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It is written [Breishis 3:14]: And Hashem said to the snake, “Because you have done this, cursed be you more than all the cattle and more than all the beasts of the field; you shall walk on your belly, and you shall eat dust all the days of your life.”
Rashi cites a Gemora in Sanhedrin (29a): From here we can derive that we may not intercede in favor of one who persuades people to commit idolatry, for had Hashem asked him, “Why did you do this?” the snake could have answered, “The words of the teacher and the words of the student; whose words do we listen to?” [Adam and Chavah should have obeyed Hashem rather than the snake!]
The Perashas Derachim cites a Medrash: Rabbi Chanina says: Under the Nohadite laws a murderer will be sentenced to death even if there is only one witness, even with only one judge, even without a proper warning and even if he killed via an agent. Evidently, the logic of “the words of the teacher and the words of the student; whose words do we listen to?” does not apply under Nohadite law! If so, what would it have benefited the snake by claiming that Adam and Chavah should not have listened to him? Under Nohadite laws, this would not have been a valid excuse!?
He answers based upon our Gemora, which states: Even if Shamai holds that agency applies by transgressions, he would admit that the agent is liable and the sender is exempt in the following case: If one tells his agent, “Go and cohabit with a forbidden relative,” or “Go and eat this forbidden fat.” The reason is because we do not find in the Torah that one person will benefit from the sin and a different person should be liable for that act. Accordingly, by the sin of the Tree of Wisdom, where the sin was the eating, the snake’s claim would have been valid, for we do not find that one person will benefit from the sin and a different person should be liable for that act.
The Shach asks that although we hold that there is no agency by transgressions, but the sender is nevertheless liable under the laws of Heaven. If so, what would it have benefitted the snake by this claim? He would anyways be liable under the laws off Heaven!?
The Mishnah Lamelech answers that since in this case the sin involved eating, the sender would not be liable even under the laws of Heaven. This is because we do not find in the Torah that one person will benefit from the sin and a different person should be liable for that act.
It is written [Breishis 3:14]: And Hashem said to the snake, “Because you have done this, cursed be you more than all the cattle and more than all the beasts of the field; you shall walk on your belly, and you shall eat dust all the days of your life.”
Rashi cites a Gemora in Sanhedrin (29a): From here we can derive that we may not intercede in favor of one who persuades people to commit idolatry, for had Hashem asked him, “Why did you do this?” the snake could have answered, “The words of the teacher and the words of the student; whose words do we listen to?” [Adam and Chavah should have obeyed Hashem rather than the snake!]
The Perashas Derachim cites a Medrash: Rabbi Chanina says: Under the Nohadite laws a murderer will be sentenced to death even if there is only one witness, even with only one judge, even without a proper warning and even if he killed via an agent. Evidently, the logic of “the words of the teacher and the words of the student; whose words do we listen to?” does not apply under Nohadite law! If so, what would it have benefited the snake by claiming that Adam and Chavah should not have listened to him? Under Nohadite laws, this would not have been a valid excuse!?
He answers based upon our Gemora, which states: Even if Shamai holds that agency applies by transgressions, he would admit that the agent is liable and the sender is exempt in the following case: If one tells his agent, “Go and cohabit with a forbidden relative,” or “Go and eat this forbidden fat.” The reason is because we do not find in the Torah that one person will benefit from the sin and a different person should be liable for that act. Accordingly, by the sin of the Tree of Wisdom, where the sin was the eating, the snake’s claim would have been valid, for we do not find that one person will benefit from the sin and a different person should be liable for that act.
The Shach asks that although we hold that there is no agency by transgressions, but the sender is nevertheless liable under the laws of Heaven. If so, what would it have benefitted the snake by this claim? He would anyways be liable under the laws off Heaven!?
The Mishnah Lamelech answers that since in this case the sin involved eating, the sender would not be liable even under the laws of Heaven. This is because we do not find in the Torah that one person will benefit from the sin and a different person should be liable for that act.
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