Mentioning Evil First

Rava stated: Let us see; where do we derive the rule for conditions? It is from the condition mentioned in the Torah regarding the Tribes of Reuven and Gad. Therefore, just as there, the positive feature (they will receive the land if they fulfill the condition) comes before the negative (if they do not fight together with the rest of Klal Yisroel, they will not receive that land), so too, it should be in all cases.

It is written [Bamidbar 16:29 - 30]: If these men die as all men die and the fate of all men will be visited upon them, then Hashem has not sent me. But if Hashem creates a creation, and the earth opens its mouth and swallows them and all that is theirs, and they descend alive into the grave, you will know that these men have provoked Hashem.

The Haflaah in Panim Yafos asks: Shouldn’t Moshe have stated the positive feature before the negative?

He answers: Our Gemora (Gittin 75) states that a man does not want to begin with a mention of evil for himself, and therefore he will say, “If I do not die” before stating, “If I will die.” So too, Moshe did not want to begin with mentioning evil even for these wicked people, and therefore, he worded the stipulation in a manner that the mention of this horrific type of death should be delayed for as long as possible.

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Compliance with the Rabbis - Gittin 73

Rabbah and Rava did not agree with Rav Huna (and they hold that if a deathly ill person gives a get and recovers, it is a valid get), as they were afraid it might lead people to think that a get could be given after death.

The Gemora asks: Since the get is void in accordance with Biblical law, how can we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world?

The Gemora answers: Yes! Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.)

The Rashba asks: Why don’t we apply this rule in the case in Yevamos where a man fell into water that has no end? There, we rule that the wife will remain an agunah because the husband might have exited the water from a place that was not visible to us. Why don’t we say that the Chachamim revoked the original kiddushin from him, and she may remarry another man?

He answers: It is only applicable in certain cases. If, for example, there was a get, except that it was written with a condition, and an uncertainty arose regarding the condition, the Chachamim can revoke his kiddushin. Another example where the Chachamim would revoke the kiddushin is where one witness is testifying on the woman’s behalf (that her husband died). However, when there is no get and no witness, the Chachamim did not go ahead and revoke a kiddushin.

The Gemora in Yevamos (110a) records an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid).

Rav Ashi explains that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Chachamim therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. (This is following the opinion of Rav, who maintains that for the marriage of a minor to become valid, she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult, and if not the marriage is invalid.)

The Chachamim were empowered to remove the kiddushin in this case because he acted improperly in the beginning of the kiddushin.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei Hashas cites a Teshuvos haRashba who writes that we only apply the principle of “Since he acted improperly, the Chachamim acted improperly with him” in places that are specifically mentioned in Chazal. The Sages did not annul the marriage in every case where one acts with trickery. This can be proven from a Gemora in Kiddushin (58b). The Gemora states: One who instructs his fellow to marry a woman for him (as an agent), and the agent goes ahead and marries her for himself, she is married to the second one. We do not say that since he acted improperly, the Chachamim invalidated his marriage.

This can also be proven from the fact that even if one betroths a woman who is subject to a negative prohibition, kiddushin, nevertheless takes effect. This is also true if someone marries a woman who is a secondary ervah to him. Obviously, sometimes this principle is applied, and sometimes, it isn’t.

The Chasam Sofer asks: Why, in these cases (where he betroths a woman subject to a negative prohibition, or a secondary ervah) do we not say that the Chachamim revoked his kiddushin?

He answers, based upon Tosfos, who says that it is for this reason that the groom tells the bride that he is betrothing her according to the laws of Moshe and all of Israel. The kiddushin is only effective if Israel, i.e. the Chachamim consent to the marriage. However, one who is violating the Torah, or the sages, is obviously not marrying with such a stipulation and therefore, the marriage can still be effective. [According to the Chasam Sofer, not every marriage has that stipulation attached to it.]

The Shiltei Giborim states that this principle applies by a get as well. Anyone who divorces a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis may, in certain cases retroactively revoke the divorce.

Based upon this, the Taamei Yaakov answers the following famous question on Rabbeinu Gershom’s decree: Since the Torah expressly permits one to divorce his wife without her consent, how can this be banned? The Taz lais down a rule that the Rabbis do not have the authority to prohibit something which is explicitly permitted by the Torah!?

He answers that since the Rabbis forbid giving a get in such a manner, it is automatically nullified, for one’s betrothal and divorce can only be effective if he is compliance with the Rabbis’ ordinances. In these cases, the Rabbis did not consent to such a get.

[I am uncertain as to how this answers the question. Granted, the get will be ineffective since it is prohibited to give a get without the woman’s consent; but how did the Rabbis have the authority to issue such a decree? If the Torah expressly permits it, they cannot forbid it!?]

Path to Sanctity

The Gemora states: Whoever betroths a woman in Jewish marriage, betroths her subject to the will of the Rabbis.

The baalei mussar say: One who wants to sanctify and purify himself in his service to his Creator, should do so subject to the will of the Rabbis. He should go to the Rabbis and the righteous people of his generation, and they shall guide him in his quest. One who tries to forge a path himself is apt to stumble and make mistakes; nothing substantive will result from it.

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Directly from Hashem

The Gemora (Gittin 72) cited a braisa: If a scribe wrote a get for the sake of a specific woman, and the witnesses signed it for her sake as well, although they wrote, signed and gave it to the husband, and the husband gave the get to his wife, it is not valid until the scribe and the witnesses hear the husband’s voice telling them to write and sign it.

It is evident from here that if one person tells another to tell another, it is not regarded as if the third person heard it from the first.

Reb Yosef Engel asks from a Gemora in Kiddushin (22b), which states: Why is the ear different than all the other limbs in the body (that it is chosen for piercing for a slave that chooses to stay by his master)? The Holy One, Blessed be He said, “The ear that heard My voice on Mount Sinai when I said, ‘Bnei Yisroel are slaves to Me, and not slaves to other slaves,’ and this person went and acquired another master for himself, his ear should be pierced!” Why is it regarded as if he heard these words from Hashem? Bnei Yisroel only heard the first two commandments from Him; the rest were said over by Moshe!? We could have answered that since Moshe heard it directly from Hashem, and Bnei Yisroel heard it from Moshe, it is regarded as if they heard it directly from Hashem. However, based on our Gemora, that is incorrect!?

He answers that since when Moshe spoke, the Shechinah was talking through Moshe’s throat, it was considered as if they heard the commandments directly from Hashem.

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From their Mouth's and not from their Writings

The Gemora (Gittin 71) states that testimony is valid only from the mouths of the witnesses, not on the basis of any documents. It is evident that writing is not the same as talking.

The Gemora Chagigah (10b) cites Shmuel who states that one who resolves to make a vow must express the vow with his lips; otherwise, it is meaningless.

The Noda b’Yehudah (Y”D I: 66) inquires if an oath that was written down but not expressed would be valid as an oath. His underlying question is: Do we regard his written word as an expression of his lips?

This should be dependent on a dispute between the Rambam and Rabbeinu Tam regarding the validity of testimony from a written document. The Rambam maintains that testimony must be from the mouth of the witnesses and a document will not be Biblically acceptable for testimony. Rabbeinu Tam disagrees and holds that one who is physically capable of testifying may testify through the means of a document.

He concludes, however, that even the Rambam would agree that writing is considered testimony and yet, a written document cannot be accepted by Beis Din. The logic for this is as follows: An act of writing can constitute speech, but only during the time that it is being written. Beis Din will only accept an oral testimony when they hear it directly; hearsay is disqualified. Witnesses who signed a document are testifying, but Beis Din is not present at that time. If they would sign in front of Beis Din, that would be considered valid testimony.

With this principle, you can answer what would seemingly be a contradiction in the Rambam. He rules in Hilchos Eidus (3:7) that testimony must be from the mouth of the witnesses and a document will not be Biblically acceptable for testimony; yet later in Perek 9:11, he writes that one is required to testify with his mouth or at least that he is fitting to testify with his mouth. This would imply that if he is fitting to testify with his mouth, he would be permitted to testify through the means of a document. According to the Noda b’Yehudah’s explanation, it can be said that the Rambam allows witnesses to testify through the means of a document, but only if they sign the document when Beis Din is present. Accordingly, we can say that an oath taken through writing will be binding.

Reb Akiva Eiger discusses some other practical applications for this principle.

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Healing an Idolater

(Gittin 70) For a skin disease (moist outside and dry inside), he should take seven plump wheat stalks and roast them over a new hoe and smear himself with the oil that exudes from them. Rav Shimi bar Ashi used this remedy for a certain idolater for “something else” (leprosy), and it cured him.

Tosfos asks from the Gemora in Avodah Zarah (26b) which states that it is forbidden to heal an idolater. The Gemora rules that one may not assist an idolater woman giving birth, even for payment, for she will raise the child to serve idols!?

Tosfos answers that Rav Shimi was permitted to heal the idolater, for this would help him perfect his medical skills, and thus enable him to heal other Jews.

Tosfos in Avodah Zarah adds that Rav Shimi was not an expert practitioner at all, and he was training when he cured the idolater.

Furthermore, in cases where the idolater knows that the Jew has the ability to cure him, it would be permitted to heal him, for otherwise, it would propagate hatred from them to us.

Alternatively, there may be a distinction between a child being born, who will serve idols, and one who already worships idols.

The Geresh Yerachim asks: How was Elisha permitted to heal Naaman from his leprosy?

He answers that Elisha knew that Naaman would not serve idols any longer, and therefore, it was permitted.

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Frontwards and Backwards

The Gemora (Gittin 69) states: For blood running out of one’s nose, one should bring a Kohen whose name is Levi, and he should write the name Levi backwards.

The Tiferes Yosef explains: It is well-known in the books of Kabbalah that the alef beis written forward connotes kindness, for this way, the inspiration comes in the regular manner; descending from Heaven to earth. The alef beis written backwards connotes judgment, similar to fire, which ascends from the earth.

It is written in the Zohar that a Kohen is a man of kindness, and a Levi is one of judgment. This is why the name Levi, written backwards, signifying judgment, should be written by a Kohen, for he represents kindness.

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Ancient Cures

The Maharsha (Gittin 69) asks: The Gemora in Brochos (10b) states that Chizkiyahu hid the book of remedies and the sages praised him for this. This book contained instructions on healing various diseases through the use of different herbs and plants. Rashi explains that the sages praised him for hiding the book, because people were relying upon these remedies and they were not praying to Hashem for healing. If so, why does the Gemora record all these remedies here?

The Maharsha answers: A doctor definitely has permission to heal the sick, and he therefore has the right to know the cure for all sicknesses. However, these should not be publicized to all people, for some people will not have faith in Hashem; rather, they will rely on these natural remedies. And just as it was permitted to write down the Oral Law, for otherwise, it would be forgotten; so too, it was permitted to write down these cures, for otherwise, they would all be forgotten.

The Geresh Yerachim answers: the book of remedies that Chizkiyahu hid contained cures that were accurate and functioned for any sick person. If that would have remained in existence, people would rely only on that, and not on Hashem. However, the remedies mentioned in our Gemora do not work for every person. There are many factors that would prevent a person from being cured, even if he followed the exact instructions. Therefore, even when these remedies would be applied, one would still need to pray to Hashem in order to be healed.

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Traits of the Sages

It was stated (Gittin 67) : Shmuel said in the name of Rebbe that the halachah is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who said that verbal instructions cannot be passed on to an agent.

Rabbi Shimon the son of Rebbe said to Rebbe: Seeing that Rabbi Chanina of Ono and Rabbi Meir disagree with Rabbi Yosi, what was Rebbe’s reason for saying that the halachah follows Rabbi Yosi?

He replied: Be quiet, my son, be quiet; you have never seen Rabbi Yosi. Had you seen him, you would know that he always had reasons for his views. For we learned in a braisa: Issi ben Yehudah used to specify the praiseworthy merits of the various Sages. Rabbi Meir was a scholar and a scribe. Rabbi Yehudah was a scholar when he desired to be. Rabbi Tarfon resembled a heap of nuts. [When he was asked a question, he cited proofs from Scripture, Medrash, Mishnah, halachah and aggadah, like a heap of nuts toppling over one another.] Rabbi Yishmael resembled a well-stocked shop. [Whenever someone asked him something, he replied immediately, without keeping him waiting.] Rabbi Akiva was like a storehouse with compartments. [All his learning was organized by subject and each subject was taught separately.] Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri was like a basket of a spice peddler. [He could answer questions from any subject.] Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah was like an individual’s basket of spices. [The spice peddler has many varieties of spices.] The teachings of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov were measured but pure. [He did not issue many rulings, but the halachah follows him.] Rabbi Yosi always had reasons for his views. Rabbi Shimon used to grind a lot and let out only a little. It was taught in a braisa that this meant that he used to forget little, and whatever he did forget was only bran (teachings that were not in accordance with halachah). And so too, Rabbi Shimon said to his disciples: My sons, learn my teachings, since my teachings are the cream of the cream of Rabbi Akiva’s.

*** The Peri Megadim asks: It is forbidden to speak the praises of a person, even in his presence!?

He answers: Rebbe spoke these praises to himself.

*** The Maharsha asks: Why is it considered a praise about Rabbi Yehudah that he was a scholar when he desired to be? Isn’t that derogatory?

The Aruch explains that Rabbi Yehudah was the first of the speakers. The Iyun Yaakov explains that he was humble, and although he had permission from the king to speak first, he did not want this honor, and he only used it when it was absolutely necessary.

*** The Kesef Mishnah in Hilchos Beis Habechirah (2:18) states that the halachah follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov only when he is mentioned in a Mishna, but not when he is mentioned in a braisa.

The Chacham Tzvi challenges this from the fact that Shimon ben Azai found this rule in the Megillas Setarim, which was written before Rebbe arranged the Mishnayos, so obviously, the rule is all encompassing, even the braisos!?

Tosfos Yom Hakippurim asks that the Kesef Mishnah contradicts himself, for he explains the Rambam in Hilchos Teshuvah (2:8) that the Rambam holds like Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov because his teachings were measured but pure, and this halachah was mentioned in a braisa!?

He explains that whenever he is mentioned in a Mishna, the halachah follows him. However, when he is mentioned in a braisa, it depends upon the logic of his argument.

The Yad Malachei writes that in truth, the Kesef Mishnah holds that the Rambam always rules like Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, even when he is mentioned in a braisa. The Kesef Mishnah that was cited above was in fact a gloss from one of his students, and it erroneously got inserted into the text of the Kesef Mishnah.

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Demons

If someone was thrown into a pit and calls out that anyone who hears him should write a get to his wife (specifying his name and his city), those who hear this should indeed write and send the get to his wife (we assume that he omitted the instruction of giving the get due to the confusion of his situation).

The Gemora (Gittin 66) asks: Is it not possible that it was a demon (who are suspect of evil behavior, such as deceiving people) that issued that proclamation?

Rav Yehudah replied: The Mishna is referring to a case where they saw in him the form of a man.

The Mishnah Lamelech proves that that there were only two people heard the voice, for if there were three people there, a demon would not reveal itself to them. Now, if there are only two people, it must be that one of them is writing the get and signing on it. This will prove that the signature of a scribe together with one witness is sufficient! This would be problematic, for Amoraim below argue on this exact issue!?

Poras Yosef answers that the Mishna can be referring to a case where there were three people there, and the demon would nevertheless reveal itself, because they were far away from each other.

The Beis Aharon writes that in a place where demons are accustomed to be, such as inside pits, they will reveal themselves even in the presence of three people.

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Chalifin for a MInor - Gittin 65

Rava said: There are three categories of a minor: If he would be given a rock, he would discard it, but if given a walnut, he would accept it, he can make an acquisition on things, but he may not acquire for others.

Tosfos asks that it seems from a Gemora in Bava Basra that a minor does not have the ability to acquire anything!?

Tosfos answers: The Gemora there could be referring to a minor who has not yet reached this stage of understanding.

Alternatively, they answer that the Gemora there is referring only to a kinyan chalifin (acquiring something through an exchange with a kerchief or other object), where a minor has a more difficult time grasping the mechanics of the kinyan.

The Ra”n explains that the Rabbis instituted for a minor only those kinyanim where the object is raised or pulled by the minor; however, other types of kinyanim, where the concepts are difficult to grasp, are not effective for the minor.

The Rashb”a adds that since we rule that the object being used for the chalifin must be owned by the one making the acquisition, it emerges that the minor must convey the object to the seller. He does not have enough knowledge to accomplish that and therefore the kinyan is not effective.

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Rav Kahana and the Poor Man's Dates

The Gemora (Gittin 61) relates an incident: Rav Kahana was going to Hutzal and he saw a certain person who was throwing sticks at a palm tree so that the dates would fall to the ground. Rav Kahana picked up the dates and ate them. The person said to Rav Kahana, “You saw that I had picked some of the dates with my hand (and therefore it is actual theft for you to take them).”

Rav Kahana said to him: You must be from Rabbi Yoshiyah’s city (who often gave public discourses in the city; that is why you know these halachos). Rav Kahana applied the following verse to Rabbi Yoshiyah: And a righteous man is the foundation of the world.

Tosfos asks: Even if Rav Kahana did not know that the person picked the dates with his hand, he still should not have eaten them!? Why was he not concerned with our Mishna’s ruling that we do not take from the poor in the interest of peace?

Tosfos answers that the man was taking the branches off the tree and the dates were falling off themselves. Rav Kahana thought that the man had no interest in the dates.

The Ramban answers that Rav Kahana thought that he was an idolater and the Mishna did not rule that the produce of an idolater is protected because of harmony.

The Rashba answers that Rav Kahana himself was a poor person (or he was regarded as one since he was traveling). [This answers why he would have been permitted to take the dates that was seemingly reserved for the poor.]

The Meiri writes that the decree of promoting harmony was instituted primarily for a poor person who would be taking for himself and eating in his house; however, the enactment for the interest of peace would not affect a passerby, such as Rav Kahana, who would be eating on the road.

The Vilna Gaon says that this decree was instituted only with respect to olives, but not for dates.

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Kohen takes Precedence, even after Ressurection - Gittin 59

It is written [Vayikra 21:8]: You shall sanctify him, for he offers the bread of your God. And it was taught in the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yishmael: You shall sanctify him teaches us that in all matters pertaining to holiness, the Kohen takes precedence. He should be the first one called to read the Torah. He should be the first to recite the blessing by a meal. He takes the first portion (if he is dividing something with a Yisroel, the Kohen has the right to choose the first portion).

The Gemora in Megillah records the following incident: Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira ate the Purim meal together. They became intoxicated. Rabbah got up and slaughtered Rabbi Zeira. On the following day, Rabbah pleaded for mercy and he revived Rabbi Zeira. On the next year, Rabbah invited Rabbi Zeira to eat with him. Rabbi Zeira replied: A miracle does not occur at all times.

The Kli Chemda at the end of Parshas Breishis cites a kuntrus called Over Oreach. In this sefer, a question is asked: The Gemora Brochos (46a) records an incident where Rabbi Avahu honored Rabbi Zeira to recite the blessing and cut the bread. The Rashba asks that this is inconsistent with the halachah which states that this honor should be reserved for the host. The Rashba answers: since the meal was on behalf of Rabbi Zeira (he had recovered from a sickness), Rabbi Zeira was considered the host. Why didn’t the Rashba answer that Rabbi Zeira was a Kohen (Yerushalmi Brochos 8:6)? He answers that since this incident happened after the episode of Rabbah with Rabbi Zeira mentioned in Megillah (Rabbah slew him and the following day revived him), Rabbi Zeira lost his sanctity of being a Kohen and did not merit the right of this honor.

The Kli Chemda is greatly perplexed by this answer. Every Kohen is considered a Kohen because his father was a Kohen. It is obvious that he did not lose his relations with his relatives because he dies, so why shouldn’t he be a Kohen? (Rabbi Chaim Berlin cites a Gemora in Sanhedrin, proving that the Kehunah remains even after resurrection.) Perhaps he would have required a new inauguration to serve in the Beis Hamikdosh but he definitely did not lose the status of being a Kohen. He cites proof from the story with Elisha that one does not relinquish his relations with his relatives after he dies.

(Look at the Ramban in the beginning of Parshas Emor, where he writes that a Kohen has certain halachos because he is a descendant of Aharon HaKohen and other halachos are because he is a Kohen himself.)

After his resurrection, would he be required to marry his wife again? Reb Elchonon Wasserman discusses the status of the wife of Eliyahu after he ascended to Heaven without dying.

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Child Prodigy

The Gemora (Gittin 58) related the following incident: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah once happened to go to the great city in Rome, and he was told there that there was in the prison a child with beautiful eyes and face and his curly hair was arranged in locks. He went and stood at the doorway of the prison and said, “Who gave Yaakov over for spoil and Israel to the plunderers?” The child answered (by continuing the verse mentioned by Rabbi Yehoshua), “Is it not Hashem? It is on account of this; we have sinned against Him, and our fathers did not want to go in His ways, neither did they listen to His Torah.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah said: I feel sure that this child will be a teacher in Israel. I swear by the Temple service that I will not move from here before I ransom him with whatever price that they demand for him. They said that he did not leave the spot before he had ransomed him with a huge amount of money, and it was not too long afterwards before he became a teacher in Israel. Who was he? He was Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha.

The question is asked: What was so exceptional about the boy’s answer that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah declared that he was certain that this child will grow up to be a tremendous Torah scholar?

The Vilna Gaon explains based on the following Gemora in Brochos (4a): It is written: “Ad ya’avor amecha Hashem; ad ya’avor am zu kanisa.” Until your people pass through, Hashem; until this people that You have acquired pass through. Until your people pass through, Hashem is in reference to the first time that the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisroel (in the times of Yehoshua). Until this people that You have acquired pass through is in reference to the second time that the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisroel (in the times of Ezra). From here, the Chachamim have said: The Jewish people deserved that a miracle should be performed for them at the time of Ezra (when they were crossing the Jordan River into Eretz Yisroel) in the same manner that happened to them in the times of Yehoshua. However, due to their sins, they lost this reward.

Accordingly, it can be said that this is what Rabbi Yehoshua was asking: Who gave Yaakov over for spoil and Israel to the plunderers? Although the Jewish people were on a low level when they entered Bavel (as the name Yaakov connotes), but why weren’t they redeemed with a complete redemption (when they were on a higher level, as the name Israel connotes)?

The child answered: It is on account of this (zu); we have sinned against Him. By the second redemption, it is written zu, this; and since we have sinned, we lost the reward that we originally deserved.

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Haman's Descendants

The Gemora (Gittin 57) had stated that some of Haman’s grandchildren (his son’s sons) taught Torah in Bnei Brak.

There are those who ask the following: How is this possible? Why, behold, we do not accept converts from Amalek!?

Reb Yosef Engel answers that it is possible in the following scenario: An Amaleki woman got married to an idolater from a different nation. She gave birth to a son. That son is not regarded as an Amaleki, for the law regarding idolaters is that a child’s heritage is based upon his father, not his mother. A child from this son could be accepted as a convert. It emerges that the Gemora did not mean that Haman’s son’s sons converted; rather, there were descendants from Haman who converted and taught Torah in Bnei Brak.

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Kamtza and Bar Kamtza

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 55b - 56a) had stated: The destruction of Yerushalayim came about through Kamtza and Bar Kamtza in the following way: A certain man had a friend Kamtza and an enemy Bar Kamtza. He once made a party and said to his attendant, “Go and bring Kamtza.” The man went and brought Bar Kamtza. When the host found him there, he exclaimed, See, you are my enemy, what are you doing here? Get out!” Bar Kamtza said to him, “Since I am here, let me stay and I will pay you for whatever I eat and drink.” The host refused. Bar Kamtza said, “Then let me give you half the cost of the party.” “No,” said the host. “Then let me pay for the whole party,” Bar Kamtza said. He still refused and he took him by the hand and threw him out. Bar Kamtza said, “Since the Rabbis were sitting there and did not rebuke him, this shows that they agreed with him. I will go and slander them to the Government.” He went and said to Caesar, “The Jews are rebelling against you.” Caesar asked him, “Who says so?” He replied, “Send them an animal as a sacrifice and see whether they will offer it on the Altar. So he sent with him a fine calf. While on the way, Bar Kamtza made a blemish on its upper lip, or as some say, he cause a cataract in the eye, in a place where we consider it a blemish, but they do not. The Rabbis were inclined to offer it in order not to offend the Government. Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas said to them, “People will then say that blemished animals are offered on the Altar!” They then proposed to kill Bar Kamtza so that he should not go and inform against them, but Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas said to them, People will then say that one who makes a blemish on consecrated animals is to be put to death!”

There is a well known question: It is understandable why the Gemora lays the blame of the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash on Bar Kamtza, for he was the one who slandered the Jews to Caesar; however, what did Kamtza do wrong? Why does the Gemora introduce the incident by saying that it was on account of both of them?

The Ben Yehoyada answers that anyone who has the ability to protest when a sin is being committed and does not do so; the sin is called upon his name as well. Chazal understood that Kamtza, being a friend of the host, had the ability to prevent the host from evicting Bar Kamtza from the banquet. Since he did not do so, he became a partner in all the events that resulted from the eviction.

The Yalkut HaGershuni answers, based upon the premise that Kamtza was not at the banquet; he did not attend, for he did not receive an invitation. It was very possible that if he would have been there, the host would not have gotten so angry, for he would have seen that his friend joined him at the banquet. Kamtza, out of haughtiness, did not attend the party. He said to himself, “If he didn’t send me an invitation, I am not attending!” It emerges that Kamtza, due to his evil attribute, also had a share in Bar Kamtza’s actions.

The Chida answers that in truth, Kamtza did nothing wrong. The meaning of the Gemora is as follows: It was because the attendant was not careful regarding his master’s words that brought about this destruction. He did not distinguish between Kamtza and Bar Kamtza. This is as the Chachamim say: One must be extremely careful in the words he speaks, and one who listens to another person talking must pay careful attention, for sometimes, due to one mistaken word, there can be deadly consequences.

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Neder like a Bamah

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The Sefas Emes and Noam Elimelech teach us that the word neder, vow is related to the word dira, dwelling. What does an oath have to do with a dwelling?

Reb Chaim from Divrei Chaim cites the Shem m’Shmuel who questions the entire essence of nedarim: How is it that a person has the power through his verbal declaration to create prohibitions (in the case of nidrei bituei) and create a status of hekdesh (nidrei hekdesh)? This power goes so far that the Gemora is uncertain whether the object of a neder is subject to the laws of me’ilah for violating a neder!

He suggests the following: In essence no new kedushah is being created. The concept of neder is a recognition that beyond what meets the eye, there is a level of kedushah already inherent in the reality around us - the Shechinah already dwells immanently in the world.

Sefas Emes notes that the first person in the Torah to take a neder is Yaakov Avinu. While the other Avos revealed Hashem’s presence as similar to a mountain or a field, Chazal tell us that Yaakov revealed Hashem’s presence as the bayis, a dwelling. Chazal tell us that taking a neder is like building a bamah, an altar used outside the Mikdash. Hashem metaphorically “dwells” in the Bais haMikdash – to create a sanctified space for him - outside those confines is a task fraught with challenge.

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Husband's Knowledge

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b - 46a)had stated: Rabbi Meir says: If it is a vow which requires examination by a Chacham (and the husband cannot annul it by himself), he may not take her back, but for one which does not require examination by a Chacham (the husband can annul it himself), he may take her back (because in this case, the husband cannot advance the claim that the divorce was due to a misunderstanding). Rabbi Elozar said: They prohibited him to remarry in the case where the vow required examination by a Chacham to annul it only on account of the case where the vow did not require examination by a Chacham to annul it (since in the latter case, the husband might claim that he was not aware that he had the right to disallow the vow; in the former case, however, no such claim can be advanced because no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law).

The Gemora asks: What is the core of their argument? Rabbi Meir maintains that a husband does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law and therefore forbids remarriage on account of the first reason mentioned above, since the first husband might claim that if he had known that the vow could be disallowed by a Chacham, he would not have consented to give a divorce. Rabbi Elozar holds that no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law.

The Tosfos Rid explains the argument in the following manner. If the vow required a Chacham to permit it, he may not remarry her. This is because we are scared that he will say that if I merely knew that a Chacham could permit it, I would never have divorced her. He would have had her go before a Beis Din to have her vow permitted, despite the fact that this is embarrassing. However, if it is a vow that he could have nullified as her husband, there is no suspicion. This is because everyone knows that they can nullify certain vows that their wives make. The fact that he did not do so shows that he clearly wanted to divorce her; regardless of whether or not the vow was actually made. Rabbi Elozar holds that a husband does not always realize that he can nullify his wife’s vows. Therefore, they cannot remarry if he divorced her because of such a vow, as he will later claim that if he had known he could have done so, he would not have divorced her. Furthermore, Rabbi Elozar says that a vow that requires a Chacham or Beis Din is not really cause for them not to remarry. This is because he would not have taken his wife to a Chacham or beis din anyway, because it is denigrating. However, in this case as well they are forbidden to remarry because of the similarity to the case where a Chacham is not required.

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Ransoming for more than their Value

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The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b) had stated: We do not redeem captives for more than their true value for “the benefit of the world.”

The Gemora inquires: Does “the benefit of the world” (with respect to redeeming the captives for more than their worth) relate to the burden which may be imposed on the community (they will all become impoverished), or to the possibility that the bandits will take more captives? [The difference would be in a case where a private individual, such as a relative, wishes to redeem him.]

Come and hear: Levi ben Darga ransomed his daughter for thirteen thousand golden dinars.

Abaye asked: But are you sure that he acted with the consent of the Sages? Perhaps he acted against their will!

Rashi explains that “more than their true value” is referring to the amount that they would fetch if they would be sold in the slave market.

The Meiri writes that their value is based upon their individual wealth and prominence.

The Radvaz rules that we may ransom any captive with the amount of money that is usual to redeem other captives during that time period.

He adds: It has become the custom to redeem captive for more than their worth in the market, for an elderly person or a minor are not worth more than ten dinars, and nevertheless, they are ransomed for more than one hundred dinars. His explanation why there is no concern that the bandits will take more captives is because the captives are not being ransomed for any more that their gentile counterparts. He concludes that nothing should be told to Klal Yisroel about this, for they are a charitable nation, and it is better for them to remain that way.

Tosfos and the Ramban disagree regarding the halachah if the captive himself is allowed to ransom himself for more money than he is actually worth.

The Gemora in Kesuvos (52b) states: If one’s wife was captured and the kidnappers sought ten times her fair value for redemption, the first time the husband must redeem her. Afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that we do not redeem captives for more than they are worth for “the establishment of the world” (that captors should not thereby be encouraged to demand exorbitant prices for the ransom of their captive).

This issue had an extraordinary public application about 700 years ago. The leader of Ashkenazic Jewry at the time was Rabbi Meir ben Boruch of Rottenberg. He was imprisoned by a German ruler, Rudolph, whose voracity knew no bounds. Rabbi Meir (known as Maharam Mi’Rottenberg) was imprisoned until his death, and his body was not released. The community did not ransom him, as he himself had ruled. Seven years after his death, a private member of the community paid almost all of his own money to release the body, with the stipulation that he be buried next to him.

There is a question whether according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel a man would be permitted to ransom his wife if the ransom exceeds her worth. The Ritva holds that he may do so, and the Chelkas Mechokeik disagrees.

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Three Hundred Silver Pieces

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The Gemora in Megillah (16b) expounds the following verse [Breishis: 45:22]: He [Yosef] gave them all changes of clothes, and to Binyamin he gave three hundred [pieces of] silver and five changes of clothes. The Gemora asks: Is it possible that Yosef would stumble on the precise action that caused him to suffer? Yaakov had given Yosef a nice woolen garment which caused the brothers to become jealous and prompted them to sell him to Mitzrayim. Should Yosef now favor Binyamin over the other brothers? Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefes answers: Yosef was hinting that a descendant of his will go in front of a king dressed in five royal garments (referring to Mordechai).

The commentators ask: Why didn’t it bother the Gemora that Yosef gave to Binyamin three hundred pieces of silver, and none to the other brothers? Wouldn’t that have caused jealousy as well?

The Chasam Sofer answers based upon our Gemora, which states: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who sells his slave to an idolater; we penalize him and force him to buy him back for up to ten times the value of the slave.

An ordinary slave is worth thirty silver coins, as we know from the halachah in the Torah that if an ox gores and kills a slave, the owner must pay the master thirty silver coins.

Accordingly, the brothers who sold Yosef should have been obligated to pay the penalty of ten times Yosef’s value in order to redeem him. Since they did not redeem him, they therefore owed to Yosef three hundred silver coins (30 ∙ 10 = 300). This is why Yosef did not give them the three hundred silver coins that he gave to Binyamin. Binyamin, who was not involved in the selling at all, rightfully deserved this amount, and therefore, Yosef was not concerned that this would be a cause for jealousy.

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Can a Tereifah Have Children?

The Gemora cites a braisa (Daf Yomi: Gittin 43a) : If an ox kills one who is a half-slave, half-free man, the (ox) owner gives half the fine (if the ox is a habitual gorer, the owner must pay thirty shekels as a penalty) to his master and half the kofer payment (the value of the victim as determined by what price he would have fetched at the slave market; this serves as an atonement for the owner of the ox) to the slave’s heirs. The Gemora points out that if the kiddushin of a half-slave, half-free man is invalid, how does he have inheritors?

Rav Adda bar Ahavah answers: The case is where he was gored and made a tereifah (deathly ill, where he was going to eventually die from his wounds). The “inheritors” referred to here actually means to the slave himself.

Rava retorted that there are two reasons to refute this answer. One is that the braisa says the money is given to his inheritors (not himself). Additionally, the payment is kofer, and Rish Lakish says that kofer is only paid after an actual death (not when someone is made deathly ill)!

The Peri Chadash asks: Why couldn’t the Gemora use the following case? He was gored and rendered a tereifah. The ox owner is required to pay the penalty after he dies. Before he died, however, the master emancipated him, he married and begot children. Afterwards, he died, and the ox owner should now be obligated to pay to his heirs!?

He proves from this that it must be that a tereifah is not capable of having children.

The Chazon Ish asks that even if we will assume that a tereifah cannot have children, there is another possibility. He was gored and injured so badly that he was dangerously close to death (yet he was not ruled to be a tereifah). The ox owner is required to pay the penalty after he dies. Before he died, however, the master emancipated him, he married and begot children. Afterwards, he died due to the injury, and the ox owner should now be obligated to pay to his heirs!?

He answers that a slave has no lineage, and therefore any children born from him while he was a slave are not regarded as his children. After he is emancipated, and now his children are considered his children, that is only for all matters that are applicable after his death. However, with respect to the obligation of the kofer payment, that is a payment that is owed to the victim’s heirs. If, at the time he was gored, he did not have any inheritors, the owner will not be obligated to pay to the heirs that came about at a later date.

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