Pumbedisean Rouges

The Gemora (Kesuvos 62a) records an incident: A yevamah fell to a yavam in Masa Mechasya. His (younger) brother wanted to disqualify her for yibum by giving her a letter of divorce. The elder brother said to him, “What is it that you have in your mind? Are you troubled because of the property that I am destined to inherit, I will share the property with you.” The younger brother replied, “I am afraid that you will treat me as the Pumbedisean rogue treated his brother.” (The people of Pumbedisa were known for being deceivers; in the incident cited above, the yavam refused to give up the land and then, Rav Yosef ruled like him.) The yavam said to him, “If you wish, you may take your half at once.”

It is noteworthy that this incident occurred in Masa Mechasya, and it was there that they spoke begrudgingly regarding the citizens of Pumbedisa.

The Gemora (Kerisus 6a) cites several teachings that Rav Mesharsheya told to his son. One such teaching was that it is better to dwell in the garbage heaps of Masa Mechasya than in the mansions of Pumbedisa.

What did Rav Mesharsheya have in mind? Rashi (Horayos 12a) states that in Masa Mechasya, there were Torah scholars who had the ability to answer Halachic questions and they also had exemplary midos. The scholars in Pumbedisa, however, did not excel in midos tovos, and therefore Rav Mesharsheya warned his son not to learn with them.

Reb Yaakov Emden cites our Gemora as proof that the Jewish population of Pumbedisa was known to be plagued with swindlers and cheats. Accordingly, perhaps we can say that Rav Mesharsheya was telling his son that Pumbedisa might not be the best location for one to reside in.

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Two Leniencies and Two Stringencies

The Gemora (Kesuvos 82a) had stated that we do not find a Tanna ruling stringently on two matters in respect to a kesuvah. Rashi explains that since a kesuvah is a Rabbinic enactment in the first place, we cannot rule with extreme stringencies. Therefore, we cannot rule that moveable objects are pledged for the kesuvah (in accordance with Rabbi Meir) and that the kesuvah may be collected from the debtor of the deceased husband (in accordance with Rabbi Nosson).

The Rif writes that this particular halachic ruling is not applicable nowadays. In the times of the Gemora, the society was an agricultural one and therefore, only real estate was pledged for the kesuvah. However, now that we maintain that all of the husband’s possessions are pledged for her kesuvah, this is not regarded as a stringency and therefore we can rule that the kesuvah may be collected from the debtor of the deceased husband.

Rabbi Braun in Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha points out that the inverse is true as well. In a situation where we rule leniently, we do not rule according to two leniencies. Shulchan Aruch (Y”D, 199:7) writes that although there are times that we allow a woman to immerse herself in a ritual bath during the daytime, we will inform her then that she must clean herself immediately prior to immersion, and we do not rely on the leniency which normally allows a woman to prepare herself a significant time before immersion.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 82 - Highlights

Delayed Kinyan

The Gemora records an incident: A yevamah fell to a yavam in Masa Mechasya. His (younger) brother wanted to disqualify her for yibum by giving her a letter of divorce. The elder brother said to him, “What is it that you have in your mind? Are you troubled because of the property that I am destined to inherit, I will share the property with you.” The younger brother replied, “I am afraid that you will treat me as the Pumbedisean rogue treated his brother.” (The people of Pumbedisa were known for being deceivers; in the incident cited above, the yavam refused to give up the land and then, Rav Yosef ruled like him.) The yavam said to him, “If you wish, you may take your half at once.”

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Although when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisroel, he stated in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If a man said to another, “Go and pull this cow, but it shall only become your legal possession after thirty days,” he legally acquires it after thirty days, even if it is standing at the time (after thirty days) in a swamp. That is because the giver had the ability to transfer possession of the cow at the initial time. However, in this case, the younger brother cannot acquire possession of the promised share, for it is not in his power to transfer immediate possession (since prior to yibum, the yavam has no rights on his brother’s land).

The Gemora asks: But, surely, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisroel, he reported in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that he does not acquire possession (in the case of the cow)?

The Gemora answers: This is no difficulty: The first ruling refers to a case where the seller said, “Acquire possession from now,” whereas the other ruling refers to a case where he did not say, “Acquire possession from now.” (82a)

Emend the Mishna

The Mishna had stated: The Chachamim said: The produce which is connected to the ground belongs to the yavam.

The Gemora asks: But why does it belong to him? Aren’t all of the brother’s properties pledges for her kesuvah?

Rish Lakish says that the Mishna must be emended to read that the produce belongs to her. (82a)

Just Like a Wife
The Mishna had stated: Once the yavam marries her, she is regarded as his wife in all respects.

The Gemora asks: Regarding what halacha is the Mishna referring to?

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: This teaches us that the yavam may divorce her with a get, and he also can remarry her afterwards.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t it obvious that he may divorce her with a get?

The Gemora answers: Since the verse [Devarim 25:5] states: The yavam shall cohabit with her, and take her to himself as a wife, and perform yibum with her; one might think that she is always regarded as his yevamah even after marrying her, and perhaps she would require a chalitzah to be released from him. The Mishna teaches us that a get is sufficient.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t it obvious that he may remarry her afterwards?

The Gemora answers: One might have thought that after he fulfilled his mitzvah and subsequently divorced her, she should become subject to the prohibition of being a brother’s wife and she should be forbidden to him; the Mishna teaches us that once she becomes permitted to him, she remains that way. (82a – 82b)

From Heaven
The Mishna had stated: If the yavam marries her, she is regarded as his wife in every respect, except that the obligations stemming from the kesuvah rests upon the property of her first husband.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this?

The Gemora answers: The yavam did not obligate himself to her; the Torah bestowed her upon him. (He is required to write for her a new kesuvah, but his properties are not encumbered towards this obligation; only the properties of the deceased are encumbered for this obligation.) But if there are no assets available from the deceased, the Rabbis established that there should be a kesuvah from the yavam as well, in order that she should not be so easy to divorce. (82b)

Lying on the Table
The Mishna had stated: The yavam should not say to her, “Your kesuvah is lying on the table (designating some of his property for the kesuvah),” but rather, all of his properties are indebted to her kesuvah. Likewise, an ordinary man may not say to her, “Your kesuvah is lying on the table.”

The Gemora asks: Why is it necessary for the Mishna to teach us the same halacha regarding an ordinary marriage; why would we think that there is a distinction?

The Gemora answers: It might have been suggested that the restriction mentioned applies only in the case of the yavam because the yavam does not insert in her kesuvah the clause, “That which I possess and that which I will acquire.” (The yevamah, having her security limited to the yavam’s possessions that were inherited from her deceased husband, would naturally suspect that by “putting her kesuvah on the table,” the yavam intends to escape his full responsibility and desires to deprive her of the possibility of collecting her kesuvah when the occasion arises. This, as might well be expected, would create animosity between husband and wife.) But in the latter case, where he does insert the clause, “That which I possess and that which I will acquire,” she relies upon this guarantee (even if he would designate money); hence, we were told that the ruling applies in both cases. (82b)

Kesuvah when he Divorces her and Remarries her
The Mishna had stated: If the yavam remarries, she is like any other woman and she is entitled only to her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: What is the novelty in this halacha? We have learned in a Mishna regarding an ordinary wife that if the husband divorces her and then remarries her, she is entitled to the initial kesuvah.

The Gemora answers: If the Mishna would not have stated this halacha in respect to a yavam, I would have thought that this would only apply to an ordinary marriage where the man wrote the kesuvah himself; however, in respect to a yevamah, where the yavam did not write the original kesuvah, perhaps when he divorces her and then remarries her, he should be obligated to write her a new kesuvah. The Mishna teaches us that this is not so. (82b)

Origin of the Kesuvah Enactments
Rav Yehudah said: Originally, they would write for a virgin two hundred zuz and for a widow a maneh, and consequently, they grew old and could not take any wives (since the women would not marry if the husband’s possessions were not pledged for her kesuvah). Shimon ben Shetach took the initiative and ordained that all of the husband’s property is pledged for his wife’s kesuvah.

The Gemora cites a braisa which supports Rav Yehudah: Originally, they would write for a virgin two hundred zuz and for a widow a maneh, and consequently, they grew old and could not take any wives. It was then ordained that the amount of the kesuvah was to be deposited in the wife’s father’s house (preventing the husband from hiding it). At any time, however, when the husband would become angry with his wife, he would tell her, “Go to your kesuvah.” It was ordained, therefore, that the amount of the kesuvah was to be deposited in the house of her father-in-law. Wealthy women converted it into silver or gold baskets, while poor women converted it into urinals. Still, whenever the husband had occasion to be angry with his wife, he would tell her, “Take your kesuvah and go.” It was then that Shimon ben Shetach ordained that the husband must insert the pledging clause, “All of my property is pledged to your kesuvah. (82b)
WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
HA’ISHA SHENAFLU

[END]

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A Childless Couple Divorcing and Remarrying

A couple who did not merit having children came to Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein with the following inquiry: Should they get divorced and then remarried, for they had heard that this is a segulah for having children? The woman, however, was refusing because getting divorced was degrading to her. What should they do?

He cited proof from our Gemora that a divorce, even just for a few moments is degrading and therefore, the wife has grounds to refuse the divorce.

The Gemora (Kesuvos 81b) states: Rava sent the following question to Abaye in the hands of Rav Shemayah bar Zeira: Is it indeed true that the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive? But didn’t we learn in the following braisa: Rabbi Abba said: I asked Sumchus: If a yavam (after performing yibum) wishes to sell some of his brother’s properties (something that he is not allowed to do), what should he do?

Sumchus responded: If he is a Kohen (and he cannot marry his divorcee), he should prepare for her a feast (with some wine) and persuade her to allow him to sell the property (which exceeds the amount of her kesuvah). If he is a Yisroel, he should divorce her and then, remarry her (he can either sell the properties before the second marriage or afterwards).

Rava concludes his question: If the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive, let the yavam designate land for her which equals the amount of the kesuvah, and then, he should be permitted to sell the remaining property? This, explains Rashi is a much more preferable option, for getting divorced is degrading!

The Steipler Gaon, when asked the same question, said that a childless couple may try to divorce and remarry (and the husband need not be concerned that after the divorce, the wife will refuse to remarry); however, he personally never heard that this is a valid segulah and he has no opinion regarding its veracity.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 81 - Highlights

The Obligation to Bury a Woman Awaiting Yibum

The Gemora inquires: Who is obligated to pay for the burial if a woman awaiting yibum dies? Is it the responsibility of the husband’s inheritors (namely, the yavam) because they inherit her kesuvah? Or, is it the responsibility of the father’s inheritors because they inherit her property that enters and leaves with her (the melog properties)?

Rav Amram said: Let me bring a proof from the following braisa: If a woman awaiting yibum dies, her inheritors, the inheritors of her kesuvah are obligated to bury her (it is evident that the responsibility rests on the yavam).

Abaye said: This ruling can be supported from the following Mishna: A widow is supported from the property inherited by the orphans and they are entitled to her earnings. They are not obligated in her burial. Her inheritors, the inheritors of her kesuvah are obligated to bury her.

Who is a widow that has two sets of inheritors? It must be a woman awaiting yibum (and it is evident that the responsibility rests on the yavam).

Rava asks: Let the yavam say, “I am inheriting my brother (it was only his brother’s responsibility to bury his wife in return for her kesuvah which he inherits, but not the yavam’s responsibility, since he does not inherit from the widow but from his brother), I have no responsibility to bury his wife.”?

Abaya responds: It is because we come at him from two sides: If he inherits the brother, he should be obligated to bury his wife; and if he wishes not to be responsible to bury his brother’s wife, then, he should pay for her kesuvah (since after all, the burial is in return for the kesuvah).

Rava counters: The following is what I meant to ask: Let the yavam say, “I am inheriting my brother, I have no responsibility to bury his wife.” And if you will say that this is not a valid claim, for then, he would be obligated to pay for her kesuvah, I could answer that a kesuvah is not meant to be payable during the husband’s lifetime (and since he was intending to perform yibum, he stands in the place of his brother; it is therefore regarded as if she died during her husband’s lifetime, where there would be no obligation for the husband to pay her kesuvah).

Abaye replies: Who is the Tanna that holds that we expound the language written in the kesuvah (the exposition being: Since the kesuvah contains the following statement: “When you will be married to another man, you will receive what is prescribed for you,” it may be inferred that, except in the case of divorce, the kesuvah is not payable during the lifetime of the husband, when his wife cannot be married to another man)? It is the opinion of Beis Shamai (in a Mishna in Yevamos, where it deals with a woman who was permitted to be married on the basis of her statement that her husband had died, and Beis Shamai said: She may marry and she takes her kesuvah. Beis Hillel said: She may marry but she does not take her kesuvah; it emerges that Beis Shamai expounds the language of the kesuvah). And we have heard that Beis Shamai holds that a contract which awaits collection is regarded as if it has been collected already (so, also regarding the amount of the kesuvah which is deemed to he in the virtual possession of the widow; the yavam is consequently inheriting it not from his brother but from the widow, in return for which he must incur the obligation of burying her).

The Gemora proves that Beis Shamai holds that a contract which awaits collection is regarded as if it has been collected already. (80b – 81a)

Yavam Selling Property

Rava sent the following question to Abaye in the hands of Rav Shemayah bar Zeira: Is it indeed true that the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive? But didn’t we learn in the following braisa: Rabbi Abba said: I asked Sumchus: If a yavam (after performing yibum) wishes to sell some of his brother’s properties (something that he is not allowed to do), what should he do?

Sumchus responded: If he is a Kohen (and he cannot marry his divorcee), he should prepare for her a feast (with some wine) and persuade her to allow him to sell the property (which exceeds the amount of her kesuvah). If he is a Yisroel, he should divorce her and then, remarry her (he can either sell the properties before the second marriage or afterwards).

Rava concludes his question: If the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive, let the yavam designate land for her which equals the amount of the kesuvah, and then, he should be permitted to sell the remaining property?

Abaye said to Rava: And according to you that the kesuvah of a yevamah was not meant to be collected while the yavam is alive, why don’t you ask from our Mishna which states that the yavam should not say to her, “Your kesuvah is lying on the table (designating some of his property for the kesuvah),” but rather, all of his properties are indebted to her kesuvah. (The fact that he cannot do this should be a proof to Rava.)

Rava responds: The Mishna is not issuing a halachic ruling; rather, it is offering good advice to the yavam. He should not designate money for her kesuvah (for if the money would get lost, he would be obligated to write for her a new kesuvah).

Rava proves this from the latter part of the Mishna which states the same thing regarding an ordinary man, and there, he certainly is permitted to sell some of his own property; it is evident that the Mishna is only offering good advice to the husband.

Abaye answers Rava’s question: Rabbi Abba ruled that one should not designate land for her which equals the amount of the kesuvah (and then, he would be permitted to sell the remaining property) because this would promote hatred between them (for she would think that he is intending to divorce her; it is therefore preferable for him to divorce her and remarry her, for then, she will realize that he divorced her only as a means to sell the property). (81a – 81b)

Ruling on an Incident
The Gemora relates the following incident: There was a yevamah who fell to a yavam in Pumbedisa. His (younger) brother wanted to disqualify her for yibum by giving her a letter of divorce. The elder brother said to him, “What is it that you have in your mind? Are you troubled because of the property that I am destined to inherit, I will share the property with you.”

Rav Yosef, in considering this case said: Since the Rabbis have established that a yavam may not sell properties that belonged to the deceased brother; his sale is invalid even if he had already sold it (and therefore the agreement between the two brothers is not valid). For it was taught in the following braisa: If a man died and left a widow who was awaiting yibum and he also left property valued at a hundred maneh, the yavam may not sell the property although the widow's kesuvah amounts only to one maneh, because all of his property is pledged to her kesuvah.

Abaye said to him: Is it true that wherever the Rabbis ruled that one must not sell, the sale is invalid, even after it had taken place? Did we not, in fact, learn in a Mishna: (If the properties fell to her after she became an arusah and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai said: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel said: She may not sell them. They both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid. ?

The case was sent to Rabbi Chanina bar Papi who sent the same reply as that of Rav Yosef. On this Abaye remarked: Has Rabbi Chanina bar Papi hung jewels upon it? (He has not! His ruling is no more supported by proof or reason than that of Rav Yosef, and may he equally disregarded.)

It was then sent to Rav Minyumi the son of Rav Nachumi who sent the same reply as Abaye, but he added: “Should Rav Yosef offer a new reason, report it to me.”

Rav Yosef thereupon went out, investigated, and discovered that it was taught in the following braisa: If a man who had a monetary claim against his brother died, and left a widow who was awaiting yibum (to the borrower), the borrower is not entitled to claim, “Since I am the inheritor, I have acquired the amount of the debt,” but it must be taken from the yavam and spent on the purchase of land and he is only entitled to its produce (the debt in this case is similar to a sale ex post facto, and nevertheless it is invalid; which proves the correctness of Rav Yosef’s ruling).

Abaye asked: But perhaps they are just advising him in his own interests (since land is more secure than money)?

Rav Yosef replied: The Tanna stated that it is taken from the yavam and you say that it is merely good advice!

The case was again sent to Rav Minyumi the son of Rav Nachumi who said to them: So said Rav Yosef bar Minyumi in the name of Rav Nachman: This braisa is not an authentic teaching.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason (that he dismissed this braisa as a mistake)? If you will suggest that it is because the loan is a movable thing and movables are not pledged to a kesuvah, is it not possible that the statement represents the view of Rabbi Meir who maintains that movables are pledged to a kesuvah. And if you will suggest that it is because he could say to her, “You are not the party I have to deal with (since he didn’t borrow from her; it was from the brother), is it not possible that the statement represents the view of Rabbi Nosson, since it was taught in a braisa: Rabbi Nosson said: How do we know that if one has a claim of a maneh against his fellow and that fellow against another fellow, we will take out a maneh from this one (the debtor’s debtor) and give it to that one (the original creditor)? It is written: And he shall give it to the one to whom he is guilty.

Rather, the Gemora concludes, this is the reason: We never find that a Tanna will impose two stringencies in the matter of a kesuvah. He might agree either with Rabbi Meir or with Rabbi Nosson (but not with both of them).

Rava remarked: If so, I can well understand what Abaye meant when I heard him say, “This braisa is not an authentic teaching” and until now, I did not understand why he said so. (81b – 82a)

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Two Points to Ponder

*** The Gemora (Kesuvos 78b - 79a) discusses a case where the woman writes a document assigning her property to her daughter for the purpose of depriving her prospective husband from the estate. Would this procedure be effective to evade a creditor as well?

*** The Gemora discusses a dispute between Chanania and the Rabbis regarding the offspring of melog animals. Are they regarded as the principal because we are concerned that the mother might die and the entire principal will be depleted or are they regarded as produce because we are not concerned for death? Tosfos in Yoma says that we are not concerned that the wife of the Kohen Gadol will die on Yom Kippur because it is only one day; but in general, we are concerned for death over a long period of time. Shouldn’t that be the case here? The animal and the slavewoman will eventually die; they will not live forever!

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 79 - Highlights

Evading the Husband

A certain woman (a widow who was about to marry) wishing to deprive her prospective husband of her estate assigned it in writing to her daughter. After she married and was divorced, she came before Rav Nachman to demand the return of her estate (from her daughter, who claimed that the property was legally hers; she brought the document as proof). Rav Nachman tore up the document.

Rav Anan, thereupon, went to Mar Ukva and said to him: “See, master, how Nachman the peasant tears up people’s deeds.” “Tell me now,” Mar Ukva said to him, “how exactly the incident occurred.” “It occurred,” he replied, “in such and such a manner.” Mar Ukva exclaimed, “Did you speak of a deed that a woman intended as a means of evasion? Thus said Rav Chanilai bar Idi in the name of Shmuel: ‘I am an officially recognized judge, and should a deed which a woman intended as a means of evasion come into my hand I would tear it up.’”

Rava said to Rav Nachman: What in fact is the reason? It is obviously because of the fact that no man would neglect himself completely and give his property away to others. But this would apply to strangers only, but to a daughter, one might well give such a gift!

Rav Nachman responded: Even in the case of a daughter, a woman gives preference to herself (and therefore, the gift is invalid).

The Gemora raises an objection from the following braisa: If a woman desires to keep her property from her husband, how is she to proceed? She writes out a deed of trust to a stranger (a document of a pretended sale or gift with which one person entrusts another in order to make people believe that a proper sale or presentation had actually taken place); these are the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel. But the Chachamim said: If the recipient wishes, he may laugh at her (and retain the property) unless she wrote out for him, “You shall acquire possession from today, and whenever I shall approve.” (In this case only is the woman protected against the holder of the deed as well as against her husband. For should her husband claim the property, she can evade him by expressing consent to its acquisition by the stranger; and should the stranger claim possession, she can exercise her right of refusing to give her consent.) The reason that this plan works is because she wrote out for him in the manner prescribed; but, had she not done so, the recipient would have acquired possession of it? (Why did Shmuel rule that the document should be ripped up?)

Rabbi Zeira replied: There is no difficulty. Shmuel is referring to a case where the woman assigned to the stranger all her property (since no person would give away all his property to a stranger; it is pretty obvious that the document related to a fictitious transaction). The braisa is discussing a case where a woman assigned to a stranger only part of her property.

The Gemora asks: But if the buyer does not acquire her property, shouldn’t the husband acquire it!

Abaye answers: This property is treated as property that is unknown to the husband in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon. (78b – 79a)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If money fell to a married woman as an inheritance, land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce. If she inherited produce which is detached from the ground, land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce. If she inherited produce which is attached to the ground, Rabbi Meir said: They assess the field as to how much it is worth with the produce, and how much it is worth without the produce, and with the difference, land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce. But the Chachamim say: That which is attached to the ground is his, and that which is detached from the ground is hers; land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce.

Rabbi Shimon says: Wherever he has an advantage upon her entry (into marriage), he has a disadvantage at her exit (when he divorces her); wherever he is at a disadvantage upon her entry, he has an advantage upon her exit. How is this? Produce which is attached to the ground – when he marries her, it is his, and when he divorces her, it is hers. And produce which is detached from the ground – when he marries her, it is hers, and when he divorces her, it is his. (79a)

Different Types of Land

(The Mishna had stated that when the woman inherits money, they should buy land with it. The Gemora discusses cases where a disagreement arises between husband and wife in regards to what type of real estate should be bought.) It is obvious that if husband and wife differ on the choice of purchase between land and houses, they should buy land (it is a safer and a better investment than houses). If they differ on the choice between houses and date palms, they should buy houses. If one insists on date palms and the other wants fruit trees, they should buy date palms. If one insists on fruit trees and the other wants grapevines, they should buy fruit trees. (79a)

Principal and Produce

If she inherited a thicket of sorb trees (which were primarily used for the cutting of its wood and which is valueless after the wood has been cut) or a fish pond, some maintain that it is regarded as produce (since no capital remains for the woman) and others maintain that it is regarded as principal (since eventually, it will be permanently depleted, the entire inheritance is regarded as principal). This is the general rule: If the stump regenerates, it is regarded as produce, but if the stump grows no new shoots, it is regarded as principal. (79a)

Offspring of Melog Property

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya who said in the name of Rabbi Yannai, and others said that Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya who said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: One who steals the offspring of a melog animal is required to pay the double payment to the wife (the Gemora is assuming now that the offspring is regarded as principal with which they would buy produce; this is because we are concerned that the mother might die and the principal will be lost).

The Gemora asks: Who is this going according to? It cannot be in accordance with the Rabbis nor Chanania, for we learned in the following braisa: The offspring of a melog animal belongs to the husband; the child of a melog slavewoman belongs to the wife. Chanania the son of Yoshiyah’s brother ruled: The child of a melog slavewoman has been given the same legal status as the offspring of a melog animal (and they both belong to the husband; according to both opinions, the offspring of the melog animal belongs to the husband, not to the wife!).

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yannai may be following both opinions, for it is the produce alone that the Rabbis in their enactment have assigned to the husband but not the produce that accrues from this produce.

The Gemora asks: Chanania’s opinion is understandable (that both, the offspring of the melog animal and slavewoman belong to the husband) because we are not concerned that the mother will die (and therefore, the principal will not be depleted). However, what is the logic behind the opinion of the Rabbis?

The Gemora answers: They are concerned that the mother will die, but an animal is different because (even if it dies) the hide of the animal will always remain (and the principal will not be depleted). (79a – 79b)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If old slaves or slavewomen fell to her as an inheritance, they should be sold, and land should be purchased with them, and he enjoys the produce. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She does not sell them because they are the pride of her father’s house.

If old olive trees or grapevines fell to her as an inheritance, they should be sold for wood, and land should be purchased with them, and he enjoys the produce. Rabbi Yehudah says: She does not sell them because they are the pride of her father’s house. (79b)

Qualifying the Argument

Rav Kahana stated in the name of Rav: The argument in the Mishna is only where the olive trees or grapevines fell to the woman in her own field (so that even if the trees die, she will retain the field as principle); but, if they were in a field that did not belong to her, she must, according to everyone, sell them, because otherwise, the principal would be depleted.

Rav Yosef asked from our Mishna: Aren’t slaves and slavewomen the same as trees in a field that does not belong to her (for if they die, no principal will remain), and nevertheless, there is a dispute?

Rather, this is what Rav Kahana stated in the name of Rav: The argument in the Mishna is only where the olive trees or grapevines fell to the woman in a field that did not belong to her, but if they were in her own field, everyone holds that she is not required to sell them because she is entitled to retain the pride of her father’s house. (79b)

[END]

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Blessing by a Bas Mitzvah

The Rema (O”C 225:2) writes that one whose son is becoming bar mitzvah should recite the following blessing: Blessed are You, Hashem, our God, King of the universe, that You freed me from the punishment due this boy. He concludes that it is preferable to recite this blessing without mentioning Hashem’s name.

The question is asked: Why is this blessing not recited when one’s daughter becomes bas mitzvah?

The Peri Megadim states that it would depend on what the reason is for this blessing.

The Magen Avraham (ibid; 5) explains this blessing as follows: Up until this juncture, the father was punished when his son sinned because he obviously did not train him well enough. Once the child becomes an adult, he is responsible for his own actions.

The Levush, however, interprets this blessing in the exact opposite manner. Up until now, the child gets punished for the sins of his father, as the Gemora Shabbos (32b) states: For the sin of unfulfilled vows, a person’s children die when they are young. The meaning of the blessing is that his son will now not incur any punishments on account of the parents.

According to the Levush, there is no reason to make any distinction between a son and a daughter. However, according to the Magen Avraham, we can say that the blessing is only applicable to a son, where there is an obligation of chinuch. However, a father does not have a mitzvah of chinuch for a daughter and therefore there is no reason to recite the blessing when she becomes bas mitzvah.

The Kaf Hachayim writes that we can apply a different logic according to the Magen Avraham. It is customary for a father to sustain his daughter until she is married and therefore, she is naturally under his jurisdiction until then. He is capable of rebuking her until she marries and will be under the jurisdiction of her husband. He therefore does not recite the blessing when she becomes bas mitzvah since he is still rebuking her.

He explains according to the Levush as well. The Levush said that the reason for the blessing is because up until then, the son gets punished for the sins of his parents. It is possible to say that a daughter, who is already under the mazal of her husband, as it is said: It is announced in heaven, “The daughter of So-and-So will be married to So-and-So,” his mazal will benefit her that she will not be punished on account of her father’s sins.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein questions this explanation from our Gemora (Kesuvos 78a). The Gemora states: In the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yannai, they replied: In the first case, it was into her possession that the property had come (prior to becoming an arusah, she is the legal possessor of whatever is given to her); in the latter case, the property came into his possession. I, however, do not understand his question. It seems that he understands the words “z’chuso and z’chusa” to mean “whose mazal caused the property to fall to her.” The simple explanation in our Gemora is in whose jurisdiction was the woman when the properties fell to her.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 78 - Highlights

Mishna

A woman to whom property fell before she became an arusah (and now she is an arusah), Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that she may sell them or she may give them away, and it is valid.(The Mishna is referring to nichsei melog - usufruct property - the property which the woman brings in with her from her father's house, and which is not recorded in the kesuvah, as well as property which comes to her by inheritance or as a gift after the marriage; this property is hers, and her husband is not responsible for it, since he may only usufruct (the right to use and enjoy the profits and advantages of something belonging to another as long as the property is not damaged or altered in any way) it; the term nikhsei melog is derived from the Aramaic word meligah, plucking, i.e., the husband plucks the property just as a chicken is plucked.)

If the properties fell to her after she became an arusah (and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai say: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel say: She may not sell them. They both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.

Rabbi Yehudah said: The Chachamim said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property? Rabban Gamliel said to them: We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old!

If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, they both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, the husband may seize it from the hand of the purchasers.

If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, and now she is a nesuah, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.

Rabbi Chanina ben Akavya said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property? He said to them: We are embarrassed regarding the new, and you impose on us the old!

Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property and property: property that is known to the husband, she may not sell, and if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is invalid. Properties that are not known to the husband, she may not sell, but if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid. (78a)

Erusin to Nisuin
The Gemora asks: What is the essential difference between the first case in which they do not differ (a woman to whom property fell before she became an arusah (and now she is an arusah), Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that she may sell them or she may give them away, and it is valid) and the latter case in which they do differ (if the properties fell to her after she became an arusah (and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai say: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel say: She may not sell them)?

In the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yannai, they replied: In the first case, it was into her possession that the property had come (prior to becoming an arusah, she is the legal possessor of whatever is given to her); in the latter case, the property came into his possession.

The Gemora questions this distinction: If, however, it is maintained that the property came into his possession (since it is after erusin), why is the transfer valid after she sells them or gives them away?

The Gemora answers: In the first case, the property has beyond all doubt come into her possession. However, in the latter case, the property might be said to have come either into her, or into his possession (since at this present time, we are uncertain if a nisuin will take place). Hence, she may not initially sell the property, but if she does sell them or give it away, the transfer is legally valid. (78a)

Clarification of R’ Yehudah’s Statement
The Mishna had stated: (If the properties fell to her after she became an arusah (and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai say: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel say: She may not sell them. They both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.) Rabbi Yehudah said: The Chachamim said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property?

The Gemora inquires: Is Rabbi Yehudah referring to Beis Shamai’s ruling, which allowed her to sell them initially (and the Chachamim are arguing that since she is an arusah, she should not be permitted to sell the properties)? Or, is he referring to Beis Hillel’s ruling, who ruled that the sale is valid after the fact (and the Chachamim are arguing that since she is an arusah,the sale should not be valid at all)?

The Gemora resolves this inquiry from the following braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: The Chachamim said before Rabban Gamliel: Since this one is his wife and this one is his wife (the nesuah and arusah), just as this one’s (the nesuah) sale is void, so too, this one’s (the arusah) sale should be void as well? Rabban Gamliel said to them: We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old!

We see from this braisa that Rabbi Yehudah was referring to Beis Hillel’s ruling that the sale is valid after the fact. That is the point that the Chachamim are contending. (78a – 78b)

Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya
The Gemora cites the conclusion of the braisa cited above: Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya said: Rabban Gamliel did not respond like this (We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old!); rather, the following was his response: It is logical that a nesuah’s sale will be void because her husband is entitled to her findings, earnings and the right to annul her vows. However, regarding an arusah, whose husband is not entitled to these rights, would you say that her sale should be void?

The Chachamim replied: My master! That is understandable if she sold the properties prior to becoming a nesuah; however, what is the halacha if she first became a nesuah and then she sold the properties?

He said to them: In this case, she is allowed to sell them or give them away and her sale would indeed be valid.

They said to him: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property? Rabban Gamliel said to them:

We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old (regarding the properties that became hers before she became a nesuah)!

The Gemora asks: But in the Mishna, the following was said: If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, and now she is a nesuah, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid (and in the braisa that we just cited, Rabban Gamliel said that she is allowed to sell them or give them away and her sale would indeed be valid)?

Rav Zevid answers: The Mishna should be emended to read that she is allowed to sell them or give them away and her sale would indeed be valid (which would be consistent with the braisa).

Rav Papa answers: The Mishna is following the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah in accordance with Rabban Gamliel (that even as an arusah, a woman is not permitted initially to sell or to give away, much less, may she do so after nisuin) and the braisa is following the opinion of Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya in accordance with Rabban Gamliel (that even a nesuah may sell or give away property that came into her possession before she became a nesuah).

The Gemora asks: If so, it will emerge that Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya follows the opinion of Beis Shamai?

The Gemora answers: This is what he was saying: Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel do not argue regarding this matter. (78b)

Rav and Shmuel
Rav and Shmuel both say: Whether the property fell to her before she became an arusah or whether they fell to her after she became an arusah, if she subsequently became a nesuah and sold the properties, the husband may extract the properties from the purchasers.

The Gemora asks: Who are they going accordsing to? This ruling is seemingly not following Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion, nor is it following Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya’s opinion?

The Gemora answers: They are following the viewpoint of “Our teachers,” for we have learned in the conclusion of the above-cited braisa: Whether the property fell to her before she became an arusah or whether they fell to her after she became an arusah, if she subsequently became a nesuah and sold the properties, the husband may extract the properties from the purchasers. (78b)

Husband Selling Nesuah’s Property
The Mishna had stated: If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, they both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, the husband may seize it from the hand of the purchasers.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t the Mishna teaching us the same halacha that we have learned as an enactment of Usha (which was decreed years after the Mishna)? For Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: In Usha they decreed that a wife who sells her melog property while her husband is alive and she dies, the husband may take the land from the purchasers (since he is regarded as a purchaser from the time of his marriage; his purchase of the property predates their purchase).

The Gemora answers: Our Mishna is dealing with the halacha of the field during her lifetime and it is referring to the produce from the land (meaning that the sale is valid, but the husband may enjoy the produce that grows from the land). The decree of Usha was dealing with the status of the land itself and it is referring to the case where the wife died (and then, the husband may seize the land from the purchasers). (78b)

Unknown Properties
The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property and property: property that is known to the husband, she may not sell, and if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is invalid. Properties that are not known to the husband, she may not sell, but if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.

The Gemora asks: What is regarded as known and what is regarded as unknown?

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: Known properties refer to land and unknown properties refer to moveables.

Rabbi Yochanan said: Both of those are regarded as known properties. Unknown properties refer to a case where the woman lives here and properties fell to her as an inheritance in a land overseas.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion: What is regarded as unknown properties? It is where the woman lives here and properties fell to her as an inheritance in a land overseas. (78b)

[END]

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Yearning to the Return to Zion

It is written [Tehillim 87:5]: And to Zion it shall be said: "this man, this man, was born in her," and He will establish her on high. (This verse is describing the future time when all the nations of the world will bring the Jews back to Zion. They will say regarding each Jew: He is a son of Zion, he was born there, let us bring him back to her.)

Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said (Kesuvos 75a): This verse is applicable to any Jew that was born in Zion and one who yearns to see her. Even Jews who were born elsewhere will be considered children of Zion, provided that they learn to return there.

I began writing the following incident when I was shown that it was already printed in Daf Digest link, so I am writing their version (with a comment or two of my own).

During World War I, Palestine was under Turkish jurisdiction and the Ottomans made life very difficult for the citizens. Press gangs would roam the streets arbitrarily drafting anyone in their wake. The conditions of these forcibly drafted soldiers were exceedingly difficult. They were subjected to hard labor, and since food was exceedingly scarce they were severely underfed.

These circumstances could all be circumvented by paying bribes to officials. However, there was one decree that was exceedingly difficult to avert. The Turks declared that anyone not born in Palestine would be deported. This was more difficult to deal with than forcible conscription, since the only way someone born out of the country could get around this was to lie on the government forms.

Since everyone knew that Rav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, zt"l,(where I saw this story brought down, it was with Rav Yosef Rogotchovi from Petach Tikva, but see below)was very careful to avoid falsehood in any form no matter what it might cost, people were afraid that he would forbid people to lie on the forms. During those difficult times, simple honesty would result in the sundering of many homes. When someone ventured to ask the Rav's opinion about this issue, he surprised everyone in the Old Yishuv. "It is certainly permitted!"

"But why is this different from any other falsehood which the Rav prohibits?" the questioner asked.

Rav Sonnenfeld explained, "This is explicit in Kesuvos 75 on the verse, 'And of Tzion it shall be said, each and every man is born therein.' The Gemora learns from the redundancy of the word "man, each and every man" that one who yearns for Tzion is as one who was born there. We see clearly that any Jew who yearns for Tzion is actually considered as one who was born in Tzion! So to write of those who came up to Tzion out of longing for her holiness that they were native citizens is no lie at all: it is a declaration of the absolute truth!"

I saw this ruling from Rav Sonnenfeld in a slightly different context. It was a question regarding people who were not born in Eretz Yisroel and they were seeking permission from the courts to emigrate to Eretz Yisroel. The courts were only granting visas to those who were born in Eretz Yisroel. Rav Sonnenfeld ruled, based on our Gemora that not only is it permitted to testify that you were born in Eretz Yisroel, but one is obligated to do so. It is not regarded as a lie at all, since one who yearns to return to Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he was born there.

The Kloizenberger Rebbe zt"l added the following: It is written that the lifespan of a person is seventy years. The Gemora in Shabbos (89b) states that the Heavenly courts do not administer punishment for the first twenty years of one's life. Consequently, it can be said that the seventy years do not begin until one is twenty years old. So too, it can be said regarding one who emigrated to Eretz Yisroel. The seventy years of his life begins only after he lives in Eretz Yisroel.

This can be proven from Rashi's commentary on the following verse [Breishis 16:3]: So Sarai, Avram's wife, took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaid, at the end of ten years of Avram's dwelling in the land of Canaan, and she gave her to Avram her husband for a wife. Rashi writes: This tells us that the time they dwelled outside of Eretz Yisroel does not count in the calculation.

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Moshe as a King

The Gemora (Kesuvos 74a) had stated: All conditions are learned out from the stipulation that Moshe made with the tribes of Gad and Reuven. (For any condition to be valid, it must be similar to that condition.) A condition that may be executed by an agent, as Moshe did there (Moshe instructed Yehoshua to act, so to speak, as his agent to give the east bank of the Jordan to them), is a valid condition. However, any stipulation that cannot be executed by an agent is not regarded as a valid condition. (Chalitzah cannot be accomplished through an agent and therefore, a stipulation cannot be attached to it.)

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: If Moshe would be giving the tribes of Gad and Reuven something that belonged to him, and he would instruct Yehoshua to act on his behalf, Yehoshua would be regarded as an agent. However, Moshe was only distributing to them land that was an inheritance to them; why should Yehoshua be considered an agent?

He answers that the land of Sichon and Og was not included in Klal Yisroel’s inheritance. Their land belonged to Moshe since it was captured by Moshe and he had the status of a king. As a king, he was allowed to take possession of this land. Moshe, out of his good-heartedness decided to give away this land to the tribes of Gad and Reuven. It emerges that the instructions to Yehoshua rendered him as an agent of Moshe.

Incidentally, I noticed an interesting Makneh in his explanation of a Gemora in Kiddushin (32b). The Gemora relates that Rabban Gamliel was serving his guests by the wedding feast for his son. The Gemora explains that a Nasi is permitted to renounce the honor that should be given to him.

The Makneh asks from the Medrash in Parshas Yisro which states that Moshe acted as the waiter for Yisro and the other guests at the feast. Why was it permissible for Moshe, who had the status of a king, to forego the honor that one is required to give to a king? The halacha is that a king is not allowed to waive this honor!

He answers by citing the source for this halacha. The Gemora (Kesuvos 17a) states that it is written [Devarim 17:15]: Surely you shall appoint a king over you. This (the double expression of som tasim) means that his awe shall be over you at all times. The Makneh explains that at the moment a king chooses to waive his honor, it is tantamount to resigning from royalty and this is not allowed, for we are commanded to enthrone a king over us continually. This is only applicable after the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisroel and were commanded to enthrone a king; however, in the Desert, although Moshe was regarded as a king, he was permitted to waive his honor and serve his guests.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 74 - Highlights

Conditions

Rav Acha bar Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If a person betrothed a woman on a condition (that she had no current vows), and he later cohabited with her (and she was later found to be in violation of that condition), there is no argument between Rav and Shmuel; they both agree that she does not require a divorce (since the marriage is completely void).

Rav Acha (Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s sister’s son) the son of Rav Ika questioned Rav Acha bar Yaakov from the following braisa: If one mistakenly performed chalitzah, it is nonetheless valid.

The Gemora asks: What is the case of the “mistaken” chalitzah?

Rish Lakish said: It is referring to a case where they told the yavam to perform chalitzah, and with that, he will be marrying her (when in fact, chalitzah accomplishes the exact opposite).

Rabbi Yochanan challenged Rish Lakish: I learned in another braisa: Whether the yavam had the intention of performing the commandment of chalitzah and she had no such intention, or whether she had such intention and he did not, chalitzah is invalid. In order for the chalitzah to be valid, they both are required to have such intention. How can you say that the chalitzah is valid?

Rather, Rabbi Yochanan explains the braisa differently: It is referring to a case where they told the yavam to perform chalitzah on the condition that the yevamah will give him two hundred zuz. The halacha is that the chalitzah is valid even if she does not end up giving him the money.

Rav Acha the son of Rav Ika explains Rabbi Yochanan’s viewpoint and then concludes his challenge. The chalitzah is valid in this case because he performed the action of chalitzah (without repeating the condition at that time – Tosfos), therefore, we may assume that he has dispensed with his stipulation (regarding the money). Here too, let us say, since he cohabited with her (without repeating the condition at that time), he has obviously dispensed with the stipulation (regarding her vows) and the marriage should take effect! (Why does Rav Acha bar Yaakov rule in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the marriage is void?)

Rav Acha bar Yaakov replies: Torah scholar! Are you in fact saying the correct reason for that halacha? (I will explain to you the real reason that the chalitzah is valid.) All conditions are learned out from the stipulation that Moshe made with the tribes of Gad and Reuven. (For any condition to be valid, it must be similar to that condition.) A condition that may be executed by an agent, as Moshe did there (Moshe instructed Yehoshua to act, so to speak, as his agent to give the east bank of the Jordan to them), is a valid condition. However, any stipulation that cannot be executed by an agent is not regarded as a valid condition. (Chalitzah cannot be accomplished through an agent and therefore, a stipulation cannot be attached to it.)

The Gemora asks: But a kiddushin through cohabitation, which cannot be executed by an agent, and nevertheless, a stipulation attached to it is a valid one!?

The Gemora answers: That is because we compare the different methods of betrothal to each other. (74a)

Betrothal by a Loan, Stipulation or with Less than a Perutah

Rav Ula bar Abba said in the name of Ula, who said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: If a man betrothed a woman by a loan (which he lent to her; such a betrothal is invalid because loaned money is given to be spent, while a betrothal cannot be valid unless money or its equivalent was actually given to the woman at the time of the betrothal) and then he cohabited with her, or if he betrothed her on a certain condition and then he cohabited with her (and the conditions were not met), or if he betrothed her with less than the value of a perutah and then he cohabited with her, she requires a get from him according to all opinions (because a man does not want his cohabitation to be rendered promiscuous).

Rav Yosef bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Menachem, who said it in the name of Rabbi Ami: If a man betrothed a woman with less than the value of a perutah and then he cohabited with her, she requires a get from him. (Seemingly, he disagrees with Rabbi Elozar regarding one who betrothed a woman by a loan or with a condition that was not fulfilled, and he holds that a get would not be required.)

The Gemora explains Rabbi Ami’s opinion: People do not make a mistake regarding the laws of betrothing with less than a value of a perutah; everyone knows that such a kiddushin is not valid and the man, obviously, cohabited with her for the sake of kiddushin; therefore, a get would be required. By the other two cases (one who betrothed a woman by a loan or with a condition that was not fulfilled), people make a mistake (and the man might assume that a kiddushin can be valid even through a loan, or even if the conditions weren’t met; therefore, the cohabitation might not have been with the proper intent for kiddushin).

Rav Kahana said in the name of Ula: If a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then he cohabited with her (and the conditions were not met), she requires a get from him. There was once such an incident, and the Rabbis did not have the strength to discharge her without a get.

The Gemora notes: This ruling excludes the opinion of the following Tanna: Rav Yehuda quoted Shmuel as saying in the name of Rabbi Yishmael that when the verse states (regarding a married woman who consents to having an affair) “and she was not forced,” it is saying that she is therefore forbidden to her husband. This implies that if she was violated, she is permitted to her (Yisrael) husband. Rebbi Yishmael derives from the word “and she” that there is a case where a different woman was not forced, and is still permitted to her husband. What is this case? It must be where her kiddushin was mistaken (such as our case; a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then he cohabited with her and the conditions were not met; if she would subsequently cohabit with another man, she would still be permitted to return to the first man because her first marriage was not valid) and even if her son is riding on her shoulder, she can pick herself up and walk away from the marriage. (74a – 74b)

Distinction between a Chacham
and a Doctor

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a man betrothed a woman on the condition that she was not under any vows and she subsequently went to a Chacham who released her from the vow, she is betrothed. If however, he betrothed her on the condition that she did not have any defects and she subsequently went to a doctor who cured her from these defects, she is nevertheless, not betrothed.

The Gemora asks: What is the difference between a Chacham and a doctor?

The Gemora answers: The Chacham annuls the vow retroactively (and it is regarded as if she never pronounced the vow), whereas the doctor only cures the defects from that moment onward.

The Gemora asks from a different braisa that states the following: If a man betrothed a woman on the condition that she was not under any vows and she subsequently went to a Chacham who released her from the vow, or if he betrothed her on the condition that she did not have any defects and she subsequently went to a doctor who cured her from these defects, she is nevertheless, not betrothed. (This contradicts the previous braisa regarding the Chacham releasing her from her vow.)

Rabbah answers: the first braisa is following the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the second braisa follows the opinion of Rabbi Elozar.

Rabbah explains: Rabbi Meir holds that a man does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law (by applying in person to the Chacham for the annulment of her vow; it is assumed, therefore, that a man has no objection to betrothing a woman who is under a vow, since she may subsequently apply to a Chacham for a disallowance). Rabbi Elozar maintains that no man wants his wife to be exposed to a court of law (consequently, if he had known that she was under a vow, he would not have betrothed her; therefore, her betrothal is invalid).

The Gemora asks: What is the source for these opinions?

The Gemora answers: We learned in a Mishna (Gittin 45b): If one divorces his wife because of a vow, he may not take her back. If he divorced her because of a bad name (it was rumored that she committed adultery), he may not take her back. (The reason for this halacha is as follows: According to one opinion, it is possible that after the woman had obtained from a Chacham the disallowance of her vow and had married another man, her first husband might regret his action in divorcing her and he might claim that he would not have divorced her had he known that her vow could be disallowed. Consequently, this might impair the validity of her second marriage. By the enactment that “he may not remarry her,” a husband is naturally induced to institute all the necessary enquiries and to consider very carefully his course before he decides upon divorce, and should he nevertheless divorce her and then claim that he was unaware that her vow could be disallowed, his plea might well be disregarded. According to another opinion, the prohibition to marry a woman in the circumstances mentioned is a penalty, and a warning to women to abstain from making vows.) Rabbi Yehudah says: If the vow was known to many, he may not take her back, but for one that was not known publicly, he may take her back. Rabbi Meir says: If it is a vow which requires examination by a Chacham (and the husband cannot annul it by himself), he may not take her back (Rabbi Meir maintains that a husband does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law and therefore forbids remarriage on account of the first reason mentioned above, since the first husband might claim that if he had known that the vow could be disallowed by a Chacham, he would not have consented to give a divorce), but for one which does not require examination by a Chacham (the husband can annul it himself), he may take her back (because in this case, the husband cannot advance the claim that the divorce was due to a misunderstanding). Rabbi Elozar said: They prohibited him to remarry in the case where the vow required examination by a Chacham to annul it only on account of the case where the vow did not require examination by a Chacham to annul it (since in the latter case, the husband might claim that he was not aware that he had the right to disallow the vow; in the former case, however, no such claim can be advanced because no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law).

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source for Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion.

The Gemora asks: How many people is considered public (that a vow pronounced in public may not be annulled)?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: Three people.

Rav Yitzchak said: Ten people. (74b – 75a)

[END]

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A Legitimate Marital Act,not a Promiscuous One

It was taught: If a person betrothed a woman on a condition (that she had no current vows), and he later married her without mentioning that condition (and she was later found to be in violation of that condition), there is an argument between Rav and Shmuel. Rav says that she requires a divorce, while Shmuel argues that she does not require a divorce.

Abaye states: Do not say that the reasoning of Rav is that because he married her without mentioning the condition he must have forgone the stipulation. Rather, Rav’s reasoning is that a person does not make his marital relations into promiscuity.

The Rishonim ask: The cohabitation in this case is anyways a promiscuous, non-marital cohabitation! This is because we learned previously (54b) that if anyone reduces the prescribed kesuvah amount from his wife, any acts of cohabitation is regarded as promiscuous. In our case, she does forfeit her kesuvah since the husband stipulated that she should not be under any vows, and since it emerged that she is under a vow, he would not be obligated to pay her kesuvah! Accordingly, what advantage is there that he does not want his cohabitation to be a promiscuous one (and therefore, the betrothal is valid), it is anyways regarded as a promiscuous one?

The Ran answers: A person is particular that he will not intentionally render his cohabitation to be regarded as a promiscuous one. However, he is not particular if the Rabbis render his cohabitation to be promiscuous (and it is the Rabbis who deemed it to e a promiscuous cohabitation, when he cohabits with a wife without a kesuvah).

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 73 - Highlights

Betrothal on Condition

It was taught: If a person betrothed a woman on a condition (that she had no current vows), and he later married her without mentioning that condition (and she was later found to be in violation of that condition), there is an argument between Rav and Shmuel. Rav says that she requires a divorce, while Shmuel argues that she does not require a divorce.

Abaye states: Do not say that the reasoning of Rav is that because he married her without mentioning the condition he must have forgone the stipulation. Rather, Rav’s reasoning is that a person does not make his marital relations into promiscuity.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rav and Shmuel already have such an argument? It was taught: A minor was married off by her brother or mother in a Rabbinical marriage in her youth, and stayed married to her first husband, and had marital relations with him even once she became older. She then did mi’un (refused the Rabbinical marriage) and married someone else. Rav says: She does not require a divorce from the second person (as she is still married to the first person). Shmuel states: She does require a divorce from her second husband.

[The Gemora presumes that their argument is regarding the status of their marital relations when she became older. Did the first husband have relations when she became older in order to do a Torah betrothal (not just Rabbinical as it was previously), or was this just a continuation of the first marriage? This could fit into the argument of whether or not a person will allow his marital relations to retroactively be deemed promiscuity.]

The Gemora answers: Both arguments are necessary. If Rav would have only discussed the argument regarding the minor, one might think that this is because she did not violate any condition. However, where there was a clear violation of a condition Rav might agree to Shmuel that she does not even require a divorce. Similarly, if the case regarding conditions was the only one stated, perhaps only there Shmuel said a divorce is unnecessary. However, in the case regarding the marriage of the minor, perhaps he would agree to Rav that she does not need a divorce. This is why both arguments are necessary. (72b – 73a)

Challenging Shmuel

The Mishna states: If a person married a woman without conditions, and he found that she had existing vows, he can divorce her without giving her a kesuvah. The Gemora asks: This implies that while she does not receive a kesuvah, she does require a divorce. It must be that this is a case of where he betrothed her on condition and married her without mentioning the condition, and this is inconsistent with the ruling of Shmuel that she does not require a divorce!

The Gemora answers: No, the case is where the entire betrothal and marriage was done without conditions. If the betrothal was on such a condition and the marriage was not, she indeed would not require a divorce.

The Gemora asks: Instead of the Mishna giving a case of a betrothal done on the condition a woman has no existing vows, and saying that if the condition was violated the betrothal was invalid, the Mishna should merely say that if a person marries a woman and she is found to have vows the marriage is invalid. We would certainly know that in a case where the condition was mentioned upon betrothal that the marriage is invalid!

The Gemora answers: The Mishna indeed means to say this in the following manner. If a person betrothed a woman on the condition that she had no vows and he later married her without mentioning that condition, the betrothal is invalid. If the betrothal and marriage is done without condition and it is found that she has vows, she can be divorced without a kesuvah. This implies correctly that although she does not need a kesuvah, she does require a divorce. (73a – 73b)

Distinction between Kesuvah
and a Get

The Gemora asks: What is the difference? Why should she require a divorce but nor receive a kesuvah? The Gemora answers: It is because he says, “I cannot live with a woman who makes vows.”

The Gemora asks: If so, let her not require a divorce as well! Rabbah answers: She only requires a Rabbinical divorce. This is also the opinion of Rav Chisda. Rava says: The Rabbis were unsure if she requires a divorce, and therefore were lenient about the husband’s monetary kesuvah obligation, but were strict that she should receive a divorce (which has halachic ramifications). (73b)

A Betrothal in Error

Rabbah states: The argument (of Rav and Shmuel) is only regarding one who betroths two women in a possibly mistaken fashion. [The case is where he makes a condition with the first that she has no vows, but he married the second lady without mentioning anything. Rav would say that he perhaps liked the second one so much he didn’t care if she had vows, while Shmuel would say his mindset is clearly that he does not want wives with vows.] However, in a case where he made their betrothal conditional but did not mention the condition by the marriage, everyone (even Rav) agrees that he relented on his condition.

Abaye asked: Our Mishna is clearly talking about one woman, and we asked a question on Shmuel above from this Mishna!

The Gemora answers: It must be that this is what Rabbah meant to say. Their argument is regarding a case of one woman but similar to a mistake by two women. [The case is where the betrothal was on condition; he then divorced her before marrying her, and then betrothed her and married her without condition.] However, in a regular case where the betrothal is with a condition and the marriage is unconditional, everyone agrees he relented on his condition.

Abaye asked: The Beraisa states that if a betrothal was a mistake, or done with less than a perutah (small coin), the betrothal was done by a minor, even if he later sent presents to his “fiancé” (when he became older or in any of the cases above), the betrothal is invalid. This is because the presents are an extension of the original invalid betrothal. However, if the couple engage in marital relations, the betrothal is valid. Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Even if they have marital relations the betrothal is invalid. In this case, Abaye asks, the question is regarding one woman, and we see they still argue! [Rav and Shmuel should also argue in such a case!]

The Gemora continues: The case above (mistaken betrothal) must be where he thought that she did not have vows! The Gemora answers: No, it is talking about the case where the betrothal was done with less than a perutah.

The Gemora asks: This cannot be the case of mistaken betrothal mentioned in the Beraisa, as that case is mentioned separately in the Beraisa! The Gemora answers: It is as if the Beraisa stated, “What is a case of mistaken betrothal? Someone who does betrothal with less than a perutah.”

The Gemora asks: What is the reasoning behind the argument in the Beraisa? The Gemora answers: One opinion (Tana Kama) holds that a person knows that betrothal with less than a perutah is invalid. Therefore, when he had marital relations, he had in mind to have a real betrothal. The other (Rabbi Shimon) says that a person doesn’t realize that betrothal cannot be done with less than a perutah. Therefore, when he has marital relations, he does so based upon what he thinks was already a valid betrothal (and he has no intent that this should be a valid betrothal).

The Gemora asks from a Beraisa: If a man says “I will have marital relations (betrothal) with you on condition that my father approves,” the betrothal is valid even if his father does not approve. Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi Yehuda states in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father approves, the betrothal is valid. If not, it is invalid. Isn’t this a case where only one woman is involved and yet they argue?

The Gemora answers: They are arguing about the following. One opinion says that the condition meant that as long as his father is quiet about it, the betrothal is valid. The father was indeed quiet, therefore the betrothal is valid. The other opinion says that the condition meant that verbal approval was needed from the father, and the father remained quiet. Therefore the betrothal is invalid. (73b)


[END]

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Sheitels

The Mishna had stated: And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered.

The Gemora (Kesuvos 72a) asks: Isn’t going out with her hair uncovered a Biblical prohibition?

The Gemora answers: Biblically, it would have been sufficient if she had covered her head with a head-basket (where some of her hair would have shown through the spaces; the Jewish custom would require a complete covering).

The Rambam seems to say that even if the basket covered her hair completely, Jewish practice mandated that she should also wear a shawl that would drape over her body.

The Chasam Sofer writes that the purpose of this shawl was to cover the hairs that protrude from under the head covering.

The Beis Yosef cites a Rashba, who rules that the wife’s hair, which is common to stick out from under the covering, is not regarded as an ervah to the husband if the husband is accustomed to seeing that hair and he would be permitted to recite kerias shema in such a situation.

The Chasam Sofer writes further that the shawl’s purpose is to cover even those hears which protrude from her head covering. However, the hairs that still stick out are not regarded as being an ervah to the husband.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 72 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: One who restricts his wife by a vow that she should not go to her father’s house, this is the halacha: When her father is with her in the city, if the term was for less than a month, he keeps her, but if the vow was for two months (more than one month), he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah (since it is customary for the wife to visit him frequently). When her father is in another city, if the term was for one festival, he keeps her, but if the vow was for three festivals, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah.

One who restricts his wife by a vow that she should not go to a mourner’s house or a wedding, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah, because he is in essence “locking the door in front of her.” If the husband claims that he made this vow because of “something else” (the Gemora will define this term), he is permitted to do so (and she may not demand a divorce).

If the husband tells her: On the condition that you tell So-and-So what you told me, or (he said) what I told you, or that you fill up or pour into the garbage, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah. (71b)

Two Festivals

The Gemora asks: The Mishna had stated that if the term was for one festival, he may keep her. We can infer from here that if the term was for two festivals, he would be required to divorce her. Then, the Mishna rules that if the term was for three festivals, he is required to divorce her. We can infer from here that if the term was for two festivals, he may keep her as a wife. These implicit rulings are contradictory!

Abaye answers: The second ruling is dealing with the wife of a Kohen, and it is following the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah (who allots extra time for the term of the vow before he would be required to divorce her).

Rabbah bar Ula answers: The first ruling of the Mishna is referring to a woman who is anxious to go to her father’s house, whereas the second ruling of the Mishna is referring to a woman who is not so anxious (and therefore, even a vow with the term of two festivals would not be grounds for divorce). (71b)

Mourning for Others
The Mishna had stated: One who restricts his wife by a vow that she should not go to a mourner’s house or a wedding, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah, because he is in essence “locking the door in front of her.”

The Gemora asks: We can understand why it is regarded as “locking the door in front of her,” when he forbids her to attend a wedding. But why are we so concerned by the fact that she cannot go to a mourner’s house?

The Gemora answers: If she does not participate in the mourning of others, they will not come to eulogize her, or they will not come to bury her.

The Gemora cites a related braisa: Rabbi Meir used to say: It is written [Koheles 7:2]: It is better to go to the house of mourning than to go to a house of feasting, for that is the end of all man, and the living should take it to heart. What does the last part of the verse mean? The living should take to heart matters connected with death.

The Gemora explains the reward for those who eulogize the dead: One who eulogizes over the dead, others will eulogize over him. One who buries the dead, others will bury him. One who cries for the dead, others will cry for him. One who accompanies the dead, others will accompany him. One who carries the dead, others will carry him. (71b – 72a)
Dissolute People at the Wedding
The Mishna had stated: If the husband claims that he made this vow because of “something else,” he is permitted to do so (and she may not demand a divorce).

The Gemora asks: What does the Mishna mean when it says “something else”?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: He claimed that there were promiscuous people there, and that is why he did not want her to attend.

Rav Ashi says: His claim is only legitimate if it has been substantiated that these people were there, but otherwise, we would not believe him. (72a)
Fill Up and Pour into the Garbage
The Mishna had stated: If the husband tells her: On the condition that you tell So-and-So what you told me, or (he said) what I told you, or that you fill up or pour into the garbage, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: Why don’t we tell her to fill up or pour into the garbage?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: The Mishna is not to be taken literally. Rather, it is a euphemism for filling herself with his seed and then pouring it out (vigorous exercise after cohabitation in order to prevent conception).

The Gemora cites a braisa: The meaning of the vow is that she should fill ten pitchers of water and spill them into the garbage.

The Gemora asks: Why is he required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah; let her do it!?

Rabbah bar bar Chana answers in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: By doing so, she will appear foolish. (72b)
Bad Reputation
Rav Kahana said: If a man restricts his wife with a vow that she shall neither borrow nor lend a fine or a coarse sieve, a mill or an oven, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah, because if she would she fulfill the vow, it would give her a bad reputation among her neighbors.

The Gemora cites a braisa which supports Rav Kahana: If a man restricts his wife with a vow that she shall neither borrow nor lend a fine or a coarse sieve, a mill or an oven, he is required to divorce her and give her the kesuvah, because if she would she fulfill the vow, it would give her a bad reputation among her neighbors. Similarly, if she vowed that she shall neither borrow nor lend a fine or a coarse sieve, a mill or an oven, or that she shall not weave beautiful garments for his children, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah, because she gives him a bad name among his neighbors (since they will say that he is stingy). (72a)
Mishna
The Mishna states: And these are divorced without receiving a kesuvah: She who transgresses the laws of Moshe or the Jewish customs. And what are the laws of Moshe? She serves him untithed food, or cohabits with him while she is a niddah, or if she does not separate challah from bread, or if she makes vows and does not fulfill them. And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered, or spins in the street, or talks to every man. Abba Shaul says: Also if she curses his parents in his presence. Rabbi Tarfon says: Also one who screams. And who is regarded as a screamer? One who speaks inside her house and her neighbors hear her voice. (72a)
Explaining the Mishna
The Mishna had stated: If she serves him untithed food, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: How are we to understand this? If the husband knows the fact, let him abstain? And if he does not know, how did he discover it?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where she told him, “'So-and-So, the Rabbi has ruled that the blood was tahor for me,” and he went and asked him and her statement was discovered to be untrue.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that it can be in accordance with Rav Yehudah who says that a woman, who was established by her neighbors to be a niddah (based upon the clothing that she was wearing), her husband will receive lashes if he cohabits with her.

The Mishna had stated: If she cohabits with him while she is a niddah, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: How are we to understand this? If the husband knows the fact, let him abstain? And if he does not know, let us now rely on her statement that she was not a niddah at that time?

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source which indicates that a woman is believed in this regard.

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where she told him, “'So-and-So, the Kohen has tithed the pile of grain for me,” and he went and asked him and her statement was discovered to be untrue.

The Mishna had stated: If she does not separate challah from bread, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: How are we to understand this? If the husband knows the fact, let him separate the challah himself? And if he does not know, how did he discover it?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where she told him, “'So-and-So, a kneader separated the challah for me,” and he went and asked him and her statement was discovered to be untrue.

The Mishna had stated: If she makes vows and does not fulfill them, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah.

This transgression effects her marriage as the master said: One’s children will die young for the sin of not fulfilling one’s vows. As the verse states: Do not let your mouth cause your flesh to sin, and do not say before the angel that it was unintentional; why should Hashem be angry at your voice, and He will destroy your handiwork? A person’s handiwork is his children, and if he does not fulfill his vows, Hashem will take his children from him. (72a)
Violating Her Vows
The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Meir said: Any man who knows that his wife makes vows and does not fulfill them should impose (the same) vows upon her again.

The Gemora asks: You say that he should impose the same vows upon her again? How will this be a remedy?

The Gemora answers: Rather, say that he should provoke her again in order that she should make her vows in his presence and he would thus be able to annul them.

They, however, said to him: No one can live with a serpent in the same basket (she will eventually pronounce a vow without him annulling it and she will then proceed to violate it).

The Gemora cites a related braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: Any husband, who knows that his wife does not properly separate challah from the dough that she bakes, should separate it himself again after her.

They, however, said to him: No one can live with a serpent in the same basket.

The Gemora notes: He who taught it (that the husband can protect the marriage) in connection with this case (the challah) would certainly apply it with even greater force to the other case (the wife who violates her vows). He, however, who taught it in connection with the other case applies it to that case only, but not to this one (the challah), because it might sometimes happen that he would eat from bread that has not been separated (since she bakes all the time). (72a)
Uncovered Head
The Mishna had stated: And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t going out with her hair uncovered a Biblical prohibition?

The Gemora answers: Biblically, it would have been sufficient if she had covered her head with a head-basket (where some of her hair would have shown through the spaces; the Jewish custom would require a complete covering).

Rabbi Assi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: A woman, who goes out wearing a head-basket, is not violating the prohibition of going out with one’s head uncovered.

Rabbi Zeira asked: Where is she going? If she is going into the public street, the Jewish custom is that her head must be completely covered? Rather, we are obviously talking about a courtyard. But, if so (that you are ruling that she must be wearing some type of head-covering), you will not leave our father Avraham a single daughter who could remain with her husband (since it was common for all married women go about in their court-yards with uncovered heads)!

Abaye said, and other say: Rav Kahana said: She was going from one courtyard to another courtyard through an alley (since fewer people frequent an alley, it would not have been included in the restrictions of a public street, yet it is not considered sufficiently private to allow the woman to go about there with her head completely uncovered). (72a – 72b)
Spinning in the Street
The Mishna had stated: And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered or she spins in the street.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: She uncovers her arms to the men as she spins.

Rav Chisda said in the name of Avimi: As she is spinning the thread, the thread extends to her thigh area (calling intention to her private parts). (72b)
Talks to Every Man
The Mishna had stated: And what are the Jewish customs? She goes out with her hair uncovered, or spins in the street, or talks to every man.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: Talking to men is referring to a woman who is flirting with young men.

The Gemora records an incident: Rabbah bar bar Chanah said: I was once walking behind Rav Ukva when I observed an Arab woman who was sitting, casting her spindle and spinning, and she extended the thread to her thighs. When she saw us, she detached the spindle from the thread, threw it down and said to me, “Young man, hand me my spindle.” Rav Ukva made a statement concerning her behavior. What was that statement? Ravina replied: He spoke of her as a woman who spins in the street. The Rabbis said: He spoke of her as one who talks to every man. (72b)

Cursing his Parents
The Mishna had stated: Abba Shaul says: Also if she curses his parents in his presence.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: This includes also one who curses her husband’s parents in the presence of his offspring; and your mnemonic (that grandsons are like sons) sign is: Ephraim and Menasheh shall be to me as Reuven and Shimon.

Rabbah explained: For instance, when she said in the presence of her husband’s son, “May a lion devour your grandfather.” (72b)
A Screamer
The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Tarfon says: Also one who screams.

The Gemora asks: And who is regarded as a screamer?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: She raises her voice concerning marital relations.

It was taught in a braisa: A screaming woman is one, who while engaging in marital relations with her husband in one courtyard, can be heard (screaming due to the pain) in another courtyard.

The Gemora asks: If so, this case should be included in the Mishna that deals with blemishes?

Rather, it is clear that the explanation is in the manner that we initially answered. (72b)

[END]

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Living in Eretz Yisroel and not Eating Meat or Drinking Wine

If a woman living outside of Eretz Yisroel pronounced a vow that she will go and live in Eretz Yisroel; at the time of her vow, it was not dangerous to live there, but later, there was a fear of war. Is the husband allowed to annul her vow?

Perhaps this question would be dependent on whether there is a mitzvah nowadays to live in Eretz Yisroel. Rabbeinu Chaim Kohen and Tosfos (110b) maintain that there is no mitzvah. The Ramban and other Rishonim disagree and hold that there is a mitzvah.

The Chidah in Birkei Yosef discusses if this is regarded as a vow that involves personal affliction or not.

Another inquiry: If a wife pronounces a vow against eating meat and drinking wine, but she does so on advice from her doctors that it is not healthy for her; can the husband annul such a vow?

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein says that the husband may annul such a vow, because even though the doctors say that consumption of meat and wine are unhealthy, that is only if he indulges in them, but eating a little meat and drinking a little wine will not cause her harm, and on the contrary, it would have some health benefits; therefore, the husband may annul such a vow. If the doctors state unequivocally that any amount of meat or wine will be harmful for her, then, the husband will not be allowed to annul such a vow.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 71 - Highlights

Rabbi Yehudah’s Opinion

The Mishna had stated (regarding one who had made a vow prohibiting his wife from deriving any pleasure from him until thirty days): Rabbi Yehudah said: If he is a Yisroel, he can keep her as a wife and she is required to be supported through a steward; if he is a Kohen, he can keep her as a wife even if the term of the vow was until two months (we are more lenient because after she is divorced, he cannot remarry her later).

The Gemora asks: Aren’t the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Yehudah stating the same opinion?

Abaye answers: Rabbi Yehudah is teaching us the halacha regarding the wife of a Kohen.

Rava answers: The difference between them is concerning a full month or a deficient month (the Tanna Kamma maintains that the appointed steward supports her for thirty days, whereas Rabbi Yehudah holds that he should sustain her for only twenty-nine days). (71a)

Unspecified Amount

Rav said: The halacha that the husband may support his wife through an appointed steward is only applicable when the husband specified a term for his vow (less than thirty days); however, if he did not specify any amount, he must divorce her immediately and give her the kesuvah. Shmuel said: Even in this case, he is not required to divorce her immediately, for perhaps, he will find an opening for his vow (and a Chacham will thereby, release him from his vow).

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rav and Shmuel have this exact dispute a different time (why do they argue twice regarding the same issue)? For we learned in a Mishna: If one vowed, prohibiting his wife to have conjugal relations with him, Beis Shamai say: Two weeks (if the vow is for longer than this period, it is the duty of the husband either to have his vow disallowed or to release his wife by divorce). Beis Hillel say: One week. And Rav said: The argument is only applicable when the husband specified a term for his vow (one or two weeks); however, if he did not specify any amount, he must divorce her immediately and give her the kesuvah. Shmuel said: Even in this case, he is not required to divorce her immediately, for perhaps, he will find an opening for his vow (and a Chacham will thereby, release him from his vow).

The Gemora answers: It was necessary for them to argue in both instances. For if they would have argued only by the case of the marital relations, that is where Rav would say that he must divorce her immediately because the option of an appointed steward is not available; however, by the case of the vow prohibiting benefit, where it is possible to sustain her through a steward, perhaps Rav would agree to Shmuel. And if they would have argued only in the case of the vow prohibiting benefit, perhaps that is where Shmuel would say that he is not required to divorce her immediately, it is possible to sustain her through a steward; however, by the case of the marital relations, where the option of an appointed steward is not available, perhaps Shmuel would agree to Rav. Therefore, the Gemora concludes that both arguments were necessary. (71a)

Put her Finger Between Her Teeth

The Gemora asks on Shmuel from our Mishna: One who vows that his wife not eat from a certain type of fruit is required to divorce his wife and give her a kesuvah. Now, according to Rav, we can explain this part of the Mishna to be referring to a case where the term of vow was unspecified and therefore, he is required to divorce her immediately. The first part of the Mishna is dealing with a case where he specified a certain period of time. However, according to Shmuel, why, in this latter case, is he required to divorce her immediately?

The Gemora answers: The case we are dealing with is where the wife pronounced the vow and the husband upheld it (there is no reason to wait and see if the wife will go to a Chacham to release her from the vow). And Rabbi Meir maintains that it is “he who put her finger between her teeth” (i.e. it is the husband’s fault because he could have annulled her vow), and therefore, she may demand to be divorced.

The Gemora asks: Does Rabbi Meir actually hold that it is “he who put her finger between her teeth”? But we learned in the following braisa: If a woman made a vow of a nazirus (which would forbid her from drinking wine or eating anything which has grapes as an ingredient) and her husband heard of it and did not annul it, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah said: It is “she who has thereby put her own finger between her teeth.” Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he said: I do not want a wife who is accustomed to taking vows, she may be divorced without receiving her kesuvah. Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Elozar said: It is “he who has put his finger between her teeth.” Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he said: I do not want a wife who is accustomed to taking vows, she may be divorced, but she does receive her kesuvah. (Thus we see that Rabbi Meir maintains that the wife is the one who “put her finger between her teeth”?)

The Gemora answers: Reverse their opinions: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah said: “He has put” and Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Elozar said: “She has put.”

The Gemora asks: But does Rabbi Yosi actually hold that it is “she who put her finger between her teeth”? But we learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Yosi said: If she was a poor woman, he is required to divorce her only if the vow was uttered without specifying a time limit. (This is referring to a case where she pronounced the vow and her husband upheld it, and if she did specify a time limit, she may demand a divorce. Thus, we see that Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is “he who put her finger between her teeth”?)

The Gemora answers: We are compelled to emend the opinions once again, and the following is what the braisa should have said: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi said: “He has put” and Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Elozar said: “She has put.”

The Gemora asks: But does Rabbi Yehudah actually hold that it is “she who put her finger between her teeth”? But we learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Yehudah said: If he is a Yisroel and the vow was only for one day, he can keep her as a wife (however, if it was for two days or more, he divorces her and gives her the kesuvah; once again, according to Shmuel, this is a case where she pronounced the vow and he upheld it; it emerges that Rabbi Yehudah also holds that it is “he who has put her finger between her teeth”)?

The Gemora emends the braisa to read as follows: Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yosi said: “He has put” and Rabbi Elozar said: “She has put.”

Alternatively, if you insist that the braisa taught the opinions in pairs, you can say that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elozar said: “She has put” and Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yosi said: “He has put,” and our anonymous Mishna will not be in accordance with Rabbi Meir (although the reverse is usually the case). (71a)

The Gemora asks: (According to Shmuel, the Mishna is referring to a case where she pronounced the vow and he upheld it) Rabbi Yosi holds that a poor woman, where a time limit was not specified (she pronounced a vow against using perfume; the husband is required to divorce her), evidently, the husband should have annulled the vow (and by refraining from doing so, it is his responsibility). The following braisa would seemingly contradict this: These are the vows which a husband may annul: Vows which involve personal affliction. For instance, if a woman said, “If I bathe,” or “If I do not bathe; “If I use adornments,” or “If I do not use adornments.” Rabbi Yosi said: These are not regarded as vows involving personal affliction. Rather, the following are vows that involve personal affliction: “I shall not eat meat,” or “I shall not drink wine,” or “I shall not adorn myself with colored clothing.” (It emerges that a vow regarding perfumes is not considered a personal affliction and the husband cannot annul such a vow!?)

The Gemora answers: Our Mishna is discussing adornments that are between him and her (a powder, for instance, for the removal of pubic hair; a woman’s abstention from the use of such kinds of cosmetics or adornments are regarded as things affecting their intimate relations and such vows are regarded as a personal affliction and may be annulled by a husband).

The Gemora asks: This is understandable according to the opinion who maintains that a husband may annul a vow which concerns matters that are between him and her; however, what is there to say according to the opinion who holds that a husband may not annul a vow which concerns matters that are between him and her? For we learned as follows: Concerning matters that are between him and her, Rav Huna said: A husband may annul such a vow and Rav Adda bar Ahavah said: He cannot, for we never found that a fox died in his own foxhole (a proverb meaning that one is not injured by an element to which one is accustomed; the husband being accustomed to his wife’s intimate parts, will not damage himself by her excess pubic hair; since the intimate relations of husband and wife are not affected by such a vow, the husband has no right to invalidate them; how, then, can he be penalized in the case of the adornments spoken of in our Mishna)?

The Gemora answers: We are dealing with a case where she made her cohabitation dependent upon her use of adornments, by saying: The enjoyment of cohabitation with you shall be forbidden to me should I ever make use of any adornment. (This vow, obviously, may be annulled by the husband since it effects their marital relations.)

This vow takes effect according to Rav Kahana, for Rav Kahana said: If a wife pronounces the following vow: The enjoyment of cohabitation with me shall be forbidden to you, we force her to cohabit with him (since the husband has a legal right to have pleasure in his marital relations, and such a vow has no validity). However, if she pronounces: The enjoyment of cohabitation with you shall be forbidden to me, he may annul the vow (since the vow was directed towards her pleasure, it takes effect; and we cannot force her to have relations with him) since we may not feed a person something that is forbidden to him (in our case, it would be forbidden to her).

The Gemora asks: But in our case (where she made her cohabitation dependent upon her use of adornments, by saying: The enjoyment of cohabitation with you shall be forbidden to me should I ever make use of any adornment), let her not adorn herself and she will not become forbidden to have relations with him (and therefore, it should not be regarded as a vow that involves matters that are between him and her, and consequently, the husband should not be allowed to annul such a vow)?

The Gemora answers: If so (that she will not adorn herself), she will be referred to as a repulsive woman (and since she eventually will adorn herself, it is regarded as a vow that involves matters that are between him and her).

The Gemora asks: Let her adorn herself and become forbidden to partake in relations with him, and according to Beis Shamai, this should be for two weeks and according to Beis Hillel, it should be for one week (why is he required to divorce her immediately)?

The Gemora answers: The dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel applies only to a case where the husband has forbidden her by a vow because in such circumstances she thinks: He may have been angry with me, but he will eventually calm down. Here, however, since she has made the vow and he remained silent, she comes to the following conclusion: Since he remained silent, he must indeed hate me (and therefore, he divorces her immediately). (71a – 71b)

Time Limit

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yosi said: If she was a poor woman, he is required to divorce her only if the vow was uttered without specifying a time limit.

The Gemora asks: How long of a time is considered as if there was a term limit specified (and within that time, he would not be required to divorce her)?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: It is twelve months.

Rabbah bar bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: It is ten years.

Rav Chisda said: It is until the festival, but not including the festival since it is common for a Jewish girl to adorn herself during the festival. (71b)

[END]

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