Child Prodigy

The Gemora (Gittin 58) related the following incident: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah once happened to go to the great city in Rome, and he was told there that there was in the prison a child with beautiful eyes and face and his curly hair was arranged in locks. He went and stood at the doorway of the prison and said, “Who gave Yaakov over for spoil and Israel to the plunderers?” The child answered (by continuing the verse mentioned by Rabbi Yehoshua), “Is it not Hashem? It is on account of this; we have sinned against Him, and our fathers did not want to go in His ways, neither did they listen to His Torah.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah said: I feel sure that this child will be a teacher in Israel. I swear by the Temple service that I will not move from here before I ransom him with whatever price that they demand for him. They said that he did not leave the spot before he had ransomed him with a huge amount of money, and it was not too long afterwards before he became a teacher in Israel. Who was he? He was Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha.

The question is asked: What was so exceptional about the boy’s answer that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah declared that he was certain that this child will grow up to be a tremendous Torah scholar?

The Vilna Gaon explains based on the following Gemora in Brochos (4a): It is written: “Ad ya’avor amecha Hashem; ad ya’avor am zu kanisa.” Until your people pass through, Hashem; until this people that You have acquired pass through. Until your people pass through, Hashem is in reference to the first time that the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisroel (in the times of Yehoshua). Until this people that You have acquired pass through is in reference to the second time that the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisroel (in the times of Ezra). From here, the Chachamim have said: The Jewish people deserved that a miracle should be performed for them at the time of Ezra (when they were crossing the Jordan River into Eretz Yisroel) in the same manner that happened to them in the times of Yehoshua. However, due to their sins, they lost this reward.

Accordingly, it can be said that this is what Rabbi Yehoshua was asking: Who gave Yaakov over for spoil and Israel to the plunderers? Although the Jewish people were on a low level when they entered Bavel (as the name Yaakov connotes), but why weren’t they redeemed with a complete redemption (when they were on a higher level, as the name Israel connotes)?

The child answered: It is on account of this (zu); we have sinned against Him. By the second redemption, it is written zu, this; and since we have sinned, we lost the reward that we originally deserved.

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Haman's Descendants

The Gemora (Gittin 57) had stated that some of Haman’s grandchildren (his son’s sons) taught Torah in Bnei Brak.

There are those who ask the following: How is this possible? Why, behold, we do not accept converts from Amalek!?

Reb Yosef Engel answers that it is possible in the following scenario: An Amaleki woman got married to an idolater from a different nation. She gave birth to a son. That son is not regarded as an Amaleki, for the law regarding idolaters is that a child’s heritage is based upon his father, not his mother. A child from this son could be accepted as a convert. It emerges that the Gemora did not mean that Haman’s son’s sons converted; rather, there were descendants from Haman who converted and taught Torah in Bnei Brak.

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Kamtza and Bar Kamtza

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 55b - 56a) had stated: The destruction of Yerushalayim came about through Kamtza and Bar Kamtza in the following way: A certain man had a friend Kamtza and an enemy Bar Kamtza. He once made a party and said to his attendant, “Go and bring Kamtza.” The man went and brought Bar Kamtza. When the host found him there, he exclaimed, See, you are my enemy, what are you doing here? Get out!” Bar Kamtza said to him, “Since I am here, let me stay and I will pay you for whatever I eat and drink.” The host refused. Bar Kamtza said, “Then let me give you half the cost of the party.” “No,” said the host. “Then let me pay for the whole party,” Bar Kamtza said. He still refused and he took him by the hand and threw him out. Bar Kamtza said, “Since the Rabbis were sitting there and did not rebuke him, this shows that they agreed with him. I will go and slander them to the Government.” He went and said to Caesar, “The Jews are rebelling against you.” Caesar asked him, “Who says so?” He replied, “Send them an animal as a sacrifice and see whether they will offer it on the Altar. So he sent with him a fine calf. While on the way, Bar Kamtza made a blemish on its upper lip, or as some say, he cause a cataract in the eye, in a place where we consider it a blemish, but they do not. The Rabbis were inclined to offer it in order not to offend the Government. Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas said to them, “People will then say that blemished animals are offered on the Altar!” They then proposed to kill Bar Kamtza so that he should not go and inform against them, but Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas said to them, People will then say that one who makes a blemish on consecrated animals is to be put to death!”

There is a well known question: It is understandable why the Gemora lays the blame of the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash on Bar Kamtza, for he was the one who slandered the Jews to Caesar; however, what did Kamtza do wrong? Why does the Gemora introduce the incident by saying that it was on account of both of them?

The Ben Yehoyada answers that anyone who has the ability to protest when a sin is being committed and does not do so; the sin is called upon his name as well. Chazal understood that Kamtza, being a friend of the host, had the ability to prevent the host from evicting Bar Kamtza from the banquet. Since he did not do so, he became a partner in all the events that resulted from the eviction.

The Yalkut HaGershuni answers, based upon the premise that Kamtza was not at the banquet; he did not attend, for he did not receive an invitation. It was very possible that if he would have been there, the host would not have gotten so angry, for he would have seen that his friend joined him at the banquet. Kamtza, out of haughtiness, did not attend the party. He said to himself, “If he didn’t send me an invitation, I am not attending!” It emerges that Kamtza, due to his evil attribute, also had a share in Bar Kamtza’s actions.

The Chida answers that in truth, Kamtza did nothing wrong. The meaning of the Gemora is as follows: It was because the attendant was not careful regarding his master’s words that brought about this destruction. He did not distinguish between Kamtza and Bar Kamtza. This is as the Chachamim say: One must be extremely careful in the words he speaks, and one who listens to another person talking must pay careful attention, for sometimes, due to one mistaken word, there can be deadly consequences.

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Neder like a Bamah

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The Sefas Emes and Noam Elimelech teach us that the word neder, vow is related to the word dira, dwelling. What does an oath have to do with a dwelling?

Reb Chaim from Divrei Chaim cites the Shem m’Shmuel who questions the entire essence of nedarim: How is it that a person has the power through his verbal declaration to create prohibitions (in the case of nidrei bituei) and create a status of hekdesh (nidrei hekdesh)? This power goes so far that the Gemora is uncertain whether the object of a neder is subject to the laws of me’ilah for violating a neder!

He suggests the following: In essence no new kedushah is being created. The concept of neder is a recognition that beyond what meets the eye, there is a level of kedushah already inherent in the reality around us - the Shechinah already dwells immanently in the world.

Sefas Emes notes that the first person in the Torah to take a neder is Yaakov Avinu. While the other Avos revealed Hashem’s presence as similar to a mountain or a field, Chazal tell us that Yaakov revealed Hashem’s presence as the bayis, a dwelling. Chazal tell us that taking a neder is like building a bamah, an altar used outside the Mikdash. Hashem metaphorically “dwells” in the Bais haMikdash – to create a sanctified space for him - outside those confines is a task fraught with challenge.

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Husband's Knowledge

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b - 46a)had stated: Rabbi Meir says: If it is a vow which requires examination by a Chacham (and the husband cannot annul it by himself), he may not take her back, but for one which does not require examination by a Chacham (the husband can annul it himself), he may take her back (because in this case, the husband cannot advance the claim that the divorce was due to a misunderstanding). Rabbi Elozar said: They prohibited him to remarry in the case where the vow required examination by a Chacham to annul it only on account of the case where the vow did not require examination by a Chacham to annul it (since in the latter case, the husband might claim that he was not aware that he had the right to disallow the vow; in the former case, however, no such claim can be advanced because no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law).

The Gemora asks: What is the core of their argument? Rabbi Meir maintains that a husband does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law and therefore forbids remarriage on account of the first reason mentioned above, since the first husband might claim that if he had known that the vow could be disallowed by a Chacham, he would not have consented to give a divorce. Rabbi Elozar holds that no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law.

The Tosfos Rid explains the argument in the following manner. If the vow required a Chacham to permit it, he may not remarry her. This is because we are scared that he will say that if I merely knew that a Chacham could permit it, I would never have divorced her. He would have had her go before a Beis Din to have her vow permitted, despite the fact that this is embarrassing. However, if it is a vow that he could have nullified as her husband, there is no suspicion. This is because everyone knows that they can nullify certain vows that their wives make. The fact that he did not do so shows that he clearly wanted to divorce her; regardless of whether or not the vow was actually made. Rabbi Elozar holds that a husband does not always realize that he can nullify his wife’s vows. Therefore, they cannot remarry if he divorced her because of such a vow, as he will later claim that if he had known he could have done so, he would not have divorced her. Furthermore, Rabbi Elozar says that a vow that requires a Chacham or Beis Din is not really cause for them not to remarry. This is because he would not have taken his wife to a Chacham or beis din anyway, because it is denigrating. However, in this case as well they are forbidden to remarry because of the similarity to the case where a Chacham is not required.

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Ransoming for more than their Value

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The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b) had stated: We do not redeem captives for more than their true value for “the benefit of the world.”

The Gemora inquires: Does “the benefit of the world” (with respect to redeeming the captives for more than their worth) relate to the burden which may be imposed on the community (they will all become impoverished), or to the possibility that the bandits will take more captives? [The difference would be in a case where a private individual, such as a relative, wishes to redeem him.]

Come and hear: Levi ben Darga ransomed his daughter for thirteen thousand golden dinars.

Abaye asked: But are you sure that he acted with the consent of the Sages? Perhaps he acted against their will!

Rashi explains that “more than their true value” is referring to the amount that they would fetch if they would be sold in the slave market.

The Meiri writes that their value is based upon their individual wealth and prominence.

The Radvaz rules that we may ransom any captive with the amount of money that is usual to redeem other captives during that time period.

He adds: It has become the custom to redeem captive for more than their worth in the market, for an elderly person or a minor are not worth more than ten dinars, and nevertheless, they are ransomed for more than one hundred dinars. His explanation why there is no concern that the bandits will take more captives is because the captives are not being ransomed for any more that their gentile counterparts. He concludes that nothing should be told to Klal Yisroel about this, for they are a charitable nation, and it is better for them to remain that way.

Tosfos and the Ramban disagree regarding the halachah if the captive himself is allowed to ransom himself for more money than he is actually worth.

The Gemora in Kesuvos (52b) states: If one’s wife was captured and the kidnappers sought ten times her fair value for redemption, the first time the husband must redeem her. Afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that we do not redeem captives for more than they are worth for “the establishment of the world” (that captors should not thereby be encouraged to demand exorbitant prices for the ransom of their captive).

This issue had an extraordinary public application about 700 years ago. The leader of Ashkenazic Jewry at the time was Rabbi Meir ben Boruch of Rottenberg. He was imprisoned by a German ruler, Rudolph, whose voracity knew no bounds. Rabbi Meir (known as Maharam Mi’Rottenberg) was imprisoned until his death, and his body was not released. The community did not ransom him, as he himself had ruled. Seven years after his death, a private member of the community paid almost all of his own money to release the body, with the stipulation that he be buried next to him.

There is a question whether according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel a man would be permitted to ransom his wife if the ransom exceeds her worth. The Ritva holds that he may do so, and the Chelkas Mechokeik disagrees.

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Three Hundred Silver Pieces

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The Gemora in Megillah (16b) expounds the following verse [Breishis: 45:22]: He [Yosef] gave them all changes of clothes, and to Binyamin he gave three hundred [pieces of] silver and five changes of clothes. The Gemora asks: Is it possible that Yosef would stumble on the precise action that caused him to suffer? Yaakov had given Yosef a nice woolen garment which caused the brothers to become jealous and prompted them to sell him to Mitzrayim. Should Yosef now favor Binyamin over the other brothers? Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefes answers: Yosef was hinting that a descendant of his will go in front of a king dressed in five royal garments (referring to Mordechai).

The commentators ask: Why didn’t it bother the Gemora that Yosef gave to Binyamin three hundred pieces of silver, and none to the other brothers? Wouldn’t that have caused jealousy as well?

The Chasam Sofer answers based upon our Gemora, which states: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who sells his slave to an idolater; we penalize him and force him to buy him back for up to ten times the value of the slave.

An ordinary slave is worth thirty silver coins, as we know from the halachah in the Torah that if an ox gores and kills a slave, the owner must pay the master thirty silver coins.

Accordingly, the brothers who sold Yosef should have been obligated to pay the penalty of ten times Yosef’s value in order to redeem him. Since they did not redeem him, they therefore owed to Yosef three hundred silver coins (30 ∙ 10 = 300). This is why Yosef did not give them the three hundred silver coins that he gave to Binyamin. Binyamin, who was not involved in the selling at all, rightfully deserved this amount, and therefore, Yosef was not concerned that this would be a cause for jealousy.

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Can a Tereifah Have Children?

The Gemora cites a braisa (Daf Yomi: Gittin 43a) : If an ox kills one who is a half-slave, half-free man, the (ox) owner gives half the fine (if the ox is a habitual gorer, the owner must pay thirty shekels as a penalty) to his master and half the kofer payment (the value of the victim as determined by what price he would have fetched at the slave market; this serves as an atonement for the owner of the ox) to the slave’s heirs. The Gemora points out that if the kiddushin of a half-slave, half-free man is invalid, how does he have inheritors?

Rav Adda bar Ahavah answers: The case is where he was gored and made a tereifah (deathly ill, where he was going to eventually die from his wounds). The “inheritors” referred to here actually means to the slave himself.

Rava retorted that there are two reasons to refute this answer. One is that the braisa says the money is given to his inheritors (not himself). Additionally, the payment is kofer, and Rish Lakish says that kofer is only paid after an actual death (not when someone is made deathly ill)!

The Peri Chadash asks: Why couldn’t the Gemora use the following case? He was gored and rendered a tereifah. The ox owner is required to pay the penalty after he dies. Before he died, however, the master emancipated him, he married and begot children. Afterwards, he died, and the ox owner should now be obligated to pay to his heirs!?

He proves from this that it must be that a tereifah is not capable of having children.

The Chazon Ish asks that even if we will assume that a tereifah cannot have children, there is another possibility. He was gored and injured so badly that he was dangerously close to death (yet he was not ruled to be a tereifah). The ox owner is required to pay the penalty after he dies. Before he died, however, the master emancipated him, he married and begot children. Afterwards, he died due to the injury, and the ox owner should now be obligated to pay to his heirs!?

He answers that a slave has no lineage, and therefore any children born from him while he was a slave are not regarded as his children. After he is emancipated, and now his children are considered his children, that is only for all matters that are applicable after his death. However, with respect to the obligation of the kofer payment, that is a payment that is owed to the victim’s heirs. If, at the time he was gored, he did not have any inheritors, the owner will not be obligated to pay to the heirs that came about at a later date.

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Afflictions Purge a Person's Sins

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 42b) states that if a master knocks out the tooth of his slave, or if he blinds his eye, he must release the slave.

It is noteworthy that Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemora in Brochos (5a) derives from here that a person is considered fortunate if Hashem inflicts him. It is taught through a kal vachomer as follows: If the loss of a tooth or an eye, which is only one of the limbs in a person’s body, nevertheless, a slave gains his freedom because of it, then afflictions, which cleanse the person’s entire body, should certainly free a person from sin because of them!

Rish Lakish derives this same lesson from a different source. He says: The word covenant is written with respect to salt and the word covenant is written with respect to afflictions. Just as salt sweetens the meat, so too, afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins.

The Bobover Rebbe in Kedushas Tziyon notes that there is a distinction between the two expositions. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the afflictions will only cleans a person if they emanate from Heaven, similar to the halachos of a slave, where he will only be set free if his master knocks out his tooth or eye. He will not gain his freedom if someone else injures him. However, according to Rish Lakish, any type of afflictions will cleanse him, in the same manner as the salt sweetening the meat. It makes no difference as to who applies the salt.

Based upon this, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank explains the following. It is written [Shmos 6:5]: And also, I heard the moans of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians are holding in bondage, and I remembered My covenant. The Jewish people thought that the Egyptians were their masters and they were those who were afflicting them. They did not realize that their suffering was decreed from Heaven. Because they didn’t know who was causing them their hardships, they did not gain their freedom. It was only because Hashem remembered His covenant, that all afflictions cleanse a person from his sins, that was the reason they were released from the bondage.

Reb Meir Shapiro adds to this: If a slave does not come to court and testify that his master knocked out his tooth or eye, he will not gain his freedom. If he says that it happened by happenstance, he will not go free. So too, it is with afflictions. If a person does not believe with complete faith that the afflictions are affecting him because of Divine Providence, the afflictions will not purge him of his sins. However, if this principle was derived through the gezeirah shavah from salt, it would not make any difference.

The Rashba was asked the following question: If a slave initiates a fight with his master and strikes the first blow, and the master counters with some strikes of his own and knocks out the slave’s tooth, will the slave gain his freedom?

He replied that the slave goes free. The proof is from the aforementioned Gemora, where Rabbi Yochanan derived that afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins through a kal vachomer from the laws of the slave. How can the two be compared? Afflictions come to a person because he has sinned! It was his own fault! Perhaps, then, those afflictions will not purge him from his sins!? Evidently, we see that a slave also gains his freedom, even if he was the one who initiated the fight!

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Permitted Rulings

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 41b) had stated, applying the classic principle that it is preferable to render a permissible ruling. Rashi in Beitzah (2b) explains that this means that something that is permitted indicates that the Tanna is relying on his knowledge of the subject matter, and is not afraid to rule leniently. One can be strict even if he is in doubt and it does not necessarily indicate the conclusiveness of the ruling.

Rashbam in Pesachim (102a) writes that if there is no compelling logic to rule stringently, then ruling leniently is not regarded as a more preferred option. Rather, it is the only option. The Rema in his responsa (§ 54) rules that one is not allowed to be stringent regarding an issue where there is no uncertainty.

Pischei Teshuvah (Yoreh Deah 116:10) cites a dispute amongst the Acharonim if one is permitted to be stringent for himself regarding a matter that has been permitted by the Torah, such as a prohibited matter that was nullified.

Bnei Yissachar writes that it is a mitzvah not to be stringent in such a situation.

The Tzlach writes that it is preferable to record the permitted ruling regarding a situation that may be subject to a Biblical prohibition, because if there would be uncertainty, we would be compelled to rule stringently. The Tanna would not be introducing a novel ruling if the ruling was that the matter is prohibited. Regarding a matter that may be subject to a Rabbinic prohibition, however, the reverse would be true. It is preferable to record the stringent ruling because if there would be uncertainty, we would rule leniently.

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Freeing a Half-Slave

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 41a) had stated: Someone who is half-slave and half-free man (he was owned by two partners, and one of them emancipated him), he works for his master one day and for himself one day; these are the words of Beis Hillel. Beis Shamai, however, says: You have created a solution for the master (for he does not lose out through this division), but you have not solved anything for the slave. He may not marry a slavewoman, for he is half-free. He cannot marry a free woman for he is half-slave. If you will say that such a person should refrain from marrying, that cannot be, for the world was created for the purpose of propagation, as it is written: He did not create it to be desolate; He formed it to be inhabited. Rather, to benefit the public (this slave), we force his master to make him a free man, and the slave writes a document for his value. Beis Hillel later retracted and ruled in accordance with Beis Shamai.

The commentators ask: How can we force the master to free the slave? Isn’t there a prohibition against emancipating a slave?

The Kli Chemdah answers this question based upon the Avudraham, who says that a woman is exempt from mitzvos which have a time element to them, because she is pledged to her husband at these times. So too, it can be said with respect to a half-slave half-free man. Since he is partially a free man, he is obligated to observe all the mitzvos. Therefore, at the times where he is responsible to serve his master, he cannot do so completely, for he is obligated in mitzvos. Consequently, the master will anyway not be able to fulfill the mitzvah of working the slave forever; therefore, there is no prohibition against freeing him.

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Women and Slaves Wearing Tefillin

Rabbah bar Rav Shila (Daf Yomi: Gittin 40a) explains that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is dealing with a case where the master himself placed the tefillin on the slave. Only then, is it an indicator that the slave was previously freed.

In Shulchan Aruch (O”C 38:3) it is written that women and slaves are exempt from the mitzvah of wearing tefillin. The Rama adds that if a woman wishes to act stringently upon herself and don tefillin, you should protest the matter. The Magen Avraham explains that this is because it is difficult for women to be cautious regarding the cleanliness of their body.

The Yerushalmi in Brochos relates that Michal the daughter of Shaul HaMelech wore tefillin, and the sages of that time protested. The Gemora in Eruvin (96a), however, states that the sages did not protest.

The Peri Megadim rules that although slaves are permitted to wear tefillin, they should not be encouraged to, and one should object if they do don tefillin. The Mishna Berurah rules that it should not be frowned upon.

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Kiddushin with a Slavewoman

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (Daf Yomi: Gittin 40b) explains the braisa to be dealing with the following case: The master told her, “Become free with this deed (of betrothal) and be betrothed to me with this.” [In this case, she was obviously not freed from beforehand.] Rabbi Meir holds that this expression (be betrothed) includes emancipation (for she cannot become betrothed to him unless he frees her first), and the Chachamim maintain that it does not include emancipation.

Tosfos in Yevamos (47b) asks: How can the kiddushin be effective if the slave did not immerse herself in a mikvah beforehand? The halachah is that after a slave becomes free, he is immersed in a mikvah to become a complete Jew. If so, this woman is still a slave, and kiddushin is not effective with a slave!?

Tosfos answers that we are dealing with a case where she immersed herself prior to the kiddushin.

The Nimukei Yosef states that the requirement for this immersion is only Rabbinical, and therefore, the kiddushin will be Biblically effective even if she did not immerse beforehand.

Reb Chaim Brisker asks that both of these answers will not resolve the issue according to the Rambam. He proves that the Rambam holds that this immersion is a Biblical requirement. This is because the Rambam maintains that this immersion is a completion of her conversion process. If so, asks Reb Chaim, it is obviously a Biblical requirement and it also cannot be done before she becomes free, for it is part of her conversion process and that can only be accomplished after she becomes free! How would the Rambam understand our Gemora? How can the kiddushin be effective with a slavewoman?

He answers as follows: A freed slave requires immersion in order to accept upon himself those halachos that he was lacking while he was still a slave, for at that time, he was not a complete Jew. This, however, has no bearing on the fact that kiddushin is not effective with a slave or a slavewoman. That, the Gemora in Kiddushin (68a) explains is because a slave does not have any lineage (yuchasin). A slave, in this respect, is inferior to an idolater, for an idolater does have lineage. As soon as the slave is freed and he is no longer a slave, he does have lineage, even though his conversion was not completed, for even an idolater has lineage. It is for this reason that kiddushin can be effective in this case even though she did not immerse in the mikvah yet. For in order for the kiddushin to be effective, it is not necessary for her to have a completed conversion; as long as she is not a slave is sufficient, and since at the moment she becomes free, she is no longer a slave, kiddushin may take effect.

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Who is the "I"?

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said (Daf Yomi: Gittin 39a) : They asked before Rebbe: What is the law if someone says that he gives up hope of ever retrieving his slave? Rebbe replied: I say that such a slave can only be fixed (to marry) with a document.

Many times in Shas, it is found that Rebbe used this terminology, “I say etc.” What was his intention with these words?

Reb Yosef Engel in Beis Haotzar explains that it is known that Rebbe was a tremendously humble person. The Gemora in Sotah (49a) states that when Rebbe died, humility ceased. Perhaps what Rebbe was saying was that it appears to him that the halachah is like this-and-this, but not that it is most definitely so.

He also writes that it is clear from the seforim of the students of the Baal Shem Tov that lofty people are constantly thinking that their words and actions are not emanating from their own power and strength; rather, it is all coming from the Ribbono shel Olam. In kabbalah, the Shechinah is referred to as “Ani,” “I.” This is the explanation in the Gemora Sukkah (53a) when Hillel said, “If I am here, then everyone is here.” The “I” did not refer to himself, for Hillel, we also know was extremely humble. Rather, he was referring to the Shechinah. This, perhaps, is what Rebbe was saying when he said, “I say.” The Shechinah which is inside of me is saying that the halachah is like this.

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Half and Half

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 38a) relates an incident: There was a certain slavewoman in Pumbedisa who was used by men for sinful acts. Abaye said: Were it not that Rav Yehudah has said in the name of Shmuel that whoever emancipates his Canaanite slave violates a positive commandment, I would compel her master to write an emancipation document for her.

Ravina said: In such a case, Rav Yehudah would agree that this is proper, in order to prevent the immorality.

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t Abaye permit this as well? But Rav Chanina bar Rav Katina has said in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak: There was an incident regarding a certain woman who was half slavewoman and half free woman (she had two masters, and one of them freed her), and they forced her master to make her a free woman. And Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: It was because people were acting immorally with her!?

The Gemora answers: In that case, she was not suitable to marry a slave or a free man; here, they could have designated a slave for her, and he would have protected her (therefore, there is no reason to free her).

The Minchas Chinuch (§ 347) asks from this Gemora on the Rashba, who holds that there is no prohibition against freeing a half slave, half free man because of his “free half.” If so, what is the Gemora asking on Abaye from the case of the half slavewoman and half free woman? Abaye would concede there that it is permitted to free her because she is already half free!?

The Oneg Yom Tov (§ 51) answers that the Rashba only said that regarding a slave, where his free half is obligated in more mitzvos than his slave half, for if he gains his freedom, he will have the ability to fulfill the mitzvah of procreation. The Torah, therefore, did not obligate the master to work him forever. However, by a slavewoman, who will not have the mitzvah of procreation even if she gains her freedom, the prohibition against emancipating her remains!

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Missing a Hand

Shmuel said (Daf Yomi: Gittin 38a) : A master who declares his slave ownerless, the slave goes out to freedom and it is not necessary to write a document of emancipation.

The Ketzos Hachoshen (200:5) asks: If, according to Shmuel, an emancipation deed is not necessary, even to permit him to marry a Jewish woman, why then, in an ordinary case of emancipating a slave through a document, would it be necessary for the deed to written for the sake of this particular slave? It should be regarded as if he was granting his slave to another owner through a document, where definitely, the halachah would not require that it should be written lishmah, for it is merely an acquisition document!?

He answers that if the document would only be regarded as an acquisition document, the slave would not have the ability to acquire it, for his hand if like his master’s hand. It is only when the master hands over to the slave a deed of emancipation, then he is granting him “his hand” to acquire the document at the same time.

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Mechanics of a pruzbul

We learned in a Mishna: A pruzbul is not made out unless the borrower has some land. If he has none, the creditor can give him ownership (through a third party) from any amount of his own land (and then a pruzbul may be written).

Rav Chiya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav (Daf Yomi: Gittin 37a): Even land the size of a carob stalk is sufficient.

Rav Yehudah said: Even if the creditor only lends him a place sufficient for the borrower to put his stove or oven, a pruzbul may be written because of it.

Rashi explains that the Rabbinical establishment of a pruzbul is only for a usual case, and since, generally, one did not lend money to someone who did not possess land, a pruzbul cannot be written in such a case.

The Rashba asks on Rashi: Is the case where the creditor lends the debtor land in order to collect from considered a usual case? Why there did we allow a pruzbul to be written? He explains that the Rabbis did not differentiate between the cases, and as long as the debtor has some property, a pruzbul may be written.

The Tumim (67:22) writes that it would seem from Rashi that the debtor is required to have land at the time of the loan, for then, it will be usual for the creditor to lend him money. However, there is no necessity for him to have land at the time that the pruzbul is being written! This, he states, is bewildering, for the primary reason for the land is that the creditor should have what to collect from!?

He answers that this case would also be an unusual one. For it is not common for a debtor to have land at the time of the loan and afterwards sell it, for there will not be many purchasers interested in buying land that is pledged to a creditor. Therefore, the presumption is that if he had land at the time of the loan, he would still have land at the time the pruzbul is being written.

Accordingly, the Tumim concludes, that if the loan would be a verbal one, and there is no land to collect from, it is not considered a usual case and a pruzbul would not be written.

The Rash explains differently. He states that a pruzbul is written only when the debtor has land, for then, the debt is regarded as if it has been already collected. This is comparable to the case where he lent with a collateral, where in that case, shemitah does not cancel the loan for that very same reason.

The Rashbam in Bava Basra (66a) also explains like that, but he adds that when the debtor has land, it not completely regarded as if it is paid already like the collateral case; rather, it appears as if there is a security on the loan. If there would be a collateral, shemitah would not cancel the debt according to the Biblical law. The Chachamim did not want to establish this institution in a manner that appeared as if they were uprooting a halachah from the Torah.

The Ran writes that there is an apparent distinction between the two explanations. According to the Rash, it would be necessary for the debtor to possess the land at the conclusion of shemitah, for then is when the loan would be cancelled. According to Rashi, it is only necessary for the debtor to possess land in the beginning, for then it is a usual circumstance, and a pruzbul may be written.

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Validity of Signatures

The Mishna had stated: The witnesses sign the get to benefit the public.

The Gemora asks (Daf Yomi: Gittin 36a) : Do the witnesses only have to sign on the Get because of “Tikun Ha’Olam” – “benefiting the world?” This is a Torah law! This is evident from the verse, “And it should be written in a document and signed!”

Rabbah says: The Mishna’s statement is needed according to Rabbi Elozar, who holds that the witnesses for the giving of the document cause the document to take effect. Even according to him, Chazal instituted that witnesses should also sign the Get because of tikun ha’olam. This is because there are times when the witnesses of the giving of the Get might have died or went overseas (and at least the witnesses signed will be able to contradict the ex-husband in case he claims that he did not divorce her).

Rav Yosef says: Even according to Rabbi Meir (who holds that the witnesses for the giving of the document cause the document to take effect), they decreed that witnesses should specify their names in a Get, due to tikun ha’olam. This is as the braisa states: Originally, people would sign, “I, So-and-so (without writing his name), have signed as a witness.” If there was a different document with the same handwriting that was verified to be authentic, this document would also be valid. If not, it is not valid. Rabban Gamliel said: They made a great decree when they instituted that witnesses should specify their names in a Get, due to tikun ha’olam.

The mefarshim ask on the Rambam in Hilchos Edus (3:4), who states that the requirement for witnesses to sign on a document is only mi’divrei sofrim (a Rabbinical obligation). The Gemora expressly states that this is a Biblical requirement!?

The Megillas Sefer answers that when the Gemora states that it is Biblically required, it is not being completely accurate, for the verse where this obligation is derived from is a verse in Yirmiyah. The Gemora only meant to ask that from the Mishna it would seem that the witnesses sign only because of Rabban Gamliel’s decree, when in truth, this was established generations beforehand!

The Pnei Yehoshua answers that it is only a Biblical requirement according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that the witnesses who sign the document are those who render it effective. However, the Rambam rules in accordance with Rabbi Elozar, who holds that the witnesses who observe the delivery of the document are those who render it effective. Therefore, the Rambam writes that the signatures are only a Rabbinical requirement.

The Nesivos Hamishpat, Chasam Sofer and others answer that the Rambam is only referring to proof documents, since the witnesses are obligated to testify in Beis Din so that the judges will have the ability to cross examine them. Testimony is valid only from the mouths of the witnesses, but not on the basis of any documents or writings. However, regarding a document that is made to affect something, either a marriage, divorce, sale etc., the Rambam will agree that the signatures of the witnesses are Biblically required.

Reb Chaim Brisker adds that a document, like a get, which later will be used as proof that the woman got divorced can still be Biblically valid. For once the document rendered an effect, it is as if it has been investigated in Beis Din, and would not any longer be disqualified because of the rule that testimony must come from their mouths and not from their writings.

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Disgraced but did not Respond

The Gemora cites a braisa (Daf Yomi: Gittin 36b) : Those who are insulted, but do not insult back, and those who hear their shame, but do not respond, and those who do God’s will out of love and are happy even while they suffer, concerning them it is written: But they who love Him shall be as the sun going forth in its might.

The Chidah in his seforim relates the following incident several times: There was once a very wealthy and powerful man who humiliated a torah scholar. The Rav of the city told the Torah scholar that he should forgive the man. The scholar told him that he immediately forgave him, for it is written in the Zohar HaKadosh that the sins of the Jewish people cause the Shechinah much pain, Heaven forbid, and if he would not forgive him, it would be regarded as a grave sin for the wealthy person. He, therefore, immediately forgave him, for this way, the Shechinah will not be pained.

The Chidah concludes that he wrote this over numerous times, for it is of tremendously important and extremely precious and words of mussar, such as these, must be constantly reiterated in order to inspire people to fear Hashem properly!

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An Idolatrous Name

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel (Daf Yomi: Gittin 34b): The Jews from abroad sent to Rabban Gamliel the following inquiry: If a man comes here from Eretz Yisroel whose true name is Yosef, but who is known here as Yochanan, or whose name is Yochanan, but who is known here as Yosef, how can he divorce his wife? Rabban Gamliel thereupon stood up and decreed that they should write in the get, “This man So-and-so or by whatever names he is known,” “This woman So-and-so or by whatever names she is known,” in order to benefit the public.

They asked Rabbeinu Tam regarding a Jew who worships idols and he divorced his wife with a get which had only his Jewish name written on it, and not his idolatrous name. What is the status of such a get?

He answered: Heaven forbid to even mention an idolatrous name on a get which is written according to the law of Moshe and all of Israel!

The Ra”dach in his response explains that his idolatrous name is not regarded as his name at all, and if that would be the only name written on the get, it would be as if the get would be written without the name of the divorcing husband.

However, Reb Yosef Engel notes that from the language of Rabbeinu Tam, it would seem that there is a different explanation. It is on account of the sanctity of the get that his idolatrous name cannot be written.

And the Rad”vaz in his response writes like that as well. He says that any holy scroll, such as a Sefer Torah, Tefillin, or Mezuzah, where there lies an obligation that it should be written lishmah, and also a get has sanctity, for it is also has a requirement to be written lishmah.

He concludes that the matzah which is being baked to be eaten on Pesach night also possesses sanctity, for it is required to be baked lishmah.

It is possible that this could explain the custom of many righteous people to kiss the matzah before they eat it on the night of the seder.

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