Afflictions Purge a Person's Sins

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The Gemora states that if a master knocks out the tooth of his slave, or if he blinds his eye, he must release the slave.

It is noteworthy that Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemora in Brochos (5a) derives from here that a person is considered fortunate if Hashem inflicts him. It is taught through a kal vachomer as follows: If the loss of a tooth or an eye, which is only one of the limbs in a person’s body, nevertheless, a slave gains his freedom because of it, then afflictions, which cleanse the person’s entire body, should certainly free a person from sin because of them!

Rish Lakish derives this same lesson from a different source. He says: The word covenant is written with respect to salt and the word covenant is written with respect to afflictions. Just as salt sweetens the meat, so too, afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins.

The Bobover Rebbe in Kedushas Tziyon notes that there is a distinction between the two expositions. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the afflictions will only cleans a person if they emanate from Heaven, similar to the halachos of a slave, where he will only be set free if his master knocks out his tooth or eye. He will not gain his freedom if someone else injures him. However, according to Rish Lakish, any type of afflictions will cleanse him, in the same manner as the salt sweetening the meat. It makes no difference as to who applies the salt.

Based upon this, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank explains the following. It is written [Shmos 6:5]: And also, I heard the moans of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians are holding in bondage, and I remembered My covenant. The Jewish people thought that the Egyptians were their masters and they were those who were afflicting them. They did not realize that their suffering was decreed from Heaven. Because they didn’t know who was causing them their hardships, they did not gain their freedom. It was only because Hashem remembered His covenant, that all afflictions cleanse a person from his sins, that was the reason they were released from the bondage.

Reb Meir Shapiro adds to this: If a slave does not come to court and testify that his master knocked out his tooth or eye, he will not gain his freedom. If he says that it happened by happenstance, he will not go free. So too, it is with afflictions. If a person does not believe with complete faith that the afflictions are affecting him because of Divine Providence, the afflictions will not purge him of his sins. However, if this principle was derived through the gezeirah shavah from salt, it would not make any difference.

The Rashba was asked the following question: If a slave initiates a fight with his master and strikes the first blow, and the master counters with some strikes of his own and knocks out the slave’s tooth, will the slave gain his freedom?

He replied that the slave goes free. The proof is from the aforementioned Gemora, where Rabbi Yochanan derived that afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins through a kal vachomer from the laws of the slave. How can the two be compared? Afflictions come to a person because he has sinned! It was his own fault! Perhaps, then, those afflictions will not purge him from his sins!? Evidently, we see that a slave also gains his freedom, even if he was the one who initiated the fight!

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Kohanim as Agents

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Rabbah inquired: Can a Canaanite slave make a messenger to accept his Get for him from his master? Do we say that being that we derive his laws from a woman (who can make a messenger), he too can make a messenger? Or do we say that a woman who can accept her Get can make a messenger, but he, who cannot accept a Get cannot make a messenger? After Rabbah asked the question, he resolved that he can make a messenger, based upon the above gezeirah shavah.

The Gemora asks: Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua says that Kohanim are Hashem’s messengers. If we would say that they are our messengers, is it possible that there is something that a person themselves cannot do, yet they have the power to create a messenger to do it for them?
However, based on what we just said, this logic seems flawed. After all, a slave cannot accept his own Get, yet, he can make a messenger who will accept it for him!?

The Gemora answers: This question is incorrect. A regular Jew cannot have anything to do with bringing a korban. A slave, however, has a connection with emancipation documents. This is as the braisa states: It appears that a slave can act as a messenger to accept his friend’s Get from his friend’s master. However, he cannot accept a Get from his own master.

The Gemora in Nedarim (35b) poses the identical inquiry and states that a practical difference between the two perspectives is with regard to someone who declared that he would not derive benefit from a certain Kohen. If the Kohen is our agent, he will not be permitted to perform the service for the one who vowed against him. However, if the Kohen is an agent of Heaven, he would be permitted to perform the service for him.

The Rishonim ask: Why didn’t the Gemora there resolve this inquiry from that which Rav Huna said here that if we would say that they are our messengers, is it possible that there is something that a person themselves cannot do, yet they have the power to create a messenger to do it for them?

1) Tosfos answers that the Gemora wished to resolve the inquiry from a Mishna or a braisa, not from an Amoraic statement.

2) Furthermore, Tosfos notes that we can only prove from Rav Huna that the Kohanim are also agents of Heaven, and not only our agents, for if they would only be our agents, how can they perform the service when the Yisroel, who sent them, cannot perform it! However, it can still very well be that they are the agents of both.

3) The Ritva answers that we can prove from Rav Huna that the Kohanim are agents of Heaven only when they are offering the korbanos of a Yisroel; however, there would still be a matter of doubt with respect to a case when they are sacrificing the korbanos for another Kohen. Here, Rav Huna’s logic would not be applicable, for the sender is able to perform the service himself!

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The Beautiful Captive

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The Gemora teaches regarding a “beautiful captive” that she should not be subjugated by the soldier during battle.

Rashi learns that the soldier should not cohabit with her during the battle. Cohabitation is not allowed until the captive is brought to the soldier’s house and converts to Judaism.

Tosfos asks four questions on Rashi.

1) Why does the braisa state that the Torah’s permission for a soldier to have relations with a captive is based upon the Torah’s recognition of the strength of one’s Evil Inclination? If according to Rashi, he may not cohabit with her until she converts in his house, how is his desire appeased during the war? Shouldn’t we still be concerned that the beautiful female captives would represent an overwhelming temptation for the Jewish soldier, and he will engage in illicit relationships with them?

Tosfos answers that since she will be permitted to him after some time, we are not concerned that he will be tempted to engage in an illicit relationship with her during the war. He will be able to overcome this desire and wait until she will be permitted to him. This is based upon the concept of having “bread in his basket.”

2) Why does the braisa compare the permission of the beautiful captive with eating meat from a slaughtered animal that had been dangerously ill? It is not so proper to eat such meat, as the Gemora in Chullin (37b) considers it repulsive to eat such meat! But according to Rashi, cohabitation with the captive after her conversion is completely permitted and allowed! What is the comparison between the two?

Tosfos answers that it is nevertheless regarded as a permission b’dieved, because since the conversion is done without her consent, it is not regarded as a bona fide conversion.

3) The Gemora in Sanhedrin (21a) records that Tamar was the daughter of a beautiful captive, Maachah, whom David had taken as a wife. Tamar was therefore permitted to Amnon, David’s son, for she was not regarded as David’s daughter. However, according to Rashi that David did not have relations with Maachah until she converted, why would Tamar be permitted to Amnon? Since she was born from her mother after she converted, it emerges that she was Amnon’s sister, for they shared the same father!?

Tosfos answers that Rashi will learn that Tamar was not the daughter of David at all; rather, Maachah was pregnant with her even before David had taken her from the battle.

4) However, Tosfos concludes that he has no explanation according to Rashi why the Gemora above said that there is a distinction with respect to a Kohen between the initial act of cohabitation and the second act. This is only understandable if the initial act is done during the battle and the second act is done after she converts (which is the way Rabbeinu Tam learns the Gemora). However, according to Rashi, both the second act of cohabitation and the first one are only after she converts! Why would the first be permitted and the second would be forbidden?

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Using a Kohen

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The Rambam rules that a Jewish servant who is a Kohen cannot become a nirtza, for he will be rendered a baal mum (a blemish, which will disqualify him from performing the Temple service).

The Mishnah La’melech asks that the Maggid Mishnah understands in the Rambam that there is no required amount for how large the piercing of the servant’s ear must be. If so, why can’t the Kohen servant become a nirtza, and they will pierce his ear in a manner which will not cause a blemish?

He answers based upon a Yerushalmi which says that we are concerned that they will forget and create a large hole, which will render him a baal mum.

The Sma”g writes that it is evident from our Gemora that it is permitted to have a Kohen work for you as a servant. He says that the prohibition is only when the Kohen is working for free; however, if he is receiving compensation for the work, it is permitted.

The Makneh asks: Accordingly, the Kohen servant should not be allowed to become a nirtza because then, he will be working for free!?

He answers based upon the Mordechai in Gittin, who says that the Kohen, if he so desires, can be mochel, and then it would be permitted for him to work for you.

The Mordechai (Gittin 461) relates that Rabbeinu Tam once instructed a Kohen to pour him some water. This caused one of his students to inquire as to how he could allow a Kohen to serve him, being that the Yerushalmi states that whoever uses a Kohen for his own needs is in violation of the prohibition of me’ilah (since the Kohen is sacred). Rabbeinu Tam's response was that the Kohen who served him in 12th century France was without the clothing of the Kohen and, therefore, not a Kohen (based upon the Gemora Sanhedrin 83b). The student persisted that if so, we shouldn’t give a Kohen the first aliyah. Rabbeinu Tam remained quiet. Rabbeinu Peter then suggested that a Kohen can voluntarily forfeit the respect due to him as a Kohen and, therefore, there was no problem with Rabbeinu Tam's use of him.

The Ta”z asks that the Kohen is not permitted to forfeit his kedushah and marry a divorcee!? What is the difference between the two?

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Three Insights

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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ANOTHER WIFE!?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers: It means that if he comes into slavery with a wife and child, his master can give him a Canaanite slavewoman (to have relations with). Otherwise, he cannot.

The commentators ask: Isn’t this illogical? If he doesn’t have a wife, the master should be able to give him a slavewoman, and if he does have a wife, why should the master give him another wife?

The Daas Zkeinim explains that if he is married to a Jewish woman, he will not be so attracted to the Canaanite slavewoman and will not follow her ways. However, if she is his only wife, he is liable to follow her ways. The Torah did not want this.


REPENTANCE IN THE
SAME SITUATION

It is written [Yirmiyah 22:10]: Cry intensely for one who leaves, because he will not return again and see the land of his birthplace. Rav Yehudah said: This is referring to one who departs this world without children.

Rav Huna said: The verse is referring to a person who committed a sin and repeated it. The Gemora states: Rav Huna is following his reasoning stated elsewhere that one who commits a sin and repeats it; it has become permitted to him.

The Gemora asks: Do you actually think that it is permitted? The Gemora answers: Rav Huna means that it becomes to him as if it was permitted.

The Gemora (Yoma 86b) explains that a true penitent is one who committed a sin in the past and then the opportunity for the same sins comes again a first time and a second time and he is saved from the sin on both occasions.

The Sefer Chasidim writes that a person should not put himself into a situation where he is tempted to sin, because he may not be able to withstand temptation.

The Tzlach questions the words of the Sefer Chasidim from the commentary of the Kli Yakar in Parshas Chukas, who writes regarding the phenomena of the Parah Adumah that the Parah Adumah was capable of rendering pure those that were impure and conversely, rendering impure those that were pure.

The Kli Yakar likens this idea to certain medicines that are beneficial for one who is ill but can prove fatal for one who is healthy. There is a parallel between remedying the body and remedying the soul. One who wishes to repent must be with the same woman that he sinned with the first time, at the same time of the year in which he had sinned, and at the same place where he sinned with her. Thus, the temptation to sin is particularly strong, as his Evil Inclination will entice him to respond exactly as he did before. By resisting the temptation, he demonstrates that he is a true penitent.

The Kli Yakar adds that this is what the Gemora (Brochos 34b) means when it states that in the place where penitents stand, the completely righteous do not stand, i.e. the completely righteous cannot stand in a place of temptation. Yet, according to the Sefer Chasidim, a righteous person is not permitted to endanger himself by entering into such a situation.

TRANSGRESSION COMMITTED ONLY ONCE

The Gemora states that if one commits a transgression and repeats it, it becomes like it is permitted to him.

Rav Shach was once giving rebuke and he questioned if there is any among us that have committed a sin and not repeated it. Woe is to us.

The Mabit in Beis Elokim (shaar hateshuva ch 11) writes that our sages have said if one commits a transgression three times, it becomes like it is permitted to him. Did he have a different version in the Gemora than us? Our Gemora states this to be correct if a person commits a sin even twice.

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Condition against the Torah

The Gemara cites a Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah regarding whether a person may make a Tenai modifying the obligations stipulated by the Torah regarding monetary law ("Masneh Al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah"). Rebbi Meir says that if a man is Mekadesh a woman on condition that he not be obligated to give her She'er, Kesus, and Onah, the Tenai is invalid and the Kidushin takes effect fully (and he is obligated to provide her with She'er, Kesus, and Onah). Rebbi Yehudah says the Tenai is valid, and the Kidushin takes effect and he is not obligated to provide her with She'er, Kesus, and Onah.
Rebbi Meir's view is difficult to understand. If the Tenai is null and void, then why should the Kidushin take effect at all? The man was Mekadesh the woman on condition that if he is not obligated to give her She'er, Kesus, and Onah, then he wants the Kidushin to take effect, and conversely, if he will be obligated in She'er, Kesus, and Onah, then he does not want the Kidushin to take effect! (Rebbi Meir requires a "Tenai Kaful" -- both sides of the condition stated explicitly -- whenever a Tenai is used, as the Mishnah says in Kidushin 61a.) Since the man specified clearly that he does not want the Kidushin to be valid if he will be obligated to give She'er, Kesus, and Onah, then how can the Kidushin take effect and obligate him in She'er, Kesus, and Onah? He did not have in mind for the Kidushin to take effect under such circumstances! (TOSFOS DH Harei Zu)


ANSWERS:

(a) The RI explains that we learns all the laws of Tenai, including the very fact that one may make a Tenai, from a verse (in Kidushin, ibid.) If not for the fact that the Torah teaches that there is such a thing as making a Tenai, we would not have known that there is a concept of Tenai at all. Had the Torah not taught us the concept of Tenai, that one may make a stipulation when making a Kinyan, we would have thought that when a person makes a Tenai as a precondition to a certain Kinyan, we just ignore the Tenai and the Kinyan takes effect. By teaching that a Tenai does work, the Torah is teaching that if the condition is not fulfilled, the Kinyan is annulled retroactively. In the situations in which the Torah does not teach that a Tenai works (such as a situation in which the Tenai counters that which is written in the Torah), we revert back to the original way we would have ruled had the Torah not taught us the concept of Tenai, and the Kinyan works regardless of the fulfillment of the Tenai.
This answer of Tosfos is very difficult to understand. Even without the Torah teaching us the laws of Tenai, we should know, logically, that if a person sells an item to his friend and stipulates that the sale should not be valid unless his friend gives him something or does something, then if the friend fails to fulfill the Tenai the sale should not be valid, since the person did not fully commit himself to the sale!
To answer this question, we must first analyze a related Halachah -- the Halachah of Bereirah. In many places in the Gemara we find the view that holds "Ein Bereirah," which means that a Kinyan cannot be effected if -- at the moment that it takes effect -- it is not clear upon what it takes effect. For example, a person cannot pick up an item in order to be Koneh it and say, "If it rains tomorrow, I want this act of Kinyan to be for Reuven, and if it does not rain tomorrow, I want this act of Kinyan to be for Shimon." If a person does make such a stipulation, then even if it rains the next day, the object will not belong to Reuven. Similarly, a person cannot eat fruits today, "The portion that I will choose to separate tomorrow will be Terumah on these fruits starting from now." If he does so, then even if he separates a portion tomorrow, it will not serve as Terumah.
The logic for this, as the RAN explains in Nedarim (45b), is that "it is not appropriate for a Kinyan to take effect in a way that leaves a doubt as to how it took effect." This means that the Kinyan must take effect at the same moment at which the action which accomplishes the Kinyan is performed (such as the act of Hagba'ah (lifting up an item) in the case of a purchase, or Dibur (speech) in the case of making something Terumah). The Kinyan cannot take effect after the act, because the act which makes the Kinyan is no longer present. Thus, if at the moment that the act is performed, the Kinyan "does not know" where to take effect, the Kinyan does not take effect (or it takes effect on one of the two, regardless of what happens the next day; see Insights to Eruvin 37b). The Kinyan cannot see into the future, so to speak.
What is the difference between Bereirah and a Tenai? No Tenai should ever work if we say "Ein Bereirah," because the Kinyan cannot know what will happen in the future (whether the Tenai will be fulfilled or not) in order to be able to take effect now!
RASHI and TOSFOS (Gitin 25b, DH u'l'Chi Mayis) explain that when a person makes a Tenai, it is in his ability, and it is his intention, to fulfill the condition (for otherwise he would not have made the Kinyan in the first place). Hence, the Kinyan is not taking effect in a matter that leaves doubt. Rather, it takes effect for certain at the time the act of Kinyan is made, since he intends to fulfill the Tenai. What, then, is it that revokes the Kinyan retroactively when the condition is not fulfilled? The Kinyan has already been made and completed; it took effect, so how can it be revoked retroactively? The answer is that this is the reason why the Torah has to teach us the novel concept of Tenai -- even though the Kinyan was made, it can be revoked through not fulfilling the condition. This is what the Ri means to say -- since the Torah did not teach the concept of Tenai in a case where the Tenai contradicts the obligations of the Torah, then we revert to saying that the Kinyan is completed and nothing can uproot it retroactively, since it has already been done and has already taken effect. The person who made the Kinyan did intend for the Kinyan to take effect for certain, since he was expecting the Tenai to be fulfilled.
For this reason, when a man makes a Kidushin on condition that he not be obligated to give She'er, Kesus, and Onah, he obviously thinks that he is able to create such a Kidushin and he has in mind that the Kidushin should be completed, except that it should be uprooted if it turns out that he is obligated to give She'er, Kesus, and Onah. But by that time, it is too late to revoke the Kidushin, since it already took effect.
(b) RABEINU TAM (cited by the Tosfos Yeshanim and the Tosfos ha'Rosh), the RITVA, and the RASHBA (cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes) explain that when a person makes a Tenai that contradicts the Torah, he does not really mean it, but he is just being "Mafligah b'Devarim" -- he is just frightening her with words. The Beraisa in Gitin (84a) teaches such a concept with regard to a person who says to his wife that he is giving her a Get on condition that she does something that is physically impossible to do (see Rashi there, DH Mafligah). Since he knows that the Halachah of the Torah requires that Kidushin be done in a certain way with certain obligations, it must be that he is not serious about his condition to alter those obligations, and therefore he probably has in mind to make a Kidushin, and he is just saying this condition in order to frighten her.
Rabeinu Tam might have rejected the explanation of the Ri because his explanation is logically sound only when the condition is something that will be fulfilled or not fulfilled at a point after the Kinyan is completed. In the case of Kidushin, though, the Kidushin takes effect at the same time that the obligations of She'er, Kesus, and Onah take effect (or do not take effect). Thus, since the Kidushin does not depend on a future event but on a present event, the Kidushin should not take effect (since he did not have in mind to make such a Kidushin that obligates him in She'er, Kesus, and Onah). (See also Rebbi Akiva Eiger.)
The Ri might have explained like the Rashba, who says that the condition that the husband was stipulating was not that Kidushin should take effect without the obligations of She'er, Kesus, and Onah. Rather, the husband was stipulating that Kidushin should take effect only if the woman forgoes her entitlement to She'er, Kesus, and Onah. This can take place after the Kidushin is effected. (This is not like the opinion of Rabeinu Elchanan as quoted later in Tosfos.)
The Ri, on the other hand, did not accept Rabeinu Tam's explanation, because "Mafligah b'Devarim" can only be applied to a Tenai made against something written in the Torah, but not when any of the other details of Tenai were omitted. However, we find that if a person makes a Tenai in the wrong order ("Ma'aseh Kodem le'Tenai"), then the Kinyan takes effect and we ignore the Tenai even though the logic of "Mafligah b'Devarim" does not apply (as the RE'AH points out)!

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Esav the Apostate

Rabbi Chiya bar Avin said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that an idolater inherits his father according to Torah law! This is apparent from the verse, “For an inheritance to Esav I gave Mount Seir.”

The Gemora asks: Perhaps an apostate Jew, suchas Esav, is different (and this law does not apply to a genuine gentile)?

The Gemora answers: Rather, the proof is from the verse, “For to the children of Lot I gave Ar as an inheritance.”

Rabbeinu Bachye writes that Esav was considered an apostate because he was the child of the Forefathers, but yet, he did not follow in their path.

Reb Tzadok HaKohen writes that he was regarded as an apostate because he was not circumcised. Although the Chasam Sofer (responsa Y”D 245) writes that this was because he was red (Admoni) and that exempted him from performing this mitzvah (on account of the danger), this argument can be rejected because before the Giving of the torah, there was no commandment of “You shall live by the mitzvos,” and therefore, even though there was a health concern, he still would have been obligated to be circumcised.

In the sefer Torascha Shashuay, he explains why Yaakov was allowed to say, “I am Esav, your first-born” based upon the fact that Esav was an apostate. Accordingly, it would have been forbidden for Yitzchak to eat from Esav’s shechitah. The halachah is that one is permitted to lie in order to prevent someone else from transgressing a prohibition. If one is allowed to lie for the sake of peace, he certainly can lie to protect someone from sinning!

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Father (outside) and Mother (inside)

The braisa (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 18) states: A person can accept kiddushin for his daughter again (if she became widowed or divorced after betrothal), he can sell her again, and he can marry her off after selling her as a maidservant. However, he cannot sell her after marrying her off. Rabbi Shimon says: Just as he cannot do this, he cannot sell her as a maidservant after he already sold her once.

This is like the argument of the following Tannaim. The braisa says: “When he betrayed her.” Once he spread his cloak over her (in marriage), he cannot sell her; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says, “When he betrayed her,” teaches that once he betrayed her (sold her as a maidservant) he cannot sell her.

What is their argument? Rabbi Eliezer says: The way the word is written in the Torah is important. Rabbi Akiva says: The way it is read is important. Rabbi Shimon says: Both are important. [“Important” here refers to how we understand the intent of the Torah. If we focus on the word as it is read, it refers to clothing, while if we focus on the letters, it refers to being sold.]

This is similar to a debate in the Gemora in Sukkah which discusses if a sukkah requires two full walls and a third wall that is at least a tefach, or should there be three complete walls. This debate is based on whether one reads the word Sukkos in the Torah with the letter vav or without the letter vav. The Chachamim maintain that we say yeish eim lemasores, the transmitted written form has primacy, whereas Rabbi Shimon maintains that yeish eim lemikra, the pronounced form has primacy.

The Rif was questioned as to why the Gemora uses the word eim, which means mother, and not av, which means father. A similar question would be that the Gemora refers to one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics as a binyan av and not a binyan eim.

The Rif initially responded that he never heard anyone shed light on this matter, but then he proceeded to offer a possible explanation. When the purpose of a principle is to teach a concept in a different area, the Gemora uses the term av, whereas if the discussion at hand is regarding relying on a principle, the Gemora uses the word eim.

Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha explains the words of the Rif. The mother is the akeres habayis, the mainstay of the house as it is said every honorable princess dwelling within. For this reason we say yeish eim lemikra or yeish eim lemasores, as the mother is the central figure in the house and it is the mother who everyone is dependant upon. The father, on the other hand, is not usually found in the house, as he leaves the house to seek a livelihood. The principle of a binyan av, however, is that we are building from one location to another, and this is analogous to a father who influences others. (See Rabbeinu Bachye to Devarim 33:8 for further discussion on the differences between the father and mother.)

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Yovel for a Runaway Servant

Rav Sheishes (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 17) explained a braisa (which ruled that a servant who runs away does not receive gifts) to be referring to a case where the servant ran away, and Yovel intervened. The braisa is teaching us that he does not receive gifts in this case (and he is not considered as if the master has freed him).

The Ramba”m rules that the runaway servant does gain his freedom when Yovel intervenes. The Ritv”a explains that there is no servant who remains by the master after Yovel.

The Sma”g, however, disagrees, and he bases his ruling upon a Yerushalmi which indicates that a servant who is not under the jurisdiction of his master when Yovel intervenes, does not go free by Yovel.

The Kesef Mishna asks: Why would the Sma”g rule in accordance with the Yerushalmi when the Bavli (our Gemora) rules that he does go free?

The Lechem Mishna explains that the Sma”g will explain our Gemora differently. He would learn that the Gemora’s conclusion is that the runaway servant does not go free in this case, and that is why he does not receive any severance gifts.

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Singing after the Egyptian's Died

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 16) cites a braisa that a servant who runs away is required to complete the remainder of his six-year term.

The Chanukas Hatorah asks the following question in Parshas Beshalach: Why did Bnei Yisroel not break out in song immediately upon leaving Egypt? Why did they wait until after the splitting of the Sea?

He answers: The halachah is that if a servant runs away before his term expires, he is required to complete it. However, the halachah is that if the master dies, he is not obligated to finish his servitude.

We know that the Jewish people left Egypt prior to the four-hundred years that they were destined to remain there. Accordingly, they would have been required to complete this term at some later date. However, once the Egyptians died, they were completely freed. This is why they waited to sing until after they saw that the Egyptians died.

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Maidservant

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 15) used a verse to teach us that a Jewish maidservant does not have the option of remaining a servant by becoming a nirtza.

The Rishonim ask: Why is a special verse necessary for this? Since the halachah is that only a servant sold by Beis Din can become a nirtza, but not one who sells himself; isn’t it therefore obvious that a maidservant cannot become a nirtza? She is not sold by Beis Din!?

Tosfos answers: It could have been said that anyone who is sold without their consent can become a nirtza, and in this respect, a maidservant is similar to someone sold by Beis Din. Her father sells her and she has no say in the matter. Another verse is required to teach us that she cannot become a nirtza.

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A Widow's Permission

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It is written in the sefer Siach Sarfei Kodesh: The Rebbe Reb Bunim was learning with his students. Amongst them was Reb Hersh Temishvar. He was one who would listen intently, but never once did he ask or answer anything.

One day, the other students came over to Reb Hersh and informed him of the new policy: If he wouldn’t contribute anything to the class, he would be asked to leave.

They were learning that day the portion in Gemora Kiddushin (Daf Yomi: 13a)dealing with the question of where is the source that teaches us that the husband’s death completely permits the wife to remarry.

The Kotzker Rebbe asked his students: Why can this not be derived from the fact that Dovid HaMelech married the wife of Naval after he died? If the husband’s death does not allow the wife to remarry, how could Dovid have married her?

Reb Hersh spoke up and answered as follows: It would not be a proof from that incident, for Naval was considered a rebel against Dovid’s Kingdom, and therefore all of his possessions legally belong to Dovid. Accordingly, even if we would say that a husband’s death would not permit the wife to remarry, Dovid would still be permitted to marry his wife, for he is the owner of all of Naval’s possessions. We would have thought that Naval’s wife would have been included in his possessions, and that would have allowed Dovid to marry her.

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Kiddushin Daf 12

MONEY; NOT DIRT

Shmuel Daf yomi Kiddushin 12a said: If someone betroths a woman with a date, even if a kur of dates is only worth a dinar, we say that she is betrothed, as a single date might be worth a perutah in (the country of) Media (where dates are not so common).

The Ra”n explains that this is because she can say that to her, the date is worth a perutah.

This explanation is challenged by the Acharonim, for if so, the kiddushin should be valid even if it is not worth a perutah in Media (similar to the incident involving Rav Kahana and the kerchief cited above)?

The Pardes Yosef answers: In order for someone to say, “It is worth a perutah to me,” it has to be regarded as “money,” and not mere earth. It is considered “money” if it valued as a perutah somewhere in the world. If the date is worth a perutah in Media, the woman can say here, “It is worth a perutah to me.”

PERUTAH

Today, the custom, based upon the Ram”a is as follows: Under the chupah, prior to the man giving the ring to the woman, the Rabbi asks the witnesses in the presence of the bride whether, in their opinion, the ring is worth a perutah, the minimum amount necessary for the marriage to be effective. This is done in order that the woman should know that her husband is only marrying her with one perutah of the value of the ring, and the remaining value is a present. It follows, therefore, that if the ring were to be found fake, it should not affect the marriage. As long as the ring was worth a perutah, she cannot claim that she consented to the marriage under an erroneous assumption. Although she thought that her present (the ring) was worth more than it actually did, it cannot affect the marriage.

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Kiddushin at Night

The Mishna had stated: The monetary transaction, according to Beis Shamai, must be done with a dinar or the equivalent of a dinar.

The Gemora Daf Yomi Kiddushin 11a asks: What is Beis Shamai’s reasoning?

Rabbi Zeira answers: A woman is particular that she should not become betrothed for less than a dinar.

Abaye asks: If so, what about the daughters of Rabbi Yannai, who are generally particular not to accept kiddushin of less than three kav of gold dinars? Are you saying that if she would accept only a dinar from someone that it would not be a valid kiddushin?

Rabbi Zeira responds: If she would knowingly take this amount of kiddushin, indeed it would be valid. The case I am referring to is if she took the money at night (and was unable to see the value of the coin). Alternatively, the case is where she made a messenger to accept kiddushin for her, and did not specify how much she wants.

The Mizrachi maintains that a get given at night is Biblically invalid. Accordingly, the halachah should be that kiddushin given at night is also invalid, for kiddushin is juxtaposed to geirushin (divorce).

The Acharonim challenge this ruling from our Gemora which clearly states that a kiddushin given at night is valid!?

The Shaar HaMelech writes that our Gemora can be referring to a kiddushin where the man gave money to the woman at night, for kiddushin through money is not derived from geirushin. The Mizrachi, however, is referring to kiddushin through a document. That will not be valid if done at night, for that we derive from geirushin.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman disagrees and states that the Rishonim who assert that kiddushin through money is not learned out from geirushin only say that with respect to the act of kiddushin, and that is why kiddushin is valid with using something that is connected to the ground (even though a get of that type will be invalid). However, with respect to the validity of the kiddushin, all types of methods of kiddushin are derived from geirushin (and then the halachah of invalidating a kiddushin occurring at night can quite possible be derived from geirushin, even when it is done through money).

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Expert in all Areas

Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira Daf Yomi Kiddushin 10a sent back to Ben Bag Bag: You do not hold this way? I understand that you are an expert in many areas of the Torah. Don’t you know how to derive a kal vachomer?

Why must he be an expert in many areas of the Torah in order to expound a kal vachomer? Isn’t a kal vachomer based upon logic?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman cites from Reb Chaim Brisker who explained as follows: One need not be an expert to expound a kal vachomer; however, the kal vachomer might be refuted from another area of Torah. In order for one to expound a kal vachomer that will not be refuted from anywhere else in the Torah, he must be an expert in all areas of Torah.

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Diamond Ring

The Gemora Daf Yomi Kiddushin 9aconcludes that silk (or things of unknown value that are clearly worth a perutah or more) do not require an evaluation before kiddushin.

Tosfos writes that this is only regarding items that their value is somewhat known and it is uncommon for people to make mistakes about it. However, items such as gems and pearls, where there are some that have very little value, people are apt to think that they are worth a lot, when in truth, they are worth very little; these require appraisal before they are used for kiddushin. This is why it has become the custom not to give diamond rings for kiddushin.

[Why has it become the custom to use a ring for kiddushin?]

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Rav Kahana Ha'Kohen

Rav Yosef states (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 8a): How do I know this (that an equivalent of money used for kiddushin must have a defined monetary value)? The braisa states: If someone says, “This calf or garment is for the redemption of my firstborn son,” he has not said (or done) anything (even if he gives it to the Kohen). If he says, “This calf or garment that is worth five sela’im is to the Kohen for the redemption of my firstborn son,” it is valid. What is the case? If they are not actually worth five sela’im, why should we think it is valid? It must be the first case is where it really is worth five sela’im, but was not appraised.

The Gemora answers: The (second) case is where it was not appraised, but the Kohen accepted it as if it was worth five sela’im. Rav Kahana indeed used to accept a (special male) head covering for the redemption, and he would say, “For me this is worth five sela’im.”

Rav Ashi says: This only applies to Rav Kahana, who was a great man and required a head covering. This would not apply to everyone. This is similar to the incident where Mar bar Rav Ashi bought a head covering from the mother of Rabbah in Kubi, and paid thirteen although it was worth ten. [One explanation is that important people pay more for things that they need than regular people (others give a different explanation, see Chidushei Ha’Rashba).]

Tosfos deduces from our Gemora that Rav Kahana was a Kohen.

However, he asks that it is evident from a Gemora in Pesachim (49a) that he was not a Kohen (rather, his wife was a Kohenes)!?

Tosfos answers that the Rav Kahana mentioned in our Gemora was evidently not the same one mentioned in the Gemora Pesachim. Alternatively, Rav Kahana took the redemption money for the firstborn on behalf of his wife.

Reb Akiva Eiger notes that the father has discharged his obligation by giving the money to Rav Kahana, for his wife is certainly pleased that he accepted the money for her.

It is noteworthy that other Rishonim disagree with Tosfos and maintain that the redemption money for a firstborn must be given only to a male Kohen, and not to a Kohenes!

The Mishneh La’Melech writes that it would seem from Tosfos that he is uncertain regarding this matter, and that is why he offers two answers.

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Mentioning Evil First

Rava stated: Let us see; where do we derive the rule for conditions? It is from the condition mentioned in the Torah regarding the Tribes of Reuven and Gad. Therefore, just as there, the positive feature (they will receive the land if they fulfill the condition) comes before the negative (if they do not fight together with the rest of Klal Yisroel, they will not receive that land), so too, it should be in all cases.

It is written [Bamidbar 16:29 - 30]: If these men die as all men die and the fate of all men will be visited upon them, then Hashem has not sent me. But if Hashem creates a creation, and the earth opens its mouth and swallows them and all that is theirs, and they descend alive into the grave, you will know that these men have provoked Hashem.

The Haflaah in Panim Yafos asks: Shouldn’t Moshe have stated the positive feature before the negative?

He answers: Our Gemora (Gittin 75) states that a man does not want to begin with a mention of evil for himself, and therefore he will say, “If I do not die” before stating, “If I will die.” So too, Moshe did not want to begin with mentioning evil even for these wicked people, and therefore, he worded the stipulation in a manner that the mention of this horrific type of death should be delayed for as long as possible.

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Compliance with the Rabbis - Gittin 73

Rabbah and Rava did not agree with Rav Huna (and they hold that if a deathly ill person gives a get and recovers, it is a valid get), as they were afraid it might lead people to think that a get could be given after death.

The Gemora asks: Since the get is void in accordance with Biblical law, how can we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world?

The Gemora answers: Yes! Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.)

The Rashba asks: Why don’t we apply this rule in the case in Yevamos where a man fell into water that has no end? There, we rule that the wife will remain an agunah because the husband might have exited the water from a place that was not visible to us. Why don’t we say that the Chachamim revoked the original kiddushin from him, and she may remarry another man?

He answers: It is only applicable in certain cases. If, for example, there was a get, except that it was written with a condition, and an uncertainty arose regarding the condition, the Chachamim can revoke his kiddushin. Another example where the Chachamim would revoke the kiddushin is where one witness is testifying on the woman’s behalf (that her husband died). However, when there is no get and no witness, the Chachamim did not go ahead and revoke a kiddushin.

The Gemora in Yevamos (110a) records an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid).

Rav Ashi explains that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Chachamim therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. (This is following the opinion of Rav, who maintains that for the marriage of a minor to become valid, she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult, and if not the marriage is invalid.)

The Chachamim were empowered to remove the kiddushin in this case because he acted improperly in the beginning of the kiddushin.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei Hashas cites a Teshuvos haRashba who writes that we only apply the principle of “Since he acted improperly, the Chachamim acted improperly with him” in places that are specifically mentioned in Chazal. The Sages did not annul the marriage in every case where one acts with trickery. This can be proven from a Gemora in Kiddushin (58b). The Gemora states: One who instructs his fellow to marry a woman for him (as an agent), and the agent goes ahead and marries her for himself, she is married to the second one. We do not say that since he acted improperly, the Chachamim invalidated his marriage.

This can also be proven from the fact that even if one betroths a woman who is subject to a negative prohibition, kiddushin, nevertheless takes effect. This is also true if someone marries a woman who is a secondary ervah to him. Obviously, sometimes this principle is applied, and sometimes, it isn’t.

The Chasam Sofer asks: Why, in these cases (where he betroths a woman subject to a negative prohibition, or a secondary ervah) do we not say that the Chachamim revoked his kiddushin?

He answers, based upon Tosfos, who says that it is for this reason that the groom tells the bride that he is betrothing her according to the laws of Moshe and all of Israel. The kiddushin is only effective if Israel, i.e. the Chachamim consent to the marriage. However, one who is violating the Torah, or the sages, is obviously not marrying with such a stipulation and therefore, the marriage can still be effective. [According to the Chasam Sofer, not every marriage has that stipulation attached to it.]

The Shiltei Giborim states that this principle applies by a get as well. Anyone who divorces a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis may, in certain cases retroactively revoke the divorce.

Based upon this, the Taamei Yaakov answers the following famous question on Rabbeinu Gershom’s decree: Since the Torah expressly permits one to divorce his wife without her consent, how can this be banned? The Taz lais down a rule that the Rabbis do not have the authority to prohibit something which is explicitly permitted by the Torah!?

He answers that since the Rabbis forbid giving a get in such a manner, it is automatically nullified, for one’s betrothal and divorce can only be effective if he is compliance with the Rabbis’ ordinances. In these cases, the Rabbis did not consent to such a get.

[I am uncertain as to how this answers the question. Granted, the get will be ineffective since it is prohibited to give a get without the woman’s consent; but how did the Rabbis have the authority to issue such a decree? If the Torah expressly permits it, they cannot forbid it!?]

Path to Sanctity

The Gemora states: Whoever betroths a woman in Jewish marriage, betroths her subject to the will of the Rabbis.

The baalei mussar say: One who wants to sanctify and purify himself in his service to his Creator, should do so subject to the will of the Rabbis. He should go to the Rabbis and the righteous people of his generation, and they shall guide him in his quest. One who tries to forge a path himself is apt to stumble and make mistakes; nothing substantive will result from it.

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Directly from Hashem

The Gemora (Gittin 72) cited a braisa: If a scribe wrote a get for the sake of a specific woman, and the witnesses signed it for her sake as well, although they wrote, signed and gave it to the husband, and the husband gave the get to his wife, it is not valid until the scribe and the witnesses hear the husband’s voice telling them to write and sign it.

It is evident from here that if one person tells another to tell another, it is not regarded as if the third person heard it from the first.

Reb Yosef Engel asks from a Gemora in Kiddushin (22b), which states: Why is the ear different than all the other limbs in the body (that it is chosen for piercing for a slave that chooses to stay by his master)? The Holy One, Blessed be He said, “The ear that heard My voice on Mount Sinai when I said, ‘Bnei Yisroel are slaves to Me, and not slaves to other slaves,’ and this person went and acquired another master for himself, his ear should be pierced!” Why is it regarded as if he heard these words from Hashem? Bnei Yisroel only heard the first two commandments from Him; the rest were said over by Moshe!? We could have answered that since Moshe heard it directly from Hashem, and Bnei Yisroel heard it from Moshe, it is regarded as if they heard it directly from Hashem. However, based on our Gemora, that is incorrect!?

He answers that since when Moshe spoke, the Shechinah was talking through Moshe’s throat, it was considered as if they heard the commandments directly from Hashem.

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