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Daily Daf Dose
Argument of Abaye and Rava
Rava says that a kohen who is the husband of a woman who is forbidden to return to him because she is a captive is obligated to redeem her, but if she is forbidden to return to him because of a different prohibition he is not obligated to redeem her.
Let us say that this (argument between Rava and Abaye) is an argument among the Tanaim. The Beraisa discusses a case of someone who vows that his wife cannot benefit from him, and she then becomes a captive. Rabbi Eliezer says that he should redeem her and honor her kesuvah (marriage commitment upon divorce). Rabbi Yehoshua states that he must honor her kesuvah but does not have to redeem her.
Rabbi Nasan says that he asked Sumchus the following question. When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he honors her kesuvah and does not have to redeem her, was it a case where he made the vow against her and she then became captive, or when she became captive and he then made the vow? Sumchus replied: I did not hear anything clearly regarding his position. However, it seems logical that it was when he made the vow first and she then became captive. If she became captive first, men will come to trickery (and take a vow as an excuse not to redeem her).
The Gemora asks: It seems that the argument above is regarding the wife of a kohen, with Abaye holding like Rabbi Eliezer and Rava holding like Rabbi Yehoshua. The Gemora answers that no, the case is where she vowed not to have benefit from him and he upheld that vow. Rabbi Eliezer that he still must redeem her, as he put her finger in between her teeth (so to speak) by upholding her vow. Rabbi Yehoshua says that she put her own finger in her mouth, by making the vow.
The Gemora asks that this explanation seems difficult. If according to Rabbi Yehoshua she is primarily looked upon as the guilty party, why does he say that the husband must honor the kesuvah? Additionally, Rabbi Nasan said that he asked Sumchus the following question. When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he honors her kesuvah and does not have to redeem her, was it a case where he made the vow against her and she then became captive, or when she became captive and he then made the vow? Sumchus replied: I did not hear anything clearly regarding his position. If she is the one who made the vow, why should it make a difference if she made the vow first and then became captive, or became captive and then made the vow!
The Gemora therefore answers that the case must indeed be where he made the vow. Abaye can explain the Beraisa according to his reasoning, and Rava according to his reasoning. Abaye will explain according to his reasoning in the following manner. Everyone will agree that a kohen gadol must redeem his wife who is a widow, and that a regular jew does not have to redeem his wife who is a mamzeres (product of an illicit relationship) or nesinah (from the nation who tricked Yehoshua into letting them become Jewish). Everyone also agrees that a kohen who vowed not to have benefit from his wife must redeem her. The argument is only regarding a regular Jew who made such a vow. Rabbi Eliezer says that the original condition is upheld, while Rabbi Yehoshua says the vow is upheld.
[Being that a kohen does not have the words “I will return you as a wife” only that he will “return her to her county,” he can do so even without taking her back as a wife. The question is only regarding a Yisrael. What is stronger: His having to take her “return her and take her back as a wife,” or does the fact that his vow clearly overrule that option enable him not to fulfill his obligation to redeem as well?]
Rava can explain the Beraisa according to his reasoning in the following manner. Everyone will agree that a kohen gadol with a wife who is a widow, and that a regular Jew with a wife who is a mamzeres or nesinah does not have to redeem his wife. The argument is only regarding any Jew, whether kohen, who made a vow that he will not benefit his wife. Rabbi Eliezer says that the original condition is upheld, while Rabbi Yehoshua says the vow is upheld.
Rava says that a kohen who is the husband of a woman who is forbidden to return to him because she is a captive is obligated to redeem her, but if she is forbidden to return to him because of a different prohibition he is not obligated to redeem her.
Let us say that this (argument between Rava and Abaye) is an argument among the Tanaim. The Beraisa discusses a case of someone who vows that his wife cannot benefit from him, and she then becomes a captive. Rabbi Eliezer says that he should redeem her and honor her kesuvah (marriage commitment upon divorce). Rabbi Yehoshua states that he must honor her kesuvah but does not have to redeem her.
Rabbi Nasan says that he asked Sumchus the following question. When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he honors her kesuvah and does not have to redeem her, was it a case where he made the vow against her and she then became captive, or when she became captive and he then made the vow? Sumchus replied: I did not hear anything clearly regarding his position. However, it seems logical that it was when he made the vow first and she then became captive. If she became captive first, men will come to trickery (and take a vow as an excuse not to redeem her).
The Gemora asks: It seems that the argument above is regarding the wife of a kohen, with Abaye holding like Rabbi Eliezer and Rava holding like Rabbi Yehoshua. The Gemora answers that no, the case is where she vowed not to have benefit from him and he upheld that vow. Rabbi Eliezer that he still must redeem her, as he put her finger in between her teeth (so to speak) by upholding her vow. Rabbi Yehoshua says that she put her own finger in her mouth, by making the vow.
The Gemora asks that this explanation seems difficult. If according to Rabbi Yehoshua she is primarily looked upon as the guilty party, why does he say that the husband must honor the kesuvah? Additionally, Rabbi Nasan said that he asked Sumchus the following question. When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he honors her kesuvah and does not have to redeem her, was it a case where he made the vow against her and she then became captive, or when she became captive and he then made the vow? Sumchus replied: I did not hear anything clearly regarding his position. If she is the one who made the vow, why should it make a difference if she made the vow first and then became captive, or became captive and then made the vow!
The Gemora therefore answers that the case must indeed be where he made the vow. Abaye can explain the Beraisa according to his reasoning, and Rava according to his reasoning. Abaye will explain according to his reasoning in the following manner. Everyone will agree that a kohen gadol must redeem his wife who is a widow, and that a regular jew does not have to redeem his wife who is a mamzeres (product of an illicit relationship) or nesinah (from the nation who tricked Yehoshua into letting them become Jewish). Everyone also agrees that a kohen who vowed not to have benefit from his wife must redeem her. The argument is only regarding a regular Jew who made such a vow. Rabbi Eliezer says that the original condition is upheld, while Rabbi Yehoshua says the vow is upheld.
[Being that a kohen does not have the words “I will return you as a wife” only that he will “return her to her county,” he can do so even without taking her back as a wife. The question is only regarding a Yisrael. What is stronger: His having to take her “return her and take her back as a wife,” or does the fact that his vow clearly overrule that option enable him not to fulfill his obligation to redeem as well?]
Rava can explain the Beraisa according to his reasoning in the following manner. Everyone will agree that a kohen gadol with a wife who is a widow, and that a regular Jew with a wife who is a mamzeres or nesinah does not have to redeem his wife. The argument is only regarding any Jew, whether kohen, who made a vow that he will not benefit his wife. Rabbi Eliezer says that the original condition is upheld, while Rabbi Yehoshua says the vow is upheld.
Redeeming a Regular Wife in Captivity
The Beraisa states that if a woman is captured while her husband is alive and he dies while she is in captivity, if he knew about her status when he was alive the inheritors must redeem her. If he didn’t, the inheritors are not obligated to redeem her.
Levi thought to act on the Beraisa in an actual case. Rav told him that Chavivi (Rabbi Chiya) had told him that the halachah does not follow this Beraisa. Rather it follows the Beraisa that states that if she was captured after the death of her husband, the orphans do not have to redeem her. Moreover, even if she was captured in the lifetime of her husband and her husband died while she was in captivity, the orphans do not have to pay to redeem her, as this is not within the requirement of “and I will return you as my wife.”
The Beraisa states: If she was captured and the kidnappers sought ten times her fair value for redemption, the first time he must redeem her. Afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that we do not redeem captives for more than they are worth for “the establishment of the world” (that captors should not thereby be encouraged to demand exorbitant prices for the ransom of their captive).
The Gemora asks, this implies that for their value they must be redeemed, even if their value is more than their kesuvah is worth. However, a similar Beraisa states that if a woman is captured and the captors sought ten times the value of her kesuvah, the first time he must do so and afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the price of her redemption is that of her kesuvah, he should redeem her, if not he does not have to redeem her! The Gemora answers that Rabban Gamliel has two separate leniencies in this matter (both are true).
Healing a Widow from the Kesuvah
The Mishna states that if she is stricken, he is obligated to heal her. The Beraisa states that a widow is supported by the possessions of the orphans, and her needing to be healed is akin to basic support. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that healing that for a limited time can be obtained through her kesuvah, but healing that does not have an end in sight is not paid for by the kesuvah.
Rabbi Yochanan says that in Eretz Yisrael they treated bloodletting treatments as healing with no end in sight. Rabbi Yochanan’s relative had a father’s wife who needed treatment every day. They came before Rabbi Yochanan, and he told them that they should come to terms with the doctor on a sum that would cover treatment for the rest of her life. Rabbi Yochanan said that he made himself like the lawyers (it is forbidden for a judge to act, even indirectly, as legal adviser to one of the litigants).
Originally what did he hold (was correct), and in the end what did he hold (was correct)? Originally he held that he should give advice that was beneficial to his relatives, as the passuk say “and from your flesh do not disappear.” In the end he held that an important person like himself cannot use this leniency (a judge must subject himself to greater restrictions in order to be free from all possible suspicion of partiality).
Mishna
If he didn’t write “the male sons that I will have from you they will inherit the money of your kesuvah more than the portion of their brothers” (in the kesuvah) he is still obligated as this is a condition of Beis Din. “The daughters that I will have from you they will sit in my house and be supported by my estate until they are taken as wives by men” is (also automatically) obligatory, as it is a condition of Beis Din. “You will sit in my house and be supported by my estate as long as you are living as a widow in my house” is (also automatically) obligatory, as it is a condition of Beis Din. This is how the people of Yerushalayim would write (a kesuvah, including these conditions). The people of the Galil would write like them. The people of Yehuda would write “until the inheritors wish to give you the kesuvah.” Therefore, if the inheritors wish, they can give her the (value of the) kesuvah and send her off.
Analyzing “Banin Dichrin”
(“Male Sons”)
Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: why did they establish the kesuvah condition (above regarding) of male sons? In order that a person should give a dowry for a daughter like the inheritance inherited by his son. The Gemora asks, is it possible that in a situation where the Torah indicated that a son should inherit and not the daughter, that the sages would institute that a daughter should inherit (by giving her a large dowry, avoiding the potential inheritance by the son)?
The Gemora answers: The inheritance of a daughter also has its roots in the Torah, as the passuk says “take wives and give birth to sons and daughters, and take for your sons wives and your daughters give to men.” It makes sense that he takes a wife for his son (as men actively search out wives), but a daughter is not normally in his hands (to actively search out for her a husband)! The passuk must be teaching us that a man should dress his daughter well and give her a dowry, in order that other should jump at the chance to marry her.
How much should he give her? Abaye and Rava say up to a tenth of his possessions.
The Gemora asks: Perhaps the money given by her father for her marriage purposes should be given to her sons from the marriage, but the kesuvah money from the husband’s side should not? The Gemora answers that if this would be the case, her father would also refrain from pledging money.
The Gemora asks: Perhaps only when the father gives a dowry, the husband’s kesuvah money should automatically go to her sons. If the father does not give a dowry, perhaps the husband’s pledge should also not go to her sons? The Gemora answers that the Rabbanan did not make a distinction between cases in their standard conditions of kesuvah.
The Gemora asks: Let this also be true regarding a daughter (from this wife) among sons (of a different wife) as well? The Gemora answers that the Rabbanan made it like the laws of inheritance regarding sons.
The Gemora asks: Let this also be true regarding a daughter (from this wife) among daughters (of a different wife) as well? The Gemora answers that the Rabbanan did not make such a distinction.
The Gemora asks: Let them also be able to collect from movable possessions (unlike the Gemora implied on 50b)? The Gemora answers that the Rabbanan made it have the regular laws of kesuvah.
The Gemora asks: Let them collect from properties that have a lien on them? The Gemora answers that the stipulation was based on inheritance (not seizure).
The Gemora asks, let this even be true when there is not a dinar worth of property (see 91a)? The Gemora answers that the Rabbanan did not institute this condition when it would conflict with a Torah law of inheritance.
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