Daf Yomi - Yevamos 5 - Highlights

The Gemora seeks to find a source according to the Chachamim (who maintain that the words wool and linen are not extra and therefore the juxtaposition cannot be expounded) that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

The Gemora answers: It is derived from the word rosho, his head, which is written in the verses discussing a metzora shaving his head (part of his purification process). This is a superfluous word because the Torah had stated already that he shall shave off all his hair; why is it said? It is written elsewhere [Vayikra 19:27]: You shall not round the corners of your head (cutting the ‘payos,’ corners of the hair from his temples). I would have thought that this prohibition includes the metzora, and he cannot shave his sideburns, the possuk says rosho, teaching us that he shaves his entire head.

The Gemora explains that this Tanna maintains that one who shaves off all his hair from his head (like the metzora is required to do) has in fact violated the prohibition of rounding the corners on his head.

It emerges that we learn that the positive commandment for the metzora to remove all his hair overrides the prohibition of rounding the corners on one’s head. We derive from here that all positive commandments can override a prohibition.

The Gemora objects: Perhaps the reason the positive commandment can override this prohibition is because the prohibition against rounding the corners of one’s head is a prohibition that is not applicable to all (a woman is not subject to this prohibition). (We cannot derive from here to other instances, where the prohibition is a universal one.) (5a)

The Gemora presents another source: It was taught in a braisa: What is derived from the word rosho, his head? It is written regarding a nazir [Bamidbar 6:5]: A razor shall not pass over his head. (This prohibition forbids him to shave any part of his head with a razor.) I would have thought that one who is a metzora and a nazir would not be permitted to shave his head (even for the purification process), the Torah teaches us that the positive commandment for a metzora to shave his head overrides the prohibition of the nazir against shaving his head with a razor. We can derive from here to all instances that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

The Gemora objects: Perhaps the reason the positive commandment can override this prohibition is because the prohibition forbidding a nazir to shave is a lenient one, for a nazir can release himself from his prohibitions by imploring a sage to annul his vow. (We cannot derive from here to other instances, where the prohibition is a strict one.)

The Gemora returns to the juxtaposition of tzitzis and shatnez. The Gemora explains that there is an extra word in the verse even according to the Chachamim. The Torah could have written: You shall make yourself tzitzis (fringes); why did the Torah write gedilim, twined fringes? It is to make the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: The word gedilim is not extra since it teaches us that each corner of the garment must have four threads.

The Gemora states: There is still an extra word in this verse. The Torah could have written: You shall not wear shatnez, wool and linen. Why did the torah write the word together? It is to make the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: the word together is not extra since it is teaches us that if one fastens a woolen garment to a linen garment with two passes of the needle (forming a complete stitch), he may not wear the garment, but if they are fastened with only one pass of the needle, it is not regarded as a connection, and they may be worn.

The Gemora states: There is still an extra word in this verse. The Torah could have written: You shall not wear wool and linen together. Why did the torah write the word shatnez? It is to make the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: The word shatnez is not extra since it teaches us that one has not violated the prohibition against wearing shatnez unless the wool and linen threads are combed, spun and woven together.

The Gemora answers: The word shatnez teaches us everything. The word is extra and therefore it is available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition. However, if this word were intended only for this teaching, the Torah could have written a more common term, such as kilayim, meaning mixture; why did the Torah use the term shatnez? It is to learn the additional halacha that one has not violated the prohibition against wearing shatnez unless the wool and linen threads are combed, spun and woven together. (5a – 5b)

The Gemora states: We have successfully found a source teaching the principle that a positive commandment overrides a standard prohibition; where do we find that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition that is subject to the penalty of kares, thus requiring the verse aleha to teach that one cannot perform yibum on his wife’s sister?

The Gemora states: Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of bris milah (circumcision), which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora objects: Bris milah is different because there were thirteen covenants sealed in regards to this commandment.

Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of korban pesach, which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora objects: Korban pesach is different because there is a penalty of kares for one who refrains from offering the korban pesach.

Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of offering the daily korban tamid, which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora objects: Korban tamid is different because it is a korban, which is offered constantly.

The Gemora proposes to derive this principle from all three of these mitzvos together. This is rejected because all three mitzvos existed before the Giving of the Torah. (5b)