Benefits of a Nazir

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 34a) had stated: There are three different types of prohibitions relevant to a nazir. He is forbidden to become tamei through corpse tumah; he may not shave his head; he is prohibited from eating grapes or drinking wine and anything that comes from a vine.

Reb Tzadok in Pri Tzadik (Naso) explains that abstaining from these three things can be a remedy for the three things that can cause a person to be driven out of this world. Growing one’s hair can be a cure for the character traits of jealousy and anger. Refraining from eating or drinking any product that comes from a vine can be a remedy for desire. Withholding from becoming tamei can be an antidote for someone who chases after his own honor. This is because of the fact that one who pursues honor can be punished with death. This can be proven from the Torah, where after the snake convinced Adam and Chava to eat from the tree of knowledge, where they were told that would be like Hashem, the concept of death was brought into this world.

K’zayis and Revi’is

The Mishna had stated: And he will not be liable for lashes until he eats a k’zayis (size of an olive) from the grapes. According to the earlier Mishna, a nazir will not be liable until he drinks a revi’is (one-fourth of a log) of wine. Rabbi Akiva said: Even if he soaked his bread in wine and there is enough in it to equal a k’zayis, he will be liable. (Rabbi Akiva disagrees with the earlier Mishna, and holds that even regarding drinking wine, the amount for which a nazir incurs lashes is a k’zayis, which is the amount displaced from a full cup of wine when an olive is placed within it; therefore, edibles combine with liquid to equal a k’zayis. He also teaches us that a permissible item can combine to equal the amount needed to be liable.)

The Bartenura explains the first opinion of the Mishna to be like Rabbi Akiva that a nazir will be liable for eating a k’zayis of grapes or drinking a k’zayis of wine. The early Mishna maintains the exact opposite that he will only be liable if he eats a revi’is of grapes or drinks a revi’is of wine.

Rabbeinu Tam asks on this explanation: Why would the Tanna of the Mishna first state the later Mishna’s opinion, then teach the early Mishna’s ruling and then return to the later teaching? He asks other questions as well.

Tosfos therefore explains that when the Mishna taught that the required amount to be liable for grapes is a k’zayis, that is according to everyone. There is only an argument regarding drinking. According to the early Mishna, it is a revi’is, and according to Rabbi Akiva, it is a k’zayis.

The Rambam rules that a nazir is liable if he eats a k’zayis of grapes, and he would be liable if he drinks a revi’is of wine. It would emerge that he is ruling according to the earlier Mishna. This is extremely odd, for the ruling is usually according to the later teaching!

The Brisker Rav explains that the Mishna actually lists three opinions. The Tanna Kamma holds that grapes are a k’zayis and wine is a revi’is. The Rambam rules that this is indeed the halacha. The second opinion is the early Mishna which rules that he is not liable unless he eats or drinks the equivalent of a revi’is. Rabbi Akiva holds that everything is a k’zayis.

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The Annonymous Man

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 32b) had stated: They (six people) were walking on a road, and there was one person coming towards them. One of them said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is So-and-so,” and a second one said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is not So-and-so.” The third one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is a nazir,” and the fourth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is not a nazir.” The fifth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that both of you (the first two) are nezirim.” The sixth person said, “I am hereby a nazir that all of you (the first five) are nezirim.”

Tosfos explains the rationale of each person: They (six people) were walking on a road, and there was one person coming towards them, who could not be identified from afar. One of them said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is So-and-so,” for he was convinced that he recognized the far away person to be Reuven.

The second one said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is not So-and-so,” for he was in fact certain that the person was not Reuven.

The third one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is a nazir,” for he figured that one of them was certainly correct.

The fourth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is not a nazir.” He is in essence saying the same as the third one, except it is the converse of his declaration.

The fifth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that both of you (the first two) are nezirim,” for he thinks that both of them should be a nazir since they both accepted upon themselves nezirus according to what they honestly thought to be the truth.

The sixth person said, “I am hereby a nazir that all of you (the first five) are nezirim,” for in his opinion, they should all be nezirim.

Retracting from Nezirus and Hekdesh

The Mishna had stated: Beis Hillel rules that none of them are nezirim except the one whose words were not fulfilled.

The Gemora asks: Why is he a nazir if his words were not fulfilled?

Rav Yehudah emends the Mishna to say that none of them are nezirim except the one whose words were fulfilled.

Abaye says: The case is where he added, “If it is not So-and-so, I am hereby a nazir.” (The novelty of this ruling is that he may retract from his original statement if his retraction was within the time of an utterance.) [Accordingly] What does Beis Hillel mean when they said, “His words did not come to fruition?” They meant that his first words did not come to fruition; only his second words.

The Tiferes Tziyon writes that this would be a distinction between the halachos of a nazir and the halachos regarding hekdesh. If one vows to become a nazir under a certain condition and immediately retracts, we accept his second declaration, for his intention is to become a nazir. However, regarding hekdesh, we would not allow one to retract from a vow declaring something to be hekdesh.

The Be’er Moshe disagrees and states that just like one may immediately retract from his nezirus vow, he may retract from a hekdesh declaration as well. He concludes that since the Rambam rules that one may not retract from hekdesh, even within the time of an utterance, it is apparent that he does not rule like our Gemora, and one may not retract from a nezirus vow either.

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Chanah and Elkanah

The Mishna had stated: A father can impose upon his son a nezirus vow, but a mother cannot impose a nezirus vow on her son.

The Redak (Shmuel I, 1:11) asks: How could Chanah’s vow of nezirus for Shmuel her son be effective? Our Mishna rules explicitly that only a father can impose upon his son a nezirus vow, but a mother cannot impose a nezirus vow on her son! Furthermore, he is astounded that Chazal do not discuss this matter at all; not in the Medrash or Gemora!

In the sefer Ziv Halevanon, he cites the Sforno, who says that when Elkanah (Shmuel’s father) said (ibid. v.23), Do whatever is good in your eyes, he was in essence agreeing to his wife. By demonstrating his consent, it was regarded as if he declared the nezirus for his son.

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Sheitel

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 28) had stated: This ruling only applies upon the conclusion of her nezirus; however, if she was bringing the korbanos because she became tamei, the husband may revoke her nezirus, for her husband can say, “I am not interested in having an abstinent wife.” Rabbi Meir said: Even upon the conclusion of her nezirus taharah, he may revoke her vow, for the husband can say, “I am not interested in having a wife with a shaven head.”

The Gemora explains the Tanna Kamma of the Mishna: Since it is possible for her to wear a wig, he cannot claim that he is not interested in having a wife with a shaven head.

Rabbi Meir would hold that the husband is not interested in having his wife wear a wig (his wife wearing someone else’s hair is repulsive to him).

The Beis Yitzchak asks on the Tanna Kamma: Even though she can wear a wig, it will still not be pleasing for the husband, because she will not be permitted to go outside in a public domain on Shabbos with it!

The Mishna Lemelech answers: The reason why a woman is forbidden to walk outside on Shabbos with a wig is because she might take it off and carry it four amos in a public domain. Here, where she has no hair, we are not concerned that she will show her wig to her friends because it is humiliating to her.

It is brought in the name of the Shiltei Geborim that our Gemora is a proof that married women are permitted to be seen publicly with a wig on their head. Some poskim held that it was forbidden because the hair of a woman is regarded as ervah, and cannot be seen.

The Be’er Sheva disagrees and refutes the proof. He maintains that it is only permitted if she wears a covering besides the wig. And on the contrary; it is evident from our Gemora that only women without hair would wear a wig. This was to appease the husband, for otherwise she would be repulsive to him. An ordinary woman, however, would not wear a wig, and it is in fact forbidden.

The Magen Avraham rules that a wig is permitted.

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Bull Refuses to Budge

The Medrash (Vayikra Rabbah 3:5) cites the following incident: There was an animal that was being brought to the Beis Hamikdosh to be brought up on the Altar as a korban. As they got near the final destination, the animal refused to budge. A pauper came by and fed the animal a bundle of truksima (a certain type of grass that is known to cause animals to sneeze). As the animal sneezed, a needle discharged from inside its throat. The animal then allowed itself to be pulled towards the Altar and be brought as a korban (if the needle would have stayed inside, it would have punctured one of the animal’s vital organs rendering it a treifa, which would invalidate it from being used as a korban). The poor person appeared to the animal’s owner in a dream and said, “The offering of a pauper (my bundle of vegetables) is regarded as being more significant than your bull.

The Drush Shmuel explains the following verse accordingly [Vayikra 1:3]: An unblemished male you shall offer it according to his will. Only if the animal is going willingly should it be brought as a korban; otherwise (if it refuses to budge), do not offer it as a sacrifice, for it might be because it has a blemish (that the owner is not aware of).

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Pauper Acting Rich

The braisa (Daf Yomi: Nazir 25b - 26a) states: Other people who are obligated to bring bird offerings by the Torah (because they cannot afford to buy animal offerings) who already designated the money to buy the birds (and then became rich), if they now want to bring a chatas or olah offering instead, they may do so.

The Mefaresh understands this Gemora to be referring to a rich woman who has given birth, where her chatas is a bird.

It is noteworthy that after the Torah discusses the korban that a rich woman who has given birth brings, it says [Vayikra 12:7]: This is the law of a woman who gives birth to a male or to a female. The question is asked: Immediately following this verse, the Torah teaches us the korbanos that a poor woman who has given birth brings. Why would the Torah say regarding the rich woman’s korbanos that “this is law of a woman who gives birth”? It would seem from the verse that only the rich woman’s korbanos are the law, and not the korbanos from the poor woman.

The Kli Chemdah (Parshas Tazria) cites a Gemora in Menochos (110a): It is written: This is the law of an olah. The Gemora expounds: Anyone that studies the laws of an olah is considered as if he brought a korban olah. What would be if a poor person would recite the portion dealing with the rich person’s korbanos? Would it be regarded as if he brought the korban? The answer may be gleaned from the fact that the Torah concluded the portion dealing with the rich woman’s korbanos with the following verse: This is the law of a woman who gives birth. The Torah is informing us that the recital of this portion is sufficient for anyone, even for a poor woman.

[The Gemora states that Hashem told Avraham Avinu that whenever Klal Yisroel will read the Torah portions pertaining to the korbanos, it will be regarded as if they brought korbanos and their sins will be forgiven.

The commentators discuss if this concept applies by other mitzvos as well. Perhaps it can be said that the studying of any mitzvah that cannot be performed nowadays will be regarded as if one fulfilled the mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemora in Bava Metzia (114b) that the Amoraim were fluent in Seder Kodoshim in the same manner as Seder Moed, Nashim and Nezikin. This is because Kodoshim was relevant to them since the learning about the korbanos was regarded as if they actually brought a korban. Implicit in his words that for some reason this was only true regarding Seder Kodoshim and not to Seder Zeroim or Taharos which also has many halachos that do not apply outside of Eretz Yisroel and after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Taz in his sefer Divrei Dovid maintains that the concept applies to all mitzvos and one who studies the laws of Zeraim, it will be regarded as if he gave terumos and ma’asros to the kohanim and levi’im and it will be considered as if he gave all the presents to the poor people. This is the explanation in Yaakov’s words to Esav "Im Lavan garti," which Chazal understand to mean that Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos in Lavan’s house. There were many mitzvos that he was not able to fulfill at that time; it is evident that the studying of these mitzvos are regarded as if he fulfilled them all.

The Ben Ish Cahi explains the verse in Nitzavim: "Ki Korov eilecha hadavar meod b’ficha u’vilvov’cha la’asoso." It is possible to fulfill all the mitzvos with your mouth (by studying them) even those mitzvos that you cannot actually perform.]

We can add that the Mishna in Negaim compliments this explanation. For the Mishna says that if a poor person who is a metzora brings the korban that a rich person is supposed to bring, he fulfills his obligation. The Chinuch (123) states by a korban olah v’yoreid - (certain sins which require a korban chatos, he either brings an animal, bird or flour offering depending on his status - this is called a fluctuating korban) if a poor person brings the korban of a rich person, he does not fulfill his obligation. The Chinuch explains the reason: the Torah had compassion on the poor person, it is not proper for him to compel himself to bring a korban which he cannot afford. How can the Chinuch hold against the Mishna, which explicitly states that he does fulfill his obligation?

The Chasam Sofer answers based on the following Gemora in Shabbos: Hashem punishes each person according to what he can afford. A rich person who sins will lose his cow. A poor person, on the other hand, will lose his chicken or some eggs. Therefore, there is a distinction between the korban of a metzora or a woman who gave birth and the korban olah v’yoreid. A metzora is not required to bring a korban because he sinned, it is to purify him and allow him to eat kodoshim. If a poor metzora decides to bring the rich man’s korban, he will have discharged his obligation. Conversely, a sinner who does that will not have discharged his obligation, for here the Torah prescribed for him the korban which will give him atonement according to his status. The korban is in place of the punishment. It is not decided by the pauper what his punishment should be, and therefore when he brings the korban of a rich person, he does not fulfill his obligation.

The Sfas Emes (here and quoted in Moadim U’zmanim as a story which occurred by a Kenesiya Gedola) answers that there is a basic distinction. A metzora disregarding if he is rich or poor, is required to bring a chatas and an olah. The rich man brings animals and the pauper brings birds. If a poor person brings the korban of a rich person, he fulfills his obligation, for he brought the prescribed amount. A korban olah v’yoreid is different. A rich person brings an animal for a korban chatas and a poor person brings two birds, one for a chatas and one for an olah. If a poor person will force himself to bring the korban of a rich person, he will not fulfill his obligation because he cheated the Altar out of one korban - namely the olah.

There are two questions on this explanation (look in Shemuas Chaim and in Mitzvas Hamelech from Harav Ezriel Cziment). Firstly, the Chinuch says a different reason for his not fulfilling his obligation. He says because the Torah doesn’t want a poor person to overburden himself. He does not say the reason of the Sfas Emes that he missed a korban? Secondly, one must ask, why is it that a poor person is required to bring two korbanos and a rich person only brings one? The Ibn Ezra explains the reason for this: A chatas bird is completely eaten and an olah bird is completely burned on the Altar. These two birds together replace a regular korban which entails a human consumption and the Altar’s consumption. They are actually one korban. Therefore, one can say that a poor person is not missing a korban by bringing one animal instead of two birds?

It would seem, however, that this question can be answered. Even according to the Ibn Ezra, the two birds are not one korban. They are two korbanos complimenting one another. The rationale behind bringing the two korbanos could be because the Torah wants human consumption and the Altar’s consumption; nevertheless, it is still two korbanos and a poor person is missing one korban when he brings the korban of a rich person.

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Halfway Nezirus

It is evident from our Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 24a) that if a woman made a neder to become a nazir, and she did not designate the animals for her korbanos (that were to be brought upon conclusion of her nezirus), and then the husband revoked her neder, she is not obligated to bring those korbanos.

The Reshash notes: The Gemora in Nedarim 83a discusses the concept of a halfway nezirus and that there are no korbanos for a partial nezirus (since the Torah only required korbanos upon completing a nezirus). The Rosh and Ran explain the case as follows: If a woman became a nazir and counted fifteen days, and then her husband revoked it, she has not completed her nezirus and therefore is not obligated to bring korbanos.

It can be inferred that it is only in a case where she observed nezirus for fifteen days that she would be exempt from bringing the korbanos, since that is not regarded as a complete nezirus, however, if she would have declared to become a nazir for sixty days, and her husband revoked it after thirty days, perhaps she would be obligated to bring the korbanos, for she has completed a full, standard term of nezirus.

The Reshash concludes that this is not the halacha. Anytime that the woman does not complete her nezirus, she is not obligated to bring the nazir’s korbanos.

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Lashes without an Action

Rava inquires (Daf Yomi: Nazir 17a): What is the law if a nazir is in a cemetery? Is there a certain amount of time that he needs to be there in order to receive lashes (one who became tamei in the Beis Hamikdosh and lingered there for the amount of time it would take for a person to prostrate himself is liable; is there a defined time for the nazir as well)?

The Gemora analyzes the case: If he is speaking about a case where he declared the vow while he was in the cemetery, and people warned him before his vow, “Do not utter this vow,” why would loitering be necessary? A nazir who enters a cemetery is punished without lingering because he was warned against entering (and he refused to listen); so too, here, he was warned (and he intentionally went against it)!

Tosfos asks: Shouldn’t this be regarded as a violation without performing an action? Why would he receive lashes for declaring himself to be a nazir?

Tosfos in Shavuos writes that the Gemora is in accordance with the opinions that maintain that one can receive lashes even without committing an action.

Tosfos here answers: Although he cannot receive lashes for the acceptance of the nezirus while inside the cemetery (for that does not entail an action), he will receive the lashes for continuing to remain in the cemetery after the acceptance of nezirus. That does constitute an action.

The Steipler Gaon asks: Where is the action? Why is the fact that he refused to leave regarded as an action?

He explains: Anytime an action is performed through a person, and he has the ability to eliminate it, but willingly refrains from doing so, this is considered as if he has committed an action, even though it happened by itself. The fact that the nazir is standing in the cemetery refusing to leave, that constitutes an action.

The Mishna Lamelech explains Tosfos differently: Tosfos maintains that although the transgression was committed without an action, he may receive lashes for the entering into the cemetery. Although no violation occurred at that time (since he was not yet a nazir), he receives lashes, since that was the action that led to the transgression.

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Yosef's Hair Cut

When Yosef was summoned to Pharaoh to interpret his dreams, it is written [Breishis 41:14]: and he shaved and changed his clothes, and he came to Pharaoh. Onkelos translates the word “shaved” as “vesaper.” It is noteworthy that every other place in the Torah, Onkelos translates it as “yegalchinei.” What is the explanation behind this?

The Rogatchover Gaon answers: It is written [ibid. 49:26]: May they come to Yosef’s head and to the crown of the head of the one who was separated from his brothers. Rabbi Levi understands this verse to mean that Yosef was a nazir. And so we find that from the day that Yosef was separated from his brothers, he did not taste any wine.

Onkelos is therefore troubled: How could it be that Yosef the nazir shaved before he came to Pharaoh? A nazir is forbidden to cut his hair! Onkelos answers that here it was not an actual giluach (hair cutting). His hair was trimmed without the use of a razor, and this is permitted for a nazir to do.

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Thirty Complete Days

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 16a) had stated: If one says, “I am hereby a nazir for thirty days,” and he shaves his head on the thirtieth day, he has not discharged his obligation.

According to Bar Pada, this halacha is understandable. For since he explicitly said that he will be a nazir for thirty days, his nezirus is for thirty days, and Bar Pada does not hold that a partial day is regarded as a complete day. This is why he would be required to take his haircut on the thirty-first day. However, according to Rav Masna, his haircut should be valid, for he holds that part of a day is like the entire day!

The Gemora (5b) answered: The Mishna is referring to a case where he said, “I am hereby a nazir for thirty complete days.” The Rosh explains that everyone would agree that a partial day is not regarded as a day in a case where he explicitly said “complete days.”

Tosfos explains differently: One who says, “I am hereby a nazir for thirty days” is regarded as if he said, “I am hereby a nazir for thirty complete days.” The reason is as follows: Since it has been established that a standard nezirus is for thirty days, why would he say “for thirty days”? It would have been sufficient for him to have said, “I am hereby a nazir”! By the fact that he added, “for thirty days,” this indicates that he wishes to be a nazir for thirty complete days.

The Keren Orah and the Brisker Rav explain the Gemora according to the Rambam: We do not use the principle of “a partial day is regarded as an entire day” in any case where the person mentions a specific number. If he accepts nezirus upon himself without specifying a number, we would say that a partial day is regarded as an entire day. However, in this case, he specified an amount, and therefore, the principle is not applicable.

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A Partial Day is Regarded as an Entire Day

We have learned in the following braisa (Daf Yomi: Nazir 15a): One who buried his dead three days prior to the festival, the decree regarding the seven days of mourning are cancelled. One who buried his dead eight days prior to the festival, the decree regarding the thirty days of mourning are cancelled. He may take a haircut on the eve of the festival; if he did not, he is forbidden from taking a haircut after the festival. Abba Shaul disagrees and holds that he would nevertheless be permitted to take a haircut after the festival since in the same manner that three days of mourning prior to the festival cancels completely the seven days of mourning, seven days of mourning prior to the festival cancels completely the thirty days of mourning.

What is Abba Shaul’s reason? Is it not because he maintains that part of the day is like the entire day and the seventh day counts for the last day of shiva (seven days of mourning) and for the first day of the sheloshim (thirty days of mourning).

The Gemora asks that perhaps Abba Shaul only ruled in this manner by the halachos of shiva, which is only Rabbinical, but with respect to a nazir, where his halachos are of Biblical origin, he would not rule this way (that one day can be counted as two).

*** Tosfos (Moed Katan 19b) cites Harav Yom Tov that since we have established that part of the seventh day counts for the last day of shiva (seven days of mourning) and for the first day of the sheloshim (thirty days of mourning), a mourner would be permitted to take a haircut on the twenty-ninth day, since the seventh day counts as two days. He then cites a dissenting opinion that with respect to the halachos of sheloshim, we do not rule that the seventh day counts as two days.

*** Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Heoros (39:3) explains the dispute between the Tanna Kamma and Abba Shaul in the following manner: Abba Shaul holds that a partial day is regarded as a full day, and therefore a day can be split into two, and it may be counted as two days. The Tanna Kamma, however, holds that one who has observed the halachos of the day can be regarded as if he observed them for the entire day, but the day itself cannot be regarded as two days.

*** The Rosh holds that this halacha that part of the day is like the entire day is even applicable at night. If one observed the halachos of mourning on the night of the seventh day, it should be regarded as if he observed them the entire day. He cites a Rashbam, who says that the custom is for the mourning period to conclude by day. The Rosh does not understand the reason for this.

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Nezirus Shimshon

It is evident from our Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 14a) that one cannot nullify a nezirus Shimshon. If so, our version of hataras nedarim (the nullification of our vows) that we recite on Erev Rosh Hashanah is very problematic. We state explicitly that we are petitioning the Beis Din to annul all of our nedarim and nezirus, and even a nezirus Shimshon! How can it be nullified?

The Pischei Teshuvah (Y.D. 139:6), based on this question writes that our version is an erroneous one.

However, the Nitzotzei Ohr cites a Minchas Chinuch (368), who says in the name of the Leket Hakemach that nezirus Shimshon cannot be nullified only if the nezirus had begun already; however, if it did not start yet (i.e. he said, “I will be a nazir Shimshon in twenty days”), it may be annulled. On Erev Rosh Hashanah, we are petitioning the Beis Din to annul any future vows of nezirus that we may utter.

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Moshe's Death and Nezirus on Shabbos

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 14a): inquires: What is the halacha if he said, “like Moshe on the seventh of Adar”? (Is he referring to Moshe’s birthday – a day of celebration, and then, he would not be declaring himself as a nazir; or perhaps, he was referring to the day that Moshe died – a day of sorrow, and then, he would be declaring himself as a nazir?)

Tosfos writes that on the day that Moshe died, there were presumably many Jews who declared a vow of nezirus because of their sorrow.

The Ben Poras asks: Behold, Moshe died on Shabbos! (Tosfos in Menachos (30a) cites a dispute regarding this. Some say that he died on a Friday.) How was it permitted for them to accept a vow of nezirus on Shabbos? He explains: The Rama Mipano rules that a Kohen Gadol cannot be anointed with the anointing oil on Shabbos because this oil renders him holy, and this would be regarded as tikkun gavra (repairing him, which would be forbidden on Shabbos). Accordingly, it should be forbidden for one to accept nezirus on Shabbos, for with his vow, he becomes holy!

He answers that since it is possible to have the nezirus annulled, and he is not a permanent nazir, it is not regarded as a tikkun gavra.

The Pardes Yosef answers that they accepted nezirus on Motzoei Shabbos; not on Shabbos. This would certainly be congruent with the opinion who holds that he died at sunset towards the conclusion of Shabbos. It is for this reason that we recite the tefillah of tzidkascha tzedek by Mincha on Shabbos.

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Son, but not a Daughter

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 13a): If someone says: “I will be a nazir when I will have a son,” he becomes a nazir when he has a son. If he has a daughter, or a tumtum (no signs of gender), or an androgynous (signs of both genders), he does not become a nazir.

Tosfos explains: He declares the nezirus in this manner as a way of thanking Hashem for providing him with a son.

The Beis Yosef explains that according to Tosfos, it is understandable why the Mishna said “a son,” and not “a daughter,” for otherwise, we would have said that the Mishna was not precise with its wording.

The Mabit (1:120) adds that if he would have a daughter, he would not be a nazir, for he is saddened that he had a daughter and not a son. In general though, a daughter would be included when he says, “a son.”

The Meiri writes that the explanation of the Mishna is as follows: Even though the word “son” connotes any child, and not necessarily a son, but its primary meaning suggests a male child.

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Daughter, not a Tumtum

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 13a)states: If someone says: “I will be a nazir when I will have a son,” he becomes a nazir when he has a son. If he has a daughter, or a tumtum (no signs of gender), or an androgynous (signs of both genders), he does not become a nazir.

Tosfos explains that he does not regard a tumtum or an androgynous as his son.

The Maaseh Rokeach wonders what would be the halacha if he said, “I will be a nazir when I will have a daughter,” and he has a daughter, or a tumtum, or an androgynous. Do we say that he is not a nazir, for his condition was not met? Or perhaps, he will be a nazir, for when he said “a daughter,” he meant “when he will be built up,” and he is considered “built” with a son, tumtum or androgynous. Although the Gemora said that he does not mean, “when he will be built up,” perhaps that is only when he declared to be a nazir on the condition that he will have a son, but if he said, “when I will have a daughter,” perhaps they would be included, for it changed for the better (when his wife gives birth to a son)?

The Keren Orah writes that whether he says, “when I will have a son” or if he says, “when I will have a daughter,” a tumtum will not be included. Even if he says, “I will be a nazir when I have a son or a daughter,” and his wife gives birth to a tumtum or an androgynous, he will not be a nazir.

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Clear Expression

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 13a) states: If he says, “I will be a nazir when I will have a child,” he becomes a nazir even if he has a daughter, tumtum, or an androgynous.

If his wife miscarries (a child was born and died soon afterwards; we are uncertain if the baby was full term or not), he is not a nazir. Rabbi Shimon says: He should say the following (he rules that he is a nazir out of doubt; the problem is that if he is not a nazir, he is forbidden from shaving his head and he is not allowed to bring a korban chatas): “If the child was viable, I am already a nazir for my previous obligation, but if not, I am voluntary declaring myself to be a nazir.”

The Rishonim explain that if he would not make such a condition, he would remain a questionable nazir for the rest of his life. He would be forbidden to shave, drink wine or become tamei to the dead.

The Brisker Rav explains that that this is not a deficiency in the halacha of hafla’ah (clear expression) that there is by nezirus. A clear expression of nezirus is required in order to accept an obligation of nezirus on oneself. Here, there is a clear acceptance of nezirus, and of that, there is no issue. The question arises only because he stipulated a time for the nezirus to take effect, and we are uncertain if the condition was met. This is why he would remain a questionable nazir for the rest of his life unless he utilizes Rabbi Shimon’s ploy.

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Eliezer’s Wit

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 11b - 12a) states: One who tells his agent, “Go and betroth a woman for me” (and the agent died), the man is prohibited from marrying any woman in the world because there is a presumption that the agent accomplished that which he was asked to do.

The Mefaresh explains: Since the man did not specify a particular woman for him to marry and we do not know which woman he betrothed, this man may not marry any woman, for we are concerned that the woman he wishes to marry is the mother, or daughter, or sister of the woman that the agent married for him.

The Mahari Asad uses this Gemara to answer the following questions: Avraham Avinu sent his servant Eliezer to find a suitable wife for his son, Yitzchak. Eliezer went to the house of Besuel. The Torah writes: And he (Besuel) placed food in front of him (Eliezer) to eat, and he (Eliezer) said, “I cannot eat until I have spoken my words.”

Why didn’t Eliezer want to discuss with Besuel the instructions that Avraham, his master gave him before he ate?

Chazal say that Besuel intended to kill Eliezer by poisoning his food. What did Besuel hope to accomplish with that?

He explains: Besuel knew that if Eliezer would die, Yitzchak would be forbidden to all women in the world, for each and every woman might be the relative of the woman to whom Eliezer betrothed. This is why Besuel wanted Eliezer dead. Eliezer understood this and therefore refused to eat until he had spoken. He informed Besuel that Avraham gave him specific instructions that he should only take a wife for Yitzchak from his own family. Accordingly, even if Eliezer would die without notifying Avraham whom he betrothed, Yitzchak would only be forbidden to the women in his own family, but he would be permitted to all other women in the world. He was telling Besuel that he would not be accomplishing much by murdering him.

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Conditions

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 11a) states: If one says, “I am hereby a nazir on the condition that I will drink wine and become tamei to the dead,” he is a nazir and all the prohibitions apply to him.

The Gemora explains: Everyone agrees to this halacha, for he is stipulating “against that which the Torah states and such conditions are null and void.

Tosfos asks: Why was it necessary for the Gemara to state this reason? The Gemora could have said the following: There is a principle that anything which cannot be performed through an agent, cannot take effect with a condition either. Since nezirus cannot be accomplished through an agent, it should not take effect with any condition (even if the stipulation is not against that which is written in the Torah)!

Tosfos answers: Since others are able to bring the korbanos for him, nezirus is regarded as something that can be performed through an agent.

The Gerrer Rebbe (Pnei Menachem in the sefer Torascha Shasu’oy) uses this Tosfos to answer the following question: It is written [Breishis 28: 20 – 21]: And Yaakov uttered a vow, saying, “If God will be with me, and He will guard me on this way, upon which I am going, and He will give me bread to eat and a garment to wear; and if I return in peace to my father’s house, and the Lord will be my God. A neder cannot be fulfilled through an agent, so a conditional neder should not take effect!

According to our Tosfos, he suggests as follows: A neder with respect to hekdesh may be performed through an agent. One person can consecrate something for his fellow. Although Yaakov’s neder was not a neder regarding hekdesh; since nedarim in general could be performed through an agent, all nedarim may take effect even with a condition attached.

The Ramban answers Tosfos’ question by saying that the principle of “anything which cannot be performed through an agent, cannot take effect with a condition either” only applies by something that a person does with his fellow. However, when a person stipulates a condition with himself, the condition is valid and takes effect even though all of the guidelines effecting conditions are not met. Since by nazir, his condition is only relevant to himself, the condition takes effect even though nezirus cannot be performed through an agent.

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Talking Cow

The Mishna had stated (Daf Yomi: Nazir 10a): If one said, “This cow said, ‘I am hereby a nazir if I stand up,’” or he said, “This door said, ‘I am hereby a nazir if I open’” (the Gemara will explain these cases), Beis Shamai says: He is a nazir. Beis Hillel says: He is not a nazir.

The Gemora asks: Does a cow talk?

The Gemora suggests different interpretations of the Mishna. It is noteworthy that Tosfos cites Rabbeinu Peretz saying that the Mishna is discussing a case where the cow actually did talk!

There are numerous times in Chazal that we find a statement that would seem to indicate that a tree, animal or even an inanimate object was speaking. The Gemora in Sanhedrin (108b) records a conversation that Noach had with the raven. The Gemora Eruvin (18b) relates what the dove told to Noach. The Yerushalmi in Sanhedrin (2:6) discusses the complaint of the letter yud before the Ribbono shel Olam (that he was removed from Saray’s name).

The Maharatz Chiyus in his introduction to the Ein Yaakov states that Chazal do not mean to say that the animal’s or letters were actually talking; rather, they are relating what they could have claimed if they would have been given the power of speech.

However, Reb Boruch Epstien in his notes on the Pardes Yosef (58) cites our Tosfos, which seems to say otherwise.

Reb Yaakov Emden comments that it would appear from our Gemora that if the cow would have been able to talk, the Mishna would be understandable. He asks: What would it accomplish if the cow had the ability to speak in the same manner as Bilam’s donkey? Can a person become a nazir because of the animal’s declaration? Even if another human would declare that his fellow should be a nazir, he wouldn’t be a nazir!

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Ruling Leniently by a Nazir; Even Nowadays

The braisa states (Nazir 8a): If someone said that he will be a nazir on condition that in this silo there are one hundred kur (type of measurement), and it was found out that some of the grain was stolen or lost and there is therefore no way of knowing for sure how much grain was there, Rabbi Shimon says he must be a nazir as a doubt of nezirus is resolved stringently.

Rabbi Yehudah said: He does not have to be a nazir, as a doubt of nezirus is resolved leniently.

The Mefaresh explains that we do not rule that he should be a nazir based upon our uncertainty, since we do not want that he should offer unconsecrated sacrifices (if he is actually not a nazir) into the Beis Hamikdosh upon conclusion of his nezirus.

It should emerge, according to this logic, that nowadays, when there are no korbanos, and the aforementioned concern is not applicable, Rabbi Yehudah should agree that we should rule stringently that he is a nazir.

However, the Maharam Mipadava (71) writes that we find many places that the ruling does not change because perhaps the Beis Hamikdosh will be built the following day. So too, here, we say that the Beis Hamikdosh might be built the following day, and he will be bringing unconsecrated offerings into the Beis Hamikdosh. Therefore, the ruling remains that he is not regarded as a nazir.

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