Praying in a Cemetery

(Daf Yomi: Sotah 34b) And they went up by the South and he arrived at Chevron. Shouldn’t the Torah have stated: and they arrived at Chevron? Rava said: It teaches us that Calev separated himself from the plan of the spies and went and prostrated himself upon the graves of the Patriarchs, saying to them, “My fathers, pray for mercy on my behalf that I may be spared from the plan of the spies.”

The Gemora in Taanis (16a) states that it was the custom to visit a cemetery on a fast day. One reason given is that the Jewish people were saying that they consider themselves like corpses and this will stimulate them to repent. Another reason is that this will enable the deceased who are buried in the cemetery to pray for them. According to the second reason, they would not visit a cemetery that contained the graves of gentiles.

The Ritva writes that they didn’t go to the cemetery in order to daven there because that is forbidden on the account of “loeg lerosh” – it is considered mocking to the dead who cannot perform the mitzvos; rather they davened in the streets and went to the cemetery afterwards. The Ran adds that they did not take the sefer Torah with them when they went to the cemetery.

The Noda B’yehuda (O”C 2:109) was asked on a year that there was no rain and there was tremendous suffering; if they would be permitted to go to a cemetery with a sefer Torah and daven there for rain.

He cites a Zohar (Acharei Mos) which states that davening by a cemetery inspires the souls of those buried there to inform those that are buried in Chevron (Patriarchs and the Matriarchs) who subsequently will arouse Hashem’s compassion.

However, there is a Gemora in Brochos (18a) which rules that a person should not enter a cemetery with tefillin on his head or read from a sefer Torah in his arm. We can infer from this Gemora that reading from the sefer Torah is forbidden but holding it would be permitted. The Kesef Mishna in Hilchos Sefer Torah (10:6) learns that both are forbidden; reading from the sefer Torah or holding it.

The Noda B’yehuda concludes that although he is not an expert in the hidden portions of Torah, the Zohar cited does warn against bringing a sefer Torah that might be missing letters into a cemetery since this can cause terrible consequences.

The sefer Igra D’taanisa wonders why the Noda B’yehuda makes no mention of the Gemora in Taanis, which would indicate that one can go daven by a cemetery.

The Minchas Elozar discusses the permissibility of people davening by Kever Rochel. Some say that we are not mocking Rochel since she was living before the Torah was given; she was never obligated in mitzvos.

The Netziv rules that in his days, it would be permitted because the custom was to bury them deeper than ten tefachim from the ground and it is considered like a different domain.

The Rama (O”C 581:4) writes that there are places that have the custom to go to cemeteries on Erev Rosh Hashanah and to recite lengthy Tefillos there. The Chidah asks on this Rama from the Ritva in Taanis that states explicitly that one should not daven in the cemetery.

There are those that create a distinction between a compulsory tefillah and a tefillah which is only voluntary.

The Elya Rabbah (581) quotes from the Maharil that one should be careful when going to the graves of Tzadikim that your tefillos should not be directed towards those that are buried there, rather one should daven to Hashem and ask for compassion in the merit of these Tzadikim. Some say that you can ask the dead to be an advocate on your behalf.

The Bach (Y”D 217) rules that it is forbidden to daven to the dead because of the prohibition of being “doresh el hameisim.” He points out that even though we find that Calev did daven in Chevron by the Meoras Hamachpeila, he wasn't davening to the Avos. Rather, since a cemetery is a place of holiness and purity, the tefillos davened there will be more readily accepted.

Read more!

Shema is Torah

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 33a) asks: Shall we say that Rebbe holds that the Torah (the Torah reading on Shabbos according to Rashi, or on special Biblically mandated occasions according to Tosfos) may be read in any other language, for if it would enter your mind that it must be recited in the Holy Tongue, why would it be necessary for the Torah to write And they shall be to teach us that shema must be recited in Hebrew?

The Gemora states that this is not necessarily the case. It is necessary to teach that the shema must be recited in Hebrew, for since it says Shema, we might have thought that it could be recited in any language (even though the Torah must be read in Hebrew).

The commentators ask: What is the connection between the reading of the Torah and the mitzvah of kerias shema? Perhaps the Torah must be recited in Hebrew, and yet kerias shema can be recited in any language.

The Keren Orah answers that it is evident from our Gemora that the mitzva of reciting kerias shema every day is actually a mitzvah of “Talmud Torah.” The obligation is to recite portions of the Torah twice daily. Obviously there is a mitzvah of accepting the yoke of Heaven by reciting these portions, but the commandment of the Torah is to learn these portions once in the morning and once at night.

This is why the Gemora states that if one merely recited kerias shema in the morning and evening, he has discharged his obligation of studying Torah day and night.

Read more!

Angels, Aramaic and Language of Tefillah

Rav Yehudah said: One should not ask his needs in Aramaic, because Rabbi Yochanan said: If one asks his needs in Aramaic, the ministering angels do not assist him, for they do not understand Aramaic!?

The Gemora explains: Rav Yehudah was discussing a prayer of an individual (which requires the assistance of the angels), whereas the Mishna is discussing a congregation’s prayer (which may be recited in Aramaic, for they do not require the angel’s help).

The Gemora asks: Do the ministering angels not understand Aramaic? But we learned in the following braisa: Yochanan, the Kohen Gadol heard a heavenly voice issued from within the Holy of Holies announcing, “The young men (Kohanim) who went to wage war in Antioch (against the Greeks) have been victorious.” It also happened with Shimon the Righteous that he heard a heavenly voice issued from within the Holy of Holies announcing, “The army that the enemy had said that they would send out against the Sanctuary has been eradicated.” And Gaskalgus (a Greek king) was slain and his decrees annulled. They noted down the time (when this heavenly voice spoke) and it coincided with the exact time that these events occurred. Now it was in Aramaic that it spoke! [Evidently, the angels do understand Aramaic!?]

If you wish I can answer that it is different with a heavenly voice, since its purpose is to notify people (and this angel knows Aramaic), or if you wish, I can say that it was the angel Gavriel who spoke, for a Master has declared in a braisa: Gavriel came and taught Yosef the seventy languages.

*** Does the prohibition against requesting one’s needs in Aramaic only apply to Aramaic, or to all languages? (Meiri and Rosh Brochos 13a)

*** Do the angels know the thoughts of a person? (Tosfos Shabbos 12b; Maadanei Yom Tov on the Rosh in Brochos 2:6; Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei HaShas Shabbos 12bSfas Emes ibid)

*** Must a private individual pray in Hebrew? (Shulchan Aruch O”C, 101:4; Bartenura on our Mishna; Ri”f , Rabbeinu Yonah and Rosh Brochos 13a; Chachmas Shlomo O”C 101:4)

*** Do our tefillos require the assistance of the angels? (HaKoseiv in Ein Yaakov Shabbos 12b; Introduction to Siddur Otzer HaTefillos; Or HaChaim Shmos 3:9; Ra’avad in Tamim De’im 184)

Read more!

WHERE TO STOP AND START

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Sotah 32a) lists statements that must be made in Hebrew. One of them is the bikkurim (the first ripe fruits which had to be brought to the Beis Hamikdosh in Yerushalayim) recitation. When he brings the fruits to the Beis Hamikdosh to be given to the Kohanim, he recites several verses from Devarim. Rashi writes that he says the verse beginning with Arami oved avi, An Aramean tried to destroy my father [Devarim 26:5], and he continues until the end of the passage.

In truth, however, he does not complete the entire passage. As a matter of fact, he stops in middle of verse 10, when he says asher nasatah li Hashem, that You have given me, Hashem. The Rambam in Hilchos Bikurim states this explicitly.

The commentators ask that the last words of this recital conclude in middle of a verse and this is against the dictum of stopping in a place that Moshe did not stop. The Gemora Brochos (12b) rules that any place in the Torah that Moshe Rabbeinu did not pause; we are forbidden to pause as well. How could they institute to stop the recital in middle of a verse?

Reb Yaakov Kaminetzky in his sefer Emes L’Yaakov in Parshas Ki Savo answers that this ruling does not apply by mitzvos, such as bikkurim. It is only a concern when verses are being recited because of Torah.

There are other examples where this principle may be applicable. The Gemora in Rosh Hashanah (31a) discusses the hymns that were recited by the Levites in the Beis Hamikdosh on Shabbos. The Gemora concludes that they would divide Parshas Haazinu into six segments, and one segment was recited each week by the korban mussaf.

The Turei Even asks from the aforementioned Gemora in Brochos. How were the Leviim permitted to stop in places that Moshe did not stop? He answers that since they intended to complete it the next week, it is not regarded as interrupting the portion (even though there will be different Leviim the next week). According to Reb Yaakov, we can suggest that the hymns of the Leviim were not being sung as Torah; but rather, as a part of the mitzvah of the bringing of korbanos. They therefore were permitted to stop and start in the Torah, even in the middle of a passage.

Magan Avrohom (O”C 282) asks this question as well, inquiring into different verses from the Torah that we recite during tefillah which are incomplete. He also answers that we only apply the principle that one cannot interrupt in middle of a verse when one is engaged in Torah study or reading from the Torah. If, however, one is reciting verses for the purpose of prayer or mitzvah observance, there is no prohibition of interrupting in middle of a verse.

Rav Nosson Grossman states that perhaps through this principle, we can answer the Turei Even’s question. The Leviim are not reciting these pesukim as Torah, rather they are being said on account of shirah, song, and therefore it will not be subject to the prohibition of stopping in an incorrect place. However, it would seem evident that the Magen Avrohom will not concur with this, since he states that principle, and nevertheless, does not apply it to the Leviim’s shirah.

It would seem that many other Acharonim do not agree with this qualification of that rule. The tefillah which is recited when the Sefer Torah is raised in shul is a combination of two different verses. There are those who stop after saying, “lifnei B’nei Yisroel,” for the next part (al pi Hashem b’yad Moshe) is not a complete verse. This reason is brought in the name of Reb Chaim Volozhiner. Once again, according to the qualification mentioned above, we could have explained that there is no concern during tefillah; it is only when we are reciting Torah for the sake of Torah where the dictum applies.

The Chasam Sofer in his Teshuvos (O”C 10) discusses why during kiddush, do we begin with the verse, Va’yehi erev va’yehi boker,” when that is the middle of a verse in the Torah. He explains that the first part of the verse has a reference to “death,” and we did not want that alluded to during kiddush. It is evident that the Chasam Sofer as well did not concur with this qualification.

Read more!

Love and Fear

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 31a) cites a braisa: Rabbi Meir noted that the verse describes both Iyov and Avraham as “G-d fearing.” He therefore derives that just as we know Avraham served Hashem out of love, so too, Iyov served Hashem out of love. How do we know that Avraham served Hashem out of love? This is evident from the verse, “The offspring of Avraham who loved Me.”

The Stepler Gaon in Birchas Peretz notes that by “Akeidas Yitzchak,” it is written: For now I know that you are fearing of God. It would seem that Avraham performed the binding of Yitzchak out of fear of Hashem; yet we know definitely that he performed this commandment out of love for Hashem. This is clearly evident from the Gemora in Sanhedrin (105b), which states: Love disregards the rule of dignified conduct. This is derived from Avraham, for it is written, And Avraham rose up early in the morning, and saddled his donkey. Our Gemora is a proof to this as well. If so, why does the Torah at the end of this portion point out that Avraham was a God-fearing man?

He explains that the “fear” mentioned in reference to Avraham Avinu was not merely a fear of retribution, but rather it was a “yiras ha’romemus,” a fright on account of the realization of the unlimited Greatness and Strength of the Omnipresent. The Rambam writes that one who analyzes the Greatness of the Ribbono shel Olam, leads him to love Him. The love that Avraham Avinu had towards Hashem inspired him to fear Him, for through the love, he realized that if he should make a mistake in his service to Hashem, it will weaken the connection of love that existed between them.

Read more!

Song by the Sea

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 30b) cites a braisa: On that same day Rabbi Akiva expounded: At the time that the Jews ascended from the Sea, they desired to utter a song. And how did they recite the song? It was like an adult who reads the Hallel for a congregation and they respond after him with the chapter headings. (If one does not know how to recite Hallel by himself, it is preferable to have a male adult recite Hallel for him and he should respond after him the refrain of Hallelukah after the completion of every phrase.) Accordingly, Moshe said, “I will sing to Hashem,” and they responded, “I will sing to Hashem”; Moshe said, “For He is exalted above the arrogant,” and they responded, “I will sing to Hashem.” Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosi HaGlili said: It was like a minor who reads the Hallel for a congregation and they repeat after him all that he says. Accordingly, Moshe said, “I will sing to Hashem,” and they responded, “I will sing to Hashem”; Moshe said: “For He is exalted above the arrogant,” and they responded, “For He is exalted above the arrogant.” Rabbi Nechemia said: It was like a schoolteacher who divides the Shema in the Synagogue, where he begins first and they respond after him.

The Maharsha explains the opinion of Rabbi Yosi HaGlili: Although Klal Yisroel would have discharged their obligation by merely saying the chapter headings, for who is greater than Moshe! If an adult recites it for them, they would certainly fulfill their obligation. Nevertheless, the reason they wanted to recite it themselves was because there was an element of publicizing the miracle, and that they wanted to actively participate in.

Reb Chatzkel Abramsky in the Chazon Yechezkel on the Tosefta explains differently. He says that when the listeners are not obligated in the recital, they can not be yotze with the recital of the leader. That would only be effective if they would be obligated to recite it as well. Klal Yisroel were not required to utter a song at that time, and therefore, when they did recite it, they sang it themselves.

Reb Dovid Goldberg asks: Why weren’t they obligated to praise and thank Hashem at that time? We have learned in Pesachim (117a) that the Chachamim said: The prophets among them instituted that Hallel should be recited for every season, on every special occasion and for every crisis that might come upon them, and when they are redeemed from it, they recite it over their redemption. If so, they certainly would be obligated to recite Hallel after being saved by the Sea!

He answers that it is evident from the Gemora in Pesachim that they did recite Hallel immediately after ascending from the Sea. Afterwards, they desired to recite even more, and that wasn’t an obligation.

Read more!

Kal Vachomer

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 29a) states that something which may be derived through a kal vachomer (literally translated as light and heavy, or lenient and stringent; an a fortiori argument; it is one of the thirteen principles of biblical hermeneutics; it employs the following reasoning: if a specific stringency applies in a usually lenient case, it must certainly apply in a more serious case), the Torah may anyway take the trouble to write it explicitly.

The Bnei Yissoschar explains the reasoning for this: A kal vachomer is based upon logic. One might say that the reason this halacha (derived through a kal vachomer) is correct is because it is understandable to me; it makes sense. The Torah therefore goes out of its way to write it explicitly in order to teach us that the halacha is correct because the Torah said so; regardless of whether it is understood or not.

The Ra”n in Nedarim (3a) notes that this concept is applicable by a hekesh (when the halachos from one topic are derived from another one) as well. The Gemora in Bava Metzia (61a) states that it also applies to a gezeirah shavah (one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics; it links two similar words from dissimilar verses in the Torah).

According to the explanation of the Bnei Yissoschar, we could say that the concept should only apply to a kal vachomer, for that is based upon logic. The Torah would not find it necessary to state explicitly a halacha which is derived through a hekesh or gezeirah shavah, for they are not based upon logic at all, and it would be superfluous to write it.

The Yad Malachei writes that if the Torah does explicitly write a halacha which was derived through one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics, we must treat it more stringently than an ordinary halacha. This is comparable to a Rabbinical prohibition, which has a slight support from something written in the Torah. Tosfos in Eruvin (31b) rules that such a prohibition is stricter than an ordinary one, which does not have any Scriptural support.

Read more!

Sotah's Seclusion

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 28b)states that the case where a sotah is deemed tamei is only when the doubt arisen in a private domain.

The Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 365) poses the following question: The Rambam in Hilchos Sotah (1:3) rules that it is possible for a husband to warn his wife against secluding with two men at the same time. If she secludes herself with them, she will become forbidden until she drinks. Why is she forbidden? Since there are three people there (the woman and the two men), it should have a status of being a public domain, and she should be permitted!

Incidentally, it is evident from the Rambam that a woman can become a sotah even though she did not violate the laws of yichud (a woman being secluded with a man), for there is no yichud in a case of a woman and two men. This can also be proven from the halacha that a woman can become a sotah when she secludes herself with her father or brother, even thought here is no prohibition of yichud there as well.

Reb Avi Lebowitz brings another proof to this concept: The Gemora in Brochos (31b) states that Chanah threatened Hashem that if she doesn’t have a child, she will behave in a manner where Elkanah will warn her and she will then seclude herself with that man. After drinking the water and emerging innocent, she would be blessed with children according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that if she was barren, she will be blessed with a child. How could a righteous woman like Chanah put herself in a situation where she would be violating a prohibition of yichud? Clearly, it must be possible to accomplish a seclusion that would render a woman a sotah even without a yichud prohibition! (There are commentators who discuss various scenarios where a woman can be rendered a sotah from secluding herself with one man even without violating the issur of yichud.)

Read more!

Disciple's Disciple

The Mishna states: Rabbi Yehoshua said: Who will remove the dust from your eyes, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai! For you used to say that another generation is destined to declare a loaf (of terumah) tahor even though it is a shlishi, since there is no verse in the Torah which states that it is tamei. But does not your student, Rabbi Akiva, cite a verse from the Torah that it is tamei, as it is said, whatever is in it, shall be tamei.

The Rambam in his introduction to his Yad HaChazakah, he writes that Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai had five outstanding students. They were: Rabbi Eliezer the Great, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Yosi HaKohen, Rabbi Shimon ben Nesanel and Rabbi Elozar ben Arach. The Rambam continues by stating that Rabbi Akiva studied under Rabbi Eliezer the Great. It would seem that Rabbi Akiva was not a disciple of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai.

It is evident from the Gemora at the end of Tractate Makkos that Rabbi Akiva lived in the times after the destruction of the Beis HaMikdosh. The Maharsha in Yevamos (16a) speaks this out as well. The Gemora there records an incident: In the times of Rabbi Dosa ben Hurkenas, the co-wife of a daughter was permitted to the yavam. This ruling was extremely troubling to the Sages, because Rabbi Dosa was a great Torah scholar and his eyes had stopped seeing, so that he was unable to come to the Beis Medrash to study. A discussion took place as to who should go and notify him that they disagree with him. Rabbi Yehoshua said to them, “I will go.” They asked, “And who will go after him?” Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah agreed to go. They asked, “And who will go after him?” Rabbi Akiva agreed to go.

The Maharsha explains: Rabbi Yehoshua went first because he was the oldest, for he was a student of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai in the times when the Beis HaMikdash was in existence. Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah was appointed to be the Nasi after the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash. Rabbi Akiva was in the times of Ben Kuziva in Beitar years afterwards, and that is why he went last. It emerges that Rabbi Akiva was clearly not a student of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, but rather, a student of his student!

Rabbi Yaakov Marcus in his sefer Minchas Yaakov asks: Why did Rabbi Yehoshua refer to Rabbi Akiva as the disciple of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, when he was in fact his disciple’s disciple? Further on in the Mishna, Rabbi Yehoshua (ben Chananyah) refers to Rabbi Yehoshua (ben Hurkanos) as being the student of the student of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai! Why was he not as accurate in the first part of the Mishna? (It would seem that the Rambam in his elucidation to the Mishnayos addresses this point as well.)

Read more!

Scheming Woman

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 26a) cites a braisa: It is written: Then she shall be innocent and she shall bear seed. This teaches us that if she was barren, she will be blessed with a child; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael asked him: If so, all the barren women will seclude themselves (and upon emerging innocent after drinking the bitter waters) and then be blessed with children, and since this one (a woman who remains loyal to her husband and avoids suspicion) did not seclude herself, she will lose out (and remain barren)! What then is the verse teaching us? It teaches us that if she used to have painful births, she will now give birth with ease; if she gave birth to females, she will now give birth to males; if she used to have short children, she will now have tall children; if she used to give birth to dark-skinned babies, she will now give birth to fair ones.

Tosfos asks: Can’t we ask the same question on Rabbi Yishmael as he asked on Rabbi Akiva? A woman who was suffering severe childbirth pains would seclude herself, and after drinking the bitter waters, she will give birth “pain-free”!

Tosfos HaRosh answers that these blessings are not as great as that of a barren woman giving birth. A woman wound not go to such lengths (secluding herself with another man) just to receive these blessings.

The Haflaah in Panim Yafos answers that a woman who was used to painful childbirths will not seclude herself with another man, for she will be afraid that her husband will rather divorce her than have her degraded in Beis Din. A barren woman, however, is not concerned that her husband might divorce her, for after ten years without children, he will anyway divorce her. She therefore has nothing to lose by secluding herself.

The Minchas Kenaos answers by asking the following question: While it is understandable that the woman might employ such a scheme, but where will she find a man to go along with her? An ordinary man will not want to transgress the prohibition of secluding with a married woman. It is illogical to assume that she will seclude herself with a wicked man, for he will want to cohabit with her, and her intention is only to be blessed with children from her husband.

We are compelled to say like the Sifri states that if the husband never had children, he will also be blessed with children. Accordingly, she will find a barren man to seclude with, for he also wants to have a child.

This concern is only according to Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that the barren women will be blessed with children. Accordingly, it can be extended to a man as well. However, according to Rabbi Yishmael, who holds that the blessing is in regards to pain-free child birth, this is only applicable to the woman, and not the man.

Read more!

Bari V'shema

The Mishna had stated: If their husbands died before they had a chance to drink, Beis Shamai says that they collect their kesuvah and do not drink. Beis Hillel says: Either they drink, or do not take a kesuvah.

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 25a - b)explains the argument: Beis Shamai maintains that a debt from a document which awaits collection is considered as if it has already been collected. [The widow wishes to collect from her husband’s property for her kesuvah. Her claim to these properties is questionable, for perhaps she committed adultery and forfeits her kesuvah. Since it is regarded as if she is already in possession of the properties, the husband’s heirs are trying to take the property away from her. The burden of proof rests on them. If they cannot provide proof, she collects her kesuvah.] Beis Hillel, however, holds that we do not regard the document as if it already collected (and therefore she is trying to take the properties from the husband’s heirs; the burden of proof is on her).

Tosfos HaRosh in Kesuvos (81a) asks: Why doesn’t the Gemora explain Beis Shamai’s reasoning based upon the principle of “bari v’shema bari adif”? Since the woman’s claim is a definite one, because she asserts that she did not defile herself, and the heirs’ claims are only an uncertain one, for they do not know if she defiled herself or not, her claim should be the stronger one, and therefore – win out!

They answer that the principle would not apply in this case for the following reason: Her definite claim is a weak one, for she knows that the husband’s heirs cannot counter her claim, for they have no way of knowing. Their claim, although it is an uncertain one, is a sound one, for there is a strong presumption of guilt based upon the fact that the husband warned her and she went against his warning by secluding herself with that man (raglayim l’davar). When the definite claim is a weak one, it cannot be superior than an uncertain strong claim.

Reb Dovid Parvarsky inquires as to the reason to the above qualification. Is it because the definite claim is a weak one, and that is why it cannot win over the uncertain claim? Accordingly, even if the doubtful claim is a weak one, the definite claim would still not be victorious! Or perhaps, it is because the uncertain claim is a powerful one? Accordingly, even if the definite claim would also be strong, it would not be able to overpower the uncertain claim!

Read more!

Sacred Waters - Daf 24

The Rambam rules that if the sotah says, “I defiled myself,” the bitter waters are poured out because there is no sanctity in them.

Rav Shach in Avi Ezri asks: How can the Rambam say that there is no sanctity in the water, when he also rules that if the waters remain overnight, they will be disqualified? Evidently, the waters are sacred, for otherwise, it would not be invalidated on account of standing overnight in the ministering vessel!

He answers: When the sotah says that she has been defiled, there is no necessity for the waters any longer, it is therefore regarded as a kodoshim animal that died, which loses its sanctity.

The Mikdash Mordechai questions this from the fact that one is still obligated to treat the dead animal with sanctity! How can the Rambam rule that the waters should just be spilled out? It should be poured into the special drain designated for sacred liquids!

He answers that a sacrificial offering that died retains its sanctity because halachically the korban is still required to be offered, but this particular animal is not suitable to be brought any longer. However, when the woman says, “I have defiled myself,” the waters accomplished its mission; although not in the most direct manner. The sotah admitted because she was frightened from the affects of the water. Since the waters brought about its intended result, it has fulfilled its assignment, and therefore, it does not retain any sanctity.

Read more!

Nezirus of a Son - Daf 23

The Mishna states: A father can impose upon his son a nezirus vow, but a mother cannot impose a nezirus vow on her son.

Rashi comments that the son remains a nazir even after he becomes an adult.

Tosfos in Nazir (28b) disagrees and maintains that as soon as the son becomes an adult, he is no longer a nazir.

Tosfos Yom Tov asks on Rashi: If a father cannot impose nezirus on his adult son, why would the nezirus that he imposed upon him as a minor remain when he becomes an adult?

The Reshash explains that there is a clear distinction between the two cases. A father does not have the authority to impose nezirus upon his adult son. However, when the father imposed nezirus upon his minor son, the child became a nazir. Once he is a nazir, why should we say that the nezirus goes away when he becomes an adult? Since he was a nazir up until now, nothing changes and he remains a nazir.

Read more!

Repentance in the same Situation

It is written [Yirmiyah 22:10]: Cry intensely for one who leaves, because he will not return again and see the land of his birthplace. Rav Yehudah said: This is referring to one who departs this world without children.

Rav Huna said: The verse is referring to a person who committed a sin and repeated it. The Gemora states: Rav Huna is following his reasoning stated elsewhere that one who commits a sin and repeats it; it has become permitted to him.

The Gemora asks: Do you actually think that it is permitted? The Gemora answers: Rav Huna means that it becomes to him as if it was permitted.

The Gemora (Yoma 86b) explains that a true penitent is one who committed a sin in the past and then the opportunity for the same sins comes again a first time and a second time and he is saved from the sin on both occasions.

The Sefer Chasidim writes that a person should not put himself into a situation where he is tempted to sin, because he may not be able to withstand temptation.

The Tzlach questions the words of the Sefer Chasidim from the commentary of the Kli Yakar in Parshas Chukas, who writes regarding the phenomena of the Parah Adumah that the Parah Adumah was capable of rendering pure those that were impure and conversely, rendering impure those that were pure.

The Kli Yakar likens this idea to certain medicines that are beneficial for one who is ill but can prove fatal for one who is healthy. There is a parallel between remedying the body and remedying the soul. One who wishes to repent must be with the same woman that he sinned with the first time, at the same time of the year in which he had sinned, and at the same place where he sinned with her. Thus, the temptation to sin is particularly strong, as his Evil Inclination will entice him to respond exactly as he did before. By resisting the temptation, he demonstrates that he is a true penitent.

The Kli Yakar adds that this is what the Gemora (Brochos 34b) means when it states that in the place where penitents stand, the completely righteous do not stand, i.e. the completely righteous cannot stand in a place of temptation. Yet, according to the Sefer Chasidim, a righteous person is not permitted to endanger himself by entering into such a situation.

TRANSGRESSION COMMITTED ONLY ONCE

The Gemora states that if one commits a transgression and repeats it, it becomes like it is permitted to him.

Rav Shach was once giving rebuke and he questioned if there is any among us that have committed a sin and not repeated it. Woe is to us.

The Mabit in Beis Elokim (shaar hateshuva ch 11) writes that our sages have said if one commits a transgression three times, it becomes like it is permitted to him. Did he have a different version in the Gemora than us? Our Gemora states this to be correct if a person commits a sin even twice.

Read more!

Teaching Torah to Girls

Rabbi Eliezer said (Daf Yomi: Sotah 21b): If someone teaches his daughter Torah, he is teaching her lewdness.

Tosfos cites a Yerushalmi which notes that Ben Azzai does not follow the exposition of Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah. For it is written regarding the mitzvah of Hakhel that men, women and children should assemble. The men come to learn, the women come to listen and the children come so that those who brought the children can earn reward. According to Ben Azzai, the reason why the women come is to learn, just like the men. However, according to Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah, who holds that one should not teach his daughter Torah, the women are not coming to learn; but rather, they are listening to the words of Torah in order for them to know how to fulfill the mitzvos that they are commanded to perform.

The Rambam rules that a woman who studies Torah receives reward, but not in the same capacity as a man. However, the Chachamim commanded a father not to teach Torah to his daughter, for women, in general, are not capable of understanding the intricacies and the fine details of the Torah, and it will lead them to incorrect halachic conclusions. This admonition is only applicable to the Oral Law; however with respect of the Written Law, one should not teach it to her, but if he does, it is not regarded as if he taught her lewdness.

The Maharatz Chiyos asks: According to the Rambam, Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah could also expound the verse by Hakhel to be saying that the women are coming to learn Torah, for there, the king was teaching the Written Law, and there is no prohibition whatsoever to teach that to her!?

He writes that after careful scrutiny of the Rambam’s language, it is clear that there is a prohibition to teach one’s daughter the Written Law; however, it is not with the same degree as the prohibition regarding the Oral law.

The Tur (Y”D 246:6) seemed to have a different version of the Rambam, for he writes that the Rambam holds that the concept of lewdness only applies by the Written Law, but with respect of the Oral Law, there is no lewdness; however, one should not teach it to her, but if he does, it is not regarded as if he taught her lewdness.

The Beis Yosef writes that it must be a printer’s mistake in the Tur, for the Rambam says the exact opposite.

The Rama rules that the laws pertaining to a woman, she is obligated to learn. The Bach writes that it is for this reason that a woman recites a birchas HaTorah in the morning.

The Aruch Hashulchan comments that it was never the custom for women to learn from a sefer. They were taught orally all the halachos that were relevant to them.

The Chafetz Chaim in Likutei Halachos writes that these halachos only applied in earlier times when the children lived in the same place as their parents and the tradition was strong. Then, it was forbidden to teach the women Torah, and the women followed the examples of the previous generations. However, in today’s times, when children live far away from their parents and the tradition has been weakened, and especially because the woman are studying the language and writings of the secular world, it is an important obligation to teach the girls Chumash, Prophets, the Writings, Pirkei Avos and the ethical teachings of our sages in order to strengthen their faith. For if not, they are liable to stray from the correct path of Hashem. The Steipler Gaon writes that in today’s times, it is more dangerous not to teach them Torah than to teach them. He even rules that one is allowed to teach Mishna to girls. However, Reb Moshe Feinstein (Y”D III, 87) rules that Mishna is part of the Oral Law, and the original prohibition is still intact, and therefore, girls should not be taught Mishna in school.

Read more!

First Thoughts

The Gemora asks (Daf Yomi: Sotah 21b): What is an example of a cunning evildoer? Rabbi Yochanan answers: This is someone who tells his side of the story to the judge before the other party shows up.

Rashi explains that once the judge hears the first side, it will be difficult for him to remove that from his mind, and he will not be impartial in the case.

The Mirrer Mashgiach, Reb Chaim Shmuelwitz notes that this is true regarding the way a person thinks as well. The first thought that enters one’s mind becomes entrenched in his brain, and he will not pay attention to a different perspective presented to him. He will not even bother thinking that perhaps his opinion is incorrect, and all that will happen in the future will only serve to strengthen his original thought.

Accordingly, he explains that which the Shach (C”M 37:109) brings from the Ball Ha’itur: If witnesses observed something concerning a relative of theirs, they cannot offer testimony even if at the time of the testimony, they were no longer relatives. This is because it is the nature of man to follow his initial thoughts, and their recollection of the incident will be based on their initial perception, which occurred while they were related.

Read more!

Forced to Drink

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Sotah 20a) had stated: If she had any merit, it would suspend her punishment. Certain merits suspend it for one year; others can suspend it for two years; and others suspend it for three years.

Ben Yehoyadah explains: There are certain mitzvos that can only be fulfilled during the day. If the woman performed such a mitzvah, the merit can delay her punishment for one year, i.e. twelve months, which corresponds to the twelve hours of the day. There are some mitzvos, such as the reading of the Megillah, which apply by day and by night. Performance of such a mitzvah can postpone her punishment for two years, twenty-four months, corresponding to the twenty-four hours of the day and night. There are mitzvos that are applicable for a day, night and a day, such as the mitzvah of fasting on Yom Kippur. The Gemora tells us that one who eats on the ninth day is regarded as if he fasted on the ninth and the tenth (of Tishrei). According to many poskim, the mitzvah of eating on Erev Yom Kippur can only be fulfilled during the day; not the night before. The mitzvah of Shabbos is also a mitzvah which comprises thirty-six hours, since there is a mitzvah to prepare for Shabbos on Friday. If the woman performed these mitzvos, the merits can hold back her punishment for thirty-six months, three years.

Read more!

Hidden Away

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Sotah 20a) had stated: If before the scroll has been erased she said: “I will not drink,” her scroll is hidden away and her minchah offering is scattered on the ashes.

Rashi learns that they are hidden away at the sides of the Sanctuary, for all sacred writings which cannot be used any longer are hidden away in a place that they will not be treated with disrespect.

In the sefer Torah Haohel, he asks, why did the sotah scroll have to be hidden away? Couldn’t they have given it to a child in order for him to learn the portion in the Torah dealing with the sotah?

He answers that since it was written with sanctity, and it contains the Name of Hashem, they were concerned that the children will not treat the scroll with the proper respect, and therefore it was required to be hidden away.

Furthermore, he says that it would be degrading for the woman, for everyone would say that this is the scroll that was prepared for So-and-So the sotah.

Tosfos cites a Yerushalmi (and some understand that this is what Rashi means as well) that the scroll is hidden away in the hinges of the Sanctuary door. The opening and closing of the door will cause that it will be worn away.

The Minchas Kenaos asks: How would it be permitted to erase Hashem’s Name by opening and closing the door? The Gemora Makkos (22a) rules that one who erases Hashem’s Name receives lashes! Since the opening and closing of the door will certainly result in the erasure of His Name, it should be regarded as a “direct erasing,” and should be forbidden!

The Ridvaz answers: Since the Name of Hashem was written on this scroll with the intention that it will be erased (in the bitter waters), there is no prohibition to erase this Name. It is not regarded as a permanent inscription, and therefore it would be permitted to erase it.

Read more!

Benefiting from the Sotah Waters

Rava inquired (Daf Yom: Sotah 18a): If two scrolls were written for two different sotahs, but they were erased into one cup, what is the halacha?

If you would conclude that each sotah needs her own personal cup, what would the halacha be if the scrolls were erased into two separate cups, but then they were mixed together? Is it valid because the scroll was erased into her cup? Or perhaps, it is disqualified, because she is not drinking her own personal cup!

The Steipler Gaon asks: Even if the halacha would be that a sotah is not obligated to drink from her own personal cup, how would she be permitted to drink from a cup that was mixed together with another sotah’s water? The water for a sotah comes from the kiyor, and that water has sanctity and carries with it a me’ilah transgression. One is prohibited from benefiting from something that possesses an inherent sanctity. If this woman is indeed innocent, she will give birth to male handsome children. It will emerge that she is deriving pleasure from these holy waters! How can this be allowed?

He answers based upon a Gemora below (20a) which states that we place something bitter into the water in order for the scroll to be properly erased. Accordingly, we can state that one who drinks water with a bitter taste will not be violating the me’ilah prohibition, for it would be regarded as drinking in an abnormal manner. This would be Biblically permitted.

Read more!

Benefit of Techeiles

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Sotah 17a) asks: It is understandable that Tefilin straps were a reward (for this world as well), as the verse states, “And all of the nations of the land will see that the name of Hashem is upon you and they will fear you.” The braisa quotes Rabbi Elazar the Great as saying that this refers to the Tefilin that we wear on our heads. However, what (earthly) reward do we have from Techeiles?

The Gemora answers this question from a braisa. Rabbi Meir taught: Why was Techeiles singled out from all colors (to be used in tzitzis)? This is because Techeiles is a similar color to that of the ocean, which is similar to that of the sky, which is similar to that of the Throne of Glory. This is as the verse states, “And they saw the G-d of Israel, and under His feet was like something made out of a brick of sapphire, and like the purity of the sky.” The verse also states, “like the appearance of a sapphire stone is that of the Throne of Glory. [The Gemora’s answer seems to be that this merit benefits us in this world as well.]

Rashi explains that anyone who fulfills the mitzvah of tzitzis is regarded as if he received the Divine Presence. This is obviously beneficial to the person.

Rashi in Chulin (89a) explains differently. He says that when Hashem looks at His Throne of Glory, He is reminded of the mitzvah of Techeiles that is being performed by the Jewish people. And because of this, Hashem has compassion on Klal Yisroel.

Read more!