Daf Yomi - Yevamos 37 - Highlights

The Gemora states: There is a dispute between Rav Acha and Rafram regarding a case where one betrothed a woman within three months of being a widow or divorced, and then he ran away. One of them said that we put him in cheirem (ban) until he divorces her and the other one says that running away is sufficient (he obviously does not intend on consummating the marriage until the proper time). (37a)

The Mishna had stated: One who performs yibum with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant and later gave birth; if the child is viable, but we are uncertain if the child is a nine-month-old baby from the first brother or the seven-month-old child of the second brother; he must divorce her, and the child is deemed to be legitimate, and they are required to bring an asham taluy (a korban that one is required to bring if he is uncertain if he mistakenly committed a transgression).

Rava asked Rav Nachman: Let us follow according to the majority of women, who give birth after nine months?

Rav Nachman replied: The women by us give birth after seven months.

Rava persisted: But the majority of women in the world give birth after nine months?

Rav Nachman explained himself: Most women give birth after nine months, but some give birth after seven months. One who gives birth after nine months; her fetus is recognizable after a third of her pregnancy days (three months), and since in this case, it was not recognizable, it weakens the majority and we cannot determine based on it.

The Gemora asks: Let the fact that her fetus was not recognizable after a third of her pregnancy days be a proof that the baby is a seven-month one?

The Gemora answers: Most women who give birth after nine months; their fetus is recognizable after a third of her pregnancy days, but some are not. Since in this case, it was not recognizable, it weakens the majority and we cannot determine based on it. (37a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: The first child (the uncertain one) is fit to become a Kohen Gadol (whether he is from the first or the second brother). The second son (if they remain married to each other) is a mamzer out of doubt. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: He is not a mamzer out of doubt.

The Gemora asks: What is the explanation for Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov?

Abaye explains: The Tanna Kamma maintained that the second son is a possible mamzer and he would be prohibited from marrying a certain mamzeres. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov disagrees and holds that he is treated as a certain mamzer and he is permitted to marry a mamzeres.

Rava explains: The Tanna Kamma maintained that the second son is treated like a certain mamzer and he would be permitted to marrying a certain mamzeres. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov disagrees and holds that he is a possible mamzer and he is prohibited to marry a mamzeres.

The Gemora cites a Tannaic dispute if a possible mamzer is permitted to marry a certain mamzer. (37a – 37b)

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov ruled that one should not marry a woman in one place and marry another somewhere else. This might result in the children from these two marriages to encounter one another, and a brother could end up marrying a sister (since they are unaware that they are related).

The Gemora asks: But Rav, when he would arrive in the city of Dardeshir, he would announce, “Who wants to marry me for one day?” (This was done in order to protect him from sinning.) Rav Nachman, when he would arrive in the city of Shechantziv, he would announce, “Who wants to marry me for one day?”

The Gemora answers: The Rabbis are different because their names are famous (and the children will know who their father was).

The Gemora asks: But didn’t Rava say: If one proposed to marry a woman and she has consented, she is required to wait seven clean days prior to the consummation of the marriage?

The Gemora answers: The Rabbis informed them before by sending their emissaries seven days prior to their arrival.

Alternatively, you can answer that they would only seclude themselves with the women. This protected them from sin because of the saying, “You cannot compare one who has bread in his basket with one who doesn’t have bread in his basket.” (37b)

The Gemora discusses different inheritance disputes that can emerge when we are uncertain if the child is a nine-month baby from the deceased brother or a seven-month baby from the yavam.

The uncertain child and the yavam come to inherit the possessions of the deceased. The uncertain one says: “I am the son of the deceased, and I am entitled to the full estate.” The yavam counters: “You are my son, and you have no claim on my brother’s estate.” This is a case where the money lies in doubt, and the halacha is that the estate should be divided amongst them.

The Gemora discusses another case: The uncertain child and the sons of the yavam come (the yavam died before the division of his brother’s estate) to inherit the possessions of the deceased. The uncertain one says: “I am the son of the deceased, and I am entitled to the full estate.” The sons of the yavam counter: “You are our brother, and you are entitled to a share together with us.”

Rav Mesharshiya rules that one-third of the estate should go to the uncertain one and the remaining two–third’s should be divided between the uncertain one and the two sons of the yavam.

The Gemora discusses another case: The uncertain child and the sons of the yavam come to inherit the possessions of the deceased after the yavam has already taken his half of his brother’s estate (according to the ruling above that the yavam and the uncertain one divide the estate equally). The sons of the yavam claim: “Bring a proof that you are our brother and we will divide our father’s estate with you.” The uncertain one counters: “No matter what, I should certainly receive a portion together with you. If I am your brother, give me a portion, and if I am not your brother (and I am the son of the deceased), give me the half that was previously given to your father (since if the deceased had a son, there was no yibum, and he should not have inherited my father in the first place).

Rabbi Abba says in the name of Rav: The initial judgment stands (we cannot reverse the first ruling and the yavam rightfully owns half the estate, and the uncertain one must bring a proof that he is a son of the yavam in order to receive a portion). Rabbi Yirmiyah says: We reverse the previous judgment. (37b)

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