argument between Pharaoh and the midwives. Pharaoh asked them, “Why didn’t you listen to my commandment? The law of the kingdom is the law and since I the king decreed that all the Jewish children should be killed, you are obligated to listen to me!” They responded to him, “Your decree is not a universal one; it was only issued regarding the Jewish children and not to any others. Accordingly, the principle does not apply and we are not obligated to adhere to the laws of the kingdom. Thereupon, Pharaoh immediately decreed that all children born must be thrown into the sea.

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Holding a Sacred Object

The Gemora (Nedarim 25a) relates the following incident: There was a person who was owed money by his friend, and the two of them came before Rava. The lender said: Pay me! The borrower said: I already did! Rava said: Swear that you paid him. The borrower then filled his cane with the amount of money he borrowed and leaned on it while walking to Beis Din. Before he took the oath, the borrower asked the lender to hold his cane for him while he took the oath. The borrower then took a Sefer Torah and swore that he had given the lender whatever he had owed him. When the lender heard this he got upset and broke the cane, causing the money to fall out. It was apparent that he had “paid” him all of the money.

Rabbeinu Tam understands this Gemora to mean that the borrower denied the entire claim and was liable only for a Rabbinic oath (called a shevuas hesseis). Nevertheless, he took the Sefer Torah in his hand prior to taking the oath. This would prove that one needs to hold a sacred object even by a Rabbinical oath.

He also presents proof to this from the Gemora in Shavuos (41a) which inquires as to the differences between a Biblical oath and a Rabbinical one. The Gemora does not offer this difference; namely, that a Biblical oath would necessitate the holding of a sacred object and a Rabbinical one would not. This proves that a Rabbinical oath also required the holding of a sacred object.

The Gaonim disagree and maintain that one is not required to hold a sacred object when taking a Rabbinical oath. The Meiri writes that our Gemora cannot serve as a proof against this, for we are discussing a case where the borrower decided himself to hold the Sefer Torah. He did this as a ruse in order to get the lender to hold his cane.

According to the Ran’s explanation of our Gemora, there would be no proof at all. For our Gemora is discussing a case where the borrower admitted to part of the claim made against him. Since he wishes to avoid paying the rest of the claim, he is Biblically obligated to take an oath that he does not owe the remainder of the claim. This oath obviously requires him to hold a sacred object.

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Six Hundred and Thirteen Mitzvos

It is evident from the Gemora (Nedarim 25a) that accepting an oath to fulfill the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos is exactly the same as accepting an oath to keep the entire Torah. Reb Avi Lebowitz hearos wonders if this is really true. Firstly, the Ramban at the beginning of sefer hamitzvos discusses the possibility that the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos is not an actual count and it is not necessarily accepted by all sources. Even if we are to assume that our Gemora holds of the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos idea (as the Gemora in Makkos seems to indicate) as do all the Rishonim who list the mitzvos, aren't there still other "mitzvos" in the Torah that are not counted in the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos? There are many mitzvah concepts that would qualify as "ratzon ha'torah", even if not an absolute obligation, and by only accepting the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos, we would seemingly not be accepting all the thousands of other points that the Torah wants us to accept! How can the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos be the same as an oath on the entire Torah?

Reb Yossie Schonkopf suggests that the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos is the root for all mitzvos and as such encompass all of Torah.

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Honoring his Friend

(Nedarim 24a) If one says to his fellow, “Konam that I will not benefit from your if you do not accept from me for your son a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine” (and the fellow refuses the gift), he may annul his vow without petitioning a sage, by his fellow saying, “Did you vow for any other purpose but to honor me (that I should accept the gift)? This (the refusal of the gift) is my honor (for it is written in Mishlei: One who hates gifts shall live).

The Rosh asks: Doesn’t every neder require annulment only through a sage? How can the vower annul this neder by himself?

He answers that since this opening is so clear and compelling, the vower is permitted to annul it himself.

The Ran according to the explanation of the Ayeles Hashachar learns differently. He explains that the purpose of the vow was to honor the other fellow. Since he is being honored by refusing the gift, that is regarded as a fulfillment of the condition of the neder. The neder never has a chance to take effect for the fellow was indeed honored.

The Ra”n Elucidated
Rejecting the proof - The Gemora attempts to bring a proof from the following braisa: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov went even further and said: If one says to his fellow, “Konam that I do not benefit from you if you will not be my guest and partake of hot bread and a hot drink with me.” The fellow resisted the invitation. This is also considered a motivational neder.

The reason it says, “Even further” is because here, even though it is applicable to say, “I am not a dog,” for behold, he is forbidding himself the benefit of the invited one if he doesn’t want to accept this benefit from him, and for this reason it can be said that he really meant the neder, nonetheless, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said that they are motivational nedarim.

According to this explanation, we now see that our rejections of all the proofs above, that even Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov agrees whenever it is possible to say, “I am not a dog” were only arguments, but were not really true.

[We use the sefer “The Commentary of Rabbenu Nissim on Nedarim” from Rabbi Nathan Bushwick extensively to assist us in preparing the “Elucidation of the Ra”n.” The sefer, written in English is available for sale by writing to: Rabbi Nathan Bushwick 901 Madison Ave. Scranton, Pa 18510-1019. The cost is $25.00.]

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The Children of Yaakov and Leah

The Gemora (Nedarim 20b) states: It is written [Yechezkel 20:38]: And I will select from among you the rebels and those that transgress against me. Rabbi Levi said: This refers to children of people belonging to the following nine categories (the children will be adversely effected when they are born from such a union): Children of fear (if the husband cohabits with his wife even when she doesn’t want to) and children of a violated woman (he forced himself upon his wife); children of a hated wife; children of an excommunicated parent; children of a woman mistaken for another (he cohabited with one wife thinking she was his other wife); children of strife; children of intoxication; children of a wife whom the husband decided to divorce; children of a mingling women (such that the true father cannot be determined); children of a brazen woman.

The commentators ask from our forefather Yaakov: Cohabiting with Leah on their wedding night should have been forbidden based upon our Gemora? Firstly, Yaakov thought that she was Rachel! Our Gemora states that a union with a woman who was mistaken for another can produce degenerate children! Secondly, the Torah describes Leah as being hated. How then could Yaakov cohabit with her? Furthermore, the Ramban cites a Medrash that Yaakov hated Leah for colluding with her father and for not informing him who she truly was on her wedding night. The Medrash states: Once Yaakov saw that Leah tricked her sister, he resolved to divorce her. This is what Leah was alluding to when she called her second son, Shimon. Why was Yaakov permitted to be intimate with her under such circumstances?

There are several answers on these questions. The Ra’avad says that during the act of intimacy, Yaakov was at peace with Leah and did not harbor any ill feelings towards her.

The Beis Yosef answers that Leah was not as “well liked” by Yaakov as Rachel was, but she was not actually hated.

The Ra’avad continues that in truth, these prohibitions were only applicable after the Torah was given; they did not apply to Yaakov (in a similar vein; that is how some explain the fact that Yaakov married two sisters).

The Magen Avraham writes that Yaakov actually realized that it was Leah when she entered the chupah. Hence, at the time of cohabitation, he did not mistake her for Rachel.

The Alshich explains that the Gates of Heaven accepted the tears of Leah and caused Yaakov to never even realize that he was cohabiting with Leah (seemingly, he maintains that the adverse effect of having children from ‘an exchanged woman’ is only applicable if he realizes during cohabitation that she is the wrong woman).

P’ninei HaDaf - Lublin

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