A Woman's Sacrifices and Recital

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Rabbi Yehudah used to expound common terms. For it has been taught in a braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: A rich person is obligated to bring a rich person’s korban for his wife, and likewise, he is obligated to provide her with the animals for any of her korbanos that she must bring, for the following is what he wrote for her in the kesuvah: My properties are pledged for every claim you may have against me from before up to now.

Rashi explains that it is the husband’s obligation to provide for the sacrifice of his wife, and Rabbi Yehudah rules that when the husband is doing so, he must bring a sacrifice according to his financial status. He cannot claim and say, “My wife has no possessions of her own and she is therefore poor, and I should therefore only be obligated to bring a poor man’s sacrifice for her.”

The Gemora in Nedarim (35b) cites a verse which teaches us that a man is required to bring a korban for his wife, whether she is normal or insane. This, however, is only true regarding sacrifices that are offered for someone who lacks atonement, for these korbanos are different in the following respect: Korbanos are only brought with the owner’s consent; however, a korban, which is brought for one who lacks atonement, can be brought even without the owner’s consent. Therefore, all other korbanos, the woman would be required to bring them; her consent is a necessity.

Rabbi Yaakov Emden in Mor U’Ketziah (47) writes that women, in general, have no connection to korbanos, except for those that are her personal obligations, e.g. the birds of a zavah or for a woman who gave birth.

The Peri Megadim disagrees and writes that they are included in the general sacrifices, and certainly with the recital of the korbanos, which we do nowadays, as a replacement for the actual offering of the sacrifices.

The sefer Toras Hayoledes brings that a woman who gave birth, on the forty-first day if she had a son, and on the eighty-first day if she had a daughter, should recite the verses in Parshas Tazria dealing with the korbanos she would have been required to bring if there was a Beis HaMikdash in existence. And she should conclude with the following prayer, “Master of the Universe, it should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that this recital which I said should be significant and accepted before You as if I actually brought my prescribed sacrifices. And it should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that You should build the Beis HaMikdash speedily in our days.”

The Pischei Zuta discusses if she would be required to recite the passages that deal with the sacrifices that she would bring if she was poor and could afford the animals. For perhaps that dispensation was only in the times of the Beis HaMikdash, when korbanos were being brought; however, now, that we are merely reciting the verses, every woman should say the same thing.

In the siddur Keser Nehura, it is written that on the day following a woman’s immersion in a mikvah for her menstrual impurity, she should recite the passages from Parshas Metzora that deal with those halachos. And she should conclude by saying, “It should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that this recital which I said should be significant and accepted before You as if I actually brought my prescribed sacrifices.”

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B'tuvo

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Rav Nachman says: A person can ask his friend to borrow something “b’tuvo” -- “when good,” and (if his friend acquiesces) borrow it anytime thereafter (even after he returns it, provided that it is in good condition, for that is what he meant when he said “b’tuvo” ).

Rav Mari, the son of the daughter of Shmuel, said: This is only if they made a kinyan to this effect.

The Ritva writes that the main novelty of this halachah, according to Rashi’s explanation, is that we expound his language. We assume that this was the borrower’s intent when he used the word “b’tuvo.”

Tosfos cites an Aruch, who offers a different explanation. If the borrower did a favor for the lender, the borrower may use the borrowed utensil forever.

The Ritva explains: The borrower, after doing a favor to the lender, requests of him to borrow his utensil in exchange for the favor that he did. The novelty of this halachah is that he is not regarded as a renter, even though the utensil is being lent to him in exchange of the favor which he provided. He is, nevertheless, regarded as a borrower.

The Rif suggests an alternative explanation of the Gemora: The borrower said to the lender, “Lend me, on account of your goodness, this utensil that I can use it.” Since a term limit was not mentioned, he may borrow it forever, or until it breaks. The novelty of this ruling is that by adding the words, “your goodness,” he may borrow it forever. This is unlike an ordinary unspecified borrowing, which is only for thirty days.

The Rosh asks: Why do these words make a difference? It is extremely common for someone to say to his fellow, “Can you do me a favor please and lend me a utensil?”

The Sm”a answers that we are referring to a case where the borrower said to the lender, “You are such a good person, one who is not particular at all as to the amount of time your utensil is lent out.” In this case, we assume that he is lending it forever.

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Mezuzah's Protection

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The Gemora cites a braisa: If one rents a house to his fellow, the tenant must provide a mezuzah. And when he leaves, he must not take it with him, unless he rented it from a gentile, in which case, he must remove it when he leaves. And it once happened that a man took the mezuzah away with him, and he buried his wife and two children.

The Gemora asks: Do we relate a story in contradiction of what we had just learned?

Rav Sheishes answers: It refers to the first clause (where he rented from a Jew).

Tosfos writes that there are mazikin - supernatural forces that enter a house bereft of a mezuzah.

The Ritva explains that this punishment was measure for measure. Since he was not concerned about the danger that could befall the future residents (for now, they will not be protected by the mezuzah), he himself suffers, and he is not afforded any protection.

The Kesef Mishnah writes that a mezuzah, which is written correctly, will protect the residents of the house. The protection is not afforded because of the names of Heavenly angels that are written there. And, he concludes, it will only protect a person if it was affixed to the doorpost for the sake of the mitzvah; not if it was placed there solely for protection.

The Maharitz Chayus compares the protection afforded by the mezuzah to the protection that comes from the studying of Torah or the performance of any mitzvah. It would emerge that that there is no greater protection afforded by the mezuzah more than any other mitzvah in the Torah.

Reb Avi Lebovitz points out that seemingly, there will be no protection afforded to a person who is exempt from the mitzvah of mezuzah, and does so anyway. It is not the mezuzah that provides the protection; it is the mitzvah of the mezuzah.

However, the Maharsham cites an opinion of the Shevus Yaakov, who holds that even if one is exempt from placing a mezuzah on a certain doorpost, he may do so for protection purposes, and he would not be called a hedyot.

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Swept Away Olive Trees and Settling in Eretz Yisroel Nowadays

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The Mishna had stated: A river swept away a person’s olives trees and deposited them (together with their roots) in someone else’s field. The owner of the trees says, “My olive tree grew this,” while the owner of the land says, “My land grew this.” They should split the olives.

The Maggid Mishnah writes that that if the olive trees were not uprooted together with their clods of earth, the trees would be regarded as a lost article that is permitted to all. This would be similar to the Gemora above (22a), which states: If a river washed away someone’s beams, timber, or stones, and has deposited them in someone else’s field, they belong to the field owner because the owner has given up hope. Accordingly, in our case, the trees would belong to the landowner, and he would not be required to pay the original owner of the trees at all. However, if they were uprooted together with their clods of earth, since the trees`are growing as a result of his land, it emerges that the tree owner is also contributing towards the growth of the olives; they therefore would divide it.

Alternatively, it can be said that if the trees were uprooted together with their clods of earth, the river cannot sweep them a great distance away from their point of origin, and therefore, the owner does not despair about getting them back.

Settling in Eretz Yisroel Nowadays

The Mishna had stated: A river swept away a person’s olives trees and deposited them (together with their roots) in someone else’s field. The owner of the trees says, “My olive tree grew this,” while the owner of the land says, “My land grew this.” They should split the olives.

A Tanna taught: If he said, “I wish to take back my olive trees,” we do not listen to him.

The Gemora asks: Why is that?

Rabbi Yochanan said: It is because of the significance of settling Eretz Yisroel.

Rabbi Yirmiyah said: For such an answer, a great man is necessary (for we would not have said like this using our own logic).

The Ramban says that this mitzvah is a Biblical commandment. The Rambam omits this mitzvah is his Sefer Hamitzvos. There are those that explain that the Rambam holds that it’s only a Rabbinical mitzvah. Other say that the Rambam holds it is not a mitzvah at all; the only reason why a man can force his family members to move to Eretz Yisroel is because this way, they will be able to fulfill the mitzvos which are dependent upon the Land of Israel.

The Ritva writes that the applications of the Mishna apply to nowadays also. Proof to this is from the fact that Rebbe incorporated these halachos into the Mishna even though he was living in the times after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

Tosfos (Kesuvos 110) cites Rabbeinu Chaim Kohen that there is no mitzvah nowadays because there are many mitzvos there which entail many punishments, and it will be impossible for one to be careful regarding all of them. This can be simply understood to mean that although there might be a mitzvah to live in Eretz Yisroel, it is simply not worth it, for one will lose out by transgressing many aveiros there. Reb Avi Lebovitz (and afterwards I found this logic in the Beis Halevi) explains a little differently: Rabbeinu Chaim is actually describing the mitzvah of living in Eretz Yisroel to be for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzvos that apply there. If one were to live in Eretz Yisroel without properly performing the mitzvos, they are not only losing out on these additional mitzvos; they are also not fulfilling the mitzvah of living in Eretz Yisroel.

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Borrowing with the Owner

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By: Reb Avi Lebovitz

Rav Hamnuna holds that the exemption of borrowing an animal with its owner only applies to a case where the owner is borrowed to work in the same labor as the animal, AND that the owner was there at the time that the accident occurred.

This approach in שאלה בבעלים is certainly the most rationale, because the reason for the exemption is that since the owner was there at the time of the accident doing the same work, he should have watched his own animal.

This is the approach of the GR"A in Aderes Eliyahu to explain the concept of שאלה בבעלים. However, the Meshech Chochma (Mishpatim 22:3) points out that this approach doesn’t at all work with the halachic ruling, rejecting Rav Hamnuna entirely. We hold that שאלה בבעלים is completely dependent on the time that the object was borrowed, the owner must have already been in the borrower service (or at least begin immediately), AND it makes no difference if the owner is working with the object that has been borrowed or in something else. What then is the rationale behind this halachah?

The Meshech Chochma suggests that the rationale is based on a Gemora in Megillah (26b) which states that the sanctity of a Shul would go away, not only through a sale, but even if it is given as a gift because: if they would not have received any benefit from the recipient, they would not have given it to him (therefore it is like a sale). Here too, it is not common to do such a huge favor for the borrower to lend him an object and work for him at the same time. Therefore, we assume that the owner is only lending and working in exchange for something that he received. Since the owner received something in exchange, the borrower is no longer a borrower, but has been downgraded to a renter, who is exempt if an unavoidable accident occurs.

This approach doesn’t explain those who hold that negligence is also exempt, and it also doesn’t explain why he is exempt for theft according to those who hold a renter is normally liable for theft (like a spaid custodian). Perhaps we will have to assume a “lo p’lug” (no distinction) to explain those opinions.

With this, we can somewhat explain the Gemora’s question (96a) whether שאלה בבעלים applies when the owner sends his messenger rather than going himself. Does the sending of a messenger also indicate that the owner must have received something significant in return for lending and supplying a worker, or do we only assume that when he himself goes? However, if this is in fact the question of the Gemora, it shouldn’t really be dependent on the halachah of שלוחו של אדם כמותו anywhere else; it should be an isolated question regarding the assumption in this specific situation. Yet, the Gemora compares it to the general halachah of שלוחו של אדם כמותו by the annulment of vows.

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Kal Vachomer

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The Gemora states that something which may be derived through a kal vachomer (literally translated as light and heavy, or lenient and stringent; an a fortiori argument; it is one of the thirteen principles of biblical hermeneutics; it employs the following reasoning: if a specific stringency applies in a usually lenient case, it must certainly apply in a more serious case), the Torah may anyway take the trouble to write it explicitly.

The Bnei Yissoschar explains the reasoning for this: A kal vachomer is based upon logic. One might say that the reason this halachah (derived through a kal vachomer) is correct is because it is understandable to me; it makes sense. The Torah therefore goes out of its way to write it explicitly in order to teach us that the halacha is correct because the Torah said so; regardless of whether it is understood or not.

The Ra”n in Nedarim (3a) notes that this concept is applicable by a hekesh (when the halachos from one topic are derived from another one) as well. The Gemora in Bava Metzia (61a) states that it also applies to a gezeirah shavah (one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics; it links two similar words from dissimilar verses in the Torah).

According to the explanation of the Bnei Yissoschar, we could say that the concept should only apply to a kal vachomer, for that is based upon logic. The Torah would not find it necessary to state explicitly a halachah which is derived through a hekesh or gezeirah shavah, for they are not based upon logic at all, and it would be superfluous to write it.

The Yad Malachei writes that if the Torah does explicitly write a halachah which was derived through one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics, we must treat it more stringently than an ordinary halachah. This is comparable to a Rabbinical prohibition, which has a slight support from something written in the Torah. Tosfos in Eruvin (31b) rules that such a prohibition is stricter than an ordinary one, which does not have any Scriptural support.

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Stipulation regarding Marital Relations

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The Gemora cited a braisa: If someone says to a woman that she is betrothed to him on condition that he does not owe her support, clothes, or marital relations, the kiddushin is valid, but the conditions are invalid; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah says: In monetary matters, the condition is upheld.

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Yehudah holds that one can make a condition modifying the obligations stipulated by the Torah regarding monetary law.

This would explain why Rabbi Yehudah holds that the condition is valid when he stipulated that he does not owe her support or clothing; however, why is it valid when he stipulates that he will not have marital relations with her? This is not a monetary law!?

Rashi, because of this, writes that the husband remains obligated to have marital relations with her, for this is not a financial right. Depriving a wife from relations would cause her physical distress and therefore the condition is void.

The Mishnah Lamelech challenges this from a Gemora which states that one can say to his fellow, “Hit me and you will be exempt.” Evidently, one can waive physical anguish! Furthermore, we find that a woman can release the husband from his marital relations!?

Some answer that Rashi himself, cited in the Shitah Mikubetzes in Kesuvos (56a), states that the condition is void, for we assume that a woman will not waive her rights regarding anything which causes physical anguish; however, if she explicitly forfeits those rights, they are forfeited.

Rabbeinu Chananel holds that a man may stipulate on marital relations, and a wife can waive her rights to it as well. This is because the pleasure of relations belongs to her and it would be regarded as a financial right.

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Fly like a Bird

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The Gemora cites a braisa: If a husband says (this is your get), “On condition that you go up into the sky,” “that you go to the depths of the earth,” “that you swallow a reed of four cubits,” “that you bring me a reed one hundred cubits long,” “that you walk over the Great Ocean with your feet,” if the condition is fulfilled, the get is valid; if not, the get is invalid. Rabbi Yehudah ben Teima says: Something such as this is a get. He said the following rule: Any condition that cannot eventually be fulfilled and the husband stipulates at the outset, he is just doing that to pain his wife, and the get is therefore valid.

There is another case brought down in the Tosefta: If the husband said, “On condition that you fly in the air.”

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei HaShas asks: Isn’t this something that is possible? Don’t we find such an occurrence by Alexander the Great? And in today’s age (of Reb Yosef Engel), people fly in the air using air balloons!?

He answers that the language “fly” connotes “by himself,” similar to a bird, and floating in the air using exterior devices is not what he had in mind. A condition must be fulfilled according to the language of the stipulator!

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Samson and the Lion

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It is written [Shoftim 14: 5 – 6]: And Shimshon and his father and mother went down to Timnah, and they came to the vineyards of Timnah, and behold, a young lion roared towards him. And there rested on him a spirit of Hashem, and he rent it as one would rent a kid, although he had nothing in his hand, but he did not tell his father and mother what he had done.

The question is asked: How did his father and mother not see what he did? The verse explicitly states that he went together with them!?

The Vilna Gaon answers based upon our Gemora, which states that that we tell a nazir, “Go around and do not come near the vineyard,” for we are concerned that the nazir will eat from the grapes.

Accordingly, it can be said that when Shimshon, who was a nazir, came across the vineyard, he immediately separated from them in order not to stumble by the vineyard. It was at this time that he met up with the lion.

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Pareve Bread

by: Rabbi Yechezkel Khayyat

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Bread - only Pareve?

The Gemora introduces the prohibition on producing and eating meat or dairy bread. The Tur and Shulchan Aruch discuss this prohibition at length in YD 97. Below are a number of issues related to this topic.

Rationale

The Gemora explains that these breads are forbidden due to a concern that one may eat the bread with meat of milk. This is true even if the bread was baked with bird fat, even though bird meat and milk is only Rabbinically prohibited.

The Poskim question why this is not a gezeirah l’gezeirah – a Rabbinic decree applied to a Rabbinic decree.

The Pri Megadim (Sifsei Da’as 97:1) answers that bread is such an essential staple that indiscriminately eating bread with meat or milk – i.e., assuming it is pareve – is so pervasive and common as to be certain. Therefore, the Rabbinic prohibition on a milk and bird meat mixture includes the prohibition of such bread.

Other Applications

The Taz (YD 97:1) applies this prohibition to other essential foods that are assumed pareve, including spices. Therefore, the Taz says that if one had a spice grinder which was used as pareve, and then one ground meat in it, it may not be used for any spices, even for use with meat.

Exceptions

The Gemora (Pesachim 36a) allows one to make such bread when made k’ain tura – like an ox. Rashi says this means that when one bakes only a small amount, which will be eaten in one meal, we are not concerned that it will be accidentally eaten with the wrong type of food, and is therefore permitted.

The Rif says that this means that if the bread baked has a distinctive shape and/or appearance, we are not concerned that one will eat it with the wrong food. For example, a muffin type of bread, or bread with obvious cheese or meat in it, would be permitted.

The Rama (YD 97:1) says that this is why it is customary to bake bread with milk for Shavuos, and with fat for Shabbos, since the bread looks different, and only a small amount is baked this way.

Taste Once Removed

The braisa says that if one coated an oven with fat, one may not bake bread in it until he burns out the fat.

The Rishonim discuss why simply cleaning the fat from the surface is not sufficient. The Rashba says that cleaning the surface is sufficient, but the braisa gave the more common action of burning it out.

Tosfos (Pesachim 30 Dilma) says that since the fat is so hard to clean at the surface, we assume that cleaning the surface will not be done thoroughly enough, and therefore one must burn it out.

The Poskim discuss whether the case of the oven whose surface is cleaned out is a case of nat bar nat – an embedded taste that is one step removed. If it is, the question and answers given by the Rishonim may indicate their position on whether one may intentionally create food that is nat bar nat for eating with meat or milk. See Yalkut Yosef YD 89, footnote 35.

Coffee Breaks

The Mishna discusses at what point in the work day a worker can eat from the food he is harvesting. Most Rishonim read the Mishna and Gemora as saying that from the Torah, while the worker is working with the fruit – until it is harvested – he may eat, while the Sages allowed them to eat during breaks between sections of the vineyard.

The Rambam (Sechirus 12:2) says that from the Torah a worker may only eat after he has harvested, since before then he will be wasting work time on eating. The Sages allowed the workers to eat before the harvest is fully done, during breaks between sections, to limit the break time taken once the harvest is done.

The Rambam’s text in the Mishna seems to be like the Rif’s - that one may eat only “b’shas gmar m’lacah” - at the time of the end of work, as opposed to our text - “b’shas m’lacha” - at the time of work.

The Maggid Mishnah says that the Rambam’s position is similar to Rashi’s. Rashi says that the Mishna says that a worker may not take a break from his work in order to eat, indicating that eating out of the permitted time is prohibited due to idling from the required work. See Drisha HM 337:4 for further details on the positions of the Rambam and Rashi. See Even Haezel for an alternate explanation of the Rambam’s position.

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Unenforcable Obligations

Rava explained that although one who muzzles an ox is punished with lashes, and therefore is not forced by the court to pay the ox’s owner the damages of the withheld food, he is still fundamentally obligated to pay. Rava compares it to the case of one who paid his mother an animal in exchange for relations with her. Although the son is killed, and we therefore the court cannot enforce his obligation to pay his mother, if he did so, he fulfilled a contractual obligation, and the animal is unfit as a sacrifice.

Rava made the same statement (Bava Kamma 70b) in relation to one who transferred a stolen animal to a customer on Shabbos, concurrent with a violation of Shabbos. Although the court cannot enforce the sale, it is valid, just as the son’s payment to the mother is considered a bona fide payment.

The Rishonim discuss the extent of Rava’s statement. The Raavad quotes those who say that this applies only to obligations explicitly taken. In the case of paying his mother, the son obligated himself to pay, and in the case of the sale of the stolen animal, the thief entered into the sale.

The Raavad disproves this from our Gemora, where Rava is discussing the obligation of the thresher to feed the ox. This does not seem to be an instance of anyone explicitly undertaking an obligation, yet the Gemora applies Rava’s statement.

Rav Chaim Soloveichik (Chidushei Rambam Me’ila 8:1) states that while the obligation to allow a worker to eat from the food he’s working with is a monetary obligation, the prohibition of muzzling an ox is fundamentally a religious obligation.

The Kehilos Yaakov (BK 13:4) suggests that our Gemora therefore indicates that when the Torah stipulated a religious obligation, any resultant recipient of monetary payment is considered a bona fide owner of that money. Therefore, the obligation of the thresher to the owner of the ox is still considered a bona fide obligation. He discusses whether one can apply this other religious obligations that require monetary payment (e.g., meats from a sacrifice given to Kohanim).

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Saving the Whales

by: Reb Avi Lebovitz

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The Gemora suggests a kal vachomer that would result in their being a mitzvah of preserving the life of animals. Although one may have a mitzvah to feed his own animals, the Gemora concludes that there is surely no mitzvah to support the animal (when it is no longer profitable), and certainly one is not obligated to support animals that are not his.

The Tosfos HaRosh asks in the name of Rabbeinu Meir: Why would we have thought differently? There should be an obvious challenge to this kal vachomer from the fact that one is not allowed to slaughter people, but may slaughter animals - this obviously shows that there isn’t any mitzvah to preserve the life of animals!?

The Tosfos HaRosh responds to this question by saying that we would have thought that this mitzvah would apply to animals that one is not allowed to slaughter, such as a bechor that is intermingled with an ox that is destined to be stoned (shor haniskal).

Aside from the actual question of the Tosfos HaRosh, the entire thought that one would be obligated to support animals and help them survive seems a little strange. Especially since in the end, the mitzvah of preserving a life only applies to a Jew and not to an idolater!?

The Biur Halachah (330:2) writes that one is obligated to help a ger toshav woman give birth because on a ger toshav, there is a mitzvah to preserve their life. He entertains the possibility that the Jew can even violate a Rabbinic prohibition to help the ger toshav give birth because when there is a mitzvah to preserve a life, the Rabbis did not issue their decrees. Based on this application of the mitzvah to preserve a life, the mitzvah goes beyond tzedakah; it compels one to actually take care of others and help them through physically challenging circumstances.

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Ma'aser on Purchased Produce

by: Reb Avi Lebovitz

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There is a fundamental argument between Rabbeinu Tam and Rivam quoted by Tosfos regarding the exemption from ma’aser on produce that Reuven sold to Shimon.

Rabbeinu Tam holds that if Reuven processed the produce prior to selling and it became obligated in ma’aser and assumes a status of tevel, by selling it to Shimon, the tevel status is removed and it is exempt once again. But if Reuven never processed it, when Shimon does the processing, he will be Biblically obligated in ma’aser because it is considered his own produce.

Rivam says exactly the opposite. If Reuven processed the produce prior to selling it, since it has become obligated in ma’aser and assumes a status of tevel, this status cannot be removed. Therefore, when he sells it to Shimon, Shimon will have a Biblical obligation to separate ma’aser. But if Reuven sold it to Shimon prior to processing it and it was processed in the home of Shimon, then it is not subject to a ma’aser obligation.

When the produce was grown by an idolater (assuming his acquisition in Eretz Yisroel will not remove the ma’aser obligation), the Gemora says in Bechoros (11b) that if the idolater processed them and then sold them to a Jew, they are exempt from ma’aser, but if the Jew processed them, they are obligated.

Rabbeinu Tam holds that if the produce was processed by the original farmer, it makes no difference if he were a Jew or an idolater, the buyer would be exempt. But, if they weren’t processed by the original farmer, the buyer would be obligated.

The Rivam holds that when the original farmer was an idolater, the halachah is exactly the opposite from when the original farmer would be a Jew. An idolater farmer who processes and sells would be exempt since it was processed by the idolater and it will remain exempt even after it is sold. But if an idolater farmer didn’t process it, it is not considered his at all, so that when he sells it to the Jew and the Jew processes it, it is obligated.

The greatest difficulty with Rabbeinu Tam is that produce that is tevel can be sold and revert back to being exempt from ma’aser (and then if sold back to Reuven would revert back to being obligated in ma’aser)! The greatest difficulty in the Rivam is that produce of an idolater is not considered to be his unless he processed it, so that if sold to a Jew, it is as if the Jew grew it himself and is obligated in ma’aser.

Another hybrid approach (possible Reb Chaim’s explanation in a Rambam) is that it is not dependent on who processed it, but rather what the intent was when it was processed. If Reuven processed it for personal use and it becomes obligated, nothing can remove that status of tevel (like the Rivam). If Reuven did not process it; rather he sold it to Shimon who processed it, then it is also obligated (like Rabbeinu Tam). Only if Reueven processed it with the intent of selling it to Shimon, it will be exempt.

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License to Lie

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Rabbi Moshe Menachem Liberman, a member of the Chicago Community Kollel discusses some of the halachos regarding the modification of the truth for certain purposes.

http://www.cckollel.org/html/parsha/bereishis/vayichi5764.html

“And they sent a message to Yoseph saying: Your father commanded before he died, saying: So you shall say to Yoseph: Please forgive now the transgression of your brethren, and their sin, for they did to you evil . . .” Vayechi 50:16-17. Rashi points out that the brothers modified the words of Yaakov Avinu in this matter in the interest of peace because Yaakov Avinu had not actually commanded thus.1 The Gemara learns from these pesukim that there is a license to alter the truth in the interest of peace.2 This freedom to alter the truth is actually mandatory and not merely an authorization to alter the truth.3 Before we look at this obligation to alter the truth in the interest of peace, it behooves us to examine the general restriction against altering it.

The Torah states in Parshas Mishpatim, “From a false matter you shall distance yourself.”4 Thus, halachic authorities hold that there is a biblical obligation to refrain from lying.5 Furthermore, Hashem exhorts us to speak the truth, as the Navi in Zechariah states, “Let one man speak with another in truth.”6

The threshold for establishing what constitutes a falsehood, though, is very low. A mere omission is considered an alteration of the truth.7 The Chofetz Chaim deduces this from our Gemora, which states:

Peace is important because even Hakodosh Boruch Hu altered the truth in the interest of peace. Initially the Torah writes [that Sarah Imeinu, after hearing that she will give birth to a son to Avraham Avinu, said], “[After I am old shall my skin become smooth] and my husband is old?”8 And afterwards it writes [Hashem (only) told Avraham Avinu that Sarah Imeinu had said], “and I am old?”9 The only difference between what Sarah Imeinu said and what Hashem told Avraham Avinu that she said, was that Hashem omitted the comment that she had made concerning Avraham Avinu.10 This omission, the Gemara said, was permitted only because it was done in the interest of peace.11 Thus, even a mere omission of part of an otherwise true statement is considered a falsehood to which we are commanded to keep our distance.12

Although merely omitting is considered a falsehood, when altering the truth in the interest of peace, it is preferred to an outright lie.13 Of course, if merely omitting would be insufficient then he should outright lie.14 This obligation to lie in the interest of peace, however, does not sanction swearing falsely.15 Additionally, one may not lie concerning things which have not yet happened.16

There are other times when it is also appropriate to lie. If a person is asked whether he is knowledgeable in a certain Mesechta, he may lie and answer that he is not when in fact he is.17 However, if he is asked in order to provide an answer to a halachic query or to teach, then he must answer truthfully, consistent with his expertise in the Mesechta.18 If a person is asked in the presence of disreputable people concerning the graciousness of his host, he may lie and answer that his host was not gracious.19

The contemporary halachic authorities also permit altering the truth in the following circumstances:
• People may answer, “I don't know” when asked about a matter that is supposed to remain secret.20
• Wealthy individuals may lie about their wealth if they fear “the evil eye” (ayin hara) or if they do not want to arouse jealousy.21
• If one fears that a package will be mishandled, it is permitted to write “glass” on it, even though it does not contain any glass.22
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1 Rashi al Hatorah, Vayechi 50:16 (beginning with the words “Your father commanded”)
2 Yevamos 65b
3 Derishah al Choshen Mishpat 262:21
4 23:7.
5 Rabbi Shmuel Hominer, Eved HaMelech, Parshas Mishpatim 23:7:1 (citing SMa”G at Esay 107 and SMa”K 226) (4th ed. 1998); but see Rabbi Menachem Trivash, Orach Maysharim 9:1:1 (noting that this verse is only a restriction on judges and witnesses in the judicial context) (3d ed. 1968).
6 Mesilas Yesharim Chapter 11 (quoting Zechariah 8:16 and other sources).
7 Chofetz Chaim Hilchos Rechilus 1:8:14.
8 Vayera 18:12.
9 Id. at 18:13.
10 Chofetz Chaim Hilchos Rechilus 1:8:14.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Chofetz Chaim Hilchos Rechilus 1:8.
14 Id.
15 Id.; but see Chofetz Chaim Hilchos Rechilus 1:8:15 (noting that if there is a foreseeable loss to the other person it is questionable whether swearing falsely may be permitted).
16 Magen Avraham 156:2 (citing Sefer Chasidim 426); but see Mishnah Berurah 156:4 (commenting on Magen Avraham 156:2 that it is questionable); see Rabbi Shmuel Hominer, Eved HaMelech, Parshas Mishpatim 23:7:2 (explaining that the Mishnah Berurah does not understand why there should be a limitation as to when one may alter the truth in the interest of peace).
17 Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 262:21.
18 Be'er HaGolah al Choshen Mishpat 262:9.
19 Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 262:21.
20 Rabbi Doniel Yehuda Neustadt, The Weekly Halachic Discussion, 47 (citing Titen Emes l'Yaakov at 76 (quoting Harav S.Z. Auerbach and Harav S.Y. Elyashiv)) (2d rev. ed. 2002).
21 Id. (citing Titen Emes l'Yaakov at 78 (quoting Harav S.Y. Elyashiv)).
22 Id. at 48 (citing Titen Emes l'Yaakov at 66 (quoting Harav S.Y. Elyashiv, Harav Y.Y. Fisher, and Harav C. Kanievsky)).

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Hosting Guests is Greater than Greeting the Divine Presence

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“And Hashem appeared to him in the orchards of Mamrei, and he was sitting at the opening of the tent in the heat of the day.” What does, “in the heat of the day” mean?

Rabbi Chama the son of Rabbi Chanina says: That day was the third day after Avraham’s bris milah. Hashem came to him to see how he was doing. Hashem therefore took out the sun from its sheath, so Avraham would not be disturbed with guests.

Avraham sent out Eliezer to go look for guests, but he came back empty handed. Avraham replied to him: I do not believe you (that there are no possible guests). This is the source of what is commonly said in Eretz Yisroel: There is no credibility in slaves. Avraham went out and saw Hashem by his doorway. This is why the verse says, “Please do not go away from Your servant.”

Tosfos writes that since Avraham asked Hashem to wait until he brings the guests inside, this would indicate that hosting guests is deemed to be even greater than greeting the Heavenly Presence.

The question is asked: How did Avraham Avinu know this halachah? Perhaps greeting the Heavenly Presence takes precedence over hosting guests? [There is an answer to this given in the name of the Noda Beyehudah.]

What is so unique about this mitzvah that it overrides a Shabbos prohibition (as the Gemora in Shabbos 127a derives) and is even greater then receiving the Divine Presence?

Rabbeinu Yonah writes that one honors his friend because his friend is a creation of Hashem. When one honors the prince, in effect, he is honoring the king. This is the deeper understanding of receiving and hosting guests. When a Jew receives Jewish guests and honors them as princes, in essence he is honoring the King, Hashem.

The Maharal writes that one cannot really honor Hashem as one cannot see Hashem and live. By receiving and hosting guests, one draws closer to the Divine Presence.

The brother of the Maharal writes in Sefer HaChaim that by performing the mitzvah of receiving and hosting guests, one will be quicker to improve on his service of Hashem. A person will say to himself, “If I can do so much for my friend who is my guest, certainly I can perform the mitzvos in a more wholesome fashion.”

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A Pair of Drinks

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The Gemora relates that Rabbah was found (by the king’s messenger) in Pumbedisa. The messenger was staying in the same inn as Rabbah. They (the workers at the inn) brought the messenger a plate of food and two cups two drink, and they then took away the plate. He turned his face away. [Rashi explains that the fact that he had two cups had given the demons reason to help damage him (in a life-threatening manner, as is apparent from the Gemora below). This is as the Gemora explains at the end of Pesachim, that an even number of drinks can cause this.] The workers asked Rabbah: What should we do? It is the king’s messenger! [They realized that this was the messenger of the king, and did not want to injure him.] Rabbah said: Bring him a plate and one drink, and take away the plate and he will be better. [He advised to give him one more drink, as this caused his drinks to be a total that was an odd number, giving the demons no more reason to harm him.] They did this, and this helped the situation.

The Tosfos HaRosh asks: Why should there be a danger here for drinking a pair of drinks? The Gemora in Pesachim (110b) states that there is no concern regarding a guest, for he does not know how many cups the host will offer him; it is therefore regarded as if he drank one and changed his mind and drank another. These two cups do not combine and there is nothing to worry about!?

He answers that the king’s messenger, on account of his prominence, is regarded as the host, since they will provide for him anything that he requests. It would therefore be a danger for him to have a pair of drinks.

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Blessing before the Torah

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The Land Became Lost

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: What does the verse mean when it says: Who is the man who is wise and can understand this? This (the reason for the destruction of the Second Temple) was asked to scholars and prophets and they could not explain it, until Hashem explained it Himself, as it says: And Hashem said that it is because they left my Torah. Isn’t the phrase “and they did not listen to My voice” the same as the phrase “and they did not go in its ways”? Rav Yehudah explains in the name of Rav: This means that they did not recite a blessing before learning Torah.

The Chanukas HaTorah explains: The Gemora in Brochos (48b) asks: From where do we derive that one should recite a blessing prior to studying Torah? Rabbi Yishmael says: It is derived by means of a kal vachomer. If a blessing is recited before partaking in “sustenance for the moment” (food), it certainly follows that a blessing should be recited on “eternal sustenance”! The Gemora (Brochos 38a) also states: Prior to reciting a blessing, the land belongs to Hashem; after the blessing is recited, the land is given over to man.

Accordingly, it can be said that if they refrained from reciting a blessing before studying Torah, it is clearly evident that they did not recite a blessing before eating as well. For if they would have made a blessing before the consumption of food, they certainly would have made a blessing before studying Torah (based upon the kal vachomer). Since they didn’t recite a blessing on their food, the land became lost, for prior to a blessing, the land belongs to Hashem.

They didn’t Recite the Blessing on the Torah “First”

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: What does the verse mean when it says: Who is the man who is wise and can understand this? This (the reason for the destruction of the Second Temple) was asked to scholars and prophets and they could not explain it, until Hashem explained it Himself, as it says: And Hashem said that it is because they left my Torah. Isn’t the phrase “and they did not listen to My voice” the same as the phrase “and they did not go in its ways”? Rav Yehudah explains in the name of Rav: This means that they did not recite a blessing before learning Torah.

The language of the Gemora is that they didn’t recite a blessing on the Torah “techilah.” What is that word coming to exclude? We do not recite any blessings after we conclude learning Torah! (The Levush says that the two blessings that we recite before studying Torah are actually “one before” and “one after,” except that we never finish studying Torah, so the Rabbis instituted that both blessings should be recited beforehand.)

The Orach Yesharim explains: When a person receives a present, he values both the gift and the giver. Even if the gift is a small one, he will value it, if it was given to him by a prominent person. Similarly, he will appreciate something given to him by an ordinary person, if the item is a valuable one.

The Torah is praised with both elements. It is written: Ki lekech tov nasati lachem, the Torah itself is valuable, and that it is being gifted to Klal Yisroel from Hashem.

This could be the explanation as to why we recite two blessings before studying Torah. The first brocha is asher bachar banu, Hashem chose us; Torah is special because Hashem has given it to us. The second bracha is v’chayei olam nata b’socheinu, Torah is precious because of its inherent value.

This is the meaning of our Gemora: They appreciated the value of Torah, and therefore, they recited the second blessing. However, they were not fully appreciative of the Giver of the Torah, and they therefore refrained from reciting the first blessing on the Torah. This is why the Torah did not continue to flourish with their children.

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Every Step of the Way

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The Gemora records a story which demonstrates the greatness of Rabbi Chiya. The Gemora relates: When Rabbi Chanina and Rabbi Chiya were once in an argument, Rabbi Chanina said to Rabbi Chiya, “How can you dispute me? If, Heaven forbid, the Torah were forgotten in Israel, I would restore it by my deliberations.” Rabbi Chiya rejoined, “How can you dispute me, who I caused that the Torah should not be forgotten in Israel? What did I do? I planted flax from which I made nets to capture deer. The meat from those deer I would give to poor orphans and I would convert their skins into parchments upon which I would write the five books of the Chumash. I brought these to a community where there was no Torah study and I would teach each one of five children one of the five scrolls. I would also teach orally each one of six youngsters one of the six orders of the Mishna. I would tell each of these young pupils, ‘Teach the others what you have learned before I return to see if you succeeded.’ It was because of this that I said that I caused that the Torah should not be forgotten in Israel.”

The Maharsha explains why it was necessary for him to go to such great lengths: Rabbi Chiya was determined that every step of the way be done purely for Heaven’s sake, and no person should be deriving any profit. It was for this reason that he could not simply go to a store and buy parchment. Even the meat of the animal, whose skins he used for parchment, was donated to needy orphans. It was only on account of such meticulous attention to every detail of the process that he could be certain that Heaven would bless his efforts with success.

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Thirty-one Hour Shabbos

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There is an obligation to add on to the Shabbos at its onset and upon its conclusion.

The Rosh writes that we do not know the exact amount that one is required to add.

The Arizal writes that the total amount of Shabbos, including the additions at its onset and upon its conclusion, should be thirty-one hours.

It is unclear where this amount comes from. Some say that a hint to this can be found in the fact that the Rambam counts the mitzvah of Shabbos as the thirty-first mitzvah in the Torah.

The Bnei Yissochar suggests the following possible reason for this. Shabbos is referred to in the Torah as a day of holiness. We find that a fifth is added to holy articles. An ordinary Shabbos day would consist of twenty-four hours. If we would add a fifth, we would have thirty hours.

Our Gemora teaches the following: Rav Pappa notes that by the fact that the braisa ruled that a kor constitutes an excessive burden for a boat, and that three kors are regarded as an excessive burden for a large ship, it can be derived that an average boat carries a load of thirty kors (for the Mishna taught us that 1/30th more than a usual load will be regarded as an excessive load).

Accordingly, we can say that we desired to add on to the Shabbos an addition that would not be regarded as an excessive burden. If the regular Shabbos day is thirty hours, one additional hour is added, for more than 1/30th would be regarded as excessive. It is because of this that the total amount of hours of Shabbos observance, according to the Arizal, is thirty-one!

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The Designation of Money and the Timeliness of a Mitzvah

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The Gemora cited a braisa: The Purim collections must be distributed for Purim (and nothing else). The local collections belong to that town only, and we are not required to be so precise in the matter (how much is needed for Purim, and how much the poor of the city needs), but calves are purchased in abundance, slaughtered and eaten, and the surplus goes to the charity fund. Rabbi Eliezer said: The Purim collections must be used for Purim only, and the poor may not even buy straps for their shoes, unless it was stipulated in the presence of the townspeople that such shall be granted; these are the words of Rabbi Yaakov, who said it in the name of Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is lenient in the matter (and allows the poor person to use the charity funds for other uses besides the Purim feast). [We may derive from here that Rabbi Meir holds that we cannot deviate from the owner’s intent.]

The Gemora notes that this braisa does not prove that (whoever deviates from the owner’s stipulation is regarded as a thief), for perhaps there too, the reason is that the donors gave the charity only that it should be used for Purim, and not for any other purpose? [Regarding charity funds, there is a significant difference between the two purposes, whereas the two routes discussed in our case are not significantly different than each other, for one is not more dangerous in any way than the other.]

The Chavos Yair quotes a Sefer Chasidim, who derives from this Gemora that if one sends his fellow a gift of food to be eaten on Shabbos, it is forbidden for the recipient to eat it during the weekdays. If he has leftover, he should let the rest of household partake in it, but only on Shabbos. If the donor explicitly stipulated that he should be the only one to eat from it, he may not give it to others.

It would seem from our Gemora that this is not merely an act of piousness; but rather, it is halachically mandated. We can extrapolate further that if one gives money or wine to his fellow and he tells him that is should be used for Kiddush, he must use it for Kiddush, and nothing else. It would be forbidden to buy fish for Shabbos with this money, for Kiddush is a Biblical mitzvah, and eating fish on Shabbos is merely a Rabbinic one.

However, according to the prevailing custom that money is given to Torah scholars, and they are told to use it for Shabbos and Yom Tov, that is only out of respect, but they are not actually being particular as to what it should be used for; in such cases, they could use the money for whatever they desire.

Reb Yosef Engel cites the following Yerushalmi: If one vows to bring a flour-offering on Yom Tov, he should not bring it on a weekday. This is why the seforim write that a transgression committed on Shabbos is more severe than one committed on a weekday, for the holiness of the day plays a role. So too it may be said regarding the performance of a mitzvah; There will be a greater reward for a mitzvah performed on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

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