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Thursday, November 30, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitza 34 - STORIES FROM THE DAF
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Posted by Avromi at 11/30/2006 02:07:00 AM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 34 - Highlights
The Gemora cites a Mishna in Chulin which rules regarding a bird that has been crushed by another animal. If the bird remained alive for twenty-four hours after it had been crushed and then it was subsequently slaughtered, the bird is permitted to be eaten. Staying alive for twenty-four hours indicates that the bird is not a treifa (a life-threatening blemish that would prohibit the bird from being eaten even if it was slaughtered correctly). Rabbi Eliezer learns that the bird must be examined after it was slaughtered to ensure that it doesn’t have any internal wounds that would render the animal a treifa.
Rabbi Yirmiyah questioned if this bird can be slaughtered on Yom Tov after waiting the twenty-four hours. Should there be a concern that the inspection will reveal that the bird is indeed a treifa and the slaughtering will be deemed to be a melocha on Yom Tov since the meat of the bird cannot be eaten.
The Gemora attempts to bring a proof from our Mishna that it should be forbidden to slaughter the crushed bird. The Mishna rules that one is not permitted to heat tiles on Yom Tov for the purpose of roasting food on them. Rabbah explains this ruling to be referring to new tiles, where there is a concern that the tiles might break and there is a necessity to test them. Slaughtering the crushed bird should have the same stringent ruling.
The Gemora concludes that one may not heat up the tiles since heating them solidifies them and that is forbidden on Yom Tov since you are creating a utensil. This case is not similar to the crushed bird and there is no proof as to what the halacha would be in that case.
The Gemora cites a Braisa which rules that a person who places an empty pot on a fire on Shabbos will be liable for violating the Shabbos. Rish Lakish explains that this is referring to a new pot and the reason for the prohibition is because the original heating hardens the pot and would be forbidden the same way it is prohibited to heat the tiles.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/30/2006 01:11:00 AM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 34 - Highlights # 2
The Mishna cites the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer who maintains that one can stand by his dried figs on Friday in a Shemitah year (the seventh year in the cycle) and proclaim that he intends to eat from here tomorrow. The figs we are referring to are ones that have not dried completely and some people will eat them while others won’t. Rabbi Eliezer holds that by announcing his intention to eat from these fruits, they are not regarded as muktza. One does not have to specify the precise fruits that he intends on eating because of the principle of bereira (whichever fruits he eats will retroactively clarify that those were the fruits that he designated). During the Shemitah year, one is not required to separate maaser and terumah and subsequently, the fruits may be eaten immediately.
The Chachamim disagree and maintain that he must specify the precise fruits that he intends to eat since they do not hold of the principle of bereira and he must mark off the fruits as well. Declaring orally is not adequate.
Rava asked of Rav Nachman if Shabbos creates an obligation for maaser (a tithing where one tenth is given to the Levi) on produce that has not been completely processed. Generally, one is not obligated to give maaser until fully processed fruit is brought into his house or courtyard. Prior to that, the produce cannot be eaten as a regular meal but may be eaten as a snack. The exception to this rule is Shabbos. One may not eat a snack on Shabbos from untithed produce that has not entered the house or courtyard. The Gemora states the reason for this is because eating on Shabbos is considered a pleasure and all food that is eaten on Shabbos is regarded as a regular meal.
Rava’s inquiry to Rav Nachman is regarding produce that has not been completely processed. Does Shabbos establish the requirement for maaser even though the produce is not completely processed, thereby prohibiting one from eating these fruits even as a snack?
Rav Nachman responded that produce which was designated for Shabbos creates an obligation for maaser even if the produce is not completely processed. This obligation prohibits the produce from being eaten even as a snack and even after Shabbos.
The Gemora offers proof to this from our Mishna which stated that the unprocessed fruits can be eaten on Shabbos during Shemitah providing that the owner designates the produce prior to Shabbos. We can infer from here that if it would be a regular year (not Shemitah) where one is obligated to separate maaser, one would not be able to eat from these fruits. This would indicate that Shabbos creates an obligation for maaser even on unprocessed fruits.
The Gemora discards the proof by stating that the reason there would be an obligation of maaser is not due to Shabbos, rather it is because the owner designated these fruits to be eaten and therefore they are considered food produce even though they are not completely processed.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/30/2006 01:05:00 AM 0 comments
Wednesday, November 29, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitza 33 - Two Categories of Muktza
Rashi explains that since the primary purpose of wood is for making utensils, something that is forbidden on Yom Tov to do, it is considered muktza; however there was a special dispensation given that the wood may be used for kindling purposes.
This is a unique concept that an object can be considered muktza and not muktza at the same time. It would depend on what the intended use is for.
The Maharsha comment that although Tosfos had previously stated that it is permitted to handle muktza for the sake of ochel nefesh on Yom Tov, that permission is only granted to remove the muktza (removal of the ashes from the oven) but not to use the muktza (supporting the pot with the wood). Using muktza is compared to eating muktza which is prohibited.
The distinction of the Maharsha requires clarification. If there is permission to handle the muktza due to ochel nefesh, why can't the muktza be used as well?
This can be explained by analyzing the words of the Chasam Sofer in regards to muktza.
The Gemora in Shabbos (124b) states that the reason handling muktza is forbidden is because it will lead to carrying objects from a private domain to a public one. The Sages decreed that muktza items cannot be handled because of the concern of carrying. (They did not forbid handling any objects because Klal Yisroel would not be able to uphold this decree.) The Raavad in Hilchos Shabbos (24:13) states this reason as well.
However Rashi in Beitza (26b) seems to offer a different reason for the prohibition against muktza. Rashi states that the Tanna that holds of muktza maintains that in order for objects to be used on Shabbos, they must be prepared prior to Shabbos and he cites a verse in the Torah that states "On the sixth day, you should prepare etc." It is evident from this Rashi that the principle prohibiting muktza is due to the lack of designation and preparation from before Shabbos and not because of a concern of carrying.
The Chasam Sofer answers this question by stating an important principle regarding muktza. There are two types of muktza. One is muktza which is forbidden to eat and that is either a Biblical prohibition (or close to it, like an asmachta) learned from the verse V'heichinu etc. which teaches us that food cannot be eaten on Shabbos or Yom Tov unless they were prepared prior to Shabbos or Yom Tov. The Chasam Sofer states unequivocally that there is no argument regarding this at all. Everyone agrees to this drasha. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree as to the guidelines of this muktza but they both agree that this type of muktza exists.
There is a second type of muktza and that includes objects that are forbidden to handle. This is a Rabbinic enactment instituted by the Prophet Nechemiah. Nechemiah saw that the people were becoming extremely lax in regards to the prohibition of carrying and therefore he decreed that there are certain objects which may not be handled at all. (I found a strong question on the Chasam Sofer in the introduction to the Sefer Imrei Yehuda from Rabbi Yehuda Wiezner. The Gemora in Shabbos relates that Dovid Hamelech died on Shabbos and was laying in the sun. Shlomo asked how Dovid can be moved since a dead body is muktza on Shabbos. It is evident from here that there existed a concept of muktza hundreds of years before Nechemia?)
With this principle, we can now explain the Maharsha (I found this tzu shtel in the Sefer Hayovel for the Chasam Sofer from Rav Shmuel Borenstein who learns Kollel Volozin in Bnei Brak). The Maharsha stated that the permission to handle muktza for the sake of ochel nefesh on Yom Tov is only granted to remove the muktza (removal of the ashes from the oven) but not to use the muktza (supporting the pot with the wood). Using muktza is compared to eating muktza which is prohibited. Handling muktza is forbidden because of the concern that it will lead to carrying and carrying itself is permitted for the sake of ochel nefesh. It will obviously follow that handling muktza for the sake of ochel nefesh will also be permitted. Eating muktza, which is prohibited on the account that it wasn't prepared from beforehand does not have the permission of ochel nefesh.
Using this principle from the Chasam Sofer, we explained the Tosfos on daf beis. If an egg was laid on Yom Tov, Bais Shammai rules that one is permitted to eat it on Yom Tov and Bais Hillel disagrees. Tosfos wonders why the Mishna states tochal, that one is permitted to eat it, and lo tochal, that one is prohibited to eat it. Why did the Mishna not state matirin, it is permitted, and osrin, prohibited? Tosfos answers that one might have erroneously assumed that it is permitted for one to handle the egg but it is forbidden to eat it.
Reb Menachem Kohn zt”l in his Sefer Ateres Avi explains the answer of Tosfos according to the Chasam Sofer who writes that there are two types of muktzeh. One type of muktzeh is derived from the verse regarding the manna where it is said vehayah bayom hashishi veheichinu eis asher yaviu, and it shall be that on the sixth day when they prepare what they bring, which means that one should prepare the Shabbos and Yom Tov meals beforehand and if one does not, one is forbidden to eat from that food. A second type of muktzeh is the muktzeh instituted by Nechemiah that one cannot handle certain objects on Shabbos as there is a concern that he might carry them into a public domain.
There are differences between the two types of muktzeh. One who did not prepare a food item prior to Shabbos or Yom Tov is prohibited from eating the food, whereas an object that is muktzeh because of the decree of Nechemiah cannot be handled on Shabbos or on Yom Tov. A further distinction between the two categories of muktzeh is that the decree of Nechemiah was only instituted with regard to utensils, whereas food cannot become muktzeh unless it was not prepared prior to Shabbos or Yom Tov.
Based on the words of the Chasam Sofer, we can now understand the answer of Tosfos. Given the fact that the decree of Nechemiah was not instituted regarding food items, the egg would only be muktzeh because it was not prepared prior to Yom Tov and one may have assumed that there would be a prohibition from eating the egg. Therefore, Bais Shammai teaches that one is permitted to eat the egg. Bais Hillel, however, who maintains that the egg is muktzeh and cannot be eaten, maintains that the egg forfeits its status as a food item and subsequently the egg also cannot be handled.
We previously cites a Beis Halevi who makes a very similar distinction. Bais HaLevi, cited in sefer Matikei Shemuah, writes that when the Baraisa rules that an egg is forbidden in a case of doubt, that only refers to the prohibition of eating the egg, as it is biblically prohibited to eat an egg which was not prepared prior to Yom Tov. It is permitted to handle the egg, however, as handling the egg is only a rabbinical decree and we are not stringent in a case of doubt.
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[KOLLEL IYUN HADAF RESPONDED TO ONE OF MICHAEL POST'S QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A SUKKAH AND AN ESROG AND AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES A SUKKAH
HERE.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/29/2006 04:55:00 AM 0 comments
Labels: beitza, chasam sofer, daf yomi, muktzah
Tuesday, November 28, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitza 32 - Disagreement and Harmonious Growth
Even couples married for many years should keep themselves focused on Shalom Bayis. Everyone can benefit from an occasional reminder, and it pays to always be alert for advice to stay on the right track.
A lesson that the Chasam Sofer derives from Parshas Chayei Sarah stands out as crucial appreciation of the difficulties that normal people can encounter in this area. His words are both simple and profound; intellectual, yet practical; they offer sound advice for all couples to whom Shalom Bayis is sacred.
Eliezer proposes that Rivka marry Yitzchak. In response, Lavan says, “Mei’Hashem yatza hadavar – this marriage is Divinely ordained. Lo nuchal dabeir eilecha ra oh tov – there is nothing we can say, neither bad nor good.”
Chasam Sofer asks: It was understood that Rivka would marry Yitzchak. Certainly, no person would say anything bad about a shidduch once he realized that it was a sealed agreement. But, why not say something good? After all, if the shidduch was going to happen away, why not offer a positive assessment of the shidduch?
Chasam Sofer answers that the Torah (through Lavan) is teaching us a lesson regarding marriage. We often harbor the misconception that to make a good marriage, it is crucial that both partners be similar, that they be as identical as possible. But this is not true. In a successful marriage, it is important that there be differences between the two partners, as well. If two people are exactly the same, what benefit is there in marriage? Instead of one six-foot person, marriage would give you eleven-and-a-half feet of that person. He is the same; nothing has changed. Marriage would not bring any fundamental improvement to a human being.
On the other hand, if the two are different, there is a great advantage. When two people with differences join together to form a single home, there are going to be disagreements. How wonderful! They will disagree, they will argue, they will discuss… and ultimately, they will come to a decision regarding their course in life. The decision will be well thought out. It will be the result of much analysis and deliberation. And it will result in a well-planned life.
“Lo nuchal dabeir eilecha ra oh tov – there is nothing we can say, neither bad not good.” The tov, says the Chasam Sofer, is not always tov, and the ra is not always ra. Differences between husband and wife may seem to be ra, but it is not actually so. These differences may in fact be the greatest tov in the life of the couple.
Chasam Sofer gives one example of this idea, an example with which many couples would easily identify. Often (very often), one partner in marriage is a pazron, a person who is quick to spend money, while the other is a kamtzan, reluctant to incur expenses. They often disagree on how their finances should be run. How fortunate they are! Imagine if they were both pazranim, impulsive spenders; the house would come to economic ruin. No money would be saved. If both would be kamtzanim, reluctant to part with their money, the house could not be a happy place. It is because they are different – one is a kamtzan and the other a pazran – that they will disagree and their constructive dialogue will bring them to a proper, happy medium.
A Funny Thing Happens on the Way Back From the Chupa
I am fortunate enough to be in yeshiva, where I come into contact with young chassanim. They are full of enthusiasm as they tell me, “You know, it’s amazing. We’re the same. Could you believe it! I loved it in Eretz Yisroel and she loved it! We like similar foods; we have similar hobbies; we even use the same brand of toothpaste!”
Then they get married. They find that they are not so alike after all. They like the same foods, but one likes to eat out while the other likes to stay home. They both use the same brand of toothpaste, but one replaces the cap, while the other loses it. (It seems that the Ribbono Shel Olam uses this crucial factor in determining shidduchim; pairing one cap-loser with a cap-replacer.)
Suddenly, things are not so rosy. There are disagreements, then arguments, and the happy couple is not so happy. There are problems and the match made in heaven is a mismatch!
The Chasam Sofer says: “Problems? Not at all. This is a match made in heaven, a perfect shidduch! That’s precisely the benefit of marriage!”
Afraid of Disagreements?
Perhaps we can better appreciate this by referring to the chavrusa relationship. Two young men are studying together, trying to appreciate the depth of a sugya (topic in the Talmud). The Gemora introduces a concept, which can be understood two ways. Each chavrusa pauses to mull over the two possibilities.
Occasionally, you have chavrusos who will generally agree. They understand the Gemora in a similar manner. They read the Gemora, express their understanding, and move on. Across the study hall, there are two other young men who are studying together. They come to same sugya. One expresses his understanding. The other disagrees. They begin arguing. One cites a source, to support his approach; the other presents a logical counter-argument. Look – they’re fighting!
Which pair of chavrusos is ideal? Which will have a better chance of fully appreciating the sugya? The pair that agree? Or the pair that disagree? Which will pursue the truth? Which is more likely to become complacent and move on without much thought or depth?
You get the picture. We know that the best chavrusa is the one that disagrees, providing that he disagrees on the issue with intellectual honesty, and with the willingness to yield when disproven, realizing that he in truth is a winner. Now he has arrived at the truth. This is what a good chavrusa is all about.
The sugyos of life deserve the same scrutiny. Disagreements are important tools in a good, constructive dialogue. They are an integral part of marriage. No wonder couples so often disagree!
I had often heard that in-laws sometimes do damage to a marriage. It’s something I could never understand. Which parents would destroy a marriage?
Over time, I’ve observed that problems often stem from parents’ insecurity. When their child and his/her wife/husband have disagreements, the parents suffer from their failure to learn this Chasam Sofer. They fail to realize that disagreements, when engaged in with willingness to listen and mutual respect, are a part of marriage. Yes, your tatelle can learn to work things out without you!
After yeshiva, I often walk around the block to catch a bus home. One evening, as I turned the corner, I saw a member of our kollel standing at the edge of the street, looking towards Boro Park, where he lives. I realize that he’s waiting for someone. I see that he is repeatedly looking at his watch… then down the street… looking… stepping out… he looks angry. I realize that he is waiting for his wife. I sympathize.
As I walked by, I commented to him, “Yehuda, don’t blame her. Blame the Ribbono Shel Olam. He created wives that way.”
The following day, Yehuda approached me to thank me for my comment the evening before. “We were headed to an important appointment. My wife was late. When she finally arrived, she was ready for a fight. I was ready for a fight. Instead, I go into the car and said, ‘Reb Yisroel said it’s not your fault! I’ll take up my complaints with the Ribbono Shel Olam.’”
Accept differences; that’s the lesson of the Chasam Sofer. It’s a lesson for shana rishona, the first year of marriage, and a lesson for all subsequent years of marriage.
A Deeper Appreciation
Rabbi Chaim Shmulevitz takes this lesson a step further. In Sichos Mussar (5732:20), he refers to a “sod gadol be’yetzira,” what he calls a great secret of creation. “A woman is created to be helpful to her husband, and as a result of this responsibility, she is endowed with the ability (chush ha’re’ach) to sense the truth regarding the manner in which her husband conducts himself, in relation to his spiritual status.”
He explains that a woman’s ability to disagree with her husband regarding his conduct – and to be correct in her contention – is a gift to the husband from the Ribbono Shel Olam.
The Gemora relates that Rav Chanina ben Tradyon, one of the ten harugei malchus (Torah giants martyred by the Romans), was punished because he pronounced Hashem’s Name as it is spelled, something that is normally done only in the Beis Hamikdash. When the Romans took him to be killed, his wife was defiled as well. The Gemora relates that he was punished for pronouncing Hashem’s Name, while she was punished for not preventing him from doing so. How incredible! Rav Chanina was a gadol hador (leader of his generation), a poseik (authority) for his people. He held that he was permitted to pronounce Hashem’s Name. Wouldn’t it be expected that his wife accept his p’sak (ruling)? How could she be faulted for failing to correct him?
Rabbi Chaim Shmulevitz presents this question, and concludes that even if a man is a gadol hador, his wife’s ability to sense his failings rises to correspond to his level. Thus, his wife did indeed have the ability to correct him.
What men often see as a hindrance, as a burden, is actually a gift of the highest order!
How tragic it is when people turn the great gifts of marriage into problems. The very potential for disagreement and constructive criticism that marriage offers should be appreciated and utilized with great joy.
If we understand that it is inherent in marriage to have disagreements, to build from differences – and yes, to accept criticism – then we can build in our marriage.
Ishto Mosheles Alav
The Gemora (Beitza 32) teaches “There are three whose lives are not lives.” One of the three is mi she’ishto mosheles alav, a man whose wife rules over him.
Using the Chasam Sofer’s idea, we can understand this Gemora in a new light. The Gaon of Vilna teaches that there are two Hebrew words for a monarch: melech, king, and moshel, ruler. There is a fundamental difference between the two.
A melech is a king who is willingly accepted by his subjects as their leader. His commands are followed happily. A moshel rules by force, against the desire of his subjects.
Ki lashem hamelucha u’moshel ba’goyim, the Jewish people have accepted Hashem’s rule willingly, but the idolater does not accept Hashem’s dictates. To him, Hashem is a moshel.
Only when Mashiach comes will all accept Hashem’s rule willingly: “V’hayah Hashem l’melech al kol ha’aretz. On that day will G-d be King over all the Earth.”
Returning to our subject, Mi she’ishto mosheles alav, a man whose wife rules over him, lives a tough life, indeed. This is because his wife’s opinions cause him anger and aggravation; he feels threatened by her. She has become a moshel. Sad, indeed. A couple should never have a memshala relationship. The home should have an atmosphere of malchus, where the royal couple rules jointly, and disagreements that arise are cause for fruitful discussion and joyful growth.
We need to internalize the Chasam Sofer’s message. Having a disagreement does not mean that a marriage is a failure. It makes growth possible. It can make a home better than it was before. Yes, intelligent people can have different opinions.
And so, the next time you and your wife view a matter differently, declare with appreciation, “Baruch Hashem, this is a marriage made in heaven!”
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Posted by Avromi at 11/28/2006 12:03:00 AM 6 comments
Labels: beitza, chasam sofer, daf yomi, marriage, Parshas Chaye Sarah
Daf Yomi - Beitza 32 - Six Sad Cases
• A person with no means of his own and looks to the table of another for his subsistence
• A person dominated by ones spouse
• A person whose body is dominated by suffering
The gemara in Mesechta Pesachim (113b) lists three different categories of people whose life is not a life.
• A person who is extravagantly merciful
• One who is overly excitable
• One who is too sensitive
All three of these, explains Rashbam, face situations regularly which allow them no peace because of their overreaction, and therefore their life is not a life. But why, asks Tosefot in Pesachim, are these six types of sufferers separated into two categories of three each, rather than combined into one statement?
The explanation, Tosefot offers, is that the three mentioned in Pesachim are the result of a persons own character traits, while the ones mentioned in Mesechta Beitza are the result of circumstances beyond his control such as poverty, illness or a mismatched marriage.
This and other insights can be found at Ohr Sameach's Weekly Daf Points here
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Posted by Avromi at 11/28/2006 12:01:00 AM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 32 - Temporary Walls
Shulchan Aruch (315:1) rules that it is permitted to erect temporary walls on Shabbos providing that it does not have a roof. Biur Halacha questions this from our Gemora where this is only permitted by a beis hakisei where we are concerned for the dignity of the person but otherwise it would be forbidden?
He answers that the Gemora is referring to a case where the wall is being constructed from stones which resembles a permanent structure and that is why it is only permitted by a beis hakisei; however it will be permitted in any instance to erect a temporary wall using curtains or mats which do not resemble a permanant structure.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/28/2006 12:00:00 AM 1 comments
Monday, November 27, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitza 31 - Tzibel mit Ayer (Eggs with Onions)
Tosfos rules that since we are not experts in the specifics of an ax, one is prohibited from using any part of the ax to chop wood and it should be done only by hand. Shulchan Aruch (501:11) rules that it is permitted to use a knife but not an ax.
Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is bothered as to why we are permitted to cut melons, apples and other fruits on Shabbos to many pieces. Chopping wood into pieces is regarded as tochen, grinding even though the pieces are large. It can be considered grinding even if the pieces are the size of a tefach.
How can we chop eggs and onions on Shabbos when the pieces are approximately a tenth of a tefach? One may answer that since it is common to chop them smaller, this will not be regarded as grinding.
Rav Shlomo Zalman answers that grinding is only if the chopping leads to the final intended result. Cutting a fruit into small pieces is not its final state since the teeth are still required to chop it further. It would appear that if one cuts fruits or vegetables so small that they can be swallowed as is, that would be prohibited and constitute grinding. One should be careful when cutting food for fish not to cut the pieces too small since fish do not have teeth and they swallow the food whole.
He concludes that creating a utensil through chopping is not regarded as grinding even though the utensil is the intended final product. This is because the melocha of grinding is only when the product is intended to be consumed and not if the intention is for the object to remain in that state.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/27/2006 07:03:00 AM 2 comments
Sunday, November 26, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitza 30 - Seven Esrogim
(Answer from Kollel Iyun Hadaf)
Michael Post asked:
The Gemara states (concerning someone in Eretz Yisrael) that if
someone had 7 esrogim for 7 days (he designated one for each day),
then one opinion states that he may eat each one immediately after
using it, while the other opinion holds that he may not eat each one
until the end of the day. Thus, on day two, according to all
opinions, he can eat the esrog that was only designated for day one.
The Gemara then states (just a bit later ) that outside of Eretz
Yisrael, there is a Rabbinic decree that forbids the esrog from being
eaten on the eighth day.
My question If someone outside of Eretz Yisrael designated 7
esrogim for 7 days (actually, 6, because of Shabbos), how would the
d'rabbanan work? Is the person not allowed to eat ANY of the esrogim
until after Simchas Torah? That doesn't seem to make a whole lot of
sense. Is the person only not allowed to eat the last one the next
day? That seems counterintuitive as well, since if there was a true
safek on the day, all the other ones should have a one-day delay in
eating them as well. Is this person "off the hook" on the d'rabbanan
because of his designation? Not sure why that should be the case either
In reality, whether the day we outside of Eretz Yisrael call Shmini
Azeres is really Hoshanah Rabbah or not should be irrelevant. Since
clearly the halacha is that we do NOT take lulav/esrog on the "eighth
day", when we purchase the esrog, we have intention to use it on the
6 days that we use it. Therefore, the esrog should become permitted
at the end of Hoshana Rabbah the same way as for all of the other days.
Michael Post, usa
----------------------------------------------
The Kollel replies:
Dear Michael,
Thanks for your query. I would like to sort out the different
statements, and I think that then all will fit into place.
The Din of a person using seven Esrogim for seven days is identical
to Eretz Yisrael and Chutz la'Aretz. The issue is whether it is
designated for the Mitzvah only and thus may be eaten immediately
after the Mitzvah was performed, or does it apply to the entire day,
and may not be eaten until the next day. As I said, the Din is the
same everywhere. The fact that in Chutz la'Aretz it might be the
second or third day of the Chag has no bearing on the situation. The
designation applies to the Mitzvah relevant on that specific day (or
the entire day) only.
The second issue is in the case of using one Esrog for the entire
Chag: when does it become permissible in Chutz la'Aretz. And in this
case the rabbinic decree forbids using it on the eighth day since in
reality it might be the seventh day and the mitzvah of Esrog still
applies. You may ask, "But nevertheless we do not observe the Mitzvah
of Esrog on the eighth day, so why should we treat it as if the
Mitzvah applies on this day also?"
There are various answers offered by the Rishonim for this question.
The most common answer is that if the people would be permitted to
benefit from the Esrog on this day, they would come to the ultimate
conclusion that it is the eighth day of the Chag, and there would be
no need to eat in the Sukah either. Thus the prohibition of eating
the Esrog applies to remind us that it is indeed a Safek.
All the best.
Y. Landy
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Posted by Avromi at 11/26/2006 05:27:00 PM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 30 - Question and Answer
The notion that there are 7 separate mitzvahs of esrog but only one long mitzvah of sukkah doesn’t really seem to answer the question.
First, according to the opinion that the esrog could be eaten immediately, the fact that the mitzvah is a full day mitzvah did not cause the esrog to be asur until the end of the day, so similarly the fact that sukkah is a seven day mitzvah should not cause it to be forbidden for the rest of the seven days.
So if I understand correctly, if someone built seven sukkahs, one for each day, all seven would be prohibited from use until the end of Sukkos?
I’m really confused about what makes a sukkah a sukkah (no, not the details…). What causes a structure that happens to meet the minimum sukkah requirements to attain this status whereby the wood is prohibited from use? If someone built a sukkah and intended to use it, but never did, could he take down the wood on Chol Hamoed, or did his intention at the start of the holiday convey the prohibited status? Or is it actually using the sukkah on Sukkos that causes it to attain this status?
If someone was out in a field and found a hut that met the requirements for being a sukkah, and he just sat in it and had a meal, does that structure, which may not even have been built as a sukkah, now acquire sukkah status for the rest of the festival? If someone is going out of town for the last days, their sukkah cannot be taken down before they leave? And, if I am understanding this correctly, someone who builds a “car sukkah” by opening their car door and laying the s’chah across the top can no longer close their car door for the remainder of Sukkos, right? Obviously that is not the case. Why not? Closing the car door effectively demolishes the sukkah.
Answer from Reb Avi Lebowitz from Palo Alto Kollel
The mishna berura 638:3 says that the concept of shem shamayim on a succah only applies if it was made l'sheim chag, to the exclusion of huts that just happen to be kosher as a succah. however, in the sha'ar hatziyun (3) he is not sure if the primary factor is whether it is made l'sheim chag, or used many times (b'kvius) as a succah. The nafka mina would be a succah that is made to use only once, but is made l'sheim chag i.e. a makeshift succah on a trip, would you be allowed to use the materials of that succah for another use. However, it seems clear if originally your intent was to only designate it as a succah for a one time use, it would not be assur afterwards (see gr"a who quotes rif, that a stipulation would work for the wood of the succah. even rashi who disagrees, that is only on yom tov where there is an issur of destroying an ohel, but for a succah built on chol hamoed even rashi would hold that a stipulation of one time use would prevent the material from being assur).
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Beitzah 030: Sukah and Esrog
The Kollel replies:
It seems to me that there is a basic difference between Sukah and Esrog. Sukah is a continual Mitzvah for every moment of all seven days whilst Esrog is a one-time Mitzvah, only once a day. See the MISHNAH on SUKAH 48a that even though one has finished one's meal on the seventh day of Sukos (i.e. in Eretz Yisrael where one does not live in the Sukah at all on Shemini Atzeres) one should nevertheless not dismantle the Sukah. RASHI DH LO YATIR writes that this is because one is obligated all day long to sleep or study inside the Sukah, and if a meal should come one's way, one requires the Sukah to eat it in.
Therefore, according to Rav (end 30b) one may eat the Esrog immediately because (1) the Esrog was only seperated for use on one day and (2) even on that day the Esrog is only specified for the Mitzvah until one performed the Mitzvah, but for no longer, because there is no obligation to "shake" the Esrog more than once a day.
In contrast not only is Sukah a 7-day Mitzvah but in addition, even though one has already fulfilled the Mitzvah, one is obliged to use the Sukah whenever one wishes to eat, sleep or learn Torah.
However if someone built 7 Sukos, one for each day, it would seem to me that he should be permitted to dismantle the Day 1 Sukah once Day 2 arrives, for instance. This is because of the reason the aforementioned Rashi gives that one may not dismantle the Sukah since one may still require it for sleeping or learning. According to this, if one has an alternative Sukah available, it should be permitted to undo the first. In addition, RASHI SHABBOS 45a DH AD seems to say more clearly that there is no prohibition against dismantling a Sukah on Chol ha'Mo'ed. However these latter points require further thought.
(1) See SHULCHAN ARUCH OC 638:1 in REMA who writes that the wood of the Sukah only becomes prohibited if one dwelt in the Sukah on one occasion, whilst if one merely prepared the Sukah but did not live there it does not become prohibited, because "Hazmanah Lav Milsa" ("Preparation is not significant").
MISHNAH BERURAH #9 cites MAGEN AVRAHAM who writes that even if the Sukah was not constructed with the intention of being a Sukah, but was merely intended to provide shelter, nevertheless, if it possesses the requirements of a kosher Sukah, and one sat there once, it is henceforth forbidden for the rest of Yom Tov.
MISHNAH BERURAH adds that this only applies if one specified before dwelling there that one intended that it should be the Sukah for Yom Tov, or if one had intention when dwelling there that it should be used henceforth for the whole of Yom Tov. Otherwise, a Sukah does not acquire Kedushah (to be considered the Sukah of Yom Tov) merely because one used it once.
(2) MISHNAH BERURAH proves the above Halachah from what he writes (638:3) that if somebody sat in the Sukah of (a) shepherds (b) "Burganin" (see RASHI SUKAH 8b DH BURGANIN that this is the booth of the city guards) or (c) "Kayatzin" (workers who guard the produce drying in the fields), this remains an ordinary hut, because merely sitting in these huts and eating one's bread does not give Kedushah to the Sukah.
(3) The question about the person who leaves town for the last days of Sukos and wants to knock down his Sukah, is not so simple. I pointed out that Rashi seems to suggest that if not for the fact that that one might still need the Sukah, there would be no prohibition on dismantling it on Chol ha'Mo'ed. Rashi is cited by MISHNAH BERURAH 666:1. I have found that SHEMIRAS SHABBOS KEHILCHASA (ch. 67 note 177) writes that it would seem that one may not dismantle a Sukah on Chol ha'Mo'ed because this constitutes doing Melachah which is unnecessary for Chol ha'Mo'ed. However SHEMIRAS SHABBOS KEHILCHASA notes that the aforementioned MISHNAH BERURAH would appear to suggest that it is permitted.
See PISKEI TESHUVOS (by R. Simcha Rabinovitz Shlita) 638:3 who cites Poskim who discuss whether one may take down a Sukah during Sukos if one is careful with the Kedushah of the walls and the roof-covering, and does not use them for other purposes. It may be that the mere fact that one demolishes the Sukah represents a lowering of its holiness, which is forbidden.
(4) I did not understand what the problem should be with the car Sukah. (See PISKEI TESHUVOS 628:4 DH UMI'KAN who writes that a Sukah made on a car is Kosher if made strongly and see also PISKEI TESHUVOS 638 note 2). If the car has a sliding roof, one could put the "Sechach" on the roof and the car might be a Kosher Sukah even if the door is open, if there is sufficient amount of Sukah walls provided by the rest of the car's structure.
KOL TUV
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Posted by Avromi at 11/26/2006 02:19:00 AM 0 comments
Saturday, November 25, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitza 30 - When the Reason doesn't Apply (Untzumdritimel)
The Rema (O.C. 339:3) rules in accordance with Tosfos. Teshuvos HaRema (125) writes that there was an incident where a marriage occurred on Friday night and the people were not concerned that the groom would write the kesuvah, marriage contract on Shabbos. The reason for this permit was because it is not common in our times for the groom to write his own kesuvah and proof to this is from our Tosfos.
Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l poses an interesting question. The halacha is that presently we do not have a legally qualified reshus harabim and for this reason one would be permitted to walk in a public thoroughfare on Shabbos while wearing various ornaments. According to this ruling, then, why are we still forbidden to blow shofar, shake a lulav and read the Megillah. Regarding these mitzvos there is a concern that one may come to carry the shofar, lulav or Megillah in the reshus harabim. Yet, the halacha is that our public thoroughfares are not deemed to be a legal reshus harabim, so we should no longer have these concerns.
Reb Shlomo Zalman also questions the opinion of the Raavad who maintains that muktzeh is forbidden on account of a rabbinical decree that one should not come to carry into a reshus harabim. Why should this decree still apply when there is no longer a legally qualified reshus harabim?
Rav Shlomo Zalman explains that Tosfos is only referring to musical instruments. In previous times, everyone was capable of playing and repairing musical instruments. For this reason there was a decree prohibiting clapping and dancing. In our times, however, only a minority of people is capable of fixing musical instruments and because it is uncommon for people to fix musical instruments, there is no necessity for the decree against clapping and dancing.
We discussed these issues previously on Dafnotes on Daf 5. Here is the discussion and the comments.
Daf Yomi - Beitza 5 - Decrees where the reason does not apply any longer
Rabbah maintained that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai rescinded the prohibition against accepting witnesses after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, and subsequently an egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah was permitted to be eaten on the second day. Rav Yosef challenged Rabbah’s ruling because if the Chachamim assembled to render a ruling, they would need to reassemble to revoke their ruling. Rav Yosef added that one could not say that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai convened with his colleagues to permit one to eat the egg, because their decision was only to accept the testimony after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, but they never took a vote on permitting the egg to be eaten.
Tosfos rules that a matter that was only prohibited for a specific amount of time will be permitted once that time period elapses. Tosfos on Daf 6 writes that a matter that was only prohibited because of a specific concern will be permitted when the concern no longer exists. This principle justifies why we do not have to be concerned for water that was exposed at night and one is allowed to drink from it because in modern times snakes are not frequent in our homes.
Tosfos HaRosh in Avodah Zara (2a) rules that one is permitted to conduct business with gentiles during their holiday season as initially this was prohibited because gentiles in the past worshipped idols and now that gentiles do not worship idols, the decree is irrelevant.
Tosfos in Brachos (53b) writes that people are not scrupulous regarding mayim acharonim , washing the hands at the end of a meal, because we no longer have melach sedomis, salt from Sodom. Tosfos notes that although the practice of washing mayim achronmim was instituted by an assembly of a Bais Din, this institution was not unanimously accepted and thus this institution is not categorized as a ruling that is irrevocable unless a Bais Din reassembles and rescinds the ruling.
Reb Shlomo Kluger in Elef Lecho Shlomo (116) rules that one is permitted to learn by candlelight on Shabbos and we are not concerned that he may come to move the wick which will cause the fire to burn brighter, thus violating a biblical prohibition, because one does not need to move the wick of our present-day candles.
Teshuvos HaRosh (klal 2:8) rules that one is permitted to tie strings of linen on a four-cornered garment that is made from linen to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzis and we are not concerned that one might tie strings of wool to the garment. The reason for this ruling is because all know that techeiles, a blue-dyed wool used for tzitzis, is not prevalent, thus there is no permit to tie strings of wool to a linen garment.
Teshuvos HaRosh writes that if is common knowledge why a decree was instituted and the rationale no longer applies, then the decree is considered irrelevant. Teshuvos HaRosh draws a contrast of this supposition to the case in our Gemara regarding the egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah, because some people are not aware whey the egg was initially prohibited, nor do they understand why the reason to prohibit no longer applies.
Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha rules that if necessary, one is permitted to take medicine on Shabbos. Taking medicine on Shabbos was initially forbidden as there was a concern that one would violate the prohibition of grinding. Now that medicine is prepared by the manufacturer and most people are not even aware of the process involved in manufacturing the medicine, there is no longer a concern that one who wishes to take medicine will violate the Shabbos prohibition of grinding herbs or spices.
Leapa said...
Apropos to gezeiros which may no longer apply, and the Daf.
1. Why is Rosh Hoshana on the first and second day of Tishrei, rather than on the 30th of Elul and the first of Tishrei?
2. Why is Rosh Hoshana 2 days in Israel?
Wed Nov 01, 11:42:07 AM 2006
Avromi said...
Rava on daf 5b on the bottom learns that even after the churban if witnesses came after mincha, both days would be kodosh and the original takanah of both days being one kedusha still remained.
this says the Rosh is the source for E"Y to still have two days now.
Look in Baal Hamaor whi disagrees and actually states that there was a long period of time kept only one day.Milchamos (Ramban) disagrees vehemently.
Wed Nov 01, 04:07:14 PM 2006
Avromi said...
I found this elsewhere and I disagree below:
TheProf said...
The reason Rosh Hashono is on 1 and 2 Tishrei and not 30 Elul and 1 Tishrei like other molei month end Rosh Chodesh is that the 1st day of Rosh Hashono would then actually be the last day of last year. Since the 1st day is actually 1 Tishrei, all of the Yomtov is in the New Year.
The reason it is also 2 days in Israel is because when Chazal originally made Rosh Hashono 2 days, it was during the time of the Bais Hamikdosh and the concept remained after the Churban because of the concept of "ishtaked", people may forget from year to year and observe the Yomtov on the wrong date.
here's why:
I would disagree with the professor since rashi on today's daf explicitly states that when the witnesses didnot come until mincha, both days would be rosh hashana and the first day would be elul 30 and the next day 1 tishrei.
Wed Nov 01, 04:25:43 PM 2006
David said...
These Poskim write that if the reason is not longer valid, the decree is no longer valid. In fact, that is one of the reasons we are allowed to dance and clap our hands on shabbos, even though it was originally outlawed for fear one might come to fashion an instrument - it is becasue we are not skilled enough. I beleive the Rama states this, but he is challenged by the Magen Avraham.
Question: The reason we are prohibited from swimming on Shabbos is b/c we are concerned one may come to make a flotation device. ( Contrary to the popular idea that it has to do with squezzing hair). But how many peopel today can do this? Should we then be permitted to swim on Shabbos
Thu Nov 02, 11:15:46 AM 2006
ben said...
From: Rabbi Doniel Neustadt.
Firstly making a floating device is a lot less complicated than making a musical instrument. Any geshikete fellow can make a makeshift floating device
Secondly, the Rama's shita is very difficult to understand even by music, and we dare not stretch it any more
Thirdly, and most important, the real reason why nowadays we do not swim is because of the old minghag Yisrael not to dip one's entire body on Shabbos even in cold water because of the concern that it may lead to sechitah or carrying; see Mishnah Berurah 326:21.
Thu Nov 02, 06:24:09 PM 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitzah 5 - More on clapping on Shabbos
Reb Dave wrote:
These Poskim write that if the reason is not longer valid, the decree is no longer valid. In fact, that is one of the reasons we are allowed to dance and clap our hands on shabbos, even though it was originally outlawed for fear one might come to fashion an instrument - it is becasue we are not skilled enough. I beleive the Rama states this, but he is challenged by the Magen Avraham.Question: The reason we are prohibited from swimming on Shabbos is b/c we are concerned one may come to make a flotation device. ( Contrary to the popular idea that it has to do with squezzing hair). But how many peopel today can do this? Should we then be permitted to swim on Shabbos
Rabbi Doniel Neustadt responds:
Firstly making a floating device is a lot less complicated than making a musical instrument. Any geshikete fellow can make a makeshift floating deviceSecondly, the Rama's shita is very difficult to understand even by music, and we dare not stretch it any moreThirdly, and most important, the real reason why nowadays we do not swim is because of the old minghag Yisrael not to dip one's entire body on Shabbos even in cold water because of the concern that it may lead to sechitah or carrying; see Mishnah Berurah 326:21.
Rabbi Ephraim Nissenbaum adds:
I only saw the piece of the posting that was e-mailed to me, but the comparison to clapping on Shabbos is a little different. Although the Rema says that we don't know how to fix instruments today, the Biur Halacha says from Elya Rabba that the Rema is not permitting every type of clapping or dancing. He's not clear what he does permit )I didn't see the Elya Rabba) but it sounds like he's saying that Chazal only prohibited certain types of clapping and dancing, and we're not going to prohibit any more since we don't know how to fix the instruments anyway. The Aruch Hashulchan says this clearly, that our clapping and dancing is a different type than they used to do....
joshwaxman said...
consider whether to delete this comment or not, because of silliness or because of the fact that Rema himself says "mutav..."
The Rema in question is in Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim, 339 seif 3, where he comments:
. הגה: והא דמספקין ומרקדין האידנא ולא מחינן בהו משום דמוטב שיהיו שוגגין וכו'. וי"א דבזמן הזה הכל שרי, דאין אנו בקיאין בעשיית כלי שיר וליכא למגזר שמא יתקן כלי שיר דמלתא דלא שכיח הוא ואפשר שעל זה נהגו * (י) להקל בכל (תוספות סוף פרק המביא כדי יין).
Thus, his first reason is that it is in fact wrong, but not to tell. He then proceeds to offer a rationalization for existing custom. I would say he is not pleased with this development, but his citation of the yesh omrim is part of a trend among Rishonim and Acharonim to rationalize existing custom even while expressing reservations about it. So one should not go out and broadly apply a principle which is applied with extreme difficultly and duress even where it was applied.
Note that in reference to the question, in the first seif the Mechaber brings down the prohibition of swimming, and the Rema does NOT offer the out that the questioner offered - because he does not really hold that it is a strongly valid reason.
Fri Nov 03, 02:25:39 PM 2006
Thinking Man said...
Everyone is ignoring the elephant in the room: If the reason doesn't apply, why are we still doing it? We would riddicule some African bushman tribe that will not eat meat today b/c someone once died from food poisining two thousand yers ago - are we not doing the exact same thing, all lomdishe rationales aside? " Zoo hee koshiah sh'ain alav teshuvah". Truly, it makes no sense.
Sun Nov 05, 11:03:03 AM 2006
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Posted by Avromi at 11/25/2006 10:11:00 PM 4 comments
Labels: beitza, daf yomi, marriage, Rav Shlomo Zalman
Daf Yomi - Beitza 30 - Red and Green Decorations
The Gemara discusses hanging ornaments to beautify the Sukkah. The Shelah writes that hanging ornaments in the Sukkah reflects our endearment for the mitzvah of Sukkah. Thus, the more one enhances the beauty of the Sukkah with ornaments, the more praiseworthy he is. Amongst the various items that the Gemara lists for the purpose of decorating the Sukkah are fruits and foods such as grapes, wine, oil and flour. It is noteworthy that these same items are listed in the Gemara Avodah Zara 51 as items that are used for idol worship. Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha (ad loc) rules that one does not have to be concerned with using items for Sukkah decorations even if these same items are used by the gentiles for their winter holidays season. The Chasam Sofer (Orach Chaim 42) rules in a similar vein that one can use for lighting in the synagogue candles that were designated for idolatry but were not actually used in the pagan service. Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha to our Gemara explains why one who uses items that are designated for idolatry is not in violation of the prohibition not to walk in the ways of the gentiles who worship idols. The reason for this is because the Gemara (Sanhedrin 52) states that one can perform any action that is recorded in the Torah, even if such an action subsequently was performed for idolatry. A Jew is not performing the act on account of the idolaters. Rather, he is performing the act because this is what he has been instructed to do by the Torah. The same idea can be said regarding the Sukkah decorations mentioned in the Gemara. One would be allowed to hang Sukkah decorations that are used by the gentiles for their holiday season, as a Jew would be hanging the decorations because the decorations are mentioned in the Gemara and not on account of the gentile’s custom.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/25/2006 10:08:00 PM 4 comments
Labels: chasam sofer, daf yomi, decorations, sukkah
Daf Yomi - Beitza 30 - Which Walls are Forbidden?
The Ran rules that the prohibition to derive pleasure is only on the walls which are needed for the sukkah to be valid, but anything more than that is deemed extra and therefore, one would be permitted to sit in the portion of the sukkah that was not needed. However, the Ran concludes that if the entire sukkah was built at the same time, one would be forbidden to derive pleasure from the entire sukkah. Tosfos holds that whatever is more than what is neceesary for the sukkah will only be prohibited midrobanan.
The Aruch Lener states that he doesn't understand their logic for before the Yom Tov of Sukkos begins, there is no prohibition and it only become forbidden when Sukkos begins and it is used for the mitzva. At that time, the entire sukkah is built, so what would be the difference between the walls which were built first or later?
I didn't see an explanation of this yet.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/25/2006 10:06:00 PM 1 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 30 - Demonstrations against Chilul Shabbos by Reb Jay
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Friday, November 24, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitza 29 - Weekday Activity
The Mishna continues that one is permitted to carry one or two pitchers on his shoulder. Rashi explains that it is evident from the manner in which he is carrying them that they are necessary for Yom Tov and that is why it is allowed.
Reb Menachem Kohn Zt"l in his sefer Ateres Avi explains why Rashi did not explain the reason for permitting the carrying of the wine on his shoulder because it is not a weekday activity. He states that perhaps during the week one would carry one pitcher on his shoulder and therefore Rashi was compeled to state the reason that it's permitted is because it is apparent that he is carrying them for Yom Tov.
The Acharonim discuss the prohibition of performing an action on Yom Tov that resembles a weekday activity. Is the reason for the prohibition because it appears as if the person is doing this action because of his weekday needs? Or perhaps, even if it is evident that his objective is for his yom Tov needs, it is forbidden because this an action that is common to be done during the weekday?
It would appear from our Gemora and Rashi's explanation that the first reason is the correct one and that is why one is permitted to carry the pitcher of wine on his shoulder even though this is a wekday activity. It is allowed because it is evident that he is carrying the wine because he needs the wine for Yom Tov.
Ateres Avi cites Harav Moshe Feinstein (O"C 4:74 Tochen:4) who explains that one is prohibited from performing an action on Yom Tov that is regarded as a weekday activity because on Yom Tov one is required to perform actions in a temporary manner and in a way that shows that the action is needed for Yom Tov. During the week, one is particular on the method of his actions and his actions are performed in a permanent manner. This explains why Rashi stated that carrying a pitcher of wine on his shoulder is permitted since it is apparent that he needs it for Yom Tov. It is this precise reason that creates the distinction between a weekday permanent action and a Yom Tov temporary one.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/24/2006 01:34:00 PM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 29- Lekavod Shabbos
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Thursday, November 23, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitza 28 - Taking Something Without Permission
Sefer Tal Torah brings a proof from this Gemora that one is permitted to take something from someone else without his permission if it is known that he will not be particular about it. This is the opinion of the Shach (C"M 358) and not like the Hagaos Ashri and Tosfos in Bava Metzia (22a).
Tal Torah concludes that perhaps it is not a proof since we could speculate that Rabbi Shimon gave Rebbe Chiya a larger portion many times in the past and therefore everyone would agree that Rebbe Chiya would be permitted to take extra without permission.
I noticed that Kollel Iyun Hadaf here offers another distinction between this incident and the case that Tosfos is referring to. Rashi's words imply that Rebbe merely left the fish in a place where he normally left things for any of the Talmidim to take; he did not specifically designate the fish for Rebbe Chiya. Accordingly, Rebbe Chiya, who was one of the Talmidim, had permission to take it even though Rebbe did not give it specifically to him.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/23/2006 04:09:00 PM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 28 - Sharpening the Knife
The Ran in the first perek stated that one is permitted to carry the shechita knife in a public domain on Yom Tov since this is regarded as preparing the food and not just a preliminary phase. The Avnei Neizer (O"C 410) explains that it is considered ochel nefesh because the person is bringing the knife closer to the food.
Rav Shlomo Zalman comments that this is understandable only if the knife is already usable to perform the shechita; however where the knife would still require sharpening, then it cannot be considered ochel nefesh and that is why the Mishna prohibits sharpening the knife.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/23/2006 03:20:00 PM 0 comments
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitzah 27 - Seeing the teacher
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Daf Yomi - Beitza 27 - When did Rabbi Tarfon Live?
The Gemora cites the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who maintains that an animal that dies on Yom Tov is not muktza. It would seem that Rabbi Shimon's view would not be consistent with the opinion cited in the Mishna. The Gemora concludes that our Mishna can be referring to an animal of kodshim and there even Rabbi Shimon would admit that one would be prohibited from moving the carcass. One cannot derive any benefit from kodshim that dies and therefore it is considered muktza.
Rashi offers several reasons why one would not be able to redeem this animal and subsuquently benefit from the animal.
Pnei Yehoshua asks that the korban that we are referring to must be a bechor. This can be proven by the fact that Rabbi Tarfon lived many years after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh and the only korbanos that are found after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh are bechoros. The halacha is clear that a bechor cannot be redeemed since its sanctity is from the womb and not by one's mouth. Why is Rashi bothered with the possibility of benefit through redemption?
Rav Shlomo Zalman answers that since the Mishna relates that Rabbi Tarfon did not know the halachic ruling on this issue, it is possible to speculate that this incident transpired when Rabbi Tarfon was extremely young and at that time the Beis Hamikdosh was still standing. It can therefore be referring to any korban, which is why Rashi is discussing the possibility of redemption.
The Gemora in Kiddushin (71a) relates that Rabbi Tarfon (who was a kohen) recalled going with his uncle (who was also a kohen) to the Beis Hamikdosh for Birchas Kohanim.
It is a bit odd that the Pnei Yehoshua states that Rabbi Tarfon lived MANY years after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.
I found this from Wikipedia.
Tarfon or Tarfon, (Hebrew: טרפון , from the Greek Tryphon), a member of the third generation of the Mishnah sages, who lived in the period between the destruction of the Temple (70 C.E.) and the fall of Bethar (135 C.E.). He is said to have lived in Yavneh, although it is evident that he lived also in Lydda. He was of priestly lineage, and he expressly stated that he officiated in the Temple in Jerusalem. As a priest, he would demand the heave-offering even after the Temple had fallen, while his generosity made him return to the father the redemption-money for the first-born, although it was his priestly perquisite.
Although wealthy, he possessed extraordinary modesty; in one instance he deeply regretted having mentioned his name in a time of peril, since he feared that in using his position as teacher to escape from danger he had seemingly violated the rule against utilizing knowledge of the Torah for practical ends.
Rabbi Tarfon was an adherent of the school of Shammai, though he was inclined toward leniency in the interpretation of those halakhot of Shammai which had not actually been put into practise; often he decided in direct opposition to the followers of Shammai when they imposed restrictions of excessive severity.
R. Tarfon engaged in halakhic controversies with Rabbi Akiva, with R. Simeon, and R. Eleazar ben Azaryah. He is mentioned briefly with regard to Bruriah. In the discussion as to the relative importance of theory and practise, Tarfon decided in favor of the latter. R. Tarfon was extremely bitter against those Jews who had been converted to Christianity and he swore that he would burn every book of theirs which should fall into his hands, his feeling being so intense that he had no scruples against destroying the Gospels, although the name of God occurred frequently in them. Justin Martyr's Dialog with Trypho, a proof of Christianity from the Old Testament, purports to be a dialog with Tarfon, though this has been held to be a literary device rather than historical (see Schiffman).
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Posted by Avromi at 11/22/2006 05:10:00 PM 6 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 27 - Blemished Bechor to the Kohen
Why did Reb Yehuda have to give the bechor to the kohanim to eat? A bechor that has a blemish is permitted even to a Yisroel? Pnei Yehoshua answers that even though a bechor with a blemish can be eaten by all, nonetheless there is an obligation to give the animal to a kohen and the kohen can allow everyone to partake in the bechor.
The Rambam in Hilchos Bechoros (1:3) writes that a bechor with a blemish is given to a kohen. It is evident that this would be included in the mitzva of matnos kehuna.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/22/2006 04:41:00 PM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitzah 26 - Broken yet complete
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Posted by Anonymous at 11/22/2006 06:35:00 AM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 26 - Rendering on Yom Tov
Rashi explains that it is prohibited to pass judgement on Yom Tov since it is the expert's declaration that enables one to eat from this animal. This would be considered making something usable on Yom Tov, which is generally forbidden. The commentators explain that this would be different than a regular decision rendered by a posek since in most cases, the posek is only clarifying something whcih we did not know before. He is not changing its status. In contrast, a bechor which is shechted prior to the experts examination is forbidden to eat even if it was subsequently determined that the animal had a blemish. It is evident that the expert's decision is making this animal usable and therefore he is prohibited from rendering such a decision on Yom Tov.
Tosfos adds that since the halacha is that one is not permitted to examine the animal, the animal becomes muktza since the owner concludes that he will not be able to use this animal, which strengthens the prohibition against examining tha animal to determine if it has a blemish or not.
The Rambam in Hilchos Yom Tov (2:3) explains that the Sages decreed that one cannot examine an animal where a blemish occured prior to Yom Tov since this will lead to people examining animals where the blemish occured on Yom Tov. Obviously if by the arrival of Yom Tov, there was no apparent blemish, the animal is deemed to be muktza since it was not prepared from before Yom Tov.
The Magid Mishna explains that we are concerned that the expert will rule that the blemish is not permanent and therefore it cannot be shechted. This will result in the fact that retroactively, the animal was handled unnecessarily on Yom Tov.
The Taz (498:9) asks that according to the Magid Mishna, all rulings should be forbidden on Yom Tov for perhaps the Rav will rule that the chicken, chollent etc. is forbidden and retroactively the object in question was handled unnecessarily?
He answers that the Magid Mishna is only referring to a case similar to bechor where there was never a status quo of heter beforehand and the issur began even as early as birth (a bechor becomes holy by peter rechem - opening of the womb).
A comparable case would be when a liquid issur fell into other liquid and there is not in the mixture enough to negate the issur and then more permissible liquid fell in and perhaps there is enough now to negate the issur. A posek cannot render a decision on this shaila because there was a time that the mixture was forbidden to eat.
The Machtzis Hashekel comments that according to Rashi, a posek can rule on this issue. Only by a bechor where the permission is dependent on the expert and not on the factual basis is where a posek cannot rule on Yom Tov.
The Meiri states this distinction explicitly. When there is a question if an animal is a treifa or not, all we need is a clarification. If one knows that it is not a treifa, the animal is permitted. A rav can rule on a treifa issue on Yom Tov since he is only clarifying. Ruling on a bechor if it has a blemish and if it is permanent is not dependent on the facts, rather on the declaration of the expert. One cannot issue such a ruling on Yom Tov.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/22/2006 06:23:00 AM 0 comments
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitzah 25 - A fiery Torah
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Posted by Anonymous at 11/21/2006 11:06:00 AM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 25 - The Jewish People are Brazen
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The Gemara states that the Jewish people are the most brazen of the nations. The attribute of brazenness is the opposite of the attribute of Bushah (bashfulness, humility). The Gemara in Yevamos (79a) teaches that David ha'Melech ruled that the Nesinim were not fit to marry into the Jewish people because they did not demonstrate the three signs characteristic of the Jewish people, who are "Rachmanim, Baishanim, v'Gomlei Chasadim" (merciful, bashful, and bestowers of kindness).
The MAHARAL (Nesiv ha'Bushah 1) explains that the Jewish people inherited these three natural characteristics from the Avos (see also Beitzah 32b). The attribute of Gomlei Chasadim comes from Avraham Avinu, who excelled in the Midah of Chesed (Bereishis 18:19). They inherited mercifulness from Yakov Avinu who said to his sons, "May Hash-m give you mercy" (Bereishis 43:14). (Yakov Avinu asked Hash-m to grant his descendants mercy in the eyes of others in return for Yakov's own exemplary Midah of Rachamim. Yakov's mercy is also demonstrated in the description of the way he tended the flocks of Lavan, Bereishis 31:38-40.)
They inherited the trait of Bushah from Yitzchak Avinu, whose unique trait was Yir'ah, fear (Bereishis 31:42), from which Bushah derives (Yevamos 79a; see Insights to Yevamos 79:1).
Why does the Gemara here say that the natural tendency of the Jewish people is the attribute of brazenness, while the Gemara in Yevamos says that the natural tendency of the Jewish people is Bushah? (MAHARAL ibid.)
ANSWER: The MAHARAL explains that there are two types of Bushah. One type comes from a person's lack of motivation and assertiveness. This type of Bushah manifests itself in one who is easily discouraged from taking any initiative because of his shame.
The other type of Bushah is the feeling which one experiences when he realizes that someone else is greater than he, and he thus submits himself to that person.
The Jewish people are brazen with regard to the first type of Bushah, which they entirely lack. The Jewish people have a great degree of initiative and assertiveness. They are always spirited, creative, and innovative.
With regard to the other type of Bushah, however, the Jewish people excel, for they submit themselves to Hash-m and recognize that they are nothing in front of Him. It is in that sense that they are Baishanim (the positive type of Bushah). The Nesinim lacked this positive Bushah and therefore David ha'Melech rejected them. (See, however, the Maharal in NETZACH YISRAEL ch. 14.)
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Posted by Avromi at 11/21/2006 06:22:00 AM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 25 - A Dog is the most Brazen
AGADAH: THE MOST BRAZEN OF ANIMALS
QUESTION: The Gemara says that the dog is the most brazen of all wild animals. However, the Mishnah in Avos (5:20) says that a person should be as brazen as a leopard to do the will of Hash-m. If the Mishnah's intent is to emphasize how brazen one must be in the service of Hash-m, why does it use the leopard as an example and not the dog? Conversely, if the leopard is the most brazen of animals, why does the Gemara here not mention it? (BEN YEHOYADA)
ANSWER: The BEN YEHOYADA answers, based on the BARTENURA in Avos, that the reason a leopard ("Namer") is so brazen is because it is the product of the union between a lioness and a wild boar. As a Mamzer, a product of inappropriate cross-mating, it is particularly brazen, for brazenness is a common trait of Mamzerim (see Bava Basra 58a, Maseches Kalah ch. 1). Any animal that is a Mamzer has that trait, but all leopards have that trait because they are all Mamzerim, and that is why the Mishnah mentions the leopard as an example of how brazen one should be in serving Hash-m. The Gemara here, however, discusses animals which are naturally endowed with the characteristic of brazenness and not animals which are brazen as a result of their pedigree.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/21/2006 06:16:00 AM 1 comments
Sunday, November 19, 2006
Daf Yomi - Beitzah 24- I run away from You, to You
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Posted by Anonymous at 11/19/2006 11:00:00 PM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 24 - A Doubt on the Preparation
The reason that an item that is not prepared prior to Yom Tov is prohibited is because of muktzeh. This is difficult, however, because muktzeh is only rabbinically prohibited, so a case of doubt should also be permitted, as there is a principle that safek derabannan lekula, an uncertainty regarding a rabbinical prohibition is judged leniently?
One answer that is suggested is that the prohibition of muktzeh can be derived from a verse in the Torah that states veheichinu, and they shall prepare. Thus, muktzeh can be viewed as a biblical prohibition and regarding an uncertainty we will rule stringently.
Tosfos Yeshanim on Daf 3b writes that even if muktzeh is not biblically prohibited, the Chachamim treated muktzeh as if it would be biblically prohibited and therefore we rule strictly even in a case of uncertainty.
The Meiri answers that muktzeh is a dovor sheyeish lo matirin', a matter that will be permitted after Yom Tov, so we will rule stringently even in a case of uncertainty.
The Shaar Hatziyon (497:10) writes, based on the Meiri, that if the fish were most likely to spoil if we would wait until after Yom Tov, we can rule leniently and allow one to eat the fish, although this is a case of safek muktzeh, a possibility of the fish being muktzeh.. Shaar HaTziyun does not conclude that this is the halacha, because there are other factors that necessitate a stringent ruling, such as the fact that muktzeh is akin to a biblical prohibition, and for this reason, even if the fish were to spoil, one cannot eat them, unless the fish spoiling will be a complete loss.
Please look here for further discussion regarding muktza.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/19/2006 10:48:00 PM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 24 - Posek Changing his Mind
Rav maintains that it was permitted to accept the fish and to handle the fish but the fish were not permitted for consumption. Levi disagrees and maintains that the fish were permitted for consumption.
Rav stated further that a person should not leave the Beis Medrash, even for a moment. Rav related that both he and Levi were in the Beis Medrash when Rebbi ruled on this matter. In the evening Rebbi ruled that it was permitted to eat the fish according to Rabban Gamliel. In the morning, however, Rebbi retracted his ruling and he ruled that one could handle the fish but they could not be eaten. Levi was only in the Beis Medrash in the evening but not in the morning and therefore he did not hear Rebbe's retraction.
Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha cites a similar Gemora in Shabbos (136b) where Ravina quotes Rava retracting his ruling the next morning.
The Noda BiYehudah writes that if a posek rules on a halachic inquiry and his ruling is accepted, the ruling has the effect of two witnesses in court. If one were to claim that the posek retracted his decision, he would not be believed as it is akin to the word of one witness against two witnesses.
Based on his premise, one must wonder how Rav was believed to state that Rebbi retracted his decision in the morning.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/19/2006 10:47:00 PM 4 comments
Labels: beitza, daf yomi, halacha, Noda b'Yehudah, posek
Daf Yomi - Beitza 24 - Halacha is not like Rabban Gamliel
Why did the Gemora have to explicitly rule against Rabban Gamliel, isn't the rule that when an individual argues with the Chachamim, the halacha is always according to the Chachamim?
Pnei Yehoshua and Reshash both answer that perhaps one would have thought that since Rabban Gamliel ruled for everyone according to his opinion, it should be considered a 'maaseh Rav' and the halacha should be according to Rabban Gamliel. The Gemora concludes that this is not the case and the halacha is in accordance with the Chachamim.
Rav Menachem Kohn Zt"l in his sefer Ateres Avi explains based on this as to why the Gemora states the halacha is not in accordance with Rabban Gamliel. It should have said, the halacha is in accordance with the Chachamim. Since the novelty is that we do not rule in accordance with Rabban Gamliel even though it was a 'maaseh Rav', the Gemora specifically states that the halacha is not according to him.
I am curious as to what the rules of 'maaseh Rav' are and if they would apply in this case when Rabban Gamliel did not actually eat from the fish. If anyone should have any information on this, please let us know - thanks.
Look at the Sefer Ateres Avi where he cites another explanation from Rabbi Mordechai Nadoff as to why the Gemora states the halacha is not in accordance with Rabban Gamliel and not that the halacha is in accordance with the Chachamim.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/19/2006 10:40:00 PM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitzah 23 - Give me knowledge or give me death
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Posted by Anonymous at 11/19/2006 05:59:00 PM 0 comments
Daf Yomi - Beitza 23 - Smoking on Yom Tov
UPDATE : Many people have mentioned that the number one issue should be second hand smoke - now that it has been proven that this is extremely dangerous. Here is a ruling issued by the Tzitz Eliezer.
When one is smoking in a public place, anyone in the vicinity who is concerned about his personal health can protest and demand that the person should not smoke in the area.
HaRav Moshe Feinstein Zt"l writes sharp words for those who smoke in a Beis Medrash, Yeshiva or kollel building.
(דברים חריפים יותר על חומרת איסור העישון בבית המדרש בישיבות ובכוללים, כתב הגר"מ פיינשטיין שליט"א, ראה צילום מכתבו להלן עמ' 251-248.
Please read this introduction again from the Kollel Iyun Hadaf: Most contemporary authorities state that there is no allowance to smoke at all, even on an ordinary weekday, due to the established and documented health hazards which the effects of cigarettes and second-hand smoke pose to the smoker and to those around him.
I have recently been asked during the Daf Yomi shiur a few times regarding smoking on Yom Tov. Does the principle of 'mitoch' apply? Is it a 'dovor hashaveh lechal nefesh'? If it's unhealthy for the lungs, can the logic of calming the digestive system outweigh the health factors? There are many issues. Kollel Iyun Hadaf has done extensive research on this topic and I copy it here for you. Please visit their site often as there is a wealth of information there.
Kollel Iyun Hadaf
HALACHAH: CIGARETTES ON YOM TOV
OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the act of placing incense on coals on Yom Tov, which involves the Melachos of kindling and extinguishing. The Gemara's discussion is relevant to a debate among the Acharonim with regard to the question of whether or not one is permitted to use cigarettes on Yom Tov.
Most contemporary authorities state that there is no allowance to smoke at all, even on an ordinary weekday, due to the established and documented health hazards which the effects of cigarettes and second-hand smoke pose to the smoker and to those around him. Nevertheless, according to those who do permit a Jew to smoke, may one smoke on Yom Tov? (This discussion is a summary of the issues involved and is not intended as a Halachic ruling.)
There are four major issues involved with smoking on Yom Tov.
(a) The MAGEN AVRAHAM (OC 514:4) cites the KENESES HA'GEDOLAH who prohibits smoking on Yom Tov because it involves the Melachah of Mechabeh, extinguishing.
In a lengthy Teshuvah, the DARCHEI NO'AM (#9) asks that the act of smoking appears to involve no act of Mechabeh, but rather an act of Hav'arah (burning). Any conceivable form of Mechabeh involved (such as diminishing the fire by squeezing the cigarette) would be a "Davar she'Eino Miskaven" and not a "Pesik Reishei," and thus should be permitted.
(b) The MAGEN AVRAHAM proposes a more basic reason to ban smoking on Yom Tov. Even if it does not involve Mechabeh but only Hav'arah, and Hav'arah is permitted on Yom Tov because of the principle of "Mitoch," the principle of "Mitoch" permits only an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," which everyone enjoys. Smoking is certainly not something which everyone enjoys.
However, the PNEI YEHOSHUA (Shabbos 39b, DH v'Omer) and RAV YONASAN EIBESHITZ (in BINAH L'ITIM, Hilchos Yom Tov 4:6) write that this reason is not enough to prohibit smoking on Yom Tov. TOSFOS in Shabbos (39b, DH u'Veis Hillel) discusses whether one may enter a bathhouse to sweat on Yom Tov. He writes that although the act of washing the entire body is not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and is therefore prohibited (see Tosfos to Beitzah 21b, DH Lo), nevertheless sweating is permitted because it is for the sake of maintaining one's health (Refu'ah) and not for pleasure. Similarly, the medicinal properties of nicotine may be grounds to permit smoking.
HAGA'ON RAV YISRAEL ZEV GUSTMAN zt'l was asked if this argument is valid grounds to permit smoking on Yom Tov today, when the dangerous effects of smoking have been proven beyond any doubt. Rav Gustman answered that any person who smokes convinces himself that it is beneficial for him. The issue of whether an activity is considered one that merely provides pleasure or one that provides health benefits does not depend on whether or not the activity is objectively healthy, but whether the person himself does it for pleasure (in which case it is not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and is forbidden on Yom Tov), or for the perceived positive chemical effects that it has on his body. One who smokes presumably does so for the artificial calming effect of the nicotine. In that respect it could be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," because with regard to acts of Refu'ah what matters is the ultimate effect and not what causes that effect, as the KESAV SOFER explains (Teshuvos OC #64). Since everyone appreciates the sense of being relaxed, any act which provides relaxing effects is considered to be "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh."
The KORBAN NESANEL (Beitzah 2:22:10) cited by the BI'UR HALACHAH (511:4) mentions another rational to consider smoking an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh." Since many people, and not merely a few, have the practice to smoke, the act can be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh." The Bi'ur Halachah adds that this obviously applies only in a place where smoking is the accepted cultural norm and most people smoke.
The KORBAN NESANEL himself, however, prohibits smoking on Yom Tov. The fact that in a certain place most people smoke does not make the act "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," because smoking is harmful to those who are not accustomed to it. Lighting the "Mugmar" and washing one's entire body are also things that many people do and are still considered things which are not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" since some people do not appreciate such "pleasures." The PNEI YEHOSHUA (Shabbos 39b) also presents this argument.
(c) The PRI MEGADIM (OC 511) points out that an additional problem is involved when there is printing or letters on the outside of the cigarette wrapper, and by smoking one destroys those letters and transgresses the Melachah of Mochek (erasing). Because of this concern, some people who smoke on Yom Tov do not finish the cigarette when it burns down to the letters, but they let it burn by itself so that they should not transgress the Melachah of Mochek.
RAV HILLEL RUVEL shlit'a pointed out that this practice does not circumvent the problem of Mochek according to the NIMUKEI YOSEF in Bava Kama (22a). The Nimukei Yosef rules that when one lights a fire, he is considered to have burned everything that will eventually be burned by the fire. When Rav Ruvel brought this issue to the attention of Rav Gustman zt'l, Rav Gustman said that those who act leniently may rely on the OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Shabbos 23:2) who says that one who burns a book on Yom Tov is not liable for the Melachah of Mochek, because Mochek involves taking away the words and not the entire paper.
(d) The KORBAN NESANEL (loc. cit.) writes that even if no Isur d'Oraisa forbids smoking on Yom Tov, it is almost impossible for one who smokes on Yom Tov to avoid transgressing Isurei d'Oraisa, such as Hav'arah when he attempts to light the pipe, cigar, or cigarette, or when he adds or removes tobacco from a pipe, or when he taps the ashes off of a cigarette. (This may be the intention of the Keneses ha'Gedolah cited in (a) above.)
Other Acharonim (BIRKEI YOSEF OC 511) write that this reason cannot be used as grounds for prohibiting smoking on Yom Tov, because it is accepted that the sages today do not enact new Gezeiros. Since this reason entails making a Gezeirah (that one may not smoke lest he transgress an Isur d'Oraisa), today's sages cannot enact a rabbinical prohibition to prohibit smoking on Yom Tov in order to prevent one from transgressing Isurei d'Oraisa.
HALACHAH: The KORBAN NESANEL concludes in very strong terms that one who smokes on Yom Tov acts reprehensibly, and "one who wants to honor Hash-m and his Torah should refrain from smoking for just one or two days (Yom Tov), even though his Yetzer ha'Ra might suggest ways to permit it based on the Shas."
However, most Acharonim (as cited by the BI'UR HALACHAH loc. cit.) rule that in a city where most of the people smoke, the act of smoking can be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and thus one may smoke on Yom Tov. RAV MOSHE STERNBUCH shlit'a points out that nowadays, since even in places where people smoke they know that it is harmful to their health, and since in more and more places smoking is looked upon disapprovingly, it is very difficult to rely on these reasons to permit smoking on Yom Tov.
When asked by Kollel Iyun Hadaf whether smoking is permitted on Yom Tov, HAGA'ON RAV CHAIM PINCHAS SHEINBERG shlit'a said that it is certainly not considered an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and thus it is forbidden on Yom Tov.
Rav Sheinberg added that it has been proven that smoking is hazardous to one's health, and therefore smoking is never permitted, even on an ordinary weekday. (Regarding those who already smoke and who suffer from nicotine addiction, see IGROS MOSHE YD 2:49, and TESHUVOS V'HANGAHOS 1:316.)
Another interesting question raised by the Acharonim is whether one who maintains that smoking is forbidden on Yom Tov may light a cigarette for someone who is lenient. The KESAV SOFER (ibid.), based on the SHA'AR HA'MELECH (Hilchos Ishus 7:12), writes that if one person maintains that a certain practice is prohibited and he helps another person, who maintains that the practice is permitted, to do that act, he transgresses the prohibition of "Lifnei Iver." Therefore, one who maintains that smoking is prohibited may not help another person smoke on Yom Tov, and he must treat cigarettes and other smoking implements as Muktzah. However, the Kesav Sofer adds, if he maintains that the Halachah permits smoking but he personally is stringent and does not smoke, then he may light a cigarette for someone else who smokes.
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Posted by Avromi at 11/19/2006 05:42:00 PM 7 comments
Labels: beitza, daf yomi, Ksav Sofer, Magen Avraham, muktzah, Peri Megadim, Reb Moshe Feinstein, smoking, yom tov












