Tuesday, September 08, 2009

Power over the Evil Inclination

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Three people were not ruled by the Evil Inclination at all. They are: Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov. This is evident as the verse states regarding them: With everything, From everything, and everything. Some say this even applies to David, regarding whom the verse states: And my heart is empty inside (referring to his lack of evil inclination). The other opinion (that does not include David) understands that in this verse he was expressing his pain (not lack of Evil Inclination).

Tosfos explains that this does not mean that their Evil Inclination was always powerless over them, for if so, they would not be entitled to receive any reward for their good deeds. Rather, it means similar to that which is stated in the Gemora Yoma (38b): When the majority of a man’s years have passed without sin, he will no more sin. So too here, since the Holy One, Blessed be he, sees that a person has fought fiercely against his Evil inclination and has distanced himself from sinning, He assists him in his older years by protecting him from its tricks.

The Brisker Maggid writes in Machazeh Einayim that there can be people who are immune from the wiles of the Evil Inclination even without Hashem’s assistance. This, says the Eitz Yosef, can only be accomplished after years of dominating over the Yetzer Hara.

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Monday, September 07, 2009

Se'udas Havra'ah

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Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Our Gemora recounts that Yaakov Avinu prepared the stew, with which he bought his brother’s firstborn rights, for Yitzchak to comfort him after Avraham’s demise.

The commentaries (see Rashi, Bereshis 25:30) explain that he brought the lentils as a se’udas havra’ah (recuperation meal) given to a mourner coming from burying his relative and the poskim learnt important halachos about this meal from our Gemora.

The Gemora in Moed Katan (27b) decides that a mourner must eat the “bread” of others at this first meal, not his own, and Shulchan ‘Aruch rules accordingly (Y.D. 378:1).

Does “bread” mean any food or is the term restricted to actual bread alone? Chochmas Shlomo and ‘Aroch HaShulchan (Y.D. 378) hold that a mourner may eat his own food aside from bread but Shevet Yehudah (378) and the Chida (Yafeh LaLev, VIII, 378) assert that he must eat nothing of his own and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch maintains that he must not even drink his own coffee.

Why is a mourner forbidden to eat his own food at the se’udas havra’ah?

According to Divrei Soferim (25:23), the above difference of opinions depends on the reason for the Talmudic regulation that a mourner must not eat his own food for his first meal. The Rosh, cited in Beis Yosef (Y.D., ibid), holds that a mourner is so despondent that he neglects to care for himself. Chazal therefore decreed that he must not prepare his first meal, causing others to bring him food and comfort him (Responsa Igros Moshe, Y.D. II, 168).

Shevet Yehudah, though, maintains that Chazal wanted to prevent a mourner from eating a full meal and neglect his mourning and therefore limited him to eating what others bring, assuming their contributions would not be excessive. Hence, Shevet Yehudah forbade a mourner to eat anything of his own, avoiding any possibility of his eating a full meal.

The Acharonim (Divrei Soferim, ibid, 27) emphasize the Tur, who quotes our sugya that the meal is intended to “comfort the mourner” – i.e., to hearten him but not to prevent his overeating.

The Rosh (Moed Katan, Ch. 3, §84) adds that a husband must not serve his wife a se’udas havra’ah for two reasons. Being that he must support her as her husband, she acquires the food he serves her and it is not regarded as another’s. Moreover, they always eat together and the food would not appear as if brought by others.

May a son supported by his father bring him a se’udas havra’ah from his own (the son’s) food? According to the first reason he may do so as the food does not belong to his father. Worrying about appearances (maris ‘ayin), though, the son must not, as anyone who knows that his father supports him and sees him serving is sure the food is his fathers.

The Acharonim prove, once again from our sugya, that the first reason of the Rosh forbidding a husband to serve se’udas havra’ah is halachically valid: Yaakov was supported by Yitzchak yet he brought him the stew which, as mentioned, was a se’udas havra’ah (Ruach Chayim by HaGaon Rav Chayim Falaji, 378).

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Friday, September 04, 2009

Torah Scroll of the Temple Courtyard

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The Gemora has a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah whether the Torah scroll that was written by Moshe was actually in the Ark with the Tablets, or whether it was in the on the side of the Ark.

The Gemora (14b) refers to this Torah scroll as the scroll of the Temple Courtyard. Why would the scroll that is kept inside the Holy of Holies be called the scroll of the Temple Courtyard?

Rashi is apparently bothered by this question and says that the scroll that Moshe Rabbeinu wrote was used by the king during hakhel, and by the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur. Apparently, Rashi held that it was permitted to go into the Holy of Holies to take out the Torah in order to read it.

Tosfos (14a) asks why the Gemora finds it necessary to leave some space in the Ark so that the Torah can be put in and removed easily; it was never removed anyway, since it is forbidden to enter the Holy of Holies except on Yom Kippur, and we don’t find any mention in the Mishnayos that they would use this Torah scroll on Yom Kippur!?

Tosfos clearly assumes not like Rashi and holds that this scroll wasn’t used, and is therefore troubled by why they had to leave space to get it in and out easily.

Tosfos answers that although it was never used, they would sometimes remove it in order to repair it (and one may enter the Holy of Holies in order to fix it, so too, one may enter to fix the Torah scroll). Also, between the destruction of the Tabernacle in Shiloh and the second Temple, they would use the Torah.

The Reshash suggests that even Rashi agrees with Tosfos that one may not enter the Holy of Holies to remove the Torah, but during the second Temple, when there wasn’t any Ark, it was used (and that is why it is called the scroll of the Temple Courtyard – for perhaps during that time, it was actually kept in the Courtyard).

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Half Slave and Half Free

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The braisa states: If someone is half slave and half free-man (he was jointly owned by two men, and one of them set him free), he serves his master for one day and then is free for one day (and so on). Beis Shammai says: You have fixed the problem for his master, but you have not solved his own problem. He cannot marry a Canaanite slavewoman (as his free side is a freeman, who is forbidden to marry a slavewoman) and he cannot marry a regular Jewish girl (who cannot be with his slave half)! Should he simply not marry? The world was created to be populated, as the verse says: The world was not created by G-d to be empty; it was created to be populated! Rather, we force his master to free his other half as well, and we have the slave write for the master a document stating that he owes the master the rest of his value. Beis Hillel retracted their opinion, and agreed with Beis Shammai.

The Sfas Emes discusses the verdict regarding a half-slave and half free person that he must go free, and the slave writes a document to the remaining partner for half of his value. This is because the slave has no money. Essentially, by the first partner’s freeing his half, the second partner lost his slave as well, as the law is that he must set him free. Can the second partner demand that the first partner should take the bond from the slave, while the first partner should pay him the monetary equivalent?

The Sfas Emes concludes that being that the damage is not direct, as it is only a consequence of the first person’s action, Beis Din will not force the first owner to pay the second owner. [However, it should be noted that usually indirect damage makes a person liable to pay according to “Heavenly law (meaning what is viewed as right and wrong by Hashem),” despite the fact that Beis Din will not make him pay. Accordingly, if the person freed his half of the slave knowing full well that this would indirectly damage the second owner, he should compensate him to ensure Heaven (Hashem) will not hold it against him.] (13a – 13b)

Half Slave and Half Free

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

Tosfos (d.h. shene’emar) asks: Why does the Gemora choose to cite the verse of “The world was not created by G-d to be empty; it was created to be populated” to justify the importance for the half-slave half-freeman to be able to procreate, rather than the more well known verse in the Torah of P’ru U’rvu (Be fruitful and multiply)?

My understanding of Tosfos answer in the name of the R"I is that the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu is really a ma’aseh mitzvah like any other, where we have exemptions for o’nes (a case where he has no choice). Therefore, citing the verse of P’ru U’rvu wouldn’t justify forcing the master to free the slave, since at the present time, the half-free side of the slave is exempt as an o’nes because he is incapable of performing the mitzvah. But by citing the verse of “The world was not created by G-d to be empty; it was created to be populated,” the Gemora is pointing to the root and purpose of the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu. This verse illustrates that the purpose of P’ru U’rvu is to occupy the world and therefore we don’t follow the regular system that we do by other mitzvos, because even if he is exempt due to o’nes, the world will still remain empty. Although the Gemora means to use the verse in the torah as P’ru U’rvu as the source, it chooses to quote an alternate verse that would justify why P’ru U’rvu should apply even in a circumstance where he is an o’nes.

This approach is very meduyak in the language of Tosfos where the entire focus is on the verse chosen by the Gemora, rather than using language that indicates that P’ru U’rvu isn’t at all applicable since he is an o’nes. Tosfos language implies that P’ru U’rvu is truly the source that compels us to force the master to free the slave, but we cite the verse that explains why P’ru U’rvu should apply even to a circumstance of o’nes.

Furthermore, this approach would compliment, rather than contradict the Turei Even in Rosh Hashanah (29a), who asks that since one who does a mitzvah when they are exempt doesn’t fulfill their obligation, how can the Gemora in Yevamos say that if one had children as an idolater, and then he converts his whole family, he automatically fulfills the mitzvah? The mitzvah was done when he was exempt, so he should have to do it again!?

Turei Even answers that since the purpose of P’ru U’rvu is to populate the world, we disregard when the act of the mitzvah was done, so long as the world is being populated as a result of his actions.

If we were to understand Tosfos simply that only the mitzvah of “sheves” (populating the world) applies, but not P’ru U’rvu, then Tosfos would be holding that P’ru U’rvu is a standard mitzvah like any other, where o’nes is exempt and the ma’aseh mitzvah should have to be done when he is obligated in the mitzvah. But since we are explaining that according to Tosfos, the entire mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu is for the purpose of populating the world, Tosfos is essentially a support for the Turei Even’s novel understanding that the time of the ma’aseh mitzvah is not relevant.

This also explains how in the very next Tosfos, they are able to ask that the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu should override the prohibition of marrying a kadeish (harlot). How can Tosfos cite the mitzvah of P’ru U’rvu moments after saying that it doesn’t apply here since he is o’nes? Clearly, Tosfos never meant to say that it doesn’t apply here; rather, the meaning is that we wouldn’t have realized that it does apply here, if not for the fact that we quoted the verse of “sheves.”

As a side note, there is a famous discussion whether an o’nes is exempt, or actually obligated but unable to perform. Tosfos here seems to support the former. Tosfos explains that since the half freeman is an o’nes in his obligation of P’ru U’rvu, we wouldn’t force the master to free him. Tosfos supports this claim from the fact that we don’t force masters to free all regular slaves to enable them to keep mitzvos. Now, if o’nes is actually obligated but unable to perform, how can Tosfos prove their case from a standard slave who isn’t even obligated at all in the mitzvos? Perhaps we don’t free regular slaves because they aren’t obligated, but we would free this half slave since his free side is obligated, just that he is an o’nes. Clearly, Tosfos holds that o’nes and not being obligated is exactly the same and can prove o’nes from the case of a regular slave.

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Continued Misfortune

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Rabbi Yochanan said: Since the Holy Temple was destroyed, prophecy has been taken from prophets and given to fools and children.

When was it given to fools? It happened with Mar the son of Rav Ashi. He was one day standing in the marketplace of Mechuza when he heard a certain deranged person exclaim: “The man who is to be appointed head of the Academy in the city of Mechasya signs his name Tavyumi.” He said to himself, “Who among the Rabbis signs his name Tavyumi? I do! This indicates that my fortunate time has come.” So he quickly went to the city of Mechasya. When he arrived, he found that the Rabbis had voted to appoint Rav Acha of Difti as their head. When they heard of his arrival, they sent a couple of Rabbis to him to ask his advice (and his permission to appoint Rav Acha). He detained them with him, and they sent another couple of Rabbis. He detained these also, and it continued until there were ten. When ten were assembled (for that is when one should begin lecturing), he began to discourse and expound to them. [He was then appointed as the head of the Academy.]

Rav Acha applied to himself the saying: If a man is dealt with harshly, he does not readily come into favor, and if a man is in favor, he does not readily fall into misfortune.

The Maharsha writes that this is only if it troubles him greatly. If he thinks that being rejected from a position of prominence was a grave misfortune, then good things will not happen soon happen to him. This is in accordance with what the Sages say: One who pursues honor – the honor will run away from him.

The Meiri writes that although there can be times that due to a person’s fortune, the door of success keeps closing on him and it is not readily opened, nevertheless, it is not completely shut. The gates of tefillah and good deeds are not sealed; they will always be there for a person’s protection.

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Thursday, September 03, 2009

Adding Years to Someone's Lifetime

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The Gemora cites a braisa: It was related of Binyamin the Righteous who was a supervisor of the charity fund. One day a woman came to him in a year of famine, and said to him, “Master, please assist me.” He replied, “I swear by the service in the Holy Temple that there is nothing in the charity fund.” She said, “Master, if you do not assist me, a woman and her seven children will perish.” He accordingly assisted her out of his own funds. Some time afterwards he became deathly ill. The angels addressed the Holy One, Blessed be He, saying, “Master of the Universe, You have said that he who preserves one soul of Israel is considered as if he had preserved the entire world; shall then Binyamin the Righteous who has preserved a woman and her seven children die at such an early age?” Immediately, his decree was torn up. It has been taught that twenty-two years were added to his life.

The Metzudas David asks that this seems to contradict Rabbi Akiva’s opinion in Yevamos (49b), where the Gemora states: I (HaShem) shall fill the number of your days; these are the years that a person is granted to live at the beginning of his life. If he merits, those years will be completed. If he does not merit, they will decrease years from his lifetime; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. Evidently, he holds that Hashem completes his years, but He does not add to them!?

He answers according to that which Tosfos writes there: Rabbi Akiva holds that when a person lives for a very long time, those years are not an addition to his allotted life, but rather a blessing from Hashem to live out his allotted time. Hashem does not add years to a person’s lifetime. That is only with respect to his own years. However, if years are deducted from another person’s life, those years can be added to someone else, provided that he deserves it.

Accordingly, it can be said that the twenty-two years which were added to Binyamin the Righteous’ lifetime, were in fact years that were deducted from others. And because Binyamin was so deserving, those years were added to his life.

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Tuesday, September 01, 2009

Accepting Charity from an Idolater

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The Gemora states: An act of kindness or charity performed by an idolater is regarded as a sin. This is because they are only performing these good deeds to live longer, or that their reign should continue, or in order to glorify themselves, or to rebuke the Jews.

The Gemora in Sotah (47a) states: When there increased the number of Jews who accepted charity from idolaters, the idolaters were on top and Israel was on bottom.

Our Gemora says that when idolaters give tzedakah it serves as an atonement for them. Because it serves as an atonement, Rav Ami refused to accept tzedakah from Ifra Hurmiz. Even Rava only accepted it for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government, but otherwise, he would not have accepted it. This is based upon a verse which teaches us that the idolaters will become weak and broken once their charitable deeds have dried up, and therefore, we don’t give them opportunities for more merits. However, the Gemora says that if we were to use the funds to support non-Jewish causes (which Rashi explains that we support anyway for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government), it would not give them any special merit. It is only if we use the funds to support Jews that it is considered a merit for them.

Tosfos (8a d.h. yasiv) points out that the Gemora in Eruchin (6b) implies that we would accept donations to synagogues that come from idolaters. Why? Tosfos explains that donations to synagogues are considered like korbanos and we do accept korbanos from idolaters.

The Gemora (Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (here) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

What does the Haga’os Ashri mean that vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings are not meant for the purpose of atonement? What is accomplished for the idolaters aside from atonement? Furthermore, the Gemora says in Sukkah (55b) that the idolaters destroyed the Holy Temple, not realizing what they will be losing. When we had the Temple, the Altar served as an atonement for them, but now they have nothing to atone for them. The Gemora in Sukkah clearly implies that the purpose for their korbanos were to be an atonement, which contradicts the Haga’os Ashri?

The distinction of the Haga’os Ashri is found in the Shach and Taz (Y.D. 254:4) to explain the Rama who says that we do accept donations to synagogues from idolaters, but don’t accept tzedakah from them (unless the money was air-marked for tzedakah and must be accepted for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government).

Reb Avi Lebowitz suggests the following: Perhaps the Gemora in Sukkah is not referring to the vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings that the idolaters bring, rather the Holy Temple, in general, served as an atonement for the entire world, including the idolaters. But the vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings, and donations to synagogues that we accept from idolaters is because it allows them to have a share in our prayers, but it will not serve as an atonement to prevent them from being destroyed for sins that they have committed. Tzedakah to the poor which would serve as an atonement for sins that they have committed, we refuse to accept from them unless we have no choice (such as for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government).

The Chochmas Adam (146:3) explains this idea a bit further: Tzedakah to the poor is tantamount to a korban chatas which we do not accept from idolaters because we don’t give them opportunity for atonement, but freewill-offerings, we do accept from them, so we can also accept gifts to synagogues.

It would seem that this prohibition, which forbids accepting tzedakah from them, only applies to tzedakah to the poor, but donations to Yeshivos and donations for kindness activities which do not go to the poor, would be like vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings that we can accept from them. But perhaps when it comes to the studying of Torah, where the donation buys them a share in the Torah, we should not provide them with that opportunity either.

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Monday, August 31, 2009

Reckoning with the Charity Collectors

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The Gemora cites a braisa: The charity collectors are not required to give an account of the monies entrusted to them for charity. And the treasurers of the Temple are not required to reckon the funds given to them for the Temple purposes. And although there is no actual proof of this in the Scriptures, but there is a hint of it in the following verse: And they would not reckon with the men into whose hand they delivered the money, to give to those that did the work, for they dealt faithfully.

Rabbi Elozar said: Even if a man has in his house a treasurer on whom he can rely, he should tie up and count out all money that he hands to him, as it is written: They bound it in in bags and counted the money.

Rashi writes that although he has no intention of demanding an accounting afterwards, he still should tie up and count out all money that he hands to him.

What is the purpose of such a counting?

The Meiri explains that if he will not count it in the beginning, he will certainly suspect the treasurer that he accepted more money then he actually spent. Now that it is counted, at least they are both aware as to the amount of money which was given over to him. One should always make an effort not to suspect a person of committing a wrongdoing.

The Maharsha writes that the money is counted in order that the mazikin (spiritual damagers) should not have any control over the money, for money that is tied, sealed, or counted they cannot have any effect over.

The Ein Eliyahu answers that it is counted in order that the treasurers themselves can make a calculation at the end, if they so desire.

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Tax Exemption for Torah Scholars

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By: Reb Yechezkel Khayyat

The Gemora presents the tax exemptions accorded to Torah scholars. The Rishonim discuss the parameters of these tax exemptions.
Who is Exempt?
The Rosh says that only one who for whom toraso umnaso – his Torah learning is his profession, is exempt. The Rosh explains that even if one learns much Torah and is proficient in Torah, if he spends most of his time working, and less of his time learning, he is not exempt. However, even if one works, if he works only as much as is necessary to support himself and his family, and constantly returns to his Torah study when he is not working, he is exempt.

The Rosh further clarifies (Responsa 15:8) that this exemption applies equally to a Torah scholar who is wealthy, since the exemption is a function of the Torah study, not poverty.

Finally, the Rosh states that if one who studies Torah is not diligent in his performance of mitzvos, he is not considered a Torah scholar who is exempt from tax.

The Rama (YD 243:2) quotes the Terumas Hadeshen (342), who further requires that the Torah scholar be well versed in all the standard Torah sources.

The Shach (HM 163:14) quotes Sefer Chasidim that limits the exemption to one who studies at all times, to the exclusion of any work, but says we do not rule like this.
From what are they Exempt?
The Ramban and Ran state that Torah scholars are only exempt from communal taxes, since they can claim that only the other members of the community are responsible for the existence of these taxes and their payment (as Rebbe stated regarding the tax levied on Teveria). However, if the tax is imposed on each person individually, even Torah scholars must pay.

The Rosh and Rambam (Talmud Torah 6:10), however, disputes this position, and state that Torah scholars are exempt from all types of tax, whether imposed communally or individually. The Rosh points out that Rav Nachman makes a categorical statement that obligating a Torah scholar in a tax is a violation of all sections of Torah, and the Gemora applies this to karga, which was a poll tax assessed on each individual. These indicate that even individual taxes levied on Torah scholars are the responsibility of the community, and not the Torah scholars.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 243:2) rules like the Rosh and Rambam. See Tzitz Eliezer 2:25 and Yabia Omer HM 7:10 for a detailed discussion of these parameters, and their applicability in contemporary society.

A Raven and Dog

When Rabbi Yonasan, Rebbe’s student, asked for food from Rebbe, he told him that he should feed him, just as Hashem feeds the raven and the dog. Rashi explains that Hashem specifically tailored the physiology of these animals to account for their lack of food. A dog typically does not have much food, so Hashem ensured that it spends three days digesting its food (Shabbos 155b), while a raven does not have feed its children, so Hashem provides them with insects in their waste, which they can eat to be nourished. Tosfos (8a kekelev) explains that the verse in Tehilim refers to both these animals. The verse says that Hashem is nosain liv’haima lachma (gives to an animal its food), livnai oraiv asher yikra’u (to the children of the raven that call out). The Gematria of behaima (animal) is 52, the same as kelev (dog).
Like the Stars
The Gemora explained that the verse that states that matzdikei harabim – those that bring merit to the community are like the stars, is referring to those who educate children in Torah.

The Ben Yehoyada points out that the appropriateness of the metaphor. Although stars appear to us much smaller than the sun, they are actually much larger and more powerful. Similarly, although those who teach seemingly trivial subjects, such as the basics of reading and writing, appear to not be as lofty as those who study and teach Torah at a much more advanced level, they are actually more exalted than others, since they teach Torah to children who are pure and untainted by sin.

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Thursday, August 27, 2009

Chazakah on a Sukkah

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By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora says that generally, if a person builds a hut which infringes on his friend’s property, there is a grace period of thirty days in which the owner graciously permits the hut owner to use the area and doesn’t have to protest. But, after that grace period has passed, if the owner doesn’t protest, the hut owner will have an established right to be able to claim that he purchased the rights of use. But, if the hut is built for a sukkah on Sukkos, then immediately after the seven days of s Sukkos passes, the lack of the owners protest enables the builder to claim that he purchased the right to leave it there permanently. [This is according to Rashi, but the Hagahos Ashri cites other opinions that it is seven days in addition to the thirty days.]

Tosfos points out that in truth, the builder doesn’t have a chazakah after seven days; he only has a chazakah after eight days since on the eighth day, which is Shemini Atzeres, it wasn’t possible to remove the sukkah.

The Ya’avetz asks: What compelled Tosfos to say that he will not have a chazakah until the eighth day is over. Perhaps we assume that the owner would have allowed him to use the space for the mitzvah, but as soon as the mitzvah ends, the owner is expected to protest. The fact that the owner fails to protest would not enable the builder to claim that he has acquired permanent rights to this area!?

It would seem that Tosfos holds that although the owner can protest the sukkah immediately after the seven days pass, even before the eighth day ends, he is not expected to do so. Why? It is because he is well aware that his protest is futile. The owner can claim that for the duration of Sukkos, he allowed the hut owner to fulfill his mitzvah. On the eighth day he also did not protest because he knew that his protest would be in vain, since the hut owner could not remove the sukkah until after Sukkos. Therefore, Tosfos holds that the owner has the right to protest through eight days.

From this we can learn that even after one has been machzik for enough time to create a chazakah, it is only effective if by the owner protesting he could have forced the hut owner to leave. But in a situation, where the owner could not have forced the hut owner to leave, such as when the chazakah concludes on a Shabbos or Yom Tov, the owner is not expected to protest and is given an extra day to voice his protest.

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Stealing for Pain

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Runya had a field which was enclosed on all four sides by fields of Ravina. Ravina fenced them and said to Runya, “Pay me (your share) what I have spent for the fencing.” Runya refused to pay. Then Ravina said, “Pay me at least the cost of a cheap fence of reeds.” He again refused. Ravina said, “Then pay me the hire of a watchman.” He still refused. One day Ravina saw Runya harvesting dates from his palm trees, and he said to his sharecropper, “Go and (in Runya’s presence) take a cluster of dates from him.” He went to take them, but Runya shouted at him, whereupon Ravina said, “You have demonstrated through this that you are satisfied with the fence (and happy that it offers protection for your trees). Even if it is only goats that you are afraid of, does your field not need guarding?” He replied, “A goat can be driven off with a shout (so there is no purpose for a fence).” Ravina asked him, “But don’t you require a man to shout at it?”

They went before Rava, who said to him: Go and appease Ravina with what he accepted (the payment for half a watchman), and if not, I will issue judgment against you according to Rav Huna’s interpretation of the ruling of Rabbi Yosi (and you would be required to pay for half the actual cost of the fence).

The Ritva asks from a Gemora in Bava Metzia (61b), which states that one should not steal in order to pain someone. If so, how was Ravina allowed to send his agent to steal?

He answers that the dates in this case were ready to be sold and their price was set. Accordingly, one is permitted to take them with the intent of paying for it. Ravina did it in this manner in order to demonstrate that Runya was pleased with the protection afforded by the fence. It was therefore not regarded as stealing at all; it only appeared that way.

He also answers that it is only forbidden if the person’s intent is to pain his fellow. Here, it was done to bring about a correct judgment.

This answer, however, is somewhat problematic, for the Gemora there states that it is forbidden to steal even if the intent is to provide him with the keifel (double the value; if someone wishes to give charity to a poor person, but he refuses, he could steal from him and the keifel will serve as his charity).

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Wednesday, August 26, 2009

Counseling an Idolater to Avoid Divine Retribution

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The Gemora asks: How could Bava ben Buta give advice to Hurdus, seeing that Rav Yehudah has said in the name of Rav, or alternatively, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that Daniel was punished only because he gave advice to Nevuchadnezzar, as it is written: Nevertheless, O king, let my counsel be acceptable to you; redeem your sins through charity and your iniquities by showing mercy to the poor; if there may be a lengthening of your tranquility etc. And later on it is written: All this came upon the King Nevuchadnezzar, and afterwards it is written: At the end of twelve months etc.?

The Gemora answers: Either you can say that this does not apply to a slave, who is under obligation to keep the Torah’s commandments, or you can say that an exception had to be made in the case of the Temple which could not have been built without the assistance of Royalty.

The Gemora asks: How do we know that Daniel was punished? Shall I say that it is from the verse: And Esther called to Hasach, who, as Rav has told us, was the same as Daniel? This is a sufficient answer if we accept the view of those who say that he was called Hasach because he was “cut down” (chatach) from his greatness. But according to the view of those who say that he was called Hasach because all affairs of state were “decided” according to his counsel, what answer can we give?

The Gemora answers that he was thrown into the den of lions.

The Meiri writes that one who constantly sins, his iniquities are so great that the ability to repent is removed from him. This is why one should not divulge to them the appropriate ways of penance, for these people are not supposed to escape the Divine punishment. This is why Daniel was punished, for without solicitation, he proffered advice to Nevuchadnezzar, as to how to escape Hashem’s anger.

The Yad Ramah adds that this prohibition applies only to an idolater who is oppressing a Jew – one is forbidden from counseling him to perform mitzvos or dispense charity to the poor in order to evade retribution for their sins. It emerges that it would be permitted to offer such advice to an ordinary idolater.

However, it is evident from the Rambam that he maintains that it is forbidden to give any positive counsel to an idolater, as long as he remains steadfast in his evil ways.

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Tuesday, August 25, 2009

Destroying a Shul

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By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora says that one cannot destroy a synagogue until the replacement is rebuilt. The Gemora quotes two reasons for this prohibition:
1. Negligence - maybe an accident will occur (Rashi) that prevents the building of the new synagogue.
2. No place to pray - in the meantime there won't be anywhere to pray.

The Shulchan Aruch (152) rules like the first reason, therefore it would be prohibited even if there was another place to pray.

The Mishnah Berurah (5) says that when there is another synagogue in town that can fit the entire congregation, the Taz permits its destruction, but the Magen Avraham is stringent.

The Biur Halachah explains that one can rely on the Taz since we are only dealing with a Rabbinical prohibition, and many Rishonim allow the synagogue to be destroyed, even according to the first reason, when there is an established synagogue to pray in; not just a place to pray (Tosfos). Based on this, a synagogue may be destroyed in order to rebuild, so long as there are other synagogues in the community that can hold all the members of the one that is rebuilding.

The Gemora says that the entire prohibition only applies when the synagogue is in good condition, but if it starting to decay and therefore not functional in its present state, one can destroy it to build another.

The Gemora also says that the only Bava ben Buta gave Hurdus advice to destroy the Beis Hamikash in order to rebuild it because they began to see cracks there.

The Mishnah Berurah (2) proves from here that even if the intent is to make a much nicer synagogue, it is forbidden, so long as the first one is still functional.

However, the Taz (quoted in M.B. 9) is liberal about the definition of “rotting.” The Taz holds that when the first synagogue is too far from where the community lives, such as outside the wall of the city, “there is no greater crack than this,” and it can be rebuilt in a more appropriate location. Similarly, Tosfos explains that a summer synagogue in winter or vice versa, can qualify as a “crack,” and it may be destroyed.

It is important to note that the entire issue of destroying a synagogue is only considered a Rabbinic prohibition because it is being done for constructive purposes, i.e. to rebuild another in its place or elsewhere. However, when the synagogue is being destroyed for a destructive purpose, it is a Biblical prohibition, at the Mishnah Berurah (11) points out that it is derived from the verse: One should not do this to Hashem, your G-d.

The Biur Halachah explains that this not only applies to items that are attached to the ground, but even destroying movable items, such as the bimah and amud are Biblical prohibitions.

The Maharam Padawa allows the removal of the tangible items from the synagogue, and it is not a violation of this prohibition, since it is not destroying the actual structure (unlike the removal of bricks).

Ariach and Levainah

By: Reb Binyomin Adler

The Gemora cites a Mishna, which states that the beam has to be wide enough to support an ariach, a half-brick. We find that the term ariach is used in other instances, i.e. by the Shiras Hayam, the Song sung by the Jewish People at the Red Sea. There the Gemara mentions that the Shirah is written ariach al gabei levainah, a half-brick on top of a full brick, which means that one line of the Song is written like a half-brick, and the line beneath it is a full brick. We can interpret the terms ariach and levainah homiletically. A half-brick symbolizes that a person’s heart should be contrite and broken, and by demonstrating sincere remorse for one’s transgressions, Hashem will grant him atonement, as the word levainah connotes atonement. The word lavan, which is closely associated to the word levainah, means white, and white reflects atonement.

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Monday, August 24, 2009

Unrecognizable Damage

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By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora quotes from a braisa that if one fails to fence his vineyard, thereby causing the adjacent produce owned by someone else to become forbidden as kilayim, the owner of the vineyard is responsible to pay for the damage.

Tosfos asks: Why is the owner of the vineyard liable to pay? It should qualify as a hezek sh’eino nikar - an unrecognizable damage, which is not considered a damage?

Tosfos answers that even if the damage isn’t recognizable in the object, so long as the context of the situation looks like a damage, i.e. the vines growing near the produce without a fence separating, it is considered a damage that is recognizable and the owner is liable.

Tosfos asks: If this is considered “recognizable,” why do we considered it to be an unrecognizable damage when one takes a sheretz (creepy insect) and places it on his friends taharos? There too, the context of the situation should qualify as a damage recognizable?

Tosfos answers that since tumah requires not only contact between the sheretz and the taharos, but also requires hechsher (the food must become moist willingly to be susceptible to tumah), that aspect is still not recognizable and therefore qualifies as a damage which is not recognizable.

The question is, however, that Tosfos just got finished saying that kilayim is not merely a situational prohibition of mixing produce and grape vines. Kilayim is only created if the owner “wants it.” Based on this, Tosfos explains that so long as the owner is doing whatever possible to build a fence, even though the kilayim grew .5% prior to the fence being erected, it is not considered a kilayim violation. Since kilayim also has its own set of prerequisites to become forbidden - only if the owner fails to put in the effort of building the fence, which is not necessarily recognizable, we should consider kilayim a damage which is not recognizable, just as we consider tumah a damage which is not recognizable (due to the lack of recognition that it became huchshar l’kabel tumah)?

Tosfos apparently holds that by kilayim the prohibition is a metzius of growth. We don’t require the consent of the owner to create the prohibition; just that if the owner makes an effort to build a fence and demonstrates that he doesn’t want the kilayim, the prohibition can be avoided. Tumah requires a positive act of hecsher to create the status of tumah, therefore it is considered “not recognizable,” but kilayim doesn’t require a positive act to become forbidden (rather, a positive act to repair the fence will prevent the prohibition).

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Evil Eye

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Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna who said in the name of Rav: A person is forbidden from standing near his friend’s field when its stalks are grown.

Shulchan Aruch cites this halachah; however, the Rambam omits it.

The Maggid Mishnah explains that the Rambam maintains that this is not actually a prohibition; rather, it is a midas chassidus - one who wishes to act piously should avoid standing near his fellow’s field when there is standing grain. This is why we do not force neighbors, whose roofs are adjacent to each other, to build a fence so one should be prevented from looking into the other’s area.

The Raavad disagrees, and holds that a wall of four amos is required by a garden.

The Steipler Gaon quotes from a wise man that one who damages by casting an evil eye on another will not be liable to pay. It is for this reason that the Gemora utilizes the term “it is forbidden,” and not that “one is liable.” The Steipler disagrees, and explains that the reason the term “liable” is not used is because we have no way of determining without a doubt that the damage occurred on account of this person’s evil eye. However, if we would know for certain that it was due to him, he would be liable (except according to the Rambam).



Evil Eye

The Gemora (Bava Metzia 30a) states that one is forbidden to spread out a lost article that he is watching when he has guests because when the guests see the article being displayed, they may be envious and they will cast an evil eye on the article.

One must wonder why one should be concerned of someone else’s jealousy, especially if it is said: and the rotting of the bones is jealousy. Why should one be concerned that someone else’s envy will harm his belongings and property?

We find that the gentile prophet Balaam, when blessing the Jewish people, declared, how good are your tents, Yaakov, your dwelling places, O Israel. The Gemora states that Balaam saw that every Jewish tent was aligned in a way that no one could see inside his neighbors’ tent. Besides for the issue of privacy, there was another dimension to this blessing. Balaam had an evil eye, and Balaam wished to curse the Jewish People with his influence. By casting an evil eye on a neighbor, one is essentially influencing his Jewish friend with the character of Balaam, and this is detrimental to one’s well being. For this reason one should avoid casting an evil eye on someone else, and one must also be careful to avoid allowing others to cast an evil eye on himself or on his possessions.

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Tuesday, August 18, 2009

Transgressions

by: Reb Avi Lebowitz

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The Gemora has a principal that one does not receive lashes for a transgression that can be fixed up through the performance of a positive commandment.

Tosfos understands the Mishna to be saying that one would receive lashes for taking a millstone as a security, since the millstone contains two components, which are considered separate and independent parts regarding the violation.

Tosfos asks: Why should one receive lashes at all since the rationale behind the prohibition is that these are ochel nefesh type items (meaning they are needed for his livelihood), so it can potentially be fixed by returning them, so that there should not be lashes associated with this violation at all?

The proof that Tosfos cites for this being a “la’av hanitek l’aseh” (a transgression that can be fixed up through the performance of a positive commandment) and that one doesn’t receive lashes for such a transgression, is the story quoted on 116a where a person took a slaughtering knife as collateral and Abaye commanded him to return it. Tosfos at first understands that the only rationale for returning the item would be that it is a“la’av hanitek l’aseh”. Ultimately, Tosfos concludes that it is not a “la’av hanitek l’aseh,” and the only reason that Abaye demanded that it be returned is that the lender didn’t realize when he took it that it was forbidden, so that he never acquired it as a security, and therefore it had to be returned.

Regarding taking ochel nefesh type items as a security, there is an argument amongst the Rishonim. Tosfos 113a (d.h. v’es), holds that any item that is needed for livelihood may not be taken at all as collateral. However, the Maharsha quotes many Rishonim who disagree with Tosfos and hold that it may be taken as collateral, but must be returned when the borrower needs them to use for his livelihood. See also Hagahos HaGra on Tosfos who quotes that the Ramban and Rashba hold that it may be taken, but must be returned when needed, whereas the Rambam agrees with Tosfos that it may not be taken at all.

Now, the entire assumption of Tosfos that the reason Abaye must have insisted on returning the ochel nefesh collateral was because it is a “la’av hanitek l’aseh”, is following his own line of reasoning. Had Tosfos held like the Ramban and Rashba, there would be no proof at all from the story of Abaye because Abaye was merely telling the person that the standard rules of this type of security is that it must be returned when the borrower needs it.

Tosfos also assumes that if we would say “Whenever the Torah says not to do something, and one goes ahead and does it anyway, it is not effective,” then it would make sense that Abaye would demand returning the security, since he wasn’t allowed to take it, the taking was ineffective.

There is a big discussion in the Achronim (Chavos Da’as and R’ Akiva Eiger in Hilchos Shechita) whether “Whenever the Torah says not to do something, and one goes ahead and does it anyway, it is not effective,” applies when the prohibition will anyway not be fixed. Meaning that “if one goes ahead and does it anyway, it is not effective” may only apply when we say that by not taking effect, the prohibition will not have been violated. Based on that principal, it is a big novelty for Tosfos to assume that “if one goes ahead and does it anyway, it is not effective” would apply here. Even if the kinyan doesn’t take effect, there is certainly some transgression violated by taking an item of the borrower that should not be taken - if not for the prohibition of “do not take,” there would be a prohibition against stealing. Yet, Tosfos assumes that since “if one goes ahead and does it anyway, it is not effective” would help avoid “do not take as a security,” even though it will cause a prohibition of stealing, we can still apply this principal to prevent the lender form acquiring the collateral.

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Sunday, August 16, 2009

Eliyahu's Locker Room

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The Gemora (Sukkah 5a) states that the presence of Hashem (as manifested in the higher worlds) never descended to within ten tefachim of the physical world. Similarly, Moshe and Eliyahu could not ascend to within ten tefachim of the upper worlds.

Discussing that Gemora, the Chasam Sofer explains that this was only as long as Eliyahu was encumbered by his physical body. However, once his soul was freed from its body, he assumed the status of an angel, and was not bound by any of these limitations.

The Chasam Sofer proceeds to say that when Mashiach comes, Eliyahu will once again don his body and live as a human amongst the other great people of that great generation. He will be allowed to rule on any halachic issues (a privilege reserved for mankind) since at that time he will have reassumed the existence of a human being. Meanwhile, however, he has the status of an angel, and therefore he is not bound by any of the limitations imposed upon men. This applies for halachah as well; Eliyahu may traverse the globe on Shabbos to go to a bris milah, even though this involves traveling beyond the permitted distance, since as an angel he is not bound by halachah.

Our Gemora relates an incident where Rabbah bar Avuha encountered Eliyahu in a graveyard. Rabbah asked him how he was permitted to be there despite his being a Kohen. The Chasam Sofer explains that Eliyahu must have been in his body at the time, because otherwise, he would have the status of an angel, and Rabbah would have known that as such, these halachos do not apply to him.

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Adam - Unity

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Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said: The graves of idolaters do not transmit tumah through the roof (if the tumah source and a person or object is under the same roof). He cites a Scriptural source to prove this point. It is written [Yechezkel 34:31]: Now you my sheep, the sheep of my pasture; you are adam. You, Israel, are referred to as “Adam,” man, but an idolater is not regarded as “Adam.” (The word “Adam” is the term used in the Torah regarding the laws of tumah by way of a roof; thus we see that the grave of an idolater does not transmit this tumah.)

The Ol’los Efraim says that there are four names for man; Adam, Gever, Enosh and Ish. Each of them can be written in a singlular form as well as in a plural form. However, the term “Adam” can only be written in a singular form. He explains this with our Gemora. Only a Jew is referred to as Adam, not an idolater. Klal Yisroel has the quality of achdus, uniting as one; therefore only we can be called Adam.

Using this principle, we can answer a famous question. It is written [Koheles 12:13]: The end of the matter, all having been heard: fear God, and keep His commandments; for this is the whole man. The Shalah comments that the verse fear God is referring to the negative prohibitions; the verse and keep His commandments is referring to the positive commandments; and the verse for this is the whole man is the essence of man, the two hundred and forty eight limbs and the three hundred and sixty five veins, which are corresponding to the two hundred and forty eight positive commandments and the three hundred and sixty five negative prohibitions.

There are those that ask: If so, it is impossible for any single individual to be complete; it is impossible to fulfill all six hundred and thirteen mitzvos. Some mitzvos are only applicable to a Kohen; some are unique to a Levi; others are only to a Yisroel; men have mitzvos that are only relevant to them, and women have their special mitzvos. How can a person be considered complete?

Perhaps the answer is because Klal Yisroel is Adam. We are all united. One person’s performance of a mitzvah effects everyone else. If everyone does their particular mitzvah, Klal Yisroel can be regarded as being complete.

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The Beilis Blood Libel

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The following story is printed in the Sefer Margaliyos HaShas amongst others and the text of the entire story can be found here: shemayisrael.

The Beilis Affair shook the ground under those Jews who had thought that the modern world was a more rational one, a world in which outrageous accusations might be levied but would certainly not gain credence. When Mendel Beilis was brought to trial for a blood libel accusation, it seemed that the progress of a century would be completely wiped away in an instant.

Jews around the world were stirred to action. There was also an outpouring of sympathy from non Jews who recognized the injustice and absurdity of the accusations. A progressive newspaper in Germany reported that libels that echo with the style and content of the darkest medieval times are being hurled against the Jewish minority in Russia. Diplomats, statesmen and other men of prominence urged the Russian government to retreat from this bizarre enterprise. But against this flood of outrage, the anti-Semites of the world only strengthened and increased their own accusations.

The Jewish world was in turmoil. In congregations around the globe, special daily prayers were instituted for the deliverance of Beilis and all the Jewish people. Community leaders, rabbis, chassidic rebbes and influential activists became involved. The Chazon Ish was an active participant in the fight, as were Rabbi Meir Shapiro, the Lubliner Rav, the Lubavitcher Rebbe and the Chortkover Rebbe. The main thrust of their efforts was ambitious. They sought not only to clear Beilis of the unfounded charges but also to uproot the very idea of the blood libel.

The lawyer that headed the defense team was the legendary Oscar Gruzenberg. He knew that the prosecutions attack was going to be directed against the Talmud and other works of Jewish scholarship and that the expertise in devising a defense would have to be provided by the rabbis. Rabbi Mazeh, Chief Rabbi of Moscow, was chosen to head the rabbinic advisory team for the defense.

On October 8, 1913, right after Yom Kippur, the trial opened. The long-awaited spectacle was now under way. Jew and non-Jew in Russia and around the world awaited the outcome with breathless anticipation.

As the trial began, the indictment accused Menachem Mendel the son of Tuviah Beilis, 39, of having murdered together with other people, not discovered, under duress of mysterious religious obligations and rituals, one Andrei Yustchinsky.

The twelve jurors were carefully chosen; their identities and ideologies had been thoroughly prepared prior to the charade of the trial. The first witnesses testified to such blatant lies that the defense lawyer did not even feel compelled to discredit their testimonies. These preliminary stages were clearly a farce, and the audience, near and far, waited for the real trial to begin. At last, the parade of experts began. And the trial became an examination of the Talmud's view on various issues.

What does the Talmud say about the place from which the soul exits the body? Is it correct that the Talmud states that stealing from a gentile is permissible?

The constant refrain was about the Talmud. There, in the depths of the main courthouse of Kiev, all one could hear was Talmud. The prosecutor was prepared with an avalanche of quotes from the Halachic (legal) and the Aggadic (homiletic) portions of the Talmud. Anti-Semites around the world had done their homework and had rallied to the cause of condemning the Jewish people and the Jewish religion in a court of law.

The crucial question was posed: How dare the Jewish sages claim that [the Jewish people] are called adam, man, while the idol worshippers are not called adam?

The illustrious Rabbi Meir Shapiro was then the Rabbi of Galina. (Later, he would establish and serve as the head of the famous yeshivah of Lublin, and he would also institute the Daf Yomi.) When Rabbi Shapiro heard about attacks against the Talmud, he understood that the Talmud was being accused of inciting Jew against non-Jew. Rabbi Shapiro sent off a very clear letter to Rabbi Mazeh dealing with this accusation. He told him to explain to the court that a very important insight into the nature of the Jewish people is revealed in this Talmudic quote.

The Torah states, he wrote, that kol Yisrael areivim zeh lazeh, all Jews are responsible for each other. (Shevuos 39) According to this principle, it stands to reason that the fate of Mendel Beilis, for example, which is in essence the fate of one single Jew, nevertheless touches the entire Jewish people. The Jewish people tremble for his welfare and would do everything in their power to remove the prisoner's collar from him. What would have been the reaction of the gentile world if one specific gentile had been accused of a similar crime and was standing trial in a faraway country? Clearly, no more than the people of his own town would show any interest in the libel. Perhaps, at most, people in other parts of his own country would criticize the proceedings. But people in other countries? They certainly wouldn't take a personal interest in him.

This, therefore, is the difference between the Jewish people and all other peoples. The Jews are considered adam, the singular form of the word man, an indication of the extreme solidarity of the Jewish people. For us, when one Mendel Beilis is put on trial, the entire Jewish world stands at his side like one man. Not so the other peoples of the world. They may very well be considered anashim, the plural form of the word man, but they cannot be considered adam, a nation that stands together as a single man.

There is no way of knowing which particular effort of which particular rabbis may have had some impact on the trial. All in all, however, the concerted efforts of the Jews bore out the interpretation of Rabbi Meir Shapiro that you [the Jewish people] are called adam, for the Jews did set aside their internal differences and stood together as one man until the verdict of not guilty was returned.

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A Pawned Sefer Torah Donated to a Synagogue

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Our Mishna treats the topic of a mashkon (“pledge” or “pawn”) taken from a debtor who fails to pay and rules that the lender must return it when needed. A pillow, for instance, taken as a mashkon must be returned at night. However, a pillow taken as a mashkon at the time of the loan does not have to be returned each night as the borrower gave it willingly (114b).

Our sugya cites other halachos applying to a mashkon taken after payment is due as opposed to that given at the time of a loan. One halachah pertinent to all mashkonos is that the lender must not sell a mashkon by himself and take the proceeds in payment for the loan but rather must bring it to a beis din for valuation. If a lender sold a mashkon without such valuation, the sale is invalid even if the price was correct (Teshuvos HaRosh; Shulchan ‘Aruch, C.M. 73:15).

A lender who thought he was clever ignored this halachah and almost suffered a great loss as a result of his actions. When his debt was not paid he took an antique Sefer Torah as a mashkon. The debtor was later convicted of a crime and sentenced to prison for several years. The lender thought he could what he pleased with the Sefer and donated it with much song and ceremony to a synagogue. Eight years later the debtor was freed and came to the lender to pay what he owed and redeem the Sefer Torah. Discovering what had occurred, he refused to accept the situation and appealed to Rav Yehudah Asad, who ruled in the debtor’s favor (Responsa Yehudah Ya’aleh, Y.D. 283). First of all, the donation was invalid as the lender was forbidden to change the proprietorship of the mashkon without valuation by a beis din and the synagogue administration was ordered to return the Sefer Torah to the borrower. Moreover, according to many poskim, the borrower was exempt from paying the debt as soon as the lender gave away the mashkon. His action showed he despaired of ever collecting the debt and even the borrower’s wish to pay does not renew it! Still, Rav Asad adopted the opinion of the Chacham Tzvi (Responsa, 144), that yeiush (despair) does not cancel a loan, and ordered the debtor to pay. (See Shulchan ‘Aruch 163:3 and Ketzos HaChoshen, ibid, S.K1.)

Meoros Hadaf HaYomi

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