Compliance with the Rabbis

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 33a) asks: Since the get may be annulled in accordance with Biblical law, how can we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world?

The Gemora answers: Yes! Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.)

The Rashba asks: Why don’t we apply this rule in the case in Yevamos where a man fell into water that has no end? There, we rule that the wife will remain an agunah because the husband might have exited the water from a place that was not visible to us. Why don’t we say that the Chachamim revoked the original kiddushin from him, and she may remarry another man?

He answers: It is only applicable in certain cases. If, for example, there was a get, except that it was written with a condition, and an uncertainty arose regarding the condition, the Chachamim can revoke his kiddushin. Another example where the Chachamim would revoke the kiddushin is where one witness is testifying on the woman’s behalf (that her husband died). However, when there is no get and no witness, the Chachamim did not go ahead and revoke a kiddushin.

The Gemora in Yevamos (110a) records an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid).

Rav Ashi explains that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Chachamim therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. (This is following the opinion of Rav, who maintains that for the marriage of a minor to become valid, she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult, and if not the marriage is invalid.)

The Chachamim were empowered to remove the kiddushin in this case because he acted improperly in the beginning of the kiddushin.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei Hashas cites a Teshuvos haRashba who writes that we only apply the principle of “Since he acted improperly, the Chachamim acted improperly with him” in places that are specifically mentioned in Chazal. The Sages did not annul the marriage in every case where one acts with trickery. This can be proven from a Gemora in Kiddushin (58b). The Gemora states: One who instructs his fellow to marry a woman for him (as an agent), and the agent goes ahead and marries her for himself, she is married to the second one. We do not say that since he acted improperly, the Chachamim invalidated his marriage.

This can also be proven from the fact that even if one betroths a woman who is subject to a negative prohibition, kiddushin, nevertheless takes effect. This is also true if someone marries a woman who is a secondary ervah to him. Obviously, sometimes this principle is applied, and sometimes, it isn’t.

The Chasam Sofer asks: Why, in these cases (where he betroths a woman subject to a negative prohibition, or a secondary ervah) do we not say that the Chachamim revoked his kiddushin?

He answers, based upon Tosfos, who says that it is for this reason that the groom tells the bride that he is betrothing her according to the laws of Moshe and all of Israel. The kiddushin is only effective if Israel, i.e. the Chachamim consent to the marriage. However, one who is violating the Torah, or the sages, is obviously not marrying with such a stipulation and therefore, the marriage can still be effective. [According to the Chasam Sofer, not every marriage has that stipulation attached to it.]

The Shiltei Giborim states that this principle applies by a get as well. Anyone who divorces a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis may, in certain cases retroactively revoke the divorce.

Based upon this, the Taamei Yaakov answers the following famous question on Rabbeinu Gershom’s decree: Since the Torah expressly permits one to divorce his wife without her consent, how can this be banned? The Taz lais down a rule that the Rabbis do not have the authority to prohibit something which is explicitly permitted by the Torah!?

He answers that since the Rabbis forbid giving a get in such a manner, it is automatically nullified, for one’s betrothal and divorce can only be effective if he is compliance with the Rabbis’ ordinances. In these cases, the Rabbis did not consent to such a get.

[I am uncertain as to how this answers the question. Granted, the get will be ineffective since it is prohibited to give a get without the woman’s consent; but how did the Rabbis have the authority to issue such a decree? If the Torah expressly permits it, they cannot forbid it!?]

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Story from the Daf

When Rabbi Yehoshua from Sosnovitz was a nine year old boy, his father took him to the Rav of the city to be tested on his learning. The Rav asked him to say over the first Mishna in the fourth perek of Gittin (Daf Yomi: Gittin 32a) . The child explained the Mishna as follows: Rabban Gamliel decreed regarding the beards. The Rav realized that the boy couldn’t even translate the words of the Mishna correctly, let alone, explain it properly! Yet, he was hesitant to inform the father of this, for he thought that it would cause him too much pain.

Reb Yehoshua’s father returned and asked the Rav for his assessment of his child. The Rav just related to him the boy’s translation of the Mishna, so the father could ascertain for himself. When the father heard this explanation, he proclaimed, “I didn’t know that my son was on such a lofty level!”

Many years later, when Reb Yehoshua became well known as one of the righteous men in the generation, there was an edict issued from the government that all Jews are required to shave off their beards. They came to Reb Yehoshua for his advice and to beseech him to pray on their behalf that the decree should be nullified. Reb Yehoshua responded: “When I was a child, I explained the Mishna to mean that Rabban Gamliel decreed regarding the beards. The meaning is that Rabban Gamliel decreed that no nation will have the ability to interfere with the beards of the Jewish people. There is nothing at all to be concerned about.” It was only a short time afterward that the decree was rescinded!

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Taste of the Manna

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 31a) states that one can separate both terumah gedolah and terumas ma’aser with a thought and one does not need to physically or orally designate the terumah.

Tosfos writes that on Shabbos, it is still forbidden to mentally separate terumah, for through that, he renders the produce usable (it is regarded as “fixing” on Shabbos).

Based upon this, the Pnei Dovid answers the following contradiction: It is written [Shmos 16:23] regarding the manna: Tomorrow is a rest day, a holy Shabbos to God. Bake whatever you wish to bake, and cook whatever you wish to cook. Rashi comments: Whatever you wish to bake in an oven, bake everything today for two days, and whatever amount of it you need to cook in water, cook today. Yet, it is written [Bamidbar 11:8]: The people walked about and gathered it. Then they ground it in a mill or crushed it in a mortar, cooked it in a pot and made it into cakes. And there Rashi comments: The manna did not actually enter the mill, the pot, or the mortar, but its taste changed to that of ground, crushed, or cooked food. And this is actually how the Gemora in Yoma (75a) explains it as well! It wasn’t actually baked, but rather, if they wanted it to taste as if it was baked, then it would! Seemingly, Rashi is contradicting himself!?

He answers that there is a distinction between the weekdays and Shabbos. During the weekdays, they could mentally decide on how the manna should taste, and so it happened. However, on Shabbos, this would be forbidden, for it would be regarded as “fixing” the food! They therefore had to bake it from beforehand if they wanted it to taste baked on Shabbos.

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Holy Thoughts

The Gemora states (Daf Yomi: Gittin 30b - 31a) that one can separate both terumah gedolah and terumas ma’aser with a thought and one does not need to physically or orally designate the terumah.

There are certain mitzvos which require one to contemplate the mitzvah, such as loving HaShem, fearing HaShem and other such mitzvos. There is even a situation where if one sought to perform a mitzvah and he could not complete it because of extenuating circumstances, it is considered as if he performed the mitzvah. Thus, thoughts play an important part in serving HaShem.

Rav Chaim Volozhiner writes in Nefesh HaChaim that one who entertains immoral thoughts is worse than the Roman general Titus, who defiled the Holy of Holies, because a gentile does not have the capability of reaching high spiritual levels, whereas a Jew has the ability to reach very high spiritual levels, and improper thoughts defile the spiritual Holy of Holies. This idea should teach us that not only do we have to be pure in our actions but we must also keep our thoughts pure and holy.

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Moshe's Instruction

It is written [Shmos 7:1]: Hashem said to Moshe, “See! I have made you a lord over Pharaoh, and Aaron, your brother, will be your speaker.” What is the connection between the two parts of the verse?

Reb Shlomo Kluger explains the verse based upon our Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 29a) . Rava had said that our Mishna was referring to words (that were said by the husband, i.e. instructions to write the get), and those cannot be passed on to another messenger (for words are too insignificant to be transferred). However, something tangible (like a get) can be passed on to another messenger.

This principal, he explains, is that mere words cannot be transferable to a second agent. However, the first agent can be appointed for mere words.

Moshe’s mission was one of words. Hashem commanded him to go to Pharaoh and speak to him. Accordingly, one can ask: How did Moshe have the authority to transfer this to Aaron? Mere words are non-transferable to another agent!?

This is the explanation for the introductory verse. Hashem made Moshe into a lord over Pharaoh. Moshe, therefore, was not merely an agent; he was the principal himself. He, therefore, had the authority to appoint Aaron to be his agent to talk to Pharaoh.

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Between Eighty and One Hundred

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 28a) had stated: If an agent was bringing a get and he left the husband old or sick, he may give the get under the assumption that the husband is still alive (for we assume, based upon the principle of chazakah, that nothing changed from the status quo). [If we would be certain that the husband died before the agent delivered the get to the wife, he may not give it any longer.]

The Chasam Sofer says: By the fact that the Mishna did not say ‘an old and sick person,” we may infer that if in fact the husband was old and sick, the agent would not be allowed to deliver the get, for then we can no longer assume that he is still alive.

The Chasam Sofer adds that this would apply for anyone over sixty years old.

The Maharshal in Yam shel Shlomo disagrees and says that even if the husband is old and sick, we nevertheless, assume that he is still alive, and we deliver the get. He adds that this is only if he is younger than eighty years old. However, if he is over eighty, it would depend upon his strength.

Reb Akiva Eiger in Shulchan Aruch writes that he is uncertain as to what the halacha would be if the husband was old and sick.

The Shiltei Giborim writes that when the Mishna rules that if the husband is sick, we still assume that he is alive, that is only if he is the sickness befell him from the hand of Heaven, such as a sickness which was caused by exposure to the cold or the heat. However, if he was knifed in the stomach or his skull was crushed, we do not assume that he is still alive, and we would not deliver the get.

The Yam shel Shlomo rules as follows: If the husband is over the age of one hundred, the agent may deliver the get even if he is sick as well. However, if he is over eighty years old, but not yet one hundred, the agent should not deliver the get if the husband is sick. The distinction between them is as follows: The Gemora refers to someone alive over eighty as a “ben gevuros,” a man of strength. This is true if he is healthy. However, if he took ill, then he is not at full strength, and therefore we cannot assume that he is still alive. Contrast this to someone who is over one hundred years old. Someone so old is always frail and weak, and there should not be any assumption that he will remain alive. However, the Gemora applies the logic that once he has reached such an age (over one hundred), he is regarded as an exceptional person (due to his longevity), and we may therefore assume that he is still alive, even if he is sick.

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An Ignorant Person's Recognition

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 27a) had stated: If an agent (who was bringing a get) lost the get and found it immediately, it is still valid. However, if he found it after some time, it cannot be used (for we are concerned that it fell from someone else and it is not the get which he lost). If he found the get in a chafisah or in a deluskema (types of containers), or if he recognizes the get, it is valid.

Rashi explains that if the agent himself found the get (not in a container) and he recognizes it, the get is valid.

Other Rishonim understand the Mishna to mean that the get is valid if he recognizes the container.

The Rashba writes that the get will be valid if the agent found it and claims that he recognizes it. This is true even if the agent is an ignorant person. That which the Gemora says below that an ignorant person cannot be trusted that he recognizes the get is only true when someone else found it and the agent is trying to claim it from him. There, we suspect that he is lying. However, if he himself found the get, he is trusted that he recognizes it, for he has a migu (believe me what I am saying, for if I would want to lie, I could have said a better lie); he could have said that he never lost it in the first place. (The Ritva seems to say that the ignorant person is believed even without the migu.)

The Ramban writes that it is only with respect to a lost article that we do not trust an ignorant person when he claims that he recognizes it. However, with regards to a get, which is a prohibitory matter, he is trusted. (The Magid Mishnah explains that this is because one witness is believed with respect to prohibitory matters.)

There are two glaring questions on the Ramban. Firstly, the Gemora below states explicitly that to return it to someone who claims that he recognizes it by sight, it is only to a Talmudic scholar who would be trusted, but not any ordinary person!? Secondly, a get should be regarded as a davar she’b’ervah, a matter with respect to relations, and two witnesses are required for testimony involving such matters!?

The Toras Gittin answers the first question as follows: When the Gemora states that an ordinary person will not be trusted that he recognizes the get, that is only with respect to the monetary issues of the get; however, with respect to the prohibitions stemming from the get, he will be trusted.

The Maharam Schick answers the second question: The halacha is if a father said, “I accepted a kiddushin for my daughter, but I do not know from whom,” and a fellow comes to us and says that it was him, he is believed and she is married to him. The Ran explains that although ordinarily, a davar she’b’ervah requires two witnesses, here it doesn’t, for his testimony is not in contrast with any preexisting status quo; it is merely a clarification as to whom the father accepted the kiddushin from. One person is sufficient for this. So too, here, the one witness is not testifying on the divorce; rather, he is clarifying for us as to who this get belongs to.

The Oneg Yom Tov answers this question by saying that the concern for two Yosef ben Shimon’s in the same city is only a Rabbinical one, and therefore, although it is a davar she’b’ervah, only one witness is required.

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Essence of a Get

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 26a) states: A scribe who writes the tofes (the text of the get, not including the names of the people and the date) of a get must leave blank spaces for the names of the man, woman and the date.

The Mishna Lamelech writes that it is necessary to write the location of the man and the woman as well.

Tosfos Yom Tov asks: Why doesn’t the Mishna mention that it the scribe is required to leave spaces blank for their locations as well?

He proves from here that the omission of the city names will not invalidate a get.

The Rashba rejects the proof by saying that perhaps it is included in that which the Mishna says: the names of the man and the woman.

It is brought in the name of Rabbeinu Tam that if their locations are omitted from the get, the get is invalid.

Proof to this is from the fact that the Mishna did not make mention of the fact that he has to leave a blank space for the words “Behold, you are permitted to any man,” and if that is not written, the get is rules to be invalid.

Tosfos writes that this precise language was not found in the earlier gittin, however, similar expressions were used and therefore, their gittin were valid.

The Ramban concludes that if this exact expression (“Behold, you are permitted to any man”) is not written in the get, the get is disqualified and if she has already remarried, she must leave that man.

The Steipler Gaon notes that the verse, sefer kerisus venasan beyadah veshilchah (a document of severance; and he shall place it in her hand and send her out) is the same numerical value as “zehu gufo shel get: harei at muteres lechal adam” (this is the essence of the get: “Behold, you are permitted to any man”).

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Two Lugin

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 25b) cites a braisa: If someone buys wine from amongst the Cutheans (converts to Judaism after an outbreak of wild animals in Eretz Yisroel and their conversion was debated as to its validity; they observed some commandments, but not others), he should say the following: “The two lugin (a measurement) that I will eventually separate (from the one hundred lugin in total) are terumah (tithe for the kohen), ten are ma’aser rishon (tithe for the Levite), nine are for ma’aser sheini (to be eaten in Yerushalyim),” and after redeeming the ma’aser sheini (with coins), he can drink right away. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Shimon forbid this leniency.

Rashi explains the braisa to be referring to a case where he does not have a vessel to separate the tithes required to allow him to drink the wine in an orderly fashion.

Some explain it that he did not have any tahor vessels.

Rashi in Sukkah (23b) explains that the fellow purchased the wine bein hashemashos (close to sunset) on Friday and he did not have time to separate the ma’aser before Shabbos. Since it is forbidden to separate ma’aser on Shabbos, he did not have what to drink.

Tosfos challenges Rashi’s explanation, for if that would be the case, he would not even be allowed to orally declare it to be ma’aser, for it is forbidden to fix his produce on Shabbos!?

The Kaftor va’Ferach answers that Rashi holds that the manner prescribed in the Gemora is permitted, for he is not actually fixing it on Shabbos. He is separating the ma’aser after Shabbos and retroactively the produce is remedied on Shabbos. It emerges that he did nothing on Shabbos.

Tosfos explains that the remedy discussed in the Gemora is only when it is still bein hashemashos. At that time, there was a Rabbinic decree not to separate ma’aser, but one, at that time, is permitted to orally declare it to be ma’aser.

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Cutheans

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 25a) cites a braisa: If someone buys wine from amongst the Cutheans (converts to Judaism after an outbreak of wild animals in Eretz Yisroel and their conversion was debated as to its validity; they observed some commandments, but not others), he should say the following: “The two lugin (a measurement) that I will eventually separate (from the one hundred lugin in total) are terumah (tithe for the kohen), ten are ma’aser rishon (tithe for the Levite), nine are for ma’aser sheini (to be eaten in Yerushalyim),” and after redeeming the ma’aser sheini (with coins), he can drink right away. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Shimon forbid this leniency.

Tosfos explains that although the Cutheans observed the mitzvos that are expressly written in the Torah, and therefore, it would be safe to assume that they already separated terumah and ma’aser, nevertheless, they are only trusted with respect to the food which they eat. However, the produce which they sell to others, they are not trusted, for the Cutheans were not particular about the transgression of lifnei iver (placing a stumbling block in front of a blind man). Tosfos in Sukkah (23b) explains further that understood that verse only in its literal sense. They maintained that it is forbidden to place a stumbling block in front of a blind man, but there is no prohibition against causing someone else to sin.

However, Tosfos asks: Would selling the produce without separating terumah and ma’aser not be regarded as stealing from the Kohanim? Stealing is a prohibition that they seemingly did observe!

Tosfos answers that since terumah and ma’aser is considered money that has no claimants (for which Kohen is regarded as its owner), it was not considered stealing in their eyes.

Other Rishonim add that, in truth, it is not regarded as stealing. Stealing is only when one takes something away from an owner who can make a claim to it. Since the Kohanim cannot forcibly take the produce from him, it is not considered stealing.

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Yosef ben Shimon

Reb Tzadok HaKohen explains why the Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 24b) uses the example of Yosef ben Shimon, a name that we do not find this sort of combination in the Torah. The Gemora could have used Reuven ben Yaakov! Why was this combination chosen?

He says that all of Klal Yisroel are called by the name Yosef, for they guard the covenant. Yet we find that twenty-four thousand members from the Tribe of Shimon died in the plague of Pe’or (which involved acting promiscuously with the women of Midyan), something that was completely contrary to the attributes of Yosef. One can therefore mistakenly think that the descendants of Shimon should not be called after the name of Yosef. It is for this precise reason that Chazal chose the name Yosef ben Shimon. It is to demonstrate that even the Tribe of Shimon is still connected to Yosef.

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Eliezer the Slave

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan (Daf Yomi: Gittin 23b) : A Canaanite slave is disqualified from serving as an agent to receive a woman’s get from her husband because he is not included in the halachos of divorce and marriage.

Tosfos in Kesuvos (7b) writes that Eliezer was the agent of Yitzchak to marry Rivkah.

The Panim Yafos asks: How could Eliezer serve as the agent for marriage, when he was not included in the halachos of marriage.

He answers that this principle is only applicable when he is serving as an agent for another person. However, a slave may serve as an agent of his master for marriage and divorce, since he is considered the hand of the master.

This explains why Eliezer began by saying, “I am the slave of Avraham.”

The Pardes Yosef asks that this does not explain how Eliezer could marry Rivkah on behalf of Yitzchak! Eliezer belonged to Avraham; not to Yeitzchak!?

He answers that this is why Avraham gave over all his possessions to Yitzchak, including his slave, Eliezer. Once Eliezer belonged to Yitzchak, he could serve as his agent.

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Minor Writing a Get

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 22b) had stated: Everyone is qualified to write a get, even a mute, one who is insane, or a minor.

Tosfos asks: Since a minor in not a “bar kerisus,” he is incapable of divorcing his own wife, he therefore should be disqualified from writing a get for someone else!?

Tosfos answers: Since he will eventually grow into an adult, he is not regarded as someone who is incapable of divorcing his wife, and therefore, he is still eligible to write a get.

The Noda b’Yehudah (O”C §1) asks: Why is the halacha of writing a get different than the halacha of writing tefillin? A minor is excluded from writing tefillin, since he is not a “bar keshirah,” he is not obligated in the mitzvah of tefillin. Why don’t we say that since he will be obligated in the mitzvah when he becomes an adult, he should be eligible to write tefillin?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman answers: That which we say that someone who is not a “bar kerisus” cannot write a get is only if he is excluded inherently from the subject of divorce. A minor, however, cannot issue a divorce, not because he is excluded, but rather, it is because he is incapable of marrying. He, therefore, can still be regarded as a “bar kerisus,” and can therefore be eligible to write a get. However, with respect of tefillin, a minor is excluded from the obligation of tefillin, and therefore, he is not considered a “bar keshirah,” and is therefore not disqualified from writing tefillin.

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Mobile Courtyard

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 21a) states that a moving courtyard cannot effect an acquisition for its owner. The Rishonim disagree as to the reason for this. Rashi and Tosfos maintain that since the halacha that a courtyard can effect an acquisition for its owner is derived from the halacha of acquiring through one’s hand, a moving courtyard, which does not resemble to a hand (which is stationary), cannot effect an acquisition for its owner.

The Ritva and the Ran suggest a different reason for this. They say that since the courtyard can be a great distance away from the owner, it is not considered protected by the owner, and therefore it is disqualified from effecting an acquisition for the owner.

The Divrei Mishpat notes that the following case would be a difference between them: If a lost object would fall on his animal which is in his courtyard. If a mobile courtyard is excluded because it does not resemble a person’s physical hand, he will not acquire this lost object, for the animal is a moveable object. If, however, a mobile courtyard is disqualified from effecting an acquisition because it is not guarded from intrusion by the owner, here, he will acquire the lost object because the object is protected.

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Name of Hashem Written without the Proper Intent

A braisa (Daf Yomi: Gittin 20a) was taught: A scribe was supposed to write the Name of Hashem in a Sefer Torah, and instead intended to write the name Yehudah. [The name Yehudah is similar to the letters in the Name of Hashem, except that the word Yehudah has a letter “dalet” between the “vav” and the “hey.”] He forgot to insert the “dalet” and ended up writing the Name of Hashem but without the required intention necessary to write the Holy Name. Rabbi Yehudah posits that the scribe can pass his quill over the Name of Hashem and have the proper intention of writing the Name. The Chachamim disagree, claiming that this is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem (and the Sefer Torah is subsequently invalid).

The Rishonim ask: According to Rav Chisda, who holds that the Chachamim maintain that the Sefer Torah is disqualified, why does he use the term that it is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem? This would indicate that the writing is good, but it is not written in the most preferable method! Why didn’t he say that the new writing does not accomplish anything?

The Rashba answers that they actually hold that the tracing over of the word is not regarded as an act of writing at all and the Sefer Torah is disqualified. They only used that term to discuss Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion.

The Pnei Yehoshua suggests a novel approach to explain the Chachamim’s terminology: Although the Chachamim maintain that the Sefer Torah is disqualified, they nevertheless hold that the Name of Hashem retains its sanctity and is forbidden to be erased. He proves that the Name of Hashem, although it wasn’t written with the correct intention, cannot be erased. This is why the Chachamim say that it is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem.

The Tashbatz, however, proves from our sugya that it is permitted to erase the Name of Hashem when it is written without the correct intention.

The Gemora in Yoma (38a) states that Ben Kamtzar had a unique talent that he was able to write four letters with one hand at the same time and he did not teach this talent to anyone else. The Gemora says that this was considered a shame and due to this, he was referred to as an evil person. What were the Chachamim concerned about? Rashi comments that this was referring to the Name of Hashem which has four letters.

The Tosfos Yom Tov explains that there is an advantage for the Name of Hashem to be written at one time, so that His Name should not be missing for a moment.

The Minchas Chinuch has a novel approach and says that if one writes the first two letters of the Name of Hashem which is the “yud” and the “hey,” that itself is one of the Name’s of Hashem, and by subsequently writing the third letter, the “vav,” it constitutes erasing Hashem’s Name. Ben Kamtzar was able to avoid with his special skill.

The Emek Brocha asks that if the Name of Hashem is written without proper intent, there is no prohibition to erase it, so why should there be a prohibition here when the scribe did not intend to write the ‘two letter’ Name of Hashem, but rather His ‘four letter’ Name?

According to the Pnei Yehoshua, this is not a question, for this, in fact, a prohibition to erase the Name of Hashem, even when it is written without the proper intent!

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Shailah from the Minchas Chinuch

It was stated (Daf Yomi: Gittin 19a): If a man writes over red paint writing with black ink on Shabbos, Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish both agree that he is liable on two counts, one for writing (the two new black letters) and one for erasing. [One is only liable on Shabbos if he erases with the intention of writing two letters in its place. Here, in order to write the two new black letters, he must erase the red letters first.]

If he writes over black ink with black ink or red pigment with red pigment, he is not punishable. [This is because nothing has been accomplished with the new writing.]

If he goes over black ink with red pigment, some say he is punishable and some say he is not punishable. Some say he is punishable because he is erasing the previous writing. [He is not liable for writing because the original black writing was much clearer than the red one.] Some say he is not punishable because he is only ruining the previous writing.

Rish Lakish inquired of Rabbi Yochanan: If witnesses are unable to sign their names on a get, is it permissible to write their names for them in red pigment and let them go over it with black ink? Is the upper writing regarded as writing or not?

He replied: It is not regarded as writing.

Rish Lakish challenged him: But, didn’t our teacher teach us that in respect of Shabbos, the upper writing is regarded as writing?

He replied: Because we have a certain opinion, shall we practice stringently based upon it? [If the Beis HaMikdosh would be in existence, I wouldn’t tell that person that he is liable to bring a korban chatas for violating the Shabbos, for perhaps it is not a transgression and he will be bringing an unconsecrated animal into the Courtyard!]

Tosfos notes: It is evident from here that tracing over letters with the same color ink is not regarded as writing with respect to Shabbos or with respect to gittin. Accordingly, Tosfos asks from a Gemora below (20a) which states: If a get was initially not written lishmah, it can be rectified if the scribe traces over the letters lishmah! (The Gemora there discusses if this is the halacha according to all opinions or not.) Why should it be valid if he is using the same color ink again?

Tosfos answers that since the scribe is adding an important element to the writing, namely the lishmah of the get, it therefore constitutes an act of writing for the get. However, in our case, the second writing accomplished nothing, and therefore, it is not regarded as an act of writing.

The Minchas Chinuch (§ 32) poses the following question: If one, on Shabbos, would trace over the letters of a get that had previously not been written lishmah, what is the halacha? If we would say that the tracing lishmah constitutes an act of writing and the get will be valid, it will emerge that he intentionally violated the Shabbos and he will be regarded as a mummar, who is disqualified from writing a get! And if we rule that he, in fact, is a mummar and the get is invalid, it will emerge that his tracing did not accomplish anything and he did not violate the Shabbos, which in turn, will validate the get! The logic goes complete circle and we will never be able to execute him for transgressing the Shabbos, for his writing did not accomplish anything and therefore it did not constitute an act of writing, and we will not be able to validate the get, for if we would do so, it would emerge that he was a mummar at that time and the get is invalid!?

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Decree when the reason no longer applies

Tosfos (Daf Yomi: Gittin 18a) asks: One of the reasons mentioned for the decree that the date should be recorded on a get is because perhaps the husband will want to save his niece from capital punishment if she committed adultery. Nowadays, Tosfos asks, when we do not execute anyone, why is there still a necessity to write the date in the get?

The Avnei Neizer (E”H: 188) cites a challenge to Tosfos’ question: Although the reason may not be applicable, the sages’ decree should still apply unless a greater Beis Din comes and nullifies it!

He answers that Tosfos understood that the initial decree was only established in a time and a place where they administered capital punishment. Accordingly, if nowadays, it is universal that we do not execute anyone, we are not nullifying the decree; rather, the enactment was never instituted for such cases. This is why it is not necessary for another Beis Din to annul the initial decree.

This would be comparable to that which Tosfos in Beitzah (6a) states: Tosfos writes that a matter that was only prohibited because of a specific concern will be permitted when the concern no longer exists. This principle justifies why we do not have to be concerned for water that was exposed at night and one is allowed to drink from it because in modern times snakes are not frequent in our homes.

The Gemora (Beitzah 30a) cites a Mishna that states that one is not allowed to clap or dance on Shabbos or Yom Tov. Rashi explains that the reason that one is prohibited from performing any of these actions is because they can lead to one fixing musical instruments. Tosfos states that this prohibition only applied in those days when they were experts in fashioning musical instruments. Presently, however, the decree does not apply, because we do not know how to fashion these instruments.

The Rema (O.C. 339:3) rules in accordance with Tosfos. Teshuvos HaRema (125) writes that there was an incident where a marriage occurred on Friday night and the people were not concerned that the groom would write the kesuvah, marriage contract on Shabbos. The reason for this permit was because it is not common in our times for the groom to write his own kesuvah.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l poses an interesting question. The halacha is that presently we do not have a legally qualified reshus harabim and for this reason one would be permitted to walk in a public thoroughfare on Shabbos while wearing various ornaments. According to this ruling, then, why are we still forbidden to blow shofar, shake a lulav and read the Megillah. Regarding these mitzvos there is a concern that one may come to carry the shofar, lulav or Megillah in the reshus harabim. Yet, the halachah is that our public thoroughfares are not deemed to be a legal reshus harabim, so we should no longer have these concerns.

Reb Shlomo Zalman also questions the opinion of the Raavad who maintains that muktzah is forbidden on account of a rabbinical decree that one should not come to carry into a reshus harabim. Why should this decree still apply when there is no longer a legally qualified reshus harabim?

Rav Shlomo Zalman explains that Tosfos is only referring to musical instruments. In previous times, everyone was capable of playing and repairing musical instruments. For this reason there was a decree prohibiting clapping and dancing. In our times, however, only a minority of people is capable of fixing musical instruments and because it is uncommon for people to fix musical instruments, there is no necessity for the decree against clapping and dancing.

Rabbah (Beitzah 5a) maintained that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai rescinded the prohibition against accepting witnesses after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, and subsequently an egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah was permitted to be eaten on the second day. Rav Yosef challenged Rabbah’s ruling because if the Chachamim assembled to render a ruling, they would need to reassemble to revoke their ruling. Rav Yosef added that one could not say that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai convened with his colleagues to permit one to eat the egg, because their decision was only to accept the testimony after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, but they never took a vote on permitting the egg to be eaten.

Tosfos HaRosh in Avodah Zara (2a) rules that one is permitted to conduct business with gentiles during their holiday season as initially this was prohibited because gentiles in the past worshipped idols and now that gentiles do not worship idols, the decree is irrelevant.

Tosfos in Brachos (53b) writes that people are not scrupulous regarding mayim acharonim, washing the hands at the end of a meal, because we no longer have melach sedomis, salt from Sodom. Tosfos notes that although the practice of washing mayim achronmim was instituted by an assembly of a Bais Din, this institution was not unanimously accepted and thus this institution is not categorized as a ruling that is irrevocable unless a Bais Din reassembles and rescinds the ruling.

Reb Shlomo Kluger in Elef Lecho Shlomo (116) rules that one is permitted to learn by candlelight on Shabbos and we are not concerned that he may come to move the wick which will cause the fire to burn brighter, thus violating a biblical prohibition, because one does not need to move the wick of our present-day candles.

Teshuvos HaRosh (klal 2:8) rules that one is permitted to tie strings of linen on a four-cornered garment that is made from linen to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzis and we are not concerned that one might tie strings of wool to the garment. The reason for this ruling is because all know that techeiles, a blue-dyed wool used for tzitzis, is not prevalent, thus there is no permit to tie strings of wool to a linen garment.

Teshuvos HaRosh writes that if is common knowledge why a decree was instituted and the rationale no longer applies, then the decree is considered irrelevant. Teshuvos HaRosh draws a contrast of this supposition to the case in our Gemora regarding the egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah, because some people are not aware whey the egg was initially prohibited, nor do they understand why the reason to prohibit no longer applies.

Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halachah rules that if necessary, one is permitted to take medicine on Shabbos. Taking medicine on Shabbos was initially forbidden as there was a concern that one would violate the prohibition of grinding. Now that medicine is prepared by the manufacturer and most people are not even aware of the process involved in manufacturing the medicine, there is no longer a concern that one who wishes to take medicine will violate the Shabbos prohibition of grinding herbs or spices.

[END]

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Romans; More Preferable than the Persians

Rabbah bar bar Chanah (Daf Yomi: Gittin 16b - 17a) was once ill, and Rav Yehudah and Rabbah went to inquire on his health. While they were there, they asked him the following question: If two agents bring a get from abroad, are they required to declare that it was written and signed in their presence, or not? He replied: They are not required, for would they not be believed to testify that this woman was divorced in their presence (and it would not be necessary for the woman to produce the get)? In the meantime, a Persian man came in and took away their lamp (for that day was one of their holidays, and it was forbidden to light a candle except in their temples). Rabbah bar bar Chanah exclaimed: All Merciful One! Either hide us in Your shadow or in the shadow of the son of Esav (for they respect us)!

The Maharam Schiff explains: The Romans (descendants of Esav) oppress the Jewish people only when Klal Yisroel shirk the yoke of Torah from themselves.

The Medrash states that this is actually what Yitzchak told Esav: If Yaakov’s descendants cast off the yoke of Torah, then your descendants could decree destruction upon them and subjugate them. However, if Yaakov’s children remain devoted to Torah, Esav would have no control over them.

It emerges that it is preferable for the Jewish people to be amidst the children of Esav, for then, Klal Yisroel is in control of their own destiny.

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Showering after Mikvah

Rashi (Daf Yomi: Gittin 16a) explains that the Chachamim enacted a decree of mayim sheuvim (drawn water) because people would err and say that immersing in a Mikvah and in mayim sheuvim would render one pure. Rava (Shabbos 14a) asked Abaye, why does it make a difference if people said this? The end result was that the people had immersed themselves in a Mikvah?

Reb Moshe Feinstein writes in Iggros Moshe that perhaps Abaye’s reasoning was that by pouring on themselves mayim sheuvim, they transgressed the prohibition of baal tosif (adding on to a mitzvah) by thinking that pouring mayim sheuvim was obligatory. Rava, however, maintained that for this suspicion there was no reason to render the person tamei. Some wrote that Abaye held that if one would immerse in a Mikvah or in mayim sheuvim, others would consider him tamei, and they would end up burning Terumah and Kodshim in an errant manner.

Some Rishonim write that similar to matters of purity, the Chachamim also enacted a decree that a woman who was a niddah is not allowed to shower after immersing in a Mikvah. If she showered after immersing in a Mikvah, her immersion would be invalid and she would be forbidden to her husband. Most Rishonim, however, maintain that this is not the law, because this decree was only enacted regarding matters of purity.

The Shach writes that the reason that is offered in the Gemora that people will err in thinking that pouring mayim sheuvim is what purifies the person, also applies to a woman immersing in a Mikvah, irrespective of the woman erring in her thinking. Others write that from the words of the Rambam, it appears that the decree was enacted because people erred and thought that merely immersing in a Mikvah did not render them pure, and they also were required to pour on themselves mayim sheuvim. This reasoning only applies with regard to mayim sheuvim of Taharos, because only when one immersed for Taharos was one required to have the correct intentions. A niddah who immersed in a Mikvah, however, does not require the correct intention, and there was no reason to enact a decree for a niddah.

Rav Shmuel Vozner in Shevet HaLevi writes that even though the Rama rules that after immersing in a Mikvah a woman should not shower, once she arrives at her home she is permitted to shower.

Rav Ovadyah Yosef in Sheilos U’Teshuvos Yabia Omer, however, rules that a woman can shower immediately after immersing in a Mikvah.

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Katafreis Connection

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 16a) cites a Mishna in Taharos: A jet of liquid from a jug (nitzok), or liquid flowing down a slope (katafreis), or liquid enough to moisten (mashkeh tofe’ach) does not form a connection for tumah or for taharah. [The explanation that they are not a connection for tumah: Nitzok – if one pours liquid from a tahor vessel into a tamei one and the flow of the liquid is uninterrupted between them, it is not regarded as a connection to make the upper vessel tamei. Katafreis – if a liquid from a pool flows down a board on a slope into a pool of liquid which is tamei, the upper pool remains tahor. Mashkeh tofei’ach – a moist trough has two pools of liquid on opposite sides; one of them tamei and one of them tahor. Although the trough is damp enough that it can moisten anything that touches it, the tamei pool does not contaminate the tahor one. The explanation that they are not a connection for taharah: A mikvah must contain forty se’ah of water in order to be valid. If there are two mikvaos and neither of them contain forty se’ah and they are connected through any one of the three ways mentioned above, they are not considered halachically connected to form one large valid mikvah.]

The Vilna Gaon asks: Even without the connection through katafreis, why don’t we say that each droplet of tamei water should contaminate another drop, and ultimately, the water in the upper pool should be rendered tamei?

He answers that the halacha of katafreis would be necessary in a case where a tevul yom (one who was tamei, but has immersed himself in a mikvah; he is considered a tevul yom until nightfall) touched the liquid, for he cannot contaminate a food item with the capability of contaminating something else (and therefore, one droplet will not cause the other to become tamei). Through the principle of katafreis, it could be regarded that the entire flow is regarded as one body of liquid, and the upper pool could become tamei (if it would be considered connected).

Reb Shimon Shkop asks on his answer from the Rambam, who rules that these halachos would apply by tumas sheretz as well, and a sheretz can contaminate one drop to render the others tamei!?

He answers that one drop cannot render the other drops tamei because of the principle of beis hasetarim (for the drops touching each other are not recognizable).

Rav Elyashiv answers simply that if the liquid would be rendered tamei because of its contact with the first droplet, it would only be Rabbinically tamei, for that which a liquid is ruled to be a rishon l’tumah is only a Rabbinic decree. Hence, kodoshim that contracted tumah in such a manner could not be burned. However, through the principle of katafreis, the entire liquid would be rendered tamei on a Biblical level, and if kodoshim would be involved, it would be required to be burned.

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