Daf Yomi - Yevamos 14 - Highlights

Rish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan: The Mishna in Megillah (2a) states: The Megillah is read on the eleventh, on the twelfth, on thirteenth, on the fourteenth and on fifteenth of Adar, not earlier than the eleventh and not later than the fifteenth. It is written [Devarim 14:1]: Lo sisgodedu, which teaches us that you should not form separate groups. Why did they allow five different days to read the Megillah; they should have established one day for everyone?

The Gemora interrupts this discussion: Doesn’t the verse Lo sisgodedu teach us the prohibition against wounding oneself while grieving for a dead person? The Gemora explains how both halachos are derived from this passuk.

Rabbi Yochanan responded to Rish Lakish with a question of his own: Why didn’t you ask from the Mishna in Pesachim (50a)? The Mishna states: A place where the custom was to do work on Erev Pesach until midday, one is permitted to do work; a place where the custom was not to do work on Erev Pesach until midday, one should not do work. Shouldn’t there be a concern here on account of forming two separate groups?

Rish Lakish replied: I was referring to cases which involve prohibitions and you are asking me form cases dependent on customs.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t engaging in labor on Erev Pesach a halachic dispute as well? The Mishna in Pesachim (55a) cites a disagreement between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel; Beis Shamai maintains that it is forbidden to do work and Beis Hillel allows it.

Rish Lakish answers: It does not appear like two separate groups because one who observes a person not working will say that he doesn’t have any work to do right now, but he will not think that it is based on his religious observance.

Rabbi Yochanan asked Rish Lakish from our Mishna: Beis Shamai permits the co-wives to the brothers, but Beis Hillel prohibits them. Shouldn’t this be a violation of this prohibition?

Rish Lakish answers: Beis Shamai did not follow their own opinion in practice. They did not allow the yavam to perform a yibum with the co-wife of an ervah.

Rabbi Yochanan maintains that Beis Shamai did follow their own opinion.

The Gemora cites a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding this same issue. Rav said: Beis Shamai did not follow their own opinion in practice. Shmuel said: that Beis Shamai did follow their own opinion.

The Gemora asks: We have learned in the Gemora Eruvin (13a) that a heavenly voice declared that whenever Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel argue, the halacha follows Beis Hillel. What point in time were these Amoraim referring to when they argued if Beis Shamai acted according to their own opinion or not? If it was prior to the heavenly voice, why would Rav and Rish Lakish maintain that Beis Shamai did not practice according to their opinion? If it was after the heavenly voice, why would Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan state that Beis Shamai did follow their own opinion?

The Gemora presents two answers: Either they were referring to the time period prior to the heavenly voice and at that time; Beis Hillel had a clear majority. Rav and Rish Lakish maintain that Beis Shamai did not practice according to their opinion because the ruling followed Beis Hillel since they were in the majority. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan stated that Beis Shamai followed their own opinion because the academy of Bais Shammai were sharper in their studies, they were not required to follow the majority.

Alternatively, they were referring to the time period after the heavenly voice; Rav and Rish Lakish maintain that Beis Shamai did not practice according to their opinion because they were instructed to follow Beis Hillel (through the heavenly voice). The opinion that maintains that Beis Shamai did not practice like Beis Hillel followed the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua who held that one does not pay attention to the dictates of the Heavenly Voice. (13b – 14a)

The Gemora asks: How can Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan hold that Beis Shamai practiced in accordance with their own opinion; there is a prohibition of forming separate groups (lo sisgodedu)?

Abaye answers: There is only a concern for lo sisgodedu when there are two courts in one town, but when they are two courts in two different cities, we are not concerned.

Rava asked: But Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel were in the same town, as well, and yet they each followed their respective opinions.

Rava answers: The prohibition applies only when the court is divided, but regarding two courts in one city, when one follows Beis Shamai and the other follows Beis Hillel, we are not concerned. (14a)

The Gemora asks from the following braisa: Where Rabbi Eliezer resided, they would cut down trees on Shabbos to make the charcoal that was required for fashioning the circumcision knife made out of iron. Where Rabbi Yosi Haglili resided, they would eat the meat of fowl together with milk. Rabbi Yosi Haglili is of the opinion that although the Torah forbids one to eat meat and milk together, this prohibition only applies to eating the meat of any kosher domestic animal with milk. Eating the meat of fowl with milk, however, is permitted.

The Gemora infers from here that they did not practice like this in the locale of Rabbi Akiva since he disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer and maintains that any act of labor that could have been performed before Shabbos and was not performed does not override the injunction of performing labor on Shabbos. Shouldn’t this be a problem of lo sisgodedu?

The Gemora answers that we have already learned that two different locations are not subject to the prohibition of lo sisgodedu. (14a)

When Rabbi Abahu went to the area where Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi resided, he would move a lamp that had been extinguished on Shabbos. When Rabbi Abahu went to the area where Rabbi Yochanan resided, he did not move the lamp on Shabbos. Although Rabbi Abahu held like Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that one may move a lamp on Shabbos, Rabbi Abahu did not move the lamp out of respect for Rabbi Yochanan who held like Rabbi Yehudah that one may not move the lamp on Shabbos. (14a)

The Gemora cites our Mishna: Although Beis Hillel prohibits the co-wives and Beis Shamai permits them; these declared certain women ineligible to a kohen and these declared them eligible, Beis Shamai did not refrain from marrying women of Beis Hillel, nor Beis Hillel from Beis Shamai.

The Gemora asks: If Beis Shamai followed their own opinion, why didn’t they refrain from marrying into each other’s families?

The Gemora answers that they would keep records and inform each other if the woman under consideration was permitted for them or not.

The Gemora proves that they would inform each other of any halachic concerns that the other might encounter from the last part of our Mishna. The Mishna had stated: So, too, in regards to tumah and tahara, they did not refrain from lending each other utensils.

The Gemora asks: How could Beis Hillel borrow utensils from Beis Shamai; those utensils had a distinct possibility of being tamei according to Beis Hillel?

The Gemora answers: It was evident that they kept records and Beis Shamai would inform Beis Hillel of any potential problems. (14a – 14b)

The Gemora states that Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that a mamzer (an illegitimate child) can only descend from a union prohibited under penalty of death or kares. (14b)