Did Rav Ashi Deny Knowing Testimony in Beis Din?

There is a known rule throughout Shas that once a person has finished testifying, he cannot go back and alter his testimony. In our Gemora (Kesuvos 20), Rav Ashi denied knowing testimony for Rav Kahana, but later remembered and testified? How could he do so? Didn’t he already testify that he didn’t know? The Hagaos Ashri (#16) states that it is therefore clear that he did not deny knowing testimony in Beis Din. Other Rishonim, however, argue that the rule above is only if someone actually testified regarding events that happened. However, if he says he is not aware of the events and later remembers, this is not called going back and changing what he had said. He simply remembered that he knew testimony.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 20 - Highlights

Conflicting Witnesses

Rav Nachman said: if they were here and other witnesses would contradict them the contradiction would be valid, and we would not pay attention to their testimony as it is contradicted testimony. Not that they (the witnesses in the document) are not here, and if they were here they might even admit, why should we believe them?

Rav Nachman therefore said: we put the pairs of witnesses against each other (cancelling each other out) and leave the money in the hands of its owner, as in the case of Bar Shatya.

Bar Shatya sold some of his possessions, and two witnesses came and testified that he did so when he was insane. Two others that he did so when he was of sound mind. Rav Ashi said: the pairs of witneses are against each other, and we leave the possessions in the hands of Bar Shatya. We only say this if he (person like Bar Shatya) has a chazakah (holding of ownership for an extended time) from his fathers. However, if he does not, we say that he bought it when he was insane and he sold it when he was insane.

Rabbi Avahu said: witnesses can only be made zomimim when they are present. Witnesses can be contradicted even when they are not present. If witnesses are attempted to be made into zomimim but not when they are present, it still counts as a contradiction.

Authenticating Signatures

Mar states: if there are witnesses verifying that the handwriting of witnesses signed on a document is indeed authentic, or this can be verified from a different document that had been questioned and subsequently authenticated by Beis Din, they (the witnesses who say that though this is an authentic signature it was from when they were young etc. see 19b) are not believed. The Gemora asks, this implies that it had to have been questioned, implying that if it was not questioned they are believed.

This is a proof to Rabbi Asi. Rabbi Asi stated: A document cannot be validated through another document, unless the other document had been questioned and was subsequently authenticated by Beis Din.

Nehardai stated: a document cannot be authenticated unless two marriage documents or documents of the sales of fields are produced (with their signatures) and the owner was there for three years without any complaints.

Rabbi Simi bar Ashi added: these other documents must come from a contract involving a party besides the person who wants to verify the present document. Why? Perhaps he forged the third document based on the signatures of witnesses from other documents in his possession. If so, perhaps he will also forge signatures from documents that are in other people’s possession? It is too difficult for a person to copy signatures that he merely saw and does not have the document to copy from.
Jogging a Witness’ Memory

The Beraisa states: a person can write down his testimony on a document, and testify from it even after many years. Rav Huna states: this is only if he indeed remembers it himself. Rabbi Yochanan said: even if he does not remember it himself (but knows that he wrote it).

Rabah says: it is evident from Rabbi Yochanan that if two people knew testimony and one merely forgot it, the other person can remind him.

The Gemora asks: can the person he is testifying for remind him? Rav Chaviva says that he can, and Mar the son of Rav Ashi says that he cannot. The halachah is that he cannot. If the witness is a rabbinic student, he can be reminded.

This is as happened when Rav Ashi knew testimony for Rav Kahana, and Rav Kahana said, “do you remember testimony for me in this matter?” Rav Ashi said he didn’t. Rav Kahana said, “isn’t this what happened?” Rav Ashi said that he didn’t know. However, Rav Ashi later remembered that this is indeed what had happened, and testified to that effect. Rav Ashi saw that Rav Kahana was stunned that he had testified. Rav Ashi told him, “Do you think I relied on your reminder of the events? I reminded myself and fully remembered.”

The Beraisa states: fresh mounds of earth that are close to either a city or a path, whether the mounds are old or new, should be considered impure (containing dead bodies). If they are far away from the city or path, the new ones are considered pure and the old ones are considered impure. What is considered close? Within fifty cubits is close. What is considered old? Within sixty years is old. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda states: Close refers to the closest, and old means it is not remembered when it was established.

What does the Beraisa mean when it says “city” and “path?” If it refers to actual cities and paths, is there a doubt whether or not it has a status of impurity? Didn’t Reish Lakish say that the sages found a reason to state that all places in Eretz Yisrael that are not known to be impure are not?

Rabbi Zeira explains that a city refers to a city next to a cemetery, while a path refers to the path in a cemetery. The Gemora asks, it makes sense regarding the path of a cemetery, as sometimes twilight arrives and they bury the person in a mound. However, in a city next to a cemetery, everyone is buried in the cemetery! Rabbi Chanina answered that because women bury their dead infants and lepers bury their limbs outside the city, and a woman only goes fifty cubits outside the city as if she will go more people will talk about her. Therefore, there generally is no impurity in other places in Eretz Yisrael.

Rav Chisda says: it is apparent from the law of Rabbi Meir that a person only remembers testimony for sixty years, not more. The Gemora says that this is incorrect. Rabbi Meir was only talking about something which is not upon him to remember. However, when he was specifically made a witness he remembers for even longer.

[END]

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BLACKMAILING FATHER TESTIFIES THAT HE MARRIED OFF HIS MINOR DAUGHTER

The Gemora (Kesuvos 17b – 18a) states: If two witnesses said that they were coerced to testify falsely on account of a threat to their finances, they are not believed.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this?

The Gemora answers: It is because that a person is not believed to establish himself as an evil person. (Rashi explains that every witness is assumed to be reliable; by issuing a self-incriminating statement, he will be disqualifying himself from further testimony. Just as a person cannot testify regarding his relative, he may not testify about himself because he is related to himself.)

The following question was raised to the poskim years ago: A man testified in Beis Din that he married off his minor daughter, but he refused to state the identity of this man. His intention was to put pressure on his wife for her to accept a divorce without receiving any alimony payments and to have equal visitation rights for the children. Do we accept his testimony and consider the girl as a married woman?

Rav Eliyahu Pesach Ramnik, Rosh Yeshiva of Ohavei torah in Far Rockaway applied the principle of ‘a person is not believed to establish himself as an evil person’ as the basis for his ruling. He explained: The father, who is testifying that he married off his minor daughter is establishing himself as a wicked person for several different reasons. Firstly, if in truth, he has married her off in order to extort money from his wife, using a mechanism of the Torah in this manner causes a tremendous desecration of Hashem’s name, and if the wife does not concede to his demands, the child will remain an agunah her entire life. This will result in an even bigger chilul Hashem. Secondly, he is transgressing the prohibition of paining another fellow Jew. The pain and the embarrassment that he is causing his wife and daughter to endure is indescribable. Thirdly, the Gemora in Sanhedrin (76a) states that one who marries his daughter to an elderly man transgresses a Biblical prohibition of causing his daughter to sin, since she will not be satisfied in that marriage; certainly in this case, the father will be violating this prohibition, for the daughter does not even know the identity of her true husband. Based on these above reasons, it emerges that by accepting the father’s testimony, he would be rendered a rasha, and therefore, his testimony should not be accepted and his daughter would not be regarded as a married woman.

Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein, in his sefer Chashukei Chemed questions the above conclusion. He cites several Acharonim who rule that when a man has already been established as a rasha regarding other matters, his testimony can still be valid (provided that he is not disqualified from offering testimony) even though it also renders him a rasha. The Chacham Tzvi (responsa 3) rules that if someone has violated a light transgression in our presence, he would still be believed that he has violated an even stricter prohibition. This is because his testimony is not rendering him a rasha, he already has established himself a rahsa. It is for this reason that we will be compelled to accept the father’s testimony that he married off his daughter, for this man has already been established as a rasha. He is desecrating the name of Hashem by using the Torah’s mechanisms for evil purposes and by causing pain and grief to his wife and to his daughter.

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DANCING BEFORE A BRIDE

The Gemora (Kesuvos 17) asks: How should one dance before a bride?, and Beis Shamai says she is to be described as she is, while Beis Hillel opines that she is always to be described as pleasant. Beis Shamai asks Beis Hillel: How is one permitted to one lie? To which Beis Hillel replies, shouldn’t one praise a buyer’s purchase to him? It seems as if Beis Hillel is avoiding the question. On the other hand, how can Beis Shamai just ignore the requirement to judge positively?

The Mishneh Halachos (12:278) suggests that Beis Hillel’s reply was to distinguish between one who asks about the kallah at the beginning (should he even meet her?), versus after they are married. If someone comes to ask about her at the beginning, Beis Hillel would agree that one must speak the truth. To do otherwise would transgress the prohibition against offering bad advice. (See the Gemora in Kesubos 75a-b where not all failings or blemishes are visible.) However, after they are married, to speak the truth (where the truth is not pleasant) would produce nothing but pain. Here, Beis Hillel argues, one must judge positively that there is something pleasant about her. For this reason, Beis Hillel used a comparison to a buyer, after he had purchased.

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Must a Prospective Bride Inform the Groom regarding her Absence of Blood?

The following question was posed to Reb Moshe Feinstein: There was a girl who was over twenty years old who had pubic hairs; however, she did not commence menstruating yet. Some doctors told her that when she gets married and cohabits with her husband, she will begin her cycle and she will have the ability to bear children. Is it permitted for her father to arrange a match for her without informing the groom of the situation? Is there a concern that this will be regarded as a mistaken kiddushin or not?

Reb Moshe (E”H, III, 27) addresses the question and cites proof from our Gemora (Kesuvos 10b).

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel the Elder and said, “Rebbi, I have had marital relations but did not find any blood.” His wife said, “Rebbi, I am from the Durkati family who does not have either menstrual blood nor virgin blood.” Rabban Gamliel investigated regarding her relatives, and found that she was correct. He said “go and take your purchase (wife, as she indeed was a virgin), praised are you who have merited (a wife) from the house of Durkati.” What does Durkati mean? A cut-off (from these bloods) generation.

Rabbi Chanina said that Rabban Gamliel comforted this man with illogical comfort. This is because Rabbi Chiya taught that just as yeast is good for dough, so is blood is good for a woman (as it causes her to become pregnant quicker).” The Braisa also says in the name of Rabbi Meir that any women who has much blood, has many children.

It is said that Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Aba stated (that the phraseology of go and take your purchase in the case immediately above means) “acquire your purchase,” he said to him. Rabbi Yossi bar Avin says “you are obligated in your purchase,” he said to him. The opinion that he meant “you are obligated in your purchase” is understandable according to the words of Rabbi Chanina (that this wasn’t great as his wife couldn’t have so many children, nor get pregnant quickly). However, according to the opinion that says “acquire,” what kind of meritorious acquisition is this (that he should use a term referring to both acquiring and implying that it is a great merit to do so)? The Gemora answers, that the husband will never have a doubt whether or not his wife is a Nidah.

We see that even according To Rabbi Yosi bar Avin who holds that the absence of blood can prevent a woman from bearing children, nevertheless, the kiddushin is valid, and not regarded as a mistake even though it is detrimental to him.

It is evident that the possibility exists that a woman without blood can give birth, although she will not bear many children. Since she is fit to have children, and many men are not particular to have many children and they are also not particular if she becomes pregnant immediately or not, it is not regarded as a mistaken kiddushin.

In our case, where there are doctors that say that her menstrual cycle will return and she will have the ability to bear many children, the father is not obligated to reveal her blemish to the groom’s family. Reb Moshe adds: The father and the bride should resolve that if four years goes by and she doesn’t become pregnant and she does not begin to menstruate, she should accept her bill of divorce without a hassle and without and monetary claims on the husband.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 10 - Highlights

Conflicting Decrees

It is said that Rav Nachman said that Shmuel said in the name of Rebbi Shimon Ben Elazar that the sages established decreed for Jewish girls that a virgin should receive (a kesuvah containing a guarantee that she will receive in case of divorce or widowhood) two hundred (zuz). A widow should receive one hundred (zuz). They (the sages) also believed the groom to say that he found an open opening (and he could thereby cause her to lose the two hundred zuz). If so, what did the sages help with their decree (of establishing this guaranteed money in her kesuvah)?

Rava answered that the sages decree was still helpful, as it is established that a person will not bother to prepare a wedding feast and lose it (for a marriage that will only last a couple days). [Accordingly, we do not assume that the groom will make this claim unless it is true.] (10a)

Rabban Shimon ben Gamilel’s Opinion: Torah Law
or Rabbinic Decree?

The Braisa states that since this is a fine established by the sages, she can only demand collection from his worst property. The Gemora asks, what is the fine (that is given to the groom, what did he do wrong)? It must mean to say that since this is a decree of the sages, she can only demand collection from his worst property. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the money in the kesuvah is a Torah law.

Did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel actually say this? Doesn’t the Braisa state that the passuk states “He should take money like the amount given to virgins.” The Braisa continues that this teaches that the amount (given to the father of a seduced girl) should be equal to the amount given to virgins, and the amount given to virgins must be equal to the amount given to this person (the father of the seduced girl). The sages understood from this passuk that it is a reliable source that the concept of money guaranteed in a kesuvah is Torah law. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel argued that the concept of kesuvah is not Torah law but rather from the words of the scribes (sages).

The Gemora answers that the opinions in this Braisa must be switched around. The Gemora asks, what do you see that makes you switch the opinions of the latter Braisa? Why not switch the opinions of the previous Braisa (and say Rabban Gamliel indeed holds kesuvah is a decree of the sages)?

The Gemora answers that we see from another source that Rabban Gamliel holds that the concept of kesuvah is based in Torah law. The Mishna (106b) states that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that he must pay her with Kaputkiya currency. [Rashi explains that Kaputkiya currency was better than the currency of Eretz Yisrael. Rabban Shimon said that if a person married there this meant that his kesuvah must be a lean that is linked to Kaputkiya currency. The Rabbanan there argue and allow him to pay even in Eretz Yisrael currency, as long as the divorce took place in Eretz Yisrael. They seemingly understand that the sages allowed the monies they instituted to be paid in the currency of the place of marriage or divorce, which means that they did not treat it like a loan. This implies that Rabban Shimon treated the monies in the kesuvah like the Torah treats a loan, and he therefore must hold the concept of monies in the kesuvah is Torah law.]

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that the entire latter Mishna is Rabban Shimon, and it is missing some words and is supposed to be read in the following way. The sages understood from this passuk that it is a reliable source that the concept of money guaranteed in a kesuvah is Torah law. However, the concept of kesuvah for a widow is not Torah law, but rather from the words of the scribes (sages),as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that the concept of kesuvah of a widow is not a Torah law but rather from the words of the sages. (10a)
Rav Nachman’s Ruling on the Claim of Finding an Open Opening

There was a man who came before Rav Nachman and said that he had found an open opening. Rav Nachman said, “give him lashes with thorny palm fronds, as he had those (prostitutes) from Birchasa who were struck by him.”[Rav Nachman meant that if he knew how to determine this, he must have been someone who knew what this felt like because of prior experience with prostitutes for which he deserves lashes.]

The Gemora asks, doesn’t Rav Nachman himself say that this claim is believed? The Gemora answers that he indeed says the claim is believed, but he is also given lashes (for knowing that he has a claim)! Rav Achai answered, that when Rav Nachman said he is believed he meant when he was already married (and therefore does not receive lashes, as he could know this from past permitted experience). This story was talking about someone who was never previously married. (10a)
Other Rulings in this Case

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel and said that he had found an open opening. Rabban Gamliel said, “perhaps you turned to the side (and she is actually still a virgin). I will give you a parable, to what is this compared to? To a person who was walking in the darkness of night, (and when he reaches the door of his house and there is an obstacle preventing the door from opening normally). If he turns, it is as if he found it open (and he doesn’t realize that he would not have been able to open the door normally). If he does not turn (and he tries to go in normally) he will find it locked.

Others say that Rabban Gamliel replied to the man that perhaps you purposely turned, and uprooted the door and the lock. I will give you a parable, to what is this compared to? To a person who was walking in the darkness of night, (and when he reaches the door of his house and there is an obstacle preventing the door from opening normally). If he purposely turns (forcefully), it is as if he found it open (and he doesn’t realize that he was the one who knocked away the barrier). If he does not turn (and he tries to go in normally) he will find it locked. (10a)
Ways to Determine Virginity

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel bar Rebbi and said that he had had marital relations and did not find any blood. His wife said, “Rebbi, I was a virgin.” Rabban Gamliel said, “bring me the sheet.” They brought him the sheet, he soaked it in water and laundered it, and he found on it many drops of blood. He replied to the man “go and take your purchase (wife, as she indeed was a virgin).”

Huna Mar the son of Rava from Parzakya said to Rav Ashi that we should also do this test (if this claim is brought before us). He answered that our ironing (that they used to do with glass stone, see Rashi) is like their laundering. If you will say that we should therefore iron (the sheet), the glass will take away the spots.

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel and said that he had had marital relations and did not find any blood. His wife said, “Rebbi, I was a virgin.” Rabban Gamliel said, “bring me two maidservants, one who is a virgin and one who is not, and sit them down on a barrel of wine. The one who is not has the smell of the wine wafting (in that area, as it is not closed), and the one who is a virgin does not. This women too (can be tested to determine her status). They sat her down on the barrel of wine and the smell did not waft. He said “go and take your purchase (wife, as she indeed was a virgin).”

The Gemora asks, why didn’t he just check this with her originally (why did he also do this with two maidservants)? The Gemora answers that he had heard this tradition, but he never saw it done. He therefore thought that perhaps the tradition was inaccurate. It was also not normal to denigrate Jewish girls (for this purpose, so he ordered that they bring maidservants who were not Jewish).

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel the Elder and said, “Rebbi, I have had marital relations but did not find any blood.” His wife said, “Rebbi, I am from the Durkati family who does not have either menstrual blood nor virgin blood.” Rabban Gamliel investigated regarding her relatives, and found that she was correct. He said “go and take your purchase (wife, as she indeed was a virgin), praised are you who have merited (a wife) from the house of Durkati.” What does Durkati mean? A cut-off (from these bloods) generation.

Rabbi Chanina said that Rabban Gamliel comforted this man with illogical comfort. This is because Rabbi Chiya taught that just as yeast is good for dough, so is blood is good for a woman (as it causes her to become pregnant quicker).” The Braisa also says in the name of Rabbi Meir that any women who has much blood, has many children.

It is said that Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Aba stated (that the phraseology of go and take your purchase in the case immediately above means) “acquire your purchase,” he said to him. Rabbi Yossi bar Avin says “you are obligated in your purchase,” he said to him. The opinion that he meant “you are obligated in your purchase” is understandable according to the words of Rabbi Chanina (that this wasn’t great as his wife couldn’t have so many children, nor get pregnant quickly). However, according to the opinion that says “acquire,” what kind of meritorious acquisition is this (that he should use a term referring to both acquiring and implying that it is a great merit to do so)? The Gemora answers, that the husband will never have a doubt whether or not his wife is a Nidah.

There was a man who came before Rebbi and said, “Rebbi, I had marital relations and did not find blood.” His wife said, “Rebbi, I was still a virgin but it was a year of famine.” Rebbi saw that their faces were black from famine. He commanded that they should be put into the bathhouse, he fed them, and gave them to drink, and then had them enter a room. The husband then had marital relations and found blood. Rebbi said to him, “acquire your purchase.” Rebbi said about them the passuk “their skin was stuck to themselves, dry like wood.” (10a – 10b)
Mishna

The kesuvah of a virgin is for two hundred (Zuz), and that of a widow for one hundred (Zuz). A virgin widow, divorcee, and woman who received chalitzah who were only formerly betrothed receive a kesuvah of two hundred and her husband has the ability to claim that he did not find that she was a virgin. (10b)
The Word “Almanah”

Why does the Mishna call the opposite of a virgin an “Almanah” – “widow” (see Chasam Sofer who explains that the correct opposite would seemingly be “Beulah” – “one who has had marital relations)? Rav Chana from Bagdas answers that this is an acronym for “Al Shem Manah” -- “due to the one hundred (that she gets for her kesuvah).” [This is why the Mishna stated “Almanah” and not “Beulah” as the word itself hints that she only receives one hundred.]

What about a widow who was merely betrothed (she receives two hundred)? The Gemora answers that since a regular widow from marriage receives one hundred, a widow from betrothal is also called an Almanah (even though she receives two hundred). What is the reason that the Torah calls a widow an “Almanah” (the Torah never talks about a kesuvah, and it is argued above whether or not it is even a Torah concept)? The Gemora answers, the Torah called a widow an “Almanah” as in the future the Rabbanan would decree that a widow should receive a kesuvah of one hundred.

The Gemora asks, is there a pasuk in the Torah that is based on future events? The Gemora answers that there is. This is evident from the passuk in Bereishis “and the third river is called Chidekel, it is the one that goes to the east of Ashur.” Rav Yosef taught that Ashur is a city called Slika. Was this city extant during the time period discussed in the pesukim (the creation of the world)? It must be that it was said in the context of the future. Accordingly, we can also say that the Torah’s name for a “widow” - “Almanah” is based on the future. (10b)

Other Interesting Words and their Characteristics

Rav Chana from Bagdas also says that dew waters, saturates, fertilizes, gives a shine (to the fruit), and helps things grow. Rava bar Rebbi Yishmael says, and some say Rav Yeimar bar Shalmiya says, what is the passuk that tells us this? The passuk “its rows are saturated to allow its rows (to give bounty for people, see Rashi in Tehilim), with dew it will moisten (alluding to fertilization), its produce will be blessed (shine and help grow).”

Rabbi Elazar states that the mizbe’ach (altar) “meizi’ach” – “atones,” supplies, causes love and “mechaper” – “atonement.” The Gemora asks, aren’t “meizi’ach” and “mechaper” redundant, as they both mean atonement? The Gemora answers that “meizi’ach” means that it atones to take away bad decrees from Bnei Yisrael. “Mechaper” means that it atones for their sins.

Rav Chana from Bagdas also stated that dates make a person, warm, full, loosen his bowls, give him strength, and do not make him too finicky. Rav says that if one eats dates he should not rule on halachic matters. The Gemora asks from a Braisa that states that dates are good to eat (after eating one’s meal) in the morning and at night, in the early afternoon they are bad, and in the late afternoon there is nothing as good as them. They take away three problems: worry, stomach sickness, and having to go the bathroom for too long. [This seemingly indicates that a person should be able to rule halachic matters after eating them.]

The Gemora answers, did we say they are not good? They are very good! For a little while, however, they can confuse one’s mind in a matter similar to wine, in the same manner as Mar stated that someone who drinks a Revi’is (86-150 ml) of wine should not rule on halachic matters.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that this is not a question. One (statement of Rav) is before eating and one (Braisa) is regarding after eating. This is as Abaye said that his foster mother told him that eating dates before a meal is like an ax to a palm tree, and eating dates after a meal is like the bolt on a door.

Rava states that the word “Dasha” – “door” is an acronym for “Derech Sham” – “that way.” “Darga” – “step,” Rava states, is an acronym for “Derech Gag” – “the way to the roof.” “Purya” – “bed,” Rav Papa says, is an acronym for “she’parin v’ravin aleha” – “that people are fruitful and multiple on it.” Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak states that the word “aylonis” is an acronym for “A ram that cannot give birth.” (10b – 11a)

[END]

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Counterclaim - Kesuvos 9 - Daf Yomi

Rabbi Elozar said: If the husband (after his first act of cohabitation with his virgin bride) claims, “I found an open entrance (her hymen has been torn by someone else),” he is believed to render her forbidden to him.

It is not clear from the Gemora regarding the counterclaim of the woman. Most Rishonim maintain that she is forbidden to him only if she contradicts him and states that her entrance was not opened, or if she remained quiet. However, if she concedes that her entrance was opened, but she claims that she was violated or she was wounded by wood, she is believed, and she will not be forbidden to him. This is because the husband’s claim is an uncertain one, but she knows what happened, and a certain claim has more validity than that of an uncertain one, especially when we can combine her certain claim with her presumption of innocence.

The Rosh disagrees with this. He states: Since there is only one doubt, we must rule stringently, and she is not believed. It is also established that we do not give more credence to a certain claim over an uncertain one, especially when there is a majority contradicting her claim. Most women cohabit willingly, and when they are violated, there is usually a rumor to that effect. A majority is superior to a presumption of innocence. We can therefore, not rely on her claim, and she is forbidden to her husband. The Rashba, while agreeing with the Rosh, states that she is believed regarding her kesuvah.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 9 - Highlights

I Found an Open Entrance

Rabbi Elozar said: If the husband (after his first act of cohabitation with his virgin bride) claims, “I found an open entrance (her hymen has been torn by someone else),” he is believed to render her forbidden to him.

The Gemora questions this ruling: Why should she become forbidden to him? It is a double doubt if she should be forbidden to him. It is uncertain whether she cohabited with another man during her betrothal to him (in which case she is regarded as an adulteress who is forbidden to live with her husband) or perhaps it occurred before she was married to him. And even if you say that she cohabited with another man during her betrothal to him, there is another doubt whether she was violated or by her own free will.

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Elozar is referring to a case where she is the wife of a Kohen (in which case, she will be forbidden to the husband even if she was violated). Alternatively, he can be referring to the wife of a Yisroel, but the case is where her father accepted kiddushin for her when she was under three years old and one day (in which case, she will be forbidden to her husband, since she obviously cohabited while she was married to him, for if it occurred before she was three, her virginity would not be affected).

The Gemora asks: What is the necessity for Rabbi Elozar’s ruling? Didn’t we learn Rabbi Elozar’s main point (that a man may, by his own testimony, may prohibit for himself a thing or a person otherwise permitted to him) in the following Mishna: If a man says to a woman, “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You have not betrothed me,” she is permitted to marry his relatives, but he is prohibited to marry her relatives.

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that only in the Mishna’s case does one become forbidden by his own words because he is certain regarding his claim, but in Rabbi Elozar’s case, where his claim is not a certainty, for he really does not know if he found an open entrance or not, perhaps she does not become forbidden to him; Rabbi Elozar teaches us that she is indeed forbidden to him.

The Gemora asks: Did Rabbi Elozar really say that she is forbidden to him? But surely, Rabbi Elozar had said: A wife does not become forbidden to her husband except in the case when there is a warning and seclusion (if the husband warned the wife not to seclude herself with a specific man and she disregards his warning and secludes herself with that man, she becomes forbidden to her husband), and as we find in the occurrence that happened (between King David and Bas-sheva)? (It is evident that Rabbi Elozar does not prohibit the wife to her husband just based on his claim that he didn’t find signs of her virginity.)

The Gemora questions the last statement: Was there a warning and seclusion by the incident with King David and Bas-sheva? And furthermore, was Bas-sheva rendered forbidden to her husband?

The Gemora explains: This is no difficulty, for this is what Rabbi Elozar meant to say: A wife does not become forbidden to her husband except in the case when there is a warning and seclusion, and this we learned from the occurrence that happened, where there was no warning and seclusion, and that is why Bas-sheva was not forbidden to her husband.

Nevertheless, the original question remains: She is only forbidden to her husband if there is a warning and a seclusion, but she would not be rendered forbidden based on his testimony that he found an open entrance.

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Elozar’s statement cannot be taken literally, for will she only be forbidden to her husband if there is a warning and a seclusion, bit if witnesses testify that she committed adultery, will she not be rendered forbidden? Obviously, yes! Rather, the following is what Rabbi Elozar meant: A woman will not be rendered forbidden to her husband through the testimony of one witness, but rather, only through the testimony of two witnesses. And a warning and seclusion even with through one witness (on the seclusion) will render her forbidden. A husband’s claim that he found an open entrance is regarded as if there would be two witnesses (because he is certain regarding his claim). And why was Bas-sheva not rendered forbidden to David (the adulteress becomes forbidden to the adulterer)? It is because she was violated (it was without her consent, and in such cases, the woman would be permitted to her husband, therefore, she is permitted to the adulterer as well).

Alternatively, the Gemora answers according to what Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said in the name of Rabbi Yonasan: Everyone who goes out into the war of the House of David writes for his wife a deed of divorce beforehand (so that in case he falls in battle his wife should be free to marry without the necessity of chalitzah. The get would in that case take effect retroactively from the date of its writing; this is why she did not become forbidden to her husband; she did not commit adultery). (8b – 9b)

Support from the Mishna

Abaye cites support for Rabbi Elozar’s ruling from our Mishna: The Mishna had stated: A virgin is married on Wednesday. We may infer from here that she is only married on Wednesday, but not on Thursday. What is the reason for this? It is because we are concerned that his anger will subside (by waiting for the next time that Beis Din would be in session; they were in session in the big cities on Monday and Thursday; if a husband, who got married on Wednesday, will have a claim regarding his wife’s virginity, he would be able to go early the next morning to the Beis Din). What were the Rabbis concerned about? If it was regarding her kesuvah, what is the reason to concern ourselves with that; let the husband give her the kesuvah (if he so desires)? Rather, it must be that she is forbidden to him. Isn’t the Mishna referring to a case where the husband claimed that he found an open entrance (and this would prove that the wife is forbidden to him based on such a claim)?

The Gemora rejects the proof: Our Mishna could be discussing a case where he claimed that he did not find any blood (only in this case, where his claim is a more certain one, will she be rendered forbidden to him). (9b)

Deprive her of the Kesuvah

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: If the husband (after his first act of cohabitation with his virgin bride) claims, “I found an open entrance (her hymen has been torn by someone else),” he is believed to cause her to lose her kesuvah.

Rav Yosef asks: What is the necessity of Shmuel’s ruling? Have we not learned this principle from the following Mishna: One who eats at his father-in-law's house (between the time of betrothal and the time of marriage) in Judaea (where this was common practice) without witnesses, cannot raise the claim (after the marriage) regarding his bride’s virginity, because he has secluded himself with her (and we suspect that he might have had intimate relations with his bride). The Gemora infers from here that it is only in Judaea that he cannot raise this claim, but in the Galilee (where it was not customary for the husband to seclude himself with the bride before they were married), he can raise it. Regarding what, was his claim? If his intention was to render her forbidden to him, why should he not be able to raise this claim in Judaea? (If he is sure that he has not been intimate with her during the time of betrothal and he charges her with unfaithfulness, he renders her, by the mere charge, forbidden to him?) It is evident that his claim is to cause her to lose her kesuvah. Isn’t the Mishna referring to a case where the husband claimed that he found an open entrance (and this would prove that he is believed to cause her to lose her kesuvah based on such a claim)?

The Gemora rejects the proof: The Mishna could be discussing a case where he claimed that he did not find any blood (only in this case, where his claim is a more certain one, will she lose her kesuvah). (9b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 9 - Highlights

I Found an Open Entrance

Rabbi Elozar said: If the husband (after his first act of cohabitation with his virgin bride) claims, “I found an open entrance (her hymen has been torn by someone else),” he is believed to render her forbidden to him.

The Gemora questions this ruling: Why should she become forbidden to him? It is a double doubt if she should be forbidden to him. It is uncertain whether she cohabited with another man during her betrothal to him (in which case she is regarded as an adulteress who is forbidden to live with her husband) or perhaps it occurred before she was married to him. And even if you say that she cohabited with another man during her betrothal to him, there is another doubt whether she was violated or by her own free will.

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Elozar is referring to a case where she is the wife of a Kohen (in which case, she will be forbidden to the husband even if she was violated). Alternatively, he can be referring to the wife of a Yisroel, but the case is where her father accepted kiddushin for her when she was under three years old and one day (in which case, she will be forbidden to her husband, since she obviously cohabited while she was married to him, for if it occurred before she was three, her virginity would not be affected).

The Gemora asks: What is the necessity for Rabbi Elozar’s ruling? Didn’t we learn Rabbi Elozar’s main point (that a man may, by his own testimony, may prohibit for himself a thing or a person otherwise permitted to him) in the following Mishna: If a man says to a woman, “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You have not betrothed me,” she is permitted to marry his relatives, but he is prohibited to marry her relatives.

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that only in the Mishna’s case does one become forbidden by his own words because he is certain regarding his claim, but in Rabbi Elozar’s case, where his claim is not a certainty, for he really does not know if he found an open entrance or not, perhaps she does not become forbidden to him; Rabbi Elozar teaches us that she is indeed forbidden to him.

The Gemora asks: Did Rabbi Elozar really say that she is forbidden to him? But surely, Rabbi Elozar had said: A wife does not become forbidden to her husband except in the case when there is a warning and seclusion (if the husband warned the wife not to seclude herself with a specific man and she disregards his warning and secludes herself with that man, she becomes forbidden to her husband), and as we find in the occurrence that happened (between King David and Bas-sheva)? (It is evident that Rabbi Elozar does not prohibit the wife to her husband just based on his claim that he didn’t find signs of her virginity.)

The Gemora questions the last statement: Was there a warning and seclusion by the incident with King David and Bas-sheva? And furthermore, was Bas-sheva rendered forbidden to her husband?

The Gemora explains: This is no difficulty, for this is what Rabbi Elozar meant to say: A wife does not become forbidden to her husband except in the case when there is a warning and seclusion, and this we learned from the occurrence that happened, where there was no warning and seclusion, and that is why Bas-sheva was not forbidden to her husband.

Nevertheless, the original question remains: She is only forbidden to her husband if there is a warning and a seclusion, but she would not be rendered forbidden based on his testimony that he found an open entrance.

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Elozar’s statement cannot be taken literally, for will she only be forbidden to her husband if there is a warning and a seclusion, bit if witnesses testify that she committed adultery, will she not be rendered forbidden? Obviously, yes! Rather, the following is what Rabbi Elozar meant: A woman will not be rendered forbidden to her husband through the testimony of one witness, but rather, only through the testimony of two witnesses. And a warning and seclusion even with through one witness (on the seclusion) will render her forbidden. A husband’s claim that he found an open entrance is regarded as if there would be two witnesses (because he is certain regarding his claim). And why was Bas-sheva not rendered forbidden to her husband? It is because she was violated (it was without her consent).

Alternatively, the Gemora answers according to what Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said in the name of Rabbi Yonasan: Everyone who goes out into the war of the House of David writes for his wife a deed of divorce beforehand (so that in case he falls in battle his wife should be free to marry without the necessity of chalitzah. The get would in that case take effect retroactively from the date of its writing; this is why she did not become forbidden to her husband; she did not commit adultery). (8b – 9b)

Support from the Mishna

Abaye cites support for Rabbi Elozar’s ruling from our Mishna: The Mishna had stated: A virgin is married on Wednesday. We may infer from here that she is only married on Wednesday, but not on Thursday. What is the reason for this? It is because we are concerned that his anger will subside (by waiting for the next time that Beis Din would be in session; they were in session in the big cities on Monday and Thursday; if a husband, who got married on Wednesday, will have a claim regarding his wife’s virginity, he would be able to go early the next morning to the Beis Din). What were the Rabbis concerned about? If it was regarding her kesuvah, what is the reason to concern ourselves with that; let the husband give her the kesuvah (if he so desires)? Rather, it must be that she is forbidden to him. Isn’t the Mishna referring to a case where the husband claimed that he found an open entrance (and this would prove that the wife is forbidden to him based on such a claim)?

The Gemora rejects the proof: Our Mishna could be discussing a case where he claimed that he did not find any blood (only in this case, where his claim is a more certain one, will she be rendered forbidden to him). (9b)

Deprive her of the Kesuvah

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: If the husband (after his first act of cohabitation with his virgin bride) claims, “I found an open entrance (her hymen has been torn by someone else),” he is believed to cause her to lose her kesuvah.

Rav Yosef asks: What is the necessity of Shmuel’s ruling? Have we not learned this principle from the following Mishna: One who eats at his father-in-law's house (between the time of betrothal and the time of marriage) in Judaea (where this was common practice) without witnesses, cannot raise the claim (after the marriage) regarding his bride’s virginity, because he has secluded himself with her (and we suspect that he might have had intimate relations with his bride). The Gemora infers from here that it is only in Judaea that he cannot raise this claim, but in the Galilee (where it was not customary for the husband to seclude himself with the bride before they were married), he can raise it. Regarding what, was his claim? If his intention was to render her forbidden to him, why should he not be able to raise this claim in Judaea? (If he is sure that he has not been intimate with her during the time of betrothal and he charges her with unfaithfulness, he renders her, by the mere charge, forbidden to him?) It is evident that his claim is to cause her to lose her kesuvah. Isn’t the Mishna referring to a case where the husband claimed that he found an open entrance (and this would prove that he is believed to cause her to lose her kesuvah based on such a claim)?

The Gemora rejects the proof: The Mishna could be discussing a case where he claimed that he did not find any blood (only in this case, where his claim is a more certain one, will she lose her kesuvah). (9b)

[END]

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HaRav Elyashiv Shlita on Smoking on Yom Tov

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 7a) states the principle of "mitoch." Since kindling is permitted on Yom tov for the sake of food preparartion, it is also permitted when it is not for the sake of food preparation. The Gemora applies this to the prohibition of causing a wound as well.

The Gemora states: This is only applicable if it is something that is enjoyable to all. The Gemora explains that one would be permitted to slaughter a deer on Yom Tov even though only rich people eat deer. This is because it is enjoyable to all; practically speaking, only the rich eat it, but that does not effect the halacha. Placing incense on the coals, which is only enjoyed by few would be prohibited.

This brings up the question regarding smoking on Yom Tov. We cite many of the opinions below, but we would like to add the ruling of Rav Elyashiv Shlita. He states that those that permitted smoking on Yom tov (for the reasons mentioned below), that was only in previous generations, when it was done for medicinal purposes. Nowadays, where it is well documented that smoking is unhealthy and extremely dangerous, and people are definitely not smoking to improve their health, and it is not something that is enjoyable by all because the majority of people do not smoke, smoking would be prohibited on Yom Tov.

Please make sure you scroll down to the comments as people are linking to very interesting articles - Halachically and health related.

UPDATE : Many people have mentioned that the number one issue should be second hand smoke - now that it has been proven that this is extremely dangerous. Here is a ruling issued by the Tzitz Eliezer.


"...וכמו כן כשמעשנים במקומות ציבוריים יכול שפיר כל אחד ואחד מהנמצאים שם החושש מזה לפיגוע בבריאותו, למחות בידי המעשנים שלא יעשנו"23.

When one is smoking in a public place, anyone in the vicinity who is concerned about his personal health can protest and demand that the person should not smoke in the area.

HaRav Moshe Feinstein Zt"l writes sharp words for those who smoke in a Beis Medrash, Yeshiva or kollel building.

(דברים חריפים יותר על חומרת איסור העישון בבית המדרש בישיבות ובכוללים, כתב הגר"מ פיינשטיין שליט"א, ראה צילום מכתבו להלן עמ' 251-248.

Please read this introduction again from the Kollel Iyun Hadaf: Most contemporary authorities state that there is no allowance to smoke at all, even on an ordinary weekday, due to the established and documented health hazards which the effects of cigarettes and second-hand smoke pose to the smoker and to those around him.

I have recently been asked during the Daf Yomi shiur a few times regarding smoking on Yom Tov. Does the principle of 'mitoch' apply? Is it a 'dovor hashaveh lechal nefesh'? If it's unhealthy for the lungs, can the logic of calming the digestive system outweigh the health factors? There are many issues. Kollel Iyun Hadaf has done extensive research on this topic and I copy it here for you. Please visit their site often as there is a wealth of information there.

Kollel Iyun Hadaf

HALACHAH: CIGARETTES ON YOM TOV
OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the act of placing incense on coals on Yom Tov, which involves the Melachos of kindling and extinguishing. The Gemara's discussion is relevant to a debate among the Acharonim with regard to the question of whether or not one is permitted to use cigarettes on Yom Tov.

Most contemporary authorities state that there is no allowance to smoke at all, even on an ordinary weekday, due to the established and documented health hazards which the effects of cigarettes and second-hand smoke pose to the smoker and to those around him. Nevertheless, according to those who do permit a Jew to smoke, may one smoke on Yom Tov? (This discussion is a summary of the issues involved and is not intended as a Halachic ruling.)

There are four major issues involved with smoking on Yom Tov.

(a) The MAGEN AVRAHAM (OC 514:4) cites the KENESES HA'GEDOLAH who prohibits smoking on Yom Tov because it involves the Melachah of Mechabeh, extinguishing.

In a lengthy Teshuvah, the DARCHEI NO'AM (#9) asks that the act of smoking appears to involve no act of Mechabeh, but rather an act of Hav'arah (burning). Any conceivable form of Mechabeh involved (such as diminishing the fire by squeezing the cigarette) would be a "Davar she'Eino Miskaven" and not a "Pesik Reishei," and thus should be permitted.

(b) The MAGEN AVRAHAM proposes a more basic reason to ban smoking on Yom Tov. Even if it does not involve Mechabeh but only Hav'arah, and Hav'arah is permitted on Yom Tov because of the principle of "Mitoch," the principle of "Mitoch" permits only an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," which everyone enjoys. Smoking is certainly not something which everyone enjoys.

However, the PNEI YEHOSHUA (Shabbos 39b, DH v'Omer) and RAV YONASAN EIBESHITZ (in BINAH L'ITIM, Hilchos Yom Tov 4:6) write that this reason is not enough to prohibit smoking on Yom Tov. TOSFOS in Shabbos (39b, DH u'Veis Hillel) discusses whether one may enter a bathhouse to sweat on Yom Tov. He writes that although the act of washing the entire body is not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and is therefore prohibited (see Tosfos to Beitzah 21b, DH Lo), nevertheless sweating is permitted because it is for the sake of maintaining one's health (Refu'ah) and not for pleasure. Similarly, the medicinal properties of nicotine may be grounds to permit smoking.

HAGA'ON RAV YISRAEL ZEV GUSTMAN zt'l was asked if this argument is valid grounds to permit smoking on Yom Tov today, when the dangerous effects of smoking have been proven beyond any doubt. Rav Gustman answered that any person who smokes convinces himself that it is beneficial for him. The issue of whether an activity is considered one that merely provides pleasure or one that provides health benefits does not depend on whether or not the activity is objectively healthy, but whether the person himself does it for pleasure (in which case it is not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and is forbidden on Yom Tov), or for the perceived positive chemical effects that it has on his body. One who smokes presumably does so for the artificial calming effect of the nicotine. In that respect it could be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," because with regard to acts of Refu'ah what matters is the ultimate effect and not what causes that effect, as the KESAV SOFER explains (Teshuvos OC #64). Since everyone appreciates the sense of being relaxed, any act which provides relaxing effects is considered to be "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh."

The KORBAN NESANEL (Beitzah 2:22:10) cited by the BI'UR HALACHAH (511:4) mentions another rational to consider smoking an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh." Since many people, and not merely a few, have the practice to smoke, the act can be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh." The Bi'ur Halachah adds that this obviously applies only in a place where smoking is the accepted cultural norm and most people smoke.

The KORBAN NESANEL himself, however, prohibits smoking on Yom Tov. The fact that in a certain place most people smoke does not make the act "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," because smoking is harmful to those who are not accustomed to it. Lighting the "Mugmar" and washing one's entire body are also things that many people do and are still considered things which are not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" since some people do not appreciate such "pleasures." The PNEI YEHOSHUA (Shabbos 39b) also presents this argument.

(c) The PRI MEGADIM (OC 511) points out that an additional problem is involved when there is printing or letters on the outside of the cigarette wrapper, and by smoking one destroys those letters and transgresses the Melachah of Mochek (erasing). Because of this concern, some people who smoke on Yom Tov do not finish the cigarette when it burns down to the letters, but they let it burn by itself so that they should not transgress the Melachah of Mochek.

RAV HILLEL RUVEL shlit'a pointed out that this practice does not circumvent the problem of Mochek according to the NIMUKEI YOSEF in Bava Kama (22a). The Nimukei Yosef rules that when one lights a fire, he is considered to have burned everything that will eventually be burned by the fire. When Rav Ruvel brought this issue to the attention of Rav Gustman zt'l, Rav Gustman said that those who act leniently may rely on the OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Shabbos 23:2) who says that one who burns a book on Yom Tov is not liable for the Melachah of Mochek, because Mochek involves taking away the words and not the entire paper.

(d) The KORBAN NESANEL (loc. cit.) writes that even if no Isur d'Oraisa forbids smoking on Yom Tov, it is almost impossible for one who smokes on Yom Tov to avoid transgressing Isurei d'Oraisa, such as Hav'arah when he attempts to light the pipe, cigar, or cigarette, or when he adds or removes tobacco from a pipe, or when he taps the ashes off of a cigarette. (This may be the intention of the Keneses ha'Gedolah cited in (a) above.)

Other Acharonim (BIRKEI YOSEF OC 511) write that this reason cannot be used as grounds for prohibiting smoking on Yom Tov, because it is accepted that the sages today do not enact new Gezeiros. Since this reason entails making a Gezeirah (that one may not smoke lest he transgress an Isur d'Oraisa), today's sages cannot enact a rabbinical prohibition to prohibit smoking on Yom Tov in order to prevent one from transgressing Isurei d'Oraisa.

HALACHAH: The KORBAN NESANEL concludes in very strong terms that one who smokes on Yom Tov acts reprehensibly, and "one who wants to honor Hash-m and his Torah should refrain from smoking for just one or two days (Yom Tov), even though his Yetzer ha'Ra might suggest ways to permit it based on the Shas."

However, most Acharonim (as cited by the BI'UR HALACHAH loc. cit.) rule that in a city where most of the people smoke, the act of smoking can be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and thus one may smoke on Yom Tov. RAV MOSHE STERNBUCH shlit'a points out that nowadays, since even in places where people smoke they know that it is harmful to their health, and since in more and more places smoking is looked upon disapprovingly, it is very difficult to rely on these reasons to permit smoking on Yom Tov.

When asked by Kollel Iyun Hadaf whether smoking is permitted on Yom Tov, HAGA'ON RAV CHAIM PINCHAS SHEINBERG shlit'a said that it is certainly not considered an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and thus it is forbidden on Yom Tov.

Rav Sheinberg added that it has been proven that smoking is hazardous to one's health, and therefore smoking is never permitted, even on an ordinary weekday. (Regarding those who already smoke and who suffer from nicotine addiction, see IGROS MOSHE YD 2:49, and TESHUVOS V'HANGAHOS 1:316.)

Another interesting question raised by the Acharonim is whether one who maintains that smoking is forbidden on Yom Tov may light a cigarette for someone who is lenient. The KESAV SOFER (ibid.), based on the SHA'AR HA'MELECH (Hilchos Ishus 7:12), writes that if one person maintains that a certain practice is prohibited and he helps another person, who maintains that the practice is permitted, to do that act, he transgresses the prohibition of "Lifnei Iver." Therefore, one who maintains that smoking is prohibited may not help another person smoke on Yom Tov, and he must treat cigarettes and other smoking implements as Muktzah. However, the Kesav Sofer adds, if he maintains that the Halachah permits smoking but he personally is stringent and does not smoke, then he may light a cigarette for someone else who smokes.

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Ask the Doctors

The Gemora had inquired: May one cohabit with his virgin wife for the first time on Shabbos? The Gemora explains the inquiry: Is the blood (which is produced when the hymen is broken) in the womb stored up (and cohabitation would he permitted, since the blood flows out of its own accord, and not because of any wound), or is it the result of a wound (caused by the tearing of the vaginal walls when they separate from each other), and therefore be prohibited?

The Gemora’s inquiry is difficult to understand. This is not a question regarding a specific woman, but rather, it is relevant to all women in the world, including idolaters. This point of inquiry should be an established fact; let us inquire from the expert doctors in this field as to the facts?

Perhaps, one may counter and say that doctors are not believed regarding halachic issues. This is not the case. The Divrei Chaim (vol. II, 77) writes regarding a woman who bleeds every time that she has relations: Even if an idolater midwife will inform us that the woman has a wound in that area, she is believed because this is a fact that we can verify with another midwife. The Maharsham relied many times on two doctors, when we asked each of them separately. Certainly in our Gemora, where it is relevant to every woman in the world, why don’t we ask the doctors?

The Chasam Sofer sheds light on our Gemora by saying the following: The Gemora is not inquiring as to the facts. In truth, the blood is loosely stored in the womb similar to the manner which liquid is contained in a sponge. Our Gemora is uncertain regarding the amount of force necessary to release the blood.

The Rambam in Hilchos Shabbos writes that threshing, squeezing, wounding and milking are all liable on Shabbos, and are included in the same category of melachah. Accordingly, the Chasam Sofer asks: The husband should certainly be liable in this case because he is separating the blood from the womb?

He answers: If this would be performed by hand, similar to squeezing and milking, he would certainly be liable. However, the question of our Gemora is regarding the strength necessary to release this blood. If it requires minimal strength, it is considered as if the blood is coming out on its own accord, and he will not be liable. However, if a considerable amount of force is necessary, he then would be liable for such an act.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 6 - Highlights

Rav’s Ruling Regarding Initial Cohabitation on Saturday Night

The Gemora had inquired: May one cohabit with his virgin wife for the first time on Shabbos? The Gemora explains the inquiry: Is the blood (which is produced when the hymen is broken) in the womb stored up (and cohabitation would he permitted, since the blood flows out of its own accord, and not because of any wound), or is it the result of a wound (caused by the tearing of the vaginal walls when they separate from each other), and therefore be prohibited?

In the Beis Medrash of Rav, they said that Rav permitted it and Shmuel prohibited it. In Nehardea (where Shmuel lived), they said: Rav prohibited it and Shmuel permitted it.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: The mnemonic to remember who said which version is: These make it lenient for themselves, and these make it lenient for themselves.

The Gemora asks: Does Rav actually allow it? But surely Rav Simi bar Chizkiyah said in the name of Rav: One is forbidden to push a cloth into a barrel on Yom Tov, although he does not intend to perform a prohibited act of labor. The issue at hand is that when one presses on the cloth, he will be unintentionally squeezing out beer, which is forbidden to do on Yom Tov. (The prohibition involved is either melaben, whitening the cloth by cleaning it, or a derivative of the melachah of dash, threshing, as taking the wine out of the cloth is akin to removing kernels of grain from their husks. Apparently, Rav follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who prohibits unintentional acts, and not Rabbi Shimon, who permits them!?)

The Gemora answers: Since it is inevitable that beer will be removed from the cloth, even Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that one is not liable for an unintentional act, will agree that here one is liable. For Abaye and Rava both said: Rabbi Shimon agrees that when the act performed is a pesik reishei, literally defined as ‘if one cuts of the chicken’s head, is it not certain that it will die?’ i.e. inevitable, that one is forbidden to perform the act even if unintentionally. (Thus, although one does not intend to squeeze the beer out when pushing the cloth into the barrel, it is inevitable that he will squeeze the beer out, and it is forbidden.)

The Gemora asks: But surely Rav Chiya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: The halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah? And Rav Chanan bar Ami said in the name of Shmuel: The halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

The Gemora answers: In truth, Rav follows Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion that unintentional acts are prohibited, but he nevertheless, rules that one may cohabit with his virgin bride on Shabbos. According to the version which stated that the blood in the womb stored up, Rav permits cohabitation because he is doing damage (to the woman) in regard to the opening (because it destroys the commodity of her virginity, and one who acts in a destructive manner on Shabbos, is exempt). According to the version which stated that the blood coming out is the result of a wound (caused by the tearing of the vaginal walls when they separate from each other), Rav permits cohabitation because he is doing damage (to the woman) in making the wound. (6a)

Hymenal Bleeding

Rav Chisda asks on Shmuel (who rules that one may not cohabit with his virgin bride on Shabbos) from a Mishna in Niddah: If a girl, who has not reached the age of menstruation, got married, Beis Shamai say: We give her four nights (where she is permitted to have marital relations) and Beis Hillel say: We give her until the wound is healed up. (The blood that comes out is attributed to the wound and not to menstruation. Ordinarily, after the first cohabitation, further cohabitation is forbidden until the menstruation, is over. But in this case, in which the young bride had never yet had any menstruation, it is assumed that the blood is not due to menstruation, but to the wound caused by cohabitation. According to Beis Shamai, this assumption holds good for four nights, and according to Beis Hillel it holds good until the wound is healed up.) If she has reached the age of menstruation (but she had in fact not yet seen blood; that is, she had the maturity for it, but the maturity had not yet manifested itself; a girl has reached the period of puberty when she is twelve years and one day old) and she married, Beis Shamai say: We give her the first night (even several times during the night is permitted) and Beis Hillel say: We give her until Saturday night, a total of four nights (assuming that they got married on Wednesday).

The Gemora analyzes the Mishna: Does it not mean that if he had not yet cohabited with his wife, he may cohabit with her even on Shabbos? (The question presumes that ‘we give her until Saturday night, a total of four nights’ means any one of the four nights, and thus he may cohabit with her on Shabbos; this indicates that one may cohabit with a virgin on Shabbos, for if her hymen has been ruptured completely by the previous cohabitations, there would be no basis to attribute any subsequent bleeding to hymenal bleeding, and cohabitation would be prohibited.)

Rava answers: The Mishna is discussing a case when he already cohabited with her (fully, and nevertheless, all subsequent bleeding can still be attributed to the hymen, and not due to menstruation).

The Gemora asks: If so, what novelty is the Mishna teaching us?

The Gemora answers: It is stated to show that cohabitation is permitted on Shabbos even if it will result in further bleeding. For Shmuel said: One may enter into a narrow opening on Shabbos even though he will cause pebbles to break loose. (6a – 6b)

Preoccupied

Rav Yosef asked on Shmuel from the following Mishna: The groom is exempt from reciting kerias shema from the first night of his marriage until after Motzoei Shabbos if he did not yet cohabit with his virgin bride. (He is exempt from the mitzvah of shema because he is thinking about the mitzvah of procreation, and one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah. This only applies if he is marrying a virgin, when he is worried that he will not be able to rupture the hymen and complete cohabitation.) Isn’t this exemption based on the fact that he wants to cohabit with her, and nevertheless, he is permitted to cohabit with her on Friday night? (We see that he may cohabit with his virgin wife on Shabbos.)

Abaye answers: No! He is preoccupied with the thought that he has failed to cohabit with her.

Rava asks: Is one exempt from performing a mitzvah because he is preoccupied with another matter (that is not a mitzvah)? If someone’s ship sank at the sea, will he be exempt from reciting shema because he is thinking about his loss?

If you will say that he is indeed exempt, but surely Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said in the name of Rav: A mourner is required to observe all mitzvos except for Tefillin which is called pe’er, glory, and a mourner is not allowed to glorify himself. (The source for this ruling is from a verse in Yechezkel, where HaShem instructed Yechezkel regarding the laws of mourning and HaShem told Yechezkel explicitly that he should don his Tefillin. This commandment implies that all other mourners are not permitted to don Tefillin. A mourner, although he is thinking about his sorrow, he is not preoccupied with performing a mitzvah and for this reason he is still obligated to observe mitzvos.)

Rather, Rava says: It is a Tannaic dispute. One braisa states: If he did not cohabit with her the first night, he is exempt from reciting kerias shema even on the second night (Thursday night). If he did not cohabit with her the on the second night, he is exempt from reciting kerias shema even on the third night (Friday night). However, it was taught in another braisa: He is only exempt on the first and second night, but not on the third (Friday night, because this braisa maintains that it is forbidden to cohabit with a virgin on Shabbos).

The Gemora cites another braisa where the Tannaim dispute this point: One who marries a virgin is prohibited from cohabiting with her for the first time on Shabbos. The Chachamim, however, permit him.

The Gemora asks: Who is the Chachamim?

Rabbah answers: It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that an unintentional act is permitted on Shabbos.

Abaye asked: But Rabbi Shimon agrees that when the act performed is a pesik reishei, literally defined as ‘if one cuts of the chicken’s head, is it not certain that it will die?’ i.e. inevitable, that one is forbidden to perform the act even if unintentionally?

Rabbah answers: The braisa is not referring to the Babylonians who dare not skilled in cohabiting on an angle (without causing bleeding), but rather, the braisa is referring to people who are skilled regarding the possibility of cohabiting on an angle (and therefore it is not inevitable that bleeding will occur). (6b)

Bursting a Boil

Rabbi Ami asked on Shmuel from the following Mishna: One who bursts a boil on Shabbos; if his intention is to create an opening for the boil so that air can enter and the boil will heal, he is liable for performing a melachah on Shabbos, but if his intention, however, was to remove the pus from the boil, he is exempt and such an act is permissible.

The Gemora answers: There (by the boil) the blood is stored up (in the abscess) and is entirely loose (from the flesh), whereas here (by the virgin), the blood is stored up in the womb, but is not entirely loose. (6b – 7a)

[END]

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Postponing Yom Kippur

The Gemora asks: Yom Kippur that falls out on a Monday should be postponed until Tuesday because of the concern that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos to prepare for the feast that will be held on the day prior to Yom Kippur?

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: It would emerge that Rosh Hashanah would be on A Sunday, and we have a principle that Rosh Hashanah may not occur on Sunday, Wednesday or Friday?

He answers: The reason that Rosh Hashanah may not occur on a Tuesday is because then, Hoshanah Rabbah will fall out on Shabbos; that is also a preventive measure. The decree based on the concern of slaughtering a young bird takes precedence over the decree of taking the aravos on Shabbos. The reason is: Here, there are no other options; by Hoshanah Rabbah, there is an option, namely, not to take the aravos on Shabbos, just like the shofar is not blown and the lulav is not taken on Shabbos.

The Chasam Sofer answers: While it’s true that if Yom Kippur is postponed until Tuesday, Hoshanah Rabbah will fall out on Shabbos, it is nevertheless preferable to uphold the decree of not slaughtering a young bird on Shabbos and sounding the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, even though we will forfeit the mitzvah of taking the aravos on Hoshanah Rabbah. Two is better than one.

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Tosfos s.v. Dam (Blood)

The Gemora discusses the prohibition of cohabiting for the first time on Shabbos. The Gemora states: If the blood is the result of a wound (caused by the tearing of the vaginal walls when they separate from each other), it would therefore be prohibited.

Why is one liable on Shabbos for causing a wound?

Rashi in Shabbos (107a) states that bruising an animal falls under the category of dyeing, as the skin of the animal is discolored.

Tosfos here asks: There is a Gemora in Chullin which states that one is liable by other rodents when the blood comes out. He cannot be liable for dyeing, for they do not have any hides. Furthermore, in our Gemora there is no dyeing occurring.

Tosfos quotes Shmuel, who states in Gemora Shabbos (75a) that one who slaughters an animal on Shabbos is liable for taking the live of a live creature. Accordingly, one who causes a wound on Shabbos will be liable because he is weakening a life and that is tantamount to taking away life. Tosfos rejects this explanation since in our Gemora, there is no necessity for the weakening of the woman, and one would not be liable for wounding in such a manner. It would be possible to say that our Gemora is discussing a mere Rabbinical prohibition, but there are other Gemoros where it is evident that one would be subject to a Biblical prohibition.

Tosfos concludes that the removal of blood is regarded as the taking of life because the blood is the life of a creature, and when one removes a little blood, it is as if he removed a little life.

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Matchmaker

The Gemora states that although mundane matters may not be discussed on Shabbos to preserve the sanctity of the day, conversations relating to Shidduchim [matchmaking] are perfectly permissible to conduct as they are considered sacred matters. This idea has been immortalized in a well known Shabbos zemer [song] entitled “Mah Yedidus.”

Rabbi Elazar Meisels discusses the concept of a matchmaker. The use of a shadchan and the involvement of the parents also contributed to the stability of traditional marriages.

In considering the match, they tended to focus on the important aspects, not just the trivial ones that youngsters are prone to concentrating on. Additionally, the Shadchan could be called upon to assist by conducting and smoothing over the financial negotiations between the two families. This eliminated much of the personal animosity that is common in the entire dating process. Payment for suggesting a match is generally expected, and there is a considerable amount of discussion in the halachic responsa regarding this point. Questions such as how to compensate two people who suggested the match, or a situation in which one person suggested the match, but another person did most of the negotiating, are dealt with in great detail.

Interestingly, Rabbenu Nissim of Gerona [Ra”n Tractate Shabbos 12a], posits that the word “Shidduch” is rooted in the word “Menuchah,” which means peace and tranquility. He bases this on the Targum Yonasan’s [Shoftim 3:11] rendering of the word “VaTishkot” – and (the land) was peaceful, as “V’Shidduchis”. Teshuvos HaGeonim [Siman 425] suggests that it stems from the word “Shadachi,” which refers to long stems that shoot forth and intertwine with one another. The word “Shidduch” then, means to knot or tie together.

May we hear of many happy matches and successful marriages!

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 5 - Highlights

Initial Cohabitation on Saturday Night

The Gemora had stated: He shall never cohabit with his virgin bride for the first time on Erev Shabbos (Friday night) or Motzoei Shabbos (Saturday night). The Gemora asks: It is understandable that he shall not cohabit with his bride for the first time on Friday night because he will be causing a wound, which is prohibited to do on Shabbos, but what is the reason for the prohibition on Saturday night?

Rabbi Zeira answers: It is prohibited because this will result in making calculations on Shabbos (if he will consummate the marriage on Motzoei Shabbos, the wedding feast will be held then and he will make calculations on Shabbos as to the cost of that festive meal, which is prohibited).

Abaye asked: Are those calculations in fact forbidden to make on Shabbos? But surely we learned that Rav Chisda and Rav Hamnuna both said: Accounts for the sake of a mitzvah may be calculated on Shabbos. And Rabbi Elozar said: One may determine the amount of charity he will be giving to the poor on Shabbos. And Rabbi Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One may go to the synagogues and study halls to attend to communal affairs on Shabbos. And Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One may publicize matters of life and death on Shabbos. And Rav Shmuel bar Nachmeini said in the name of Rabbi Yonasan: One may go to amphitheatres and circuses to attend to communal affairs on Shabbos. And a Tanna in the Beis Medrash of Menashya taught: One is permitted to negotiate a match for a young girl for the sake of betrothal on Shabbos, and for someone to teach a young boy Torah or to teach him a trade. (Why can’t we calculate the cost of the wedding feast on Shabbos?)

Rather, Rabbi Zeira answers: It is prohibited to cohabit with his bride for the first time on Motzoei Shabbos because the Rabbis were concerned that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos to prepare for the wedding feast.

Abaye asked: If so, Yom Kippur that falls out on a Monday should be postponed until Tuesday because of the concern that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos to prepare for the feast that will be held on the day prior to Yom Kippur?

The Gemora answers: Regarding Yom Kippur, where the preparations are only for himself, we are not concerned that he will become preoccupied and forget that it is Shabbos, and slaughter a young bird; however, here, where the preparations are for all the people that will be attending the wedding feast, we are concerned that he will become preoccupied and forget that it is Shabbos, and slaughter a young bird.

Alternatively, you can answer that regarding Yom Kippur, where the feast is not eaten until the next day, there is ample time after Shabbos to prepare the meal, and we are not concerned that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos; however, here, where the wedding feast takes place immediately after Shabbos, we are concerned that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos.

The Gemora adds: Now that we have provided this answer, we can say that this could be the reason for not cohabiting with his bride for the first time on Friday night, because perhaps he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos (since the wedding feast might extend into Shabbos). (4b – 5a)

Wednesday or Wednesday Night?

The Gemora inquires: Does the Mishna mean that a virgin is married on Wednesday and she cohabits with her husband on Wednesday, and we are not afraid that his anger will subside before Thursday morning (when Beis Din will be in session)? Or perhaps the Mishna means that a virgin is married on Wednesday and she cohabits with her husband only on Wednesday night, because we are afraid that his anger will subside before Thursday morning?

The Gemora attempts to resolve the inquiry: Come and hear from the braisa which Bar Kappara taught: A virgin is married on the Wednesday and she cohabits with her husband on Wednesday night because it was on the fifth day (of Creation) that the blessing for the fish was pronounced (Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters of the sea). A widow is married on Thursday and she cohabits with her husband on Thursday night because it was on the sixth day that the blessing for man was pronounced (Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth). It emerges that the only reason that the virgin cohabits on Wednesday night is on account of the blessing, but as to his anger subsiding, we are not afraid.

The Gemora asks: If so, the widow should cohabit on Wednesday night as well, since it was on the fifth day that the blessing for the fish was pronounced?

The Gemora answers: The blessing for man is a stronger reason.

Alternatively, you can answer that it was because the Rabbis were diligent in their concern for the welfare of Jewish women, like it was taught in the following braisa: Why did we say that a widow is married on Thursday and she cohabits with her husband on Thursday night? For if you would say that she should cohabit with her husband on Thursday, the next morning, the husband will rise and go to his work (leaving his bride home alone). Therefore the Sages watched over the welfare of the Jewish women that he should rejoice with her for three days, namely, Thursday, Friday and Shabbos.

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons?

The Gemora answers: A difference between them will be in a case where the husband does not work, or in a case where there was a festival on Friday (in both cases, we are not concerned that the husband will go to work, but the reason to cohabit on Friday because of the blessing for man still applies). (5a)

Hand or Hands?

Bar Kappara expounded: The handiwork of the righteous is greater than the handiwork of God’s creation of the heaven and earth. For in regard to the creation of heaven and earth, it is written [Yeshaya 48:13]: Also, My hand has laid the foundation of the earth, and My right hand has spread out the heavens, while in regard to the handiwork of the righteous it is written [Shmos 15:17]: The foundation of your dwelling place which You, Hashem have, the Sanctuary, My Lord, which Your hands have established. (Hashem created the earth with one “hand,” while the righteous created the Temple with “two hands.”)

A Babylonian replied, and his name was Rabbi Chiya: It is written [Tehillim 95:5]: And the dry land, His hands formed!

The Gemora answers: It is written: His hand (in the singular form).

The Gemora asks: But it is written, they formed?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: His fingers formed it.

The Gemora raises a further objection: It is written [Tehillim 19:2]: The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament shows work of His hands?

The Gemora answers: This is the explanation of the verse: Who shows the handiwork of the righteous? The firmament. And how? Through the rain. (Rain descends because the righteous pray for it. The handiwork of the righteous is called the ‘work of His hands,’ because in the rain, the work of God and the work of the righteous meet. The rain is the work of God, but it comes as the result of the good deeds of the righteous, whose prayers God fulfills.) (5a)

Purpose of the Fingers

Bar Kappara expounded: What is the meaning of that which is written [Devarim 23:14]: You shall have a peg in addition to your weapons? Do not read it “your weapons,” but rather, “your ears.” This means to say that if a man hears something unworthy, he shall insert his finger (shaped like a peg) into his ears.

And this is the same as Rabbi Elozar said: Why do the fingers of man resemble pegs? The Gemora interrupts: What is the meaning of his question? Shall I say because each finger is divided from the other? Surely, each finger has been made for its own purpose! For the master said: The smallest finger is the zeres (the distance from the little finger to the thumb of a spread hand), and it is used for measuring the Kohen Gadol’s breastplate; the fourth finger is the kemitzah, and it is used for taking a scoop of the flour-offering; the middle finger is the amah, and it is used for defining the cubit measure (the cubit is a measure equal to the distance from the elbow to the tip of the middle finger); the index finger is the etzbah, and it is used to apply the blood of a chatas-offering on the Altar; and the thumb is the gudel, and blood from offerings are sometimes applied there. (Obviously, there is good reason for the fingers to be divided.) Rather, the question is why are the fingers pointed like pegs? The reason is that if a man hears something unworthy, he shall insert his finger (shaped like a peg) into his ears.

A braisa was taught in the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yishmael: Why is the ear hard except for the ear lobe, which is soft? The reason is that if a man hears something unworthy, he shall bend the lobe into it.

The Gemora cites a braisa: One should not hear unworthy things, because the ears are the most easily burned from all the other organs. (5a – 5b)

Cohabitating the First Time
on Shabbos

The Gemora inquires: May one cohabit with his virgin wife for the first time on Shabbos (they were not aware of the braisa mentioned above, or they inquired if the halacha follows that opinion)? The Gemora explains the inquiry: Is the blood (which is produced when the hymen is broken) in the womb stored up (and cohabitation would he permitted, since the blood flows out of its own accord, and not because of any wound), or is it the result of a wound (caused by the tearing of the vaginal walls when they separate from each other), and therefore be prohibited?

And if you will say that the blood is stored up in the womb, we can ask: Is the husband’s main concern to release the blood (in order to ascertain if she is a virgin), and it is permitted: or is he concerned with creating an opening (for the future), and it is forbidden (making an opening on Shabbos is forbidden under the category of building)? And if you will say that the husband’s main concern to release the blood and the opening comes by itself (without his intention for it), we can ask: Is the halacha according to Rabbi Shimon who says: Something which is not intended is permitted (an act which is in itself forbidden but is the unintended though unavoidable result of an act which is permitted; thus one may, according to Rabbi Shimon, push a couch on the floor on Shabbos, if one is not intending to make a rut in the floor, although, as a matter of fact, such a rut is made as the unavoidable result of pushing the couch), or is the halacha according to Rabbi Yehudah who says: Something which is not intended is forbidden? And if you will say that the halacha follows Rabbi Yehudah, we may ask: Is he doing damage (to the woman) in regard to the opening (and one who acts in a destructive manner on Shabbos, is exempt), or does he improve (her) in regard to the opening?

The Gemora cites another version of the above Gemora: Others say: And if you will say that the blood the result of a wound, we can ask: Is the husband’s main concern to release the blood (in order to ascertain if she is a virgin), and it is prohibited, or is he concerned with his own pleasure, and it is permitted (according to Rabbi Shimon)? And if you will say that he concerned with his own pleasure and the blood comes by itself (without his intention for it), we can ask: Is the halacha like Rabbi Yehudah who says: Something which is not intended is forbidden, or is the halacha like Rabbi Shimon that it would be permitted? And if you say the halacha is like Rabbi Yehudah, we may ask: Is he doing damage (to the woman) in making the wound (and one who acts in a destructive manner on Shabbos, is exempt), or does he improve (her) in regards to the wound? And if you will say that he is doing damage in regards to the wound, we may ask: Is the halacha like Rabbi Yehudah (that one is exempt for doing damage while causing a wound), or is the halacha like Rabbi Shimon (that although generally, one is exempt for causing damage on Shabbos, making a wound is an exception, and he would be liable)? (5b – 6a)

[END]

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Food for Thought - Kesuvos 4 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora cites the following braisa: One whose bread was already baked, his animals were slaughtered, his wine was diluted in preparation for the wedding meal (all these items would spoil if the wedding would be delayed significantly), and the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died, the law is the following: We move the corpse to a room and we bring the groom and the bride to the chupah. (After burial, there would be a seven-day mourning period, in which they would be prohibited to marry.) He then would perform his dutiful marital act with his bride, and then he separates from her. (Immediately afterwards, the burial would take place.) They then observe seven days of the wedding feast, and afterwards, he observes the seven days of mourning. During all those (all fourteen) days, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women (in order that they shouldn’t cohabit with each other; a mourner is forbidden to engage in cohabitation during the shivah days). We do not withhold ornaments for the bride all thirty days. (This is the case that the braisa is referring to; if the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died on a Monday, the marriage takes place immediately.)

*** The reason that we do not postpone the wedding is because otherwise, all the food will be lost. What is the reason that the Rabbis allowed the initial cohabitation? He should be regarded as an onein (one whose close relative has died and has not been buried yet), and the cohabitation should be Biblically prohibited?

*** Why is the initial marital act referred to as a mitzvah-cohabitation? The Chasam Sofer adds: A woman cannot become pregnant from her first act of cohabitation; if anything the second act should be regarded as the mitzvah-cohabitation?

*** During all those (all fourteen) days, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women. How many men are required? How many women are required?

*** The Rambam writes that the thirty days of mourning begin after the seven days of the wedding feast. Why can’t the seven days of the wedding feast be included in the thirty days? This should be similar to the law that the days of the festival are included in the thirty days.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 4 - Highlights

Marriage on Monday
The Gemora had stated: On Monday one should not marry, and if he did so due to the forced circumstances it is permitted. The Gemora offers an alternative explanation as to what the forced circumstances was. It refers to a case that we were taught in the following braisa: One whose bread was already baked, his animals were slaughtered, his wine was diluted in preparation for the wedding meal (all these items would spoil if the wedding would be delayed significantly), and the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died, the law is the following: We move the corpse to a room and we bring the groom and the bride to the chupah. (After burial, there would be a seven-day mourning period, in which they would be prohibited to marry.) He then would perform his dutiful marital act with his bride, and then he separates from her. (Immediately afterwards, the burial would take place.) They then observe seven days of the wedding feast, and afterwards, he observes the seven days of mourning. During all those (all fourteen) days, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women (in order that they shouldn’t cohabit with each other; a mourner is forbidden to engage in cohabitation during the shivah days). We do not withhold ornaments for the bride all thirty days. (This is the case that the braisa is referring to; if the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died on a Monday, the marriage takes place immediately.) (3b – 4a)

Preparations Lost

The Gemora qualifies the above ruling: The marriage takes place immediately if the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died because there is nobody else who would bother preparing for them (if everything that was prepared will be lost); however, in the reverse situation (if the mother of the groom or the father of the bride died), we do not delay their burial.

Rafram bar Papa said in the name of Rav Chisda: We delay the burial only if water was placed on the meat in preparation for its cooking (it will spoil if the wedding is postponed and it can no longer be sold in the market); but if the water was not placed on the meat, we delay the wedding until after the burial, because the meat may still be sold in the market.

Rava said: If this occurred in a big city (where people buy all types of meat), the wedding is postponed even if the water was placed on the meat because the meat may still be sold in the market.

Rav Papa said: If this occurred in a village, the wedding is not postponed even if the water was not placed on the meat because it is improbable that all the meat from the wedding feast will still be sold in the market.

The Gemora asks: If so, when does Rav Chisda’s distinction (if the water was placed on the meat or not) apply?

Rav Ashi answers: In a city like Masa Mechasya, which is smaller than a big city, but larger than a village.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rav Chisda: One whose bread was already baked, his animals were slaughtered, his wine was diluted in preparation for the wedding meal and water was placed on the meat, and the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died, the law is the following: We move the corpse to a room and we bring the groom and the bride to the chupah. He then would perform his dutiful marital act with his bride, and then he separates from her. (Immediately afterwards, the burial would take place.) They then observe seven days of the wedding feast, and afterwards, he observes the seven days of mourning. During all those (all fourteen) days, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women (in order that they shouldn’t cohabit with each other; a mourner is forbidden to engage in cohabitation during the shivah days). And similarly, if the bride would begin to menstruate after the chupah, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women. We do not withhold ornaments for the bride all thirty days. He shall never cohabit with his virgin bride for the first time on Erev Shabbos (Friday night) or Motzoei Shabbos (Saturday night). (4a)

Treating a Prohibition Lightly

The braisa had ruled: If the bride or groom is in a state of mourning or if the bride began to menstruate, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women.

Rav Yosef the son of Rava expounded in the name of Rava: The braisa’s ruling applies only if the husband did not cohabit with his wife yet, but if he did cohabit with her, his wife is permitted to sleep with him.

The Gemora asks: But in the case where one of their parents died, he has cohabited with her, and nevertheless, the braisa rules that the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women?

The Gemora answers: Rava was referring to the case where the bride began to menstruate.

(It emerges that if the bride began to menstruate and they had already cohabited, we trust them to be secluded together, but if one of them is in mourning, we do not trust them to be secluded together even if they had already cohabited.) The Gemora asks: Do people treat a prohibition pertaining to mourning more lightly that a prohibition regarding menstruation? But surely Rabbi Yitzchak bar Chanina said in the name of Rav Huna: All kinds of work that a woman performs for her husband, a menstruant may perform for her husband, except the mixing of the cup (of wine to serve him), and the making of his bed and the washing of his face, his hands and his feet (because these actions may bring about temptation); while with regard to mourning, it has been taught in the following braisa: Although the Rabbis said: No man has a right to force his wife (while she is mourning) to paint her eyes or powder her face, in truth they said: She may mix the cup for him, and she makes the bed for him and she washes his face, his hands and his feet? (It would seem that people treat a prohibition pertaining to menstruation more lightly that a prohibition regarding mourning!?)

The Gemora answers: This is not a difficulty. Here (where the braisa rules: he sleeps among the men and she sleeps among the women), it is referring to a case where the husband was mourning (for he might become tempted); there, the braisa is referring to a case where she was mourning (and she would resist any temptations).

The Gemora unsuccessfully challenges this distinction from a braisa.

Rav said to Chiya his son, when Chiya’s father-in-law died: You should observe the laws of mourning when your wife is present, but you are not required to observe the laws of mourning when she is not present. (4a – 4b)

Newlyweds

Rav Ashi answers the original question differently: Can you compare this mourning (by the newlywed couple) with an ordinary mourning? Ordinary mourning is strict in the eyes of people, and one would not treat it lightly (a wife is permitted to perform certain actions for her husband). But by this mourning, since the Rabbis were lenient regarding it, one might treat it lightly. What is the leniency? If you will say it is because he may perform the dutiful act of marriage with her first, that is only because the laws of mourning have not taken effect upon him yet. The Gemora explains: According to Rabbi Eliezer, the mourning does not begin until the body has been taken out the door of the house, and according to Rabbi Yehoshua, the mourning does not begin until the top of the casket has been closed! Rather, the leniency is this: They then observe seven days of the wedding feast, and afterwards, he observes the seven days of mourning. (4b)

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Revoking a Kiddushin

The Gemora asks, is there any kind of get (halachic divorce document) that the Torah says is invalid, and due to the concern regarding modest or brazen women, we will permit the men in the world to marry what is essentially a married woman?! The Gemora answers that yes, it is possible, as there is a principle that whoever effects kiddushin does so based on the standards of the Rabbanan. The Rabbanan took away the kiddushin from this man (and therefore the woman is not married, although she never received a get).

The Rashba asks: Why is this case different than the case in Yevamos where a man fell into water that has no end? There, we rule that the wife will remain an agunah because the husband might have exited the water from a place that was not visible to us. Why don’t we say that the Rabbanan took away the kiddushin from them, and she may remarry another man?

He answers: The two cases are very different. Here, there was a get, except that it was written with a condition, and an uncertainty arose regarding the condition. Another example where the Rabbanan would revoke the kiddushin is where one witness is testifying on the woman’s behalf (that her husband died). However, when there is no get and no witness, the Rabbanan did not go ahead and remove a kiddushin.

The Gemora in Yevamos (110a) records an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid).

Rav Ashi explains that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Rabbanan therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. (This is following the opinion of Rav, who maintains that for the marriage of a minor to become valid, she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult, and if not the marriage is invalid.)

The Rabbanan were empowered to remove the kiddushin in this case because he acted improperly in the beginning of the kiddushin.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei Hashas cites a Teshuvos haRashba who writes that we do not apply the principle of “Since he acted improperly, the Rabbanan acted improperly with him” only in places that are specifically mentioned in Chazal. The Sages did not annul the marriage in every case where one acts with trickery. This can be proven from a Gemora in Kiddushin (58b). The Gemora states: One who tells his friend to marry a woman for him (as an agent), and he goes ahead and marries her for himself, she is married to the second one. We do not say that since he acted improperly, the Chachamim invalidated his marriage.

This can be proven from the fact that even if one betroths a woman who is subject to a negative prohibition, kiddushin, nevertheless takes effect. This is also true if someone marries a woman who is a secondary ervah to him. Obviously, sometimes this principle is applied, and sometimes, it isn’t.

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