Reasons for a Mitzvah

The Tur (Y”D 181) cites the Rambam who writes that the Torah prohibits rounding the corners of one’s head and destroying one’s beard because it was the practice of idolaters.

The Tur writes that we do not need to seek out the reasons for mitzvos, for they are the King’s commandments, even if we do not understand the reason.

The Beis Yosef defends the Rambam, and he writes that there is no one who is concerned for the honor of the Torah and its mitzvos more than the Rambam. Although the laws of the Torah can be decrees from the King, nevertheless, wherever a reason for the mitzvah is found, it may be said. Whenever a reason cannot be found, it should be attributed to our shallow understanding. We are, nonetheless, obligated to fulfill those mitzvos that we do not understand its reasons in the same manner as we are obligated to fulfill those mitzvos that we do understand.

He concludes that the Rambam did not think up the reason for these mitzvos himself; rather, he saw from the juxtaposition of the verses that this is the reason for these prohibitions.

The Rama explains the Tur: Heaven forbid to think that the Tur suspected the Rambam to mean that if one does not understand the rationale for a mitzvah, he is not obligated to fulfill it. No sage will believe such a thing! However, those heretics who deny the truth of the Torah only believe in a mitzvah that they understand its reason. Rather, the following is the way that the Tur understood the Rambam: It is only if one shaves his head or destroys his beard in the same manner that the idolaters do; that is when one has transgressed this prohibition. The Tur writes that it is forbidden in any fashion whatsoever. Since the reason is not explicit in the Torah, the prohibition always applies. There is no room for leniency in a place where the reason is not applicable!

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Merely Growing his Hair

Rav Sheravya asks from our Mishna, which stated that he does not have to redo the days of nezirus that he had already observed and he can start counting right away. Now, if the Mishna is referring to a case of a thirty-day nezirus, how can it rule that he does not forfeit the days that he had already observed? He needs to count another thirty days in order for him to have a thirty-day growth of hair! It must be referring to a case where he declared a long nezirus, but the Mishna states that he can start counting right away. [This implies that the days of tzaraas are not counted towards his term of nezirus. This is direct contrast to Rav Chisda’s ruling!]

Rav Sheravya himself answers the question: The Mishna is referring to a case where he declared to be a nazir for fifty days, and he became a metzora after twenty days. He must undergo the purification process for a metzora and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair.

Tosfos notes that the Gemora could have stated a case where he declared to be a nazir for forty days, and he became a metzora after ten days. He must undergo the purification process for a metzora and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair.

The Brisker Rav asks: Couldn’t the Mishna be referring to a case where he declared to be a nazir for one hundred days, and he became a metzora after seventy days. He would not forfeit the original days, and the days that he was a metzora will not count towards his nezirus, for he needs to have a thirty-day growth of hair. When the purification process is completed, he will be compelled to count another thirty days!

He answers that if there are not thirty days remaining from the time that the purification process is completed, the days that he was a metzora will not count at all, and the days that he observes afterwards will be days of an actual nezirus; not only days where he is growing his hair. This is true only if he did not have a fulfillment of thirty days before he became a metzora; however, if he became a metzora after thirty days, then even if when the purification process is completed, he does not have thirty days remaining, the days that he was a metzora counts towards the nezirus, and the days of waiting afterwards are merely days where he is growing his hair. They are not regarded as days of nezirus!

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Leaving Eretz Yisroel

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir Daf 55a) cited a braisa: If one enters the land of the nations inside of a carriage, chest or closet, Rebbe rules that he is tamei and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that he is tahor.

The Gemora suggested that the basis for their argument is as follows: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that since traveling inside a chest is uncommon, the Rabbis did not intend for the decree to apply in such a situation. Rebbe holds that although it is unusual, the Rabbis decreed tumah in this case as well.

The question is asked: How can this be their argument? Do we not find all throughout Gemora that the Rabbis did not intend that their decree should be applicable in cases that are uncommon? We do not find any Tanna that disagrees with this principle! Why in this specific case would they dispute this well-established principle?

The Mishna L’melech answers: In this case, the Rabbis decreed a tumah on anyone entering the land of the nations, even if they enter in an unusual manner. This is because they wished to prevent people from leaving Eretz Yisroel. Their original decree was on all situations!

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Mummies and Kohanim Entering the Land of the Nations

By: Reb Avi Lebovitz (Heoros al Hadaf)

The Mishna L'melech (Avel 3:1) has a teshuva where he discusses Kohanim going into the mummy business. He begins by saying that although they may consist of very dry bones, theywill still transmit tumah. However, his reason to be lenient is based on the opinion of the Yerai'im that we follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai that aside from idolaters not transmitting tumah through roof association, they also do not transmit tumah via “touching.” (Tosafos 54a clearly rejects this and says that even according to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, they will transmit tumah via “touching.”) Based on the combination of the Yerai'im, and the Ra'avad who says that any Kohen who is already tamei (even after he separates from the corpse) has no prohibition of becoming tamei again, the Mishna L’melech creates a s'fek sfeika (double doubt) to be lenient, but eventually rejects it, since it is clear from the many places, including our Tosfos, in the name of Rabbeinu Chaim Cohen that a Kohen cannot make himself tamei even if he is already a tamei meis.

The issue that is related to our Gemora is that the Gemora in Avoda Zara (13a) says that a Kohen cannot enter into the Land of the Nations except for a mitzvah because of the decree of tumah on the Land of the Nations. The Rambam in Hilchos Ohalos (2:3) seems to understand that the concern of the Land of the Nations is because of the fetuses of idolaters that are buried there. This would clearly indicate that there is at least a prohibition of touching and carrying for Kohanim even related to the corpses of idolaters. However, the Mishna L'melech rejects this proof based on Tosfos, who says that the decree of tumah on the Land of the Nations is due to “the many Jews that were killed outside of Eretz Yisroel,” not because of the idolaters.

Practically speaking, what happened to the prohibition for a Kohen to go from Eretz Yisroel to the Land of the Nations (other than for mitzvah purposes)? The Shulchan Aruch (369) rules that a Kohen cannot go into the Land of the Nations, but the Shach (3) writes that it only applies when Eretz Yisroel is presumed to be in a state of taharah, but nowadays, this does not apply. This opinion is also quoted in the b'er hagola from the maharshal. The Shevus Yakov (brought in pischei teshuva) argues and claims that it applies even nowadays. Reb Akiva Eiger justifies the custom to be lenient about this, either because “sustaining one’s family” is a significant enough of a mitzvah (but this would not justify those who travel to chutz la'aretz for vacation) or because we are all tamei meisim. The second rationale seems to be either based on the opinion of the Ra’avad that the prohibition of tumas meis in general only applies when the Kohen is tahor, and although we are not lenient for a Biblical tumah, we rely on the Ra'avad for the Land of the Nations, which is only Rabbinical. But more likely he means to say that the entire decree of the Land of the Nations is in order to maintain the taharah of the Kohen, and it would not apply when the Kohen is a tamei meis.

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Kohen’s Sanctity based upon his Service

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 49) answers: Both words are necessary. For if the Torah would have only written for his father (that the nazir may not become tamei to), we would have thought that it is only the father that he cannot become tamei to for there is merely a presumption of paternity (for perhaps his mother committed adultery), but regarding his mother, whom we know gave birth to him, he could become tamei to her (the Torah therefore has to write “his mother” to teach us that he cannot become tamei to her). And if the Torah would have only written for his mother (that the nazir may not become tamei to), we would have thought that it is only the mother that he cannot become tamei to for her children’s lineage is not reckoned through her, but regarding his father, where the halacha is that family is determined by the father, he could become tamei to him (the Torah therefore has to write “his father” to teach us that he cannot become tamei to him).

The following question is asked: Why is the fact that we cannot prove for certain that the Kohen Gadol’s father is truly his father grounds to suggest that the Kohen Gadol may not become tamei to his father? If his father is not his actual father, for that very reason he should be permitted to become tamei to him! If the deceased man (a Kohen) is not his father, the Kohen Gadol is in all probability a Yisroel! Why would we think that he cannot become tamei to him, for he might not be his father? That is precisely the reason why he should be able to become tamei to him!

The Rashba ask a similar question on the Toras Kohanim (Parshas Emor). The verse states that an ordinary Kohen is permitted to become tamei to his father and mother. The Toras Kohanim notes that had the verse said only that he may become tamei to his mother, we might have thought that he would be forbidden to become tamei to his father, because his father is only his father based upon a presumption. He asks that the possibility that the man is not his father should not be a reason to forbid him from becoming tamei to him. On the contrary, it is precisely the reason to permit him to become tamei to him, because if this man is not his father, he is not a Kohen altogether!

The Chasam Sofer (based on Rishonim) explains it as follows: We are dealing with a case where this man was presumed to be a Kohen. He performed the service in the Beis Hamikdosh for many years. When his father dies, if not for the fact that the Torah explicitly permits him to become tamei to him, it would be forbidden. Even though on the chance that the deceased is not his father, he would be a Yisroel, he still would be forbidden to become tamei to him. This is because the verse states: You shall sanctify him, for he offers up the food offering of your God. Since he was allowed to perform the service in the Beis Hamikdosh (based on the presumption that he is indeed a Kohen), he is forbidden to contaminate himself with corpse tumah, even if he is a Yisroel. His sanctity comes about because of his service. This would be the explanation in our Gemora as well.

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The Nazir's Allowance to Become Tamei

It is evident from the Rambam in Hilchos Nezirus (7:12) that the reason that a nazir may become tamei to a meis mitzvah is because of the mitzvah of burial. However, from Tosfos, it would seem that there is a different reason. Tosfos writes that it is permitted for the nazir to move the corpse from the sun to the shade. This would indicate that the allowance for the nazir to become tamei is not on account of the mitzvah of burial, but rather it is due to the obligation of respecting the dead.

The Rogatchover Gaon notes the following distinction between the two reasons: If a father imposed nezirus upon his son, and the son, as a minor, comes upon a meis mitzvah. If the reason for the permission to becoming tamei is because of the mitzvah of burial, a minor who is not obligated in mitzvos, would not be allowed to become tamei to the corpse. However, if the allowance is based upon respecting the dead, the minor would also be obligated to bury him, for he is also responsible to see that a corpse does not lie in degradation.

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Nezirus from Birth

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir Daf 47) states: A Kohen Gadol and nazir cannot become tamei to their relatives, but they can become tamei to a meis mitzvah. If they were traveling together and they happened across a meis mitzvah, (who should become tamei)? Rabbi Eliezer says: The Kohen Gadol should become tamei and not the nazir. The Chachamim say: The nazir should become tamei instead of even an ordinary Kohen becoming tamei. Rabbi Eliezer told them: Let a Kohen become tamei as he does not have to bring a korban for becoming tamei, and do not let the nazir become tamei, as he will have to bring a korban! They answered him: Better that the nazir should become tamei, as his holiness is not forever, as opposed to a Kohen, whose holiness is forever!

The Tosfos Yom Tov asks in the name of his son: We learned above (28b) that a father can impose upon his son a nezirus vow, and he is even allowed to render him a permanent nazir, like we find by Shmuel. It emerges that a nazir can be a nazir forever! Why did the Mishna not differentiate between a nazir forever and an ordinary nazir? The halacha that the nazir should become tamei before the Kohen Gadol should only apply by an ordinary nazir!

The Tosfos Yom Tov answers: We are compelled to say that the nezirus does not take effect immediately upon birth, for as long as the son does not know how to be careful with respect to the halachos of nezirus, how can he be rendered a nazir? And even though, when he is first born and his mother is watching him in a crib, but as soon as he is capable of walking, his mother’s surveillance will not be sufficient, for she is preoccupied with her daily chores. Not everyone has the means to hire a full-time babysitter, who will ensure and guarantee that the child will not violate any of the laws of nezirus. We therefore must say that nezirus does not become effective upon the child until he reaches the age of chinuch, where he has the ability himself to make certain that he will not violate the halachos of nezirus. It emerges that there is no case where someone can be a nazir forever, and a Kohen is therefore regarded as one who has a higher level of sanctity.

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Once a Nazir; Always a Nazir

It is written: And afterwards, the nazir may drink wine. The Gemora cites several opinions as to when precisely is he permitted to drink wine and become tamei to the dead. According to one opinion, he only has to wait until after one of the korbanos have been brought, and according to another opinion, he is required to wait until all the korbanos have been brought.

The question is asked: Why does the Torah say that the nazir is permitted to drink wine? He is no longer a nazir!

Reb Moshe Feinstein answers that the inspiration that a nazir attains from abstaining from some of the worldly pleasures remains with him his entire life. Although the halachos of nezirus no longer apply to him, he is nevertheless in an elevated state, similar to the sanctity he had imposed upon himself during the term of his nezirus.

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Post # 1,500!!! Reciting Korbanos in the Morning and the Reason for the Nazir's Chatas

Shulchan Aruch (O”C 1:5) rules that it is beneficial to recite every morning the portions in the Torah dealing with the korban olah, mincha, shelamim, chatas and asham.

The Magen Avraham asks: Shouldn’t the chatas be mentioned before the olah, since the chatas always takes precedence?

The Chidah offers the following answer: The Gemora in Menachos (110a) states that whoever recites the portion in the Torah discussing the korban chatas is recognized as if he offered a chatas on the Altar. This, he explains, is only applicable to the portions of the korban which are burned on the Altar; however, with respect to the portion that is given to the Kohanim, and that which they eat which provides atonement for the owner, the recital of the relevant verses does not help for this. Therefore, he says, that which our Gemora said that a chatas takes precedence over an olah, that is only with respect to the sacrifice; however, with respect to the recital of the korbanos, it is preferable to recite the olah portion prior to the portion dealing with the chatas. When one recites the verses of the chatas, he only receives credit for the portion that was to be brought on the Altar, but he does not receive credit for the portion of the korban which was to be eaten by the Kohanim; however, with the recital of the olah verses, it is regarded as if he offered the entire korban, for an olah is completely burned on the Altar. This is the reason that the olah is recited before the chatas.

The Nazir’s Chatas

The nazir brings three animals; a chatas, olah and a shelamim.

It is not explained why a nazir brings a korban chatas. The Ramban writes that it is for the following reason: A nazir separates himself to serve Hashem in a manner of extreme sanctity. It is only fitting, that after he has reached such a high level, he should strive to remain on that level for the remainder of his life. Since he concluded his nezirus and he reverted back to the desires of this world, he is required to offer a korban chatas to atone for this reversal.

The Meshech Chochmah writes that the accepting of nezirus upon oneself results in the forfeiture of many mitzvos, such as involving himself with the burial of his close relatives, reciting kiddush over wine and making havdalah. Although, a nazir accomplishes much in his abstainment and he is considered praiseworthy for this, he nevertheless is required to bring a korban chatas to atone for the mitzvos that he has lost.

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The Nazir's Barber and Hair that will be Cut Off

The Torah states, “A razor should not pass over his head.” This can be read as not allowing a razor to be passed over his head by anyone, whether it is him or someone else.

The Rishonim learn that the one who gives the nazir a haircut has violated this prohibition.

The Haflaah asks: How do we know from this verse that the one who gives the haircut has violated this prohibition? Perhaps it is the nazir who is transgressing by allowing the other fellow to give him a haircut, but the “barber” has not violated anything!

Hair that will be cut off is still not a Chatzitzah

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 44b) cites a braisa: If he cuts his hair on the eighth day, he brings his korbanos on the ninth day.

Rava explains that the braisa is talking about a case where he did not go the mikvah on the seventh day.

It is evident from this Gemora that the immersion of a nazir is valid, even though it occurred prior to his haircut! One might argue that his hair should be regarded as a chatzitzah (interposition), since it will shortly be cut off.

The Chasam Sofer (Y”D 195) derives from here the following halacha: Although a bride will be shaving her hair immediately after she marries (for her head will be covered), nevertheless her hair is not regarded as a chatzitzah when she immerses in the mikvah before her marriage.

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Buried on the Land where he Died

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 43b) states that if a person dies and has no one to bury him, he is considered a meis mitzvah. The halacha is that he is buried on the land where he died, even if the land is privately owned. This is one of the ten conditions that Yehoshua made upon the division of Eretz Yisroel.

Why did Yehoshua make such a condition? Would it not be more appropriate to bury a person in a regular cemetery? The Chazon Ish writes that there was a concern that one who dies without relatives would be left to the devices of other people who would neglect the dead body on the road, thus leaving the corpse unprotected. Yehoshua therefore decreed that a person who dies and has no one to attend to his burial should be buried where the body was found.

The Taz and Shach write that nowadays in lands outside of Eretz Yisroel, we must bury an unattended corpse in the cemetery, because even if the person was buried at the site of his death, we are not certain that the site will be undisturbed.

Perhaps there is another aspect to burying an unattended corpse at the site of his death. It is said: v’chiper admaso amo, and He will appease His Land and His people, and this can be interpreted to mean that the land itself atones for the person. Burial is a sign of respect for the dead body, and although one normally buries a corpse in a cemetery, Eretz Yisroel is unique that anywhere in the Land is considered a respectful location. This would explain why Yehoshua was the one who set this condition, because the condition was unique for Eretz Yisroel.

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Distinction between a Kohen and a Nazir

The halachic distinction between a nazir and a Kohen is noteworthy. A nazir is forbidden to become tamei to anyone, including his close relatives, whereas a Kohen is permitted. Why is that?

The following explanation is brought in the name of the Avnei Neizer: The sanctity of a Kohen emanates from his ancestors. It is fitting therefore that he should be allowed to contaminate himself by involving himself in the burial of his close relatives, for it was them (his father) that brought about his kedushah. The kedushah of a nazir, on the other hand, he imposed upon himself, and it does not create any type of bond between him and his relatives.

The Beis Yisroel suggests an alternative explanation. The sanctity of a Kohen emanates from heaven, and there is no concern that by becoming tamei to his relatives that he will tarnish that kedushah. However, a nazir, where his sanctity was self-imposed, the Torah was concerned that contaminating himself in any manner, even to his relatives, could blemish his kedushah.

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A Woman Shaving

The Torah writes [Vayikra 19:27]: Lo sakifu pe’as rosheichem. You shall not round the corners of your head. Here, it is written in a plural form “rosheichem.” Yet, by the destruction of one’s beard, it is written: V’lo sashchis pe’as z’kanecha. And you shall not destroy the corners of your beard. There, it is written in the singular form, “z’kanecha.” Why does the Torah change?

The Meshech Chochmah explains according to the following Rambam (Avodah Zarah 12:5): Although a woman is permitted to shave the corners of her head, she is prohibited from shaving the corners of a man’s head. However, with respect to the prohibition of destructing one’s beard, the Rambam (12:7) writes: A woman is permitted to destroy her own beard if she has beard hair, and if she destroys the beard of a man, she is exempt. It emerges that there is a clear distinction between the halacha of a woman rounding the corners of a man’s head and her shaving a man’s beard.

Accordingly, it can be understood why the Torah uses the plural form when discussing the prohibition of rounding one’s head, for a man and a woman are included in this prohibition. However, with respect to the prohibition of destroying one’s beard, the Torah uses the singular form, because only the man is liable, not the woman.

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The Holiness of a Nazir

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 41b) asks: How then (since “his head” is used to teach us that a metzora must shave his head with a razor) does Rabbi Eliezer derive that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition?

The Gemora answers: He derives it from tzitzis. For we learned in a braisa: It is written [Devarim 22:11]: You shall not wear shatnez (wool and linen together). But the next verse states: You shall make for yourself twisted cords from them. (If the garment is linen, we are obligated to place woolen strings of techeiles on them; we see from here that the positive mitzvah of tzitzis overrides the prohibition of shatnez.)

Tosfos explains why this exposition is necessary only according to Rabbi Eliezer, and not according to the Chachamim.

Tosfos makes mention of the fact that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it is possible for a nazir to petition a sage to have his nezirus annulled.

The Acharonim challenge this from a Gemora in Eruchin (23a) where it is evident that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one cannot petition a sage to annul a neder of hekdesh. Accordingly, one should not have the ability to annul his nezirus, for according to Beis Shamai (9a), nezirus and hekdesh have the same halachos. This, Tosfos explains, is because it is written by nezirus: You shall be holy; grow the growth of your hair. Thus we see that the laws of hekdesh apply by nezirus. If so, why does Rabbi Eliezer make a distinction between nezirus and hekdesh with respect to the laws of annulment?

The Asvon D’oraysa suggests the following to explain this: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer holds that a nazir tahor cannot petition a sage to have his nezirus annulled, for he is regarded as being holy (like hekdesh). However, a nazir tamei would have the ability to petition a sage to have his nezirus annulled; for he presently is not regarded as being holy (this is predicated upon the Rambam, who holds that the positive commandment of “kodosh yih’yeh” does not apply to a nazir tamei).

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Positive Commandment Overriding Two Prohibitions

Reb Moshe Rozmerin in Dvar Moshe states that the Rambam maintains that one who rounds the corners of his head has violated two prohibitions; one for cutting his payos (corners), and another for following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

Our Gemora states that the positive commandment for the metzora to remove all his hair overrides the prohibition of rounding the corners on one’s head. According to the Rambam, it is actually overriding two prohibitions. Tosfos in Yevamos (3b) discussed this issue and did not cite our Gemora as a proof. Other Rishonim maintain that a positive commandment cannot override two prohibitions.

A question is brought in the name of the Lubliner Gaon: The Gemora in Yevamos (20b) states regarding a widow falling to yibum to a Kohen Gadol that it is a situation where the positive commandment of yibum can possibly override the prohibition of a Kohen Gadol marrying a widow. He asks: There are two prohibitions for a Kohen Gadol to marry a widow; one is lo yikach (he shall not take her), and the other is lo yechallel (he shall not desecrate the kehuna). How can the positive commandment of yibum override two prohibitions?

Reb Chaim Ozer in Achiezer (Even Ezer, 4) answers: The Rishonim concede that when the two prohibitions are dependent on each other, the positive commandment can override both prohibitions. The basis for the prohibition of desecrating the kehuna is because it is an illicit relationship; once the mitzvah of yibum overrides the prohibition of lo yikach, it becomes a permitted relationship and there will be no prohibition of lo yechallel.

[It would seem to me that this is dependent on how we understand that a positive commandment cannot override two prohibitions. We can explain that each prohibition strengthens one another and the positive commandment cannot override any of them; or perhaps the positive commandment does override one of the prohibitions, but it does not have the capabilities to override the second one. Reb Chaim Ozer would be in accordance with the latter explanation.]

According to the Achiezer, we can answer the Dvar Moshe’s question. The positive commandment for the metzora to cut his hair overrides the prohibition against rounding the corners of one’s head, and consequently, there will be no prohibition of following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

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Shaving on Shabbos

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 40a) cites the verse regarding the Levi’im [Bamidbar 8:7]: And they shall pass a razor over their entire skin. The Chasam Sofer asks: According to the calculation, this occurred on Shabbos. How was it permitted for them to shave on Shabbos?

He answers: They shaved in a manner that was less than the amount required for one to be liable.

A similar question is asked regarding Yosef. How was he permitted to shave on the day that he emerged from prison? Chazal say that Yosef was summoned to Pharaoh on Rosh Hashanah! Chasam Sofer answered that it was permitted due to the honor of the king.

Accordingly, the Pardes Yosef said that this answer can be used to explain the Levi’im’s permission to shave as well. Since this shaving was part of the process of anointing and sanctifying the Levi’im, which prepared them to serve Hashem in the Mishkan, it would certainly be permitted, even on Shabbos.

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Stubble Left Behind

They inquired (Daf Yomi: Nazir 39a): Does the new growth of hair grow from the bottom or from the top (and the hairs closest to the head do not move at all)?

The Gemora explains a halachic difference between them. The case is as follows: Bandits shaved a nazir’s head and they left over enough hair to bend the top of the hair to its root. If hair grows from the bottom, they have removed his hairs of nezirus (and his days are forfeited). However, if hairs grow from the top, the hair which he sanctified still remains (and his days are not forfeited).

It is evident from this Gemora that if the bandits left less than enough to bend the top of the hair to its root, the nazir will forfeit all his previous days.

Tosfos HaRosh asks that this would seemingly be inconsistent with Rav Chisda’s ruling below (40a), who states that a nazir is only liable if he cuts his hair similar to that of a razor. This means that he cuts the hair down to the skin, leaving no stubble at all!

He answers that Rav Chisda is only referring to a case where the nazir shaved most of his head (but not all the hairs on his head). That is when the halacha is that the hairs must be completely cut in order to forfeit the previous days. However, if he (or the bandits) cuts all the hairs on his head, he will forfeit his previous days even if the hairs are not completely cut.

The Sfas Emes (and others) say that Rav Chisda disagrees with our Gemora.

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The Novelty of the Midianite Utensils

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 37b) had concluded regarding the emissions of utensils used by idolaters that have been used within twenty-four hours, it is impossible that the absorption is not deemed slightly bad, and although with respect to all prohibitions, such a taste would be permitted, nevertheless, the Torah states that one is prohibited from using such a pot unless it is first scalded.

The Ramban asks: If in regards to those utensils used by idolaters, the flavor is regarded like the substance, how is it possible to say that with respect to other prohibitions, the flavor is not forbidden like the substance? Are the emissions from the idolaters’ utensils a distinct class of prohibition, different from any other prohibitions? The Midianite utensils were forbidden out of the concern that there were non-kosher foods cooked inside of it!

He answers that the Torah elevated its prohibition with respect of utensils that a utensil that absorbed flavor from a forbidden food is forbidden. And although the flavor that will be emitted from this pot will be slightly spoiled, and is not equivalent to the substance, nevertheless the Torah decreed that the flavor is not nullified and is forbidden. This is similar to the halacha that one must immerse in water a utensil purchased from an idolater even though it has not been used. There, if one would use it without immersion, the food would not be forbidden; here, it would be.

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Drinking Bread

The Maharil writes that if one eats bread that wine fell into it, he should recite the blessing made over wine, i.e. borei peri hagafen. In the footnotes, the following verse is mentioned as support to this halachic novelty: Anything which is soaked in wine, he may not drink. Although he is eating something which was steeped in wine, the Torah refers to it as “drinking,” not “eating.”

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Blessing after Coffee

The Tosfos Yom Hakippurim (Yoma 79b) wonders as to the necessity of reciting a blessing after one drinks coffee. Perhaps it should not require a blessing at all since a person does not drink a revi’is at once; rather, he drinks a little at a time, and it emerges that he does not drink a revi’is within the amount of time it takes to eat a peras (half a loaf of bread). Or, perhaps one might counter and say that this principle should only apply to other liquids, where one has the ability to drink it at once, but he chooses not to. However, coffee, which one cannot drink at one time, and on the contrary, it is natural to take short sips with long intervals in between, perhaps the entire drinking will combine to the required amount for the blessing to be recited.

He resolves this question from our Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 36b) which states that if one eats the Babylonian kutach (a dip that has a minimal amount of chametz in it) in a “dip-like” fashion, he will not be liable for eating chametz on Pesach. This is because he did not eat it a k’zayis within the amount of time it takes to eat a peras. Now, it is not normal to eat a dip at once, and nevertheless, one is not liable for eating the dip in its normal fashion. This would prove that one should not recite a blessing after drinking a cup of coffee.

The Minchas Chinuch rejects the proof: One would not be liable because of the kutach. It is because of the chametz that is mixed into it. Chametz by itself is normal to eat a k’zayis within the amount of time it takes to eat a peras. Therefore, he is not liable on the dip when he eats it in a normal manner. However, with respect to coffee, it is usual to drink the coffee slowly, and therefore, one would be obligated to recite a blessing afterwards.

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