Daf Yomi - Yevamos 18 - Highlights

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: If a woman awaiting the decision of the yavam died, the yavam is permitted to marry her mother. This obviously indicates that Rav maintains that no zikah (an attachment on the account of yibum, which would create halachos similar to marriage) exists between the yevamah and the yavam.

The Gemora asks: Let him then say, the halachah is in accordance with the view of the one who doesn’t hold of zikah?

The Gemora answers: If he would have said so, it might have been suggested that this applied only to the case where there are at least two surviving brothers, but that in the case of one brother, a zikah does exist.

The Gemora asks: Then let him say, the halachah is in accordance with the view of the one who doesn’t hold of zikah even in the case of one brother?

The Gemora answers: If he would have said so, it might have been assumed that there is no zikah even where the yevamah is alive (and he would be permitted to marry her mother then); Rav Huna taught us that only after the yevamah dies is he permitted to marry her mother, and not when she is still alive, because it is forbidden to abolish the commandment of yibum (marrying her mother would exempt the yevamah from yibum and chalitzah). (17b)

Rav Yehudah disagrees with Rav Huna: Rav Yehudah maintains that if a woman awaiting the decision of the yavam died, the yavam is still forbidden to marry her mother.

The Gemora asks: Let him then say, the halachah is in accordance with the view of the one who holds of zikah?

The Gemora answers: If he would have said so, it might have been suggested that this applied only to the case where there is but one brother, however when there are at least two surviving brothers, perhaps there is no zikah.

The Gemora asks: One could not possibly think that the dispute is only in a case where there is one brother because they explicitly argue in a case when there are two remaining brothers.

The Gemora answers: If he would have said so (the halachah is in accordance with the view of the one who holds of zikah), it might have been assumed that there is only a zikah when the yevamah is alive (and he would be prohibited to marry her mother then), but that after her death, the zikah is broken; Rav Yehudah taught us that the zikah is not automatically dissolved. (17b – 18a)

Abaye asks on Rav Yehudah from the following braisa: Reuven and Shimon were contemporary brothers and Reuven died childless. Shimon planned to perform a ma'amar to his yevamah, but before he managed to perform a ma’amar to her, a third brother, Levi was born and subsequently Shimon died childless. The first (Reuven’s wife) is exempt from yibum and chalitzah on account that she is the wife of his brother who was not in his world, whereas the second (Shimon’s wife) can be taken for yibum or chalitzah. Now, if you would say that a zikah does exist, Shimon’s wife should be regarded as a co-wife of the first wife, who is forbidden because she is the wife of his brother who was not in his world (and it should be forbidden for Levi to perform a yibum with her)?

The Gemora answers that this braisa is following the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that there is no zikah. (18a)

The Gemora asks: Does Rabbi Meir actually hold that there is no zikah; we have learned in a Mishna otherwise? The Mishna states: There were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died; these sisters require chalitzah, but they cannot be taken for yibum. (The only reason to prohibit yibum in this case would be because each yevamah is the sister of his zekukah, the bond that exists between the yavam and the yevamah.) Now, if Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that no zikah exists, each yevamah is coming from two different houses, and one brother could marry the one while the other could marry the other?

The Gemora answers: Actually Rabbi Meir maintains that no zikah exists, but nevertheless, it would be forbidden to perform yibum with each of the widows. This is because a yibum with one can annul the precept of yibum with the other; if one of the brothers performs yibum with one sister and the other brother dies, there would be no possibility of yibum or chalitzah with her (since she is the yavam’s wife’s sister) and this would have negated the mitzvah of yibum with her.

The Gemora asks: If there is no zikah, we should not be concerned with the possibility of negating the mitzvah of yibum either? The Gemora proves this to be the case from Rabban Gamliel.

The Gemora answers that Rabbi Meir is concerned even when it is merely a possibility that the mitzvah of yibum will be negated and Rabban Gamliel is not concerned even when the mitzvah of yibum will certainly be negated. (18a)

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Rav Yehudah’s ruling follows his teacher Shmuel, for we have learned in a Mishna (41a): A woman was awaiting the decision of the yavam, and his brother (who is also a yavam) betrothed the yevamah’s sister; it was said in the name of Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira that we should tell him (the one who married the sister) to wait (from consummating the marriage) until his brother performs a yibum or chalitzah with the yevamah. (This ruling is based on the concept of zikah; the brother is forbidden to consummate the marriage with the sister of the yevamah because she is prohibited to him on account of her being the sister of his zekukah.) And Shmuel said: The halacha is like Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira. (18a – 18b)

The Mishna states: There were two brothers, Reuven and Shimon. Reuven died childless and Shimon performed a yibum on Reuven’s widow, Penina. A third brother, Levi was born and subsequently Shimon died childless. Shimon’s two widows fall for yibum to Levi. Penina is exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the wife of Levi’s brother who was not in his world (Reuven and Levi were not alive at the same time.) Chana, Shimon’s original wife, is exempt as well because she is the co-wife of an ervah. If Shimon performed a ma’amar with Penina and then died childless, Levi can perform chalitzah, but not yibum.



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Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Mishna’s fist ruling. He maintains that Levi may perform yibum or chalitzah with any one that he desires. (This is because Reuven’s widow, Penina became Shimon’s wife before Levi was born; Penina never fell for yibum to Levi as the wife of his brother who was not in this world.) (18b)

Rabbi Oshaya states: Rabbi Shimon would disagree even in the case in the beginning of the chapter.



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There are two brothers, Reuven and Shimon; Reuven dies childless and then a third brother, Levi is born to them. The second brother, Shimon performs a yibum with Reuven’s wife, Penina, and then, he too, dies childless. Shimon had another wife, Chana, as well. They both (Penina and Chana) fall to yibum to Levi. Penina is exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the wife of Levi’s brother (Reuven) who was not in his world (Reuven and Levi were not alive together). Chana is also exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the co-wife of an ervah.

Rabbi Shimon would permit Reuven’s wife, Penina to Levi even though Levi was born before Shimon took her in yibum. (18b)

The Gemora asks: If Rabbi Shimon disagrees in both cases, what would be a case of the wife of a brother that was not in his world, according to Rabbi Shimon?

The Gemora presents two cases: If there was only one brother and he died childless; afterwards another brother was born. The new brother may not perform a yibum on the wife of his brother that was not in his world. Another case is when there were two brothers and one of them died childless. The third brother, Levi was born and the second brother did not perform a yibum and did not die. The widow of the first brother will be forbidden to Levi even according to Rabbi Shimon. (18b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 17 - THE BRILLIANT WISDOM OF KING SOLOMON

Baruch Cohen (Jewish Law) quotes the famous Chazal regarding Shlomo Hamelech, and explains it with a brilliant and original answer from Rabbi Mordechai Kornfeld from Kollel Iyun HaDaf. This is worthy of reading from beginning to end.
The Book of Kings [Melachim 1 3:12] states that Israel's great King Solomon was twelve years old when God promised him that he would be granted great wisdom. He turned out to be the wisest man ever to live. As an illustration of the fulfillment of this blessing of wisdom, the Book of Kings reports the following account of a case that was brought before King Solomon's court in Jerusalem.
Two women came to King Solomon and stood before him. One woman (#1) said: "My Lord, this woman and I dwell in the same house, and I gave birth to a child while with her in the house. On the third day after I gave birth, she also gave birth. We live together; there is no outsider with us in the house; only the two of us were there. The son of this woman died during the night because she lay upon him. She arose during the night and took my son from my side while I was asleep, and lay him in her bosom, and her dead son she laid in my bosom. when I got up in the morning to nurse my son, behold, he was dead! But when I observed him (later on) in the morning, I realized that he was not my son to whom I had given birth!"
The other woman (#2) replied: "It is not so! My son is the live one and your son is the dead one!"
The first woman (#1) responded: "It is not so! Your son is the dead one and my son is the living one!"
They argued before King Solomon.
King Solomon said: "this woman (#2) claims 'My son is the live one and your son is the dead one, 'and this woman (#1) claims 'Your son is the dead one and my son is the living one!"'
King Solomon said, "Bring me a sword!" So they brought a sword before the King. The King said, "Cut the living child in two, and give half to one and half to the other"
The woman (#2) turned to the King, because her compassion was aroused for her son, and said: "Please my Lord, give her the living child and do not kill it!"
But the other woman (#1) said: "Neither mine nor yours shall he be. Cut!"
The King spoke up and said: "Give her (#2) the living child, and do not kill it, for she is his mother!" All of Israel heard the judgment that the King had judged. They had great awe for the King, for they saw that the wisdom of God was within him to do justice. [I Melachim 3:16 - 27]. The woman was rightfully awarded custody of her son.
It should be noted, that King Solomon's was the first major recorded and published decision in the history of legal jurisprudence, and I believe that with the help of the commentaries, one can begin to appreciate the magnificent depth of his wisdom.
OBSERVATIONS
Some say that King Solomon truly knew who was the real mother as soon as he saw the two women. This was the nature of the special divine wisdom that God gave him. As King Solomon was able to understand the speech of the animals and the birds, so he could see the truth in someone's face. His knowledge was of Divine origin. It was infallible.
According to the Abarbanel and Metzudas David, King Solomon studied the countenance of each woman as they presented their claims and counter-claims, and by means of his penetrating and heavenly wisdom, understood which of the two women was telling the truth.
Still, to prove this to the people, he had to demonstrate it in a way that everyone would acknowledge. Perhaps that is why he pretended not to know who said what, and repeated their arguments in reverse order, by repeating Woman #2's argument first, and Woman #1's argument second.
He even pretended to apply the well-known law of dividing disputed property. If two people come to court holding on to the ends of a piece of clothing, and each claims it to be his, the court divides it and gives each one half. King Solomon seemed to pretend to be ignorant of the many complicated details of this law, and to think that it applied to babies as well, which would have been ridiculously simpleminded. No judge would ever make such a foolish mistake. Yet, he succeeded in convincing the two women that he was serious.
Nonetheless, he was careful not to let the trick go too far. He specifically commanded his servants to bring the sword to him, not to give it to one of the guards. They too, were no doubt fooled and he did not want them to divide the baby before he had a chance to stop them. In fact, the King's ministers said "Woe to you Oh Land, whose king is but a boy!" They thought "what has God done to us to give us such a king? How long will we have to suffer with such foolish judgments?" But afterwards, when they saw the women's reactions they knew that he had recently received Divine inspiration and rejoiced saying "Happy are you, oh Land, whose king is a free man!" - i.e., one who studies Torah (Koheles - Ecclesiastes 10:16-17).
King Solomon's trick succeeded. The imposter revealed herself by her heartless cruelty. After all, no mother would have let her own child be killed just to spite another woman.
But how could King Solomon have been sure the other woman would not also have mercy on the child? Wouldn't most people break down in such a situation and relinquish their claims? What sort of person would want to be responsible for the death of an innocent child, even if it were not her own?
Perhaps this was an aspect of the depth of King Solomon's insight - he knew that no normal mother lies on her own child and crushes him in her sleep. Babies always sleep with their mothers and fathers, yet this never happens, for perhaps God implants within a human being an innate sensitivity that prevents her from doing such a thing. A woman who lies on her child must be lacking basic human feeling, and such a person would certainly have no mercy on the child of another. According to the Abarbanel, perhaps such a woman developed a blood lust and possessed a cruel desire to see another life snuffed out.
And what of the compassionate one? Was it not possible that she was acting cunningly to impress the King with a false sense of motherly commiseration?
WHO HAD THE BETTER ARGUMENT?
Notwithstanding the outcome, many believe that Woman #1 still made a convincing and persuasive argument. She made it clear that there were no witnesses because they lived alone. Perhaps she suspected that Solomon would be able to tell how old the baby was and identify the mother. According to the Radak and the Metsudas David, her argument was bolstered by the claim that no one else knew the identities of the babies, nor had one been sick, that the neighbors might remember whose baby it was. When she first got up, it was still dark. She could not recognize the baby, so she did not suspect that it was not hers. All she knew was that it was dead. But when it got light, she saw it and realized what had happened. She asserted that her baby boy was born three days earlier, and therefore there was some reliable distinction available.
Woman #2 had only a brief presentation and did not claim to have any proof. She simply said that the child was hers. All she did was state her case.
Based on the first round of oral arguments, it would appear that Woman #1 had the better claim, and that she was the real mother.
It is noteworthy, that the women did not bring the corpse of the dead child for further identification. Perhaps the child was buried already, or its features were already changed making recognition difficult.
SUBTLE TRUTHS BEGIN TO UNRAVEL
Yet, as the women's dispute continued, their respective positions seemed to change ever so slightly. There was something disturbing and disingenuous about the way in which Woman #1 continued arguing her case, in that she subsequently seemed less concerned with having a live child and focused more on the other having the dead one. The fact that she mentioned the dead child first, in itself, was an indication of this ("It is not so! Your son is the dead one and my son is the living one!").
Woman #2, by contrast, always spoke of her own son first ("No. my son is the living one and your son is the dead one"). It seemed as if her heart was with her son. She spoke out of love and was apparently heartbroken at the thought of potentially losing her child.
According to the Devorim Rabah, King Solomon then repeated the arguments of both women, verbatim, without adding anything, making sure that he properly understood the arguments of both sides, listening carefully, and if there was anything that he misunderstood, the women had an opportunity to correct him.
ODD DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STORY
King Solomon's wisdom surely gave him the insight to foresee that the real mother (#2) would recoil in terror when she heard of his intention to kill the infant, nevertheless, could his wisdom have possibly predicted the liar (#1)'s response - to comply with this grotesque compromise?
Second, the woman who was lying (#1) was initially interested in taking the living child for herself, otherwise she never would have asserted such a bold and aggressive claim.
As soon as the real mother offered to let the liar keep the child in order to spare its life, the liar should have accepted the real mother offer's and kept the child. She could have played up her victory by saying: "Aha! She admits that the baby was truly mine all along! She is a kidnapper but not a murderer. The baby is mine." Instead, she did something totally unpredictable. She refused saying "Neither mine nor yours shall he be. Cut."
I have always wondered what made her suddenly lose interest in having the child for herself?
A brilliant and original answer to these questions is offered by Rabbi Mordechai Kornfeld of Har Nof Jerusalem, of the Shmayisroel Torah Network (www.shemayisroel.co.il), who cited two 13th century commentators: Rav Yehoshua Ibn Shu'ib in his Drasha for Parshas Mishpatim, and Rav Menachem HaMeiri in his commentary to Yevamos 17a; and another 14th century commentator, the author of Shemen Rokeach and Sha'arHachazokas. They believe that in order to understand the real story behind King Solomon's decision, an understanding of the laws of Yibbum is necessary.
THE LAWS OF YIBBUM
The Torah describes the practice of Yibbum in the Parsha of Ki Setzei (Devarim 25:5,7,9):
"If there are brothers, and one of them dies without children, the wife of the deceased man may not marry out to another man. Her brother-in-law (her deceased husband's brother) must marry her and thus perform Yibbum on her ... If the man does not want to marry her, she shall approach the elders and declare 'My brother-in-law refuses to establish his brother's name in Israel; he does not consent to perform Yibbum on me'
... Then she shall approach him in the presence of the elders and remove his shoe from his foot, and spit in front of him and proclaim "Such should be done to a man who would not build up his brother's house!"
Yibbum is a Halachic rite which must be performed when a man who has a living brother dies childless. If this uncommon situation occurs, the widow must not remarry unless one of two actions are taken - either she must marry the brother of the deceased or she must be released from the obligation of marrying her brother-in-law by having him perform the Chalitzah ("removing" of the shoe) ceremony.
It is obviously uncomfortable for a woman to be trapped in this situation, wherein she would be subject to the will of another man. Her brother-in-law may not be locatable, compliant or appealing.
There are several fundamental laws concerning the childless nature of the deceased and the age of the bother that control whether Yibbum applies:
LAWS CONCERNING THE CHILDLESS NATURE OF THE DECEASED
1. Rule #1: The man must die childless. According to the Talmud Yevamos 87b, Dying childless includes instances where a man once had children, but these children were already dead at the time of his own death.
2. Rule #2: Grandchildren: According to the Talmud Yevamos 70a, if the deceased man has no living children but he does have living grandchildren, he is not considered to be childless, and therefore, there is no Yibbum obligation.
3. Rule #3: Offspring: According to Talmud Yevamos 11 lb and Shabbos 136a, if the deceased left behind any offspring at all, there is no Yibbum - even if the offspring is only one day old. Even if the offspring is still a viable fetus at the time of the husband's death, its mother is exempted from being bound to the living brother. If the fetus is a stillborn or is aborted, or dies, or is killed before it lived for thirty days, it is not considered to have ever been a viable offspring, and Yibbum would be required.
LAWS CONCERNING THE AGE OF THE DECEASED'S BROTHER
4. Rule #4: Brother-In-Law: According to the Talmud Yevamos 17b, the widow is obligated to marry her deceased husband's brother. If the deceased husband does not leave a living brother, his wife is free to marry whoever she pleases.
5. Rule #5: Minor: According to the Talmud Yevamos 1 05b, if the brother of the deceased is a minor, the widow is still bound to him, and does not have the option of freeing herself through Chalitzah since a minor lacks capacity to perform the ceremony. Instead she must wait until the brother reaches the age of majority (Bar Mitzvah 13) in order for him to render Chalitzah at that time. Only then may she remarry. According to the Talmud Niddah 45a if she wants to marry him, she must wait until he reaches 9 years of age.
APPLICATION & CONCLUSION
We now return to King Solomon's judgment.
The Midrash (Koheles Rabah 10:16) tells us that the reason both of these women were so desperate to have the living child declared theirs was that they were both potential Yevamos (widows subject to Yibbum). Neither of the two had any other offspring. Whoever would be judged to be the childless woman would not only lose the infant, but would also be trapped in the unpleasant status of Yevamah, being dependent upon her brother-in-law's good will.
The Midrash (Yalknt Shimoni 2:175) asserts that the husbands of the two women were father and son, making the two women, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law to each other.
According to the Meiri in his commentary to Yevamos 17a, the two Midrashim may be complementing each other - thanks to our 5-rule Yibbum analysis.
The two women - mother-in-law and daughter-in-law - had just lost their husbands, and needed a live child to exempt them from the status of a Yevamah. Both women gave birth to babies. However, these two babies were still less than 30 days old at the time that one of them died. The mother of the dead child would therefore be subject to the laws of Yibbum (Rule #3). This was the lying mother's motivation for taking the other woman's child.
If it were the mother-in-law's child who had died, she would have no incentive to kidnap her daughter-in-law's child. Even though her son (the deceased husband of her daughter-in-law) had passed away before her own husband had, and therefore he would not exempt her from Yibbum (Rule #1), nevertheless, she would be exempt from Yibbum for another reason. The living child was her son's child, and a grandchild exempts one from Yibbum (Rule #2).
Only the daughter-in-law had the motive to lie and try to claim that the child was hers. If it was her baby who had died within 30 days of its birth, leaving her childless, she would have been bound to her husband's brother as a Yevamah (Rule #4) - and that brother would have been -none other than the living baby (who was in fact her mother-in-law's child - i.e., her deceased husband's bother)! Since her brother-in-law was a newborn, the daughter-in-law would have had to wait 13 years before this baby would be able to perform Chalitzah on her and free her to remarry (Rule #5).
King Solomon realized all of this and suspected that since the only one with a strong motive to lie was the daughter-in-law, the child must really belong to the mother-in-law.
Perhaps this also explains why King Solomon ordered that the child be cut in half.
If the remaining child were to be killed, this too would free the daughter-in-law from her Yevamah status - since the living baby was her only brother-in-law (Rule #3). From the daughter-in-law's perspective, in fact, killing the child would result in a better solution for her. By just kidnaping the child she might have convinced the earthly court that she was not a Yevamah. However, she herself would know that the child was not really hers and that she really was not permitted to remarry, until Chalitzah was performed. By having the baby killed, though, she would truthfully be released from the bonds of Yibbum.
This is the reason the daughter-in-law suddenly lost interest in keeping the child when she saw that King Solomon was ready to cut the child in half. This would serve her interests even more if she took the child for herself. Therefore she insisted: "Cut!"
Young King Solomon guessed that this would be the woman's reaction. By tricking her into making a seemingly ludicrous statement, he revealed her true motives and that she was lying.
This is why, "All of Israel heard the judgment that the King had judged. They had great awe for the King, for they saw that the wisdom of God was within him to do justice."

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 17 - Highlights

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav Assi: If at the present time an idolater betroths a Jewish girl, we suspect that the kiddushin (betrothal) since it may be that he is from the Ten Tribes (Sancheriv exiled them prior to the destruction of the first Beis Hamikdosh. Rav Assi maintains that a child born from a Jewish man and a gentile woman is a Jewish mamzer.).

The Gemora asks: Why don’t we apply the rule that anything that separates is assumed to have been separated from the majority; and the majority of idolaters are not descendants from the Ten Tribes?

The Gemora answers: Rav Assi's statement is referring to places where the Ten Tribes have settled, and any doubt which is related to something “in its place” is regarded as having a probability of fifty-fifty. In the place where the Ten Tribes settled, we don’t apply the principle of majority. (16b)

The Gemora identifies the regions where the Ten Tribes settled. (16b – 17a)

Rav Yehudah said: When I said the statement before Shmuel (if at the present time an idolater betroths a Jewish girl, we suspect that the kiddushin (betrothal) since it may be that he is from the Ten Tribes), he told me: Your son who comes from a Jewish woman is called your son (he is considered Jewish), however, your son who comes from an idolatrous woman is not called your son, but rather he is called her son. (Accordingly, he is disagreeing with Rav Assi. He maintains that there is no reason to be concerned for an idolater’s betrothal being valid since the children born from a marriage between a Jewish man and a gentile woman are gentiles.)

The Gemora asks: Weren’t there Jewish women in the Ten Tribes, as well? If a gentile man married the Jewish woman, their children would be Jewish; there should be a concern for an idolater’s betrothal to a Jewish woman since his mother might have been Jewish, in which case he would be a Jew and his kiddushin would be valid.

The Gemora answers: There is a tradition that the Jewish women of that generation could not bear children (their wombs were torn due to the anguish of the journey into exile). (17a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
CHAMESH ESREI NASHIM

The Mishna asks: What is the case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world (this brother and the yavam were not alive at the same time)? There are two brothers, Reuven and Shimon; Reuven dies childless and then a third brother, Levi is born to them. The second brother, Shimon performs a yibum with Reuven’s wife, Sora, and then, he too, dies childless. Shimon had another wife, Chana, as well. They both (Sora and Chana) fall to yibum to Levi. Sora is exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the wife of Levi’s brother (Reuven) who was not in his world (Reuven and Levi were not alive together). Chana is also exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the co-wife of an ervah.

If Shimon had performed a ma’amar (Biblically, the yavam cohabits with the yevamah, thus acquiring her. The Rabbis established ma’amar, the betrothal of a yevamah as a prelude to yibum.) with Sora instead of yibum and then he dies childless, Chana would require chalitzah, but not yibum. (17a)

Rav Nachman states: There are two versions in the Mishna. One refers to Sora as “the first one,” and one refers to her as “the second one.” Both versions are not mistaken, for she can understandable be called the “first” or the “second.” She can be called the “first” because she was the first to fall for yibum. She can be called the “second” because she was the second one married to Shimon.

The Gemora asks: Wouldn’t the halacha be the same if Shimon first performed a yibum with Sora and then married Chana (and then Sora was married first, not second)?

The Gemora answers: Rather, the “second” is referring to the fact that it is her second time falling for yibum (once on account of being Reuven’s wife and once because of Shimon). (17a – 17b)

The Gemora inquires as to the source for the exemption of the wife of a brother who was not in this world. Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: It is written [Devarim 25:5]: When brothers dwell together. We derive from here that in order to be permitted to perform yibum, the brothers must be alive together.

The word together in the verse teaches us that yibum is only applicable to paternal brothers, who are together in regards to inheritance, not maternal brothers.

Rabbah derives this halacha from a gezeira shavah (one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics – it links two similar words from dissimilar verses in the Torah). (17b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 16 - RABBI DOSA AND THE SAGES

The Gemora states that in the times of Rabbi Dosa ben Hurkenas, the co-wife of a daughter was permitted to the yavam. This is a clear proof that Beis Shamai practiced according to their own opinion.

The Gemora cites the entire incident: In the times of Rabbi Dosa ben Hurkenas, the co-wife of a daughter was permitted to the yavam.

This ruling was extremely troubling to the Sages, because Rabbi Dosa was a great Torah scholar and his eyes had stopped seeing, so that he was unable to come to the Beis Medrash to study. A discussion took place as to who should go and notify him that they disagree with him. Rabbi Yehoshua said to them, “I will go.” They asked, “And who will go after him?” Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah agreed to go. They asked, “And who will go after him?” Rabbi Akiva agreed to go.

They went and stood at the entrance of his house. His maid entered and told him, “Master, the Sages of Israel have come to visit you.” He said to her, “Let them enter,” and they entered. He took hold of Rabbi Yehoshua and sat him upon a golden couch. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him, “Master, tell your other disciple to sit down.” Rabbi Dosa asked Rabbi Yehoshua, “Who is he?” Rabbi Yehoshua answered, “He is Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah.” Rabbi Dosa exclaimed, “Does our friend Azaryah have a son?” He applied to him the following Scriptural text [Tehillim 37:25]: I have been young and now I am old; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his children begging for bread. He took hold of him also and sat him upon a golden couch. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him, “Master, tell your other disciple to sit down.” Rabbi Dosa asked Rabbi Yehoshua, “Who is he?” Rabbi Yehoshua answered, “He is Akiva ben Yosef.” Rabbi Dosa exclaimed, “Are you the Akiva ben Yosef whose name is known from one end of the world to the other! Sit down, my son, sit down. May there be many men like you in Israel.”

Thereupon, they began to pester him with all sorts of halachic questions on until they reached that of the co-wife of a daughter. They asked him, “What is the halachah regarding the co-wife of a daughter?” He answered them, “This is a dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel.” They asked him, “In accordance with whose ruling is the halachah?” He replied, “The halachah is in accordance with the ruling of Beis Hillel.” They said to him, “But, it was reported in your name that the halachah is in accordance with the ruling of Beis Shamai?” He asked them: “Did you hear it in the name of Dosa or the son of Hurkenas?” They replied, “By the life of our Master, we only heard the son of Hurkenas.” He said to them, “I have a younger brother who is very stubborn and his name is Yonasan and he is a disciple of Shamai. Be careful that he does not crush you regarding halachic matters, because he has three hundred answers to prove that the co-wife of a daughter is permitted. But I call the heavens and the earth to witness that upon this mortar sat the prophet Chaggai and issued three rulings: A co-wife of a daughter is forbidden; tithes could be taken from grain in the lands of Ammon and Moav during the shemitah year; and that converts may be accepted from the Karduyites and the Tarmodites (they were not suspected of being mamzeirim).

The braisa continues: When they came, they entered through one doorway; but when they left, they left through three different doorways. Yonasan met Rabbi Akiva. He questioned him and silenced him. He asked him, “Are you the Akiva whose name is known from one end of the world to the other? You are fortunate indeed to have merited such a name, but you have not yet reached the level of an oxherd.” Rabbi Akiva replied (with humility), “I have not even reached the level of shepherds.”

*** Why were the Sages troubled because Rabbi Dosa was a great Torah scholar; since the correct ruling was that the co-wife of the daughter is forbidden, he would certainly admit? (Arvei Nachal)

*** Why did Rabbi Dosa take hold of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah and seat them on the golden couch, but he did not do that to Rabbi Akiva; he merely instructed him to sit down? (Ben Yehoyadah)

*** Why is an oxherd regarded as a higher level that a shepherd? (Igrah D’Kallah)

*** How can a shepherd be considered degrading; weren’t all our Patriarchs, Moshe and King David all shepherds? (Chasam Sofer)

(Kaftor Vaferech)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 15 - NEW RULINGS REGARDING A MIKVAH AND ERUV

The Gemora attempts to prove from the following braisa that Beis Shamai followed in practice according to their own opinion.

Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri said: How should we rule regarding the co-wife of an ervah? If we rule according to Beis Shamai and allow the yavam to perform a yibum with the co-wife, the children will be mamzeirim (illegitimate) according to Beis Hillel. If we rule according to Beis Hillel and exempt the co-wife from chalitzah and yibum, thus allowing her to marry another man; the children will be tainted (if she marries a kohen without first performing a chalitzah) according to Beis Shamai. Therefore, he wished to establish that they should have chalitzah and not yibum. This would accommodate both opinions. They were not able to resolve the matter in this way.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel asked them: What will become of all the earlier co-wives who were taken in yibum; their children will all be regarded as mamzeirim?

This is a proof that Beis Shamai did practice according to their own viewpoint.

The Gemora counters: Perhaps Beis Shamai did not permit the co-wives to be taken for yibum; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was asking according to Beis Hillel. Previously, they allowed the co-wife of the ervah to marry someone else without a chalitzah. If we would enact that the co-wives would require chalitzah, what would we do to all those co-wives who married another man? Should we perform a chalitzah now; this would be revolting to their husbands, and it is written [Mishlei 3:17]: The Torah’s ways are ways of pleasantness and all its paths are peace.

The commentators prove from this Gemora that Beis Din should not issue new decrees that will result in children born earlier to be rendered mamzeirim.

The Terumas Hadeshen (II, 21) asks: Why are we more concerned with the children born before, let us concern ourselves with the future children and institute a new decree, so that the marriages will be in accordance with halacha?

The poskim offer various distinctions as to when we are concerned and when we are not. (See Terumas Hadeshen, Maharit (I,86).

The Minchas Elozar (IV, 17) proves from here that Beis Din does not institute a new decree only when the result will lead to mamzeirim, however in regards to a mikvah, where the concern is not pertaining to mamzeirim, rather that a child will be considered a ben niddah, tainted, we are not concerned and Beis Din may issue decrees regarding a mikvah.

It is noteworthy that the Terumas Hadeshen (74) says that one time, one of the sages from Lenaistadt came to the city and wanted to change the lechis (poles for the eruv) to make them thicker in order to uphold the opinion of the Mordechai, who states that they should be as thick as one’s finger. The leaders of the city did not allow him to because people will say that up until then everyone had desecrated the Shabbos.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha states that this is because the halacha is in accordance with the lenient opinion in regards to the laws of an eruv.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 15 - Highlights

The Gemora attempts to prove from the following braisa that Beis Shamai followed in practice according to their own opinion.

Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri said: How should we rule regarding the co-wife of an ervah? If we rule according to Beis Shamai and allow the yavam to perform a yibum with the co-wife, the children will be mamzeirim (illegitimate) according to Beis Hillel. If we rule according to Beis Hillel and exempt the co-wife from chalitzah and yibum, thus allowing her to marry another man; the children will be tainted (if she marries a kohen without first performing a chalitzah) according to Beis Shamai. Therefore, he wished to establish that they should have chalitzah and not yibum. This would accommodate both opinions. They were not able to resolve the matter in this way.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel asked them: What will become of all the earlier co-wives who were taken in yibum; their children will all be regarded as mamzeirim?

This is a proof that Beis Shamai did practice according to their own viewpoint.

The Gemora counters: Perhaps Beis Shamai did not permit the co-wives to be taken for yibum; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was asking according to Beis Hillel. Previously, they allowed the co-wife of the ervah to marry someone else without a chalitzah. If we would enact that the co-wives would require chalitzah, what would we do to all those co-wives who married another man? Should we perform a chalitzah now; this would be revolting to their husbands, and it is written [Mishlei 3:17]: The Torah’s ways are ways of pleasantness and all its paths are peace. (14b – 15a)

The Gemora attempts another proof: There was an incident regarding the daughter of Rabban Gamliel, who was married to Abba, his brother, who died childless. Rabban Gamliel performed a yibum with the co-wife. It seems evident that Rabban Gamliel followed the opinion of Beis Shamai.

The Gemora asks: This is obviously incorrect; Rabban Gamliel was a descendant of Hillel and not a disciple of Beis Shamai. The reason why he was able to perform a yibum with the co-wife was because his daughter was an aylonis and thus, the co-wife was permitted. (15a)

Rav Mesharshiya asked from the following braisa: Rabbi Akiva picked esrogim from a tree on the first of Shevat. He separated maaser sheini as if it was the second year of the Shemitah cycle and he also separated maaser oni as if it was the third year of the Shemitah cycle. He took the maaser sheini in accordance with Beis Hillel who maintain that the New Year for trees is the fifteenth of Shevat and he took maaser oni in accordance with Beis Shamai who holds that the New Year for trees is the first day of Shevat.

It is evident from this braisa that Beis Shamai did follow their own opinions.

The Gemora rejects this proof: Rabbi Akiva ruled in accordance with Beis Hillel, however he was uncertain if Beis Hillel stated that the New Year for the trees is the first of Shevat or the fifteenth and that is why he separated both maasros. (15a)

The Gemora attempts another proof: Rabbi Yehoshua was asked, “What is the law regarding the co-wife of one's daughter?” He answered them, “It is an argument between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel.” He was asked, “Who is the halacha according to?” He answered them, “Why are you placing my head between two great mountains, between two great groups, between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel? I fear that they (the rendered mamzeirim, as a result of ruling in accordance with Beis Hillel) might crush my head! I testify to you concerning two great families in Yerushalayim, namely, the family of Beis Tzevo’im who descended from Ben Achmai and the family of Beis Kofai, who descended from Ben Mekosheish, that they were descendants of co-wives (of an ervah and were married without chalitzah) and from them were High Priests who ministered upon the altar.”

The Gemora explains the proof: If they acted in accordance with their own rulings, it is quite understandable why he feared from the mamzeirim. If, however, they did not act in accordance with their own rulings, which mamzeirim was he concerned about?

This proves that Beis Shamai did practice according to their rulings. (15b)

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ONE THOUSANDTH POST - HEAVENLY VOICES - YEVAMOS 14

The Gemora states that a heavenly voice declared that the halacha follows the opinion of Bais Hillel.

Reb Elchonon says that he found in seforim (Mikdash Melech in the name of the Arizal – he doesn’t cite this) that in the future world, the halacha will follow the opinion of Beis Shamai.

He explains: In truth, Beis Shamai had the sharper minds, but due to our intellectual deficiencies, we were not able to fully grasp and understand their intent; a judge can only rule according to what he sees in front of him and that is why we rule according to Beis Hillel in this world. It is written regarding the future that the world will be full with wisdom; Beis Shamai will be understood, and we will rule according to them.

I once heard that if one analyzes the disputes between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel, one can reach the following conclusion: Beis Shamai rules according to the spiritual level and Beis Hillel rules according to the physical level. This will explain why we rule according to Beis Hillel in this physical world, and in the World to Come, the spiritual world, we will rule according to Beis Shamai.

The Gemora cites the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua: He maintains that we do not pay attention to a heavenly voice dictating who the halacha should follow.

The Gemora later (122a) states: A woman can get married on account of a heavenly voice. This means that if her husband went overseas and a heavenly voice declares that her husband died, she is permitted to get married.

The Tosfos Yom Tov states that this is not referring to a heavenly voice since we rule that one does not pay halachic attention to a voice emanating from heaven.

Reb Elchonon explains differently: We do not pay attention to a heavenly voice regarding halachic matters because Torah is not in the heavens; it was given to human beings. The Sages of Klal Yisroel have the authority to resolve all halachic matters, not the heavens. However, a heavenly voice can resolve a factual doubt. We would not rely on a heavenly voice in regards to something that requires two witnesses. The Chachamim were lenient in regards to the testimony of a woman and they relied on the words of even one witness; that is why a heavenly voice can be believed in this matter.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 14 - Highlights

Rish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan: The Mishna in Megillah (2a) states: The Megillah is read on the eleventh, on the twelfth, on thirteenth, on the fourteenth and on fifteenth of Adar, not earlier than the eleventh and not later than the fifteenth. It is written [Devarim 14:1]: Lo sisgodedu, which teaches us that you should not form separate groups. Why did they allow five different days to read the Megillah; they should have established one day for everyone?

The Gemora interrupts this discussion: Doesn’t the verse Lo sisgodedu teach us the prohibition against wounding oneself while grieving for a dead person? The Gemora explains how both halachos are derived from this passuk.

Rabbi Yochanan responded to Rish Lakish with a question of his own: Why didn’t you ask from the Mishna in Pesachim (50a)? The Mishna states: A place where the custom was to do work on Erev Pesach until midday, one is permitted to do work; a place where the custom was not to do work on Erev Pesach until midday, one should not do work. Shouldn’t there be a concern here on account of forming two separate groups?

Rish Lakish replied: I was referring to cases which involve prohibitions and you are asking me form cases dependent on customs.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t engaging in labor on Erev Pesach a halachic dispute as well? The Mishna in Pesachim (55a) cites a disagreement between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel; Beis Shamai maintains that it is forbidden to do work and Beis Hillel allows it.

Rish Lakish answers: It does not appear like two separate groups because one who observes a person not working will say that he doesn’t have any work to do right now, but he will not think that it is based on his religious observance.

Rabbi Yochanan asked Rish Lakish from our Mishna: Beis Shamai permits the co-wives to the brothers, but Beis Hillel prohibits them. Shouldn’t this be a violation of this prohibition?

Rish Lakish answers: Beis Shamai did not follow their own opinion in practice. They did not allow the yavam to perform a yibum with the co-wife of an ervah.

Rabbi Yochanan maintains that Beis Shamai did follow their own opinion.

The Gemora cites a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding this same issue. Rav said: Beis Shamai did not follow their own opinion in practice. Shmuel said: that Beis Shamai did follow their own opinion.

The Gemora asks: We have learned in the Gemora Eruvin (13a) that a heavenly voice declared that whenever Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel argue, the halacha follows Beis Hillel. What point in time were these Amoraim referring to when they argued if Beis Shamai acted according to their own opinion or not? If it was prior to the heavenly voice, why would Rav and Rish Lakish maintain that Beis Shamai did not practice according to their opinion? If it was after the heavenly voice, why would Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan state that Beis Shamai did follow their own opinion?

The Gemora presents two answers: Either they were referring to the time period prior to the heavenly voice and at that time; Beis Hillel had a clear majority. Rav and Rish Lakish maintain that Beis Shamai did not practice according to their opinion because the ruling followed Beis Hillel since they were in the majority. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan stated that Beis Shamai followed their own opinion because the academy of Bais Shammai were sharper in their studies, they were not required to follow the majority.

Alternatively, they were referring to the time period after the heavenly voice; Rav and Rish Lakish maintain that Beis Shamai did not practice according to their opinion because they were instructed to follow Beis Hillel (through the heavenly voice). The opinion that maintains that Beis Shamai did not practice like Beis Hillel followed the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua who held that one does not pay attention to the dictates of the Heavenly Voice. (13b – 14a)

The Gemora asks: How can Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan hold that Beis Shamai practiced in accordance with their own opinion; there is a prohibition of forming separate groups (lo sisgodedu)?

Abaye answers: There is only a concern for lo sisgodedu when there are two courts in one town, but when they are two courts in two different cities, we are not concerned.

Rava asked: But Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel were in the same town, as well, and yet they each followed their respective opinions.

Rava answers: The prohibition applies only when the court is divided, but regarding two courts in one city, when one follows Beis Shamai and the other follows Beis Hillel, we are not concerned. (14a)

The Gemora asks from the following braisa: Where Rabbi Eliezer resided, they would cut down trees on Shabbos to make the charcoal that was required for fashioning the circumcision knife made out of iron. Where Rabbi Yosi Haglili resided, they would eat the meat of fowl together with milk. Rabbi Yosi Haglili is of the opinion that although the Torah forbids one to eat meat and milk together, this prohibition only applies to eating the meat of any kosher domestic animal with milk. Eating the meat of fowl with milk, however, is permitted.

The Gemora infers from here that they did not practice like this in the locale of Rabbi Akiva since he disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer and maintains that any act of labor that could have been performed before Shabbos and was not performed does not override the injunction of performing labor on Shabbos. Shouldn’t this be a problem of lo sisgodedu?

The Gemora answers that we have already learned that two different locations are not subject to the prohibition of lo sisgodedu. (14a)

When Rabbi Abahu went to the area where Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi resided, he would move a lamp that had been extinguished on Shabbos. When Rabbi Abahu went to the area where Rabbi Yochanan resided, he did not move the lamp on Shabbos. Although Rabbi Abahu held like Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that one may move a lamp on Shabbos, Rabbi Abahu did not move the lamp out of respect for Rabbi Yochanan who held like Rabbi Yehudah that one may not move the lamp on Shabbos. (14a)

The Gemora cites our Mishna: Although Beis Hillel prohibits the co-wives and Beis Shamai permits them; these declared certain women ineligible to a kohen and these declared them eligible, Beis Shamai did not refrain from marrying women of Beis Hillel, nor Beis Hillel from Beis Shamai.

The Gemora asks: If Beis Shamai followed their own opinion, why didn’t they refrain from marrying into each other’s families?

The Gemora answers that they would keep records and inform each other if the woman under consideration was permitted for them or not.

The Gemora proves that they would inform each other of any halachic concerns that the other might encounter from the last part of our Mishna. The Mishna had stated: So, too, in regards to tumah and tahara, they did not refrain from lending each other utensils.

The Gemora asks: How could Beis Hillel borrow utensils from Beis Shamai; those utensils had a distinct possibility of being tamei according to Beis Hillel?

The Gemora answers: It was evident that they kept records and Beis Shamai would inform Beis Hillel of any potential problems. (14a – 14b)

The Gemora states that Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that a mamzer (an illegitimate child) can only descend from a union prohibited under penalty of death or kares. (14b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 12 - HASHEM PROTECTS THE FOOLS IS SMOKING INCLUDED?

The Gemora states: Three types of women are permitted to insert a wad into their bodies prior to engaging in marital relations in order to prevent conception. They are: A minor, a pregnant woman and a nursing woman. A minor is permitted because otherwise, she may become pregnant and die. A pregnant woman is permitted because otherwise, she might become pregnant again, and the second fetus will crush the first one. A nursing woman is permitted because otherwise, she might be compelled to wean her child, resulting in his death.

The braisa continues: What age minor are we referring to? We are concerned when the minor is between eleven and twelve years old. If she is younger or older than that, she is not permitted to cohabit in that manner; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

The Chachamim disagree with the entire ruling and state that these women should cohabit in the regular manner and Heaven will have compassion on them (becoming pregnant in these situations is highly unusual and therefore we prohibit them from utilizing and type of contraceptive measures) as it is written [Tehillim 116:6]: Hashem protects the fools.

Rabbi Winston (Rabbi Winston) discusses the statement of "G-d protects the fools." It is often used in situations of halachically- reasonable risk (Shabbos 129b; Yevamos 12b). For example, when many people do something that may be somewhat risky for one's health, but statistically, nothing has become conclusive, then halachically, one can continue to perform the act and not worry about the consequences. Even should there be some latent danger in the act, G-d will intercede on the person's behalf and protect the "fool."

For a long time, cigarette smoking fell into this category. Though the Torah is against all kinds of physical addiction for obvious reasons, as long as there wasn't conclusive proof that the risk factor wasn't as great as we now know it to be, and many people smoked without negative results, it remained halachically permissible to do so; G-d protects the fools.

However, cigarette smoking is now known to be the number one man-made killer of human beings, and this consciousness has made its way into the Torah world, albeit somewhat late. We are no longer "fools" with respect to the effects of cigarette smoking, and, the Poskim (those who decide Torah-law) have now posted signs asking those who still smoke to begin weaning themselves from doing so. For years already, however, they have forbid anyone to start smoking.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 12 - RELYING ON PIKUACH NEFESH L’CHATCHILAH

Reb Elchanon (Kovetz Hearos 23) discusses whether it is permitted for a person to put themselves into a situation where they will have to use the permissibility of pikuach nefesh (they are in mortal danger) to permit what otherwise would have been regarded as a prohibition.

Reb Avi Lebovitz (Hearos on the Daf/) explains Reb Elchonon: He proves from the Ba'al Hameor who forbids leaving on a ship within three days of Shabbos because it is likely that you will find yourself in a situation of pikuach nefesh and have to be desecrate the Shabbos, that it is only a Rabbinical prohibition, but not Biblical (if it would be an Biblical, it should not matter if it is within three days or more than three days). Once it is only a Rabbinical prohibition, we can permit it for shalom bayis purposes. Therefore, one would be allowed to have relations with a woman for whom it is dangerous to become pregnant, even though after relations she will use a 'moch' to prevent pregnancy (I am not sure about the statistical success rate associated with this form of birth control).

This explanation would be necessary if we learn the Gemora to be speaking about a moch (wad) after relations (Tosfos in the name of Rabbeinu Tam) and would be forbidden if not for pikuach nefesh. But, according to Tosfos who explains that these three women must use a moch, which implies that others also are allowed to because there is no prohibition for her to remove the shichvas zerah (semen) with a moch after engaging in relations, we don't need to come onto the permissibility of pikuach nefesh.

Reb Elchonon second guesses his proof, that perhaps there is a Biblical prohibition to put oneself into a situation where pikuach nefesh will have to override the prohibition and no proof can be brought from the Ba'al Hameor because he may hold that Shabbos specifically is "hutrah," (completely permitted) for pikuach nefesh (but other prohibitions which are only "dechuya," (overridden), there would be a Biblical prohibition to out rightly put oneself into a situation where they will have to rely on the license of pikuach nefesh.

At the end he cites a Magen Avrohom (O.C. 248) who questions whether one, who intentionally put themselves into a situation of pikuach nefesh should rely on it to override Shabbos. Reb Elchonon explains that by not relying on this permissibility, it comes out retroactively that he did not do a prohibition by placing himself in that situation. Reb Moshe has a teshuva where he adamantly disagrees and says that one must use the permissibility of pikuach nefesh to override Shabbos and save their life.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 12 - Highlights

Rav Lili bar Mammal said in the name of Mar Ukvah, who said in the name of Shmuel: The co-wife of a wife who refused the yavam is forbidden. (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively. Our Gemora follows the opinion cited later (107a) that a minor, whose husband had died childless, may refuse the yavam, as well, which retroactively nullifies the original brother’s marriage.)

The Gemora explains: Although the wife who refused the yavam is not prohibited to the other brothers, her co-wife is forbidden to the one who refused. This is because we are concerned that this co-wife might be confused with the co-wife of one’s own daughter who refused him. (12a)

Rav Assi rules: The co-wife of an aylonis (an adult woman who did not develop any signs of female puberty and is incapable of bearing children) is forbidden to be taken in yibum. It is written regarding yibum [Devarim 25:6]: It shall be the firstborn – if she can bear. This excludes an aylonis since she cannot bear children.

Rav Sheishes asks: The Mishna (31b) states: There were three brothers who were married to three unrelated women, and one of them, Reuven died. The second brother, Shimon married the yevamah by ma'amar (Biblically, the yavam cohabits with the yevamah, thus acquiring her. The Rabbis established ma’amar, the betrothal of a yevamah as a prelude to yibum.), and he died. Reuven’s original wife falls for yibum to the third remaining brother, Levi. Levi must perform chalitzah, but he cannot perform a yibum. This is derived from a Scriptural verse which states that a yevamah can be taken in yibum only if there was a zikah (an attachment on the account of yibum) from one brother; not when there is a zikah from two brothers. (The yevamah is doubly subject to yibum, on account of her Biblical marriage with Reuven and her Rabbinical marriage with Shimon.)

Rav Yosef said: This is a case where the co-wife of a paternal brother’s wife is exempt from yibum only because the wife fell to yibum and we do not find anything similar to this in the entire Torah. What is this coming to exclude? Is it not excluding the case of a co-wife of an aylonis that she will be permitted to the yavam? (These are both examples where a yevamah is forbidden because of her falling to yibum and not on account of being an ervah.)

The Gemora states that the inference is slightly different. It is excluding the case of a co-wife of an aylonis but the distinction between the two cases is as follows: The co-wife of the double widow requires a chalitzah, whereas the co-wife of an aylonis does not even require chalitzah. This is because an aylonis is Biblically prohibited, whereas the double widow is only Rabbinically prohibited. (12a)

Ravin said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The co-wife of a wife who refused the yavam, the co-wife of an aylonis and the co-wife of an illegally remarried divorcee are all permitted to the yavam. (12b)

Rav Bibi cites the following braisa in front of Rav Nachman: Three types of women are permitted to insert a wad into their bodies prior to engaging in marital relations in order to prevent conception. They are: A minor, a pregnant woman and a nursing woman. A minor is permitted because otherwise, she may become pregnant and die. A pregnant woman is permitted because otherwise, she might become pregnant again, and the second fetus will crush the first one. A nursing woman is permitted because otherwise, she might be compelled to wean her child, resulting in his death.

The braisa continues: What age minor are we referring to? We are concerned when the minor is between eleven and twelve years old. If she is younger or older than that, she is not permitted to cohabit in that manner; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim disagree with the entire ruling and state that these women should cohabit in the regular manner and Heaven will have compassion on them (becoming pregnant in these situations is highly unusual and therefore we prohibit them from utilizing and type of contraceptive measures) as it is written [Tehillim 116:6]: Hashem protects the fools.

The Gemora asks on our Mishna from the braisa: The braisa stated: A minor is permitted because otherwise, she may become pregnant and die. We can infer that a minor can become pregnant and not die. This would be inconsistent with our Mishna which stated that you cannot say of his mother-in-law or his mother-in-law's mother or his father-in-law's mother that they refused (since only a minor can refuse). Perhaps she is a minor and nevertheless, she can be a mother-in-law because it can happen that a minor will give birth and live?

The Gemora attempts to answer that a minor will certainly die if she becomes pregnant; however the Gemora proves from a different braisa that this cannot be correct.

Rav Safra answers that having children is similar to the signs of puberty. Just as a girl with two pubic hairs after twelve years old indicates that she is an adult, so too, conceiving a child at any age signifies that she is an adult. This is why the Mishna stated that a mother-in-law cannot refuse her husband any longer. Although a minor can give birth and survive, she cannot refuse her husband since she is regarded as an adult.

Rav Zevid answers: We assume that a woman who gives birth developed the signs of puberty. We cannot examine her for the two pubic hairs because there is a legitimate possibility that the hairs fell out due to the pains of childbirth. (12b – 13a)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 11 - When The Maps of Countries Are Being Redrawn -- Hold Your Breath! - Scriptural verses do not leave their simple interpretation

Rabbi Frand on Parshas Ha'azinu

Scriptural verses do not leave their simple interpretation

When The Maps of Countries Are Being Redrawn -- Hold Your Breath!

The Torah states "Remember the days of old, understand the years of generation and generation. Ask your father and he will relate it to you, your elders and they will tell you." [Devorim 32:7]. Rash"i does not explain this pasuk [verse] according to the simple reading. Rather, Rash"i explains the pasuk as a warning: "Look at what happened to other people who came before you, when they angered Me." "Understand the years of generation _after_ generation" refers to the era of Enosh upon whom HaShem [G-d] poured forth the waters of the Ocean and to the era of the (people of the) Flood, whom HaShem washed away.

The next pasuk continues, "When the Supreme One distributed to nations their portions, when He separated the children of man, He set the borders of nations according to the number of the Children of Israel." [32:8]. Rash"i similarly interprets this pasuk: "when He separated the children of man" refers to the Dor Haflaga [Generation of the Dispersion]. This is what happens to those who anger HaShem.

However, we have a long-standing tradition that "Scriptural verses [pasukim] do not leave their simple interpretation" [Shabbos 63a; Yevamos 11b; 24a]. Rash"i himself says in a number of places that even though at times he is providing a Midrashic interpretation, the simple interpretation of the pasuk remains. The simple interpretation of these pasukim is an admonition to us to understand history and learn its lessons.

The traditional Jewish belief is that HaShem is not only the Creator of Heaven and Earth, but that He is the G-d of history. The historical events that we witness are the means by which HaShem is continuously directing His world. Simply stated, these pasukim are teaching us that when HaShem establishes the boundaries of the world, it is ultimately because of the Children of Israel. The different wars and conflicts that take place in the world and the different border changes that occur -- according to the simple reading of our pasukim -- all occur because of their ultimate impact on the Jewish nation.

There is a quote from the writings of Rav Elchanon Wasserman (who himself was killed by the Nazis at the beginning of World War II): The Torah gave us a great key to understand the hinge upon which all historical events revolve -- Devorim 32:8 (the previously quoted pasuk). HaShem sets the borders of nations and causes nations to inherit for the sake of the Jews. History revolves around the Jews. "For Hashem's share is His people; Yaakov is the portion of His possession" [32:9].

Rav Elchanon continued (regarding the Peace Treaty ending World War I), "when the map of Europe was drawn up in Versailles, the borders were already set in Heaven". Sometimes it takes us years, decades, or centuries to put the pieces together. Sometimes, in the interval, the activities seem to have nothing to do with the Jewish people. But the great lesson of history that we are taught in the opening pasukim of this week's parsha is that when HaShem sets up the borders of nations, it is for the sake of the Children of Israel.

I recently read (1993) that the people in MacMillan and Company -- the mapmakers -- are having a very hard time these days. We think that we have hard jobs! -- Imagine the job of mapmakers! -- It has been a very difficult couple of years for them. They had just finished their latest edition of the Atlas, in which they printed East Germany and West Germany. Bonn and Berlin were the respective capitals. All of a sudden, they had to reprint the map. OK, done. Now they think that now they are set. Then, all of a sudden, Yugoslavia divides -- Serbia, Croatia, we can not even pronounce all these names! When we are talking maps or when we discuss borders -- ultimately we are talking Klal Yisroel.

One does not have to be a politically astute individual to realize the momentousness of the breakup of the Soviet Union. The mapmakers do not know from day to day whether they should draw 15 republics or 12 republics. We ask ourselves what difference does it make if Azerbaijan decides to become independent or not. What is the meaning of all these changes?

This is the lesson of history that we should never forget. These events -- the placement of national boundaries -- have an impact on Klal Yisroel.

At the beginning of World War I, the Ottoman Empire chose the wrong side and allied themselves with the Germans. At that time, one would have had to be exceedingly insightful to have realized that this decision would have a major impact on Jewish history in the twentieth century. Our tendency would have been to think, "Who cares? What's the difference?" But that single event -- coupled with the fact that there was this little country called "Palestine" under the rule of the Ottoman Turks -- had major ramifications.

When Germany (and the Ottoman Empire) eventually lost World War I; their empires were disassembled. Part of the price that the Ottoman Empire paid for "picking the wrong horse" was that they lost their empire. Their little protectorate called "Palestine" became the British Mandate of Palestine. Not long after that there was a proclamation called the Balfour Declaration. Who would have thought that the Ottoman Turk's poor decision would lead toward the Jews attaining an independent homeland in the Land of Israel?

When we see maps changing -- we need to hold our breaths. This has to do with us. Somehow or another, we will be in the center of this. Sometimes it is for our benefit. Sometimes, G-d forbid, it is to our detriment. But we are always on center stage because "Yaakov chevel nachalos" [Jacob is the portion of His possession]. We are the protectorate of the Master of the Universe.

Rabbi Frand @ Torah.org

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 11 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a dispute between Rav Acha and Ravina: If one of the brothers performs a yibum and another brother lives with her co-wife; one of them maintains that he is liable to kares and the other one holds that he is transgressing a positive commandment.

The Gemora explains: The one who maintains that he is liable to kares follows the opinion of Rish Lakish (who holds that the brother who performed the yibum is acting for himself and he is subject to the prohibition of not building two houses, but the other brothers are still subject to the prohibition of their brother’s wife). The one who holds that the brother has transgressed a positive commandment is in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan (who maintains that all the brothers are subject to a mere positive prohibition and not the kares prohibition of their brother’s wife since the brother who performed the yibum or chalitzah acted as an agent for all the brothers). (11a)

Rav Yehudah says in the name of Rav: The co-wife of a sotah, an adulteress (witnesses testified that she committed adultery) is forbidden to the yavam and is therefore exempt from chalitzah. (The sotah herself is also forbidden to the yavam.) He explains: The term tumah, defilement is mentioned in regards to the sotah just as it is mentioned by arayos. Just as an ervah is exempt from chalitzah and yibum, so too, a sotah and her co-wife are exempt from chalitzah and yibum.

The Gemora distinguishes between a sotah under Biblical law and one that is regarded as a sotah under Rabbinical law. (A man went overseas and a witness testified that he had died. The woman married another man and subsequently, the husband returned. The Rabbis regarded her as an adulteress because she did not investigate the matter thoroughly (although she was permitted to marry based on the testimony) and decreed that she is forbidden to return to her initial husband.) The Mishna later ruled that a woman who is regarded as a sotah under Rabbinical law must have chalitzah and her co-wife could be taken in yibum or chalitzah.

The Gemora makes a distinction between a woman who is a confirmed sotah and one who is an uncertain sotah (she had secluded herself with another man, but we have not ascertained if she had been defiled). If the husband of the uncertain sotah would die childless (prior to resolving the situation through the drinking of the bitter waters), she would be subject to chalitzah. The Gemora explains the distinction: The term tumah is only mentioned in reference to a confirmed sotah and not in regards to an uncertain sotah. (11a – 11b)

Rav Yehudah inquired of Rav Sheishes: If a person remarries his divorcee unlawfully after she had been married to another man, and he then dies childless, what is the law regarding this woman’s co-wife? Can the brother perform a yibum with her or not?

The Gemora elaborates: According to Rabbi Yosi the son of Keifar, there is no inquiry at all. He maintains that the term tumah is used in reference to the remarried divorcee, and therefore the halacha would be that she and her co-wife are exempt from yibum.

The inquiry would only be applicable according to the Chachamim who maintain that the term tumah written in the Torah portion regarding the remarried divorcee is referring to a sotah. Do we say that the verse never departs from its literal meaning and since the term tumah is written in the Torah portion regarding the remarried divorcee, she and her co-wife will be excluded from the yibum obligation? Or perhaps, since we expound the term tumah to be referring to a sotah and not to the remarried divorcee, she is not regarded as an ervah and her co-wife is available to be taken for yibum?

The Gemora presents an alternative explanation for this inquiry: According to the Chachamim, there is no inquiry at all. They maintain that the term tumah written in the Torah portion regarding the remarried divorcee is referring to a sotah and not to the remarried divorcee, she is not regarded as an ervah and her co-wife is available to be taken for yibum.

The inquiry would only be applicable according to
Rabbi Yosi the son of Keifar, who maintains that the term tumah is used in reference to the remarried divorcee. Do we say that although the term tumah is used in reference to the remarried divorcee, there is another verse which indicates that she is an abomination, but not the co-wife? Or perhaps, the verse is teaching us that she is an abomination, but her children are not (the co-wife would thus be eligible for yibum)? (11b)

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said: Rabbi Yochanan inquired as follows: If a person remarries his divorcee unlawfully after she had been married to another man, and he then dies childless, what is the law regarding this woman’s co-wife? Can the brother perform a yibum with her or not?

Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Yochanan: Why don’t you inquire regarding the woman herself?

Rabbi Yochanan replied: Regarding the remarried divorcee, I do not inquire at all. She cannot be taken for yibum on account of the following kal vachomer: If to the one she was permitted to initially (her husband), she became forbidden (after her marriage to another man), certainly in regards to the man that she was always forbidden to (her husband’s brother), she should be forbidden. The inquiry is only regarding her co-wife. Is the kal vachomer strong enough to exempt the co-wife from yibum?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak learned as follows: Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said: Rabbi Yochanan inquired: If a person remarries his divorcee unlawfully after she had been married to another man, and he then dies childless, what is the law regarding this woman? Can the brother perform a yibum with her or not?

Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Yochanan: Why don’t you inquire regarding the co-wife?

Rabbi Yochanan replied: The co-wife can certainly be taken for yibum since the kal vachomer is not strong enough to exclude her; the inquiry is only regarding the remarried divorcee herself.

The Gemora cites various braisos attempting to resolve these inquiries. (11b – 12a)

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THE STATUS OF THE WIVES AFTER ONE OF THEM PERFORMS CHALITZAH presented by: Kollel Iyun HaDaf

Kollel Iyun HaDaf

QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the status of the surviving brothers and the wives (Tzaros) of the deceased brother after Chalitzah is performed by one of the brothers with one of the Tzaros. Reish Lakish maintains that all of the brothers are prohibited to all of the Tzaros with an Isur Kares (the Isur of "Eshes Ach"), with the exception of the brother and the woman who did Chalitzah, who are prohibited to each other only with a Lav (the Isur of "Lo Yivneh"). Rebbi Yochanan maintains that they are all prohibited to each other with only a Lav and not with Kares.

The Gemara explains Rebbi Yochanan's reasoning. It does not make sense that one brother (the one who did Chalitzah) should be prohibited to the woman with only a Lav while the other brothers are prohibited to her with an Isur Kares, since they were all equally entitled to do Chalitzah. Rather, the brother who did Chalitzah acted as a Shali'ach on behalf of all the other brothers, and the woman who did Chalitzah acted as a Shali'ach on behalf of all the Tzaros.

It is clear that Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the Isur Kares of "Eshes Ach" disappears completely in a situation of Yibum, when one brother dies and his wives fall to Yibum (or Chalitzah) to the other brothers. According to Rebbi Yochanan, at exactly what point does the Isur Kares of "Eshes Ach" of all the wives disappear? Is it removed as soon as the brother dies or only when a surviving brother performs Chalitzah? The words of the Gemara provide apparently conflicting implications.

The first part of Rebbi Yochanan's reasoning (that the Isur Kares should be removed from all of the brothers because initially any one of them could do Chalitzah or Yibum) implies that even before any brother performs Chalitzah, the Isur Kares is removed. On the other hand, the second part of his reasoning (that the Yavam and Yevamah who perform Chalitzah (or Yibum) act as Shelichim for the others) implies that it is the act of Chalitzah which removes the Isur Kares, and until that act is done the Isur remains in force.

ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS (10b, DH Ihu) implies that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" remains in force until Chalitzah is performed, at which time the act of Chalitzah removes the prohibition. Rebbi Yochanan -- who says that when the wife falls to Yibum any brother may perform Chalitzah -- does not mean that there is no prohibition of "Eshes Ach," but rather that it is logical that the Torah would not give a Mitzvah to the brothers from which they could excuse themselves and pass on to another brother. Rather, the brothers never actually remove themselves from the obligation. Whichever brother performs Chalitzah (or Yibum) does so on behalf of all of the other brothers.

This also seems to be the opinion of RASHI (52a, DH Nasan), who calls the Yevamah an "Eshes Ach" even during the period of Zikah.

Support for this approach may be adduced from the opinion of Aba Shaul (39b). Aba Shaul disagrees with the Rabanan and maintains that performing Chalitzah is preferable over performing Yibum, because one who performs Yibum with impure intentions "is considered as though he lives with an Ervah, and the child is virtually a Mamzer." If the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed at the time the woman falls to Yibum and before Yibum is done, there should be no prohibition of Ervah whatsoever and no reason to say that the child is close to being a Mamzer. (See also Insights to Yevamos 7:1:b.)

(b) However, the RASHBA (41a, end of DH Shomeres Yavam) writes that Rebbi Yochanan's statement, "If this [brother] wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it, and if this one wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it," implies that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" actually falls away as soon as the brothers become permitted to perform Yibum.

According to the Rashba, why does Rebbi Yochanan add that the brother acts as a Shali'ach on behalf of the other brothers? Even if he does not perform Chalitzah or Yibum on their behalf, the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" has already been removed from them!

Moreover, how does the Rashba understand the opinion of Reish Lakish who says that all of the other brothers are prohibited to the woman with an Isur Kares when one brother performs Yibum with her? The Rashba cannot explain that the Isur Kares falls away and then returns to the other brothers when one brother performs Yibum, because the Rashba himself asserts that once the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed it cannot return.

The Acharonim offer two approaches to answer these questions. The simple approach is that the reason why Rebbi Yochanan says that one brother acts as a Shali'ach for the others is not to explain why the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed (because it is not removed when the brother performs Yibum, but earlier, at the time the woman falls to Yibum). Rather, when Rebbi Yochanan says that one brother acts as a Shali'ach for the others his intent is to explain why the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" takes effect for the other brothers. Although the verse implies that the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" applies only to the brother who performed Chalitzah (and prohibits him from attempting to "rebuild" his brother's family), Rebbi Yochanan says that the prohibition of "Lo Yivneh" applies to all of the brothers (and Tzaros) because of the Shelichus. (This approach is difficult to read into the words of the Gemara.)

How does the Rashba understand the opinion of Reish Lakish? The Rashba apparently understands that Reish Lakish indeed maintains that the prohibition of "Eshes Ish" could return even if it was removed at the time the Yevamah fell to Yibum. Therefore, when one brother performs Chalitzah or Yibum, the prohibition returns to the other brothers. (This also appears to be the intention of the Rashba to 44a, DH v'Nachlotz, as printed in the Mosad ha'Rav Kook edition.)

A second approach is suggested by RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN Hy'd in KOVETZ HE'OROS (4:9 and 1:7). From various sources it seems that when one brother performs Yibum or Chalitzah, his act determines retroactively that the other brothers were not involved with the Zikah at all (see Insights to Yevamos 18:1, 24:1, and Imrei Moshe, end of #5). Perhaps this is Reish Lakish's intention when he says that the other brothers are prohibited to the Yevamah with an Isur Kares. Once one brother has performed Yibum, it becomes determined retroactively that he was the only one who was permitted to her. To which brother the Heter applies becomes known only after the Heter is actually utilized by one of the brothers.

Rebbi Yochanan also agrees that, in theory, the Zikah would be retroactively removed from any brothers and Tzaros not involved in the Chalitzah. However, he maintains that because of the Shelichus, they are all considered to be involved in the Zikah even retroactively, and thus the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed from all of them. (According to the proposal that Rebbi Yochanan agrees that Zikah can be removed retroactively, it is not clear what he tries to prove from the words, "If this [brother] wants to do Chalitzah, then he may do it." How does Rebbi Yochanan prove from those words that the Zikah applies retroactively to all of them? Also, the Rashba clearly states that even when one brother can no longer do Yibum, the Yevamah is still permitted to him. This is contrary to the logic which Rav Elchanan applies to Reish Lakish's opinion.)

Another problem with the opinion of the Rashba is why the Gemara needs a verse to prove that the brother may remarry the Yevamah (with whom Yibum has been performed) after he divorced her (8b). His allowance to remarry her should be obvious if the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" can never return to the Yavam. Perhaps the Rashba maintains that it is only after the above verse is expounded that the Gemara understands that the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed permanently once the Yevamah falls to Yibum.

Another possible explanation is that the Rashba accedes that after Yibum (or Chalitzah) is performed, the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" can return. Since the prohibition can return, a verse is necessary to teach that the Yavam may remarry the Yevamah (with whom Yibum was performed) after he divorced her. If this indeed is the view of the Rashba, it also explains why Reish Lakish can posit that the brothers become prohibited to the Yevamah with an Isur Kares, and why Rebbi Yochanan needs to introduce the concept of Shelichus.

As for how the Rashba adduces support for his opinion from the Gemara, perhaps he merely intends to show that there is a logical reason to assume that once the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed, it remains permitted as long as possible (until Yibum according to Reish Lakish, and even after Yibum according to Rebbi Yochanan).

How does the Rashba understand Aba Shaul's statement (that it is better to do Chalitzah than Yibum because Yibum with impure intentions "is considered as though he lives with an Ervah")? The Kovetz He'oros explains that either the Rashba discusses only the opinion of the Rabanan, or he understands that Aba Shaul's statement expresses only a Halachah d'Rabanan and not a Halachah d'Oraisa.

In conclusion, there is a basic difference in understanding among the Rishonim with regard to whether the prohibition of "Eshes Ach" is removed at the moment the woman falls to Yibum (RASHI and TOSFOS) or whether it is removed only at the time of Chalitzah or Yibum (RASHBA). (See also Insights to Yevamos 20:2 and 20:3.)

This dispute may have other Halachic implications. For example, the Gemara (54a) states that if the Yavam unknowingly has relations -- before he has performed Yibum -- with his deceased brother's wife (for example, he was asleep during the act), no Kinyan takes effect. According to Rashi and Tosfos, she should become disqualified from eating Terumah since she has had a forbidden relationship with an Ervah. According to the Rashba, the act was not forbidden at all, and thus she should remain permitted to eat Terumah and to marry a Kohen. (See, however, Insights to Yevamos 35:2.)

INSIGHTS INTO THE DAILY DAF

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 10 - Highlights (there's always more by the "click more")

Rav Adda Karchina said in front of Rav Kahana, in the name of Rava: Rebbe in fact agrees with Rabbi Chiya’s rules, but this is what he answered Levi: Regarding the case where one’s mother was violated by his father will only be in accordance with one of Rabbi Chiya’s rules, but not both.

The Gemora explains: If the father violated two sisters and had two sons. His two other sons married the two women who were violated by the father. Subsequently, they died childless and the two sisters fall for yibum to their sons. Each one of the women is a sister to a yevamah, but we cannot say that one who is forbidden to one brother will be permitted to the other brother because they are both prohibited to each of the brothers. One woman is the mother of the brother and the other woman is his aunt.

If the father violated two women who are unrelated to each other, we can say that one who is forbidden to one brother will be permitted to the other brother, but we cannot say that they are sisters of a yevamah. (10a)

Rav Ashi offers an alternative answer: The Mishna is following the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that a man is forbidden from marrying a woman who has been violated by his father; hence, this case is not possible.

Ravina asked Rav Ashi: Perhaps the Mishna is referring to a case where the brother transgressed and married the woman who was violated by his father; he then died childless. His widow is falling for yibum to her son. Why didn’t the Mishna include this case?

Rav Ashi responded: The Mishna does not want to discuss a case which can only occur “if” there is an illegal marriage.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: The Mishna can state a case even without the brother marrying his wife illegally. The case is: Yaakov violated his daughter-in-law, the wife of Reuven and had a son. Reuven dies childless and his wife falls for yibum to Reuven’s brothers; they cannot perform a yibum with her because she is their father’s violated woman.

Rav Kahana replied: The Mishna does not want to deal with cases that involve a prohibition.

Although Rebbe rebuked Levi’s question, Levi nevertheless included this case in his collection of braisos. (10a – 10b)

Rish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan: According to Levi, who includes in the Mishna cases where the brother had married his wife illegally, let the Mishna teach the following case: A man performed a chalitzah with his yevamah and then married her (this is prohibited) and then died childless. The yevamah will be forbidden to the brothers on account of her being the original brother’s wife. She is an ervah, subject to the penalty of kares and shall thus exempt her co-wife, as well.

Rabbi Yochanan answered: This case is not mentioned because this yevamah would not be included in the case of a co-wife’s co-wife (since she is forbidden to each of the brothers).

Rish Lakish could have answered that the yevamah is only forbidden to the brothers by a mere negative commandment (unlike Rabbi Yochanan, who maintains that she is subject to the penalty of kares) and thus would be eligible for chalitzah and yibum. (10b)

The Gemora presents the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish. A man performed a chalitzah with his yevamah and then married her; Rish Lakish said that he is not liable for kares for marrying the chalutzah (the one with whom the chalitzah was performed), but the brothers will be liable to kares for taking her. He (the one who performed the chalitzah) and his brothers will be liable to kares for taking the co-wife. Rabbi Yochanan says: Both he and the brothers will not be liable to kares for taking the chalutzah or her co-wife.

The Gemora cites the sources for their respective opinions. (10b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 9 - SHAMING A STUDENT

Levi asked of Rebbe: Why did the Mishna list only fifteen cases of women who exempt themselves and their co-wives from yibum and chalitzah; the Mishna should have listed sixteen? Rebbe said: It would seem to me that he doesn’t have any brains in his head.

The commentators ask: How could Rebbe talk to Levi in such a demeaning way? Doesn’t it say in Koheles [9:17]: The words of the wise are heard when spoken softly, more than the shout of a ruler of fools? The Mishna in Pirkei Avos [2:10] says: Rabbi Eliezer said: Let the honor of your fellow be as precious to you as your own. Why did Rebbe degrade Levi in such a manner?

The Chavos Yair (152) answers: Levi was the student of Rebbe and since Rebbe understood that Levi was a tremendous Torah scholar, it wasn’t possible for him to err unless he did not thoroughly examine the matter prior to his question. Rebbe did not talk this way out of anger or haughtiness; as a matter of fact, the Gemora in Sotah (49a) states that when Rebbe died, humbleness was lost. Rebbe was instructing his student Levi that one must always scrutinize all relative material on any subject before openly discussing it.

This is the source for the following Rambam in Hilchos Talmud Torah (4:5) and cited in Shulchan Aruch (Y”D 246:11) as well (Torah.org): The student should not be embarrassed because his peers grasped [the lesson] after one or two times and he learned it only after many times. If he is embarrassed from this matter, he will end up coming in and going out of the Beit Midrash without learning anything. Therefore, the early sages said: "The shy one does not learn and the short-tempered one cannot teach" (Avot 2:5). When does this apply? If they didn't understand because of the depth of the Halakha or their limited abilities. However, if it became apparent to the teacher that they were not applying themselves to the words of Torah and were being lax about them - and therefore, they did not understand - , he is obligated to become angry with them and to shame them with words in order to sharpen them. In this context, the sages said: "Cast fear into the students." (BT Ketubot 103b).

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 9 - Highlights

Levi asked of Rebbe: Why did the Mishna list only fifteen cases of women who exempt themselves and their co-wives from yibum and chalitzah; the Mishna should have listed sixteen? Rebbe said: It would seem to me that he doesn’t have any brains in his head.

The Gemora explains Rebbe’s reaction: Which case should the Tanna have included; a man’s mother who has been violated by his father? This case is not possible according to Rabbi Yehudah who maintains that a man cannot marry a woman whom his father violated and therefore a woman cannot fall for yibum to her son. The Mishna does not list cases that involve a dispute.

The Gemora challenges the assertion that the Mishna does not discuss cases that involve a dispute: Doesn’t the Mishna later (20a) discuss cases where a woman is prohibited by mitzvah (arayos that are Rabbinically forbidden) or because of sanctity (women that would violate his innate sanctity, they are not subject to the penalty of kares) and yet, Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis dispute the halacha in these cases?

The Gemora answers that Rebbe was only referring to the cases discussed in this chapter (the next perek, chapter does discuss disputed cases).

The Gemora asks: The Mishna cites the opinion of Beis Shammai, who maintain that the co-wives of the fifteen women mentioned in the Mishna are permitted for yibum?

The Gemora answers: The viewpoint of Beis Shammai when Beis Hillel disagrees is not regarded as an authoritative opinion.

The Gemora asks: Our Mishna mentioned a case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world (this brother and the yavam were not alive at the same time), and Rabbi Shimon and the Sages disagree (Rabbi Shimon maintains that she is eligible for yibum or chalitzah)?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Shimon agrees when the brother (Levi) was born first and then Shimon performed a yibum (on Penina).


Courtesy of http://chavruta.tripod.com/

In this case, Rabbi Shimon will agree that Levi will not be able to perform a yibum on Penina or Chana if Shimon subsequently dies. This is because Levi was alive when Reuven dies and he was forbidden to perform a yibum on Penina then because he was not alive together with Reuven. Once she is forbidden to him, she remains that way and the prohibition of his brother’s wife can never be lifted. (9a – 9b)


The Gemora persists in its questioning: Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav and it was taught in the braisa of Rabbi Chiya: The following teaching can apply to the fifteen cases of the Mishna: The one who is forbidden to one brother will be permitted to the other brother, and her sister, who is also a yevamah can do chalitzah or be taken in yibum.

The case is as follows: There were four brothers; two of them, Reuven and Shimon were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. If Reuven and Shimon died, the remaining two brothers (Levi and Yehudah) cannot perform a yibum with any of them because each one of these women is attached to every potential yavam with a zikah, an attachment on the account of yibum. The Rabbis decreed that one cannot marry the sister of a zekukah (the woman who is attached to the yavam) because a zekukah is similar to a wife and one is not permitted to marry his wife’s sister.

If Rochel was an ervah to Levi (his mother-in-law) and Leah was an ervah to Yehudah; Levi can perform yibum with Leah and Yehudah can perform yibum with Rochel. In this case, the sisters are not forbidden because there is only a zikah from one man to one woman (since an ervah removes the zikah).

According to Rav Yehuda, the Tanna of the Mishna (26a) can only be referring to the last nine arayos listed in the first Mishna, but not to the first six (such as his daughter). The reason is because those six cases cannot occur unless the daughter was born through the violation of her mother (If Levi and Yehudah’s daughters are sisters, they obviously have the same mother; Levi and Yehudah could not possibly marry the same woman); and the Mishna is discussing cases of marriage, not cases of violation.

Abaye states that the Mishna can be referring to the first six cases because the Mishna has no compunctions discussing cases of violation. It is not discussing the case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world because that would involve a disagreement (Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis) and the Mishna does not involve itself with disputed cases.

Rav Safra states that the Mishna can be discussing the case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, but only in the following scenario: There were six brothers all together. Originally, there were four, and two of them, Reuven and Shimon were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless and then a fifth brother, Yissochar was born. (Rochel is forbidden to Yissochar on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world.) Levi, the third brother, performed a yibum with Rochel and subsequently, Shimon died childless. (Yissochar can perform a yibum with Leah because he was alive together with Shimon.) A sixth brother, Zevulun was now born. (Rochel is not forbidden to Zevulun on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world because when he was born she was married to Levi. Leah is forbidden to Zevulun on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world.) Yehudah performed a yibum with Leah. Levi and Yehudah then died childless. The Rabbis maintain that each one is forbidden to the surviving brothers on the account of being the wife of their brother who was not in this world (because of the initial marriage). Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that the remaining brothers can perform yibum or chalitzah (he is concerned only with the last marriage).

The Gemora concludes its question: If this halacha is included in the Mishna, it is evident that the Tanna of the Mishna is discussing cases that involve a dispute.

The Gemora answers that Rebbe would understand the Mishna to be referring to a case where the brothers (Yissochar and Zevulun) were born before the other brothers (Levi and Yehudah) performed a yibum. Even Rabbi Shimon would agree in this case that they cannot perform a yibum. (9b – 10a)

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