Perhaps they Repented - Kiddushin 63

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The Gemora inquires: Would we execute someone by stoning (if she has relations with a man) based upon the father’s testimony (that he married her off)?

Rav said: We would not. We only believe the father with respect to a prohibition, but not for execution. Rav Assi said: We would. We believe the father for everything.

Rav Assi admits that if she would say, “I got married,” we would not stone anyone.

Rav Assi notes the apparent contradiction in his rulings: If in a case (the father said that he married her off) where we believe a man that he is able to marry her (if he comes saying that he was the one who married her), and we rule that we would execute someone by stoning (for having relations with this woman). Then, in a case (where she was the one who said that she got married) where we do not believe a man to marry her (if he comes saying that he was the one who married her), shouldn’t the halachah certainly be that we would execute someone by stoning (for having relations with this woman)!?

Rav Assi answers: There is a clear distinction. The Torah believed the father, but not her. [The only reason that she is forbidden to every man is because of the principle of “shavya anafshei chaticha d’issura” i.e. she has made for herself a forbidden piece; she is compelled to abide by her declaration.]

The Maharik (shoresh 33) writes concerning a case where one witness testifies that a certain shochet was slaughtering improperly and the shochet himself contradicts the witness; since the witness is not believed, he himself is permitted to eat all future meat slaughtered by this shochet. This is not comparable to a case where a witness testifies regarding wine that is forbidden on account of it being yayin nesech because here there is a possibility that the shochet will repent and slaughter properly.

The Pri Chadash (Y.D. 1, 14) asks: Why don’t we apply the principle of “shavya a’nafshei chaticha d’issura,” one who states that something is forbidden, even if he is not believed in respect to everyone else, renders the object forbidden to him (as is evident from the Gemora in Kesuvos 9a)? All the meat slaughtered by this shochet should be forbidden to this witness!?

The Pri Megadim (Sifsei Daas, ibid, 41) answers that the Maharik is referring to a case where the witness retracted and said that he had testified falsely. In such cases, the principle of “shavya a’nafshei chaticha d’issura” does not apply.

Rav Elyashiv answers: The reason why one can render the object forbidden with the principle of “shavya a’nafshei” is not because he is believed in respect to himself; rather, it is because it is regarded as an oath. The witness is taking a vow forbidding himself from this particular object. Accordingly, he explains that the witness who testified regarding the shochet it making a vow that he will not eat the meat from this animal, however, he will not be prohibited, on account of his vow, against eating from any other animal that this shochet slaughters.

The Mishna Lemelech (Hilchos Shechitah 1:26) challenges the ruling of the Maharik from a Gemora (Kesuvos 44a) which discusses a case where two deeds were given over regarding the same field. The ruling is that the second deed cancels the first one. Rafram explains that the recipient has admitted to the other that the first deed is invalid. Accordingly, the Gemora continues that these witnesses must be regarded as legally unfit for further evidence concerning this recipient since he is stating that they put their signatures to an invalid document. We do not say that they should be valid witnesses later, for perhaps they repented. What is the difference between the two cases?

The Shaar Hamishpat (92:7) answers: The Maharik rules that all meat slaughtered by this shochet will be permitted to eat by the witness because there is a double doubt; perhaps, he has slaughtered the animal properly and perhaps he repented. Just because he slaughtered improperly (according to the witness’ testimony) one time, it is not logical that we should prohibit his slaughtered meat forever. However, in respect to testimony, once the recipient has stated that these witnesses testified falsely, they will be disqualified to offer testimony for him forever. Even according to those that hold that we can apply the principle of a double doubt in regards to monetary judgments, here, it will not apply. What can be said? Perhaps the witnesses will testify truthfully and perhaps they repented. This logic is not applicable by testimony, for testimony functions as a proof, and if we are uncertain if the witnesses repented or not, they cannot be accepted as witnesses because we have no proof that they are testifying truthfully. Therefore, they will not be believed for all future testimonies regarding this recipient.

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Stealing from an Idolater

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 63) proves that Rabbi Meir holds a man may sell something that is not yet in existence from the following braisa: If a man said to a woman, “You shall be betrothed to me after I convert,” or “After you shall convert,” or “After I shall have been set free from slavery,” or “After you have been set free,” or “After your husband dies,” or “After your sister (my wife) dies,” or “After your yavam has submitted to chalitzah from you,” she, Rabbi Meir ruled, is legally betrothed! [The kiddushin is effective when the respective conditions are fulfilled, though at the time of the betrothal they were still unfulfilled; this indicates that an act that involves something that is not yet in existence is nevertheless, valid.]

The Acharonim ask: The Gemora in Bava Kamma (70b) explains that the acquisition using money (kinyan kesef) functions in the following way: When the seller receives the money, he becomes obligated to give the item being exchanged with the money. Now according to those that hold that it is permitted to steal from a gentile, how can the idolater betroth this woman with money after he converts? The woman is not obligated to return the money, and if she will lose the money, she would not be required to compensate him! If so, where is the kinyan?

Reb Shimon Shkop answers based upon the opinion of the Yereim, who says that even according to those that hold that it is permitted to steal from a gentile, one cannot fulfill his mitzvah with an esrog that he stole from a gentile. This is because it is not regarded as “his,” for the Torah did not render their money ownerless that anyone has the right to possess their money. “Stealing from an idolater is permitted” means that there is no prohibition against keeping that which was stolen from them. However, since it does not belong to the Jew, he still has an obligation to return it to its rightful owner, and he would be liable to compensate the gentile if he would lose it. Accordingly, the kinyan of money would still apply to an idolater.

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Kiddushin 62 - Two Perutos

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The Mishna states: One cannot take off terumah from what is detached from the ground in order to exempt things still attached to the ground. If he does, it is invalid.

Rav Assi asked Rabbi Yochanan: If someone says that the fruit of this row that is detached should be terumah for the fruit of this row that is still attached or visa versa, but he adds that this should take effect when the fruit becomes detached, what is the law? [Perhaps the attached fruit should be regarded as something that has not yet come into the world (for it is not yet subject to the halachos of terumah)?]

Rabbi Yochanan answered: Anything that is in his hands to do is not considered as if it is lacking an action (and it is therefore valid). [If one has the ability to change its status, the transaction can be valid, even though it presently is still not in the world.]

The Gemora asks a question from a statement of Rabbi Oshaya. Rabbi Oshaya says: If someone gives a perutah to his wife and says that this is her kiddushin for after he divorces her, it is invalid. However, according to Rabbi Yochanan this should be valid!?

The Gemora answers: Although he can indeed divorce her, he cannot make her accept kiddushin afterwards (this is not “in his hands”).

We should therefore be able to answer Rabbi Oshaya’s question. He asked: If someone gives two perutos to a woman, and says, “With the first one, I am betrothing you today, and with the second one, I am betrothing you after I divorce you,” what is the law? According to the above statement (he cannot make her accept kiddushin), the kiddushin should be invalid!?

The Gemora answers: Being that she is already accepting kiddushin from him now, it is possible that the kiddushin after future divorce is also valid.

What would be the halacha if one purchased a field with one perutah and stipulated that he is buying it back after he gives it back to the seller?

The Rashba proves from out Gemora that it will be ineffective because the Gemora needs to say a case where there were two perutos.

The Chasam Sofer makes a distinction: Our Gemora needs to discuss a case with two perutos, for kiddushin cannot take effect without a perutah. However, regarding a field, there are other ways to acquire a field, and it would not be necessary to have two perutos.

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Teaching Torah to an Idolater who Plans on Converting - Kiddushin 62

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The Rambam (Issurei Bi’ah 14:2) writes that we inform the prospective convert the essentials of the faith, which is the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and they go on at great length about these matters.

The Machaneh Chaim (Y”D II, 45) asks: Why isn’t this forbidden on account of a gentile studying Torah? The Gemora in Sanhedrin (59a) states explicitly that a non-Jew who studies Torah is liable for death.

He answers by citing a Medrash Tanchuma in Parshas Vayelech: The numerical value of Torah is six hundred and eleven. The remaining two mitzvos which complete the six hundred and thirteen are the two mitzvos which were given by Hashem directly at Har Sinai. This is the explanation of the verse: The Torah that Moshe commanded us to observe. Moshe instructed us regarding six hundred and eleven mitzvos; the other two were from Hashem.

The prohibition against teaching an idolater Torah is only applicable to the six hundred and eleven mitzvos that Moshe taught us. The other two, I am Hashem your God and the Unity of God; one would be permitted to teach to them. This is where the Rambam derived his ruling from; we can go on with great length discussing the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry.

The Maharsha (Shabbos 31a) writes that it is permitted to teach Torah to an idolater who wishes to convert. He proves this from the incident with Hillel and the convert.

Reb Akiva Eiger (41) disagrees and maintains that it is forbidden to teach Torah to an idolater even if he is planning on converting. Hillel taught the convert Torah only after he converted.

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Concern for an Unfulfilled Condition

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The braisa (Kiddushin 60) had stated: If someone says, “This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” even if the get is torn or lost, she is divorced. She should not marry someone else until she gives him the money.

Rashi explains that we are concerned that she will remarry, and if she doesn’t give the money, it will emerge that she was never divorced, and her second marriage would be an adulterous one!

The Ran writes that we can derive from this halachah to any case where a man divorces his wife with a condition; she may not remarry before the condition is met, for otherwise, her second marriage would be an adulterous one!

The Ran challenges this principle from a Gemora in Gittin (83a): Rabbi Akiva said: What happens if after this Get (if one divorces his wife and stipulates that she can marry anyone except for one certain man), she marries a man and has children from him, and then subsequently he divorces her or dies? If she now goes and marries the man that her first husband forbade her to marry, this would make her first Get invalid and the children from her second marriage are rendered mamzeirim! The Gemora asks: According to this question all conditions made in gittin should not be valid, as she could always marry someone first, have children, and then not fulfill the condition! This is the question on Rabbi Akiva’s question.

It would seem from this Gemora that we are not concerned by an ordinary condition that it will not end up being fulfilled!?

The Ran differentiates between conditions that require an action, and those that don’t. In our case, the woman must give the two hundred zuz to the man. Here we are concerned that due to an accident, she will not give him the money. However, in the case in Gittin, we are not concerned that she will willingly violate the condition.

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Food for Thought - Kiddushin 59

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*** The Mishna had stated: And similarly, if a man says to a woman, “Become betrothed to me after thirty days,” and someone else betroths her within thirty days, she is betrothed to the second person.

The Ramban writes that the first kiddushin was not totally voided, and therefore, if within the thirty days, the second man dies or divorces her, the first kiddushin will be valid. Proof to this is from the language of the Mishna when it states that she is mekudeshes to the second one, and it does not say that she is not mekudeshes to the first one.

The Rashba disagrees and holds that the action of the second marriage negates the verbal arrangement of the first one. He adds that the language of the Mishna does not prove otherwise, for once we have established that the second marriage is valid; it is obvious that the first one is voided.

*** Ravin Chasida went to betroth a woman for his son, but instead ended up marrying her himself.

The Gemora asks: Doesn’t the braisa say that in such a case what is done is done, but it is a deceptive act?

The Gemora answers: In the case of Ravin Chasida, the girl was not going to be given to his son in any event (the family did not agree to it).

The Gemora asks: He still should have first notified his son that this was the situation before going ahead and marrying her himself!?

The Gemora answers: He was worried that in the interim, someone else would betroth her.

The Ritva asks: Why was he concerned? Doesn’t the Gemora (Moed Katan 18b) say that every day a Heavenly voice pronounces: “The daughter of this individual is designated for that man”?

He answers that this was Ravin Chasida’s second marriage, for he already had a son, and the Heavenly voice only makes this proclamation by a first marriage.

Furthermore, he answers that perhaps someone will marry her as a result of their prayer. The Gemora in Moed Katan even states that another man might desperately want a certain woman as a wife and he cannot bear the fact that she will be married to another man; subsequently he will pray that she dies.

*** The Gemora asks: What is the law regarding someone who interferes with a poor person who is trying to get a loaf? Rabbi Abba answered: He is called an evildoer.

Rashi writes that the poor man saw a loaf that was abandoned by its owner, and he wanted to acquire it for himself. If another person snatches it away from him, he is a wicked man.

Tosfos writes that there is no ethical breach to do this when the item is ownerless, for if the other person will not acquire the loaf, he will not be able to get it anywhere else. He is not required to lose because of the poor man. The poor man only has a claim to the object when he wishes to purchase the item from another; there the poor person can claim that the “snatcher” is ruining his opportunity to profit.

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A Single Grain is Sufficient

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Rabbi Chiya bar Avin inquired of Rav Huna (Kiddushin 58) : Is the “benefit of gratitude” regarded as money or not?

The Gemora comments: Let us say that this is a matter of a Tannaic dispute, for we learned in a braisa: If one steals the tevel (untithed produce) of his fellow, he is obligated to pay him for the value of the entire tevel (including the terumah and ma’aser that is mixed in, according to its value to him based upon his ability to choose who he wants to give them to). Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah says: He is only obligated to pay him for the value of the chulin. It must be that Rebbe holds that the ability to choose who to give something to has a monetary value, while Rabbi Yosi holds it does not.

The Gemora rejects this, and gives an alternate explanation to their argument. Everyone holds that the matanos (gift portions for the Kohen) that were not yet separated are considered as if they were separated, and the “benefit of gratitude” is not regarded as money, and the dispute is regarding Shmuel’s ruling, for Shmuel said: One grain of wheat can exempt an entire pile (and there would be no need to separate any more terumah). Rebbe holds of Shmuel’s ruling (and the thief would be required to pay the full value, for the owner could have exempted himself with one grain of wheat), and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah does not.

The Acharonim ask that Shmuel is only discussing the Biblical requirement, but the Chachamim instituted that one must give at least one sixtieth of his produce to the Kohen as terumah! If so, the thief should be exempt from paying the value of terumah that he is Rabbinically required to give!?

The Oneg Yom Tov answers based on the Tosfos Ri”d, who says that even Rabbinically speaking, one grain of wheat can exempt an entire pile from the prohibition of tevel. The Chachamim instituted that there is a mitzvah of giving to the Kohen. This, however, the owner could claim that he would not have given, and the thief would therefore be required to pay the entire amount.

The Mishnah Lamelech disagrees and holds that if one does not give at least one-sixtieth to the Kohen, it is Rabbinically regarded as tevel. Accordingly, the thief should not be required to pay the entire amount!?

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Nullified Metzora Bird

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 57) had stated: One verse comes to include the metzora bird that is set free in the category of permitted birds. Another verse comes to include the slaughtered metzora bird in the category of forbidden birds.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps it is exactly the opposite!?

Rava answers: It is not logical to assume that the Torah said that the bird should be sent away in a matter where it will create a stumbling block (for if this would be the bird that is forbidden, someone might mistakenly find this bird and eat it, for there is no way to recognize that this was a metzora bird).

The Acharonim ask: What stumbling block would there be? The metzora bird will become nullified because of the majority of birds in the world that are permitted!?

The Shaar Hamelech answers: We are concerned that someone will find the metzora bird before it intermingles with other birds.

The Peleisi answers: The halachah is that if there is one person in the world that recognizes the forbidden item, it is not nullified, even for the people who do not recognize it. Accordingly, we are concerned that a person will be standing on the top of a mountain and will see where the metzora bird went.

Reb Shimon Shkop answers that the principle of nullification does not apply here, for all the birds in the world are not intermingled with each other in one location; rather, they are all scattered about. And even though it will be permitted, for we follow the majority and say that this one came from the permitted birds, the metzora bird does not lose its prohibited status and will therefore still be considered a stumbling block.

The Chasam Sofer answers that we are not concerned with the finder, for he will not violate any prohibition. We are concerned that the sender will violate the prohibition of outrightly nullifying a prohibition.

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"Es" Includes the Torah Scholars

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 57a) notes that some opinions do not expound the word “es.” This would be in accordance with the following braisa: Shimon Ha’amsoni, and others say that it was Nechemia Ha’amsoni, would expound on every word es that was written in the Torah. (This means that he would teach what the word es was coming to include.) When he reached the verse that states you shall revere es Hashem your G-d, he stopped expounding on the word es. Shimon Ha’amsoni felt that it is impossible to equate the reverence of Hashem to anything else, so he retracted from all of his previous interpretations of the word es. When questioned by his students what would happen to all the words es that he had expounded upon previously, Shimon Ha’amsoni replied, “Just as I received reward for expounding on those words, I will receive reward for retracting my interpretations. Rabbi Akiva arrived later and expounded the verse to mean you shall revere es Hashem your G-d, to include Torah scholars. Just like one is obligated to revere Hashem, so too, one must revere Torah scholars.

The Pardes Yosef (Vayechi) explains Rabbi Akiva by citing the Gemora in Nedarim, which states: Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: What does the verse mean when it says: Who is the man who is wise and can understand this? This (the reason for the destruction of the Second Temple) was asked to scholars and prophets and they could not explain it, until Hashem explained it Himself, as it says: And Hashem said that it is because they left my Torah. Isn’t the phrase “and they did not listen to My voice” the same as the phrase “and they did not go in its ways”? Rav Yehudah explains in the name of Rav: This means that they did not recite a blessing before learning Torah.

Rabbi Akiva was saying: The word es is including the Torah scholars. The Holy One, Blessed be He said: it is because they left “es” my Torah. They left that which was included from the word es, for they were not honoring the Torah scholars.

However, it can be asked that the Torah scholars should have been mochel the respect that they deserved!? We have learned that if a Torah scholar is mochel on the honor due to him, it is valid!

This is why Hashem continued with the verse, it is because they left my Torah. Hashem is saying: The Torah is Mine and the Torah scholar cannot be mochel. Why is the Torah Mine? It is because Klal Yisroel did not recite the blessing before learning Torah. The Gemora Brochos asks: It is written: The entire world belongs to Hashem. But it is also written: And the land was given to the people!? The Gemora answers: It depends if they recite a blessing first or not. Since they didn’t recite the blessing before learning Torah, it is regarded as Hashem’s Torah, and the Torah scholars could not be mochel on the obligation to honor the Torah.

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Yaakov's Altar (this week's Parshah)

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It is written [Breishis 28:18]: And Yaakov arose early in the morning, and he took the stone that he had placed at his head, and he set it up as a monument, and he poured oil on top of it.

The Chasam sofer asks: The Gemora in Zevachim (116a) states: Anything used by a common person becomes forbidden to be used for the High! Once Yaakov used these stones for his head, how could he have used them afterwards to build an Altar?

He answers: the Yalkut (119) states that these stones were the stones from Noach’s altar, and it was also the stones used for Akeidas Yitzchak. The Zayis Raanaan asks: How could Yaakov use these stones to lie upon; he should be guilty of me’ilah in hekdesh!? Firstly, he answers that he did not actually use the stones, but rather, he placed them around him as a protection. Accordingly, we can use this to answer the original question. Yaakov could use these stones to build a monument, for he never actually used them for his personal needs.

The Zayis Raanaan offers an alternative answer to his question. Yaakov used these stones to lie upon even though they were hekdesh because he was in dangerous situation. He needed the stones to protect him from the wild animals. Accordingly, the first question returns. How could he then use these stones to build an altar, if these stones were actually used for his personal needs? He answers based upon our Gemora, which states that if one knowingly uses hekdesh for his own personal needs, the hekdesh does not become deconsecrated. Consequently, Yaakov was permitted to use these stones for an altar, for his deliberate usage of the stones beforehand did not deconsecrate them.

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Eating the Size of a Bean

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 53) states: The righteous Kohanim would withdraw their hands from the lechem hapanim (for eating a portion the size of a bean would not be regarded as a mitzvah), but the gluttons would divide their shares (seemingly this means that they would leave a large amount for one Kohen, and they would take his share a different time)

Rashi cites the Gemora in Yoma 39a which states that in the times of Shimon Hatzadik, there was a blessing in the lechem hapanim and a Kohen who would eat a k’zayis would be satisfied, but afterwards, they would only receive a portion the size of a bean, and still not be satiated.

Tosfos Yeshonim comments that if they would have become satiated from a portion the size of a bean, they would have fulfilled their mitzvah.

Chasam Sofer notes that there exists a novelty in the mitzvah of eating kodoshim. If one person eats from the korban the size of a k’zayis and the rest of the Kohanim all have less than a k’zayis, that is sufficient in respect to the korban. The first Kohen is the only one that fulfilled his mitzvah. This is why the righteous ones held back from eating when it was only the size of a bean.

The Beis Halevi explains the Tosfos Yeshonim that there is a distinction between the korban pesach and other korbanos. By the korban pesach, there is an obligation on the individual and he is required to eat a k’zayis. By the other korbanos, the mitzvah is that the korban should be eaten, and if accumulatively, the korban was eaten, even though there was no Kohen who had a k’zayis, that is sufficient.

According to the Beis Halevi, we do not understand why the righteous ones held back from eating when it was only the size of a bean; as long as everyone ate the entire lechem hapanim, the mitzvah would be fulfilled!?

(Shemuas Chaim attempts to answer this, however, it is not clear to me)

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It's Worth a Perutah to her

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Rav said (Kiddushin 52) : We see four lessons from our Mishna, three of which Rav held of clearly. One is that a person who betroths a woman with shemitah fruit has done a valid kiddushin.

Rashi explains that the novelty is that even though the produce is ownerless because of shemitah, nevertheless, once he picks it up and takes it for himself, he acquires it, and he can use it for kiddushin.

The Mishnah Lamelech poses the following question: Can a man betroth a woman with something that to him is not valued at a perutah, but to the woman, it is worth a perutah? He resolves this from a Rashi in Avodah Zarah which seems to indicate that she would be mekudeshes.

However, from Rashi in our Gemora, it would seem otherwise. What compelled Rashi to say that the man had acquired the shemitah produce before he gives it to the woman? Even if he does not acquire it first, she should be mekudeshes, for she acquires it!?

The Chedvas Yaakov explains that with respect to the produce of shemitah, if it is not regarded as being in his possession, it will not be hers either, for we would say that it is regarded as Divine property (and it belongs to nobody). However, something that belongs to the man, but it is not worth a perutah, may be used to effect kiddushin, if to the woman, it is worth a perutah.

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Marrying off a Minor Daughter

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 51) challenges Rava from the following Mishna: If one marries off his daughter to a man, but he does not specify which daughter he is giving, the adult daughters are not included (for the father has no authority over them). It can be inferred from here that his minor daughters are included (and they all would require a get). But why should this be? It is a case where the marriage does not have the possibility of cohabitation. This is a refutation of Rava (for he holds that such types of kiddushin are not effective)!?

Rava answers: the Mishna is dealing with a case where he only had one adult daughter and one minor daughter (the key point being that there was only one minor daughter, for she is the only one that the father could have married off).

The Gemora asks: What then is the novelty of this Mishna?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is referring to a case where the adult daughter appointed her father as her agent to accept kiddushin for her. You might have thought, that in this case, the father is accepting kiddushin for his adult daughter. The Mishna teaches us that the father would not leave something from which he would derive benefit (the kiddushin money that he receives for marrying off his minor daughter).

The Gemora asks: Are we not referring to a case where the adult daughter told the father that he can keep the kiddushin money?

The Gemora answers: The father would not leave a mitzvah that he is obligated to perform (marrying off his minor daughter) and perform a mitzvah that is not his obligation (accepting kiddushin for his adult daughter).

The Ritva asks: How can the Gemora say that it is a mitzvah for a father to give his minor daughter in kiddushin? Did we not learn before (41a) that it is forbidden for a man to marry off his minor daughter until she is mature enough to say that she wants to be married to a certain man?

He answers: That Gemora is referring to a case where there is a concern that she will not desire that specific man, and eventually, she will perform mi’un. (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.). However, in cases where there is no such concern, the father certainly has a mitzvah to marry her off.

Alternatively, he answers that our Gemora can be referring to a na’arah, who already is mature enough, but nevertheless, the father can marry her off, and he has a mitzvah to do so.

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Forced Divorce

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 50) asks: How does Rava know that “words that are only in the heart are not regarded as words”?

Perhaps it is from the following braisa: It is written regarding a sacrifice: He shall bring it. This teaches us that we force him to fulfill his obligation. Perhaps, you might think that he brings the korban even against his will. The Torah writes: Of his will. This teaches us that we compel him to bring the sacrifice until he says that he is willing to bring it. Evidently, the sacrifice is valid even though, in his heart, he does not want to bring it. This proves that words that are only in the heart are not regarded as words.

The Gemora rejects this proof: Perhaps there it is different, for everyone wishes to receive atonement (and he is really willing to bring the korban).

Rather, it may be proven from the latter part of that braisa, which states: And the same is true regarding a letter of divorce and the emancipation of slaves. We compel him to give the get (in cases where he is required to do so) until he says that he is willing to give it. Evidently, the divorce and emancipation is valid even though, in his heart, he is not truly willing. This proves that words that are only in the heart are not regarded as words.

The Gemora rejects this proof: Perhaps there it is different, for he has a mitzvah to listen to the Chachamim (to issue a divorce or to free his slave).

Similarly, the Rambam discusses a case when a person is obligated to divorce his wife due to the ruling of Beis Din. When he refuses, he is beaten until he says that he is willing.

The Rambam asks: How can a get that is given by force be ruled to be valid? A coerced get is not valid at all!?

He explains that it is only considered “forced,” if a Jew is compelled to do something that the Torah does not obligate him to do. However, if he is compelled to do something that the Torah instructs him to do, this is not considered “forced.” The explanation is as follows: A Jew wants to perform all the mitzvos and distance himself from all sins, but his evil inclination convinces him to do otherwise. When he is beaten, his evil inclination is broken and when he says that he is willing, it is his actual intent and the get is valid.

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Opportunity to Repent - Kiddushin 49

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If he says, “Become betrothed to me on condition that I am a righteous person,” she is mekudeshes even if he is completely wicked, because perhaps he intends to repent.

The Beis Yosef writes in the name of Rabbeinu Yeruchem that if he is a rasha due to sins committed between his fellow man, such as a thief, he cannot be considered righteous until he returns the stolen object. And so it would be by all such sins; if he wounded his fellow man, he cannot be regarded as a Tzadik until he compensates the injured party.

However, some say that as long as he has resolved to make amends, he is considered a righteous person.

The sefer Shai Lemoreh asks: The Gemora in Bava Kamma states that if a person stole money and he decided that he will return it, but before he had the opportunity to return it, he died, he is not regarded as a wicked person. Yet we find that Yom Kippur does not atone for sins between a man and his fellow until one asks forgiveness from the one that he offended. It emerges that even though he already repented, Yom Kippur will not atone for those sins!?

He answers that by Yom Kippur, it is different. Since the injured party is still alive, he still has the opportunity to ask him for forgiveness. So long as he does not take advantage of that opportunity, he will not be forgiven. However, one who steals and later intended to return that which he stole, but he died beforehand, he is not regarded as a rasha, for now, he does have the availability to make amends.

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Accepting less than a Perutah - Kiddushin 46

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The Mishna had stated: If she was eating them one by one (as soon as one was given to her, she ate it), she is not mekudeshes unless one of the dates was valued at a perutah.

The Gemora asks: On which case of the Mishna is this ruling referring to?

Rav and Shmuel both answer: It is referring to the first case of the Mishna, and it is written in a “it was not necessary to state” format. Certainly, if she leaves the dates as is, the halachah is as follows: If one of them is valued at a perutah, the kiddushin is valid; otherwise, it is not. However, if she eats them one by one, perhaps she will be mekudeshes even if there is not one of them which is valued at a perutah. This would be because she derives the benefit from them immediately, and perhaps she decides to give herself to him even though it is less than a perutah. The Mishna teaches us that this is not so.

Tosfos Yeshanim writes that although the halachah is clear that kiddushin cannot take effect with an object valued at less than a perutah even if the woman consents to it; nevertheless, it is sufficient enough of a reason to explain why it was necessary for the Mishna to state such a case.

Poras Yosef explains based on a Gemora above (8a), which states: Rav Kahana indeed used to accept a (special male) head covering for the firstborn redemption, and he would say, “For me this is worth five sela’im.” The Ra”n there was uncertain if that logic could work for something that is not worth a perutah, and the person says, “To me, it is worth a perutah.” He specifically mentions kiddushin as a practical application for this. The reason to distinguish between the two is that perhaps something that is not “money” (if it less than a perutah), cannot be made into “money” by the fact that someone accepts it to be worth more than it actually is. Accordingly, it can be said that this is the novelty that our Mishna is teaching us. Although the woman accepts the date to be worth more than a perutah to her, the kiddushin is not valid, for the date (being valued at less than a perutah) is not regarded as “money” at all.

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Everybody Knows - Kiddushin 45

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The Gemora had stated: Everyone knows that the sister of one’s chalutzah is only prohibited to that person according to Rabbinic law! Therefore, if the yavam, the one who performed chalitzah, gives kiddushin to her sister, the kiddushin would clearly be valid.

Rav Yehudah Assad in teshuvos Yehudah Yaaleh asks the following question: Why do we assume that everyone knows that the chalutzah’s sister is only a Rabbinical prohibition? Tosfos in Bava Metzia (15b) writes: Shmuel maintains that if someone sells a field during Yovel, the money is returned. Shmuel does not say that since everyone knows that a field cannot be sold during Yovel, the money was definitely given as a gift. This is because there is a dispute on this matter, as Rav holds that a field can be sold during Yovel. Something that is a topic of dispute is not well-known. If so, perhaps everyone does not know that a chalutzah’s sister is only a Rabbinical prohibition, for Rabbi Akiva, in fact, holds that she is Biblically forbidden!?

He answers that it is quite possible that Rabbi Akiva holds that the chalutzah’s sister is Biblically forbidden to the yavam only if she was a nesuah to her first husband. However, if she was only an arusah, like in our case, everyone agrees that she is only Rabbinically forbidden.

Reb Ezriel Hildesheimer answers that Tosfos’ logic applied to Shmuel himself, for although the halachah is according to Shmuel, Shmuel himself could not say that everyone knows that a field cannot be sold during Yovel, because he knew that Rav disagrees with this. However, here, everyone knows that the halachah follows Rebbe that the chalutzah’s sister is only Rabbinically forbidden.

In the gloss to the sefer Yehudah Yaaleh, another distinction between the two cases is pointed out. Firstly, by Yovel, we are concerned about one person; namely, the buyer. Perhaps he does not know that a field cannot be sold during Yovel. Here, we are worried about the onlookers. We can safely assume that many people will not make a mistake even though there is an argument on the matter.

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Transposing the Opinions - Kiddushin Daf 44

It was stated: If a minor accepted kiddushin without the knowledge of her father, Shmuel said: She requires a get and mi’un (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.). Karna asked: If she needs a get, why is mi’un necessary? And if mi’un is needed, why do we require a get?

Other Amoraim replied to him: Mar Ukva and his Beis Din are in Kafri (let’s ask him). They switched the opinions of Shmuel and Karna and sent it to Rav (they did this on purpose, for Rav was a close friend of Shmuel and they wished to see if Rav would agree to Karna’s ruling if it was said in the name of Shmuel). Rav said to them: Hashem! She requires a get and mi’un and Heaven forbid that the son of Abba bar Abba (Shmuel) should say such a thing!

The Reshash asks: How can it be that they would think that Rav would be influenced to rule according to Shmuel, for he was his friend? And besides, Rav and Shmuel argue throughout Shas!? He shows that Rashi elsewhere understands the word “switched” to mean “by mistake.”

Some say that Rashi did not write this, but rather, one of his students mistakenly inserted this explanation into his commentary.

The Reshash also asks: Why doesn’t the Gemora mention what Mar Ukva answered?

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The Snake's Claim - Kiddushin 43

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It is written [Breishis 3:14]: And Hashem said to the snake, “Because you have done this, cursed be you more than all the cattle and more than all the beasts of the field; you shall walk on your belly, and you shall eat dust all the days of your life.”

Rashi cites a Gemora in Sanhedrin (29a): From here we can derive that we may not intercede in favor of one who persuades people to commit idolatry, for had Hashem asked him, “Why did you do this?” the snake could have answered, “The words of the teacher and the words of the student; whose words do we listen to?” [Adam and Chavah should have obeyed Hashem rather than the snake!]

The Perashas Derachim cites a Medrash: Rabbi Chanina says: Under the Nohadite laws a murderer will be sentenced to death even if there is only one witness, even with only one judge, even without a proper warning and even if he killed via an agent. Evidently, the logic of “the words of the teacher and the words of the student; whose words do we listen to?” does not apply under Nohadite law! If so, what would it have benefited the snake by claiming that Adam and Chavah should not have listened to him? Under Nohadite laws, this would not have been a valid excuse!?

He answers based upon our Gemora, which states: Even if Shamai holds that agency applies by transgressions, he would admit that the agent is liable and the sender is exempt in the following case: If one tells his agent, “Go and cohabit with a forbidden relative,” or “Go and eat this forbidden fat.” The reason is because we do not find in the Torah that one person will benefit from the sin and a different person should be liable for that act. Accordingly, by the sin of the Tree of Wisdom, where the sin was the eating, the snake’s claim would have been valid, for we do not find that one person will benefit from the sin and a different person should be liable for that act.

The Shach asks that although we hold that there is no agency by transgressions, but the sender is nevertheless liable under the laws of Heaven. If so, what would it have benefitted the snake by this claim? He would anyways be liable under the laws off Heaven!?

The Mishnah Lamelech answers that since in this case the sin involved eating, the sender would not be liable even under the laws of Heaven. This is because we do not find in the Torah that one person will benefit from the sin and a different person should be liable for that act.

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Laws of Heaven

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 41b) cites a Mishna: If one sends out a fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor (and it consequently burned someone’s haystack), he is not liable to pay according to the laws of man, but he is liable according to the laws of Heaven. If, however, he sent out the fire in the hands of a competent person, the competent person is liable to pay for the damages.

It would seem that in the case where the sender sent the fire with a competent person, the sender is not liable at all, even under the laws of Heaven!

The Ram”a (C”M: 32:2) rules that if one sends out false witnesses to testify against someone, and they cause that fellow a loss, the sender is not liable at all, even under the laws of Heaven. This is because we say that there cannot be a shliach to commit a transgression.

The Sha”ch disagrees and maintains that the sender will be liable to pay under the laws of Heaven. He explains the distinction between the two cases. The sender will always be liable under the laws of Heaven. The only reason that the sender is not required to pay at all in the case of the fire is because once the competent person is liable to pay, there is no place for the sender to be liable as well!

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