Stolen Water is Sweet

(Nedarim 91b)A certain adulterer visited a woman. Her husband came, whereupon the adulterer went and hid himself behind a curtain before the door. There was some cress lying there that a snake had ate from while the husband was away, and now the husband was about to eat from the cress without his wife’s knowledge. The adulterer exclaimed, “Don’t eat from it, because a poisonous snake has tasted it!”

Rava said: The wife is permitted, for had he committed a sin, he would have been pleased that the husband should eat from it and die, as it is written: For they have committed adultery, and there is blood on their hands.

The Gemora asks: Surely that is obvious?

The Gemora answers: I might have thought that he had committed a sin, and as for his warning, that is because he prefers the husband not to die, so that his wife may be to him as stolen waters are sweet, and bread of secrecy is pleasant; therefore Rava teaches otherwise.

Tosfos explains that although it is true that “stolen waters are sweet,” an adulterer is not aware that this is the cause for his pleasure; rather, he thinks that his desires will be fulfilled if the husband dies and he can marry her publicly.

Rabbi Eliyahu Dessler in Michtav M’Eliyahu explains as follows: The reason that “stolen waters are sweet” is because the forbidden pleasures which the sinner desires are out of his reach. Once he reaches it and brings himself to the gratification that he was seeking, he loses his desire for that enjoyment.

The sinner, however, does not realize this. He thinks that he is genuinely attracted to that forbidden pleasure. He therefore deludes himself into thinking that finding a legal way to enjoy this forbidden pleasure will bring him the gratification that he desires.

Rava understood that this man did not realize what the driving force behind his desires is. This is why he ruled that the woman is permitted. If he indeed was an adulterer, he would have chosen the simple way for him to fulfill his desires; let the husband die. He did not do that, and that to Rava was an indicator that he was indeed innocent.

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The Violation of a Kohen's Wife

The Mishna (Nedarim 90b) stated: At first they said that the following three women must be divorced and they also receive their kesuvah: One (a wife of a Kohen) who declares, “I am defiled to you (I have been violated forcibly by another man),” or “Heaven is between me and you (my husband is impotent),” or “May I be kept away from the Jews (a vow to have no cohabitation with any of them; such a vow is assumed to be the result of the pain that cohabitation may cause her, and therefore justified).” This ruling was afterwards retracted in order that a wife might not cast eyes upon another man and act immorally towards her husband. Instead, it was ordained that one (a wife of a Kohen) who declares, “I am defiled to you (I have been violated forcibly by another man)” must bring evidence in support of her statement; in respect of a woman who tells her husband, “Heaven is between me and you (my husband is impotent),” peace is made between them by way of a request addressed to the husband that he should treat his wife properly; and if a woman vowed, “May I be kept away from the Jews,” the husband revokes his part of the vow and she may cohabit with him, though she remains removed from all other Jews.

The Meiri writes that it became common for women to cast their eyes upon other men, and they would gain their release from their husband with these claims. Even in the case where she made a neder prohibiting cohabitation with all Jews, they were still concerned that she might later petition a sage to have the neder annulled.

The Ra”n asks: If with these claims, she is believed, and therefore, halachically forbidden to her husband, how did the Chachamim permit her to her husband? Where has the prohibition gone?

The Ra”n answers that the Chachamim have the authority to retroactively take away their marriage, and it would emerge that at the time that she was violated, she was unmarried, and therefore, she is legally permitted to her husband. The Chachamim have this right, for any marriage is contingent upon the consent of the Chachamim, and if they see a reason to nullify the kiddushin, they may do so.

The Ra”n suggests an alternative answer: In truth, the woman should not be believed with respect to these claims, because she cannot release herself from her obligations to her husband. The initial ruling believed her to be speaking the truth, for otherwise, she would not have disgraced herself with these claims. Afterwards, when their level of morality deteriorated, and they realized that the women were casting their eyes upon other men and falsely claiming that there were grounds for divorce, the Chachamim rejected her claim.

The Rishonim ask: Why don’t we apply the principle of “shavya a’nafshei chaticha d’issura,” one who states that something is forbidden, even if he is not believed in respect to everyone else, renders the object forbidden to him? If so, she should be forbidden to him, even if we do not believe her!

Tosfos quotes from Rabbeinu Eliezer that a Kohen’s wife who is violated is forbidden as a zonah, is only a prohibition on the Kohen, but not on her, so since she is not believed, she is permitted to remain with him.

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The Man and the Servant

In our Mishna (Nedarim 89a), when it says, “This is the rule” (once she enters into her own jurisdiction for even one moment, the husband cannot revoke her vows), it is coming to include a case where the father gave her over to the husband’s agents, or the father’s agents gave her over to the husband’s agents. From this point and on, the husband may not revoke any of his wife’s prior vows.

For once she was given over to them, her father no longer has any jurisdiction over her, because this handing over is regarded like nisuin. The husband may revoke nedarim that she makes from this time on, but with respect to her prior nedarim, he may not revoke them. He cannot revoke them in conjunction with her father either, because she has left her father’s jurisdiction, and he no longer has any rights over her.

Based upon this principle, the Pardes Yosef explains the following verse [Breishis 24:61]: And Rivkah and her maidens arose and rode on the camels, and they followed the man; and the servant took Rivkah and left. Why was Eliezer first referred to as “the man,” and afterwards, “the servant”?

We can answer as follows: As long as Rivkah was under the jurisdiction of her father, although Eliezer was the servant of Yitzchak, because Avraham gave over all his possessions to him, nevertheless, he was not the servant of Rivkah. Therefore, Eliezer (with respect to Rivkah) was called, “the man.” However, after Rivkah’s maidens, who were Lavan’s agents, handed her over to Eliezer, she entered into the jurisdiction of Yitzchak, for her father gave her over to the husband’s agent (Eliezer). Once she entered into her husband’s authority, Eliezer now became her servant, and therefore, the Torah refers to him as “the servant.”

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Within a Period of an Utterance

The Gemora (Nedarim 87a) issues a halachic ruling: The halacha is that a statement which follows another statement within the period of an utterance is regarded as if it were made together with the first one except in the case of blasphemy, idolatry, betrothal and divorce. (If one commits blasphemy or practises idolatry, and immediately, within the period of utterance, retracts, his retraction is unavailing, and he will still incur the death penalty. If a man betroths a woman or divorces her, and immediately thereafter changes his mind, such withdrawal is invalid.)

The Ra”n comments that he doesn’t know why these cases are different and from where did the Rabbis derive this. It would seem, he says, that in regards to other things that are not as serious, when a person does them, he doesn’t do them with absolute intent. Rather, his intention is that he will be able to retract them within the time it takes for an utterance. But these, since they are so serious, a person will not proceed unless he has made up his mind completely, and for this reason, retraction, even within the period of time it takes for an utterance, is not effective.

The Ramban in Meseches Bava Basra quotes Rabbeinu Tam who says that the halacha that within the time it takes for an utterance is regarded as a single utterance is a decree that the Rabbis made because of a student who is purchasing something and his teacher comes, so that he will be able to greet him. They issued this ruling for all things except for these.

The Ra”n asks: How could they make a decree in respect to nedarim which will permanently uproot something from the Torah in a manner that involves actively doing something?

The Imrei Binah answers according to the Radvaz, who says that we are more lenient with respect to nedarim because they can be annulled by a sage. Therefore, the Torah gave the power to the Chachamim to permit a Biblical prohibition, even when it involves actively uprooting it.

Reb Shimon Shkop asks on the Ra”n: If the logic that enables one to retract within the period of an utterance is because he lacks absolute intent, how can this apply to the halacha of rending one’s garments over a death? There is no intention required!

They explain as follows: The principle of “within the time required for an utterance” accomplishes that any act performed can be viewed as continuing for a further amount of time (“the period of an utterance”). Therefore, when he rends his garments and then, within the time required for an utterance, discovers who died, it may be regarded as if he tore his clothes at that time.

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Blessing on the Torah

The Land Became Lost

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav (Nedarim 81a): What does the verse mean when it says: Who is the man who is wise and can understand this? This (the reason for the destruction of the Second Temple) was asked to scholars and prophets and they could not explain it, until Hashem explained it Himself, as it says: And Hashem said that it is because they left my Torah. Isn’t the phrase “and they did not listen to My voice” the same as the phrase “and they did not go in its ways”? Rav Yehudah explains in the name of Rav: This means that they did not recite a blessing before learning Torah.

The Chanukas HaTorah explains: The Gemora in Brochos (48b) asks: From where do we derive that one should recite a blessing prior to studying Torah? Rabbi Yishmael says: It is derived by means of a kal vachomer. If a blessing is recited before partaking in “sustenance for the moment” (food), it certainly follows that a blessing should be recited on “eternal sustenance”! The Gemora (Brochos 38a) also states: Prior to reciting a blessing, the land belongs to Hashem; after the blessing is recited, the land is given over to man.

Accordingly, it can be said that if they refrained from reciting a blessing before studying Torah, it is clearly evident that they did not recite a blessing before eating as well. For if they would have made a blessing before the consumption of food, they certainly would have made a blessing before studying Torah (based upon the kal vachomer). Since they didn’t recite a blessing on their food, the land became lost, for prior to a blessing, the land belongs to Hashem.

They didn’t Recite the Blessing on the Torah “First”

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: What does the verse mean when it says: Who is the man who is wise and can understand this? This (the reason for the destruction of the Second Temple) was asked to scholars and prophets and they could not explain it, until Hashem explained it Himself, as it says: And Hashem said that it is because they left my Torah. Isn’t the phrase “and they did not listen to My voice” the same as the phrase “and they did not go in its ways”? Rav Yehudah explains in the name of Rav: This means that they did not recite a blessing before learning Torah.

The language of the Gemora is that they didn’t recite a blessing on the Torah “techilah.” What is that word coming to exclude? We do not recite any blessings after we conclude learning Torah! (The Levush says that the two blessings that we recite before studying Torah are actually “one before” and “one after,” except that we never finish studying Torah, so the Rabbis instituted that both blessings should be recited beforehand.)

The Orach Yesharim explains: When a person receives a present, he values both the gift and the giver. Even if the gift is a small one, he will value it, if it was given to him by a prominent person. Similarly, he will appreciate something given to him by an ordinary person, if the item is a valuable one.

The Torah is praised with noth elements. It is written: Ki lekech tov nasati lachem, the Torah itself is valuable, and that it is being gifted to Klal Yisroel from Hashem.

This could be the explanation as to why we recite two blessings before studying Torah. The first brocha is asher bachar banu, Hashem chose us; Torah is special because Hashem has given it to us. The second bracha is v’chayei olam nata b’socheinu, Torah is precious because of its inherent value.

This is the meaning of our Gemora: They appreciated the value of Torah, and therefore, they recited the second blessing. However, they were not fully appreciative of the Giver of the Torah, and they therefore refrained from reciting the first blessing on the Torah. This is why the Torah did not continue to flourish with their children.

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Is the Fetus a "Swallowed Item"?

The following halacha is derived from our Gemora (Nedarim 75b): If a person swallows a tahor ring and subsequently enters a room containing a corpse, the ring does not contract tumah. This is based on a Gemora in Chulin (71b), which states that a “swallowed item” does not contract tumah.

The Minchas Chinuch (263:3) asks the following question: How can Rabbi Akiva in Chulin (72a) rule that a fetus inside of its mother’s womb can Biblically contract tumah? Shouldn’t the fetus be regarded as a “swallowed item,” and therefore, be shielded by the mother’s body from becoming tamei?

He answers that the fetus is considered like a thigh of its mother and therefore is rendered tamei just like any other one of the mother’s limbs.

The Magen Avraham (O”C 343:2) cites the Rokeach as saying the following: Concerning a pregnant wife of a Kohen, she is permitted to enter into a room that contains a corpse (even though the baby might be a male and cannot become tamei). The rationale is based upon a “double doubt.” Perhaps she will miscarry, and even if she will not, perhaps the child will be a female, not a male!

The Magen Avraham asks: Why is this logic necessary? It should be permitted because the fetus can be regarded as a “swallowed item,” and hence, cannot become tamei?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Shiurim (2:41) answers: A Kohen is forbidden from entering into a room that contains tumah (regardless of becoming tamei). A “swallowed item,” although it does not become tamei, it is nevertheless, considered as if it is inside the room. Therefore, the principle of a “swallowed item” will not permit her to enter the room.

According to the Minchas Chinuch, we can answer that the fetus is not regarded as a “swallowed item,” and therefore will not be a reason to permit her to enter.

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Ben Azzai

(Nedarim 74b) When Ben Azzai heard Rabbi Akiva’s argument, he exclaimed in this exact language: It is a pity to you, Ban Azzai, that you did not serve Rabbi Akiva!

The Yad Malachei asks: It is evident from this Gemora that Ben Azzai did not study under Rabbi akiva. However, the Gemora Brochos (62a) states that Rabbi Yehudah told Ben Azzai: For how long will you be brazen towards Rabbi Akiva, your master? It could be answered that Ben Azzai went to study under Rabbi Akiva, and that is what the Gemora in Brochos is referring to.

However, the Gemora Brochos mentions that Ben Azzai said to Rabbi Akiva: For how long will you be brazen towards your master, that you followed Rabbi Yehoshua into the lavatory? If Rabbi Akiva was his master, how could he speak in such a degrading manner towards him? Even a teacher to a student wouldn’t talk like that; certainly a student to his teacher!

Therefore, he writes that it must be that Ben Azzai was a talmid chaver (a peer) of Rabbi Akiva. They were both disciples of Rabbi Eliezer the Great.

The Gemora in Bava Basra (158a) refers to Ben Azzai as the “Talmid chaver” of Rabbi Akiva. Ben Azzai was considered somewhat of a disciple of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbeinu Gershom comments: Since Ben Azzai was a “bochur,” he was unable to comprehend halachic logic as well as Rabbi Akiva.

What is the connection between being a “bochur,” and not comprehending to the fullest extent?

I once heard from my Rosh Yeshiva, HaRav Chaim Schmelczer zt”l that Rabbeinu Gershom means that Ben Azzai was a bachelor, and one who is not married does not have the same level of contentment as one who is married. Torah study requires one to be at ease; one must have a menuchas hanefesh in order to comprehend the depths of the Torah. This is what Ben Azzai was lacking.

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Deaf-mute Revoking

Rami bar Cham inquires (Nedarim 73a): Can a deaf man revoke the nedarim of his wife?

The Ra”n explains that the Gemora is referring to a deaf person who can talk, but cannot hear.

The Rosh adds: We cannot be referring to a deaf-mute, for he can only make a Rabbinical kiddushin through hinting or signing. He will not be able to revoke her nedarim, which are Biblically valid! Furthermore, he would have the halacha of a shoteh, and the halachos of revoking will not be applicable for him.

Reb Yaakov Emden explains the Rosh to mean as follows: The kiddushin of a deaf-mute is only a Rabbinical one. He performs a kiddushin by demonstrating that he wishes to marry her. It is, therefore, impossible for him to revoke his wife’s nedarim, for that is a Biblical halacha, which would only be applicable to a marriage on a Biblical level.

The Acharonim challenge this explanation from a Gemora in Niddah (46b), which states that one who married a minor, who has no father, and the kiddushin is only a Rabbinical one, may nevertheless revoke her nedarim. This is because every woman who makes a neder intends that it will be subject to her husband’s will. This applies by a Rabbinical marriage as well, since she is his wife.

Reb Shmuel Rozovsky (and others) explain the Rosh to mean that since he cannot talk, he is incapable of revoking his wife’s vows. For one needs to speak in order ot revoke a vow; hinting and signing will not be sufficient.

The Nidrei Zerizin is perplexed by this answer: Where does it say that one needs a complete expression in order to revoke a vow? Furthermore, he can revoke it through writing. For there are many opinions that maintain that writing is considered like speaking in regards to making an oath; certainly it should suffice for revoking a vow!

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Pre-existing Conditions

The Gemora (Nedarim 72a) stated that the Mishna is referring to a nesuah, and the reason that the husband cannot revoke her vow is because the halacha is that a husband cannot revoke his nesuah’s prior vows.

The Ra”n explains that it can be referring to a nesuah either in the marriage preceding the divorce or the one that followed it. If she was an arusah by the first marriage and a nesuah at the end, he would not be able to revoke her nedarim, for the husband cannot revoke pre-existing nedarim. If she was a nesuah by the first marriage and an arusah at the end, he cannot revoke her nedarim, for once she is a nesuah, the father loses his rights over her, and the arus is not able to revoke her vows without the conjunction of her father.

The Reshash notes that it would seem from this Ra”n that a husband after nisuin can indeed revoke the nedarim that his wife made while she was an arusah. For otherwise, the Mishna did not have to mention that he divorced her and then remarried her. He cites the Rambam’s opinion that the husband may not revoke the nedarim that his wife made while she was an arusah.

There are those that explain the argument as follows: Does the husband have authority over his wife’s nedarim, while she is an arusah? If you say that the husband has no authority then; it is only in conjunction with her father that he may revoke her nedarim, we can explain the Rambam’s opinion. Once they perform nisuin, the husband acquires the authority to revoke her nedarim, but he can only use this authority on nedarim that his wife makes from now on. However, if you will say that the husband does have authority to revoke her vows even during the erusin, except that this authority is limited in the fact that he may only revoke her nedarim in conjunction with her father, we can understand the Ra”n’s opinion. The husband may revoke the nedarim that his wife made during erusin, for this is not regarded as a pre-existing neder, since he had the authority to revoke this neder even beforehand.

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A Quiet Confirmation

Rava inquires (Nedarim 69a): Is there such a thing as an annulment for a confirmation, or not?

The Ra”n explains: If the father or the husband confirmed the neder and asked on that same day that the confirmation should be annulled, can it be annulled (similar to a neder)? It is obvious that it cannot be annulled on the following day, for it has no less effect than remaining quiet.

It is evident from the Ra”n here and he says so explicitly in Kesuvos that there is certainly no annulment if he had remained quiet.

The Reshash asks: What is the distinction? If he can annul a spoken-out confirmation, why can’t he annul a confirmation that came about because he remained quiet (which is regarded automatically as a confirmation)?

The Steipler Gaon answers: An annulment is only possible on an action performed by a person; however, remaining quiet, although that is deemed a confirmation, is not an action that can be annulled.

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Father Revoking by Himself - Nedarim Daf 67

The Rambam holds that a father has the right to revoke all types of his daughter’s nedarim. The husband, however, can only revoke a neder of personal affliction, and only those that affect their marital relationship. The Ra”n nd the Rosh disagree and hold that the father may only revoke her nedarim that are of personal affliction, and only those matters that are between him and her.

The Keren Orah poses the following question: The halacha is that the father and the husban revoke the nedarim of a betrothed na’arah. According to the Rambam, who maintains that the father can revoke all types of nedarim, what is the halacha if his daughter is a betrothed na’arah and she pronounces such a vow? Do we say that the father has a right to revoke this neder by himself? Or, perhaps, the halacha is that the father may only revoke nedarim in partnership with her husband, and since her husband cannot revoke such a neder, the father cannot revoke it either?

Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach wonders further: This inquiry can be posed according to the Ra”n and the Rosh as well. If the girl makes a neder that is a “matter that is between her father and her,” but it does not affect the husband. For example, she said that she will not assist her father. Do we say that the father can revoke this neder by himself, or do we say that he can only revoke nedarim together with her husband, and since her husband cannot revoke this neder, the father cannot revoke it either?

The Meiri writes that the Rambam would concede that the father does not have the ability to revoke the neder of his betrothed daughter by himself. His rights to revoke his daughter’s neder are only in partnership with her husband, and if the husband cannot revoke the neder, since it is not a neder that affects him, the father cannot revoke it either.

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Spit in his Eye

The Yerushalmi in Sotah relates the following: Rav Meir was accustomed to deliver a Torah lecture every Friday night. A certain woman was always in attendance. One time, Rabbi Meir said a lengthy drasha and by the time she arrived home, the Shabbos candles had already burnt out. Her husband was angry with her and told her, “I do not want to see you again until you spit into the eye of the person who was giving the lecture that you attended.”

The Medrash records that the woman sat outside of her house for several weeks. All the women saw her and asked her what was going on. She explained the story. The women went to Rabbi Meir and related the situation to him in hope that he would have a solution. (The Yerushalmi states that Rabbi Meir realized through Divine spirit what the situation was even before the women came to him.)

Rabbi Meir pretended to be suffering from pain in the eyes, and announced: “If there is any woman skilled in whispering charms for the eyes (a type of "medicine" which was believed to be effective in those days) , let her come and whisper.” When this particular woman came to him, he asked her: “Are you skilled in whispering charms for the eyes?” She said that she didn’t. Rabbi Meir told her, “Do not worry. I will tell you what to do. Just spit into this eye seven times and all will be well.” After she did as she was instructed, Rabbi Meir told her to go to her husband and say that you only requested of me to spit in his eye once; I did so seven times.

His students asked him: “Master! Should Torah be degraded in such a manner?” Rabbi Meir replied: “Should my honor be treated in a higher regard than the honor of the Omnipresent? If, in order to make peace between a husband and a wife, the Torah commanded: Let My Name, which was written in sanctity, be erased in the destructive waters, how much more so I, where I can forego my honor in order to bring about peace between a man and his wife.

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Four People are Considered as Dead

The braisa (Nedarim 64b) states: Four people are as if they are dead. These are a poor person, a leper, a blind person, and someone who does not have children. A poor person is as if he is dead, as derived from the passuk above, ““Because all of those (who have sought to kill you) have died.” A leper is considered like he is dead, as the passuk states, “let her not be as if she is dead.” A blind person is considered dead, as the passuk states, “In the darkness he placed me like the dead of the world.” Someone who does not have sons is considered dead, as the passuk states, ““give me children, and if not I am dead.”

Reb Chaim Shmulevitz explains that the common denominator among these four is that they do not feel someone else’s pain and that they cannot provide benefit for others.

A poor person is considered as dead not because he is lacking himself, but rather, it is because he cannot give to others.

A blind person cannot see others and therefore, he is unable to perceive their pain or suffering. He cannot join in his tribulation.

A metzora is banished from the camp and therefore, he is unable to offer assistance to others.

One who does not have children to nurture is lacking the ability to provide benefit to those that are dear and close to him. It is a natural instinct for a person to desire to give whatever he has to his children.

Only a life where one can share with others is worth living.

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Delaying by a Neder

The Mishna (Nedarim 63a) had stated: If one made a neder against tasting wine for the year, and the year was proclaimed to be a leap year, he is forbidden for the year and its extension.

The Ra”n explains: The Mishna is teaching us that even if one made the neder from the beginning of the year, since he said “this year,” we do not say that he meant “one year,” but rather, he is prohibited for an extra month, which is thirteen months. However, if he said “one year” without any specification, the extra month is not included, even though the year was a leap year. For behold, if he did not abide by his prohibition this year, he makes it up the next year, which is a regular year. And although, it is forbidden for him to do that, because there is a prohibition against delaying, since if he would delay, he could make it up in another year, his neder is not connected to this year, which is a leap year. Therefore, even if he fulfills it this year, the extra month is not included.

The Rashba holds that even if he says, “one year from today,” the extra month is not included.

It is evident from the Ra”n that he holds of the following novelty: One can violate the transgression against delaying, even by a prohibatory neder.

The Rambam and Ramban, both maintain that this prohibition is only applicable by a neder for hekdesh, when one is obligating himself to do something.

The Machaneh Efraim adds that this transgression can apply by all nedarim to fulfill a mitzvah.

Reb Shimon Shkop states that the Ra”n’s words are perplexing. The prohibition against delaying is applicable when the person has an obligation to do soemthing. A neder is a prohibition on an object. If the object is forbidden, it is forbidden, but if it is not, how can there be a prohibition against delaying?

Reb Dovod Pervarsky explains: A neder also begins with an obligation resting on the person. He is obligated to fulfill his neder. If the forbidden object is in existence, the neder takes effect upon that object. However, if it is not in existence at that time, the person has a responsibility to render it forbidden when it comes into this world. If he fails to do so immediately, he is violating the transgression against delaying.

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An Abbreviated Cycle

The Gemora (Nedarim 61a) presents a dispute regarding the counting of Yovel. The Chachamim hold that Yovel is the fiftieth year in the cycle and the following year is the first year of the next cycle. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the fiftieth year is reckoned for both cycles. It is the fiftieth year of the previous cycle and the first year of the forthcoming cycle.

The Turei Even poses an interesting question according to the viewpoint of Rabbi Yehuda. In the first Shemitah cycle after a Yovel, there will only be five field working years between Yovel and Shemitah since during Yovel one is not permitted to work his field.

In a normal Shemitah cycle, each of the six years has a designated tithing that one is required to separate from his field. One is obligated to take maaser sheini (he would bring one tenth of his produce to Yerushalayim to be eaten there) on the first, second, fourth and fifth years. He would separate maaser oni (given to the poor) on the third and sixth years. The Turei Even wonders what the arrangement would be according to Rabbi Yehuda in the first cycle following a Yovel, where there is only five years.

The Netziv and the Sfas Emes state that in the third year, one would separate maaser oni and regarding the remaining years, he would take maaser sheini. This is because the Torah states that maaser oni should be separated every three years; however the Torah does not prescribe set years for maaser sheini. A year that does not have a requirement for maaser oni, automatically has an obligation for maaser sheini.

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Term Expired and Fasting for "One Day"

Annulment after the Term of the Neder Expired

The Mishna (Nedarim 60a) states: If a person says: “Konam” (he forbids himself with a vow) that he will not taste any wine today, he is only forbidden from doing so until it gets dark.

Rabbi Yirmiyah says: When it gets dark, he must ask a scholar (to permit his vow). The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Yosef answers: It is a decree, lest he confuse this case with a vow that he will abstain “for one day” (which the Mishna stated means that he is forbidden for twenty-four hours, not just until dark).

The Acharonim ask: Why can’t he have the neder annulled before the night? Why must he wait for the night?

The Chasam Sofer answers: If he would have the neder annulled before the night, it would retroactively annul his neder. It would emerge that he had abstained for nothing. However, if he waits until the night to annul the neder, he has fulfilled his neder, since the term of his neder was for that day. It was only a stringency based upon a decree that he should have it annulled at night.

It is evident from the Chasam Sofer that he maintains that a neder cannot be annulled after its term has been completed. The Tosfos Ri”d holds that a neder can be annulled by a sage even after its term has expired.

Fasting Nowadays

The Ra”n asks on our custom of accepting to fast for one day, and immediately by nightfall, he is permitted to eat without petitioning a sage first. According to our Gemora, shouldn’t he be required to have the neder annulled because of Rav Yosef’s decree of “one day”?

The Ra”n answers: Everyone knows that the Chachamim instituted that the time for a fast is from morning until night. It is not similar to other nedarim, which do not have a set time. There, therefore, is no reason for a decree, for everyone understands that the halachos of nedarim and the halachos of fasting are distinct from each other.

The Rashba answers: The Gemora’s decree is only applicable in a case where he made a neder, saying, “Today, I will not drink wine,” which is similar to the case where he said, “I will not drink wine for one day.” There, we rule that he must have the neder annulled at nightfall, since it is similar to the case where he made the neder for “one day,” where he was permitted in the beginning of the day. However, regarding a fast, where one is forbidden to eat from the beginning of the day until its conclusion, there is no reason for any decree. One would easily think that the reason why we are lenient and allow him to eat at nightfall is because we were stringent upon him at the beginning of the day. When he makes the neder in middle of the day, and he was permitted up until then, we decree that he is required to petition a sage for annulment of his neder at nightfall.

The Rashba offers another answer: There is no place for Rav Yosef’s decree by a neder to fast, for even if one would make a neder to fast for “one day,” he will not be required to fast for twenty-four hours like by a different neder. Therefore, on a regular fast, he may begin to eat immediately upon nightfall.

The Yados Nedarim answers: This decree was never issued by a neder for a mitzvah. One who vows to fast is regarded as a mitzvah, as the Gemora refers to him as a kodosh.

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Pigs in the Future

(Nedarim 59a) The Rishonim disagree regarding a food item that the Gemora is uncertain if it is forbidden or not and it remains unresolved. The inquiry will remain in that state until Eliyahu Hanavi clarifies it for us. The Ohr Zarua maintains that this is regarded as “something which can become permitted,” since there is a possibility that Eliyahu will say that it is permitted. The Rashba (Beitzah 4a) disagrees and he explains: If Eliyahu will decide that the food is forbidden, it will emerge that this item will never be permitted. If he will rule that it is permitted, it actually was never forbidden. Either way, he argues, it cannot be labeled as “something which can become permitted.” The Bach cites a Mordechai that it is not considered “something which can become permitted,” for by the time Eliyahu will permit it, the food will be already ruined.

The Chasam Sofer cites the following question from the Rav in Frankfurt: Chazal write that a pig is called a “chazir,” for in the future, Hashem will reverse the prohibition of the pig and it will be permitted. If so, according to those Rishonim, pig should be regarded as “something which can become permitted”?

The Chasam Sofer answers based upon that which was written in the Toldos Yitzchak: The Torah forbids animals that do not have split hooves, or those that do not chew their cud because those animals are naturally conceited; they trample with their feet and they have a poison inside of them, which is extremely dangerous for a Jew to eat. The animals that do not digest their food easily and they are compelled to chew their cud; those animals are permitted to eat.

If so, explains the Chasam Sofer, there will be no change in halacha regarding the pig. It was forbidden and will remain forbidden. Rather, Hashem will change the nature of the pig and it will begin to chew its cud. That is why it will be permitted then. Accordingly, the only pigs that will be permitted then, are those that will be born after this change occurs; however, the pigs that were in existence prior to that will remain forbidden. This is why a pig is not classified as “something which can become permitted.”

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Women and Shemitah

The Chinuch states that there is a positive commandment which forbids plowing on Shemitah. It is written [Shmos 34:21]: From plowing and harvesting you shall desist.

The Minchas Chinuch (112) asks that if so, women should be exempt from this mitzvah, and they should be permitted to plow on shemitah because it is a positive commandment that has a time element to it and the principle is that women are exempt from any positive mitzvah which is governed by time?

He answers that women are obligated in this mitzvah because that rule is applicable only regarding a positive mitzvah that is incumbent on the body of the person and not a mitzvah like shemitah, which is a mitzvah that is dependent on the land (mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz). This can be better understood based upon our Gemora which says that the shemitah prohibition is on account of the ground.

Proof to this distinction is cited from the Ritva in Kiddushin (29a). The Gemora rules, based on a Scriptural verse that women are not obligated to perform a circumcision on their sons. Tosfos asks: Why is a verse necessary; circumcision is a positive mitzvah which is governed by time since the mitzvah can only be performed by day, and women are exempt? The Ritva answers: Any mitzvah which is not related to the person themselves; this principle does not apply. The mitzvah of milah is to perform the circumcision on the son and therefore women would be obligated if not for the special verse teaching us otherwise.

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Something that will become Permitted

Rabbi Shimon said Nedarim 58a): That Mishna is only referring to the halacha of bi’ur i.e. removing (the produce of Shemitah may be kept as long as that produce is still available in the fields for the animals; afterwards, it may no longer remain in the house).

The Ra”n explains: Since it was possible to eat it before that time, it is regarded as something that can become permitted.

The Sha’ar Hamelech and the Noda B’Yehudah ask: According to this logic, why is it only not nullified if it becomes intermingled with its type? The halacha should be that it should not become nullified even if it becomes mixed up in something that is not its type? For the Ra”n above (52a) explained at great length in the name of the Ri”f that something which is permitted presently to be consumed will not be nullified, even with a mixture of things that aren’t its type?

The Sha’ar Hamelech answers: The Ra”n only said that rule in respect of things that will be permitted forever, such as meat, which will always be permitted to be eaten with other meat or foods that are not from milk. However, here, the Shemitah produce will become forbidden forever, i.e. after the “time of removal.” It is therefore compared to something that will become permitted, where it will not become nullified only in a mixture of things that aren’t its type.

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Superstition

Ula says (Nedarim 56a): A dargash bed is a bed of good fortune.

The Rishonim ask: Shouldn’t such a bed be forbidden on account of the prohibition of nichush; One should not act upon the basis of omens or lucky times (Vayikra 19:26)?

The Radvaz answers that it is being used as a sign to strengthen one’s luck, but not to be superstitious about it. R’ Eliezer MiMitz disagrees with him and maintains that even that would be forbidden.

The Shitah Mikubetzes explains that this is a bed designated for the guardian angel of the house. It was done for the purpose of honoring the Holy One, blessed is He. This is similar in the manner that we prepare a chair for Eliyahu Hanavi by a bris milah.

The Ra”n in Sanhedrin explains that it is a bed which is constantly made and kept empty in order to demonstrate that the household has more than they need. Through this, one is recognizing that Hashem has blessed him with wealth and thanking Him for it.

The Rambam writes that dargash is a small bed that is placed before a larger bed; it is used as a stepping-stool in order to climb onto the higher bed.

The Rosh explains that the angel in charge of poverty resides in a dirty house and the angel in charge of riches and success resides in a clean house. The dargash is a bed which always remained clean in order to beckon the angel of wealth to reside in the house.

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