Eliezer the Slave

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan (Daf Yomi: Gittin 23b) : A Canaanite slave is disqualified from serving as an agent to receive a woman’s get from her husband because he is not included in the halachos of divorce and marriage.

Tosfos in Kesuvos (7b) writes that Eliezer was the agent of Yitzchak to marry Rivkah.

The Panim Yafos asks: How could Eliezer serve as the agent for marriage, when he was not included in the halachos of marriage.

He answers that this principle is only applicable when he is serving as an agent for another person. However, a slave may serve as an agent of his master for marriage and divorce, since he is considered the hand of the master.

This explains why Eliezer began by saying, “I am the slave of Avraham.”

The Pardes Yosef asks that this does not explain how Eliezer could marry Rivkah on behalf of Yitzchak! Eliezer belonged to Avraham; not to Yeitzchak!?

He answers that this is why Avraham gave over all his possessions to Yitzchak, including his slave, Eliezer. Once Eliezer belonged to Yitzchak, he could serve as his agent.

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Minor Writing a Get

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 22b) had stated: Everyone is qualified to write a get, even a mute, one who is insane, or a minor.

Tosfos asks: Since a minor in not a “bar kerisus,” he is incapable of divorcing his own wife, he therefore should be disqualified from writing a get for someone else!?

Tosfos answers: Since he will eventually grow into an adult, he is not regarded as someone who is incapable of divorcing his wife, and therefore, he is still eligible to write a get.

The Noda b’Yehudah (O”C §1) asks: Why is the halacha of writing a get different than the halacha of writing tefillin? A minor is excluded from writing tefillin, since he is not a “bar keshirah,” he is not obligated in the mitzvah of tefillin. Why don’t we say that since he will be obligated in the mitzvah when he becomes an adult, he should be eligible to write tefillin?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman answers: That which we say that someone who is not a “bar kerisus” cannot write a get is only if he is excluded inherently from the subject of divorce. A minor, however, cannot issue a divorce, not because he is excluded, but rather, it is because he is incapable of marrying. He, therefore, can still be regarded as a “bar kerisus,” and can therefore be eligible to write a get. However, with respect of tefillin, a minor is excluded from the obligation of tefillin, and therefore, he is not considered a “bar keshirah,” and is therefore not disqualified from writing tefillin.

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Mobile Courtyard

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 21a) states that a moving courtyard cannot effect an acquisition for its owner. The Rishonim disagree as to the reason for this. Rashi and Tosfos maintain that since the halacha that a courtyard can effect an acquisition for its owner is derived from the halacha of acquiring through one’s hand, a moving courtyard, which does not resemble to a hand (which is stationary), cannot effect an acquisition for its owner.

The Ritva and the Ran suggest a different reason for this. They say that since the courtyard can be a great distance away from the owner, it is not considered protected by the owner, and therefore it is disqualified from effecting an acquisition for the owner.

The Divrei Mishpat notes that the following case would be a difference between them: If a lost object would fall on his animal which is in his courtyard. If a mobile courtyard is excluded because it does not resemble a person’s physical hand, he will not acquire this lost object, for the animal is a moveable object. If, however, a mobile courtyard is disqualified from effecting an acquisition because it is not guarded from intrusion by the owner, here, he will acquire the lost object because the object is protected.

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Name of Hashem Written without the Proper Intent

A braisa (Daf Yomi: Gittin 20a) was taught: A scribe was supposed to write the Name of Hashem in a Sefer Torah, and instead intended to write the name Yehudah. [The name Yehudah is similar to the letters in the Name of Hashem, except that the word Yehudah has a letter “dalet” between the “vav” and the “hey.”] He forgot to insert the “dalet” and ended up writing the Name of Hashem but without the required intention necessary to write the Holy Name. Rabbi Yehudah posits that the scribe can pass his quill over the Name of Hashem and have the proper intention of writing the Name. The Chachamim disagree, claiming that this is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem (and the Sefer Torah is subsequently invalid).

The Rishonim ask: According to Rav Chisda, who holds that the Chachamim maintain that the Sefer Torah is disqualified, why does he use the term that it is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem? This would indicate that the writing is good, but it is not written in the most preferable method! Why didn’t he say that the new writing does not accomplish anything?

The Rashba answers that they actually hold that the tracing over of the word is not regarded as an act of writing at all and the Sefer Torah is disqualified. They only used that term to discuss Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion.

The Pnei Yehoshua suggests a novel approach to explain the Chachamim’s terminology: Although the Chachamim maintain that the Sefer Torah is disqualified, they nevertheless hold that the Name of Hashem retains its sanctity and is forbidden to be erased. He proves that the Name of Hashem, although it wasn’t written with the correct intention, cannot be erased. This is why the Chachamim say that it is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem.

The Tashbatz, however, proves from our sugya that it is permitted to erase the Name of Hashem when it is written without the correct intention.

The Gemora in Yoma (38a) states that Ben Kamtzar had a unique talent that he was able to write four letters with one hand at the same time and he did not teach this talent to anyone else. The Gemora says that this was considered a shame and due to this, he was referred to as an evil person. What were the Chachamim concerned about? Rashi comments that this was referring to the Name of Hashem which has four letters.

The Tosfos Yom Tov explains that there is an advantage for the Name of Hashem to be written at one time, so that His Name should not be missing for a moment.

The Minchas Chinuch has a novel approach and says that if one writes the first two letters of the Name of Hashem which is the “yud” and the “hey,” that itself is one of the Name’s of Hashem, and by subsequently writing the third letter, the “vav,” it constitutes erasing Hashem’s Name. Ben Kamtzar was able to avoid with his special skill.

The Emek Brocha asks that if the Name of Hashem is written without proper intent, there is no prohibition to erase it, so why should there be a prohibition here when the scribe did not intend to write the ‘two letter’ Name of Hashem, but rather His ‘four letter’ Name?

According to the Pnei Yehoshua, this is not a question, for this, in fact, a prohibition to erase the Name of Hashem, even when it is written without the proper intent!

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Shailah from the Minchas Chinuch

It was stated (Daf Yomi: Gittin 19a): If a man writes over red paint writing with black ink on Shabbos, Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish both agree that he is liable on two counts, one for writing (the two new black letters) and one for erasing. [One is only liable on Shabbos if he erases with the intention of writing two letters in its place. Here, in order to write the two new black letters, he must erase the red letters first.]

If he writes over black ink with black ink or red pigment with red pigment, he is not punishable. [This is because nothing has been accomplished with the new writing.]

If he goes over black ink with red pigment, some say he is punishable and some say he is not punishable. Some say he is punishable because he is erasing the previous writing. [He is not liable for writing because the original black writing was much clearer than the red one.] Some say he is not punishable because he is only ruining the previous writing.

Rish Lakish inquired of Rabbi Yochanan: If witnesses are unable to sign their names on a get, is it permissible to write their names for them in red pigment and let them go over it with black ink? Is the upper writing regarded as writing or not?

He replied: It is not regarded as writing.

Rish Lakish challenged him: But, didn’t our teacher teach us that in respect of Shabbos, the upper writing is regarded as writing?

He replied: Because we have a certain opinion, shall we practice stringently based upon it? [If the Beis HaMikdosh would be in existence, I wouldn’t tell that person that he is liable to bring a korban chatas for violating the Shabbos, for perhaps it is not a transgression and he will be bringing an unconsecrated animal into the Courtyard!]

Tosfos notes: It is evident from here that tracing over letters with the same color ink is not regarded as writing with respect to Shabbos or with respect to gittin. Accordingly, Tosfos asks from a Gemora below (20a) which states: If a get was initially not written lishmah, it can be rectified if the scribe traces over the letters lishmah! (The Gemora there discusses if this is the halacha according to all opinions or not.) Why should it be valid if he is using the same color ink again?

Tosfos answers that since the scribe is adding an important element to the writing, namely the lishmah of the get, it therefore constitutes an act of writing for the get. However, in our case, the second writing accomplished nothing, and therefore, it is not regarded as an act of writing.

The Minchas Chinuch (§ 32) poses the following question: If one, on Shabbos, would trace over the letters of a get that had previously not been written lishmah, what is the halacha? If we would say that the tracing lishmah constitutes an act of writing and the get will be valid, it will emerge that he intentionally violated the Shabbos and he will be regarded as a mummar, who is disqualified from writing a get! And if we rule that he, in fact, is a mummar and the get is invalid, it will emerge that his tracing did not accomplish anything and he did not violate the Shabbos, which in turn, will validate the get! The logic goes complete circle and we will never be able to execute him for transgressing the Shabbos, for his writing did not accomplish anything and therefore it did not constitute an act of writing, and we will not be able to validate the get, for if we would do so, it would emerge that he was a mummar at that time and the get is invalid!?

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Decree when the reason no longer applies

Tosfos (Daf Yomi: Gittin 18a) asks: One of the reasons mentioned for the decree that the date should be recorded on a get is because perhaps the husband will want to save his niece from capital punishment if she committed adultery. Nowadays, Tosfos asks, when we do not execute anyone, why is there still a necessity to write the date in the get?

The Avnei Neizer (E”H: 188) cites a challenge to Tosfos’ question: Although the reason may not be applicable, the sages’ decree should still apply unless a greater Beis Din comes and nullifies it!

He answers that Tosfos understood that the initial decree was only established in a time and a place where they administered capital punishment. Accordingly, if nowadays, it is universal that we do not execute anyone, we are not nullifying the decree; rather, the enactment was never instituted for such cases. This is why it is not necessary for another Beis Din to annul the initial decree.

This would be comparable to that which Tosfos in Beitzah (6a) states: Tosfos writes that a matter that was only prohibited because of a specific concern will be permitted when the concern no longer exists. This principle justifies why we do not have to be concerned for water that was exposed at night and one is allowed to drink from it because in modern times snakes are not frequent in our homes.

The Gemora (Beitzah 30a) cites a Mishna that states that one is not allowed to clap or dance on Shabbos or Yom Tov. Rashi explains that the reason that one is prohibited from performing any of these actions is because they can lead to one fixing musical instruments. Tosfos states that this prohibition only applied in those days when they were experts in fashioning musical instruments. Presently, however, the decree does not apply, because we do not know how to fashion these instruments.

The Rema (O.C. 339:3) rules in accordance with Tosfos. Teshuvos HaRema (125) writes that there was an incident where a marriage occurred on Friday night and the people were not concerned that the groom would write the kesuvah, marriage contract on Shabbos. The reason for this permit was because it is not common in our times for the groom to write his own kesuvah.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l poses an interesting question. The halacha is that presently we do not have a legally qualified reshus harabim and for this reason one would be permitted to walk in a public thoroughfare on Shabbos while wearing various ornaments. According to this ruling, then, why are we still forbidden to blow shofar, shake a lulav and read the Megillah. Regarding these mitzvos there is a concern that one may come to carry the shofar, lulav or Megillah in the reshus harabim. Yet, the halachah is that our public thoroughfares are not deemed to be a legal reshus harabim, so we should no longer have these concerns.

Reb Shlomo Zalman also questions the opinion of the Raavad who maintains that muktzah is forbidden on account of a rabbinical decree that one should not come to carry into a reshus harabim. Why should this decree still apply when there is no longer a legally qualified reshus harabim?

Rav Shlomo Zalman explains that Tosfos is only referring to musical instruments. In previous times, everyone was capable of playing and repairing musical instruments. For this reason there was a decree prohibiting clapping and dancing. In our times, however, only a minority of people is capable of fixing musical instruments and because it is uncommon for people to fix musical instruments, there is no necessity for the decree against clapping and dancing.

Rabbah (Beitzah 5a) maintained that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai rescinded the prohibition against accepting witnesses after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, and subsequently an egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah was permitted to be eaten on the second day. Rav Yosef challenged Rabbah’s ruling because if the Chachamim assembled to render a ruling, they would need to reassemble to revoke their ruling. Rav Yosef added that one could not say that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai convened with his colleagues to permit one to eat the egg, because their decision was only to accept the testimony after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, but they never took a vote on permitting the egg to be eaten.

Tosfos HaRosh in Avodah Zara (2a) rules that one is permitted to conduct business with gentiles during their holiday season as initially this was prohibited because gentiles in the past worshipped idols and now that gentiles do not worship idols, the decree is irrelevant.

Tosfos in Brachos (53b) writes that people are not scrupulous regarding mayim acharonim, washing the hands at the end of a meal, because we no longer have melach sedomis, salt from Sodom. Tosfos notes that although the practice of washing mayim achronmim was instituted by an assembly of a Bais Din, this institution was not unanimously accepted and thus this institution is not categorized as a ruling that is irrevocable unless a Bais Din reassembles and rescinds the ruling.

Reb Shlomo Kluger in Elef Lecho Shlomo (116) rules that one is permitted to learn by candlelight on Shabbos and we are not concerned that he may come to move the wick which will cause the fire to burn brighter, thus violating a biblical prohibition, because one does not need to move the wick of our present-day candles.

Teshuvos HaRosh (klal 2:8) rules that one is permitted to tie strings of linen on a four-cornered garment that is made from linen to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzis and we are not concerned that one might tie strings of wool to the garment. The reason for this ruling is because all know that techeiles, a blue-dyed wool used for tzitzis, is not prevalent, thus there is no permit to tie strings of wool to a linen garment.

Teshuvos HaRosh writes that if is common knowledge why a decree was instituted and the rationale no longer applies, then the decree is considered irrelevant. Teshuvos HaRosh draws a contrast of this supposition to the case in our Gemora regarding the egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah, because some people are not aware whey the egg was initially prohibited, nor do they understand why the reason to prohibit no longer applies.

Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halachah rules that if necessary, one is permitted to take medicine on Shabbos. Taking medicine on Shabbos was initially forbidden as there was a concern that one would violate the prohibition of grinding. Now that medicine is prepared by the manufacturer and most people are not even aware of the process involved in manufacturing the medicine, there is no longer a concern that one who wishes to take medicine will violate the Shabbos prohibition of grinding herbs or spices.

[END]

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Romans; More Preferable than the Persians

Rabbah bar bar Chanah (Daf Yomi: Gittin 16b - 17a) was once ill, and Rav Yehudah and Rabbah went to inquire on his health. While they were there, they asked him the following question: If two agents bring a get from abroad, are they required to declare that it was written and signed in their presence, or not? He replied: They are not required, for would they not be believed to testify that this woman was divorced in their presence (and it would not be necessary for the woman to produce the get)? In the meantime, a Persian man came in and took away their lamp (for that day was one of their holidays, and it was forbidden to light a candle except in their temples). Rabbah bar bar Chanah exclaimed: All Merciful One! Either hide us in Your shadow or in the shadow of the son of Esav (for they respect us)!

The Maharam Schiff explains: The Romans (descendants of Esav) oppress the Jewish people only when Klal Yisroel shirk the yoke of Torah from themselves.

The Medrash states that this is actually what Yitzchak told Esav: If Yaakov’s descendants cast off the yoke of Torah, then your descendants could decree destruction upon them and subjugate them. However, if Yaakov’s children remain devoted to Torah, Esav would have no control over them.

It emerges that it is preferable for the Jewish people to be amidst the children of Esav, for then, Klal Yisroel is in control of their own destiny.

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Showering after Mikvah

Rashi (Daf Yomi: Gittin 16a) explains that the Chachamim enacted a decree of mayim sheuvim (drawn water) because people would err and say that immersing in a Mikvah and in mayim sheuvim would render one pure. Rava (Shabbos 14a) asked Abaye, why does it make a difference if people said this? The end result was that the people had immersed themselves in a Mikvah?

Reb Moshe Feinstein writes in Iggros Moshe that perhaps Abaye’s reasoning was that by pouring on themselves mayim sheuvim, they transgressed the prohibition of baal tosif (adding on to a mitzvah) by thinking that pouring mayim sheuvim was obligatory. Rava, however, maintained that for this suspicion there was no reason to render the person tamei. Some wrote that Abaye held that if one would immerse in a Mikvah or in mayim sheuvim, others would consider him tamei, and they would end up burning Terumah and Kodshim in an errant manner.

Some Rishonim write that similar to matters of purity, the Chachamim also enacted a decree that a woman who was a niddah is not allowed to shower after immersing in a Mikvah. If she showered after immersing in a Mikvah, her immersion would be invalid and she would be forbidden to her husband. Most Rishonim, however, maintain that this is not the law, because this decree was only enacted regarding matters of purity.

The Shach writes that the reason that is offered in the Gemora that people will err in thinking that pouring mayim sheuvim is what purifies the person, also applies to a woman immersing in a Mikvah, irrespective of the woman erring in her thinking. Others write that from the words of the Rambam, it appears that the decree was enacted because people erred and thought that merely immersing in a Mikvah did not render them pure, and they also were required to pour on themselves mayim sheuvim. This reasoning only applies with regard to mayim sheuvim of Taharos, because only when one immersed for Taharos was one required to have the correct intentions. A niddah who immersed in a Mikvah, however, does not require the correct intention, and there was no reason to enact a decree for a niddah.

Rav Shmuel Vozner in Shevet HaLevi writes that even though the Rama rules that after immersing in a Mikvah a woman should not shower, once she arrives at her home she is permitted to shower.

Rav Ovadyah Yosef in Sheilos U’Teshuvos Yabia Omer, however, rules that a woman can shower immediately after immersing in a Mikvah.

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Katafreis Connection

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 16a) cites a Mishna in Taharos: A jet of liquid from a jug (nitzok), or liquid flowing down a slope (katafreis), or liquid enough to moisten (mashkeh tofe’ach) does not form a connection for tumah or for taharah. [The explanation that they are not a connection for tumah: Nitzok – if one pours liquid from a tahor vessel into a tamei one and the flow of the liquid is uninterrupted between them, it is not regarded as a connection to make the upper vessel tamei. Katafreis – if a liquid from a pool flows down a board on a slope into a pool of liquid which is tamei, the upper pool remains tahor. Mashkeh tofei’ach – a moist trough has two pools of liquid on opposite sides; one of them tamei and one of them tahor. Although the trough is damp enough that it can moisten anything that touches it, the tamei pool does not contaminate the tahor one. The explanation that they are not a connection for taharah: A mikvah must contain forty se’ah of water in order to be valid. If there are two mikvaos and neither of them contain forty se’ah and they are connected through any one of the three ways mentioned above, they are not considered halachically connected to form one large valid mikvah.]

The Vilna Gaon asks: Even without the connection through katafreis, why don’t we say that each droplet of tamei water should contaminate another drop, and ultimately, the water in the upper pool should be rendered tamei?

He answers that the halacha of katafreis would be necessary in a case where a tevul yom (one who was tamei, but has immersed himself in a mikvah; he is considered a tevul yom until nightfall) touched the liquid, for he cannot contaminate a food item with the capability of contaminating something else (and therefore, one droplet will not cause the other to become tamei). Through the principle of katafreis, it could be regarded that the entire flow is regarded as one body of liquid, and the upper pool could become tamei (if it would be considered connected).

Reb Shimon Shkop asks on his answer from the Rambam, who rules that these halachos would apply by tumas sheretz as well, and a sheretz can contaminate one drop to render the others tamei!?

He answers that one drop cannot render the other drops tamei because of the principle of beis hasetarim (for the drops touching each other are not recognizable).

Rav Elyashiv answers simply that if the liquid would be rendered tamei because of its contact with the first droplet, it would only be Rabbinically tamei, for that which a liquid is ruled to be a rishon l’tumah is only a Rabbinic decree. Hence, kodoshim that contracted tumah in such a manner could not be burned. However, through the principle of katafreis, the entire liquid would be rendered tamei on a Biblical level, and if kodoshim would be involved, it would be required to be burned.

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Dangerous Custodians

Daf Yomi: Gittin 14a - 14b: Rabbi Achi the son of Rabbi Yoshiyah deposited a silver vessel with custodians in Nehardea. He said to Rabbi Dustai the son of Rabbi Yannai and to Rabbi Yosi the son of Kippeir, who were on their way there, “When you come back from Nehardea, bring me the vessel back.” They went and got it from the custodians. The custodians said to them: “Make with us a kinyan (that we will thereby be exempt from any further responsibilities)!” They said, “No (we do not want the labilities)!” “Then, give it back,” they said. Rabbi Dustai the son of Rabbi Yannai was willing, but Rabbi Yosi the son of Kippeir refused. The custodians started to hurt Rabbi Yosi the son of Kippeir (in order to get the vessel back). They said to Rabbi Dustai, “See what your friend is doing.” He replied, “Beat him up good!” When they returned to Rabbi Achi the son of Rabbi Yoshiyah, Rabbi Yosi said, “Look, master, not only did he not assist me, but he even said to them, ‘Beat him up good’!” Rabbi Achi the son of Rabbi Yoshiyah asked Rabbi Dustai, “Why did you act in that manner?” He replied, “Those people are very tall and their hats are very tall, and their voices comes from their midsection (since they had very deep voices), and their names are frightening - Arda and Arta and Phili as their leader. If they give instructions, ‘Tie him up,’ they tie him up; if they instruct, ‘kill him,’ you are killed. If they had killed Dustai, who would have given Yannai, my father, a son like me?” Rabbi Achi the son of Rabbi Yoshiyah asked Rabbi Dustai, “Are these men connected with the government?” He replied, “Yes.” Do they have horses and mules that run behind them?” He answered, “Yes.” Rabbi Achi the son of Rabbi Yoshiyah asked Rabbi Dustai, “If that is so, you acted properly.”

*** It is evident from the Gemora that halachically, they were not obligated to return the vessel to the custodians. The Tosfos Harosh explains: The Gemora above had stated that unless the custodian has been established as a liar, he could claim that the depositor does not want that his deposit shall be in someone else’s hands (and therefore, it should be returned to the custodian). Here, the custodian cannot make such a claim. For Rav Achi explicitly instructed them to return the vessel to him.

*** Rashi cites two explanations as to what Rav Dustai said when the custodians were hurting Rabbi Yosi. Either he said, “Beat him up good (in order that he should return the vessel to them)!” Or, he said, “He is deserving of this (since he is not returning the vessel).” Some Rishonim derive from here that it is permitted to save oneself with someone else’s body, for Rav Dustai was telling them to hit Rabbi Yosi because he was terrified that he would get hit.

*** Rabbi Dustai excused his actions by saying, “Those people are very tall and their hats are very tall, and their voices comes from their midsection, and their names are frightening - Arda and Arta and Phili as their leader.” Rashi explains that they were men of great dimensions and they wore awesome clothing. And since they had very deep voices, it appeared as if their voices were coming from their midsections. The Maharsha brings an alternative explanation according to the simple reading of the Gemora: They were one cubit tall and their hats were one cubit tall. It was because of this that their voices appeared to emanate from their midsections.

*** Rabbi Dustai concluded, “If they had killed Dustai, who would have given Yannai, my father, a son like me?” The Vilna Gaon states that it may be gleaned from here that when a son adds an honorable title to his father’s name, he is permitted to say his father’s name. It is only forbidden for one to say his father’s name without a title.

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Selling a "Runaway" Slave

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 13a) explained the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Chachamim as follows: The Gemora explains: Rabbi Meir said to them: You have answered me with regard to his food (the master has a right not to provide him with food), but you have not answered me with respect of terumah (if his master was a Kohen, he will lose the ability of eating terumah)! And if you will answer me that the master, if he wanted, could throw the document to the slave (against his will) and thereby disqualify him from eating terumah, this is not correct because the slave can run away and the master will not have the option to free him (and therefore the slave can still eat terumah)! For if the slave of a Kohen ran away (and he could not be found to free him), or the wife of a Kohen rebelled against him (and she could not be found for him to divorce her), would they not be able to still eat terumah! This slave (if someone is acquiring the document for him), however, will not be able to eat terumah!

Rava explains the Chachamim’s response in our Mishna: It is because the slave is the master’s property. The meaning is as follows: The master, if he wants, could take four zuzim from a Yisroel (selling the slave to him), which would thereby disqualify the slave from eating terumah (even if the slave runs away)!

The Reshash asks: How could the master sell his slave who ran away? This should be akin to one who stole an object from his friend. The owner is unable to sell it because it is not presently under his jurisdiction. Here too, the slave is not presently under the control of the owner!

He answers that here it is different. The slave fled from the master because he wants to remain a slave. He is therefore still regarded as being under the jurisdiction of his master.

Furthermore, the halacha is that land cannot be halachically stolen, and a slave which is compared to land has that halacha as well. Therefore, the slave, no matter where he is, would still be regarded as being under the control of the owner.

The Ayeles Hashachar answers: Since the slave is required to return himself to his master, it is considered as if he is still under his jurisdiction.

The Dvar Avraham writes that this question can be answered according to the Shitah Mikubetzes in Bava Kamma (33b). The Shitah says that if someone sells an item that was not under his control, but afterwards, it came into his jurisdiction, the sale is effective retroactively. Here too, if the slave is returned to the master, at that point the sale will be effective.

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Rashi's Retraction

The Mishna states: If one says, “Give a get to my wife,” or he says, “Give an emancipation document to my slave,” and he died, the documents should not be given after his death.

Rashi notes that our Mishna should not read, “Give this get to my wife,” or “Give this emancipation document to my slave,” rather, he merely said, “Give a get to my wife,” or “Give an emancipation document to my slave.” He instructed the agents to do so, but he did not actually give them the document. If he would have handed the document to the agents, the Chachamim would hold that the emancipation is effective immediately, for they maintain that it is advantageous for a slave to gain his freedom and the agents can acquire the document for him.

Tosfos (9b) points out that here, Rashi, is retracting from a position he took above. Rashi had stated that when the agents acquire the document for the slave, the slave does not gain his freedom at that time. He becomes free when the document is delivered into his hands. The acquisition of the document accomplishes that the master may not retract any longer. Here, Rashi says that if the agents would acquire the document, the slave’s emancipation would be effective immediately.

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Food and Medicine for the Slave

*** Rabbi Yochanan said (Daf Yomi: Gittin Daf 12b) : If a man cuts off the hands of his friend’s slave, he pays the loss of earnings and the doctor bills to the master, and that slave receives his food from charity.

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Yochanan is discussing a case where the master is providing food for the slave, and he is taking from charity for the extras.

Rashi explains that the slave requires additional food because of his medical condition.

The Nesivos Hamishpat writes that the additional food will speed up the recovery process. This, the slave must pay for himself. The damager is not required to pay for that.

The Chazon Ish disagrees: He states that if this additional food will be beneficial to improve his medical condition, he would not have to pay for it himself; it would be included in the doctor bills. Rather, the Gemora is discussing the delicacies which are given to a sick person in order to cheer him up. This is not included in the medical bills.

*** The Gemora concludes that the master can say to the slave, “Work for me, but I will not sustain you.”

Reb Yechezkel Abramsky explains that the master is not completely exempt from sustaining the slave when he is working for him. The master has the right to tell him that he should worry himself with regards to his food. This is why Tosfos says that during a famine year, where people will not have pity on the slave and he will not be able to find food, the master is obligated to feed him, and if he doesn’t, the slave can demand his freedom.

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Agent to Free a Slave

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 11b) had stated: If someone says: “Give this Get to my wife” or “Give this document freeing my slave to my slave,” if he wants to retract the document (before it gets to his wife/slave) he may. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim say: He can retract by the Get of his wife, but not by the document freeing his slave. This is because a person can have someone else acquire something beneficial for him when he is not present, but not something that is a liability for him when he is not present.

The Acharonim ask: One who frees his Canaanite slave has violated a Biblical commandment! If so, the agent who is being sent to deliver the emancipation document is an agent for an aveirah! There is a well established principle that one cannot be an agent for an aveirah!?

There are those who prove from here that although one is not permitted to serve as an agent to commit an aveirah, the agency, nevertheless, is not negated because of it. Tosfos in Bava Metzia (13b), however, states clearly regarding one who was sent to serve as an agent for an aveirah, the agency is negated and his actions are null and void.

The Noda BeYehudah answers that since the agent is acquiring the document for the slave, he is serving as an agent of the slave and not as an agent of the master. He is therefore not regarded as being an agent for an aveirah, because the aveirah is for the master to set him free; not for the slave to gain his freedom.

One can also answer that we are discussing a case where it was a mitzvah to free the slave (a tenth man was needed for a minyan), and therefore, there was no aveirah.

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Idolater Judges

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin Daf 11a) asks: What are names that are clearly those of non-Jews?
Rav Papa answers: Names such as Hurmiz, Abudina, Bar Shibsai, Bar Kidri, Bati, and Nakim Una. Rashi explains that these are all names of idolater judges.

The Maharam Shif asks: The judges are not the ones who are signing! Rather, it is the witnesses who are signing in the presence of the judges.

He answers that Rashi is only stating as to why these names are obviously idolaters, and not Jewish. There were well known idolater judges with those names, and that is why when someone signs with such a name, we are certain that he is an idolater and not a Jew.

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The Law of the Government

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin Daf 10b) notes: The Mishna did not make any distinction between a document of sale and one of a gift. It is understandable that a document of sale can be valid even if idolaters are signed on it, for when the buyer gave the money before the judges is actually the time that he acquired the land; the document is only a proof to the sale. If the buyer had not given money in front of the judges, they would not have discredited their reputation by writing the document for him. But with respect of a gift, with what did he acquire the property? It is only through this document! But this document is equivalent to a shard! [Why does the Mishna rule that even in this case, the document is valid?]

Shmuel answers: The law of the government is the law (even according to our law).

The Gemora in Shabbos (88a) teaches that when Bnei Yisroel stood at Mount Sinai and heard the word of Hashem, He held the mountain over our heads. Hashem declared, “If you’ll accept the Torah, all will be well. If not, this will be your burial place!” Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: This can now be used as an excuse for Klal Yisroel when they do not perform the mitzvos. For when they are summoned for judgment, they can claim that they were coerced into accepting the Torah; it was not done willingly.

The Perashas Derachim asks from our Gemora which states that the law of the kingdom is the law. If so, this should certainly apply by The Holy One blessed is He, Who is the King of all Kings. How could Klal Yisroel use the coercion as an excuse? The law of the kingdom is the law, and they took an oath obligating themselves to perform His mitzvos!

He answers that Rabbeinu Tam holds that the principle of the law of the kingdom is the law is only applicable if the king decrees on all his subjects. However, if the decree is issued only on part of his kingdom, this principle does not apply. Since Hashem is the King over all the nations of the world and He only forced Bnei Yisroel to accept His mitzvos, this principle would not apply and hence, a claim of coercion can be effective.

It emerges that regarding the seven mitzvos that were given to all Bnei Noach, the principle of the law of the kingdom is the law would apply, and a claim of coercion would not be valid.

According to this, the Ketzos HaChoshen explains the argument between Pharaoh and the midwives. Pharaoh asked them, “Why didn’t you listen to my commandment? The law of the kingdom is the law and since I the king decreed that all the Jewish children should be killed, you are obligated to listen to me!” They responded to him, “Your decree is not a universal one; it was only issued regarding the Jewish children and not to any others. Accordingly, the principle does not apply and we are not obligated to adhere to the laws of the kingdom. Thereupon, Pharaoh immediately decreed that all children born must be thrown into the sea.

Reb Shlomo Kluger uses this principle to explain Adam HaRishon’s response to Hashem. He answered, “The woman which you gave to me gave me from the tree and I ate.” What kind of answer was this? Adam HaRishon was saying that since his was wife was here as well and she was not commanded not to eat from the tree. Therefore, the law of the kingdom does not apply and that is why he ate.

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Cuthean as a Witness

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin Daf 10a) had stated: Any document that has a Cuthean witness signed on it is disqualified (for he is suspected of lying) except that of a get for a woman and for the freeing of a slave.

Tosfos writes that this Mishna is only according to those that hold that the Cutheans were true converts to Judaism, and Biblically, they are regarded as full-fledged Jews. However, according to those who maintain that the Cutheans only converted out of fear of the lions, they are not regarded as Jews, and they cannot be eligible as a witness.

The Ri”f rules that nowadays, the Cutheans are disqualified from all types of testimony, for they are considered like an ordinary idolater.

Reb Isser Zalman Meltzer asks: How can a Cuthean be qualified to testify? Even if they are not suspected to lie, but they deny the Oral Law, and certainly they should be ruled ineligible!

He writes that since this was the tradition that they accepted from their fathers, they are regarded as a child who was taken captive by idolaters (and the fact that he does not believe in the truth of the Oral law does not disqualify him, for he never knew any different), and therefore, they are not disqualified from being a witness.

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Suspected of Lying

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin Daf 10a) had stated: Any document that has a Cuthean witness signed on it is disqualified (for he is suspected of lying) except that of a get for a woman and for the freeing of a slave.

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: Since they are suspect of lying, they should be regarded as a rasha (wicked person) with respect of monetary matters, and the halacha is that a thief is disqualified form all testimony!?

He answers that the Yerushalmi says that the Cutheans are eligible to sign on a get because they are only suspect with regards to monetary matters, but not with respect of illicit relations. The Pnei Yehoshua explains: The Yerushalmi holds that a witness who is suspected of stealing is only disqualified from testifying with regards to money matters, but he would still be eligible to testify on arayos (relationships). However, l’halacha we hold that such a person is ineligible to testify on all matters, so accordingly, how could the Mishna rule that the get is valid?

He answers that in truth, we do not know definitely that they would lie; it is only that they are suspect of lying. The halacha is that if they are suspected of lying, they are disqualified from testifying with respect of monetary matters, but not with respect of other testimonies.

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Get

A bill of divorce is referred to as a get. Tosfos (Daf Yomi: Gittin 2a) writes that it is the practice for a get to be written in twelve lines, because the numerical value (gematria) of the word get is twelve (gimmel = 3; tes = 9; 3 + 9 = 12).

The Vilna Gaon adds that the document could have been called differently, for there are many combinations of letters that add up to twelve, such as a “ches” and a “daled.” However, what is unique about the “gimmel” and the “tes” is that you will never find these two letters next to each other in the entire Torah. This is why the document which is used as a separation between the man and his wife is referred to as a get.

The Steipler asked that there are other combinations of letters, such as a “gimmel” and a “kuf,” or a “zayin” and a “tzadi,” or a “samech” and a “tzadi” that are also never found next to each other!? He answers that the “gimmel” and the “tes” are the first of such combinations.

It can also be said that they wanted a name that would accomplish two things; one, that its numerical value is twelve, and secondly, that the two letters are never found next to each other. The “gimmel” and the “tes” are the only two letters that have both components.

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Learning while Standing

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Sotah 49a) had stated: When Rabban Gamliel the Elder died, the glory of the Torah terminated and purity and abstinence perished.

Rashi cites the Gemora in Megillah ((21a) which states that from the days of Moshe until Rabban Gamliel, they would study Torah standing. Afterwards, people became weaker and they would study torah while sitting; they didn’t have the strength to stand.

The Gemora in Brochos (28a) says that when Rabban Gamliel was the Rosh Yeshiva, his policy was that any student who was not "tocho c'baro," his inside was not like his outside, would not be allowed to enter the Beis Medrash. Not everyone who applied was automatically accepted into his Yeshiva. Rabban Gamliel only accepted students who were honest and sincere, through and through, without any hints of fakery or hypocrisy.

The Gemora relates that there was a subsequent change in the leadership and Rabbi Elozar ben Azariah was appointed the new Rosh Yeshiva. He implemented a new policy: Everyone was invited into the Beis Medrash even someone who was not "tocho c'baro." As a result, the Gemora records: Many benches were added to the Beis Medrash.

Two questions can be asked. Firstly, how were they able to ascertain who was a “tocho c’baro” and who wasn’t; only Hashem is capable of peering into someone’s heart? Secondly, why does the Gemora state that many benches were added; we are not interested in the amount of chairs there were; it should have said that there were many more students learning on the account of the new policy?

Rav Nosson Gishtetner answers based on our Gemora: In the days of Rabban Gamliel, the sincere students would be learning standing; that was a symbol that he was learning Torah for the sake of the mitzvah and not for any ulterior motive. When the new policy was enacted, more benches were added because the generation was weaker and they did not have the ability to stand while they were learning.

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