Yearning to the Return to Zion

It is written [Tehillim 87:5]: And to Zion it shall be said: "this man, this man, was born in her," and He will establish her on high. (This verse is describing the future time when all the nations of the world will bring the Jews back to Zion. They will say regarding each Jew: He is a son of Zion, he was born there, let us bring him back to her.)

Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said (Kesuvos 75a): This verse is applicable to any Jew that was born in Zion and one who yearns to see her. Even Jews who were born elsewhere will be considered children of Zion, provided that they learn to return there.

I began writing the following incident when I was shown that it was already printed in Daf Digest link, so I am writing their version (with a comment or two of my own).

During World War I, Palestine was under Turkish jurisdiction and the Ottomans made life very difficult for the citizens. Press gangs would roam the streets arbitrarily drafting anyone in their wake. The conditions of these forcibly drafted soldiers were exceedingly difficult. They were subjected to hard labor, and since food was exceedingly scarce they were severely underfed.

These circumstances could all be circumvented by paying bribes to officials. However, there was one decree that was exceedingly difficult to avert. The Turks declared that anyone not born in Palestine would be deported. This was more difficult to deal with than forcible conscription, since the only way someone born out of the country could get around this was to lie on the government forms.

Since everyone knew that Rav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, zt"l,(where I saw this story brought down, it was with Rav Yosef Rogotchovi from Petach Tikva, but see below)was very careful to avoid falsehood in any form no matter what it might cost, people were afraid that he would forbid people to lie on the forms. During those difficult times, simple honesty would result in the sundering of many homes. When someone ventured to ask the Rav's opinion about this issue, he surprised everyone in the Old Yishuv. "It is certainly permitted!"

"But why is this different from any other falsehood which the Rav prohibits?" the questioner asked.

Rav Sonnenfeld explained, "This is explicit in Kesuvos 75 on the verse, 'And of Tzion it shall be said, each and every man is born therein.' The Gemora learns from the redundancy of the word "man, each and every man" that one who yearns for Tzion is as one who was born there. We see clearly that any Jew who yearns for Tzion is actually considered as one who was born in Tzion! So to write of those who came up to Tzion out of longing for her holiness that they were native citizens is no lie at all: it is a declaration of the absolute truth!"

I saw this ruling from Rav Sonnenfeld in a slightly different context. It was a question regarding people who were not born in Eretz Yisroel and they were seeking permission from the courts to emigrate to Eretz Yisroel. The courts were only granting visas to those who were born in Eretz Yisroel. Rav Sonnenfeld ruled, based on our Gemora that not only is it permitted to testify that you were born in Eretz Yisroel, but one is obligated to do so. It is not regarded as a lie at all, since one who yearns to return to Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he was born there.

The Kloizenberger Rebbe zt"l added the following: It is written that the lifespan of a person is seventy years. The Gemora in Shabbos (89b) states that the Heavenly courts do not administer punishment for the first twenty years of one's life. Consequently, it can be said that the seventy years do not begin until one is twenty years old. So too, it can be said regarding one who emigrated to Eretz Yisroel. The seventy years of his life begins only after he lives in Eretz Yisroel.

This can be proven from Rashi's commentary on the following verse [Breishis 16:3]: So Sarai, Avram's wife, took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaid, at the end of ten years of Avram's dwelling in the land of Canaan, and she gave her to Avram her husband for a wife. Rashi writes: This tells us that the time they dwelled outside of Eretz Yisroel does not count in the calculation.

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Moshe as a King

The Gemora (Kesuvos 74a) had stated: All conditions are learned out from the stipulation that Moshe made with the tribes of Gad and Reuven. (For any condition to be valid, it must be similar to that condition.) A condition that may be executed by an agent, as Moshe did there (Moshe instructed Yehoshua to act, so to speak, as his agent to give the east bank of the Jordan to them), is a valid condition. However, any stipulation that cannot be executed by an agent is not regarded as a valid condition. (Chalitzah cannot be accomplished through an agent and therefore, a stipulation cannot be attached to it.)

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: If Moshe would be giving the tribes of Gad and Reuven something that belonged to him, and he would instruct Yehoshua to act on his behalf, Yehoshua would be regarded as an agent. However, Moshe was only distributing to them land that was an inheritance to them; why should Yehoshua be considered an agent?

He answers that the land of Sichon and Og was not included in Klal Yisroel’s inheritance. Their land belonged to Moshe since it was captured by Moshe and he had the status of a king. As a king, he was allowed to take possession of this land. Moshe, out of his good-heartedness decided to give away this land to the tribes of Gad and Reuven. It emerges that the instructions to Yehoshua rendered him as an agent of Moshe.

Incidentally, I noticed an interesting Makneh in his explanation of a Gemora in Kiddushin (32b). The Gemora relates that Rabban Gamliel was serving his guests by the wedding feast for his son. The Gemora explains that a Nasi is permitted to renounce the honor that should be given to him.

The Makneh asks from the Medrash in Parshas Yisro which states that Moshe acted as the waiter for Yisro and the other guests at the feast. Why was it permissible for Moshe, who had the status of a king, to forego the honor that one is required to give to a king? The halacha is that a king is not allowed to waive this honor!

He answers by citing the source for this halacha. The Gemora (Kesuvos 17a) states that it is written [Devarim 17:15]: Surely you shall appoint a king over you. This (the double expression of som tasim) means that his awe shall be over you at all times. The Makneh explains that at the moment a king chooses to waive his honor, it is tantamount to resigning from royalty and this is not allowed, for we are commanded to enthrone a king over us continually. This is only applicable after the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisroel and were commanded to enthrone a king; however, in the Desert, although Moshe was regarded as a king, he was permitted to waive his honor and serve his guests.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 74 - Highlights

Conditions

Rav Acha bar Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If a person betrothed a woman on a condition (that she had no current vows), and he later cohabited with her (and she was later found to be in violation of that condition), there is no argument between Rav and Shmuel; they both agree that she does not require a divorce (since the marriage is completely void).

Rav Acha (Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s sister’s son) the son of Rav Ika questioned Rav Acha bar Yaakov from the following braisa: If one mistakenly performed chalitzah, it is nonetheless valid.

The Gemora asks: What is the case of the “mistaken” chalitzah?

Rish Lakish said: It is referring to a case where they told the yavam to perform chalitzah, and with that, he will be marrying her (when in fact, chalitzah accomplishes the exact opposite).

Rabbi Yochanan challenged Rish Lakish: I learned in another braisa: Whether the yavam had the intention of performing the commandment of chalitzah and she had no such intention, or whether she had such intention and he did not, chalitzah is invalid. In order for the chalitzah to be valid, they both are required to have such intention. How can you say that the chalitzah is valid?

Rather, Rabbi Yochanan explains the braisa differently: It is referring to a case where they told the yavam to perform chalitzah on the condition that the yevamah will give him two hundred zuz. The halacha is that the chalitzah is valid even if she does not end up giving him the money.

Rav Acha the son of Rav Ika explains Rabbi Yochanan’s viewpoint and then concludes his challenge. The chalitzah is valid in this case because he performed the action of chalitzah (without repeating the condition at that time – Tosfos), therefore, we may assume that he has dispensed with his stipulation (regarding the money). Here too, let us say, since he cohabited with her (without repeating the condition at that time), he has obviously dispensed with the stipulation (regarding her vows) and the marriage should take effect! (Why does Rav Acha bar Yaakov rule in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the marriage is void?)

Rav Acha bar Yaakov replies: Torah scholar! Are you in fact saying the correct reason for that halacha? (I will explain to you the real reason that the chalitzah is valid.) All conditions are learned out from the stipulation that Moshe made with the tribes of Gad and Reuven. (For any condition to be valid, it must be similar to that condition.) A condition that may be executed by an agent, as Moshe did there (Moshe instructed Yehoshua to act, so to speak, as his agent to give the east bank of the Jordan to them), is a valid condition. However, any stipulation that cannot be executed by an agent is not regarded as a valid condition. (Chalitzah cannot be accomplished through an agent and therefore, a stipulation cannot be attached to it.)

The Gemora asks: But a kiddushin through cohabitation, which cannot be executed by an agent, and nevertheless, a stipulation attached to it is a valid one!?

The Gemora answers: That is because we compare the different methods of betrothal to each other. (74a)

Betrothal by a Loan, Stipulation or with Less than a Perutah

Rav Ula bar Abba said in the name of Ula, who said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: If a man betrothed a woman by a loan (which he lent to her; such a betrothal is invalid because loaned money is given to be spent, while a betrothal cannot be valid unless money or its equivalent was actually given to the woman at the time of the betrothal) and then he cohabited with her, or if he betrothed her on a certain condition and then he cohabited with her (and the conditions were not met), or if he betrothed her with less than the value of a perutah and then he cohabited with her, she requires a get from him according to all opinions (because a man does not want his cohabitation to be rendered promiscuous).

Rav Yosef bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Menachem, who said it in the name of Rabbi Ami: If a man betrothed a woman with less than the value of a perutah and then he cohabited with her, she requires a get from him. (Seemingly, he disagrees with Rabbi Elozar regarding one who betrothed a woman by a loan or with a condition that was not fulfilled, and he holds that a get would not be required.)

The Gemora explains Rabbi Ami’s opinion: People do not make a mistake regarding the laws of betrothing with less than a value of a perutah; everyone knows that such a kiddushin is not valid and the man, obviously, cohabited with her for the sake of kiddushin; therefore, a get would be required. By the other two cases (one who betrothed a woman by a loan or with a condition that was not fulfilled), people make a mistake (and the man might assume that a kiddushin can be valid even through a loan, or even if the conditions weren’t met; therefore, the cohabitation might not have been with the proper intent for kiddushin).

Rav Kahana said in the name of Ula: If a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then he cohabited with her (and the conditions were not met), she requires a get from him. There was once such an incident, and the Rabbis did not have the strength to discharge her without a get.

The Gemora notes: This ruling excludes the opinion of the following Tanna: Rav Yehuda quoted Shmuel as saying in the name of Rabbi Yishmael that when the verse states (regarding a married woman who consents to having an affair) “and she was not forced,” it is saying that she is therefore forbidden to her husband. This implies that if she was violated, she is permitted to her (Yisrael) husband. Rebbi Yishmael derives from the word “and she” that there is a case where a different woman was not forced, and is still permitted to her husband. What is this case? It must be where her kiddushin was mistaken (such as our case; a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then he cohabited with her and the conditions were not met; if she would subsequently cohabit with another man, she would still be permitted to return to the first man because her first marriage was not valid) and even if her son is riding on her shoulder, she can pick herself up and walk away from the marriage. (74a – 74b)

Distinction between a Chacham
and a Doctor

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a man betrothed a woman on the condition that she was not under any vows and she subsequently went to a Chacham who released her from the vow, she is betrothed. If however, he betrothed her on the condition that she did not have any defects and she subsequently went to a doctor who cured her from these defects, she is nevertheless, not betrothed.

The Gemora asks: What is the difference between a Chacham and a doctor?

The Gemora answers: The Chacham annuls the vow retroactively (and it is regarded as if she never pronounced the vow), whereas the doctor only cures the defects from that moment onward.

The Gemora asks from a different braisa that states the following: If a man betrothed a woman on the condition that she was not under any vows and she subsequently went to a Chacham who released her from the vow, or if he betrothed her on the condition that she did not have any defects and she subsequently went to a doctor who cured her from these defects, she is nevertheless, not betrothed. (This contradicts the previous braisa regarding the Chacham releasing her from her vow.)

Rabbah answers: the first braisa is following the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the second braisa follows the opinion of Rabbi Elozar.

Rabbah explains: Rabbi Meir holds that a man does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law (by applying in person to the Chacham for the annulment of her vow; it is assumed, therefore, that a man has no objection to betrothing a woman who is under a vow, since she may subsequently apply to a Chacham for a disallowance). Rabbi Elozar maintains that no man wants his wife to be exposed to a court of law (consequently, if he had known that she was under a vow, he would not have betrothed her; therefore, her betrothal is invalid).

The Gemora asks: What is the source for these opinions?

The Gemora answers: We learned in a Mishna (Gittin 45b): If one divorces his wife because of a vow, he may not take her back. If he divorced her because of a bad name (it was rumored that she committed adultery), he may not take her back. (The reason for this halacha is as follows: According to one opinion, it is possible that after the woman had obtained from a Chacham the disallowance of her vow and had married another man, her first husband might regret his action in divorcing her and he might claim that he would not have divorced her had he known that her vow could be disallowed. Consequently, this might impair the validity of her second marriage. By the enactment that “he may not remarry her,” a husband is naturally induced to institute all the necessary enquiries and to consider very carefully his course before he decides upon divorce, and should he nevertheless divorce her and then claim that he was unaware that her vow could be disallowed, his plea might well be disregarded. According to another opinion, the prohibition to marry a woman in the circumstances mentioned is a penalty, and a warning to women to abstain from making vows.) Rabbi Yehudah says: If the vow was known to many, he may not take her back, but for one that was not known publicly, he may take her back. Rabbi Meir says: If it is a vow which requires examination by a Chacham (and the husband cannot annul it by himself), he may not take her back (Rabbi Meir maintains that a husband does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law and therefore forbids remarriage on account of the first reason mentioned above, since the first husband might claim that if he had known that the vow could be disallowed by a Chacham, he would not have consented to give a divorce), but for one which does not require examination by a Chacham (the husband can annul it himself), he may take her back (because in this case, the husband cannot advance the claim that the divorce was due to a misunderstanding). Rabbi Elozar said: They prohibited him to remarry in the case where the vow required examination by a Chacham to annul it only on account of the case where the vow did not require examination by a Chacham to annul it (since in the latter case, the husband might claim that he was not aware that he had the right to disallow the vow; in the former case, however, no such claim can be advanced because no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law).

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source for Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion.

The Gemora asks: How many people is considered public (that a vow pronounced in public may not be annulled)?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: Three people.

Rav Yitzchak said: Ten people. (74b – 75a)

[END]

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A Legitimate Marital Act,not a Promiscuous One

It was taught: If a person betrothed a woman on a condition (that she had no current vows), and he later married her without mentioning that condition (and she was later found to be in violation of that condition), there is an argument between Rav and Shmuel. Rav says that she requires a divorce, while Shmuel argues that she does not require a divorce.

Abaye states: Do not say that the reasoning of Rav is that because he married her without mentioning the condition he must have forgone the stipulation. Rather, Rav’s reasoning is that a person does not make his marital relations into promiscuity.

The Rishonim ask: The cohabitation in this case is anyways a promiscuous, non-marital cohabitation! This is because we learned previously (54b) that if anyone reduces the prescribed kesuvah amount from his wife, any acts of cohabitation is regarded as promiscuous. In our case, she does forfeit her kesuvah since the husband stipulated that she should not be under any vows, and since it emerged that she is under a vow, he would not be obligated to pay her kesuvah! Accordingly, what advantage is there that he does not want his cohabitation to be a promiscuous one (and therefore, the betrothal is valid), it is anyways regarded as a promiscuous one?

The Ran answers: A person is particular that he will not intentionally render his cohabitation to be regarded as a promiscuous one. However, he is not particular if the Rabbis render his cohabitation to be promiscuous (and it is the Rabbis who deemed it to e a promiscuous cohabitation, when he cohabits with a wife without a kesuvah).

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 73 - Highlights

Betrothal on Condition

It was taught: If a person betrothed a woman on a condition (that she had no current vows), and he later married her without mentioning that condition (and she was later found to be in violation of that condition), there is an argument between Rav and Shmuel. Rav says that she requires a divorce, while Shmuel argues that she does not require a divorce.

Abaye states: Do not say that the reasoning of Rav is that because he married her without mentioning the condition he must have forgone the stipulation. Rather, Rav’s reasoning is that a person does not make his marital relations into promiscuity.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rav and Shmuel already have such an argument? It was taught: A minor was married off by her brother or mother in a Rabbinical marriage in her youth, and stayed married to her first husband, and had marital relations with him even once she became older. She then did mi’un (refused the Rabbinical marriage) and married someone else. Rav says: She does not require a divorce from the second person (as she is still married to the first person). Shmuel states: She does require a divorce from her second husband.

[The Gemora presumes that their argument is regarding the status of their marital relations when she became older. Did the first husband have relations when she became older in order to do a Torah betrothal (not just Rabbinical as it was previously), or was this just a continuation of the first marriage? This could fit into the argument of whether or not a person will allow his marital relations to retroactively be deemed promiscuity.]

The Gemora answers: Both arguments are necessary. If Rav would have only discussed the argument regarding the minor, one might think that this is because she did not violate any condition. However, where there was a clear violation of a condition Rav might agree to Shmuel that she does not even require a divorce. Similarly, if the case regarding conditions was the only one stated, perhaps only there Shmuel said a divorce is unnecessary. However, in the case regarding the marriage of the minor, perhaps he would agree to Rav that she does not need a divorce. This is why both arguments are necessary. (72b – 73a)

Challenging Shmuel

The Mishna states: If a person married a woman without conditions, and he found that she had existing vows, he can divorce her without giving her a kesuvah. The Gemora asks: This implies that while she does not receive a kesuvah, she does require a divorce. It must be that this is a case of where he betrothed her on condition and married her without mentioning the condition, and this is inconsistent with the ruling of Shmuel that she does not require a divorce!

The Gemora answers: No, the case is where the entire betrothal and marriage was done without conditions. If the betrothal was on such a condition and the marriage was not, she indeed would not require a divorce.

The Gemora asks: Instead of the Mishna giving a case of a betrothal done on the condition a woman has no existing vows, and saying that if the condition was violated the betrothal was invalid, the Mishna should merely say that if a person marries a woman and she is found to have vows the marriage is invalid. We would certainly know that in a case where the condition was mentioned upon betrothal that the marriage is invalid!

The Gemora answers: The Mishna indeed means to say this in the following manner. If a person betrothed a woman on the condition that she had no vows and he later married her without mentioning that condition, the betrothal is invalid. If the betrothal and marriage is done without condition and it is found that she has vows, she can be divorced without a kesuvah. This implies correctly that although she does not need a kesuvah, she does require a divorce. (73a – 73b)

Distinction between Kesuvah
and a Get

The Gemora asks: What is the difference? Why should she require a divorce but nor receive a kesuvah? The Gemora answers: It is because he says, “I cannot live with a woman who makes vows.”

The Gemora asks: If so, let her not require a divorce as well! Rabbah answers: She only requires a Rabbinical divorce. This is also the opinion of Rav Chisda. Rava says: The Rabbis were unsure if she requires a divorce, and therefore were lenient about the husband’s monetary kesuvah obligation, but were strict that she should receive a divorce (which has halachic ramifications). (73b)

A Betrothal in Error

Rabbah states: The argument (of Rav and Shmuel) is only regarding one who betroths two women in a possibly mistaken fashion. [The case is where he makes a condition with the first that she has no vows, but he married the second lady without mentioning anything. Rav would say that he perhaps liked the second one so much he didn’t care if she had vows, while Shmuel would say his mindset is clearly that he does not want wives with vows.] However, in a case where he made their betrothal conditional but did not mention the condition by the marriage, everyone (even Rav) agrees that he relented on his condition.

Abaye asked: Our Mishna is clearly talking about one woman, and we asked a question on Shmuel above from this Mishna!

The Gemora answers: It must be that this is what Rabbah meant to say. Their argument is regarding a case of one woman but similar to a mistake by two women. [The case is where the betrothal was on condition; he then divorced her before marrying her, and then betrothed her and married her without condition.] However, in a regular case where the betrothal is with a condition and the marriage is unconditional, everyone agrees he relented on his condition.

Abaye asked: The Beraisa states that if a betrothal was a mistake, or done with less than a perutah (small coin), the betrothal was done by a minor, even if he later sent presents to his “fiancé” (when he became older or in any of the cases above), the betrothal is invalid. This is because the presents are an extension of the original invalid betrothal. However, if the couple engage in marital relations, the betrothal is valid. Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Even if they have marital relations the betrothal is invalid. In this case, Abaye asks, the question is regarding one woman, and we see they still argue! [Rav and Shmuel should also argue in such a case!]

The Gemora continues: The case above (mistaken betrothal) must be where he thought that she did not have vows! The Gemora answers: No, it is talking about the case where the betrothal was done with less than a perutah.

The Gemora asks: This cannot be the case of mistaken betrothal mentioned in the Beraisa, as that case is mentioned separately in the Beraisa! The Gemora answers: It is as if the Beraisa stated, “What is a case of mistaken betrothal? Someone who does betrothal with less than a perutah.”

The Gemora asks: What is the reasoning behind the argument in the Beraisa? The Gemora answers: One opinion (Tana Kama) holds that a person knows that betrothal with less than a perutah is invalid. Therefore, when he had marital relations, he had in mind to have a real betrothal. The other (Rabbi Shimon) says that a person doesn’t realize that betrothal cannot be done with less than a perutah. Therefore, when he has marital relations, he does so based upon what he thinks was already a valid betrothal (and he has no intent that this should be a valid betrothal).

The Gemora asks from a Beraisa: If a man says “I will have marital relations (betrothal) with you on condition that my father approves,” the betrothal is valid even if his father does not approve. Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi Yehuda states in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father approves, the betrothal is valid. If not, it is invalid. Isn’t this a case where only one woman is involved and yet they argue?

The Gemora answers: They are arguing about the following. One opinion says that the condition meant that as long as his father is quiet about it, the betrothal is valid. The father was indeed quiet, therefore the betrothal is valid. The other opinion says that the condition meant that verbal approval was needed from the father, and the father remained quiet. Therefore the betrothal is invalid. (73b)


[END]

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Sheitels

The Mishna had stated: And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered.

The Gemora (Kesuvos 72a) asks: Isn’t going out with her hair uncovered a Biblical prohibition?

The Gemora answers: Biblically, it would have been sufficient if she had covered her head with a head-basket (where some of her hair would have shown through the spaces; the Jewish custom would require a complete covering).

The Rambam seems to say that even if the basket covered her hair completely, Jewish practice mandated that she should also wear a shawl that would drape over her body.

The Chasam Sofer writes that the purpose of this shawl was to cover the hairs that protrude from under the head covering.

The Beis Yosef cites a Rashba, who rules that the wife’s hair, which is common to stick out from under the covering, is not regarded as an ervah to the husband if the husband is accustomed to seeing that hair and he would be permitted to recite kerias shema in such a situation.

The Chasam Sofer writes further that the shawl’s purpose is to cover even those hears which protrude from her head covering. However, the hairs that still stick out are not regarded as being an ervah to the husband.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 72 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: One who restricts his wife by a vow that she should not go to her father’s house, this is the halacha: When her father is with her in the city, if the term was for less than a month, he keeps her, but if the vow was for two months (more than one month), he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah (since it is customary for the wife to visit him frequently). When her father is in another city, if the term was for one festival, he keeps her, but if the vow was for three festivals, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah.

One who restricts his wife by a vow that she should not go to a mourner’s house or a wedding, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah, because he is in essence “locking the door in front of her.” If the husband claims that he made this vow because of “something else” (the Gemora will define this term), he is permitted to do so (and she may not demand a divorce).

If the husband tells her: On the condition that you tell So-and-So what you told me, or (he said) what I told you, or that you fill up or pour into the garbage, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah. (71b)

Two Festivals

The Gemora asks: The Mishna had stated that if the term was for one festival, he may keep her. We can infer from here that if the term was for two festivals, he would be required to divorce her. Then, the Mishna rules that if the term was for three festivals, he is required to divorce her. We can infer from here that if the term was for two festivals, he may keep her as a wife. These implicit rulings are contradictory!

Abaye answers: The second ruling is dealing with the wife of a Kohen, and it is following the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah (who allots extra time for the term of the vow before he would be required to divorce her).

Rabbah bar Ula answers: The first ruling of the Mishna is referring to a woman who is anxious to go to her father’s house, whereas the second ruling of the Mishna is referring to a woman who is not so anxious (and therefore, even a vow with the term of two festivals would not be grounds for divorce). (71b)

Mourning for Others
The Mishna had stated: One who restricts his wife by a vow that she should not go to a mourner’s house or a wedding, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah, because he is in essence “locking the door in front of her.”

The Gemora asks: We can understand why it is regarded as “locking the door in front of her,” when he forbids her to attend a wedding. But why are we so concerned by the fact that she cannot go to a mourner’s house?

The Gemora answers: If she does not participate in the mourning of others, they will not come to eulogize her, or they will not come to bury her.

The Gemora cites a related braisa: Rabbi Meir used to say: It is written [Koheles 7:2]: It is better to go to the house of mourning than to go to a house of feasting, for that is the end of all man, and the living should take it to heart. What does the last part of the verse mean? The living should take to heart matters connected with death.

The Gemora explains the reward for those who eulogize the dead: One who eulogizes over the dead, others will eulogize over him. One who buries the dead, others will bury him. One who cries for the dead, others will cry for him. One who accompanies the dead, others will accompany him. One who carries the dead, others will carry him. (71b – 72a)
Dissolute People at the Wedding
The Mishna had stated: If the husband claims that he made this vow because of “something else,” he is permitted to do so (and she may not demand a divorce).

The Gemora asks: What does the Mishna mean when it says “something else”?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: He claimed that there were promiscuous people there, and that is why he did not want her to attend.

Rav Ashi says: His claim is only legitimate if it has been substantiated that these people were there, but otherwise, we would not believe him. (72a)
Fill Up and Pour into the Garbage
The Mishna had stated: If the husband tells her: On the condition that you tell So-and-So what you told me, or (he said) what I told you, or that you fill up or pour into the garbage, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: Why don’t we tell her to fill up or pour into the garbage?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: The Mishna is not to be taken literally. Rather, it is a euphemism for filling herself with his seed and then pouring it out (vigorous exercise after cohabitation in order to prevent conception).

The Gemora cites a braisa: The meaning of the vow is that she should fill ten pitchers of water and spill them into the garbage.

The Gemora asks: Why is he required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah; let her do it!?

Rabbah bar bar Chana answers in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: By doing so, she will appear foolish. (72b)
Bad Reputation
Rav Kahana said: If a man restricts his wife with a vow that she shall neither borrow nor lend a fine or a coarse sieve, a mill or an oven, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah, because if she would she fulfill the vow, it would give her a bad reputation among her neighbors.

The Gemora cites a braisa which supports Rav Kahana: If a man restricts his wife with a vow that she shall neither borrow nor lend a fine or a coarse sieve, a mill or an oven, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah, because if she would she fulfill the vow, it would give her a bad reputation among her neighbors. Similarly, if she vowed that she shall neither borrow nor lend a fine or a coarse sieve, a mill or an oven, or that she shall not weave beautiful garments for his children, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah, because she gives him a bad name among his neighbors (since they will say that he is stingy). (72a)
Mishna
The Mishna states: And these are divorced without receiving a kesuvah: She who transgresses the laws of Moshe or the Jewish customs. And what are the laws of Moshe? She serves him untithed food, or cohabits with him while she is a niddah, or if she does not separate challah from bread, or if she makes vows and does not fulfill them. And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered, or spins in the street, or talks to every man. Abba Shaul says: Also if she curses his parents in his presence. Rabbi Tarfon says: Also one who screams. And who is regarded as a screamer? One who speaks inside her house and her neighbors hear her voice. (72a)
Explaining the Mishna
The Mishna had stated: If she serves him untithed food, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: How are we to understand this? If the husband knows the fact, let him abstain? And if he does not know, how did he discover it?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where she told him, “'So-and-So, the Rabbi has ruled that the blood was tahor for me,” and he went and asked him and her statement was discovered to be untrue.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that it can be in accordance with Rav Yehudah who says that a woman, who was established by her neighbors to be a niddah (based upon the clothing that she was wearing), her husband will receive lashes if he cohabits with her.

The Mishna had stated: If she cohabits with him while she is a niddah, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: How are we to understand this? If the husband knows the fact, let him abstain? And if he does not know, let us now rely on her statement that she was not a niddah at that time?

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source which indicates that a woman is believed in this regard.

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where she told him, “'So-and-So, the Kohen has tithed the pile of grain for me,” and he went and asked him and her statement was discovered to be untrue.

The Mishna had stated: If she does not separate challah from bread, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: How are we to understand this? If the husband knows the fact, let him separate the challah himself? And if he does not know, how did he discover it?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where she told him, “'So-and-So, a kneader separated the challah for me,” and he went and asked him and her statement was discovered to be untrue.

The Mishna had stated: If she makes vows and does not fulfill them, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah.

This transgression effects her marriage as the master said: One’s children will die young for the sin of not fulfilling one’s vows. As the verse states: Do not let your mouth cause your flesh to sin, and do not say before the angel that it was unintentional; why should Hashem be angry at your voice, and He will destroy your handiwork? A person’s handiwork is his children, and if he does not fulfill his vows, Hashem will take his children from him. (72a)
Violating Her Vows
The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Meir said: Any man who knows that his wife makes vows and does not fulfill them should impose (the same) vows upon her again.

The Gemora asks: You say that he should impose the same vows upon her again? How will this be a remedy?

The Gemora answers: Rather, say that he should provoke her again in order that she should make her vows in his presence and he would thus be able to annul them.

They, however, said to him: No one can live with a serpent in the same basket (she will eventually pronounce a vow without him annulling it and she will then proceed to violate it).

The Gemora cites a related braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: Any husband, who knows that his wife does not properly separate challah from the dough that she bakes, should separate it himself again after her.

They, however, said to him: No one can live with a serpent in the same basket.

The Gemora notes: He who taught it (that the husband can protect the marriage) in connection with this case (the challah) would certainly apply it with even greater force to the other case (the wife who violates her vows). He, however, who taught it in connection with the other case applies it to that case only, but not to this one (the challah), because it might sometimes happen that he would eat from bread that has not been separated (since she bakes all the time). (72a)
Uncovered Head
The Mishna had stated: And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t going out with her hair uncovered a Biblical prohibition?

The Gemora answers: Biblically, it would have been sufficient if she had covered her head with a head-basket (where some of her hair would have shown through the spaces; the Jewish custom would require a complete covering).

Rabbi Assi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: A woman, who goes out wearing a head-basket, is not violating the prohibition of going out with one’s head uncovered.

Rabbi Zeira asked: Where is she going? If she is going into the public street, the Jewish custom is that her head must be completely covered? Rather, we are obviously talking about a courtyard. But, if so (that you are ruling that she must be wearing some type of head-covering), you will not leave our father Avraham a single daughter who could remain with her husband (since it was common for all married women go about in their court-yards with uncovered heads)!

Abaye said, and other say: Rav Kahana said: She was going from one courtyard to another courtyard through an alley (since fewer people frequent an alley, it would not have been included in the restrictions of a public street, yet it is not considered sufficiently private to allow the woman to go about there with her head completely uncovered). (72a – 72b)
Spinning in the Street
The Mishna had stated: And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered or she spins in the street.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: She uncovers her arms to the men as she spins.

Rav Chisda said in the name of Avimi: As she is spinning the thread, the thread extends to her thigh area (calling intention to her private parts). (72b)
Talks to Every Man
The Mishna had stated: And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered, or spins in the street, or talks to every man.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: Talking to men is referring to a woman who is flirting with young men.

The Gemora records an incident: Rabbah bar bar Chanah said: I was once walking behind Rav Ukva when I observed an Arab woman who was sitting, casting her spindle and spinning, and she extended the thread to her thighs. When she saw us, she detached the spindle from the thread, threw it down and said to me, “Young man, hand me my spindle.” Rav Ukva made a statement concerning her behavior. What was that statement? Ravina replied: He spoke of her as a woman who spins in the street. The Rabbis said: He spoke of her as one who talks to every man. (72b)

Cursing his Parents
The Mishna had stated: Abba Shaul says: Also if she curses his parents in his presence.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: This includes also one who curses her husband’s parents in the presence of his offspring; and your mnemonic (that grandsons are like sons) sign is: Ephraim and Menasheh shall be to me as Reuven and Shimon.

Rabbah explained: For instance, when she said in the presence of her husband’s son, “May a lion devour your grandfather.” (72b)
A Screamer
The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Tarfon says: Also one who screams.

The Gemora asks: And who is regarded as a screamer?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: She raises her voice concerning marital relations.

It was taught in a braisa: A screaming woman is one, who while engaging in marital relations with her husband in one courtyard, can be heard (screaming due to the pain) in another courtyard.

The Gemora asks: If so, this case should be included in the Mishna that deals with blemishes?

Rather, it is clear that the explanation is in the manner that we initially answered. (72b)

[END]

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Living in Eretz Yisroel and not Eating Meat or Drinking Wine

If a woman living outside of Eretz Yisroel pronounced a vow that she will go and live in Eretz Yisroel; at the time of her vow, it was not dangerous to live there, but later, there was a fear of war. Is the husband allowed to annul her vow?

Perhaps this question would be dependent on whether there is a mitzvah nowadays to live in Eretz Yisroel. Rabbeinu Chaim Kohen and Tosfos (110b) maintain that there is no mitzvah. The Ramban and other Rishonim disagree and hold that there is a mitzvah.

The Chidah in Birkei Yosef discusses if this is regarded as a vow that involves personal affliction or not.

Another inquiry: If a wife pronounces a vow against eating meat and drinking wine, but she does so on advice from her doctors that it is not healthy for her; can the husband annul such a vow?

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein says that the husband may annul such a vow, because even though the doctors say that consumption of meat and wine are unhealthy, that is only if he indulges in them, but eating a little meat and drinking a little wine will not cause her harm, and on the contrary, it would have some health benefits; therefore, the husband may annul such a vow. If the doctors state unequivocally that any amount of meat or wine will be harmful for her, then, the husband will not be allowed to annul such a vow.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 71 - Highlights

Rabbi Yehudah’s Opinion

The Mishna had stated (regarding one who had made a vow prohibiting his wife from deriving any pleasure from him until thirty days): Rabbi Yehudah said: If he is a Yisroel, he can keep her as a wife and she is required to be supported through a steward; if he is a Kohen, he can keep her as a wife even if the term of the vow was until two months (we are more lenient because after she is divorced, he cannot remarry her later).

The Gemora asks: Aren’t the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Yehudah stating the same opinion?

Abaye answers: Rabbi Yehudah is teaching us the halacha regarding the wife of a Kohen.

Rava answers: The difference between them is concerning a full month or a deficient month (the Tanna Kamma maintains that the appointed steward supports her for thirty days, whereas Rabbi Yehudah holds that he should sustain her for only twenty-nine days). (71a)

Unspecified Amount

Rav said: The halacha that the husband may support his wife through an appointed steward is only applicable when the husband specified a term for his vow (less than thirty days); however, if he did not specify any amount, he must divorce her immediately and give her the kesuvah. Shmuel said: Even in this case, he is not required to divorce her immediately, for perhaps, he will find an opening for his vow (and a Chacham will thereby, release him from his vow).

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rav and Shmuel have this exact dispute a different time (why do they argue twice regarding the same issue)? For we learned in a Mishna: If one vowed, prohibiting his wife to have conjugal relations with him, Beis Shamai say: Two weeks (if the vow is for longer than this period, it is the duty of the husband either to have his vow disallowed or to release his wife by divorce). Beis Hillel say: One week. And Rav said: The argument is only applicable when the husband specified a term for his vow (one or two weeks); however, if he did not specify any amount, he must divorce her immediately and give her the kesuvah. Shmuel said: Even in this case, he is not required to divorce her immediately, for perhaps, he will find an opening for his vow (and a Chacham will thereby, release him from his vow).

The Gemora answers: It was necessary for them to argue in both instances. For if they would have argued only by the case of the marital relations, that is where Rav would say that he must divorce her immediately because the option of an appointed steward is not available; however, by the case of the vow prohibiting benefit, where it is possible to sustain her through a steward, perhaps Rav would agree to Shmuel. And if they would have argued only in the case of the vow prohibiting benefit, perhaps that is where Shmuel would say that he is not required to divorce her immediately, it is possible to sustain her through a steward; however, by the case of the marital relations, where the option of an appointed steward is not available, perhaps Shmuel would agree to Rav. Therefore, the Gemora concludes that both arguments were necessary. (71a)

Put her Finger Between Her Teeth

The Gemora asks on Shmuel from our Mishna: One who vows that his wife not eat from a certain type of fruit is required to divorce his wife and give her a kesuvah. Now, according to Rav, we can explain this part of the Mishna to be referring to a case where the term of vow was unspecified and therefore, he is required to divorce her immediately. The first part of the Mishna is dealing with a case where he specified a certain period of time. However, according to Shmuel, why, in this latter case, is he required to divorce her immediately?

The Gemora answers: The case we are dealing with is where the wife pronounced the vow and the husband upheld it (there is no reason to wait and see if the wife will go to a Chacham to release her from the vow). And Rabbi Meir maintains that it is “he who put her finger between her teeth” (i.e. it is the husband’s fault because he could have annulled her vow), and therefore, she may demand to be divorced.

The Gemora asks: Does Rabbi Meir actually hold that it is “he who put her finger between her teeth”? But we learned in the following braisa: If a woman made a vow of a nazirus (which would forbid her from drinking wine or eating anything which has grapes as an ingredient) and her husband heard of it and did not annul it, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah said: It is “she who has thereby put her own finger between her teeth.” Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he said: I do not want a wife who is accustomed to taking vows, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah. Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Elozar said: It is “he who has put his finger between her teeth.” Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he said: I do not want a wife who is accustomed to taking vows, she may be divorced, but she does receive her kesuvah. (Thus we see that Rabbi Meir maintains that the wife is the one who “put her finger between her teeth”?)

The Gemora answers: Reverse their opinions: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah said: “He has put” and Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Elozar said: “She has put.”

The Gemora asks: But does Rabbi Yosi actually hold that it is “she who put her finger between her teeth”? But we learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Yosi said: If she was a poor woman, he is required to divorce her only if the vow was uttered without specifying a time limit. (This is referring to a case where she pronounced the vow and her husband upheld it, and if she did specify a time limit, she may demand a divorce. Thus, we see that Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is “he who put her finger between her teeth”?)

The Gemora answers: We are compelled to emend the opinions once again, and the following is what the braisa should have said: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi said: “He has put” and Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Elozar said: “She has put.”

The Gemora asks: But does Rabbi Yehudah actually hold that it is “she who put her finger between her teeth”? But we learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Yehudah said: If he is a Yisroel and the vow was only for one day, he can keep her as a wife (however, if it was for two days or more, he divorces her and gives her the kesuvah; once again, according to Shmuel, this is a case where she pronounced the vow and he upheld it; it emerges that Rabbi Yehudah also holds that it is “he who has put her finger between her teeth”)?

The Gemora emends the braisa to read as follows: Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yosi said: “He has put” and Rabbi Elozar said: “She has put.”

Alternatively, if you insist that the braisa taught the opinions in pairs, you can say that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elozar said: “She has put” and Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yosi said: “He has put,” and our anonymous Mishna will not be in accordance with Rabbi Meir (although the reverse is usually the case). (71a)

The Gemora asks: (According to Shmuel, the Mishna is referring to a case where she pronounced the vow and he upheld it) Rabbi Yosi holds that a poor woman, where a time limit was not specified (she pronounced a vow against using perfume; the husband is required to divorce her), evidently, the husband should have annulled the vow (and by refraining from doing so, it is his responsibility). The following braisa would seemingly contradict this: These are the vows which a husband may annul: Vows which involve personal affliction. For instance, if a woman said, “If I bathe,” or “If I do not bathe; “If I use adornments,” or “If I do not use adornments.” Rabbi Yosi said: These are not regarded as vows involving personal affliction. Rather, the following are vows that involve personal affliction: “I shall not eat meat,” or “I shall not drink wine,” or “I shall not adorn myself with colored clothing.” (It emerges that a vow regarding perfumes is not considered a personal affliction and the husband cannot annul such a vow!?)

The Gemora answers: Our Mishna is discussing adornments that are between him and her (a powder, for instance, for the removal of pubic hair; a woman’s abstention from the use of such kinds of cosmetics or adornments are regarded as things affecting their intimate relations and such vows are regarded as a personal affliction and may be annulled by a husband).

The Gemora asks: This is understandable according to the opinion who maintains that a husband may annul a vow which concerns matters that are between him and her; however, what is there to say according to the opinion who holds that a husband may not annul a vow which concerns matters that are between him and her? For we learned as follows: Concerning matters that are between him and her, Rav Huna said: A husband may annul such a vow and Rav Adda bar Ahavah said: He cannot, for we never found that a fox died in his own foxhole (a proverb meaning that one is not injured by an element to which one is accustomed; the husband being accustomed to his wife’s intimate parts, will not damage himself by her excess pubic hair; since the intimate relations of husband and wife are not affected by such a vow, the husband has no right to invalidate them; how, then, can he be penalized in the case of the adornments spoken of in our Mishna)?

The Gemora answers: We are dealing with a case where she made her cohabitation dependent upon her use of adornments, by saying: The enjoyment of cohabitation with you shall be forbidden to me should I ever make use of any adornment. (This vow, obviously, may be annulled by the husband since it effects their marital relations.)

This vow takes effect according to Rav Kahana, for Rav Kahana said: If a wife pronounces the following vow: The enjoyment of cohabitation with me shall be forbidden to you, we force her to cohabit with him (since the husband has a legal right to have pleasure in his marital relations, and such a vow has no validity). However, if she pronounces: The enjoyment of cohabitation with you shall be forbidden to me, he may annul the vow (since the vow was directed towards her pleasure, it takes effect; and we cannot force her to have relations with him) since we may not feed a person something that is forbidden to him (in our case, it would be forbidden to her).

The Gemora asks: But in our case (where she made her cohabitation dependent upon her use of adornments, by saying: The enjoyment of cohabitation with you shall be forbidden to me should I ever make use of any adornment), let her not adorn herself and she will not become forbidden to have relations with him (and therefore, it should not be regarded as a vow that involves matters that are between him and her, and consequently, the husband should not be allowed to annul such a vow)?

The Gemora answers: If so (that she will not adorn herself), she will be referred to as a repulsive woman (and since she eventually will adorn herself, it is regarded as a vow that involves matters that are between him and her).

The Gemora asks: Let her adorn herself and become forbidden to partake in relations with him, and according to Beis Shamai, this should be for two weeks and according to Beis Hillel, it should be for one week (why is he required to divorce her immediately)?

The Gemora answers: The dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel applies only to a case where the husband has forbidden her by a vow because in such circumstances she thinks: He may have been angry with me, but he will eventually calm down. Here, however, since she has made the vow and he remained silent, she comes to the following conclusion: Since he remained silent, he must indeed hate me (and therefore, he divorces her immediately). (71a – 71b)

Time Limit

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yosi said: If she was a poor woman, he is required to divorce her only if the vow was uttered without specifying a time limit.

The Gemora asks: How long of a time is considered as if there was a term limit specified (and within that time, he would not be required to divorce her)?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: It is twelve months.

Rabbah bar bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: It is ten years.

Rav Chisda said: It is until the festival, but not including the festival since it is common for a Jewish girl to adorn herself during the festival. (71b)

[END]

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Showing Gratitude to the Swindlers

The Gemora (Kesuvos 68) cites an incident: Rabbi Chanina had a poor man to whom he regularly sent four zuz on every Erev Shabbos. One day he sent the money with his wife who came back and told him that the man was in no need of charity. Rabbi Chanina asked her, “What did you see?” She replied, “I heard that he was asked, ‘On what would you like to dine? Would you like silver or gold tablecloths?’” Rabbi Chanina remarked, “It is because of such cases that Rabbi Elozar said: Come and let us be grateful to the swindlers (who pretend to be poor), for were it not for them, we would have been sinning every day (on account of ignoring the poor).

*** The Gemora cites a Scriptural verse proving that one is regarded as a sinner if he does not give charity to a poor person. Why is a special verse necessary? The mitzvah of giving tzedakah should be like any other mitzvah, and one who refrains from giving to a pauper should automatically be transgressing this mitzvah?

*** How can we give gratitude to the swindlers; it is prohibited to provide assistance for one who is committing a transgression? Cheaters and swindlers are from the group that will not merit seeing the Shechina; wouldn’t it be better if there weren’t any swindlers at all?

*** What sin are we showing gratitude to the swindlers for? Is it for the sin of ignoring a genuine poor person, or perhaps, it is only if we ignore a person whom we are uncertain if he is actually poor or not?

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 68 - Highlights

Pretenders

The Gemora cites an incident: Rabbi Chanina had a poor man to whom he regularly sent four zuz on every Erev Shabbos. One day he sent the money with his wife who came back and told him that the man was in no need of charity. Rabbi Chanina asked her, “What did you see?” She replied, “I heard that he was asked, ‘On what would you like to dine? Would you like silver or gold tablecloths?’” Rabbi Chanina remarked, “It is because of such cases that Rabbi Elozar said: Come and let us be grateful to the swindlers (who pretend to be poor), for were it not for them, we would have been sinning every day (on account of ignoring the poor).

Rabbi Chiya bar Rav of Difti taught the following braisa: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha said: Any one who shuts his eyes against charity is regarded like who worships idols.

The Gemora cites a related braisa: If a man pretends to have a blind eye, a swollen belly or a shriveled leg, he will not depart from this world before actually experiencing such a condition. If a man accepts charity and is not in need of it, his end will be that he will not depart from this world before he experiences such a condition. (67b – 68a)

Less than Two Hundred Zuz

The Gemora cites a Mishna in Pe’ah: We do not compel him (one who has less than two hundred zuz in cash and he therefore wishes to take a share in the poor man's gifts) to sell his house or his utensils (even though the proceeds from such a sale will raise his capital to above two hundred zuz, and he will not be considered a pauper any longer).

The Gemora asks: Is that so? Was it not taught in the following braisa: If a poor man was in the habit of using gold utensils, he must sell them and use silver utensils. If he was in the habit of using silver utensils, he must sell them and use copper ones. (This indicates that a poor man is expected to sell his costlier goods before he is allowed to take entitlements designated for the poor; why then was it stated here that he is not compelled to sell his house or utensils?)

Rav Zevid replied. This is no difficulty. The braisa is referring to his bed and table (we require him to sell them); the Mishna is referring to his cups and dishes.

The Gemora asks: What difference is there in the case of the cups and dishes that they are not to be sold? Obviously because he can say, “The inferior quality is repulsive to me.” But in respect of a bed and table also, he might say, “The cheaper ones are unacceptable to me!”

Rava the son of Rabbah offers a different answer: The braisa is referring to a silver plow (which is an item that is not used for his personal use, and generally, people are not finicky about it).

Rav Papa replied: There is no difficulty: The Mishna is referring to a man before he came under the obligation of repayment (if he possessed less than two hundred zuz and applied for assistance; he is not required to sell utensils to raise his capital), whereas, the braisa is referring to a man after he had come under the obligation of repayment (who, being in possession of two hundred zuz, accepted entitlements granted to the poor under false pretences; after it had been discovered that he was not actually a pauper, he was instructed by the court to refund all sums he had received unlawfully; in such a case, if he is unable to repay the money, he is compelled to sell his costly articles and use the cheaper ones). (68a)


Mishna

The Mishna states: An orphan (minor) who was given in marriage by her mother or her brother with her consent, and they wrote for her one hundred, or fifty zuz (for her dowry), she can, after she comes of age, exact from them what should rightfully be given to her (a tenth of her father’s estate).

Rabbi Yehudah says: If he gave his first daughter in marriage, the second should be given in the same manner as he gave to the first. But the Chachamim say: Sometimes a man is poor and becomes wealthy, or he is wealthy and becomes poor; rather, they appraise the assets and give her accordingly. (68a)

Assessing the Father’s Character

Shmuel said: With regard to a dowry, we estimate according to the disposition of their father (if he would be liberally generous or perhaps sting).

The Gemora asks on Shmuel from the following braisa: The daughters are to be maintained and provided for out of the estate of their father. How do we do this? It is not to be said, “Had her father been alive, he would have given her such and such an amount.” Rather, the estate is valued and she is given accordingly. Are we not referring to the estate set aside for the dowry of the orphaned daughter (this would be inconsistent with Shmuel’s ruling that we assess the father’s disposition)?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak replied: No! It is referring to her own maintenance (before she is married, she is supported by the brothers).

The Gemora asks: But, surely, it was stated: The daughters are to be maintained and provided for; doesn’t one of the expressions refer to the dowry and the other to her own maintenance?

The Gemora answers: No! They both refer to her own maintenance, and yet there is no difficulty, for one of the expressions refers to food and drink and the other refers to clothing and bed coverings.

The Gemora asks on Shmuel from our Mishna: The Chachamim say: Sometimes a man is poor and becomes wealthy, or he is wealthy and becomes poor; rather, they appraise the assets and give her accordingly. What does the Mishna mean when it says “poor” or “rich”? If it means that he is poor or rich in possessions, it would follow that Rabbi Yehudah holds that even if the father was rich when he married off the first daughter, and now he is poor, we would provide for the second daughter the same amount as the first! How can that be? The father’s estate does not have the money to give her? Rather, it is evident that “poor” means that he is poor in mind (stingy) and “rich” means that he is rich in mind (generous). Accordingly, it emerges that Rabbi Yehudah maintains that we assess the father’s disposition and the Chachamim disagree; they hold that we do not make presumptions regarding the father’s disposition. This would refute Shmuel’s opinion!

The Gemora answers: Shmuel would follow Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion, for Rabbi Yehudah said: If he gave his first daughter in marriage, the second should be given in the same manner as he gave to the first.

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t Shmuel just say that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah?

The Gemora answers: If he would have said that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah, we might have thought that this is applicable only in a case where the father married off his first daughter (then, we assess his character), but in a case where he did not marry off any daughter previously, we do not make any presumptions as to the character of the father. Shmuel, therefore, teaches us that Rabbi Yehudah’s logic is based on our presumption to the father’s character, whether he married off a daughter or even if he did not marry one off. The Gemora concludes that the reason the Mishna specified the case where he married off the first daughter is to demonstrate the extent of the Chachamim’s opinion – that even in that case, they disagree. (68a)

The Gemora cites another braisa: If an orphan applied for assistance (from the charity fund) to marry, a house must be rented for him, a bed must be prepared for him and he must also be supplied with all the household objects required for his use, and then he is given a wife in marriage. (67a – 67b)

Is the Halacha like Rabbi Yehudah?

Rava said to Rav Chisda: Shall we rule in your name that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah?

Rav Chisda replied: May it be the will of God that you report in your discourses all such excellent sayings in my name.

The Gemora asks: Could Rava, however, have made such a statement (agreeing to Rabbi Yehudah)? Surely, it was taught in the following braisa: Rebbi said: A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is entitled to receive a tenth of her father’s estate (and we do not make presumptions regarding the father’s character). And Rava stated that the law is in agreement with Rebbe!?

The Gemora answers: This is no difficulty. The halacha follows Rabbi Yehudah in a case where we were able to determine the father’s disposition; whereas, Rebbe’s ruling applies in a case where we have not formed any opinion about his character.

This explanation may also be supported by the following logical reasoning: For Rav Adda bar Ahava stated: It once happened that Rebbe gave her a twelfth of her father’s estate. Are not the two statements contradictory (for elsewhere, Rebbe ruled that she should be awarded a tenth)? Consequently, it must be inferred that one ruling (where she is awarded a twelfth) refers to a father of whom some opinion had been formed, while the other refers to a case where we have formed no opinion.

The Gemora concludes: This is indeed conclusive proof. (68a)

A Tenth of the Estate

The Gemora stated above: Rebbi said: A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is entitled to receive a tenth of her father’s estate (and we do not make presumptions regarding the father’s character).

They said to Rebbe: According to you, if one has ten daughters and one son, the son will receive nothing because of the daughters!

Rebbe replied: The following is what I am saying: The first daughter is awarded a tenth of the father’s estate. The second daughter is awarded a tenth of the remainder. The third daughter is awarded a tenth of what is now remaining. Then, they pool all their shares together and divide them equally. (There will be approximately thirty-five percent of the estate remaining for the son.)

The Gemora asks: Why do they have to pool their shares together after they already received their appropriate “tenth”?

The Gemora answers: They would pool their shares together in a case where they all came to get married at one time. (68a – 68b)

A Gift and a Loan

The Gemora cites a braisa: The orphaned daughters, whether they had attained bagrus (generally, at twelve and a half) before they married or whether they married before they had attained bagrus, they lose their right to maintenance (as this is explicitly stated in the kesuvah), but not to their dowry; these are the words of Rebbe. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar said: They lose their rights to a dowry as well (the tenth of the estate to which, a daughter is entitled; in his opinion, it is only one who is a minor that receives the tenth, however, once she has reached bagrus, or she performed nisuin as a na’arah, without claiming at the time her dowry, she loses her claim to it). How should they proceed (if they are close to attaining bagrus and have not found a husband yet)? They hire for themselves husbands and the husbands will collect their dowries for them.

Rav Nachman stated: Huna told me that the halacha follows the opinion of Rebbe.

Rava asked Rav Nachman from our Mishna: An orphan (minor) who was given in marriage by her mother or her brother with her consent, and they wrote for her one hundred, or fifty zuz (for her dowry), she can, after she comes of age, exact from them what should rightfully be given to her (a tenth of her father’s estate). It would seem that the Mishna rules in this manner because she married when she was a minor (and she cannot waive her rights to the tenth), but if she would have married as adult, her waiver is legally valid (and since this is an anonymous Mishna, it is evident that even Rebbe, who compiled the Mishnayos is ruling like Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar)?

The Gemora answers: Rebbe is referring to a case where she protested, whereas the Mishna is referring to a case where she did protest.

The Gemora proves that Rebbe is only referring to a case where she protested. (68b)

[END]

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Who Needs the Horse?

There once was an incident, where a certain Rebbe came to visit the Kotzker Rebbe. The Kotzker Rebbe gave him tremendous honor, and arranged for him a lavish feast. His disciples were astonished, for they knew that the Kotzker Rebbe did not hold this other individual in such high esteem.

The Kotzker explained: The Gemora (Kesuvos 67b) states: You are commanded to support a poor person, but you are not commanded to make him rich. You must provide for him a horse to ride on and a servant to run before him.

Now, it is understandable, the Rebbe said, that a person might need a horse to ride on, for perhaps, he is weak or ill, but what is the necessity in having a servant running before the horse? That is silly!

It is therefore evident, the Rebbe concluded, that one is obligated to provide even foolish things for a fool. This guest, although he might not be worthy of the honor we bestowed upon him, it is obvious that this is the manner in which he wishes to be treated. It is therefore our obligation to honor him.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 67 - Highlights

Gold Bars

Rav Shemen bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If the woman brought gold into the marriage in her dowry, we assess it and enter it into her kesuvah according to its actual value (no addition of fifty per cent, as in the case of cash since they do not exaggerate the value of gold and no subtraction of a fifth as in the case of goods are made because gold is not subject to wear and tear).

The Gemora asks from the following braisa: Gold is regarded as utensils. Does this not mean that gold is treated like silver utensils, which do, in fact, depreciate (and therefore, we would subtract a fifth in the kesuvah).

The Gemora answers: The braisa means that gold is treated just like gold utensils (and they do not depreciate).

The Gemora asks: If so, the braisa should have stated that gold is regarded just like its utensils?

And furthermore, we learned in a braisa: Gold is regarded as utensils. Gold dinars are treated as cash (and we add fifty percent to it). Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In a place where the custom is not to exchange them, we assess them and enter them into her kesuvah according to their actual value.

[The Gemora is attempting to prove that the braisa is referring to silver utensils; in order to do so, the Gemora must first clarify Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion.] The Gemora asks: Which case is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel referring to? If you say that he is referring to the latter statement (gold dinars are treated as cash), it may then be inferred that the Tanna Kamma maintains that gold dinars are treated as cash even where the custom is not to exchange them. What would be the logic in that? If they cannot be spent, why would they be treated as cash? Rather, it is evident that he is referring to the first statement of the braisa, and this must be the explanation: The Tanna Kamma maintains that gold is regarded just as silver utensils (and therefore, we would subtract a fifth in the kesuvah). Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and holds that gold is treated as gold dinars in a place where the custom is not to exchange them (and therefore, we assess them according to their actual value without subtracting a fifth). (It emerges that the Tanna Kamma maintains that gold is treated like silver utensils; this would be inconsistent with Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling.)

The Gemora answers: No! In fact, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is referring to the latter statement (gold dinars are treated as cash), and we are discussing a case in which the gold dinars, with difficulty, may be used as currency. The following would be the explanation of their argument: The Tanna Kamma maintains that we add fifty percent since they can be used as cash. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and holds that we do not add fifty percent since they can only be used as currency with difficulty.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers: The entire braisa can be in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and there are seemingly some missing words in the braisa, but this is what it means: Gold is regarded as utensils. Gold dinars are treated as cash (and we add fifty percent to it). When are they treated as cash? Only in a place where the custom is to exchange them, but in a place where the custom is not to exchange them, we assess them and enter them into her kesuvah according to their actual value; these are the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In a place where the custom is not to exchange them, we assess them and enter them into her kesuvah according to their actual value. (Accordingly, we have no proof or challenge to Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion regarding gold itself.)

The Gemora asks: If so, the braisa should have stated that gold is regarded just like its utensils?

The Gemora remains with that difficulty.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers: The braisa is discussing broken pieces of gold (which wear away in use; they are indeed to be treated in the same way as silver utensils, their price being entered in the kesuvah after a deduction of one fifth had been made; Rabbi Yochanan, however, deals with the case of large gold bars which do not wear away, and whose full value must consequently appear in the kesuvah).

Rav Ashi says that the braisa is referring to gold dust. (67a)

Mishna
One who gives his daughter in marriage without specifying (an amount for her dowry) may not give her less than fifty zuz. If he stipulated to give her in marriage bare of any dowry, the husband may not say, “When I take her into my house, I will provide her with clothing,” but he is required to clothe her while she is still in her father’s house. And likewise, one who gives an orphan in marriage may not give her less than fifty zuz. If there is in the charity fund, they support her according to the honor due to her. (67a)

Provincial Zuzim
Abaye comments: The Mishna is referring to the provincial zuzim (which are only worth an eighth of the Tyrian zuzim).

Abaye explains himself: Since the Mishna states: One who gives an orphan in marriage may not give her less than fifty zuz. If there is in the fund, they support her according to the honor due to her. And we asked: What fund are they referring to? Rachavah said: It is a charity fund. If you would think that we are referring to the Tyrian zuzim, how much more than fifty zuz does she require? It is therefore evident that the Mishna is referring to the provincial zuzim. (67a)

Marrying an Orphan Off
The Gemora cites a braisa: If an orphan boy and an orphan girl applied for maintenance, the girl orphan is to be provided for first and the boy orphan afterwards, because it is not unusual for a man to go begging, but it is unusual for a woman to do so.

If an orphan boy and an orphan girl applied for charity funds in order to get married, we enable the girl orphan to marry first and the boy orphan is married afterwards, because the shame of a woman is greater than that of a man.

The Gemora cites another braisa: If an orphan applied for assistance (from the charity fund) to marry, a house must be rented for him, a bed must be prepared for him and he must also be supplied with all the household objects required for his use, and then he is given a wife in marriage. (67a – 67b)

According to the Pauper’s Needs
The Gemora cites a braisa: You are commanded to support a poor person, but you are not commanded to make him rich. You must provide for him a horse to ride on and a servant to run before him. They said in regards to Hillel the Elder that he took for a certain poor man who was from a wealthy family a horse to ride upon and a servant to run before him. On one occasion, Hillel could not find a servant to run before him, so Hillel himself ran before him for three milin (6,000 amos).

A related braisa is cited: It once happened that the people of Upper Galilee bought for a poor person from a wealthy family of Tzippori a litra of meat every day.

The Gemora asks: What is the greatness about a litra of meat?

Rav Huna answered: It was a pound of (very expensive) fowl’s meat. Alternatively, you can say that they purchased ordinary meat with a litra’s weight of money.

Rav Ashi replied: The incident took place in a small village (and there were not so many people that would buy the remainder of the meat) and everyday an entire animal had to be wasted for his sake.

The Gemora records a related incident: A certain man once came to Rabbi Nechemia for maintenance. Rabbi Nechemia asked him, “What do your meals consist of?” He replied, “Of fatty meat and old wine.” “Will you agree,” Rabbi Nechemia asked him, “to join me with eating lentils?” The pauper consented, lived with him on lentils and died. Rabbi Nechemia exclaimed, “Woe unto this man, whom Nechemia has killed!”

The Gemora asks: On the contrary, he should have said, “Woe unto Nechemia, who killed this man!”

The Gemora answers: The man himself was at fault, for he should not have spoiled himself to such an extent.

The Gemora cites a similar incident: A man once came to Rava for maintenance. Rava asked him, “What do your meals consist of?” He replied, “Of fatty meat and old wine.” Rava asked him, “Did you not consider the burden on the community?” The man replied, “Do I eat from their food? I eat the food which belongs to Hashem, for we learned in the following braisa: The eyes of all look to You with hope and You give them their food in the proper time. This teaches us that Hashem provides for every individual his food i accordance with his own habits. Meanwhile, there arrived Rava's sister, who had not seen him for thirteen years, and brought him a fat chicken and old wine. “What a remarkable incident!” Rava exclaimed; and then Rava said to him, “I apologize to you, come and eat.” (67b)

A Gift and a Loan
The Gemora cites a braisa: If a man has no means to support himself, but he does not wish to be maintained out of the charity fund, he should be granted the necessary sum as a loan, and then as a gift (we do not ask him to repay it); these are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim, however, said: It is given to him as a gift and then it is granted to him as a loan.

The Gemora interrupts and asks: As a gift? He, surely, will refuse to accept the money as a gift!?

Rava replied: It is offered to him initially as a gift (and if he refuses, we lend him the money).

The braisa continues: If a man has means to support himself, but he does not wish to use his own money, he should be granted the necessary sum as a gift, and then, we will collect payment from him?

The Gemora interrupts and asks: If we will demand payment from him, he will not take anymore!?

Rav Papa replied: We will collect from his estate after he dies.

The braisa continues: Rabbi Shimon says: If a man has means to support himself, but he does not wish to use his own money, we do not get involved with him. If a man has no means to support himself, but he does not wish to be maintained out of the charity fund, we tell him to bring a collateral and take the money, for this way, his mind will be put at ease (thinking that it is indeed a loan).

The Gemora cites scriptural sources for the halachos mentioned above. (67b)

Mar Ukva’s Acts of Charity
Mar Ukva had a poor man in his neighborhood into whose door-socket he used to throw four zuz every day (in a way that the pauper did not know who was his benefactor). Once, the poor man thought, “I will go and see who is doing this kindness for me.” On that day, it happened that Mar Ukva was late at the Beis Medrash, and his wife was coming home with him. As soon as the poor man saw them moving the door, he went out after them, but they fled from him (in order that he shouldn’t be embarrassed) and ran into an oven from which the fire had just been swept (but was still extremely hot). Mar Ukva’s feet were burning and his wife said to him, “Raise your feet and put them on mine.” As he was dejected (thinking that he was not as worthy of divine protection as his wife), she said to him, “I am usually at home (and the poor people can find me easily) and my benefactions are immediate (since she provided them with ready-made food).

The Gemora asks: Why was it necessary for them to flee?

The Gemora answers: Because Mar Zutra bar Toviah said in the name of Rav, and others say that it was Rav Huna bar Bizna who said it in the name of Rabbi Shimon Chasida, and others say that it was Rabbi Yochanan who said it in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: It is more preferable for a man to throw himself into a fiery furnace than that of publicly putting his neighbor to shame.

The Gemora asks: How do we know this concept?

The Gemora answers: It is from the action of Tamar; for it is written [Breishis 38:25]: As she was taken out etc. (She chose to be burned rather than publicly put her father-in-law to shame. It was only through Yehudah’s own confession after he received her private message that she was saved.)

The Gemora cites another incident with Mar Ukva and his charitable acts: Mar Ukva had a poor man in his neighborhood to whom he regularly sent four hundred zuz on Erev Yom Kippur. On one occasion, he sent the money with his son who came back and said to him, “He does not need your help any longer.” Mar Ukva asked his son, “What have you seen?” The son replied that they were aromatizing his house with old wine. Mar Ukva said, “Is he so delicate?” He, therefore, doubled the amount that he had previously been sending.

When Mar Ukva was about to die, he requested, “Bring me my charity accounts.” Finding that he had given seven thousand of Siyankian dinars (an astonishingly large sum), he exclaimed, “The provisions are scanty and the road is long,” and he immediately distributed half of his wealth to charity.

The Gemora asks: But how was he permitted to do such a thing? Didn’t Rabbi Ila say: It was decreed in Usha that one who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his wealth (for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself)!?

The Gemora answers: This is applicable only during a man’s lifetime, since he might thereby be impoverished, but after death, we have no need to be concerned for this. (67b)

[END]

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Perfume for the Yerushalmi Women

The Mishna had stated: The groom should give ten dinars to her “kupah.”

The Gemora (Kesuvos 66b) asks: What is her “kupah?” Rav Ashi says: It refers to her box of perfumes. Rav Ashi qualified this ruling: This law was only stated regarding Yerushalayim.

Tosfos explains: Although, the Gemora in Yoma (39b) states that a bride had no necessity to use fragrances because of the aroma of the ketores; they still required cosmetics in order to beautify her skin.

The Ritva (ibid) answers: It was beneath the dignity of the wealthy women in Yerushalayim to rely on the aroma of the ketores; their husbands were required to provide fragrances for them.

The Netziv answers that the aroma of the ketores was only sufficient during the time of the burning of the incense, but a husband needed to provide his wife with perfumes and cosmetics for the remainder of the time.

Reb Elozar Moshe Horowitz answers: On the contrary! The women of Yerushalayim required even more perfume than others. When they took leave of Yerushalayim, they needed to compensate for the lack of the aroma emanating from the ketores.

A similar answer is brought from the Likutei Chaver ben Chaim: A woman in Yerushalayim required even more perfume than an ordinary woman, for if she would want that her husband should recognize her distinct smell, she would need to use a lot of perfume in order that her aroma should not be negated by the aroma of the ketores.

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How the Mighty have Fallen

The Rabbis taught in a braisa (Kesuvos 66b): There was an incident with Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai who was riding on a donkey on his way out of Yerushalayim, and his students were following him on foot. H saw a young girl who was picking barley out of the dung of Arab-owned animals. When she saw him, she covered her face with her hair and stood before him saying, “Master, give me food!” He said, “My daughter, who are you?” She replied, “I am the daughter of Nakdimon ben Gurion.” He asked her, “My daughter, where did your father’s money go?” She replied, “Don’t they say the following parable in Yerushalayim: “The salt of money is its shortage (if you want your money to be preserved, lessen it through charity)?” Others say that it is through kindness. (As the members of her family were not charitable they lost their money.) He asked, “Where did the fortune of your in-laws go?” She replied, “This one came and destroyed that which belonged to the other (my father’s money and his money were mixed up together, and when one was lost, the other disappeared with it).” She continued, “Master, do you remember when you signed my kesuvah?” He turned to his students and said, “I remember when I signed on her kesuvah, and I read about a million gold dinarss that were pledged by her father alone, besides of that of her in-laws.” Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai started crying. He said, “Praised are you Yisrael! When you do the will of Hashem, no nation can rule over you! When you do not do the will of Hashem, He delivers you into the hands of a low nation. And not into the hands of a low nation, but in the hands of the animals of a low nation!”

The Gemora asks: Didn’t we learn that Nakdimon gave generously to charity?

The Gemora answers: Either he gave for his own honor or he did not give as much as he should have.

*** What can we derive from the fact that Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai was riding on a donkey, and his students were following him on foot?

*** How could she have covered her face with her hair; isn’t the hair of a woman regarded as ervah?

*** Why did Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai question her regarding the money of her father; didn’t he know about the fire that destroyed all of his storehouses?

*** The Hafla’ah writes a fascinating interpretation of the proverb said over in Yerushalayim: “The salt of money is its shortage.” If one shortens the word “mamon,” it will be spelled: mem, mem and nun. If you spell out these letters, the letters mem, mem, vav and nun will appear, spelling “mamon” in its entirety. This demonstrates that if one creates a deficit in his money by giving generously to charity, his money will be preserved and he will be repaid many times over.

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Humiliation through Words

The Gemora (Kesuvos 66a)cited a Mishna in Bava Kamma: If someone spat at his friend and the spittle hit him, or he removed the hair covering of a woman or his friend’s cloak, he is required to pay him/her four hundred zuz. Rav Papa taught: This is only if the spittle reached his friend, but if it only hit his clothes, he is exempt from paying this fine.

The Gemora in Bava Kamma asks: Shouldn’t the perpetrator be liable similar to one who humiliates his fellow with words? The Gemora answers: It is evident from here that one who embarrasses his fellow with words is exempt from any liability.

The Rosh cites Rav Shrira Gaon: Although it seems from the Scriptural verses that one is not liable for humiliating his fellow with words, nevertheless, the Sages would excommunicate him until he appeases his fellow properly according to his honor. He notes that it is logical to assume that there is a higher degree of embarrassment for one who is humiliated with words more than one, who was embarrassed through a wound, for there is nothing worse than slandering one’s fellow.

The Rambam (Hilchos Chovel 5:7) rules that one who admits in Beis Din that he wounded his fellow privately, he will be liable to pay for the embarrassment, for even though the victim was not humiliated at the time of the wounding, he was humiliated at the time of the admission in Beis Din.

The Minchas Chinuch (49:7) asks: Isn’t this a classical case of embarrassing one’s fellow with words, and one is not liable for such humiliation?

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 66 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: The findings of a woman and her earnings belong to her husband. Regarding property that she inherits, the husband may only eat the produce while she is alive. Payment for her embarrassment or blemish belongs to her. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira says: When the injury is hidden, two parts of the payment are hers, and one is his. And when it is exposed, two parts are his and one is hers. His portion is given to him immediately, but in regards to her portion, land is purchased and he eats the produce. (65b).

Does a Married Woman Keep Lost Objects That She Finds?

A braisa was taught in front of Rava stating that a lost object found by a wife belongs to her. Rabbi Akiva said: It belongs to her husband.

Rava asked: If Rabbi Akiva holds that the money produced by extra work that a woman does can be kept for herself, although work money usually goes to a husband, certainly he would hold that she could keep any lost object that she finds!

[The fact that Rabbi Akiva holds this way is established in a Mishna.] The Mishna states: If a woman vows that the benefits of her work should be forbidden to her husband, her husband does not have to be “meifer” – “deny” the vow (as she is already indebted to give him these benefits). Rabbi Akiva says: He should be meifer, as she might work more than she has to and these benefits will be forbidden to him.

Rava therefore said: It must be that the opinions are mixed up. The braisa should read that a lost object found by a wife belongs to her husband. Rabbi Akiva said: It belongs to her.

When Rabin arrived (from Eretz Yisrael), didn’t he say in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Everyone agrees that if a woman does more work than necessary because she is talented and can easily do so that all of the profits belongs to the husband. The only argument is when a woman pushes herself to work more than usual. The Tana Kama (of the braisa) understands that this too goes to her husband, while Rabbi Akiva says that she is allowed to keep the extra money. [Accordingly, why should Rabbi Akiva say that if she finds a lost object, that took no effort to find, that it should not go the husband?]

Rav Papa answered: A lost object is considered as if extra effort is put in (as it often takes some effort to recover, such as a lost injured animal), and is therefore subject to the argument of Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbanan.

Rav Papa asked: If she does two jobs at once, is this considered extra effort? Ravina asked: If she does three or four jobs at once, is this considered extra effort? Their questions remain unanswered. (65b – 66a)

Paying the Husband for Embarrassing his Wife
[The Mishna quotes Rabbi Yehuda ben Beseira as saying that a husband receives partial payment for the embarrassment and blemish of his wife.] Rava bar Rav Chanan asked: If someone embarrassed his friend’s horse, should he have to pay him for embarrassment? The Gemora asks: Does a horse get embarrassed?

The Gemora answers that Rava bar Rav Chanan meant to ask: If someone spat at his friend and the spittle hit him, or he removed the hair covering of a woman or his friend’s cloak, he is required to pay him/her four hundred zuz. Rav Papa taught: This is only if the spittle reached his friend, but if it only hit his clothes, he is exempt from paying this fine.

The Gemora answers: Spit that only hits clothing is not such an embarrassment, whereas if a person’s wife is embarrassed it is embarrassing to him as well.

Ravina asked Rav Ashi: This seems difficult, as according to this answer if someone embarrassed a poor person from a good family, he should have to pay the entire family for the embarrassment!

Rav Ashi answered: In such a case the poor person is not like their body. Here, a wife is considered to be as one person with her husband. (66a)

Mishna
If a person promised monies to his son-in-law who died (and his brother will perform “yibum” – “levirate marriage” if he will similarly be supported by his father-in-law), the sages said: He can tell his new son-in-law, “I was willing to give this money to your brother, but not to you.”

If a woman promises to bring in one thousand manah to the marriage, he should write in the kesuvah that he will give her one thousand five hundred. If she brings presents to him that deteriorates over time, he should pledge opposite their value in the kesuvah less one fifth. If she brings assets into the marriage that are worth one hundred and they are worth exactly one hundred (and no more) in the marketplace, he should pledge one hundred in the kesuvah. If he commits to writing a manah in the kesuvah, she must ascertain that the wear-and-tear valuables she brings him are worth thirty one sela and a dinars (which equal a manah plus one fifth). If he commits to four hundred, she must bring him five hundred. Whatever the estimate is by the groom, he must commit to one fifth less (the Gemora will discuss all of these seemingly extra statements). (66a – 66b)

A Solid Claim
The braisa states: It does not need to be said that the father-in-law can make this claim if his first son-in-law was a Torah scholar and his second (possible) son-in-law is an ignoramus. Even if the opposite is true, he can claim “I would give this money to your brother but not to you.” (66b)

The Mishna’s Cases Are Not Redundant
[The Gemora now discusses the redundancies of the Mishna.] The Gemora asks: These are the same cases as in the first part of the Mishna!

The Gemora answers: The difference between them is a large estimate versus a small monetary estimate. [One might think that either the larger amounts are exaggerated or that smaller amounts are exaggerated to make them more important, and therefore a fifth is not in every case. This is why examples of both a lot of money and small amounts are given.] Additionally, the Mishna wanted to state that this is true whether the estimate is done by him or by her. (66b)

Mishna
If she commits to bringing him money (to invest), each sela of hers equals six dinars (one third more than its face value). The groom should give ten dinarss to her “kupah” (see Gemora later) for every hundred that she brings into the marriage for her own benefit (see Rashi). Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: This is all in accordance with the custom of the land. (66b)

The Case is not Redundant
The Gemora asks: This is the same lesson as the first case in the previous Mishna that he had to commit to fifteen hundred zuz! The Gemora answers that the Mishna wanted to stress that just as this applies to big amounts it also applies to small amounts.

The Gemora explains further why this was necessary. If it would only say this by big amounts, one might say that this is because one can easily make a lot of profit with a lot of capital. However, with small amounts of money with small profit margins, maybe this is not the case. The Mishna therefore said the law is the same. If it would have only said the law by small money, we would have thought this is only regarding small money where there is less responsibility and liability, not regarding large amounts where the responsibility and liability is greater. This is why the case of the large amount is also necessary. (66b)

What is a “Kupah”?
The Mishna had stated: The groom should give ten dinarss to her “kupah.”

The Gemora asks: What is her “kupah?” Rav Ashi says: It refers to her box of perfumes. Rav Ashi qualified this ruling: This law was only stated regarding Yerushalayim.

Rav Ashi asked: Is this according to their estimated value or the value he accepts for the kesuvah (one fifth less)? If you say it is for the value he accepts, is it just the first day or for every day? If it is every day (see Rashi), does that mean just the first Shabbos or every Shabbos? If it includes every Shabbos, is this only the first month of marriage or every month? If it is every month, does it mean every month for the first year of marriage, or for every year of marriage? The question remains unresolved. (66b)

The Daughter of
Nakdimon ben Gurion
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: There was an incident with the daughter of Nakdimon ben Gurion, who the sages ruled should receive for her box of perfumes four hundred gold coins for one day. She told them: “So you should rule for your daughters.” They answered amen.

The Rabbis taught in a braisa: There was an incident with Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai who was riding on a donkey on his way out of Yerushalayim, and his students were following him on foot. H saw a young girl who was picking barley out of the dung of Arab-owned animals. When she saw him, she covered her face with her hair and stood before him saying, “Master, give me food!” He said, “My daughter, who are you?” She replied, “I am the daughter of Nakdimon ben Gurion.” He asked her, “My daughter, where did your father’s money go?” She replied, “Don’t they say the following parable in Yerushalayim: “The salt of money is its shortage (if you want your money to be preserved, lessen it through charity)?” Others say that it is through kindness. (As the members of her family were not charitable they lost their money.) He asked, “Where did the fortune of your in-laws go?” She replied, “This one came and destroyed that which belonged to the other (my father’s money and his money were mixed up together, and when one was lost, the other disappeared with it).” She continued, “Master, do you remember when you signed my kesuvah?” He turned to his students and said, “I remember when I signed on her kesuvah, and I read about a million gold dinarss that were pledged by her father alone, besides of that of her in-laws.” Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai started crying. He said, “Praised are you Yisrael! When you do the will of Hashem, no nation can rule over you! When you do not do the will of Hashem, He delivers you into the hands of a low nation. And not into the hands of a low nation, but in the hands of the animals of a low nation!”

The Gemora asks: Didn’t we learn that Nakdimon gave generously to charity?

The Gemora answers: Either he gave for his own honor or he did not give as much as he should have. (66b – 67a)

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